United States 

Institute of Pe a c e

The News Media and

Peace Pro c e s s e s

The Middle East and Northern Ireland

Gadi Wo l f s fe l d
Peaceworks No. 37. First published January 2001.

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and/or interviewees alone.

They do not necessarily reflect views of the United States Institute of Peace.

UN I T E D ST A T E S IN S T I T U T E O F PE A C E

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C o n t e n t s

S u m m a r y 5

A ck n ow l e d g m e n t s 7

1. Introduction 8

2. Theoretical Principles Guiding the Study 10

3. Research Strategy 18

4. The Israeli Media and the Oslo Peace Process 21

5. The Case of Northern Ireland 30

6. Conclusions and Implications 42

N o t e s 46

R e fe re n c e s 49

About the Au t h o r 53

About the Institute 54
S u m m a r y

The news media can play a cen tral role in the prom o ti on of pe ace . Th ey can

em ph a s i ze the ben efits that pe ace can bri n g, t h ey can raise the legi ti m acy of

groups or leaders working for pe ace , and they can help tra n s form images of t h e

enemy. But the media also can serve as de s tru ctive agents in a pe ace proce s s . Th ey can

em ph a s i ze the risks and dangers assoc i a ted with com prom i s e , raise the legi ti m acy of

those oppo s ed to con ce s s i on s , and rei n force nega tive stereo types of the en emy. Th i s

report by Gadi Wo l fs fel d , a sen i or fell ow in the Jen n i n gs Ra n do l ph Program for

Intern a ti onal Pe ace at the Un i ted States In s ti tute of Pe ace in 1998–1999 and a profe s s or

of pol i tical scien ce and com mu n i c a ti on at the Hebrew Un ivers i ty in Jeru s a l em , ex p l a i n s

h ow and wh en the media take on each of these ro l e s .

In ch a pter 1,Wo l fs feld argues that there is an inherent ten s i on bet ween the needs of a

pe ace process and news ro uti n e s . A su ccessful pe ace process requ i res pati en ce , and the

n ews media usu a lly demand immed i ac y. Pe ace is most likely to devel op within a calm

envi ron m en t , and the media tend to have an ob s e s s ive interest in threats and vi o l en ce .

Nevert h el e s s , the role of the media does va ry. And if the role of the media is to becom e

less disru ptive to some pe ace proce s s e s ,“both re s e a rch ers and practi ti on ers must bet ter

u n derstand the re a s ons for these va ri a ti on s ,”Wo l fs feld wri te s .

The report points to four major factors that have an impact on that va ri a ti on : (1) the

amount of con s en sus among po l i tical el i tes in su pport of the pe ace proce s s , (2) the nu mber and inten s i ty of c rises assoc i a ted with the proce s s , (3) the ex tent to wh i ch shared media—those used by both sides of the con f l i ct — ex i s t , and (4) the level of s en s a ti onalism as

a dominant news va lu e .

Wol fs feld decl a res his own bias rega rding the media and pe ace proce s s e s :“I . . . bel i eve

that journalists have an ethical obl i ga ti on to en co u ra ge recon c i l i a ti on among hostile popu l a ti on s ,”he wri te s .“At the very least, j o u rnalists should do no harm .”

In ch a pter 2,Wo l fs feld discusses in detail the four va ri a bles men ti on ed above . Rega rding the first va ri a bl e , el i te con s en su s ,b a s ed on his own re s e a rch and that of o t h ers , he conclu des that “the gre a ter the level of el i te con s en sus [on certain po l i c i e s ] , the more likely the

n ews media are to play a su pportive role in implem en ting su ch po l i c i e s .”

The second va ri a ble has to do with the nu m ber and inten s i ty of the crises affecting the

pe ace proce s s . Because media tend to stress con f l i ct , and some media ro uti n ely sen s a ti ona l i ze even t s , the more crises that occur du ring a pe ace proce s s , the more heated the po l i tical atm o s ph ere becom e s , Wo l fs feld wri te s . Su ch an atm o s ph ere influ en ces po l i tical leaders

to overre act to even t s ,t hus cre a ting a vicious cycle of e s c a l a ti on .

