U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

35–614PDF WASHINGTON : 2019

PROPOSED SMALL ARMS TRANSFERS: BIG 

IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND 

INVESTIGATIONS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

MARCH 26, 2019 

Serial No. 116–17 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs 

( 

Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov, 

or http://www.govinfo.gov 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York, Chairman 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

TED LIEU, California 

SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania 

DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota 

ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota 

COLIN ALLRED, Texas 

ANDY LEVIN, Michigan 

ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia 

CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania 

TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey 

DAVID TRONE, Maryland 

JIM COSTA, California 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Ranking 

Member 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE ZELDIN, New York 

JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin 

AMY WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN MAST, Florida 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

JOHN CURTIS, Utah 

KEN BUCK, Colorado 

RON WRIGHT, Texas 

GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania 

TED BURCHETT, Tennessee 

GREG PENCE, Indiana 

STEVE WATKINS, Kansas 

MIKE GUEST, Mississippi 

JASON STEINBAUM, Staff Director 

BRENDAN SHIELDS, Republican Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

AMI BERA, California, Chairman 

ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

TED LIEU, California 

TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

LEE ZELDIN, New York, Ranking Member 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

KEN BUCK, Colorado 

GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania 

NIKOLE BURROUGHS , Staff Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD FROM REPRESENTATIVE 

ZELDIN 

Letter from the National Sports Shooting Foundation submitted by Representative Zeldin ................................................................................................ 5 

WITNESSES 

Torres, Honorable Norma J., a member of Congress ............................................ 10 

Abramson, Jeff, Senior Fellow Arms Control and Conventional Arms Transfers, The Arms Control Association .................................................................... 15 

Waltz, Dr. Susan, Professor, Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy, University of Michigan .................................................................................................... 24 

Reeves, Johanna, Executive Director, F.A.I.R. Trade Group ............................... 29 

ADDITIONAL MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD FROM 

REPRESENTATIVE LIEU 

CNN article entitled ‘‘Trump’s New Gun Export Rules Could Aid Terrorists, 

Tyrants, and Criminals.’’ ..................................................................................... 46 

APPENDIX 

Hearing Notice ......................................................................................................... 56 

Hearing Minutes ...................................................................................................... 57 

Hearing Attendance ................................................................................................. 58 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN BERA 

Opening statement submitted for the record from Chairman Bera .................... 59 

ADDITIONAL MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD FROM 

CHAIRMAN BERA 

Photos submitted for the record from Chairman Bera ......................................... 65 

MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD FROM MR. ABRAMSON 

Photo submitted for the record from Mr. Abramson ............................................ 67 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

Responses to questions submitted for the record from Chairman Bera .............. 68 

(1) 

PROPOSED SMALL ARMS TRANSFERS: BIG 

IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 

Tuesday, March 26, 2019 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Washington, DC 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in Room 

2200 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ami Bera (chairman of 

the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. BERA. This hearing will come to order. The hearing titled 

Proposed Small Arms Transfers: Big Implications for U.S. Foreign 

Policy will focus on the implications of the Trump Administration’s 

proposal to transfer approval for small arms sales from the State 

Department to the Commerce Department. 

Without objection, all members may have 5 days to submit statements, questions, extraneous materials for the record, subject to 

the length limitations in the rules. 

I will now make an opening statement and turn it over to the 

ranking member for his opening statement. 

And hopefully Mr. Zeldin will make it to the hearing soon. We 

have 2 panels today. If Mr. Zeldin does not make it in time after 

I finish the opening statement, we will turn it over to Congresswoman Torres, for her statement. 

So, let’s frame this hearing and why I think this is an important 

topic. When we are thinking about this, this is not a hearing about 

gun control. There is already a decision that we will be selling, exporting small arms, regardless of what my personal opinion might 

be or the opinion of others. That is not what this hearing is about. 

In addition, this hearing is not meant to be a criticism of the 

Trump Administration. That is not what we are talking about here 

as well, since the Obama Administration actually contemplated a 

similar rule change and then made the decision not to go through 

with it. What this hearing really is about is something that I think 

we can all agree on—Democrats and Republicans. When we choose 

to export these weapons, we want to make sure that they are going 

to legitimate allies, that they are being used for legitimate purposes, and that they are being used by our friends. 

We also want to make sure we have a thorough vetting process 

to make sure the weapons are not being used to commit human 

rights atrocities. We need to ensure that we have mechanisms in 

place to ensure they end up where they were meant to be shipped. 

And since this is the Oversight Committee, we also want to make 

sure Congress has appropriate oversight and the abilities, and 

there is a congressional notification process. 
2 

Now, we have been exporting more and more arms to Latin 

American countries, particularly those in the Northern Triangle. 

And if I can have the first slide. 

If you look at this slide, again, you will see it is not just under 

the Trump Administration. You will see the exports, both to Mexico 

where we have seen a rise in violence, but also to the Northern Triangle countries, and that has been going up over the last few years. 

And the reason why I am choosing to focus in a little bit on the 

Northern Triangle countries is, when we think about the crisis we 

are having on our southern border right now, it is in part because 

of the rise of violence in these 3 countries. 

If you look, there were 110,000 asylum seekers in 2015 from the 

Northern Triangle. That was a 5-fold increase from 2012. In 2016, 

42 percent of those apprehended at the southern border came from 

the Northern Triangle. These countries rank in the top 10 for 

homicides. Doctors Without Borders, doing a survey of Northern 

Triangle citizens in Mexico, said 40 percent had relatives who had 

been killed in the last 2 years; 31 percent knew someone who had 

been kidnapped. 

Again, look at that graph and look at the exports of small arms 

to those countries. That is the reason I believe we should be having 

a process to make sure we are not inadvertently creating the chaos 

in the Northern Triangle, we are not inadvertently creating that 

unrest, because when I think about addressing the crisis at the 

southern border, these are individuals that are human beings. 

They are just choosing to try to find a better life for themselves. 

They are fleeing that violence. And if we do not address it in the 

countries there and try to create some stability and find solutions 

in the Northern Triangle, we will have to do it at our borders. 

Now, State can do a better job ensuring arms do not fall into the 

wrong hands, but removing oversight mechanisms will increase the 

probability these weapons are being misused to create further violence. 

Again, I will acknowledge that all of us want to prevent U.S.- 

manufactured weapons from ending up being used against civilian 

populations and human rights abuses. In fact, in the Philippines, 

security forces have committed thousands of extrajudicial killings. 

According to the Simpson Center, the U.S. has sold some $2 billion 

in arms to the Philippines, and it is likely American-made pistols 

have been used in many of these killings. 

What we are talking about today is what department has the 

best mechanism to control this, and both Commerce and State have 

different approval processes for arms exports. The U.S. Munitions 

List administered by the State Department under the Arms Control Act provides more control over arms exports than the Commerce Control List. 

It requires sales advance our foreign policy objectives and the national interest. Sales must be for friendly countries, solely for the 

use of internal security, legitimate self-defense, or to participate in 

U.N. efforts to restore international peace and security. 

Additionally, it requires annual registration of manufacturers, 

exporters, and brokers of defense articles or services. It ensures no 

security assistance is provided to countries with a pattern of internationally recognized human rights abuses. Under the Administra-
3 

tion’s plan, many small arms would be transferred to the new 500 

Series of the Commerce Control List from the U.S. Munitions List. 

Although the Department of Commerce would still conduct interagency review before approving a small arms export license, there 

will still be significant shortcomings as compared to the State Department review. Philosophically, Commerce and State differ. State 

has to have the big picture foreign policy considerations and 

human rights considerations in mind. Commerce aims to boost our 

exports. 

In addition, no annual registration of manufacturers, exporters, 

and brokers of defense articles or services would be required, if this 

rule change were to go through. There would not be a specific criterion for human rights abuses. Items on the U.S. Munitions List 

currently require congressional notification for small arms sales 

over $1 million. 

This goes away with the transfer of these items to Commerce. 

And, again, that is not to say State Department is perfect. A State 

OIG report requested by the office responsible for export control licensing found that the office had not followed proper internal controls, and that licensing personnel were not properly trained. And 

this, in some ways, was attributed to a 28 percent reduction in 

staffing. 

So as we kind of go through this hearing, I think it is important 

for us to—again, it is not a hearing on gun control. It is not a hearing on whether we will be exporting small arms or not exporting 

small arms. But it is a hearing on the proper way to make sure 

these arms are ending up where they are supposed to end up, that 

we are selling these to friends, allies, and that they are not being 

used to commit human rights atrocities. 

And with that, I want to acknowledge our colleague, Congresswoman Norma Torres. I also want to acknowledge the witnesses on 

the second panel. 

And with that, I will turn it over to the ranking member. The 

ranking member is now recognized for 5 minutes to deliver his 

opening remarks. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to all of 

our witnesses who will be testifying today on the decision to transfer certain defense articles and services from State to Commerce 

that began in the prior Administration. This was part of a larger 

interagency process to modernize the United States Munitions List 

to ensure the State Department retained oversight over only the 

most critical military and defense articles with military end use. 

This rule was supposed to be rolled out in December 2012. This 

rule change had strong bipartisan support but got caught up in a 

domestic gun control debate that had nothing to do with export 

control reform. The process to remove certain defense articles has 

already begun. In fact, here are just some of the categories of weapons that have already moved to Commerce licensing controls— 

launch vehicles and missiles, explosive, military aircraft, submersible vessels, tanks, and the list goes on. 

Once again, these defense articles have already moved to Commerce control. The jurisdictional transfer of certain defense articles 

in Categories I, II, and III, to Commerce will reduce the regulatory 

burden on State to create a simpler and more robust system of 
4 

compliance. And the U.S. Government is not removing export controls for firearms or ammunition. 

Commerce still requires that U.S. companies obtain a license to 

export or re-export to any country any weapon currently on the 

Commerce Control List, a function it already performs. Any licenses that include these transferred items would still be reviewed 

by the State Department. 

Additionally, the government—that is, both State and Commerce—will continue its longstanding end use monitoring efforts, 

including vetting of potential end users, to help prevent human 

rights abuses. This rule change should be finalized. After years of 

input from both sides of the aisle to make the change from State 

to Commerce, there is no reason this decision needs to be delayed 

any longer. 

I ask unanimous consent that the following letter from the National Sports Shooting Foundation be submitted for the record. 

[The information referred to follows:] 
5 

NATIONAL SHOOTING SPORTS FOUNDATION, INC. 

Headquarters: 11 Mile Hill Road, Newtown, CT 064 70-2359 

400 N. Capitol Street NW, Suite 490, Washington, D.C. 20001 

Lawrence G. Keane 

SVP Gov't & Public Affairs 

202·220·1340 ext. 249 lkeane@nssf.org 

Assistant Secretary & General Counsel 

March 25, 2019 

The Honorable Ami Bera 

The Honorable Lee Zeldin 

U.S. House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations 

2170 Rayburn House Office Building 

Washington, D.C. 20515 

Dear Chairman Sera and Ranking Member Zeldin, 

On behalf of the National Shooting Sports Foundation, Inc.® (NSSF®), the firearms industry's 

trade association, I am writing in regard to the March 26, 2019 hearing titled "Proposed Small 

Arms Transfers: Big Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy" and in strong support for the 

completion of Export Control Reform (ECR), also known as the "USML to CCL Transition." 

As you are aware, Export Control Reform rules have been implemented for all other industries; 

however, despite repeated confirmation that there would be a final rule published, the previous 

administration never completed the transfer of Categories I, II, and Ill. Members of the firearms 

industry understand the importance of protecting our national security by safeguarding critical 

U.S. technologies and goods and ensuring that sensitive material does not fall into the hands of 

our adversaries, but also of the importance of maintaining U.S. competitiveness. Exporting U.S. 

goods not only increases our nation's presence in the global marketplace, but it also creates 

jobs and strengthens the American economy. 

As our member companies have experienced, the Arms Export Control Act and the International 

Traffic in Arms Regulations have been hurting U.S. businesses by giving foreign companies a 

competitive advantage over U.S. companies in the global marketplace. We believe that 

completing Export Control Reform and moving the export licensing of commercial dual-use 

items in Categories I, II, and Ill to the Commerce Department's Commerce Control List (CCL) 

from the U.S. Munitions List (USML), would allow the State Department to place greater focus 

on those sensitive articles that would remain on the USML, streamline the licensing process, 

help level the playing field with our foreign competitors and significantly increase American 

exports while creating good-paying domestic manufacturing jobs. 

Despite misrepresentation by opponents, there would be no change to the licensing policies for 

end item firearms and related ammunition. If a gun required a license to export when it was 

regulated by the State Department then it would require a license to export when it is regulated 

by the Commerce Department. If an export to a destination or end user would have been denied 

or approved before, it would be denied or approved in the same manner under the new rules. 

Applications would go through the same interagency review process, including by the Defense 

Department and the State Department's human rights and other experts. 

THE FIREARMS INDUSTRY TRADE ASSOCIATION NSSF.ORG 
6 

Our industry's small- and medium-sized companies will economically benefit because the 

regulatory simplification and cost reductions will allow them to consider exporting when they 

might not have otherwise. Those that already export will be able to expand sales of exports that 

would have otherwise been approved. This reflects the fact that the IT AR exists to regulate the 

export of defense articles that provide a significant military or intelligence advantage in a "one 

size fits all" type approach with regulatory requirements that are more relevant to the export of a 

fighter aircraft than something that can be purchased at a retail outlet. 

Additionally, we have a significant number of members who perform some type of gunsmithing 

activity and are being forced to pay an onerous and burdensome annual minimum fee of $2,250 

regardless of whether they export any products or not. This too is having a serious, negative 

impact on small businesses throughout the country, many of which do not even make $2,250, 

forcing them to close their doors. Completing the transition would remove the costly regulatory 

burden on gunsmiths. 

To date this initiative has enjoyed strong bipartisan support, including nearly a third of your 

colleagues in both Houses. Under President Trump, the State and Commerce departments 

published proposed rules in May 2018 and are poised to publish final rules. These rules are the 

logical continuation of the effort begun in 2010 under the Obama Administration to modernize 

the administration of U.S. export control regulations "to create a simpler, more robust system 

that eases industry compliance, improves enforceability, and better protect America's most 

sensitive technologies." We would appreciate support from your subcommittee in completing 

what the previous administration had begun and affording members of our industry the benefits 

of ECR that other industries for more than a year have been experiencing. 

Sincerely, 

Lawrence G. Keane 
7 

Mr. ZELDIN. And if I may yield 1 minute to Mr. Perry of Pennsylvania. 

Mr. PERRY. I thank the chairman and the ranking member. I 

hope that we have a robust conversation this morning about our 

export control system and the ways we can make it more effective 

and efficient. 

In 2009, the Obama Administration launched the Export Control 

Initiative with the goal to strengthen our national security and increase the competitiveness of U.S. manufacturing and technology 

sectors. The Administration rightfully determined that our then-export control system was overly complicated, contained too many 

redundancies, and an overly protective posture diminished our ability to focus our efforts on the most critical national security priorities. 

I am disappointed that this common sense, good government, and 

bipartisan, or should I say once-bipartisan issue has been politicized, and our domestic industries will continue to be unduly overregulated until the government takes action. The proposal we are 

about to discuss is the epitome of this politicization. 

This bill does not provide ideas of how we can better regulate the 

export of defense articles or lift the burdensome regulations and 

registration fees our domestic industry is suffering under. Instead, 

it proposes to completely stop this conversation and halt the actions that the current and former administrations embarked upon 

to create a better export system. We must work together and propose ideas that will create a more effective export control regime. 

I look forward to this discussion and hope that we can once again 

come to a bipartisan agreement on export controls that protect our 

national security, our constitutional rights, and our constitutional 

rights while promoting American industries. And I yield. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Thank you, Mr. Perry, and I yield back to the chair. 

Mr. BERA. Great. Thank you, Mr. Zeldin. 

I am pleased to announce and welcome our witnesses to today’s 

hearing. We are first joined by my friend and fellow Californian, 

the Honorable Norma Torres. She will give 5 minutes of remarks 

and then depart because I know you have got another hearing to 

get to. 

Following that, we will be joined by our second panel. Jeff 

Abramson serves as a senior fellow for arms control and conventional arms transfers for The Arms Control Association. Dr. Susan 

Waltz is a professor at the Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy 

and the University of Michigan. Finally, Ms. Johanna Reeves is an 

attorney and executive director of the Firearms and Ammunition 

Import/Export Roundtable, F.A.I.R. Trade Group. 

I ask that the witnesses limit their testimony to 5 minutes. And 

without objection, your prepared statements will be made part of 

the record. 

Thank you so much for being here today. I now ask Ms. Torres 

to summarize her remarks. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE NORMA J. TORRES, A 

MEMBER OF CONGRESS 

Ms. TORRES. Good morning, and thank you, Mr. Chairman, and 

Mr. Ranking Member, distinguished members of the subcommittee. 
8 

Thank you for the opportunity to provide testimony today. It is 

good to be back in the Foreign Affairs Committee. 

Across the world, firearms are used to kill people in a range of 

settings—the armed conflict in Syria, turf battles between drug 

cartels in Mexico, the repression of public protest in Venezuela, 

and terrorist attacks in a mosque in New Zealand. 

Whatever our views on firearms policy, we should all be able to 

agree that putting more firearms in the wrong hands would make 

the world a more dangerous place. Some of the most urgent challenges facing this committee-addressing the root causes of migration from Central America, defeating ISIS, ending the scourge of 

human trafficking—are more difficult because dangerous people 

have firearms. 

Failure to address these challenges will not only pose risks to the 

safety of U.S. service members and citizens abroad, but will also 

impact our homeland in the form of increased migration, terrorism, 

and crime. 

That is why I am so concerned about this Administration’s plan 

to change our firearms export licensing system. Under the status 

quo, if a U.S. company wants to export firearms, the company 

needs to apply for a license from the State Department, which will 

weigh the risks of that sale before granting a license. If the sale 

is over $1 million, the appropriate congressional committees, including this committee, receive a notification and can review the 

sale before it moves forward. 

The system is not perfect; I get that. For example, the State Department should have more resources to track where firearms are 

used, and to carry out due diligence on recipients before the sales 

are approved. 

Sadly, the Administration is taking the opposite approach—proposing to move licensing authority from the State Department to 

the Commerce Department. This is a bad idea for several reasons. 

I will describe just a few of them here. 

First, the Commerce Department has different priorities, a different mission, than the State Department. If Commerce is making 

the final decision on firearm exports, I worry that they will do 

what is best for firearm manufacturers, even if it puts our national 

security at risk. When it comes to keeping firearms out of the 

hands of terrorists and drug cartels, we should err on the side of 

caution. That means keeping the State Department in charge. 

Second, the Commerce Department is not required to notify Congress before a sale proceeds. That means this committee would lose 

the ability to object to sales that raise national security or human 

rights concerns. It also means that Congress would be in the dark 

about where guns are going. This would be very dangerous, as it 

would undermine Congress’ ability to conduct effective oversight. 

Third, taking on this new responsibility would require significant 

additional staff time and expertise at the Commerce Department’s 

Bureau of Industry and Security, but this Administration has not 

provided Congress with a plan for increasing the Bureau’s capacity. 

For these and other reasons, many experts and Members of Congress have expressed their deep concerns about this change. I am 

glad that Senator Menendez has placed a hold on the rule. 
9 

To permanently block the Administration’s dangerous proposal 

from moving forward, I urge this committee to consider a markup 

of my legislation, the Prevent Crime and Terrorism Act. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Torres follows:] 
10 

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, distinguished members of the Subcommittee, thank 

you for the opportunity to provide testimony today. It is good to be back in the Foreign Affairs 

Committee. 

