NO. 07-10-0350-CR IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT AMARILLO
PANEL D APRIL 11, 2011

BRAD HALDERMAN, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

__________________ ___________ FROM THE 154TH DISTRICT COURT OF LAMB COUNTY; NO. 4685; HONORABLE FELI X KLEIN, PRESIDING

Memorandum Opinion

Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and PIRTLE, JJ. Brad Halderman was convicted of tam pering with evidence and sentenced to twenty years confinement and a fine of $10,000. He seeks reversal by contending the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to sustain the conviction. 1 We affirm the judgment.

1 We are no longer to conduct factual sufficiency reviews. See Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Thus, our task will be lim ited to assessing only the legal sufficiency of the evidence.2 Background Appellant was unemployed and about to be ev icted from his apartment. He ran into an acquaintance, Ron Bures, who inform ed him that they could live with Mickey Burchfield, a friend of Bures. The men spent the week at Burchfield’s house in the country. During that time, they mostly dr ank alcohol and drove around in Bures’ car. 2 On July 31, 2009, after the three men h ad spent most of the morning and early afternoon drinking, appellant w ent to the living room to take a nap. He was awakened by Burchfield, who told appellant to come to the kitchen to see what he had done. When appellant entered the ki tchen, he observed Bures with his throat cut. Bures attempted to stand, and Burchfield cut Bures’ throat again. When Bures ran out of the house, Burchfield followed Bures and struck him with barbells and a grubbing hoe until he was dead. Burchfield then left for about an hour and went to a neighbor’s house. He told her that he had killed so meone and needed help to hide the body. After he left the neighbor’s house, she eventually pl aced a call to law enforcement. When Burchfield returned to his house, he and appellant cleaned the kitchen. They then attempted to place Bures’ body into the trunk of the car, but when it would not fit, Burchfield tied Bures’ feet to an air hos e and the air hose to the back of the car. The two men then drove the car appr oximately four miles, dragging the body behind, and left it in a ditch. Law enforcement officers arri ved shortly after they returned to Burchfield’s house.

2 Burchfield worked as a day laborer one day, and appellant sold plasma to make money on the same day.3 Sufficiency of the Evidence After the State presented its case, appel lant moved for an instructed verdict which he now contends shoul d have been granted. A challenge to the failure to grant a directed verdict is a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence. Canales v. State, 98 S.W.3d 690, 693 (Tex. Cr im. App. 2003). We review the sufficiency of the evidence under the standard discussed in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.C t. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). And, in making that review, we are not limited to the evidence presented before the motion for instructed verdict was made. Montgomery v. State, 198 S.W.3d 67, 85 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth 2006, pet. ref’d); Smith v. State, 109 S.W.3d 80, 81 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 2003, no pet.). Burchfield was char ged with intentionally or knowingly concealing the corpse of Bures with the intent to impair its verity, legibility, or availability as evidence. See
T EX

. P ENAL C ODE A NN

. §37.09(d) (Vernon Supp. 2010). Burchfield contends that there is insufficient evidence of his intent. At tr ial, he testified that he only assisted in the disposal of the body because he was afraid of Burchfield. An instruction on duress was included in the jury charge. A person’s intent may be inferred from acts, words, and conduct. Shamam v. State, 280 S.W.3d 271, 278 (Tex. App.–Amarillo 2007, no pet.); see also Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 524 (Tex. Crim. App. 200 9) (stating that one’s acts are generally reliable circumstantial evidence of one’s intent). T he following evidence appears in the record: 1) appellant did nothi ng to asssist Bures while Burchfield was beating Bures to death, 2) appel lant was larger than Burc hfield and carried a pocket knife, 3) appellant did nothing to seek help or escape dur ing the hour that Burchfield4 was gone from the house, 4) Bures’ cell phone was on the floor of the kitchen but appellant did not attempt to use it, 5) Burchf ield did not directly threaten appellant, 6) appellant told one officer that he had bloo d on him because he cut his hand and another officer that he had a nose bleed, 7) appell ant explained blood on the ground by saying he and Burchfield got into a fight, 8) appe llant kicked the window out of the police vehicle after he was placed in it and was com bative to officers at the station, 9) Burchfield stuffed playing cards in Bures’ mouth after he died, and appellant removed them claiming at trial that he did not care if he was kill ed for doing so, 10) appellant asked Burchfield if Burchfield was going to kill appellant and Burchfield replied that he was not, 11) Bures’ face was “mush” after being drug by the ca r, 12) the body became unfastened from the car at one point and Burchfield had to get out of the car and retie it, 13) Burchfield asked appellant if he wanted to stab or hit Bures but appellant did not, 14) appellant testified he made a decision not to use his pocket knife to defend himself, 15) appellant told an officer he believed he might be arrested as an accessory, 16) Burchfield told appellant that they were taking Bures to where they “dump dogs,” 17) appellant stated he helped Bu rchfield put the body in a ditch after Burchfield told him to get out of the car, 18) appellant admitted at trial that he probably could have placed a call on a phone, and 19) when asked about both he and Bu rchfield cleaning up the kitchen and dragging the body to “the ravine,” appellant said that “[w]e’re a good team” and that they acted “[v]ery efficiently, yeah.” This was some evidence from which the jury could have inferred beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant intentionally helped Burchfield conceal the body. Although the jury could hav e chosen to believe that appellant acted in fear of his life, it obvi ously did not, and that decision was within its5 province. See Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 902 (Tex. Cr im. App. 2010) (stating that the jury is the exclusive judge of t he credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony). Accordingly, we overrule appella nt’s issue and affirm the judgment.

Brian Quinn Chief Justice

Do not publish.