The third and fo u rth va ri a bles zero in on two important factors that impact the pe ace

proce s s : the ex tent of s h a red news media that can re ach both sides of the con f l i ct , and the

degree to wh i ch sen s a ti onalism has a major foothold in the media market . Wo l fs feld finds

that the more ex ten s ive the shared news med i a , the more likely the media wi ll play a con5
s tru ctive role in the pe ace proce s s . A high level of s en s a ti onalism in a media envi ron m en t ,

on the other hand, i nva ri a bly wors ens a situ a ti on .

In ch a pter 3,Wo l fs feld discusses his analytical stra tegy. He foc u s ed on two case stu d i e s :

(1) the Oslo pe ace process bet ween Is rael and the Pa l e s ti n i a n s , and (2) the attem pts to

bring pe ace to Nort h ern Ireland that cen tered on the Good Fri d ay Agreem en t . For the

f i rs t , he intervi ewed forty - one key actors in po l i tics and the med i a , and for the secon d ,

t wen ty. He also analy zed ed i torials from five news p a pers ,t h ree in Is rael for a total of 2 2 9

ed i tori a l s , and two in Belfast for a total of 147 ed i tori a l s . The ed i torials were wri t ten in the

w a ke of m a j or events in the two pe ace proce s s e s , and Wo l fs feld assessed the type and

ra n ge of op i n i on ex pre s s ed .F i n a lly, Wo l fs feld loo ked at the news covera ge of t wo major

terrorist attack s , one in Is rael and the other in Nort h ern Irel a n d .

Ch a pter 4 lays out in detail Wo l fs fel d ’s analysis of the Is raeli media and the Oslo pe ace

proce s s .“ It was clear from the beginning that the stru ggle over Oslo would be bi t ter,” h e

wri te s . Prom o ting a ‘ Pe ace fra m e ,’“the Ra bin govern m en t , for the most part ,t a l ked abo ut

the need for com promise to end the con f l i ct . . . . The ri gh t - wing oppo s i ti on to the pe ace

process put forth a ‘Sec u ri ty fra m e ,’ arguing that any con ce s s i ons to the Pa l e s tinians wo u l d

l e ad on ly to more bl ood s h ed .”A lack of el i te con s en sus on the proce s s , an ex trem ely

po l a ri zed soc i ety, a rash of terrori s m , and sen s a ti onalist media re su l ted in an ex p l o s ive situ a ti on .An a lysis of n ews stories and ed i torials along with intervi ews with Is raeli and Pa l e stinian leaders and Is raeli journalists ex p l ore the interp l ay among these factors and thei r

i m p act on the pe ace proce s s .

Ch a pter 5 looks at Wo l fs fel d ’s data from the Nort h ern Ireland pe ace proce s s , in wh i ch

the news media played a very different ro l e .“The po l i tical envi ron m ent in Nort h ern Ireland was marked by a large degree of el i te con s en sus in su pport of the agreem ent and by

rel a tively little vi o l en ce on the part of those oppo s ed to the accord s ,”he wri te s .“The media envi ron m ent was ch a racteri zed by many shared news or gans and by a rel a tively low

l evel of s en s a ti on a l i s m . This set of c i rc u m s t a n ces tu rn ed the news media into an important tool for prom o ting the pe ace proce s s .”Wo l fs fel d ,t h ro u gh ex ten s ive intervi ews and

a n a lys i s , examines these factors in det a i l .

Ch a pter 6 draws some con clu s i ons and assesses the policy implicati ons of Wo l fs fel d ’s

re s e a rch .“This report contains good news and bad news for those intere s ted in prom o ti n g

peace ,”Wol fs feld wri te s .“The bad news is that leaders cannot depend on the news med i a

to help them wh en they are in tro u bl e .”In deed , the news media are least likely to help in

those cases wh ere they might do the most good in helping to set a modera ting ton e ,

Wol fs feld argues.“ It is important for po l i c ym a kers to understand this situ a ti on and find

bet ter ways to deal with it.”A lon g - ra n ge po l i tical stra tegy needs to prep a re to limit dama ge assoc i a ted with inevi t a ble failu res along the road to pe ace . This can be accom p l i s h ed

in part by con ti nu a lly prom o ting a lon g - ra n ge pers pective and by having crisis teams in

p l ace to deal with the med i a .