Across the world, firearms are used to kill people in a range of settings-the armed 

conflict in Syria; turf battles between drug cartels in Mexico; the repression of public protest in 

Venezuela; a terrorist attack in a mosque in New Zealand. 

Whatever our views on firearms policy, we should all be able to agree that putting more 

firearms in the wrong hands would make the world a more dangerous place. Some of the most 

urgent challenges facing this committee-addressing the root causes of migration from Central 

America; defeating ISIS; ending the scourge of human trafficking-are more difficult because 

dangerous people have firearms. Failure to address these challenges will not only pose risks to 

the safety of U.S. service members and citizens abroad, but will also impact our homeland in the 

form of increased migration, terrorism, and crime. 

That's why I'm so concerned about the Trump administration's plan to change our 

firearms export licensing system. Under the status quo, if a U.S. company wants to export 

firearms, the company needs to apply for a license from the State Department, which will weigh 

the risks of that sale before granting a license. If the sale is over one million dollars, the 

appropriate congressional committees, including this committee, receive a notification and can 

review the sale before it moves forward. 

The system is not perfect. For example, the State Department should have more resources 

to track where firearms arc used, and to carry out due diligence on recipients before the sales are 

approved. 

Sadly, the Trump administration is taking the opposite approach: proposing to move 

licensing authority from the State Department to the Commerce Department. 

This is a bad idea for several reasons. I will describe just a few of them here. 

First, the Commerce Department has different priorities than the State Department. If 

Commerce is making the final decision on firearm exports, I worry that they will do what is best 

for firearm manufacturers, even if it puts our national security at risk. When it comes to keeping 

firearms out of the hands of terrorists and drug cartels, we should err on the side of caution. That 

means keeping the State Department in charge. 

Second, the Commerce Department is not required to notify Congress before a sale 

proceeds. That means this committee would lose the ability to object to sales that raise national 

security or human rights concerns. It also means that Congress would be in the dark about where 

guns are going. This would be very dangerous, as it would undermine Congress' ability to 

conduct effective oversight. 

Third, taking on this new responsibility would require significant additional staff time 

and expertise at the Commerce Department's Bureau of Industry and Security, but the 

administration has not provided Congress with a plan for increasing this Bureau's capacity. 
11 

For these and other reasons, many experts and Members of Congress have expressed their 

deep concerns about this change, and I am glad that Senator Menendez has placed a hold on the 

rule. 

To permanently block the administration's dangerous proposal from moving forward, I 

urge this Committee to consider a markup of my legislation, the Prevent Crime and Terrorism 

Act. It is a very simple bill that prevents the President from removing firearms, flame throwers, 

ammunition, and other items that are listed in Categories One, Two, and Three of the United 

States Munitions List. The bill does not prevent the export of firearms, and it docs not create any 

new restrictions. It simply keeps the status quo in place, so we can focus our efforts on 

strengthening the current system. 

Again, I thank the committee for the opportunity to provide testimony. 
12 

Mr. BERA. Thank you, Ms. Torres. 

We will now briefly recess, so that the second panel can be seated. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. BERA. Thank you. We will now reconvene. 

I will first go to Mr. Abramson. 

STATEMENT OF JEFF ABRAMSON, SENIOR FELLOW ARMS 

CONTROL AND CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS, THE 

ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION 

Mr. ABRAMSON. Good morning, Chair Bera and Ranking Member 

Zeldin and other members of the committee. It is a privilege to testify before this committee today and discuss concerns about how 

the United States exports some of the weapons most used in violence around the world and proposed changes that I fear could lead 

to greater human suffering. 

My comments here are an abbreviated version of my longer written testimony. In brief, the weapons and ammunition that are currently controlled under U.S. Munitions List Categories I to III belong there and should stay there. There are many concerns about 

the administration’s proposal to move semiautomatic and select 

other weapons from State Department regulatory control of military weapons to the Commerce Department’s control of so-called 

dual-use items. 

Rather than transfer responsibility to an arm of the executive 

branch whose mission is to promote sales and for Congress to abdicate oversight, the best way to move forward is to strengthen the 

State Department’s capacity and for Congress to better use its authority. 

We commend Representative Norma Torres and co-sponsor Eliot 

Engel for introducing H.R. 1134, which a number of members of 

the subcommittee have also now co-sponsored, and Senator Menendez for introducing S. 459, which keep the control lists from changing. 

These legislative efforts have the backing of a wide range of civil 

society organizations, including Amnesty International USA, 

Brady, Giffords, Global Exchange, the Violence Policy Center, and 

the Arms Control Association, where I am a senior fellow. 

The proposed regulatory changes are problematic for several reasons, many of which have already surfaced so far. First, the type 

of weapons pictured here this Administration wants to remove from 

State Department review and congressional notification actually 

merit the tightest export control. Research indicates that AR-and 

AK-type rifles and their ammunition are weapons of choice of drug 

trafficking organizations in Mexico and other Central American 

countries. 

Many can also be easily converted to fully automatic weapons. 

Many sniper rifles that would be moved to Commerce control are 

currently in U.S. military use. And as in the Sig Saver advertisement from this year’s catalog, many of these weapons are marketed 

domestically as ‘‘featuring the same innovation and versatility as 

the U.S. Army’s available in a civilian version.’’ 

Second, the fact that these weapons may be widely available in 

the United States does not mean they should be widely exported. 
13 

In many of the countries where these weapons are likely to be marketed, they are considered military weapons and are tightly controlled. The fact is that anyone can build their own army with guns 

you can buy retail in the United States. 

While the rationale for the shifting to Commerce was that the 

State Department should focus on weapons that provide the United 

States with a critical military or intelligence advantage, or that are 

inherently for military end use, drawing that distinction in this 

case does not match the realities of the world. 

Third, by shifting licensing authority to the Commerce Department, these weapons will be removed from the statutory regime devised for them by Congress. This has significant implications because there are a number of counterterrorism, humanitarian, and 

human rights provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act and the 

Arms Export Control Act that are tied to the State Department’s 

control list. 

To begin with, Congress will not be notified of the sale of these 

weapons. In recent years, congressional involvement has helped 

forestall firearms transfers to repressive forces in Turkey and the 

Philippines, but it is difficult to imagine how Congress could do 

that moving forward if never provided the information that such 

sales were under consideration. 

My longer testimony details how the current regime provides requirements for suspension of future sales, reporting of misuse to 

Congress, and other critical capabilities for identifying and enabling prosecution of bad actors that will be threatened or lost under 

a Commerce-controlled system. 

Unfortunately, we know abuses of U.S.-supplied weapons will 

occur as in Guatemala last year when that government used U.S.- 

donated military vehicles to surround the U.S. Embassy as seen 

here, and as with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates who 

reportedly transferred U.S. weapons to al-Qaeda linked militias in 

Yemen. Under State Department authority, Congress will simply 

have greater awareness and ability to act on such abuse. 

Fourth, the Commerce-led approach is different than that of the 

State Department and creates new risks, including capturing less 

information in licensing requests, a different end use monitoring 

approach, lack of enforcement personnel in the Western Hemisphere, exemptions and broad implications for the proliferation of 

untraceable ghost guns and 3–D printed guns for which the Commerce Department is expected to abandon control efforts. Many of 

these differences are detailed in a recent Government Accountability Office report. 

Looking ahead, the United States is far and away the world’s 

largest arms exporter, and as such, can and should uphold the 

highest standards. That begins with Congress continuing to receive 

arms sales notifications, so that they are informed and are able to 

act. Congress can also play a role in improving transparency in the 

State Department-led direct commercial sales process through 

which the majority of small arms sales occur. 

Congress can block or amend the sale up until weapons are delivered, and it is important for Congress to scrupulously monitor the 

entire process. Congress should also mandate much greater transparency on the specifics of what is in U.S. weapons deliveries. 
14 

Finally, this committee, with its oversight over the State Department, should consider looking into the hollowing out of this critical 

part of the executive branch. As already mentioned, an alarming 

Office of the Inspector General report last month found that the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls did not implement sufficient 

internal controls. 

While proponents of the rule changes argue that Commerce is 

better staffed, the State Department has the most appropriate expertise to consider the human rights, security, and political implications of arms transfers. If further investment is needed to improve State’s capabilities, that is the correct path to explore. 

Wrapping up, we must be mindful that we are not talking about 

benign trade commodities, but, rather, the types of killing machines that are arguably the ones most responsible for death and 

injury worldwide. In the words of Maria Herrera of Mexico, 4 of 

whose sons were forcibly disappeared by heavily armed men, ‘‘They 

have their gun factories and they send them here as if they were 

pears or apples. They should think about the damage and destruction these weapons bring.’’ 

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Abramson follows:] 
15 

Arms Control 

Working to Eli_minate the Threats Posed by Ass 0 c 1. at 1. on 

the Worlds Most Dangerous Weapons 

Testimony by Jeff Abramson 

Senior Fellow, Arms Control Association 

Before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations 

"Proposed Small Arms Transfers: Big Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy" 

March 26,2019 

Good morning, Chair Bera and Ranking Member Zeldin. lt is a privilege to testify before 

this Committee and discuss concerns about how the United States exports some of the 

weapons most used in violence around the world and proposed changes that I fear could 

lead to greater human suffering. 1 

To sum up my forthcoming remarks in just a few lines: The weapons and ammunition 

that arc currently controlled under U.S. Munition List Categories I-III belong there and 

should stay there. There are many concerns about the administration's proposal to move 

semiautomatic and select other weapons to the Commerce Control List, from arms 

control, human rights, and gun safety groups, to mention a few. The best way to move 

forward is to strengthen the State Department's capacity and for Congress to better use its 

authority, not to transfer responsibility to an arm of the executive branch whose mission 

is to promote sales and for Congress to abdicate oversight 

Where we are today 

Under the current system, the State Department regulates the export of military 

equipment and the Commerce Department controls so-called dual use items. The State 

Department employs more vigorous oversight powers than the Commerce Department, 

including a registration regime that provides insight into the manufacturing of weapons. 

The Export Control Reform Initiative, begun under the Obama administration, upended 

this arrangement, transferring licensing authority for a significant percentage of military 

equipment to the Commerce Department The rationale for the shift was that the State 

Department should focus on weapons that provide the United States with a critical 

military or intelligence advantage or arc inherently for military end use. Most Commercelicensed items, however, are not subject to Congressional notification requirements or the 

prohibition on further transfers to governments that misuse U.S. weapons. Such misuse 

1 The views expressed in this testimony are the author's own and do not necessarily retlect the views of the 

members or the Board of Directors of the Arms Control Association. I am grateful to my community 

colleagues Brittany Benowitz, Colby Goodman, Daryl Kimball, John Lindsay-Poland, Kristen Rand, and 

Adzi Vokhiwa for their insights and suggestions on this testimony. 

WINNER OF THE MN;ARTHUR AWARD FOR CREATIVE AND EFFECTIVE INSTITUTIONS 

1200 18th Street NW, Suite 117S, Washington, DC 200J6 • 202.463.8270 • fax 202.46:l.S273 • www,armscontrol.org 
16 

appears to have recently occurred with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, who 

reportedly transferred U.S. weapons to al Qacda -linked militias in Yemen.2 

During the previous administration, however, the first three categories of the U.S. 

Munitions List, addressing firearms and their ammunition, were not changed, perhaps 

because those leaders correctly understood the unique dangers these weapons posed and 

that the logic behind the reform initiative did not apply well to them. 

Last year, the government's approach changed. The Trump administration proposed new 

rules that would move semi-automatic and certain nonautomatic weapons and their 

ammunition, as well as some other weapons to Commerce Department control. This 

generated thousands of public comments, the majority of which were negativc.3 Early last 

month, the administration presented revised versions of those rules that that mostly 

ignored expressed concerns and started a 30-day Congressional review before the rules 

could be officially published. In late February, Senator Robert Menendez sent a letter to 

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo placing a hold on the proposed rules change, giving 

Congress time to act. 

We commend Representative Norma Torres, and co-sponsor Chairman Eliot Engel for 

introducing H.R. 1134, the "Prevent Crime and Terrorism Act," which would keep the 

control lists from changing. 

In the Senate, Menendez, Ranking Member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 

introduced S.459, the "Stopping the Traffic in Overseas Proliferation of Ghost Guns 

Act," which also prohibits the changes. 

These legislative efforts have the backing of a wide range of civil society organizations, 

including Amnesty International USA, Brady, Giffords, Global Exchange, the Violence 

Policy Center, and the Arms Control Association. 

Dangers of the new approach 

The proposed regulatory changes are problematic for several reasons. 

First, the types of weapons the administration wants to remove from State Department 

review and Congressional notification actually merit the tightest export control because 

of their real and potential role in fueling violence, including violence against U.S. 

military and law enforcement personnel. Research indicates that the types of weapons 

being transferred to Commerce control-AR- and AK-type rifles and their ammunitionare "weapons of choice" of drug trafficking organizations in Mexico and other Central 

z See "Exclusive Report: Sold to an ally lost to an enemy" CNN, February 5, 2019 3 A wide range of resources is compiled on the Forum on the Arms Trade website including the 

public comments published by the State Department that were uploaded to the DDTC website on july 

25,2018. 

2 
17 

American countries.4 Many can also be easily converted to fully automatic weapons.5 

Many sniper rifles that would be moved to Commerce control are currently in U.S. 

military use, again undermining the core distinction between these weapons. 

Second, the fact that these weapons may be widely available in the United States does not 

mean they should be widely exported. ln many of the countries where these weapons are 

likely to be marketed, they are considered military weapons and are tightly controlled.6 

As Kristen Rand of the Violence Policy Center argued in a press briefing earlier this 

month, " ... the fact is that many of these guns and other weapons are identical or virtually 

identical to military firearms. The fact is that anyone can build their own army with guns 

you can buy retail in the United States."7 

Third, by shifting licensing authority to the Commerce Department, these weapons will 

be removed from the statutory regime devised by Congress for these weapons. This has 

significant implications because there are a number of counterterrorism, humanitarian, 

and human rights provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act and the Arms Export Control 

Act that are all tied to the State Department's control list. It would also undermine 

statutory prohibitions on transfers to specific countries, such as the Tiananmen Square 

sanctions. 8 

To begin with, Congress will not be notified of the sale of these weapons. In 2002, 

Congress amended notifications requirements so it would be informed of sales authorized 

by the State Department for firearms valued at $1 million or more. No such notification 

requirements exist ifthcse weapons are transferred to Commerce control. In recent years, 

Congressional involvement has helped forestall firearms transfers to repressive forces in 

Turkey and the Philippines, but it is difficult to imagine how Congress could do that 

moving forward if never provided the information that such sales were under 

consideration. 

When items controlled by the State Department are misused or re-transferred without 

permission, the State Department is required by Section 3 of the Arms Export Control 

4 AR and AK-type rifles have consistently been identified by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms 

and Explosives (ATF) as the "weapons of choice" of cross border gun traffickers. For a recent example 

in the context of a federal prosecution of traffickers see, United States v. So to, eta/, No. 6:18mj173, U.S 

District Court, S.D. Tex., December 5, 2018 (ATF agent noting that AK- and AR-style rifles are 

"weapons of choice" for Mexican cartels). In addition, the Violence Policy Center tracks the specific 

types of firearms involved in federal cross-border trafficking prosecutions and finds that AK- and ARtype rifles are the firearms most preferred by traffickers at resource page "Cross-Border Gun 

Trafficking." 

5 See "Examples of Firearms Transferred to Commerce Under New Export Rules "Violence Policy 

Center, and two submitted images, one from Middle East Eye of weapons that would be "easier to 

export" and another from Sig Sauer of the P320 M17 advertised as an Army weapon in civilian 

version. 

6 See john Lindsay· Poland, Global Exchange, public comments submitted to proposed rule as part of 

public comment period in 2018 addressing retail availability in other countries (nQ..f), 7 "Press Briefing on Firearms Expo1t Reform," March 5, 2019, audio and other resources available at 

the Forum on the Arms Trade website. 8 See "Five dangers of giving the Commerce Department oversight of firearms exports 

[commentary] " Colby Goodman and Rachel Stohl, DefenseNews, Sept 25, 2017, and "~ 

Firearms Export Changes: Key Challenaes for U.S. Oversight" Center for International Policy: Colby 

Goodman, Christina Arabia, and William Hartung, july 9, 2018. 

3 
18 

Act to notify the Congress. That Act conditions the sale of weapons on compliance with 

end-use agreements. Any use of the weapons for anything other than legitimate defense 

purposes is not permitted. Section 3 requires the suspension of further sales and deliveries 

to any recipient that violates the end-usc agreements. The Commerce Department 

typically does not require such end-use agreements, without which there are significant 

legal hurdles to suspending deliveries once sales are approved if the recipients prove to 

be untrustworthy. 

If I icensing authority shifts to the Commerce Department, then these statutory 

requirements will no longer apply. Therefore, if foreign security personnel misuse U.S. 

weapons or transfer weapons to organized crime networks, the Congress would not be 

notified and there would be no statutory requirement to suspend further sales or deliveries 

to the same security forces. Unfortunately, this is all too common. For example, in 

Guatemala, the government used U.S. military vehicles lo surround the U.S. Embassy 

when it was displeased with the United States stance on anti-corruption investigations.9 

The proposed shift ofjurisdiction to Commerce would also undermine key components 

of the Foreign Assistance Act. The Secretary of State is required by that Act to suspend 

the sale of weapons to countries that consistently violate human rights. No such 

requirement would exist for the Commerce Department under the proposed rule. While 

the Commerce Department has stated that it would consult with State Department, there 

is no statutory requirement that the Secretary of State consent to any transfers. Under the 

current system, if the State Department fails to implement these human rights provisions, 

there is a procedure for expedited Congressional review. So, the proposed rule would 

undermine both this Committee's jurisdiction over a major component of U.S. foreign 

policy and the authority of the Secretary of State. 

Fourth, the Commerce-led approach is different than that of the State Department and 

creates new risks. A recent Government Accountability Office report provides a detailed 

look at the differences between the two departments, identifying many of the following: 10 

• The State Department requires more information as part of export license 

requests, which gives a better understanding of company ownership and location, 

as well as those individuals involved in an arms transfer, making anti-corruption 

efforts and prosecution for misdeeds easier. 

• State's approach on end-use monitoring puts a much greater emphasis on prelicense checks rather than post-delivery verification. State's approach is a better 

way to prevent misuse and diversion. 

9 See "US suspends some military aid to Guatemala over vehicle use" Associated Press, March 14, 

2019 and submitted photos of Guatemalan forces using jeep outside the U.S. Embassy. 10 "EXPORT CONTROLS: State and Commerce Should Share Watch List Information If Proposed Rules 

to Transfer Firearms Are Finalized "Government Accountability Office, GA0-19307, March 1, 2019. 

For more information on a number of these concerns, see also "Proposed Firearms Export Changes: 

Key Challenges for! J.S. Oversight" Center for International Policy: Colby Goodman, Christina Arabia, 

and William Hartung, July 9, 2018, "Key Questions about tbe lJ.S. 'Export Control Reform Initiative'" 

Security Assistance Monitor, April16, 2016, Key Questions, Security Assistance Monitor, and "White 

Papi•r: Proposals to Relax Export Controls for Sionificant Military Equipment," American Bar 

Association (ABA) Center for Human Rights, jan. 14, 2013. 

4 
19 

• The Commerce Department has no enforcement personnel for end-use controls of 

weapons exports in the entire Western Hemisphere and Africa, regions were 

diversion of these weapons is particularly harmful. 

• The State Department and Commerce Department have not established a way to 

share State's internal watch list, which contains derogatory inf01mation from past 

screening of licenses for firearms, artillery, and ammunition exports. 

• The Commerce Department has no database of allegations of human rights abuses 

similar to the State Department's database for implementing the Leahy Law, 

which is a critical tool for screening weapons export applications to state forces. 

• The proposed rule change has broad implications for the proliferation of 

untraceable ghost guns and 3D-printed guns, including homemade AR- and AKtype rifles. The Obama-era State Department characterized the online publication 

of 3D-printed gun code as a violation of restrictions on exporting weapons. A 

court case currently prevents the Trump administration's State Department from 

abandoning these restrictions, which the Commerce Department is expected to do 

if control were transferred to it. 

• The new proposal would allow for license exemptions under certain 

circumstances and would allow for multiple exports pursuant to a single license. 

Both of these changes could well fuel the grey market, where small arms and 

spare parts are in high demand. 

Finally, the new approach threatens to undermine an already challenged international 

system that is striving to make the arms trade more responsible via an array of treaties, 

regional agreements, and political commitments. The United States is far and away the 

world's largest arms exporter 11 and as such can and should uphold the highest standards. 

While we certainly have concerns about decisions made by prior administrations, we fear 

that this President, in his stated Conventional Arms Transfer Policy and in his willingness 

to arm repressive regimes, prioritizes commercial considerations over human rights 

concerns and even some U.S. national security objectives. Functionally making these 

weapons easier to export and less subject to review would constitute a dangerous erosion 

of long-standing, proven practices designed to suppoti U.S. national security objectives 

and human rights values. 

A more responsible approach 

Congress, and an infonned American public, can play a significant role in making sure 

U.S. weapons exports are made as responsibly as possible. That is critically important 

given the decades-long lifespan of many types of small arms. 12 

That begins with Congress continuing to receive arms sales notifications so that they are 

informed and able to act. The loss of that critical initial notification is unwise and should 

be rejected. Of course, Congress must also pay close attention in order to act on these 

11 See "Trends in international arms transfers 2018," SIPR!, March 2019. 12 See "How Conaress Can Exert Responsible Oversight on Trump's Dangerous Approach to Arms 

Sales" Arms Control Association issue brief; january 15, 2019, for elaboration on these suggestions. 

5 
20 

notifications, and this committee needs to closely monitor these notifications and set 

aside the time necessary to engage in the informal and formal notification processes. 

Congress can also play a role in helping the public be aware of these potential sales. The 

majority of small arms sales are notified through the Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) 

process, rather than the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process. FMS notifications are 

announced on a public website. Congress should endeavor to finds ways to make DCS 

sales more accessible. 

According to data analysis by the Security Assistance Monitor, in 201 8 the Trump 

administration requested Congress to approve at least $746 million in firearms sales to a 

total of 14 countries in 2018, with more than $575 million for Saudi Arabia, another 

nearly $100 million to the Philippines, and more than $21 million to the United Arab 

Emirates. 13 These countries are some of the ones most watched for human rights and 

security concerns, especially after the murder of Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi Arabia and 

revelations that the UAE may be providing arms to militia in Yemen that are fighting 

against U.S. efforts. 

While the notification period garners the most attention, Congress also can block a sale 

up until weapons are delivered. Given how security, geopolitical, and humanitarian 

realities can change between the time of notifications and often years-later deliveries, it is 

important that Congress scrupulously monitor the entire process. 

In 2014, Congress gave itself the authority to receive from the State Department 

notification of an arms shipment at least 30 days before its delivery. It is currently limited 

to joint requests by the chair and ranking members of this committee or the Senate 

Foreign Relations Committee. We encourage those leaders to be even more diligent in 

their oversight and would recommend that Congress consider allowing any member of 

these committees the opportunity to request pre-delivery notifications. 

In general, transparency concerning arms deliveries is limited. Under the current system, 

the State Department reports publicly the annual value of exports by category of weapon 

and recipient country. The Commerce Depatiment only provides such information on 

around 20 countries. Even with that limited insight into how the Commerce Department 

is using its new authority over the export of military equipment, it is clear that a number 

of countries of significant concern-including Vietnam and Uzbekistan-have been 

authorized by the Commerce Department to receive military equipment previously 

controlled by the State Department. I find it disturbing that such delicate decisions 

concerning U.S. foreign relations are no longer the subject of this Committee's 

jurisdiction. More broadly, Congress should mandate a change demanding much greater 

transparency on the specifics of what is in U.S. weapons deliveries. 

Finally, this Committee, with its oversight over the State Department, should consider 

looking into the hollowing out of this critical part of the executive branch. 

An alarming Office of the Inspector General report last month found that the Directorate 

of Defense Trade Control (DDTC) did not implement sufficient internal controls when 

13 "Congressional Notifications for Proposed U.S. Commercial Firearms Exports in 2018," Security 

Assistance Monitor, February 12, 2019. 

6 
21 

examining export license applieations. 14 While proponents of the rules change argue that 

Commerce is better staffed, the State Department has the most appropriate expertise to 

consider the human rights, security, and political implications of arms transfers. If further 

investment is needed to improve State's capabilities, that is the correct path to explore. 

We must be mindful that we are not talking about benign trade commodities, but rather 

the types of killing machines that are arguably the ones most responsible for death and 

injury in conflict worldwide. Export of small arms deserve the highest level of oversight 

and attention from the executive branch and the Congress. 

In closing, I urge you to keep in your minds and hearts the impact on human suffering of 

weapons that fall into the wrong hands. In the words of Maria Herrera of Mexico, four of 

whose sons were forcibly disappeared by heavily armed men: "They have their gun 

factories and they send them here, as if they were pears or apples. They should think 

about the damage and destruction these weapons bring." 15 

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify before you today. !look forward to your 

questions. 

14 "Audit of Department of State Directorate of Defense Trade Controls Export Licensing Processes" 

AUD-Sl-19-07, Office of Inspector General, February 2019. 15 For additional insights from Maria Herrera and others on the human impact, see "Where the Guns 

Go: !f.S. Policy and Human Rights in Mexico" film produced by Encinal, 2017. 

7 
22 

Mr. BERA. Thank you, Mr. Abramson. 

Ms. WALTZ. 

STATEMENT OF SUSAN WALTZ, PH.D., PROFESSOR, GERALD R. 

FORD SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN 

Ms. WALTZ. Thank you, Chairman Bera, Ranking Member 

Zeldin, and members of the subcommittee. I want to thank you for 

the opportunity to testify about the proposal to remove certain 

weapons from the U.S. Munitions List. In a nutshell, I am concerned that we are on the verge of unraveling an interlocking set 

of policies that are intended to prevent exported U.S. weapons from 

falling into unintended hands where they can be used for human 

rights abuse and criminal activity. 

I have long been associated with Amnesty International, and my 

remarks are informed by its published human rights research. In 

an internal review that was undertaken about 10 years ago, Amnesty International found that some 60 percent of the grave human 

rights abuses it had investigated involved firearms. 

If that inventory were to be updated today, it would include, for 

example, the recent cold-blooded execution of civilians by uniformed Cameroon soldiers—an event that prompted the U.S. to 

withdraw millions of dollars of military aid earlier this year. It 

would also include Philippines, where since 2016 the government 

has encouraged targeted political killings that have claimed more 

than 4,000 lives in operations specifically conducted by the police. 

My concerns about the proposal under consideration were only 

heightened last month when the State Department released its 

audit report about a 2017 of 400,000 semi-automatic rifles to Philippines, a sale that never should have been licensed and for which 

the license was ultimately revoked. 

In my remarks today, I want to make 3 key points. First, the 

proposed regulatory changes seek to draw a bright line between 

fully automatic weapons on one hand and semi-or non-automatic 

weapons on the other. And in human rights situations where it 

really matters, this is a distinction without a difference. It is a 

false dichotomy. 

In practical reality, there may be little difference between the 

semi-and fully automatic types of firearms. A semi-automatic firearm can fire about 45 rounds a minute, and non-automatic sniper 

rifles can shoot with great accuracy over long distances. 

These are powerful lethal weapons. The soldiers in Cameroon 

last summer used semi-automatic rifles. In Mexico, the local police 

in Guerrero State that were responsible for the enforced disappearance of 43 students in 2014 were armed, again, with semi-automatic rifles. 

The point here is that in many perilous human rights situations 

the weapons that are slated for transfer to the Commerce Control 

List are every bit as threatening as fully automatic weapons. The 

bright line, as I have said, proposed by the Administration makes 

a distinction without true difference. 

And, second, there is more to the proposed regulatory changes 

than first meets the eye. What is ultimately at stake here—and 

this is I think a crucial point for the committee—is which rules, 
23 

which laws will apply to the exports of these small but lethal weapons. 

Over the years, Congress has embedded important human rights 

provisions in 2 key statutes—the Arms Export Control Act and the 

Foreign Assistance Act. And the provision of these laws, generally 

speaking, apply only to defense articles as defined by their presence on the U.S. Munitions List. 

So if you remove these weapons from that particular list, then 

ipso facto you exempt them from the related statutory constraints, 

and therein lies the rub. These various statutory controls are tied 

together in an elaborate legislative architecture that in the past 15 

years American officials have touted as the gold standard of arms 

export laws and regulations. 

The ‘‘cradle to grave’’ control system that we have promoted 

internationally includes multiple statutory requirements, including, 

among others, a multi-step registration and licensing procedure for 

exporters that provides several opportunities to detect irregular aspects of an application. It requires, as has been noted, congressional notification of firearm sales that exceed $1 million. It includes tough controls on brokering and the possibility of both preand post-shipment review through the State Department’s Blue 

Lantern Program. 

So together these provisions constitute a robust oversight mechanism. And without mitigating action from Congress now, the 

straightforward and seemingly innocuous act of transferring items 

from one regulatory regime to another would essentially nullify the 

export laws as they apply to non-automatic and semi-automatic 

weapons in one fell swoop. 

My final point relates to a specific concern about the regulation 

of firearms brokering and human rights implications. I do not have 

time to go into details now, but let me just say that brokering activities, which by statute are defined as financing, transport, and 

freight forwarding, are understood by human rights advocates to be 

the weakest link in the chain of regulatory controls. 

And it is of note that in the case of the 2017 Philippines sale it 

was an issue with the middlemen in Florida that alerted U.S. Embassy personnel to the likelihood that something was awry with 

that transaction. 

In closing, I want to say that I am not opposed in principle to 

export control reform, but it strikes me that these particular regulatory changes are irresponsible. As far as I have been able to ascertain, these are the only complete lethal weapons that are being 

transferred to the Commerce Control List. 

In December 2000, the U.S. pledged to the world that we would 

observe the highest standards of restraint in our small arms export 

policies, and these proposed changes betray that pledge. 

The best course of action, in my view, would be to retain the current range of firearms on the U.S. Munitions List by supporting 

H.R. 1143. And failing that, I would urge you to amend the statutes to ensure that the weapons transferred to the Commerce Control List would be included in the statutory definitions of defense 

articles and security assistance. 

Thank you very much for your attention and the opportunity to 

share these concerns. 
24 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Waltz follows:] 

SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON, DC 20S1S-6128 

Proposed Small Arms Transfers: Big Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy 

March 26, 2019 

Comments by 

Susan Waltz, Ph.D. 

Professor 

Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy 

University of Michigan 

Chairman Bera, Ranking Member Zeldin and Members of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on 

Oversight and Investigation: 

Thank you for holding this hearing on Small Arms Transfers and for the opportunity to share my views about 

the proposal to remove certain weapons from the US Munitions List. In a nutshell, I am concerned that we 

are on the verge of unraveling a sophisticated policy architecture intended to prevent exported US weapons 

from falling into unintended hands- where they can be used for human rights abuse and criminal activity. 

I have long been associated with Amnesty International, and my remarks are informed by its published 

human rights research. In an internal review about 10 years ago, Amnesty International found that some 

60% of the grave human rights abuses it had investigated involved firearms. If that inventory were to be 

updated today, it would include, for example, the recent cold-blooded execution of civilians by uniformed 

Cameroon soldiers- which prompted the US to withdraw millions of dollars of military aid earlier this year 

and rescind an invitation for Cameroon to join a partnership program with the US National Guard. 

It would also include Philippines, where since 2016 the government of Rodrigo Duterte has encouraged 

targeted political killings that have claimed more than 4000 lives in operations led by the police. My concerns 

about the proposal under consideration were only heightened last month when the State Department 

released its audit report about a 2017 sale of FDR-15 semi-automatic rifles to Philippines, a sale that never 

should have been licensed and for which the license was ultimately revoked. 

In my remarks today, I want to make three general points. 

First, the proposed regulatory changes seek to draw a bright line between fully automatic weapons 

on one hand, and semi- or non-automatic weapons on the other. In human rights situations where 

it matters, this is a false dichotomy. In practical reality, there may be little difference between the 

semi- and fully-automatic types of firearms. A semi-automatic weapon can fire 45 rounds per 

minute, and non-automatic sniper rifles can shoot with great accuracy over long distances. These 

are powerful, lethal weapons. The soldiers in Cameroon last summer used semi-automatic rifles in 

their executions of several men, two women, and two small children- in two separate incidents 

captured on video. In Mexico, the local police in Guerrero State responsible for the enforced 

disappearance of 43 students in 2014 were armed with semi-automatic rifles. 
25 

In many perilous human rights situations, the weapons slated for transfer to the Commerce Control 

list are every bit as threatening as fully automatic weapons. The bright line proposed by the 

Administration makes a distinction without true difference. 

Secondly, with regards to human rights oversight, there is more to the proposed regulatory changes 

than first meets the eye. What is ultimately at stake here is which rules- which laws-- will apply to 

exports of these small but lethal weapons. Over the years, Congress has embedded important 

human rights provisions in two central statutes, the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and the Foreign 

Assistance Act (FAA). The provisions of these laws, generally speaking, apply to defense articles, 

defined as such by their presence on the US Munitions list. Removing weapons from this list-ipso 

facto--exempts them from the related statutory constraints. And therein lies the rub. These various 

statutory controls are tied together in an elaborate legislative architecture that American officials 

have touted as the gold standard of arms export laws and regulations. The "cradle to grave" control 

system that we have promoted internationally includes multiple statutory requirements, including: 

an explicit scrutiny of human rights implications mandated by the Foreign Assistance Act, 

a multi-step registration and licensing procedure for commercial exporters that provides 

several opportunities to detect irregular aspects of an application, 

Congressional notification of firearms sales exceeding $1 million, 

tough controls on brokering, 

requirements for end use certification, 

prohibition against unauthorized re-transfers, and 

the possibility of pre- or post-shipment review through the Blue Lantern program. 

Together these provisions constitute a robust oversight mechanism. Without mitigating action from 

Congress now, the straightforward and seemingly innocuous act of transferring items from one 

regulatory regime to the other would essentially nullify the arms export laws as they apply to nonautomatic and semi-automatic weapons. In one fell swoop. 

My final point relates to a specific concern about the regulation of firearms brokering and human 

rights implications. Brokering activities-including financing, transportation, and freight forwarding1-

-are understood to be the weakest link in the chain of regulatory controls. As human rights research 

has shown, legitimate transactions entrusted to unscrupulous middlemen, or illicit transactions 

confided to unsuspecting transporters, are among the main ways that weapons are diverted to the 

gray and black markets. (And I might note, it was the disappearance of middlemen in Florida that 

alerted Embassy personnel in Manila to the irregularities of the 2017 license for the sale of semiautomatic rifles to Philippines.) With the proposed changes I am particularly concerned about 

potential new opportunities for illicit trade involving unscrupulous brokers.2 The proposals 

circulated last June included an exemption from the standard brokering controls for licensed 

transactions subject to the Export Administration Regulations (which houses the Commerce Control 

List). Such a change risks creating a substantial loophole that could open new conduits for weapons 

'22 USC 2778 (b)(1)(A)(H)(IV) 

2 The State Department has proposed an amendment to Federal Regulations that would allow it to maintain regulatory control over brokers of 

items remaining on the USML but also on the US Munitions Import List (a separate list which will continue to include the items that-for export 

purpose-are deemed no longer to warrant control under the USML). The intended effect is that brokers wanting to export items that are 

included on the list of items controlled as defense articles for import {but not for export) wlll be subject to the rules pertaining to the export of 

such items. The logic is convoluted at best, and it raises questions about the statutory grounding for requiring brokers who are exporting items 

"no longer warranting control under USML" to register with the State Department and comply with related requirements of the International 

Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).It is also hard to imagine the bureaucratic mechanisms by which the licensing of a transaction will be handled 

by Commerce and any brokering aspects (including completion of information required by 22. CfR 129.6) will be handled by State. The carve 

out anticipated for 2.2. CFR 12.9.2 further complicates the application of brokering rules. 
26 

to be diverted to the gray and black markets where they could be acquired by otherwise prohibited 

parties. 

In closing: I am not opposed in principle to export control reform, but these particular regulatory changes are 

irresponsible. In 2000 the US pledged to the world that we would observe the highest standards of restraint 

in our small arms export policies, and these proposed changes betray that pledge. The best course of action, 

in my view, would be to retain the current range of firearms on the US Munitions List, by supporting HR 1134. 

Failing that, I urge you to amend relevant statutes3 to ensure that weapons transferred to the Commerce 

Control List (as SOD-series items) are included within the statutory definitions of defense articles and security 

assistance. 

Thank you very much for your attention, and for the opportunity to share these concerns. 

3 Notably 22 USC 2304{d)(2)(C) should be amended to include the "500 Series" and section 2778 should likewise be amended to ensure that 

relevant provisions apply to the 500 series. Further, to prevent the diversion to unauthorized users or those engaged ln atrocities, Congress 

should ensure that such security assistance is subject to relevant oversight provisions, including Sections 2314 (diversion), 2378d (vetting) and 

2776 {Congressional notification of proposed sales). To ensure that Congress continues to receive a comprehensive annual report on us arms 

sales, the Arms Export Control Act (22 USC 2778) should be amended to clarify that "defense articles" includes any 500-series items on the CCL 
27 

Mr. BERA. Thank you, Professor Waltz. 

And Ms. Reeves. 

STATEMENT OF JOHANNA REEVES, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, 

F.A.I.R. TRADE GROUP 

Ms. REEVES. Good morning and thank you. Chairman Bera, 

Ranking Member Zeldin, and other distinguished members of this 

subcommittee, thank you for inviting the F.A.I.R. Trade Group to 

testify today on this important issue of reform to our export control 

regulations and the perceived impact such reform may have on our 

national security and foreign policy. 

The Firearms and Ammunition Import/Export Roundtable, or 

F.A.I.R. Trade Group, is made up of firearms and ammunition 

manufacturers, importers, and exporters who serve both civilian 

and government customers. We work closely with U.S. Federal 

agencies to improve regulations governing the import and export of 

firearms, ammunition, and other similar articles. 

The proposed rules that are at the heart of today’s hearing are 

to transition commercially available firearms from the export controls of the U.S. Department of State’s International Traffic in 

Arms Regulations, or ITAR, to the controls of the U.S. Department 

of Commerce known as the Export Administration regulations, or 

EAR. 

Since the publication of the proposed transition rules, there has 

been a plethora of misinformation and mischaracterizations. First, 

the proposed transition rules are not a de-control of manufacture, 

transfer, or export of firearms or ammunition. The proposed 

changes are part of an effort to reform outdated regulations and 

right size our export control system—an effort that started under 

President Obama in 2010. 

The proposed shift in oversight responsibility is long overdue and 

will help strengthen the national security of the United States by 

ensuring the exporting licensing authorities can focus on those 

items that warrant control under the ITAR rather than waste resources on export licensing for springs and bolts or for items that 

are available in sporting goods stores and retail outlets. 