The news med i a , on the other hand, m i ght or ga n i ze joint meeti n gs of ed i tors and

reporters from rival com mu n i ties with the goal of fo s tering gre a ter com mu n i c a ti on

bet ween them . Fu rt h er, practicing “pe ace journ a l i s m”m i ght inclu de co u n teracting mispercepti ons abo ut the con f l i ct and the other side and reporting on areas of coopera ti on

bet ween antagon i s t s .“ It must be em ph a s i zed ,h owever, that a more con du c ive form of

6 Summary
Summary 7

j o u rnalism depends on making s tru ctu ral ch a n ge s in the news produ cti on proce s s ,”Wo l fsfeld stre s s e s . Su ch ch a n ges might inclu de cre a ting special secti ons in news p a pers and programs in the broadcast media ded i c a ted to pe ace issu e s , forcing journalists to search for

m a terials that would be con s i s tent with the va lues of pe ace journalism ra t h er than wi t h

the media ten dency to search out exclu s ively areas of con f l i ct and ex treme op i n i on .

A ck n ow l e d g m e n t s

I

want to thank the Un i ted States In s ti tute of Pe ace for gra n ting me the fell owship that

en a bl ed me to carry out the re s e a rch for this report . I am espec i a lly gra teful to Joe

Kl a i t s ,d i rector of the In s ti tute’s Jen n i n gs Ra n do l ph fell owship progra m , and progra m

of f i cer John Cri s t , who provi ded a seem i n gly en dless su pp ly of su pport and assistance

during my year in Wa s h i n g ton . My re s e a rch assistant, Guy Ben - Pora t , was a major asset

to this proj ect . Not on ly did he co ll ect an important part of the data, but his theoreti c a l

i n s i ghts and cri ticisms proved inva lu a bl e . I also want to thank my re s e a rch assistants in

Israel who hel ped carry out many of the intervi ews in that co u n try: Issam Abu ra iya ,

Mo t ti Nei ger, and Yael Shel ef .
O n e

I n t ro d u c t i o n

The news media can play a cen tral role in the prom o ti on of pe ace . Th ey can

em ph a s i ze the ben efits that pe ace can bri n g, t h ey can raise the legi ti m acy of

groups or leaders working for pe ace , and they can help tra n s form images of t h e

enemy. The med i a ,h owever, can also serve as de s tru ctive agents in the pe ace proce s s .

They can em ph a s i ze the risks and dangers assoc i a ted with com prom i s e , raise the legi tim acy of those oppo s ed to con ce s s i on s , and rei n force nega tive stereo types of the en emy.

In this report I explain how and wh en the media take on each of these ro l e s .

Con s i dering the obvious import a n ce of the top i c , su rpri s i n gly little has been wri t ten

a bo ut the role of the news media in the process of pe ace .1 Se a rching thro u gh hu n d reds of

s tudies on pe ace building and con f l i ct re s o luti on , I could hardly find even a passing referen ce to the news med i a .Yet those invo lved in pe acemaking con s t a n t ly con f ront the issu e

of h ow to deal with the pre s s .

In gen era l , an inherent ten s i on exists bet ween the needs of a pe ace process and news

routi n e s . A su ccessful pe ace process requ i res pati en ce , and the news media dem a n d

i m m ed i acy. Peace is most likely to devel op within a calm envi ron m en t , and the med i a

h ave an ob s e s s ive interest in threats and vi o l en ce . Pe ace building is a com p l ex proce s s ,a n d

the news media tend to deal with simple even t s . Progress tow a rd pe ace requ i res at least a

minimal understanding of the needs of the other side , but the news media ro uti n ely rei nforce et h n ocen trism and hosti l i ty tow a rd advers a ri e s .

The role of the media does va ry, h owever, and both re s e a rch ers and practi ti on ers mu s t

bet ter understand the re a s ons for these va ri a ti on s . In this report I point to four major factors that have an impact on this equ a ti on : (1) the amount of con s en sus among po l i ti c a l

el i tes in su pport of the pe ace proce s s , (2) the nu m ber and inten s i ty of c rises assoc i a ted

with the proce s s , (3) the ex tent to wh i ch shared med i a ,u s ed by both sides of the con f l i ct ,

exi s t , and (4) the level of s en s a ti onalism as a dominant news va lu e . The first two va ri a bl e s

tell us som ething abo ut the state of the po l i tical envi ron m en t , while the final two rel a te to

the media envi ron m en t .

I dem on s tra te the import a n ce of these four factors by com p a ring the role of the news

m edia in two pe ace proce s s e s : (1) the Oslo pe ace process in the Mi d dle East and (2) the

process assoc i a ted with the Good Fri d ay Agreem ent in Nort h ern Irel a n d . I con clu de that

the Is raeli news media played pri m a ri ly a nega tive role in the Oslo pe ace proce s s , while the

North ern Ireland news media played a more po s i tive ro l e . This differen ce stems from the

very different po l i tical and media envi ron m ents in wh i ch journalists in the two co u n tri e s

were opera ti n g. The Oslo pe ace process was ch a racteri zed by a rel a tively low level of el i te

con s en sus in su pport of the govern m en t , a large nu m ber of s erious and vi o l ent cri s e s , a

total lack of s h a red media bet ween Is raelis and Pal e s ti n i a n s , and sen s a ti onalist news med i a

8 that of ten inflamed the atm o s ph ere . A su b s t a n ti a lly different po l i tical and media 
envi ron m ent in Nort h ern Ireland sign i f i c a n t ly influ en ced the more po s i tive role of t h e

m edia in that pe ace proce s s .

Res e a rch ers wri ting abo ut pe ace face some of the same dilemmas as journ a l i s t s . It is almost impo s s i ble to take a neutral stand on the issu e . The very fact that the rel evant fiel d s

a re en ti t l ed “pe ace stu d i e s” and “con f l i ct re s o luti on” tells us that the implicit goal of su ch

work is to prom o te pe ace and prevent vi o l ent con f l i ct . This type of bias can thre a ten the

i n tegri ty of the re s e a rch .Wh en the news media make it more difficult to prom o te pe ace ,

for ex a m p l e , this wi ll be con s i dered a “probl em” that needs to be solved . Yet those

oppo s ed to a particular pe ace process would argue that su ch media are dem on s tra ti n g

t h eir indepen den ce and pro tecting nati onal intere s t s .

Al t h o u gh there is no soluti on to this probl em , it is hel pful to state on e’s biases at the

o ut s et , making it easier for re aders to detect probl ems roo ted in su ch preju d i ce s . My own

bias is that I su pport both of the pe ace processes discussed in this work . I bel i eve that the

Ra bin govern m ent took an important step forw a rd at Oslo and, l i ke most Is rael i s , I hope

it wi ll su cceed . Al t h o u gh I have no pers onal invo lvem ent in the Nort h ern Ireland con f l i ct ,

my po s i ti on is the same. I bel i eve the Good Fri d ay Agreem ent was a major ach i evem en t

and that it of fers a real po s s i bi l i ty for bri n ging pe ace to the are a .

I also bel i eve that journalists have an ethical obl i ga ti on to en co u ra ge recon c i l i a ti on

a m ong hostile pop u l a ti on s . This does not mean that they should bl i n dly accept every

pe ace proposal that calls for com prom i s e . Nor should they serve as prop a ganda or gans for

a prope ace govern m en t . The goals of j o u rnalists working in con f l i ct - ri d den areas should

be to provi de as mu ch inform a ti on as po s s i ble abo ut the roots of the probl em and to

en co u ra ge a ra ti onal public deb a te con cerning the va rious opti ons for ending it.At the

very least, j o u rnalists should do no harm . Th ey should ref rain from practi ces that raise the

l evel of h a te ,d i s tru s t , and vi o l en ce bet ween com mu n i ti e s . I discuss these issues more fully

in the con clu s i on of this report .