Not all firearms and ammunitions are slated to transition to the 

Commerce Controls. The firearms that will remain under the Department of State are those that are inherently military, including 

fully automatic firearms, modern large-caliber munitions, such as 

mortars and howitzers, high-capacity magazines and drums, and 

all specially designed parts and components for those articles. 

For the firearms and ammunition that will transition over to the 

Department of Commerce, this is not a de-control or a deregulation 

of those articles. Under the EAR, exports and license applications 

for firearms and ammunition will be subject to controls under national security, regional stability, crime control and detection, the 

Firearms Convention, United Nations sanctions, and anti-terrorism. 

Indeed, the proposed rules make it abundantly clear that the 

Commerce Department will require a license to export or re-export 

firearms or ammunition to any country, including Canada. 

The proposed changes are to licensing processing, not policy. End 

use monitoring will continue under the Commerce Department, in-
28 

cluding vetting of potential end users. In addition, the State Department, as well as the Department of Defense, will remain very 

involved in the review of export license applications for national security and foreign policy reasons, pursuant to the Export Control 

Reform Act. 

Further, the Commerce Department will not approve any license 

application if the export will violate the laws of the destination 

country. 

Another myth is that the Department of Commerce does not 

have the capability to control firearms or ammunition exports. This 

is not true. The Office of Export Enforcement is the only Federal 

law enforcement agency exclusively dedicated to the enforcement of 

export control laws, specifically the EAR, and does so to protect the 

national security, foreign policy, and economic interests of the 

United States. 

OEE works closely with the Department of Justice to prosecute 

criminal violations and with the Office of Chief Counsel for Industry and Security for civil enforcement cases. This reform to our export control system is long overdue. Because of the age and widescale availability of the underlying technology, many firearms and 

ammunition do not have the characteristics that provide critical 

military advantage to the United States, nor are they exclusively 

available from the United States. 

Unfortunately, the current policies and regulations have prevented the U.S. firearms and the ammunition industries from becoming reliable suppliers to our allies and, in general, competing 

effectively in the global marketplace. 

We, therefore, urge Congress to permit the right sizing of the 

outdated one-size-fits-all export policy for firearms and ammunition, so that these industries may be regulated like the other defense sectors that have experienced export control reform. 

This reform will not result in the de-control of firearms and ammunition, and it is critical to the positioning of our manufacturers 

in the world market and, thus, our national security. 

Chairman Bera, Ranking Member Zeldin, and other distinguished members of this subcommittee, this concludes my testimony on behalf of the F.A.I.R. Trade Group. Thank you for the opportunity to speak today, and I welcome your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Reeves follows:] 
29 

United States House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

"Proposed Small Arms Transfers: Big Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy" 

Written Testimony for Johanna Reeves 

Executive Director, F.A.I.R. Trade Group 

March 26, 2019 

Chairman Bcra, Ranking Member Zeldin, and other distinguished members of the House Foreign 

Affairs Committee's Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, thank you for inviting the 

F.A.I.R. Trade Group to testify today on this important issue of reform to our export control 

regulations, and the perceived impact such reform may have on our national security and foreign 

policy. 

The F.A.I.R. Trade Group is made up of firearms and ammunition manufacturers, importers and 

exporters who serve both civilian and government customers. We work closely with U.S. federal 

agencies, such as the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, the U.S. Department 

of State, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection, among others. to improve regulations governing 

the import and export of firearms, ammunition, and other military articles. 

Almost a year ago, the Administration published the last in a series of proposed rules to reform the 

U.S. export control system; which reform initiative began in 2010 under the Obama 

Administration. The proposed rules that are at the heart of today's hearing are to transition 

commercially available firearms from the export controls of the U.S. Department of State's 

International Traffic in Arms Regulations (!TAR) to the controls of the U.S. Department of 

Commerce known as the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). It is interesting to note that 

when the Obama Administration launched the Export Control Reform (ECR) initiative, the IT AR 

U.S. Munitions List (USML) Categories I, II, and III, the Categories that control firearms and 

ammunition, were the first categories to be revised. The fact that the rules were not rolled out until 

May 2018 does not make it a creation of President Trump. 

Although no longer branded "ECR," the proposed rules to revise Categories I, II and III are a 

continuation of the U.S. Government's effort to modernize U.S. export controls and better focus 

IT AR controls over those weapons or articles that are inherently for military use or that provide 

the United States with a critical military or intelligence advantage. The purpose of the proposed 

revisions to the USML is to adjust the scope of the Department of State's jurisdiction to focus on 

those weapons or articles that are inherently for military use, or that provide the United States with 

a critical military or intelligence advantage. All other items will transition to the export controls 

of the Department of Commerce, as has happened for all previously implemented reform efforts. 

What is being proposed for USML Categories I, II, and Ill is nothing new. 

Since the publication of the proposed rules for USML Categories I, II, and lll, there has been a 

plethora of misinformation and mischaracterizations of the proposed rules. Indeed, these 

distortions, many of which are politically motivated, have given rise to the current attempts to 

prevent the President from exercising authority which Congress originally granted under the Arms 

Export Control Act. 
30 

Johanna Reeves Prepared Statement 

U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

March 26, 20 19 

Page 2 

The fact is, the proposed transition rules are not a decontrol over the manufacture, transfer, or 

export of firearms or ammunition. The proposed changes are an effort to reform outdated 

regulations and right-size our export control system. The proposed shift in oversight responsibility 

is long overdue and will help strengthen the national security of the United States by ensuring that 

export licensing authorities can focus on those items that warrant control under the IT AR rather 

than waste resources on export licensing for springs and bolts for items that are abundant 

throughout the world. In addition, this reform is absolutely necessary to ensure "America's ability 

to engage effectively with the rest of the world and keep our most sensitive technology away from 

those who would do us harm." 

These are not my words. These are the words of Defense Secretary Gates in 20 I 0, when President 

Obama issued the directive to overhaul the overly complicated U.S. export controls system, a 

system with too many redundancies to effectively support the national security and foreign policy 

interests of the United States. By modernizing U.S. export controls, we could more effectively 

account for emerging critical technologies, whose exports would be subject to closer scrutiny than 

those items readily available at Walmart or hardware stores. 

Items that Have Already Transitioned.from State to Commerce Export Controls 

Since the Obama Administration first rolled out ECR in 2010, several items once classified as 

defense articles and subject to IT AR licensing controls of the Department of State have moved 

over to the licensing controls of the Department of Commerce. The following USML categories 

were revised under the Obama Administration: 

Launch vehicles and missiles; 

• Explosives and propellants 

Vessels of War 

Tanks and military vehicles 

Military aircraft 

Training equipment 

Personal protective equipment 

Military electronics 

• Fire control 

• Toxicological agents 

• Spacecraft and satellites 

Nuclear weapons 

• Directed energy weapons 

Gas turbine engines 

• Submersible vessels 

The list of items that have already moved off the U.S. Munitions List and over to the Commerce 

Control List is extensive. Every single one of these items is subject to the same set of controls that 
31 

Johanna Reeves Prepared Statement 

U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

March 26, 2019 

Page 3 

commercially available firearms and ammunition would be, including the treatment of information 

published on the Internet. 

Military Weapons Will Stay Controlled Under /TAR 

Under the proposed transition rules, military weapons will remain under the State Department 

licensing authority. As I stated earlier, fully automatic firearms will remain under USML Category 

I. A fully automatic firearm includes those firearms that have the option to select either a semiautomatic function, a two or three-round burst function (in other words it fires two or three rounds 

with a single pull of the trigger), and also a fully automatic function. These firearms, known as 

"select-fire" firearms, are well recognized as military weapons. These should not be confused with 

purely semi-automatic firearms. To that end, some argue the ARI 5 rifle, a purely semi-automatic 

rifle, is a military-style weapon. It is not, and it should not be conflated with a rifle that has full 

automatic capabilities. AR I 5-type rifles arc not used in the military, and to say there is little 

difference between a semi-automatic firearm and a fully automatic firearm is disingenuous. 

Congress itself recognized this substantial difference when it established the National Firearms 

Act of I 934, which imposed significant restrictions on civilian possession of fully automatic 

firearms, but not on semi-automatic firearms. 

While it is true that soldiers in combat may use fully automatic firearms in semi-automatic mode, 

this is dependent on the situation and threat level. In close quarters, the military trains shooters to 

engage targets with controlled pairs (two shots). If fire suppression is needed, then full auto is 

more effective at keeping the enemy down and permits freedom of movement by friendly forces. 

The use of semi or single shot or controlled pair is more prevalent but it is mostly a matter of 

ammunition consumption so as not to waste ammunition. For the soldier, the full auto option 

offers reassurance and a tactically sound choice. It provides lethality overmatch and makes a 

smaller fighting force more effective. 

The AR 15, a sporting rifle that has been widely available on the commercial market since 1963, 

cannot and must not be grouped in the same category as the assault weapon described above. The 

semi-automatic AR15 (or other model) rifle docs not have the design features that allows it to 

accept a full automatic sear that changes its design into a machinegun capable of shooting 

automatically. Indeed, the current effort to reform our export control laws will allow the U.S. 

Government to focus more on controlling true military assault weapons. 

Domestic Controls over Firearms and Ammunition 

Any reforms to our export control system will not affect in any way domestic controls over 

firearms and ammunition. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives is the 

agency in charge of enforcing the Gun Control Act and the National Firearms Act, and these 

statutes will continue to regulate the manufacture, transfer and possession of firearms and 

ammunition. 
32 

Johanna Reeves Prepared Statement 

U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

March 26, 2019 

Pagc4 

ATF controls over firearms in the United States extends to 3D printed guns. The Gun Control Act 

prohibits the manufacture, import, sale, shipment, delivery, possession, transfer and receipt of any 

handgun that is undetectable by x-ray machines commonly used at airports. Violations of this 

statute are punishable by up to five years imprisonment and a fine of $250,000. The last time this 

prohibition was due to sunset in 2013, Congress passed a renewal unanimously by voice vote. 

U.S. Dep11rtment of Commerce Export Controls 

l. Export License Requirements 

It is important to remember that not all firearms and ammunition are slated to transition to 

Commerce controls. The firearms that will remain under the Department of State are those that 

are inherently military, including fully automatic firearms, regardless of the caliber, fully 

automatic shotguns, magazines and drums with a capacity of 50 rounds or greater, and all specially 

designed parts and components therefor. The types of ammunition that will remain with the 

Department of State include ammunition preassembled into links or belts, and projectiles with a 

core or projectile produced from tungsten, steel, or beryllium copper alloys (also referred to as 

armor piercing ammunition). 

Contrary to many of the objections that have been voiced about the proposed rules, the transition 

of firearms and ammunition from State Department's oversight to the Department of Commerce's 

control will NOT result in a decontrol or a deregulation of these articles. Firearms transitioning to 

the Department of Commerce will be subject to licensing controls under National Security, 

Regional Stability, Crime Control and Detection, the Firearms Convention, United Nations 

Sanctions, and Anti-Terrorism. Indeed, the proposed rules make it abundantly clear that the 

Commerce Department will require U.S. Government authorization to export or reexport firearms 

or ammunition transitioning from the USML to ANY country, including Canada. The transition 

will not result in the unlicensed export of firearms and ammunition. 

lt must be emphasized that the proposed changes are to license processing, NOT POLICY. Enduse monitoring will continue, including vetting of potential end-users, and contrary to popular 

belief, the State Department, as well as the Department of Defense will remain very involved in 

the review of export license applications for national security and foreign policy reasons. 

Commerce Department will continue to staff license requests to executive agencies for review, 

just as State Department has done under !TAR. Of course, we must not forget the fact that the 

Commerce Department, like the State Department today, will not approve any license application 

if the export will violate the laws of the destination country. 

2. Office of Export Enforcement 

Another myth is that the Department of Commerce does not have the capability to control firearms 

or ammunition exports, or has looser licensing rules and procedures. In reality, the Department of 

Commerce has an arsenal of tools it can use, and indeed does use already to effectively control 

exports and enforce against export violations, including those that have not yet occurred. 
33 

Johanna Reeves Prepared Statement 

U.S. House Committee on Foreign Afl'airs 

March 26, 20 19 

Page 5 

The Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) Export Enforcement 

consists of the Office of Export Enforcement (OEE), the Office of Enforcement Analysis (OEA), 

and the Office of Antiboycott Compliance (OAC). The overarching mission is to protect the U.S. 

national security, homeland security, foreign policy and economic interests through a law 

enforcement program focused on: sensitive exports to hostile entities or those that engage in 

onward proliferation; prohibited foreign boycotts; and related public safety laws. BIS's Export 

Enforcement is an elite law enforcement organization recognized for its expertise, professionalism, 

integrity, and accomplishments. It accomplishes its mission through preventative and investigative 

enforcement activities and then, pursuing appropriate criminal and administrative sanctions 

against export violators. 

In particular, the Office of Export Enforcement is dedicated to protecting U.S. national security, 

foreign policy, and economic interests by investigating violations, prosecuting violators of export 

control laws, interdicting illegal exports, and educating parties to export transactions on how to 

improve export compliance practices. To accomplish this, OEE Special Agents work with 

Commerce Department licensing officials and policy staff to deter the export of items which, in 

the hands of unreliable users, can prove damaging to U.S. national security and foreign policy 

interests. 

Noteworthy is the fact that Commerce enforcement of export controls is carried out by Special 

Agents, sworn federal officers with "authority to bear firearms, make arrests, execute search 

warrants, serve subpoenas, detain and seize items about to be illegally exported, and order the 

redelivery to the United States of items exported in violation of U.S. law." Indeed, OEE is the 

only federal law enforcement agency exclusively dedicated to the enforcement of export control 

laws, specifically the EAR, and it works closely with the Department of Justice to prosecute 

criminal violations, and with the Office of Chief Counsel for Industry and Security for civil 

enforcement cases. 

Under the IT AR, the State Department's Office of Defense Trade Controls Compliance 

investigates export violations. This office is comprised of Compliance Specialists who are not law 

enforcement officers. 

What does this all mean? Stated plainly, this means that the Commerce Department already has 

in place the resources to send special agents to investigate suspected violations of the EAR. And, 

they do. This includes investigating suspected export violations by U.S. persons, as well as 

suspected unauthorized reexports or transfers by foreign persons. As outlined on OEE's website, 

OEE Special Agents also conduct end use checks to confirm items are being used in accordance 

with any license conditions, as well as to assess the suitability of foreign end-users to receive U.S.-

origin licensed goods and technology, assess prospective end-users on pending license applications 

for diversion risk, and conduct educational outreach to foreign trade groups. 

In a recent Commerce publication, Don't Let This Happen To You (Nov. 20I 8), in fiscal year 2017, 

BIS investigations led to the criminal convictions of 3 I individuals and businesses for export 
34 

Johanna Reeves Prepared Statement 

U.S. House Committee on foreign Affairs 

March 26,2019 

Page6 

violations with penalties of over $287 million in criminal fines, more than $166 million in 

forfeitures, and 576 months of imprisonment. In addition, OEE and BIS's Office of Chief Counsel 

completed 52 administrative export matters, resulting in over $692 million in civil penalties." In 

contrast, in 2017 and 2018 combined the U.S. Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade 

Controls (DDTC) issued only two consent agreements. 

Fostering Competitiveness of the American Manufacturer 

Another unfortunate truth of our current export control system is the unintended harm on our 

ability to provide weapons to our allies. It is no secret that many foreign governments restrict 

bidding on supply contracts to non-ITAR-controlled product. This affects U.S. manufacturers 

from being able to sell firearms and firearm components, all controlled under the !TAR. To 

illustrate, let me draw your attention to a French tender for semi-automatic pistols. Although it 

does not specifically reference "IT AR-frec," the governing french legislation requires the 

applicant offer: 

I. A certification according to which the offeror will be able to meet all obligations in 

terms of export, import, transfer and transit of defense articles related to the awarded 

contract, including those obligations contained in any other document related to such 

tender; and 

2. The indication of any restrictions resulting from any security or export-control regime 

applicable to such offeror and/or its defense articles or services and which affects the 

disclosure, transfer and/or usage of such defense articles and/or defense services (i.e. 

maintenance services, product support services, etc.). 

The legislation does not cite to the !TAR precisely, However, because of the inherent controls of 

the !TAR that affect all U.S.-origin defense articles and services, especially in terms of prior export 

license and the required prior approvals from the Department of State for reexports or retransfers, 

the above provisions of the French legislation nearly eliminate any chance for success in proposing 

US-origin !TAR-controlled defense articles and/or services in response to this tender (and to any 

tender for defense articles and services issued by the French Government). 

On the contrary, this situation does not replicate among E.U. Member States to the extent that, 

E.U. member states have agreed to principles of mutual trust and reciprocity between the Member 

States' export control policies and procedures for the defense sector so that once delivered to one 

Member State, defense articles and/or services from another Member State are controlled onward 

only by the recipient Member State export control policies and procedures. 

Another example is the restriction on countries sourcing product made with U.S. - ongm 

components and parts. The ITAR restrictions on reexport attach to each defense article, so that 

even for !TAR-controlled parts and components that are incorporated into a non-U.S. end-item, 

the end-item becomes subject to the !TAR requirement for advance U.S. Government approval for 

nearly all reexports. At this time, all firearm parts and components and accessories are subject to 
35 

Johanna Reeves Prepared Statement 

U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

March 26, 2019 

Page 7 

IT AR export and reexport controls, with very few exceptions. Regardless of the size of the part, 

whether it be a bolt or a spring, or a barrel or a receiver, the part is subject to IT AR restrictions on 

reexports. In many cases, the process for obtaining such reexport approval has resulted in 

significant and even detrimental delays, even when the reexport is for ally governments. 

Consequently, there is a push to reduce U.S.-made components from defense products so as not to 

be burdened with the reexport restrictions under ITAR. 

Our allies are shunning U.S. products because ofiTAR, both because of unreliable delivery and 

the inability to reexport. The result is they source their products from other countries, including 

Russia and China. This poses a significant threat to our national security, because not only is the 

U.S. removed from the immediate supply chain (including potential U.S. government oversight 

thereof), but long term we are isolated from the replacement and repair market. This has very 

significant consequences on the American defense sector, not the least of which is the firearms 

and ammunition manufacturers. 

Conclusion 

Because of the age and wide-scale availability of the underlying technology, most firearms do not 

possess characteristics or parameters that provide a critical military advantage to the United States, 

nor are firearms exclusively available from the United States. In fact, it is these points that make 

the current system of export controls particularly harmful to U.S. industry, and indeed U.S. 

national security because of global competition and the inability of U.S. firearms companies to 

compete with foreign sources. 

The policies and regulations currently in place have not prevented firearms or the related 

technology from going to restricted places. Indeed, to our detriment they have only prevented the 

U.S. firearms industry from becoming reliable suppliers to our NATO and non-NATO allies, and 

in general competing effectively in the global market place. Similar to the challenges faced by 

other defense industries, the firearms trade has been negatively impacted by the incentives of 

foreign companies and governments to avoid U .S.-origin firearms. Our inability to effectively 

compete globally will undermine our firearms manufacturing base by inducing U.S. companies to 

move production offshore. This will affect jobs and domestic production levels, thus weakening 

the US Defense Industrial base. 

In conclusion, F.A.I.R. Trade Group supports the Administration's continued efforts to reform and 

modernize our export control system. We urge Congress to permit the right-sizing of the longstanding one-size-fits-all export policy for firearms and ammunition, and allow the firearms and 

ammunition sector to be regulated as other defense sectors are. This reform will not result in the 

decontrol of firearms or ammunition, and is critical to the positioning of our manufacturers in the 

world market and thus our national security. It is time to control exports of firearms and 

ammunition as we do all other sectors in the defense industry, and we look to this Committee to 

ensure this occurs. 
36 

Johanna Reeves Prepared Statement 

U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

March 26, 20 19 

Page 8 

Chairman Bera, Ranking Member Zeldin, and other distinguished members of the House Foreign 

Affairs Committee's Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, this concludes my testimony. 

On behalf of the members of F.A.l.R. Trade Group, thank you for the opportunity to testify, and 1 

look forward to your questions. 
37 

Mr. BERA. Thank you, Ms. Reeves. And thank you to all of the 

witnesses for being here. 

Mr. Abramson, in your opening remarks you touched on something about 3–D printing rules, and so forth. And I think this is 

an important component that we ought to touch on. Within State 

Department, when 3–D printing and how to make a gun that was 

undetectable was going to be posted on the internet, the State Department put a stop to it. 

Now, there was a lawsuit that was filed with that, and State Department settled it. But right now that lawsuit is being contested 

by about 20 state attorney generals. What we are told is if this rule 

change goes through, Commerce will not enforce, the ruling not to 

post this on the internet. 

We do not know how this lawsuit is going to get settled, but I 

do think, from an oversight perspective I have some concern, and 

I think this body ought to have some concern, as to whether we 

think it is a good idea for people to post how to make a 3–D printed 

gun that might not be detectable. That puts our kids at risk. That 

puts all of us at risk. 

All of you had to go through security screening when you came 

into this building. Again, from my end, I do not think it is a great 

idea for someone to figure out how to make a 3–D printed gun. 

That, hopefully, is something that we can work on in terms of trying to figure out how do we make sure that technology does not end 

up in the wrong hands. 

I just thought it was important for us to point that out, and I 

actually think State Department did the right thing. I am not 

thrilled that they settled this, and I am glad the state attorney 

generals have stepped up to try to prevent that posting. 

Again, this hearing is not about gun control, from my perspective. That is not the intent. It is also not about putting our manufacturers at a disadvantage to the rest of the world. I have long 

been an advocate for looking at our export control regime and making it a little bit more streamlined. 

In some of my dealings with other countries, and India in particular, there are items that do not make sense to be on the Export 

Control List, that, if they are not purchasing from us, they will be 

purchasing from others. 

My concern in this hearing—and what might happen with this 

rule—change is I want to make sure we are not treating everyone 

the same, that as we are interacting with countries that are allies, 

that share similar values, et cetera, that is one thing. But the reason why I focused on the Northern Triangle countries is in areas 

where we know there is an increase in violence, we know there is 

an increase in homicide, our values as Americans, and as leaders 

in the world and wanting to occupy the higher moral ground, we 

should not want you to think that our guns are contributing to 

that, or our small arms are contributing to that destabilization, 

particularly, as the President has pointed out, some of the crises 

on the southern border. 

If we do not try to address it in the countries that, are contributing to some of this migration, we will be addressing it on the 

souther border. And I think, again, as the world leader, we have 

a responsibility to try to address this. 
38 

So maybe I will turn to either Mr. Abramson or Professor Waltz 

on this one. It does seem to me that there is, a lack of—once these 

arms are sold, to be able to trace whether U.S. arms are being used 

in some of these atrocities. 

Professor Waltz, you touched on, what happened in Cameroon 

and other places, and I think that is something that we ought to 

figure out. Whether that is State Department doing this, whether 

that is Commerce, whether it is an interagency process, but if 

atrocities are happening, are these U.S.-made arms that are being 

used in those atrocities? 

Ms. WALTZ. I would say that this is the most difficult issue with 

regards to these weapons. They are small, and they come from 

many different places. And to try to do a ballistic analysis to figure 

out what weapon was used in what particular instance is really, 

really challenging. 

On top of that, trying to figure out whether the weapon was 

transferred in a lawful way or in an unlawful way makes it a really 

tricky issue to tackle, period. That is the reason why doing all of 

the due diligence up front to make sure that you have done as 

much as you possibly can to prevent the arms from going in the 

direction where they are going to end up in unintended hands is 

so important. 

We do have some examples of U.S. weapons being used—of weapons that were known to be transited from or supplied via U.S. 

channels that have ended up in hands, but very often these are not 

ones that were sold commercially. They were sold, perhaps transferred by U.S. military. 

But that is in many ways besides the point. The part that I think 

all of us are really concerned about is the prevention. What is the 

best system for keeping the weapons from getting out and into the 

wrong hands in the first place? The system that is now in place has 

a review at registration, a second review at licensing, and the possibility of going into a place and looking at the weapons. 

The last comment that I would make here is that while Commerce Department does have uniformed and armed officers, they 

do not actually have anyone on the ground in place overseas in the 

Northern Triangle of Central America. So they are really without 

the possibility of pursuing on the ground investigations at this 

point. 

Mr. BERA. Right. Well, I would love to work with the ranking 

member again, if we are selling small arms to Canada, it is one 

thing. If we are selling, small arms to Honduras, it might be another thing. 

And what I understand is it is better to be sure and do our due 

diligence on the front end to make sure where those weapons are 

going, and then at least on the back end having some ability to 

make sure they ended up in the right place. So I would love to 

work with you, Mr. Zeldin, on what that might look like. 

And with that, I will turn it over to the ranking member. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

And, Ms. Reeves, is there anything that you would like to weigh 

in on the conversation I was just having—taking place? 

Ms. REEVES. I think one—regarding the registration point, I 

think it is important to notice that under the Gun Control Act 
39 

manufacturers of firearms and ammunition must obtain a Federal 

firearms license from ATF. And the form to do that is—it is an application for a Federal firearms license, and on that form manufacturers or would-be licensees must disclose all responsible persons 

who are at the company. And a responsible person is not a nomination; it is actually a role of the job function. 

So if you have the power to make decisions at the company pertaining to firearms or ammunition, you must be designated. The 

background check that goes into that licensing process is pretty extensive, and on the form itself it includes country of birth, it includes citizenship, and it includes addresses for the last 5 years. 

So in terms of registration, it is not a completely black hole because that will be covered domestically under the Gun Control Act 

for licensing. 

Mr. ZELDIN. And how does the Commerce’s license review process 

differ from State’s? 

Ms. REEVES. Actually, not that much different because what will 

happen on the back end is when a license application is submitted, 

Commerce Department will take that license application and put it 

through an interagency review process. This is actually going to be 

required under the Export Control Reform Act. 

Part of those agencies include Department of Defense and the 

Department of State. The Department of State will refer everything 

to the Democracy, Rights, and Labor Bureau, DRL, so they will be 

intricately involved in reviewing license applications on the front 

end, and they will do so under foreign policy and national security. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Do either of the 2 witnesses want to weigh in on 

that? 

Mr. ABRAMSON. Yes, briefly. It is not a question in my mind of 

the Commerce Department suddenly wants weapons to end up in 

the wrong hands. I do not think that is the concern. Obviously, I 

have concerns about Commerce’s approach, more toward sales, but 

the reality is the way the system is set up the State Department 

captures more information during the licensing process, and ICE 

officials and others have told us that that information is very helpful as a deterrent value, but also later for prosecutions. 

The State Department will have a role in the Commerce—if 

Commerce is taking control, but the State Department will not 

have the primary authority of making that decision. Commerce will 

still hold that, so the State Department’s role will be lessened. But 

there is other pieces of this where the Congress will not be notified 

of misuse. That will happen if it is something that is controlled 

through the State Department. 

But when we go through the Commerce Department, you have 

different requirements about how the law is applied, so your oversight capacity will change. That is some of the big changes that we 

are talking about. 

Ms. WALTZ. If I might add, the changes and the processes that 

we are talking about right now, once these items move off of the 

U.S. Munitions List and are no longer defined as defense articles, 

will no longer be mandated by law. 

It is all a matter of regulatory practice and procedures within 

the—and I think that that is a crucial point, because what is required—in the early years, in the 1970’s, when some of this was 
40 

set up, for 6 or 7 years the administrations did not follow the general guidance of Congress. It was not until it was locked into law 

that these became really enforceable provisions. And what we are 

really talking about is possibly exiting them from the legal requirements. 

Mr. ZELDIN. I appreciate all 3 witnesses for that exchange. But, 

just to sum up some of the items that have already transitioned 

from U.S. ML to the CCL, Category IV, launch vehicles, guided 

missiles, ballistic missiles, rockets, torpedoes, bombs, and mines; 

Category VI, surface vessels of war and special naval equipment; 

VII, ground vehicles; IX, military training equipment; X, personal 

protective equipment; Category XIV, toxicological agents; Category 

XV, spacecraft and related articles; Category XVI, nuclear weapons-related articles. 

So it is just really important to note just how much of a transition has already been completed between U.S. ML and CCL. I appreciate the hearing and the conversation today, but, Commerce 

has already established quite a robust and proven role in many 

other pieces of equipment that, people would also suggest are consequential for this related debate as to context of this hearing. And 

I yield back. 

Mr. BERA. Yes. If I could just comment on the ranking member’s 

observation, that last observation. I think, Professor Waltz, you 

talked about the difficulty of tracing and tracking small arms, 

which is why much of the due diligence I suspect has to be done 

on the front end, whereas if we are selling an aircraft carrier to a 

country, we can probably better track how that aircraft carrier is 

being utilized and used. So, but I appreciate that, I am glad that 

we made some of those. 

I will now turn to Mr. Malinowski for purposes of questioning the 

witnesses. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Reeves, you 

mentioned the State Department’s DRL Bureau. I ran the State 

Department’s DRL Bureau, so I can speak a little bit to these questions. And when we were having this debate at the State Department in the last administration, there were arguments on both 

sides, but let me first attest the arguments have nothing to do with 

our domestic uncontrolled debate. They have to do with a broad understanding that violence against civilians around the world, mass 

violence by militias, by criminal terrorist organizations, by rapacious abuse of governments, is not committed by aircraft carriers. 

It is not committed by boats, largely not by planes or by tanks or 

by howitzers or by mortars. It is committed by small arms. 

The reality of places like Congo, Central America, Burma, is that 

small arms are the weapons of mass destruction of our time, and 

that is why we are very, very sensitive about getting this right. 

One case I was involved with involved the Philippines where we 

discovered an impending commercial sale of small arms, not to the 

Philippine government or Philippine police, but because we, in the 

State Department, had a thing called an Embassy in the Philippines and large numbers of people who monitored such things, 

we realized that the Philippine police was purchasing arms from 

the dealers to whom these small arms were going to be sold. 
41 

This was at a time when the Duterte Regime—well, it is still 

doing so—was conducting a campaign of extrajudicial executions as 

part of its so-called drug wars, including a lot of innocent kids who 

were being rounded up, killed in the middle of the night by gangs 

that were actually police officers off duty. 

And so we made the decision at the State Department to freeze 

that sale. I can 100 percent guarantee to you that if the Commerce 

Department had the final say in that sale they would not have 

made the same decision because the Commerce Department’s 

ethos, mandate, and mission was to support American manufacturers in their efforts to export their products. That is perfectly fine. 

That is exactly why the Commerce Department exists. The State 

Department exists to raise foreign policy, human rights, and national security considerations. 

So let me ask a few questions. Maybe, Mr. Abramson, Ms. Waltz, 

you can take the first few. Does the Commerce Department have 

personnel at U.S. embassies around the world that monitor these 

sorts of issues? Yes or no. 

Ms. WALTZ. No. 

Mr. ABRAMSON. No. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Does it have any staff assigned to review firearms sales to Central America, the Philippines, Afghanistan, 

Congo, Cameroon, Sudan, any of the countries where these issues 

might be of concern? 

Ms. WALTZ. It has a few—3 or 4 people stationed in various parts 

of the world, but none for Latin America. And I do not believe any 

for Africa as well. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. All right. And does it perform these due diligence checks, particularly on human rights, before a sale goes 

through? 

Ms. WALTZ. It has not so far. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. So let me ask you, Ms. Reeves, you spoke in 

your testimony about outdated regulations. Is the requirement that 

Congress be notified of sales over $1 million an outdated regulation? 

Ms. REEVES. No, I would not call that an outdated regulation for 

items governed by the U.S. Munitions List. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. For small arms, for semi-automatic weapons. 

So if we were to sell 20,000 AR–15s to the Philippines, would it be 

an outdated regulation for Congress to be notified of that? 

Ms. REEVES. Well, one thing that I will point out is that the $1 

million threshold only applies to small arms, and it is significantly 

different from the next highest threshold, which is $14 million. 

This, of course, affects significantly U.S. manufacturers from being 

able to ship to our allied governments, because when they have 

contracts that exceed that amount of money it is significantly delayed. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. So if the rules change goes through, would you 

support legislation that would impose the same $1 million threshold reporting requirement, even though it is going through the 

State Department for small arms? 

Ms. REEVES. I would have to see what the legislation is. 
42 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Would you support legislation that would require the Commerce Department to do a review of the potential 

human rights implications of a sale before the sale takes place? 

Ms. REEVES. I think the legislation is already there. I think 

under the Export Control Reform Act there is a review process that 

is specified under the statute. And in the review process, DRL, 

State Department objections to a license would not be overruled. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. OK. Well, I can just—I will close by saying, in 

my experience, for any item or issue where the Commerce Department had the final say, under current rules—and I can say, for example, surveillance technology is a very good example of this, 

where there is a vote by a committee in which Commerce, DoD, 

and the State Department each have one vote. 

In literally every single case, in my experience, where the State 

Department did not have the final say, and the Commerce Department had either a vote or the deciding vote, the Commerce Department 100 percent of the time voted for the export of, say, surveillance equipment to dictatorships that were going to use them 

against dissidents, journalists, et cetera. 

Unless there is a change in the ethos, mission, and mandate of 

the Commerce Department, I have no reason to believe that that 

will change. And I would hope that the industry, in its own interest, would support maintaining a very robust review process, because if you do not have that, you are going to find yourselves 

caught up in front page stories about U.S. weapons, weapons manufactured by your members, being used for things that will outrage 

the American people, and people will wonder who is responsible. 

You need the State Department to protect you from them. 

Thank very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BERA. Thank you. And I will recognize Mr. Perry for purposes of questioning the witnesses. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. Reeves, are you familiar with the IRGC? Do you know who 

that is? 

Ms. REEVES. Yes. 

Mr. PERRY. Are you familiar with the fact that the IRGC or components of those folks are driving around in Iraq in American-made 

M1 tanks? 

Ms. REEVES. Am I aware of that? 

Mr. PERRY. Yes. I am just asking. 

Ms. REEVES. Yes. 

Mr. PERRY. Yes. Right? And we are outraged by it, but the 

point—and do you suspect that a tank, an M1 tank, is significantly 

more lethal than, let’s say, an AK–47 or an AR–15? 

Ms. REEVES. That would be my assessment. 

Mr. PERRY. That would be mine as well. So let me just—in the 

last—I think you characterized it—I do not know the exact date, 

but this transfer to the Commerce Control List. When did that 

start? When did that effort start? 

Ms. REEVES. 2010 is when it really started. 

Mr. PERRY. 2010. Did you come to the Hill and testify in that regard? 

Ms. REEVES. No, I did not. 
43 

Mr. PERRY. And at all, between 2010 and now, have you come 

and testified? 

Ms. REEVES. No, I have not. 

Mr. PERRY. Why do you suppose that when that action was being 

proposed under the previous administration there did not seem to 

be any aversion to it, but now there appears to be? Why do you 

suppose that is? 

Ms. REEVES. I think that is a really good question. My own perception is that it is a different landscape right now. It is highly political. I think that there is a lot of conflation between modernizing 

our export control laws and domestic gun control and gun control 

arguments. 

Mr. PERRY. And in the context, I mean, look, I hate to bring this 

up, but I think it is important to bring this up, you are familiar 

with the Fast and the Furious—— 

Ms. REEVES. Yes, I am. 

Mr. PERRY [continuing]. Operation, et cetera. 

Ms. REEVES. Yes, I am. 

Mr. PERRY. Even in the context of the previous administration 

and the—let me ask you this. How did that arms transfer take 

place, if you know? 

Ms. REEVES. That was a lawful—as far as I know, it was a combination of lawful transfers and also unlawful exports by non-U.S. 

persons purchasing weapons from licensed firearms dealers who 

were trying to get ATF involved in monitoring and preventing the 

transfers. 

Mr. PERRY. Was the State Department involved? 

Ms. REEVES. Not that I know of. 

Mr. PERRY. Was the Commerce Department involved? 

Ms. REEVES. Well, the State Department was involved in terms 

of the lawful exports that went down there. 

Mr. PERRY. OK. But they still went, right? 

Ms. REEVES. Right. They did. 

Mr. PERRY. They still went. And they are credited with killing 

not only people of a foreign country but American citizens; is that 

correct as well? 

Ms. REEVES. Correct. 

Mr. PERRY. It seems to me that the current process, if that is allowed to happen, is certainly lacking for a lot of reasons, and it also 

seems to me that even in the face of that, at that time, nobody apparently—well, certainly you were not asked to come—and you are 

an expert in what you do, you are here now, but nobody at the time 

in Congress thought it important enough to bring you to testify and 

answer questions under that administration. But now that it is this 

administration, is the action significantly different under this administration than the previous one? 

Ms. REEVES. No. My understanding is that the proposed rules 

are largely unchanged from what was originally drafted. These categories were the first categories drafted. 

Mr. PERRY. OK. And even under the Commerce Control List, national security, foreign policy, review of applications still takes 

place; is that correct? 

Ms. REEVES. Yes. 
44 

Mr. PERRY. Would they still be reviewed by the State Department for human rights, illicit trafficking, and other security concerns? 

Ms. REEVES. Yes. 

Mr. PERRY. So it is essentially the same thing. 

Ms. REEVES. Yes. 

Mr. PERRY. Just streamlining it. But because we have a new administration—my words, not yours—that we disagree with—what 

before was OK is now not OK. That is—those are my—but you 

would tend to agree with them. 

Ms. REEVES. Yes. 

Mr. PERRY. Do American small arms manufacturers sell abroad? 

I mean, is it a part of their—a significant part of their business 

profile and their ability to stay in business and make a profit and 

produce not only items that are used by the military but by American citizens to defend themselves, by law enforcement in America, 

and around the world? 

Ms. REEVES. For some companies, it is very significant. 

Mr. PERRY. It is very significant. This technology has been 

around for a fairly—for a long time I think. 

Ms. REEVES. For a long time. I think it might have originated 

with the Chinese. 

Mr. PERRY. About the 11th century, right? 

Ms. REEVES. Something like that. 

Mr. PERRY. So the question is—and you have already heard the 

list that—which is incomplete, but you heard the list that my good 

friend from New York enumerated about the things that are already moved here of military concern. 

But is there any critical military advantage in the items listed 

in Categories I, II, or III, that are proposed to move to the CCL 

that would imperil the United States or where we would be giving 

away a significant and military advantage, understanding one of 

the items that Mr. Zeldin talked about was nuclear weapons. Just 

one of them was nuclear weapons. That is already there. 

Ms. REEVES. From what I understand, this was looked at very, 

very closely, and very extensively by experts within the government. And what they found is that the items listed to transition 

over to the Commerce Department do not give any significant improvements or—yes, exactly, for United States security. 

Mr. PERRY. I thank the ladies and gentleman. And I have exceeded my time. I yield. 

Mr. BERA. Thank you, Mr. Perry. 

If I could just—clarify, the purpose of this hearing is not because 

it is the Trump Administration proposing the rule change. I was 

not in Congress when the Obama Administration was proposing 

this rule change. Otherwise, I would have hoped we would have 

had a similar hearing. It really is: how do we make sure, when we 

are exporting these small arms, they do not end up in the hands 

of the wrong people? 