The report is divi ded into five part s . The first pre s ents theoretical principles that

explain why the news media play different roles in different con tex t s . The second bri ef ly

de s c ri bes the re s e a rch stra tegy em p l oyed in this stu dy. The third and fo u rth parts pre s en t

an analysis of the role of the news media in the Oslo process and in Nort h ern Irel a n d ,

res pectively. The con clu s i on discusses the more important implicati ons of these findings

for re s e a rch ers and po l i c ym a kers .

Introduction 9
Two

The o retical Principles Guiding the Study

Jo u rnalists tell stori e s . As noted in the introdu cti on ,h ow they con s tru ct stori e s

a bo ut a pe ace process can have an important impact on the process itsel f . Ci ti zen s

depend on these stories to learn abo ut what is happen i n g. Is the process movi n g

forw a rd or back w a rd? Does the overa ll level of h o s ti l i ty and vi o l en ce appear to be ri s i n g

or declining? Is the “o t h er side” keeping its part of the agreem ents? How mu ch of t h e

p u blic su pports what the govern m ent is trying to do? Is it re a lly going to work? Al t h o u gh

m em bers of the audien ce also app ly their own interpret a ti ons to su ch stori e s ,n ews repres ents a major referen ce point for public disco u rs e .

The po l i tical and profe s s i onal con text for these news stories has a major impact on

h ow they are wri t ten . All news media work from a particular cultu ral and profe s s i on a l

base that helps define the con s tru cti on of n ews (Gamson and Stu a rt 1992; G a m s on et al.

1 9 9 2 ; Ryan 1991). What is con s i dered a re a s on a ble story in one po l i tical envi ron m ent may

be con s i dered of fen s ive in another. Au d i en ces can be espec i a lly sen s i tive abo ut stories having to do with pe ace and con f l i ct , because su ch items en ga ge peop l e’s most basic loya l ti e s

and iden ti ti e s .

The state of the po l i tical envi ron m ent has a major impact because the con s tru cti on of

n ews is pri m a ri ly a re active proce s s .E d i tors and reporters re s pond to sti muli that are provided by a mu l ti tu de of s o u rces and events and then give their audien ce a report abo ut the

s t a te of t h eir worl d . Ma j or ch a n ges in the tone and con tent of n ews covera ge ref l ect shifts

in the po l i tical proce s s .

The Impact of Elite Consensus 

The success govern m ents have in mobilizing con s en sus among po l i tical el i tes in su pport

of t h eir policies is an espec i a lly important va ri a ble affecting news covera ge : The gre a ter

the level of el i te con s en su s , the more likely the news media are to play a su pportive role in

i m p l em en ting su ch po l i c i e s . Po s i ti ons taken by the major po l i tical parties serve as the

most important indicator for the news media in these situ a ti on s . Jo u rnalists depend on

p a rty leaders as their dominant sources for assessing the state of the po l i tical envi ronm en t . The major oppo s i ti on parties define wh i ch issues are con ten tious and wort hy of

p u blic deb a te . Le aders from small er parties or ex tra p a rl i a m en t a ry movem ents have less

power and are of ten fra m ed as devi a n t s .

Hallin (1986) makes a similar point in his work abo ut the beh avi or of the Am eri c a n

n ews media in the Vi etnam Wa r. Con tra ry to popular bel i ef , U. S .n ews covera ge of t h e

e a rly stages of the con f l i ct was ex trem ely su pportive . This was in keeping with the almost

u n iversal agreem ent abo ut the need to stop the spre ad of com munism in So utheast As i a .

As the level of el i te con s en sus decl i n ed ,n ews reports and ed i torials began to focus on

1 0 m ore nega tive aspects of the war. The media may also have accel era ted the decline in
p u blic su pport on ce the nega tive story took hold. Thu s , ch a n ges in the po l i tical envi ronm ent direct ly influ en ce the news media to move from a su pportive role to a more indepen dent and cri tical ro l e .