Again, I think we can all agree that we do not want, as Mr. 

Malinowski was pointing out, to see U.S.-made weapons on the 

front page of our hometown newspaper being used to kill civilians. 

We ought to figure out the best way to prevent that from happening. 
45 

With that, I will recognize my colleague from California, Mr. 

Lieu, for purposes of questioning the witnesses. 

Mr. LIEU. Thank you. Thank you to the witnesses for being here 

today. Let me just say for the record I opposed the Obama Administration’s unauthorized war in Syria. I oppose the Trump Administration’s unauthorized war in Syria. I would have opposed this rule 

change had I been able to vote on it under the Obama Administration. I am going to oppose it now under the Trump Administration. 

This is not a partisan issue. This is about saving lives. 

So I have heard my colleagues’ statements. I simply note there 

are troops who are stationed in Afghanistan and Syria and Iraq on 

the front lines that are not being killed by nuclear weapons, by directed-energy weapons, or by torpedoes. Many of them are getting 

shot. They are being killed by small arms weapons. 

And I have this article here that I want to enter into the record. 

It is called Trump’s New Gun Export Rules Could Aid Terrorists, 

Tyrants, and Criminals. And it is from CNN dated February 14, 

2019. If I could enter that into the record. 

Mr. BERA. Without objection. 

[The information referred to follows:] 
46 

3/26/2019 New US gun export rules could aid terronsts. tyrants and criminals (opinion)- CNN 

Editor's Note: Wilham n Hartung is the director of trw Arms ;mci S;;:cumy l'rojoct nt the Centt::r tor lntmn::morul Poltcy. The v;nws expreS-<:nd in this commrmta!Y are h1s 

https:IIW#\v.cnn.com/201-9/02/14/opinions/dona!d-1rump-dangerous-new-gun-ru!es-hartung/index.htm1 i/2 
47 

3/26/2019 New US gun export rules could aid terrorists, tyrants and criminals (opinion)~ CNN 

Stay up to date ... 

htlps:/fwww.cnn.com/2019102/14/oplnlons/dona!d-trump-dangerous-new-gun-rules-hartung!lndex.htm! 212 
48 

Mr. LIEU. All right. So let me ask some questions. Either Mr. 

Abramson or Professor Waltz, the U.S. has lost weapons that we 

gave to Syrian rebels and other folks that now end up in the hands 

of ISIS; is that right? 

Mr. ABRAMSON. That is correct. 

Mr. LIEU. And this is under the State Department, and would 

have even less regulations and less oversight under the Commerce 

Department; is not that correct? 

Mr. ABRAMSON. That is correct. 

Mr. LIEU. What we actually would want is more oversight, not 

less, if these weapons are ending up in our enemy’s hands and then 

they are killing U.S. troops; is not that right? 

Mr. ABRAMSON. That is correct. 

Mr. LIEU. OK. So, Ms. Reeves, I have a question for you. You had 

said that a bunch of these weapons could be brought in, commercial 

retail places. Flamethrowers are one of the things here that will be 

transferred to the Commerce Department, right? 

Ms. REEVES. Yes. 

Mr. LIEU. Do you know—— 

Ms. REEVES. Up to 20 meters. 

Mr. LIEU. Right. So do you know if Dick’s Sporting Goods sells 

flamethrowers? 

Ms. REEVES. No, they do not. 

Mr. LIEU. That is right. 

Ms. REEVES. Not that I know of. 

Mr. LIEU. So there is actually items here that you could not actually go to a commercial retail establishment and buy, like flamethrowers, correct? 

Ms. REEVES. OK. 

Mr. LIEU. OK. Now, I am going to reference this article we entered into the record from February. It says that ‘‘Saudi Arabia and 

the United Arab Emirates, which are wagering a brutal war in 

Yemen, has killed a thousand civilians and pushed the country to 

the brink of famine have’’—actually, thousands of civilians—‘‘have 

aggregately requested to buy hundreds of millions of dollars of firearms from the U.S.’’ 

You would not want Congress to know that that is the case, that 

countries are going to buy hundreds of millions of dollars of these 

kinds of weapons? Why would you want to Congress to not know 

that? 

Ms. REEVES. Well, for military weapons, Congress will know 

about that. That is written into the law, and there is the potential 

for including congressional notifications. That is something that 

should be worked out between Congress and the Commerce Department. 

Mr. LIEU. So you would not oppose that if there was this rule 

change that Congress would still be notified of sales over $1 million? 

Ms. REEVES. I would have to see it. 

Mr. LIEU. OK. Another part of this article was that the Philippines ordered $22 million worth of guns from the U.S. Professor 

Waltz or Mr. Abramson, would not Congress want to know about 

that? 
49 

Ms. WALTZ. Yes, of course they would. And they should have, actually. And in the case that I referred to earlier, one of the big 

problems was that they did not receive the notification by error. 

Mr. LIEU. So now that this proposal is to have a bunch of these 

weapons go under the Commerce Department’s jurisdiction, I 

would simply note that the head of the Commerce Department, 

Wilbur Ross—do any of you know if he has any military experience? He does not have any. He is a banker, and so we are going 

to have a banker make these kinds of decisions, which does not 

make a lot of sense to me. 

I have got another question for either Professor Waltz or Mr. 

Abramson. What was your understanding of the original rationale 

under the Obama Administration for proposing this? 

Mr. ABRAMSON. My understanding was it was just part of the 

broader export control reform initiative, which had this process of 

changing how things were done, and eventually ending up with one 

list that we never got to that point. But the arguments that this 

was never raised—no one raised an alarm during the Obama Administration—disregards the fact that it was never introduced for 

us to raise an alarm. We certainly were ready and at that point 

would have raised this. We have been waiting for many years 

knowing this was coming, and so to say that somehow this is an 

Obama era thing, and why did not we raise an alarm, really is a 

false reading of the history. 

Mr. LIEU. Thank you. And we just heard from our colleague, 

Congressman Malinowski, which basically said that he was opposed to it. He was in charge of one of the main offices at the time. 

Mr. ABRAMSON. Yes. 

Mr. LIEU. I also want to just make 2 requests for the consideration of the chair. I do hope that either this subcommittee or their 

House Foreign Affairs Committee will mark up the legislation that 

Congresswoman Torres presented on today. 

I also want to offer for the chair’s consideration my legislation 

called the Arms Sales Oversight Act. Right now, in the U.S. Senate, any member of the Senate can introduce a privileged resolution, which would cause a vote on arms sales transfers. We do not 

have the same thing in the House. This legislation would simply 

harmonize that and would request this committee to look at that 

legislation as well and decide what we want to do with it. 

Mr. BERA. Great. Thank you, Mr. Lieu. 

Mr. LIEU. And with that, thank you all for being here, and I yield 

back. 

Mr. BERA. All right. Thank you. 

I will recognize Congresswoman Omar for purposes of questioning the witnesses. 

Ms. OMAR. Thank you, and I hope you all will indulge me because I know that many of the people who are watching this testimony are like me. They are not really following most of the conversations and the kind of questions a lot of my colleagues are asking. It seems like a little inside baseball conversation. 

So I just want to simplify and sort of ask particular examples, 

and I hope you will give me leniency with time as I try to get the 

public to sort of understand what we are really talking about. 
50 

So I will start with you, Mr. Abramson. There was a mass shooting in Munich in July 2016 that left 10 people dead, and there was 

a Glock 17 semi-automatic weapon that was used. It is my understanding—is it your understanding that this administration’s policy 

would make a weapon like that for gun manufacturers to export? 

Mr. ABRAMSON. Yes. The semi-automatic weapons would move to 

the Commerce Control under this proposal. 

Ms. OMAR. Wonderful. Thank you. And then, as there were about 

67 of the 77 people killed in the 2011 attacks in Norway were 

killed by gunfire. The shooter was armed by a Ruger Mini–14 semiautomatic rifle and a Glock 37 semi-automatic handgun. Is it your 

understanding that this administration’s policy would make a 

weapon like that for American manufacturers to export? 

Mr. ABRAMSON. That is my understanding, yes. 

Ms. OMAR. Wonderful. Thank you. And in 2015—I mean, on 

March 15 of this year, there was a shooting at a mosque in Christchurch, New Zealand, that left 50 people dead. The shooter was 

armed with 5 guns, 2 of which were semi-automatic rifles. Is it 

your understanding that this policy would make it easier for American manufacturers to export that weapon? 

Mr. ABRAMSON. Indeed. That is exactly what we are talking 

about. 

Ms. OMAR. OK. So according to Insight Crime, 85 percent of the 

pistols that are used by MS–13 in Guatemala were stolen from 

Guatemalan law enforcement agencies. Is it your understanding 

that this administration would make it easier for American manufacturers to sell weapons to Guatemalan police? 

Mr. ABRAMSON. Yes. I mean, there is going to be a process either 

way, but, yes—— 

Ms. OMAR. Wonderful. 

Mr. ABRAMSON [continuing]. That is the case. 

Ms. OMAR. Thank you. And so, Ms. Reeves, I also have a few 

questions following up to that. In your testimony, you talked about 

the need for American gun manufacturers to have an easier time 

selling weapons to NATO and none NATO allies. Norway and Germany are our allies. So I can have this be clear for our constituents 

who are watching, is it your position that the United States should 

make it easier to export the kind of weapons that were used in the 

mass shootings that I just mentioned in Norway and Germany? 

Ms. REEVES. I do not agree with the word ‘‘easier’’ because in fact 

if it does—if these items do move over to Commerce Department, 

I do not think it is going to be easier. It is going to be different. 

It is going to—we are talking about right sizing the export control 

policy, and so it is a difference of who is going to be issuing the 

licenses—— 

Ms. OMAR. In your testimony—— 

Ms. REEVES [continuing]. Because I do not think what we are 

talking—— 

Ms. OMAR [continuing]. You did say we have to ease the process, 

we have to make it a little easier for these weapons to move. So 

in that, would it make it easier for us to sell? It is just very simple. 

Would it make it easier for us to sell these weapons in Norway and 

Germany? 
51 

Ms. REEVES. The licensing process would still be in place, and it 

would be a very extensive review on the front end for national security and human rights issues and foreign policy issues. So all of 

those reviews would still be in place by Commerce, State Department, and DoD. 

Ms. OMAR. All right. Wonderful. And, Ms. Reeves, in light of 

what happened last week, I find it a little disturbing that we are 

having this conversation after 11 days of the shooting in New Zealand, talking to people who manufacture guns, arguing for the need 

to loosen restrictions to import assault rifles. 

But as you mentioned, domestic laws of trading with our partners still does not violate the Administration’s policy. That means 

that American gun manufacturers will not be able to export semiautomatic rifles and assault rifles to places like New Zealand, even 

under these regulations, correct? 

Ms. REEVES. Well, again, I mean, we are not talking about loosening controls over exports of firearms. We are talking about a different agency that would be in charge of issuing licenses. And, 

again, those reviews would still be in place, and there would be reviews after the fact with end use monitoring and end use checks 

by Commerce Department. 

Ms. OMAR. In New Zealand, would we still be able to sell these 

semi-automatic weapons with—— 

Ms. REEVES. I am not going to speak for the government and 

what they will or will not approve. But my understanding is that 

there is a long history of the State Department issuing export licenses for New Zealand. 

Ms. OMAR. The reason you are not speaking on it, is it correct, 

is that in New Zealand they had just passed a law that prohibits 

these kind of weapons to be used and sold? 

Ms. REEVES. I think the law was passed after. 

Ms. OMAR. Yes. After the shooting happened. 

Ms. REEVES. Right. And so the U.S.—— 

Ms. OMAR. No. That was—— 

Ms. REEVES [continuing]. Government would not issue a license, 

though, if it would violate local law. 

Ms. OMAR. Precisely. That is what I was trying to get at. Thank 

you so much. 

And then I will just finish up with asking Dr. Waltz, I believe 

that insisting on human rights standards around the world is not 

just a moral responsibility but a national security imperative. You 

mentioned in your testimony that 60 percent of the grave human 

rights abuses investigated by Amnesty International involved firearms. 

The country that I come from—Somalia—really is an example of 

what my colleague from New York was talking about. He mentioned Congo and other places, but Somalia is a really good example of what happens when we just allow firearms to run rampant. 

Is it correct that the Administration’s policy would make it easier 

for gun manufacturers to sell to governments with patterns of 

human rights violations? 

Ms. WALTZ. I think it would, yes. And if I might add, I think the 

big error in the consideration of this category of weapons is not to 

consider their lethality. It is to treat them as though they are sim-
52 

ple commercial products that are easily available instead of the 

dangerous items that they are. 

Ms. OMAR. Yes. And, last, I just wanted to—I had the opportunity to visit Honduras when the elections were happening in 

2017, and so I know that we have a lot of interactions with Honduras, and so I wanted to talk to you a little bit about the postelectoral violence in Honduras where dozens of people were killed 

by State security forces, and the military police and other Honduras security forces. 

They used semi-automatic weapons to kill a lot of these 

protestors. The post-electoral crisis was one of the main drivers of 

the current refugee crisis that we are seeing from Central America. 

And so I just wanted to have on the record, is it correct that the 

administration’s policy would make it easier for gun manufacturers 

to sell weapons to Honduras security forces? 

Ms. WALTZ. It could very well have that effect. 

Ms. OMAR. Thank you so much. And thank you for your indulgence. 

Mr. BERA. Thank you. And I will recognize my colleague from 

New York, Mr. Espaillat, for purposes of questioning the witnesses. 

Mr. ESPAILLAT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, ranking member. I 

am proud to be a co-sponsor of H.R. 1134 for multiple reasons. 

First and foremost, I believe it is important that this function remains within the State Department. 

Simply, it just sends the wrong message that moving arms, export from the Department of State to the Department of Commerce 

sort of like creates the real impression that this is a commercial 

transaction, right? That no human factor is involved. That it is 

going to be so clean and septic that no one is ever going to die. It 

is like, we are trading coffee or sugar or something, but in this case 

obviously it is arms. 

Second, I believe that it is vital that Congress continues to conduct strong oversight over these transactions, as we must be able 

to ensure that American interests and priorities are upheld. And, 

obviously, this does not strengthen oversight. I believe that it 

weakens it. 

Finally, I believe that it is vital because of the threat of gun violence at home and abroad that we must do all we can do to ensure 

that guns do not fall into the wrong hands. I want to address this 

from a sort of like different angle, right, because although semiautomatic weapons are horrible and they show their ugly face 

every so often, and the consequences are so tragic as we just saw 

in New Zealand, it is handguns really that are taking the vast 

number of lives here in the United States and in urban cities 

across the world. 

And as sectors, very radical sectors of urban settings begin to 

radicalize themselves, and begin to act in very aggressive and violent ways, I think it is incumbent upon us to make it even more 

difficult for the wrong people to get their hands on handguns. 

Now, I sponsored a piece of legislation that is called the Ghost 

Guns are Guns Act, because ghost guns are a way to circumvent 

local measures to restrict access to guns as well as 3–D printed 

guns. How do you see this whole debate with regards to access to 

handguns? Is it going to make it easier to access handguns, ghost 
53 

guns, 3–D printed guns, et cetera, across the world? Are we going 

to be the great exporter of death now, not just through semi-automatic weapons but also through handguns? 

Anybody that would like to tackle this. 

Mr. ABRAMSON. I am glad you asked this question, because this 

is clearly one of the areas where our export policy has a big play 

on this, because currently ghost guns, or 3–D printed guns, are regulated as an export. You put them online and anybody can get 

them. That is what this proposal would change, and it is completely alarming. It is completely alarming for domestic reasons 

and for international reasons that you are talking about, which is 

where, we are not having a domestic gun control debate when we 

are talking about the export, but in this case we are and it is very 

important. 

Dr. Waltz has been looking at this a bit more than I have, if you 

wanted to—— 

Mr. ESPAILLAT. Dr. Waltz. 

Ms. WALTZ. Well, just simply in terms of the regulations that are 

involved. The Commerce Department has, as part of its rules, that 

if any technology is available open source, and readily available for 

anyone, they do not make any effort to regulate it. They have asserted that for firearms that migrate over to the Commerce Control 

List they simply will not have any control at all over open source 

instructions for 3-D production. 

We have seen slightly different approaches in the previous State 

Department and this State Department, but I think we are at a 

place where right now the possibilities of control for export remain 

in place as long as they are on the State Department side of the 

divide. If they move over to Commerce, it is crystal clear that there 

will be no control. 

Mr. ESPAILLAT. Finally, Mr. Abramson, there is a pending court 

case that prevents the online publication of 3–D printed guns. How 

did this lawsuit come about? And with the transfer of some of these 

items, how will this lawsuit be impacted? 

Mr. ABRAMSON. I am not a lawyer, but my understanding is functionally, if this transaction were to happen and it is moved over to 

State Department, there would be no longer any control—moved 

over to Commerce, there would no longer be any control in the 

State Department. So I do not understand why the lawsuit would 

continue. Other lawyers may know better, but functionally you 

would abdicate the suit because there would be no purpose for it 

because it is no longer a State Department-controlled weapon. 

Mr. ESPAILLAT. Any lawyers in the house? No. 

Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BERA. Thank you. I will recognize my colleague from Rhode 

Island, Mr. Cicilline, for purposes of questioning the witnesses. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to you 

and Ranking Member Zeldin for holding today’s hearing on the importance of export controls to properly regulate the sale of defense 

articles and firearms, and I thank our witnesses for being here 

today and for their testimony. 

Our Nation’s export control regime is a critical tool for ensuring 

that the weapons, materials, and technologies that we produce for 

military and commercial purposes, particularly those that can in-
54 

flict deadly harm, do not end up in the wrong hands. Recent proposals from the Trump Administration in the last year to remove 

several types of military model firearms from the U.S. Munitions 

List under the jurisdiction of the State Department, and move 

them to the Commercial Control List, could jeopardize our ability, 

in my view, to determine the manner in which these weapons may 

be used and could ultimately lead to these weapons ending up in 

the hands of those who would threaten our Nation’s security interests. 

And I thank the witnesses for their testimony regarding the impact that these policy proposals could have on foreign policy, and 

the suggestions that you have made in your testimony and ways 

that we can strengthen our export control system. 

I would like to start with you, Mr. Abramson. In your testimony, 

you mentioned that the State Department requires the suspension 

of sales to countries that violate human rights. Could you talk a 

little bit about some kind of historical examples of that and what 

the implications of this new proposal might be on those efforts? 

Mr. ABRAMSON. Certainly. And I think maybe the most relevant 

right now is what we are seeing with the arming of the Saudis and 

the Emiratis as they conduct their war in Yemen. There have been 

concerns about their misuse of U.S.-supplied weapons. It is very 

rare, actually, to hear publicly that the Administration has found 

a violation of human rights, but that does seem to be what is happening, and that is what has driven a lot of concern about how that 

misuse of weaponry could occur. 

It is very important that these regulations within the current 

system also provide a chance for the Congress to be notified if violations occur, and then actions do occur. My understanding is if it 

is moved to Commerce, that would not be the case any longer. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you. And, Professor Waltz, would you 

speak a little bit about the relationship that you have observed between countries that have security forces that—and may not have 

kind of strong internal controls and that relationship to organized 

criminal activity in those countries, and the danger of weapons falling into the hands of, organized crime or criminals, and the significance of that, particularly in countries with weak internal controls, 

and how these policies might impact those dangerous. 

Ms. WALTZ. So, really, you are talking about issues of diversion. 

There may be one authorized recipient, and then because of lax 

controls, as we have seen in Mexico where all of the weapons that 

are lawfully commercially supplied to Mexico go to the Army (National Defense Secretariat). They transfer them, and then, in the 

hands of local police, they are used to violate human rights, sometimes in the most awful sorts of extrajudicial executions and forced 

disappearances. 

We are seeing something very similar with the Philippines. So it 

is not at all uncommon for the controls locally to be lax. If you are 

thinking particularly about issuing a license for a country as a 

whole and not scrutinizing which units might actually receive those 

weapons, you are multiplying the possibilities of abuse. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you. And I thank the chairman and the 

ranking member again. You know, as we all know, we have a very 

pernicious gun violence problem in this country. We ought not to 
55 

put forward policies that will in any way export that very pernicious problem we have in America to other countries around the 

world and bring less stability and more unrest to places all over 

the world. 

So I thank you for convening this hearing on this very important 

subject, and I yield back. 

Mr. BERA. Thank you. I want to thank the witnesses and all the 

members for being here today. 

And with that, the committee is adjourned. 

Ms. WALTZ. Chairman Bera, may I ask for just 1 second? 

Mr. BERA. Yes. I will—— 

Ms. WALTZ. I know this is—— 

Mr. BERA. With some latitude, I will go ahead and give you a second. I will then extend the same courtesy to Ms. Reeves and Mr. 

Abramson, if they—— 

Ms. WALTZ. I realize this is highly exceptional. But I want to say 

that over the weekend I spent a lot of time combing through the 

Commerce Control List looking for items that have been transferred, the 600 items—the 600 Series items. And what I found were 

not military lethal weapons. 

What I found were unarmed, unarmored vehicles, non-submersible, unarmed submarine rescue ships, shelters that were specifically to provide against nuclear or biological contamination, radar 

equipment, telecommunications, joysticks, circuit boards, rheostats, 

et cetera. I did not find any weapons, any items that were recognizable as lethal weapons. 

The one item I am aware of that has caused concern in the 

human rights community is the equipment to spray tear gas. I 

would really appreciate that being entered into the record. Thank 

you very much. 

Mr. BERA. It will be. Ms. Reeves, I will extend you—— 

Ms. REEVES. What I will say to that is one of the—some of the 

items that have moved from the U.S. Munitions List is riot control 

agents, and those have moved over to the Commerce Control List. 

I will also just reiterate that, again, State Department will have 

absolute visibility in the review process of license applications. If 

there is any objection or reservation from the State Department on 

issuing a license, that will not be overruled, my understanding is, 

by Commerce Department. 

So those review processes for human rights and unrest in certain 

regions will be reviewed and adhered to. 

Mr. BERA. Great. And with that, this committee is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
56 

APPENDIX 

SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128 

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations 

Ami Bera (D-CA), Chairman 

March 26, 2019 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign 

Affairs, to be held by the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations in Room 2200 of the 

Rayburn House Office Building (and available live on the Committee website at 

https://foreignafTairs.house.gov/): 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESSES: 

Tuesday, March 26, 2019 

10:00 a.m. 

Proposed Small Arms Transfers: Big Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy 

!J!.!!ill 

The Honorable Norma J. Ton·es 

Member of Congress (D-CA) 

Panel II 

Mr. Jeff Abramson 

Senior Fellow for Arms Control and Conventional Arms Transfers 

The Arms Control Association 

Susan Waltz, Ph.D. 

Professor 

Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy 

University of Michigan 

Ms. Johanna Reeves 

Executive Director 

F.A.I.R. Trade Group 
57 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

MINUTES OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON _____ o_vE_·R_S_IG_'II_T_&_I_N_V_Es_r_IG_~_1:_10_N_s _____ HEAR1NG 

Day_-'-T-'1'-te_s<_la-"J-' -~Date. __ M_m_·c_lt_2_6-'-,_2_0_19 __ R.oom Raybum 2200 

Starting Time 10:02 AM__Ending Time 11:30AM 

ReceSses ( __ to__) L_to __ )( __ to __ ) L__to __ ) ( __ to__) ( ___ to __ ) 

Chairman Ami Bem, M.D. 

Open Session 0 Executive ~sed) Session D Televised lZI 

TITLE 011 HEARING: 

Electronically Record!ll!Jtaped) G'J 

Stenographic Record lLJ 

Proposed Small Arms Tmnsfers: Big Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy 

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: 

See attached affemlance sheet. 

NON-SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: (Mark with an *if they are not members offul/ committee.) 

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes [D NoD 

(If "no", please list beloll' and include title, agemy, department, or organization) 

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (List any statements submitted for the record) 

Clwirman 's Opening Statement 

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE ___ _ 

or 

TIME ADJOURNED 11:30AM 

Subcommittee Staff Associate 
58 

PRRSF.NT 

~_/ 

v/ 

L// 

~ 

/ 

,__,/ 

t--

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

SUBCOMMI11'EE ON OVERSIGHT & iNVESTIGATIONS HEARING 

MEMB£11 PRESF:NT'- MEMBER 

\mi Hem C:A ~ Lee "'eldin, NY 

Ilhan Omar, MN \// Scott Peny, PA 

Adriano Espaillat, NY / Ken Buck, CO 

Ted Lieu, CA ./ Guy Reschenthaler, PA 

Tom Malinowski, NJ -- David Cicilliue, Jl! 

---

--

-

--

---·---
59 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN BERA 

Opening Statement 

The Honorable Ami Bera 

Chaiiman, Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Proposed Small Anns Transfers: Big Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy 

Tuesday, March 26, 2019 

10::00 AM, 2200 Rayburn House Office Building 

I want to thank Ranking Member Mr. Zeldin, members of the subcommittee, our witnesses, 

and members of the public for joining us for today's hearing on the Administration's proposal to 

transfer the export licensing of small arms from the Department of State to the Department of 

Commerce. This proposal has raised a series of questions about the implications for continued 

adherence to congressional oversight requirements and foreign policy directives. The 

responsibility to conduct oversight of such matters lies with Members of Congress, in particular 

those of us who serve on the Foreign Affairs Committee. 

This hearing is not about questioning the basis for the U.S. arms export control system. 

Reasonable people will disagree about whether we are exporting too many weapons abroad or how 

economic considerations should factor into such decisions. This hearing is not about gun control, 

or whether we should or should not be exporting these weapons, regardless of my personal opinion 

or the opinions of others. Nor is this hearing meant as a blanket criticism of the Trump 

administration; in fact, the Obama administration contemplated the same rule change but elected 

not to pursue it. 

This hearing is about something that Democrats and Republicans can all agree on: when 

the United States chooses to export weapons, we want to make sure that they are going to legitimate 

allies for purposes that align with our foreign policy interests. We want to be sure they are going 
60 

through a vigilant vetting process and are not ending up in the hands of foreign governments or 

organizations using them to commit human rights atrocities, and that once the arms are shipped, 

we have mechanisms in place to track the arms to ensure they end up with the intended recipients 

and arc used for the agreed-upon purposes. 

Over the past decade, reasonable questions have been raised about the strengths and 

weaknesses of the cmTent system, including by the previous and current administrations. The 

Obama administration sought to streamline the export administration of defense articles and 

services and "dual-use" items that are used for both military and civilian purposes. As the ViceChairman of the Science Committee, I've been supportive of this overall initiative in the past. For 

example, many of our domestic satellite manufacturers lost out on business because of the lengthy 

approval process for civilian satellites, which fall into the dual-use category. I therefore supported 

moving those satellites off U.S. Munitions List and to Commerce Control List. 

The rule change we are discussing here today, however, is fundamentally different. This 

proposal has implications for three related and very important issues: 

1) ensuring the small arms export control system protects U.S. human rights interests; 

2) ensuring this system maintains- and docs not in any way weaken- current congressional 

oversight mechanisms and practices; and 

3) export laws and regulations related to potentially harmful and weaponizable 3D 

technologies. 

I'm confident that all of us gathered here today want to prevent U.S. manufactured weapons 

from ending up in the wrong hands and being used to commit human rights abuses of civilian 

2 
61 

populations. The proliferation of small arms and light weapons is a major cause of instability and 

the rise of low intensity conflicts around the world. The items being proposed to shift to the 

Commerce Department's purview differ than the items that have been transferred in recent years. 

A spare part for an engine cannot be used by criminal clements or to commit human rights abuses 

by security forces. We must be vigilant in our export controls to ensure these small arms do not 

fuel criminal activities that could be used against civilians. 

Of particular relevance is the export of weapons to the countries that comprise the 

Northern Triangle - Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. These exports have increased in 

recent years as the slide being displayed shows. [Insert slide]. 

These countries are wracked by political instability, violent crime, and weak internal 

security. Not coincidentally, the United States has seen a dramatic increase in migrants from 

these countries. Between 2012 and 2015, there was a five-fold increase in the number of asylum 

seekers from the Northern Triangle- 110,000 in 2015. In 2016,42% of those apprehended at the 

southern border came from the Northern Triangle, according to the Department of Homeland 

Security. 

They are being driven here by violence in their home countries. All three countries rank 

in the top 10 for homicide according to the Brookings Institution. A Doctors Without Borders 

survey of Northern Triangle migrants in Mexico from 2015 found that an astounding 40% of 

respondents had relatives who had been killed in the last two years; over 33% knew someone 

3 
62 

who had been kidnapped. Is it really in our interest to make reduce controls and make it easier to 

send weapons to these countries? 

Over decades the U.S. has refined our arn1s export control system to ensure weapons do 

not end up in the wrong hands abroad. There is no doubt that the State Department can and must 

do a better job of ensuring these weapons are not slipping through the cracks. If this proposal is 

put into place, the disappearance of oversight mechanisms that do exist lead to a greater probability 

that these weapons will more easily fall into the hands of those who commit acts of violence around 

the world. 

The State Department and Commerce Department fundamentally treat arms exports 

differently. The State Department requires sales advance our foreign policy objectives and the 

national interest Sales must be for friendly countries "solely" for use in "internal security"; 

"legitimate self-defense"; or to participate in UN efforts to restore international peace and security. 

They have strict human rights criteria. 

Commerce differs from the State Department Unlike the State Department, they do not 

have an automatic requirement that manufacturers and brokers register. They also arc not required 

to take human rights criteria into consideration when granting a license. 

Finally, Congress loses its oversight role under this rule change. Through legislativelymandated notification and consultation processes, Congress regularly questions proposals of small 

arms sales to ensure they do not endanger the national security, foreign policy and moral interests 

of our nation. Congress is notified for sales over $1,000,000 and allowed time for the appropriate 

review and approval or disapproval of such sales. There are many moments when Congress has 

4 
63 

arrived at different conclusions related to a proposed sale than previous administrations, 

irrespective of our political parties. Last year, Congress blocked the sale of semi-automatic 

handguns and assault rifle sales to the Philippines and Turkey because of concerns that they would 

be unlawfully used against civilians. 

The proposed rule change would eliminate the congressional oversight function ·written in 

current legislation. We have a responsibility on our end to ensure that congressional inquiries 

and holds are placed based on legitimate reasons, and we are not slowing down sales due to our 

own inefficiencies. That said, while we seek to improve efficiencies and effectiveness of the 

system as a whole, simultaneously abandoning congressional oversight is not something I can 

support. 

The system is not perfect. A State Department OIG investigation of the office in charge of 

approving licenses, the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, found significant flaws. They discovered 

that DDTC failed to implement proper internal controls and that DDTC licensing personnel weren't 

properly trained. They attributed this, in part, to a 28% reduction in staff from previous years. 

In response, they made a series of recommendations including establishing proper procedures for 

license reviews and developing a staffing plan to address shmtfalls in capacity. 

And while we must focus on improving the system and the near term implications of the 

rule change, we also shouldn't ignore longer term consequences. The State Department is 

currently involved in a lawsuit with over 20 State Attorneys General involving the publication of 

manuals for 3D guns. Right now, the State Department can regulate these publications. The 

5 
64 

Commerce Department argues that due to pre-existing intemal regulations it cannot prevent the 

publication of this information online. While the teclmology is still in its infancy, it has dramatic 

potential to upend the safety of our airports, schools, and public buildings- not to mention the 

serious risk of proliferation. It is in the interest of all Americans to figure out a way to prevent 

such technologies from ending up in the wrong hands, irrespective of whether the authority for 

control rests with the Commerce or State Departments. 

I look forward to hearing solutions to ensure we have the right controls in place before 

approving the export of small arms. This is not a perfect system. It's our job in Congress to 

devise solutions so that these kinds of weapons don't end up in the wrong hands- whether or not 

these licenses are processed by the State Department or the Commerce Department 

In the near term, I recommend one such solution offered by my friend and fellow 

Califomian, Congresswoman Norma Torres. We welcome Ms. Torres back to the Foreign 

Affairs committee, which we served together on for a number of years. I look forward to her 

testimony, as well as the testimony of our witnesses. With that, I tum to my Ranking Member, 

Mr. Zeldin, for his opening statement 

6 
65 

MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD FROM 

CHAIRMAN BERA 
66 
67 

MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD FROM MR. 

ABRAMSON 
68 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

9 April2019 

To: Congressman Ami Bera, Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations, Committee on 

Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives 

From: Susan Waltz, Professor, Ford School of Public Policy, University of Michigan 

RE: Replies to Questions for the Record 

Subcommittee Hearing, March 26, 2019 --Proposed Small Arms Transfers: Big Implications for 

U.S. Foreign Policy 

******************************************************************************************************************** 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify as part of the March 26 Hearing on Proposed Small Arms 

Transfers. My responses to your Questions for the Record follow. 

1. Which items have been moved from the U.S. Munitions List (USML) to the Commerce 

Control List (CCL)? How were those items identified? Was there a formal notification 

articulating these items? 

Short answer. 

Over the past several years, the United States has moved numerous defense articles previously 

controlled under the USML to the CCL. The main types of milttary equipment on the CCL are 

parts and components for a range of sophisticated and unsophisticated US weapons systems, 

including F-16s, Apache helicopters, and M1A1 tanks. The administration has also placed on the 

CCL some complete defense articles without their armor or munitions, including military transport 

vehicles. (See Appendix for more details). 

However, the United States has yet to move any complete weapons that are designed to directly 

harm or kill individuals or that have been implicated in sparking and fueling anmed conflict--as has 

been the case with small anms and light weapons in recent decades. This is why fireanms are 

currently categorized as significant military equipment. 

More detailed response. 

The process and criteria for identifying items for transfer was initially outlined in Advance Notices 

of Proposed Rulemaking issued by the Departments of State and Commerce in 2010. The two 

departments jointly called for the establishment of a "bright line" between the USML and the CCL 

"to distinguish the types of items that should be controlled at different levels for different types of 

destinations, end-uses, and end-users" and "to reduce government and industry uncertainty 

about whether a particular item is subject to the jurisdiction of the ITAR or the EAR." 1 According 

to notices subsequently published in the Federal Register, the main criteria used to determine 

which defense articles would move from the USML to the CCL have generally been linked to an 

item's inherent military nature or, for items with common civilian application, a critical military 

advantage it supplies. 2 

1 See "Revisions to the United States Munition List A Proposed Rule by the State Department, 2010, 

https:I/WitWJ. federa!register_ gov/ doc!Jments/201 0/12/1 0/201 0-30994/revisions-to-the-united-states-munitions-list accessed April 8, 

2019. 

2 See for example, BIS, Revisions to the Export Administration Regulations: Auxiliary and Miscellaneous Items That No Longer 

Warrant Control Under the United States Munitions List and Items on the Wassenaar Arrangement Munitions List, 2012, 

ht1ps:l/www.federa!register .gov/documents/2012/05/18!2012-12124/revisions-to-the-export-admlnistraUon-regulations-quxmary-andmiscel!aneous-items-that-no-1onqer accessed 8 April 2019. 
69 

The identification of firearms recently proposed for transfer was "based on a review of those 

categories by the Department of Defense, which worked with the Departments of State and 

Commerce in preparing the amendments."3 Several reasons were offered to justify the proposed 

transfer of non-automatic and semi-automatic firearms from the USML to the CCL, including: an 

assessment that these weapons do not provide the US a critical military or intelligence 

advantage; they are manufactured from technology that is widely available and they are available 

outside the US; they have commercial and other non-military characteristics distinguishing them 

from other items on the Munitions List; there is a significant market for firearms related to civil and 

recreational activities; they are available in US retail outlets; and the current controls burden U.S. 

industry without any proportionate benefits to United States national security or foreign policy 

objectives. 4 

The criteria have not included an assessment of the risks that these weapons could be diverted 

or used for unintended purposes. Nor have they accounted for the current military utility of these 

firearms, evidenced by the fact that some are regularly issued to US military personnel. 5 

Paradoxically, and perhaps ironically, the firearms currently proposed for removal from the US 

Munitions List for purpose of export would remain on the US Munitions Import List (USMIL) for 

purposes of import into the United States. 6 

The items that have thus far been moved from the USML to the CCL as part of the Arms Export 

Control Reform initiative are classified as "600-series" on the CCL, and for general purposes they 

can be identified by the third character "6" in the 5-character CCL classification numbers 

(ECCNs). 7 The 600-series is considered a munitions list within the CCL 8 Firearms are intended 

to be classified separately, in a series of ECCN numbers with the third character "5" (the "500-

series"). 

As for notification of proposed changes, throughout the reform process notifications of all 

proposed rule changes have been posted in the Federal Register with the customary request for 

public comment. 9 Furthermore, for previous proposed rule changes, the State Department and 

Commerce Department have offered substantive responses to public comments, occasionally by 

adjusting the proposed rules. 10 

3 BIS,"Control of Firearms, Guns, Ammunition and Related Articles the President Determines No Longer Warrant Control Under the 

United States Munitions List (USML)," May 2018, 

b.!1Qs://vw"M. federalregister.gov/documents/2018/05/24/2018-1 P~QZLQQD.tro!-of.:fjrean:ru~.::9.!J.O§··ammunition-and-relat?_Q:::f:l.r.li.9ill.!dl::!§: 

~§]!-determines-no-longer-warrant, accessed April 8, 2019. 

"

1 BIS,''Control of Firearms, Guns, Ammunition and Related Articles the President Determines No Longer Warrant Control Under the 

United States Munitions List (USML),'' May 2018, 

httos:l/www federa!register.qov/documents/2018/05/24/20 18-1 0367/control-of-flrearms-guns-ammunitlQ_r:l-and·JQJ.ill.©d-artides-~Jl~ 

Q[s;sident-determines-no-longer-warrant, accessed April 8, 2019. 5 Several sidearms (pistols) and sniper rifle models used by US armed forces are slated for transfer to the CCL, for example the 

Glock M007 (Glock 19M) pistol used by the US Marines and the Heckler & Koch MK 23 pistol used by US Special Forces, and the 

M24 Sniper Rifle used by the US Army. See Comments of the Brady Center in "Public Comments on USML 1-111" accessed via 

Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, https://WNW.pmddtc state.qov/?id=ddtGJ!.t,!Qlig_p_.Qil§Ln . .§.W.S and event~.Q.:;l April 8. 2019. 

~>Firearms imported to the US are controlled by the US Munitions Import List (USMIL), under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of 

Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. 7 The full Commerce Control Ust is found at https:/1\I'JWW.bis.doc.gov/index.php/regu!atlons/export-admmistratlon-regufations-ear, 

accessed AprilS, 2019. (The middle character "6" while a reliable indicator of transferred items, the rule is not without exceptions. 