The influ en ce of el i te con s en sus on the role of the media can also be seen in the Gu l f

War. The U. S . Sen a te was split almost com p l etely down the middle wh en it was asked to

give Bush a green light for attacking Saddam Hu s s ei n .O n ce the war bega n ,h owever,

American journalists found it difficult to find mem bers of the oppo s i ti on who were wi lling to speak publ i cly against Bu s h’s policy (Wo l fs feld 1997a). The ch a n ging level of cons en su s , or at least ex pre s s ed con s en su s ,h ad an important influ en ce on the med i a .Wh i l e

e a rly news covera ge and ed i torials foc u s ed on the fierce deb a te in the Un i ted State s ,t h e

covera ge of the war itsel f can on ly be de s c ri bed as en t hu s i a s tic (Ben n ett and Pa l etz 1994).

Norma lly cynical journalists found them s elves swept up in a wave of p a tri o ti s m , and it

was difficult to find el i te sources who were wi lling to publ i cly cri ti c i ze the Am erican interven ti on .

The level of po l i tical con s en sus among the gen eral public can also have an impact on

m edia covera ge , but this type of i n f lu en ce is less direct and less sign i f i c a n t . The indirect

i n f luen ce comes from the fact that po l i tical leaders con s i der the cl i m a te of op i n i on wh en

forming their own po s i ti on s . As poi n ted out by Ben n ett (1990), h owever, the ra n ge of

deb a te ex pre s s ed in the news media is for the most part simply an “ i n dex ” of the ra n ge of

deb a te among the po l i tical el i te . The news med i a’s almost exclu s ive depen den ce on institutional sources severely limits the ra n ge of p u blic deb a te and margi n a l i zes public op i ni on .

There is good re a s on to bel i eve that the level of el i te con s en sus also has an import a n t

i n f luen ce on the role of the news media in a pe ace proce s s . The gre a ter the level of d i su n i ty among el i tes over the proce s s , the gre a ter the likel i h ood that the news media wi ll

m a ke the situ a ti on wors e . The media serve as the cen tral arena for su ch dispute s , ref l ecti n g

and even playing up those divi s i ons and thus making them espec i a lly likely to tu rn ugly.

On the other hand, in pe ace processes or stages of a process that are marked by a high

l evel of el i te su pport ,j o u rnalists wi ll become unabashed en t husiasts and story lines wi ll

become cel ebra tory. Those who oppose the agreem ents wi ll be fra m ed as tro u bl em a kers .

A useful rule to fo ll ow in these matters is to start by looking at a particular po l i ti c a l

con tex t ,a t tem pt to understand how po l i tical actors and journalists interact within the situ a ti on , and then examine how the re su l ting news stories influ en ce the process itsel f . Th i s

i de a , wh i ch su rf aces at several points in the stu dy, is referred to as the “po l i ti c s - m edia cycle .”Cha n ges in the po l i tical envi ron m ent lead to ch a n ges in the role of the news med i a

that then lead to furt h er ch a n ges in the po l i tical envi ron m en t .

This process can also be unders tood by examining the way the news media con s tru ct

f rames abo ut po l i tical issu e s .The news media ro uti n ely em p l oy interpretive frames as a

devi ce for providing meaning to even t s , and the level of con s en sus has a major impact on

the frames they em p l oy. Gitlin (1980) provi ded the best de s c ri pti on of m edia frames over

t wen ty ye a rs ago :

Media frames, largely unspoken and unacknowledged, organize the world both for journalists who report it and, in some important degree, for us who rely on their reports.

Theoretical Principles 1 1
Media frames are persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and presentation, of

selection, emphasis, and exclusion, by which symbol-handlers routinely organize discourse, whether verbal or visual. Frames enable journalists to process large amounts of

information, to assign it to cognitive categories, and to package it for efficient relay to

their audiences [p. 7].

The news media con s tru ct frames for con f l i cts by attem pting to fit the inform a ti on they

a re receiving into a pack a ge that is profe s s i o n a lly usef u l and c u l tu ra lly familiar (Wo l fs fel d

1 9 9 7 a ) . The process is best unders tood as one in wh i ch journalists attem pt to find a narrative fit bet ween incoming inform a ti on and ex i s ting media fra m e s . The frames that are

ava i l a ble for use by journalists va ry over ti m e ,c u l tu re , and po l i tical circ u m s t a n ce . Med i a

f rames in most We s tern co u n tries for covering wom en’s issu e s , for ex a m p l e ,h ave gon e

t h ro u gh important ch a n ges in recent ye a rs .

When a wi de level of el i te con s en sus ex i s t s , one frame tends to dom i n a te media disco u rs e , and few qu e s ti ons are ra i s ed abo ut its va l i d i ty. As the level of oppo s i ti on grows ,

a l tern a tive frames em er ge , and this com peti ti on is ref l ected in ch a n ging media covera ge .

The public deb a te in the Un i ted States over Vi etnam is again instru ctive . The Cold Wa r

f rame dom i n a ted public disco u rse du ring the early ye a rs of this con f l i ct ,a n d , as noted ,

this had a major impact on news stories (Ha llin 1986). G iven the high degree of con s ensu s ,s pon s ors of a n tiwar frames were ei t h er ign ored or tre a ted as devi a n t s . In later ye a rs

the growing disen ch a n tm ent with the war among important el i tes incre a s ed the prom in en ce of com peting fra m e s . The Vi etnam issue en tered what Ha llin (1986) label ed “t h e

s ph ere of l egi ti m a te con trovers y.”Jo u rnalists who covered su ch issues felt obl i ga ted to pres ent a more balanced form of covera ge that gave govern m ent cri tics a significant amount

of time and space to pre s ent their vi ews .

This helps explain why it is so important to eva lu a te the level of el i te con s en sus concerning a pe ace proce s s . The lower the level of con troversy among el i tes con cerning the

process itsel f , the more likely prope ace frames wi ll dom i n a te media disco u rs e . Pe ace

f rames wi ll be used to or ga n i ze inform a ti on abo ut both su ccesses and setb ack s : Su cce s s e s

wi ll lead to more opti m i s tic covera ge and setb acks wi ll be seen as “probl em s”that must be

s o lved . Here too those who oppose pe ace wi ll of ten be tre a ted as tro u bl em a kers ,e s pec i a lly if t h ey re s ort to vi o l en ce . The news media in su ch cases become active agents in prom o ting the pe ace proce s s , con s t a n t ly amplifying the ex i s ting con s en su s .

When , on the other hand, t h ere is serious com peti ti on among frames abo ut the pe ace

proce s s , the news media wi ll legi ti m a tely give ex pre s s i on to both pers pective s . In su ch

cases a good deal of the news covera ge wi ll focus on the internal deb a te over the proce s s ,

and journalists wi ll actively search for sources from both camps. An o t h er means to

ach i eve balance wh en con s en sus is low is to swi tch back and forth bet ween altern a tive

f rames in accord a n ce with ch a n ging even t s . The news media can em p l oy the prope ace

f ramewhen the process is moving forw a rd and more pe s s i m i s tic frames du ring times of

c ri s i s .

A legi ti m a te cri ticism of this argument is that it may be difficult to make a clear disti n ction bet ween the indepen dent va ri a ble—the level of el i te con s en sus in su pport of pe ace —

and the depen dent va ri a ble—the use of prope ace media fra m e s . The news med i a , su ch

c ri tics would su gge s t ,m ay simply make an indepen dent dec i s i on to su pport the pe ace

1 2 Theoretical Principles
proce s s . Th ey would then margi n a l i ze the oppo s i ti on , and the level of con s en sus wo u l d

a ppear mu ch gre a ter than it is. The media could also take the oppo s i te stand and high l i gh t

the internal dispute over the proce s s ,t hus giving the appe a ra n ce that there is less con s ensus than actu a lly ex i s t s . This cri ticism su ggests that the argument is circ u l a r.

However, t h ere is a differen ce bet ween a circular argument and a circular rel a ti on s h i p. I

would argue that the social and po l i tical forces within a given soc i ety are far more powerful and en du ring than any ed i torial dec i s i ons abo ut how to cover a particular pe ace

proce s s . The major po l i tical parties and movem ents within a given soc i ety devel op over an

ex ten ded peri od and do not simply appear and disappear in re s ponse to media covera ge .

The po l i tical po s i ti ons su ch or ga n i z a ti ons take with rega rd to a pe ace process can best be

u n ders tood by looking at the gro u p s’ h i s tori e s . Ideo l ogical ch a n ges within su ch insti tutions are norm a lly slow and increm en t a l .