A few items listed on the CCL prior to the Export Control Reform were renumbered to harmonize with Wassenaar classification, and 

some space-related technologies and commodities were assigned an ECCN number of 9A515.) 8 See "Definition of Terms," CCL https·lf\NV\1\"L.IJ.l~doc.govllndex.pllp/documents/regulations-docs/2344-772-1 0-24-18/file accessed 

April 8, 2019. 9 A summary table of notifications, public comment and final rules is available at 

httos://bui!d.export.gov/buitd/grotlps/public/®eg main/documents/webcontentleg main 048264.pdf, accessed 8 April 2019. 

Hl See for example, Department of State, Amendment to the International Traffic in Anns Regulations: Third Rule Implementing 

Export Control Reform https:/lwww.govinfo.gov/cqntontlokg/FR-2014-01-02/pdf/2013-31323 pdf, accessed AprilS, 2019 

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2. What is the nature of the controls proposed for firearms intended for transfer from the U.S. 

Munitions List to the Commerce Control List? 

Short answer 

Firearms transferred to the CCL would be subject to a relatively streamlined licensing process 

that relies heavily on the systematic application of several screens rather than country specific 

information available to the Department of State for licensing of defense articles on the USML. 

The Department of Commerce's streamlined process would leave fewer opportunities for prelicense screening and scrutiny of midd Iemen because these would not necessarily be detailed at 

the time of license application. (See below for a comparison of the CCL and the USML license 

procedures, as provided by the Department of Commerce.) 

The CCL licensing process extends from a series of controls ("reasons for control") that are 

applied to individual countries, or groups of countries. Within this regulatory framework, the 

Department of Commerce (BIS) has proposed that firearms exports be subject to controls 

specifically for reasons of National Security (NS), Regional Stability (RS), the OAS Firearms 

Convention (FC), United Nations restrictions (UN), and Anti-Terrorism (AT). 11 (What this means, 

in a nutshell, is that for firearms exports, transactions to destinations in countries that have been 

flagged in the Country Chart for any one of these reasons would be reviewed for related 

concerns. Transactions to destinations not flagged for the particular control would not receive 

similar scrutiny.) According to the proposed regulatory changes, for exports that involve complete 

firearms a license would be required for all destinations and all applications would be subject to 

case-by-case review. A few countries and situations would be explicitly subject to a "policy of 

denial."12 

Human rights. While the RS screen does mention human rights considerations as an aspect of 

US foreign policy, most of the firearms proposed for transfer to the CCL would not be subject to 

the Crime Control (CC) screen--which is more explicitly linked to human rights-related concerns 

(and is sometimes called the Crime Control/Human Rights control). State Department 

evaluations based on statutorily-mandated annual human rights reports to Congress are also 

directly linked to the CC reason for control. 13 (See below for details.) 

More detailed response 

According to the Commerce Department (BIS), the general process for licensing under the CCL is 

streamlined in two ways that are generally advantageous to industry: a license can be issued 

before all the arrangements of the sale are known, and a license may authorize muttiple 

transactions. The Commerce Department (BIS) has frequently highlighted differences between 

the USML and CCL licensing processes, as in the following passage: 

"Under the USML licensing procedure, an applicant must include a purchase order or 

contract with its application. There is no such requirement under the CCL licensing 

procedure. This difference gives the CCL applicant at least two advantages. First, the 

applicant has a way of determining whether the U.S. government will authorize the 

transaction before it enters into potentially lengthy, complex and expensive sales 

presentations or contract negotiations. Under the USML procedure, the applicant will 

need to caveat all sales presentations with a reference to the need for government 

approval and is more likely to have to engage in substantial effort and expense only to 

11 From BIS,"Controf of Firearms, Guns, Ammunition and Related Articles the President Determines No Longer warrant Control 

Under the United States Munitions List (USML)," May 2018, 

https://WMJV.federalregfster .gov/documents/2018/05/24/2018-1 0367 /control-of-firearms-guns-ammunition-and-re!ated-articles-thepresident-determines-no-!onger-warrant, accessed AprilS, 2019. 12 See licensing policies for National Security (742.2) and Regional Security controls in CCL Part 742, 

https://W'M\'.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/regulations-docs/2342-7 42-1 0-24-18ffi!e, accessed April 8, 2019. 13 See 2018 Report On Foreign Policy-Based Export Controls, p. 9, at https://'vWM'.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/regulationsdocs/2342-742-10-24-18flile, accessed April8, 2019. 

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find that the government will reject the application. Second, a CCL license applicant need 

not limit its application to the quantity or value of one purchase order or contract. It may 

apply for a license to cover all of its expected exports or reexports to a particular 

consignee over the life of a license (normally two years, but may be longer if 

circumstances warrant a longer period), reducing the total number of licenses for which 

the applicant must apply. ' 14 

In addition to the general procedures described above, for firearms transfers an exemption from 

the standard brokering controls is anticipated for licensed transactions subject to the CCL (via an 

amendment to Section129.2 of International Traffic in Arms Regulations, ITAR)15 

In its licensing process, the CCL relies on two basic forms of control, country,specific controls and 

a series of listed reasons for control (which in combination automatically trigger the need for a 

license unless exemptions are available). 16 Each article on the CCL is tagged by one or more 

"reasons for control," and license applications are evaluated according to the listed reasons as 

they apply to particular countries (as set forth in a Country Chart). When reviewing license 

applications, only the tagged reasons for control are considered. 

A separate "licensing policy" is outlined for each control reason in the Export Administration 

Regulations that house the CCL 17 Many items are controlled for more than one reason. 

Within the CCL control system, there are two separate "reasons for control" that specifically 

mention human rights concerns. As detailed below, the CC reason has conventionally been 

associated with human rights considerations, to the extent that BIS regularly reports on this 

control under the rubric of "Crime Control/Human Rights." While the RS (Regional Stabiltty) 

control licensing policy does assert that promoting human rights is a US foreign policy interest 

and includes it in determining whether a transaction is contrary to the national security or foreign 

policy interests, human rights concerns within the RS control are not necessarily a prominent 

consideration nor are they explicitly listed as cause for a policy of denial. 

To expand on these points: 

(1) Semi-automatic and non-automatic firearms transferred to the CCL would be subject to 

control for reasons of Regional Stability (RS). The RS control is intended to: 

" ... to determine whether the export could contribute, directly or indirectly, to a country's 

military capabilities in a manner that would destabilize or alter a region's military balance 

contrary to U.S. foreign policy interests. Regional Stability controls provide a 

mechanism for the U.S. Government to monitor the export of controlled ttems, to restrict 

their use in instances that would adversely affect regional stability or the military balance 

within a region, and to protect the national security and foreign policy interests of the 

United States. "18 

14 BIS, "Revisions to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR): Control of Military Vehicles and Related Items That the President 

Determines No Longer Warrant Control on the United States Munitions List" 

bltQW.yvww. federal@_gl§Jer. gov/do_cuments/2011/12/06/20 11-3097£L[evisions-to-the-export-administration-requlations-ear -cpntro!-ofmHitary-vehic!es-and-related, accessed 8 April2019. 15 Department of State, International Traffic in Arms Regulations: U.S. Munitions List, proposed rule May 2018 

https://www. federa!reqister .govfdocuments/2018/05/24/20 18-1 0366/international-traffic-in-arms-regu!ations-us-munitlons-!istcategories-i-ii-and-1i1 

"The list of reasons includes National Security (NS), Missile Technology (MT). Regional Stability (RS), Crime Control (CC), 

provisions of the OAS Firearms Convention (FC), and Anti-Terrorism (AT). 17 In addition, an annual report from BIS offers expanded commentary on the reason-related policies. See 2018 Report On Foreign 

Policy-Based Export Controls, https :l/www. bis. doc.gov/index. php/documentsfpdfs/2186-bis-foreqin+oo!icy-reoort-2018/file, accessed 

AprilS, 2019. 18 BIS, 2018 Report on Foreign Policy-Based Export Controls, pp. 15-18. https:/IIMV'N.bis.doc.govlindex.ohp/documents/pdfs/2186-

hls..:f9Le_g.i.o.:.Q_o!icy+reoort~2018/file, accessed AprilS, 2019. 

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With regards to human rights, the license policy statement for Regional Stability asserts: 

"Applications for exports and reexports ... will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis to 

determine whether the transaction is contrary to the national securtty or foreign policy 

interests of the United States, including the foreign policy interest of promoting the 

observance of human rights throughout the world." 19 

Proposed amendments to this regulation (742.6) would extend the case-by-case examination 

of license applications to most of the firearms slated for transfer. They would also impose a 

"policy of denial" (i.e. deny a license) on firearms exports and retransfers destined for a few 

specific countries (China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria) or when there is reason 

to believe the transaction involves criminal organizations, rebel groups, street gangs, or other 

similar groups or individuals, that may be disruptive to regional stability, including within 

countries. 

(2) Semi-automatic and non-automatic firearms transferred to the CCL would not be 

6m:i!J), 2019. 

subject to control for reasons of Crime Control. The CC control is intended to: 

... ensure that U.S.-origin crime control and detection items are not exported to countries 

where governments fail to respect internationally recognized human rights or where civil 

disorder is prevalent. Denial of export license applications for crime-controlled items to 

such countries helps to prevent human rights violations and clearly signals U.S. concerns 

about human rights in these countries. The license requirements for most destinations 

allow close monitoring of exports of crime control items that could be misused to commit 

human rights violations. 

With regards to human rights, the license policy statement for Crime Control asserts: 

Applications for items controlled under this section (Crime Control) will generally be 

considered favorably on a case-by-case basis unless there is civil disorder in the country 

or region or unless there is evidence that the government of the importing country may 

have violated internationally recognized human rights. The judicious use of export 

controls is intended to deter the development of a consistent pattern of human rights 

abuses, distance the United States from such abuses and avoid contributing to civil 

disorder in a country or region. 20 [emphasis added] 

And as further commentary on the CC licensing policy, BIS has added these remarks in its 

2018 report: 

The Department of State annually compiles for submission to Congress the Country 

Reports on Human Rights Practices. The Department of State prepares these reports in 

accordance with Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. The 

factual information presented in these reports is a significant element in dual use export 

licensing recommendations made by the Department of State. In accordance with the 

Foreign Assistance Act, the Department of Commerce denies license applications to 

export crime control items to any country whose government engages in a consistent 

pattern of violations of internationally recognized human rights. Applications to export 

crime control items to countries that are not otherwise subject to economic sanctions or 

comprehensive embargoes, but that are identified by the Department of State as human 

rights violators, receive additional scrutiny in the license review process. The Department 

Control Policies, https:/Jmv. bis.doc. gov/index.php/documents/regulations+docs/2342-7 42-1 0-24-18/fi!e accessed 

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of State reviews all license applications for these countries on a case-by-case basis and 

makes recommendations to Commerce. 21 

BIS documents that set forth the proposed transfers and listed the proposed controls22 do not 

explain why firearms would not be subject to CC as well as RS. This is puzzling, as both 

categories of control already do apply to long barreled shotguns, the only modern firearms 

currently included on the CCL 

In summary reply to this second question, it appears that the standard CCL licensing process-as 

describe by the Department of Commerce--would reduce pre-license screening and scrutiny of 

middlemen (brokers) involved in licensed transactions. Moreover, there is reason to be concerned 

that the semi-automatic and non-automatic weapons proposed for transfer have not been tagged with 

the Crime Control/Human Rights control on the CCL If the proposed transfer goes forward, not only 

would firearms exports no longer be subject to Congressional oversight (by virtue of their removal 

from the USML), but the transferred semi-automatic and non-automatic firearms would be subject 

only to a weak form of available human rights controls on the CCL 

21 2018 Report on Foreign Policy-Based Export Controls, pp. 9-10 at https:llwww.bis.doc.qovlindex.phpldocumentsiQdfs/2186-bi§: 

foregin:QQ!.icy-report-2018/fi!e, accessed AprilS, 2019 22 BIS."Control of Firearms, Guns, Ammunition and Related Articles the President Determines No longer Warrant Control Under the 

United States Munitions List (USML)," May 2018, 

https://yyww,federa!register.gov/documents/20 18/05/24/2018-1 0367/control-of -firearms-quns-ammunition-and-re!ated-artic!es-theQresident-determines;--no-!onger-wammt, accessed Apri18, 2019. 

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Appendix. 600-Series Systems, Equipment and Components transferred from the US 

Munitions List to the Commerce Control List (CCL), in conjunction with the 2010 Export 

Control Reform initiative.23 

CCL CATEGORY 0- MISCELLANEOUS 

[Note: The full title assigned to this category is "Nuclear Materials, Facilities, and Equipment (and 

Miscellaneous Items)." However, readers should be aware most nuclear-related items and materials are 

controlled by the Department of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission The only nuclearrelated listed on the CCL pertain to equipment for testing nuclear radiation 24 The semi-automatic and 

non-automatic firearms and ammunition proposed for transfer to the CCL are intended for inclusion in this 

CCL category, as 500-series items.] 

OA604 Commodities related to milrtary explosive devices and charges. 

Items moved from the USML include: Smoke hand grenades, demoliTion blocks and 

corresponding detonators. [Note: Military explosive devices including t01pedos, bombs and 

mines remain on the Munitions List and are explicitly excluded from the Commerce Control List.] 

OA606 Ground vehicles and related commodities 

Includes: Unarmed and unarmored ground vehicles and related commodities, such as air-cooled 

diesel engines and engine blocks for armored vehicles, transmissions, military vehicle fording 

kits, and military vehicle self-launching bridge components (OA606). This control category also 

includes a number of parts, components, accessories and attachments for military vehicles, 

including for example: brake discs, axles, batteries, alternators, hoses, latches, seats, tires, and 

windows for unarmored vehicles. [Note: Armed and/or armored ground vehicles, including tanks 

and infantry fighting vehicles remain on the US Munitions List.] 

OA614 Militarv training equipment 

Includes operational flight trainers, radar target trainers, certain flight simulators, navigation 

trainers for military items, and target equipment 

OA617 Miscellaneous "equipment" materials and related commodities 

Includes certain concealment and deception equipment, i.e. special paints, decoys, smoke or 

obscuration equipment and simulators and ferries, bridges and pontoons for military use. 

CCL CATEGORY 1- SPECIAL MATERIALS AND RELATED EQUIPMENT. CHEMICALS 

"MICROORGANISMS " AND "TOXINS" 

1C607 and 1A607 Tear Gases Riot Control Agents and Militarv dissemination equipment 

Includes various chemical tear gases and riot control agents (1 C607a) and equipment for 

dissemination (1A607.e), protection (1A607.f), decontamination (1A607.g) and detection 

(1A607.h). 

1A613 Armored and protective "equipment" and related commodities 

Includes armor plate and helmets, certain shetters designed to provide ballistic protection for 

military systems or protect against nuclear, biological, or 

chemical contamination, and atmospheric diving suits for rescue operations 

CCL CATEGORY 2- MATERIALS PROCESSING 

No items have been transferred from the US Munitions List to this portion of the CCL as part of 

the Export Controls Reform initiative. (No 600-items are included in this portion of the CCL.) 

"The CCL includes a range of items from 5 product groups: (A) Systems, Equipment & Components; (B) Test, Inspection & 

Production Equipment; (C) Materials; (0} Software; and (E) Technology_ This list inventories transferred items that have been 

classified in Group A Graduate students at the Ford School of Public Policy, University of Michigan, helped to compile this list. 24 See fl.tt.QsJ!www.bis.doc.qovlindex.q_Qpjdocuf11.entsJregulations-docsJ2331-ccf0-10_-24-18/file, accessed Apri/8, 2019. 

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CCL CATEGORY 3- ELECTRONICS 

3A611 Militarv Electronics 

Includes a range of milrtary electronic equipment that are not specifically listed in the USML, 

ranging from computers and circuit boards to high frequency surface wave radar capable of 

tracking surface targets on oceans, electric fans, joy sticks, multichip modules, rheostats, 

solenoids, speakers, transformers and microwave transistors. 

CCL CATEGORY 4 ·COMPUTERS 

No items have been transferred from the US Munitions List to this portion of the CCL as part of 

the Export Controls Reform initiative. (This category generally includes software and computer 

technology Computer equipment is controlled under Category 3 above) 

CCL CATEGORY 5- TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION SECURITY 

5A611 Telecommunications equipment and related components 

This is a residual control category that includes equipment not listed on the US Munitions List and 

not specifically controlled in CCL Category 3 above. 

CCL CATEGORY 6- SENSORS AND LASERS 

No items have been transferred from the US Munitions List to this portion of the CCL as part of 

the Export Controls Reform initiative. (Acoustic systems and radar equipment are controlled 

under Category 3 above) 

CCL CATEGORY 7- NAVIGATION AND AVIONICS 

7 A611 Military fire control laser imaging and guidance equipment 

Includes certain guidance or navigation systems that are not included in the US Munitions List 

{Note: This is a residual control category. No specific items have been transferred from the US 

Munitions List to this portion of the CCL as part of the Export Controls Reform initiative.} 

CCL CATEGORY 8 • MARINE 

8A609 Surface vessels of war and related commodities 

Includes unarmed and unarmored rescue and repair ships and Coast Guard patrol boats with 

mounts or hardpoints for firearms. Also includes a wide range of commodities for use on ships, 

ranging from non-magnetic diesel engines to equipment such as compasses public address 

systems, galleys, lavatories, medical facilities and water tanks as well as various hoses, gauges 

and filters. {Note: this category of the CCL does not include actual surface vessels of war and 

special naval equipment, which are covered by the US Munitions List.] 

8A620 Commodities related to submersible vessels 

Includes submarine rescue vehicles and Deep Submergence Vehicles (DSV) as well as semisubmersible vessels for cargo transport. Also includes a wide range of commodities for use on 

submarines, ranging from diesel engines, harbor entrance detection devices, submarine and 

torpedo nets, and diving and underwater swimming apparatus designed for military use to 

equipment such as public address systems, galleys, lavatories, and water tanks as well as 

various hoses, gauges, and filters. 

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Æ 

CCL CATEGORY 9- AEROSPACE AND PROPULSION 

9A604 Commodities related to launch vehicles missiles and rockets 

Includes thermal batteries and various components and composite structures--such as motors, 

engines, stages, and re-entry vehicles--related to missiles and rockets that are themselves 

controlled on the US Munitions List. 

9A610 Milttary aircraft and related commodities 

Includes trainer aircraft, cargo aircraft, military helicopters, observation aircraft, utilfty fixed wing 

aircraft and all other unarmed mil nary aircraft. 25 (All armed aircraft, including attack helicopters 

and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles specially designed to incorporate a defense article) are controlled 

on the US Munitions List.) This control number also covers a wide array of equipment, such as 

refueling equipment, equipment to launch and control unmanned aerial vehicles, parachutes, 

flight control systems, galleys, lavatories and water tanks, along with related commodtties, such 

as brake pads, ejection seats, fire detectors and extinguishers, cockpit mirrors, and windshield 

wipers. 

9A619 Military gas turbine engines and related commodities. 

Includes military gas turbine engines that are specially designed for defense articles controlled on 

the US Munitions List (Categories VI, VII or VIII) or elsewhere on the Commerce Control List, as 

well as specific parts and components including certain compressors, fuel lines, oil lines and 

tubes, oil tank and reservoirs for gas turbine engines. 26 

9A620 Crvogenic and "superconductive" equipment. 

Includes cryogenic and superconductive electrical equipment (rotating machinery and 

transformers) specially designed to be installed in a vehicle for military ground, marine, airborne, 

or space applications, and capable of operating while in motion. 

25 Some of these items were already on the CCL and have simply been renumbered to conform to Wassenaar classification numbers. 

26 Military trainer aircraft Turbo prop engines were already included in the CCL prior to the Export Control Reform initiative and have 

been renumbered to align with Wassenaar classification numbers. 

9