In ad d i ti on , ed i tors do not simply invent interpretive fra m e s ;t h ey absorb them from

the soc i ety in wh i ch they opera te . As noted , the con s tru cti on of n ews is a re active proce s s ,

and journalists attem pt to cre a te stories that are po l i ti c a lly accept a ble to their re aders .

E d i tors working in We s tern dem oc racies cannot afford to ign ore the activi ties of m a j or

pol i tical parties or movem en t s . Jo u rnalists report on su ch or ga n i z a ti on s ;t h ey do not 

i nvent them . The news media can be important agents in a ccel era ti n g po l i tical ch a n ge s

within a given soc i ety, but to su ggest that they i n i ti a tesu ch ch a n ges con trad i cts most of

what we know abo ut how journalists opera te .

De s p i te all this, it is important to make an em p i rical disti n cti on bet ween measu res that

a re inten ded to ga u ge the state of the po l i tical envi ron m ent and those that tell us som ething abo ut the natu re of m edia covera ge . Examining the level of el i te con s en sus invo lve s

l ooking at the po s i ti ons taken by the major parti e s : The small er the official oppo s i ti on ,t h e

gre a ter the con s en su s . The amount of su pport among the gen eral publ i c , wh i ch may also

h ave an influ en ce on news covera ge , can usu a lly be measu red using su rvey data. The measu rem ent of m edia covera ge can be ascert a i n ed by con tent analyses of actual news stori e s

and ed i tori a l s . Di s tinguishing bet ween po l i tical and media va ri a bles redu ces the ch a n ce

that re s e a rch ers are merely measu ring different aspects of the same con s tru ct .

The Number and Intensity of Crises 

A second va ri a ble influ encing the state of the po l i tical envi ron m ent has to do with the

nu m ber and inten s i ty of c rises affecting the pe ace proce s s . Every pe ace process is marked

by a certain nu m ber of bre a k downs and setb ack s . The gre a ter the nu m ber and severi ty of

these cri s e s , the more likely the news media are to play a nega tive role in the proce s s . Th e

m ed i a’s need for drama and their lack of a lon g - term pers pective lead them to ex a ggera te

the inten s i ty and sign i f i c a n ce of these cri s e s . Po l i tical leaders are po u n ded with hu ge

h e adlines and angry qu e s ti on s . By heating up the po l i tical atm o s ph ere , this type of covera ge can become a sel f - f u l f i lling proph ec y. Po l i tical leaders may feel com pell ed to overre act

to this sense of c risis and the cycle begins aga i n .

The role of the news media in a rel a tively calm pe ace process wi ll be very differen t . Th e

tone of the reporting wi ll be gen era lly low - key and many stories wi ll be rel ega ted to a less

prom i n ent po s i ti on in the lineu p. Con tra ry to what has been all eged by their more arden t

c ri ti c s , the media ra rely invent stori e s . If the pe ace process is not producing anything 

Theoretical Principles 1 3
i n tere s ting—meaning drama or con f l i ct — j o u rnalists wi ll look el s ewh ere for stori e s . Th e

m ore stable and tro u bl e - f ree a pe ace proce s s , the less likely the news media wi ll play a 

de s tru ctive ro l e .

Here too the level of po l i tical con s en sus is import a n t . Le aders are in a mu ch bet ter

pos i ti on to ri de out a crisis wh en they can afford to lose a few percen t a ge points in thei r

perform a n ce ra ti n gs . Th ey are in a very different po s i ti on if su ch a crisis means losing

t h eir majori ty. As discussed , the amount of con s en sus wi ll also have an ef fect on how the

m edia vi ew a cri s i s , on the meaning they give to even t s . Wh en , for ex a m p l e ,oppon ents of

a pe ace process carry out acts of vi o l en ce ,j o u rnalists can see these as a sign ei t h er that

pe ace is impo s s i ble or that pe ace is even more urgen t .

There is an important lesson in all this for po l i tical leaders : Nothing su cceeds like su cces s . Le aders who can mobi l i ze a broad con s en sus for their policies and manage to keep

the pe ace process on a ste ady co u rse with a minimum of s etb acks have little to fear from

the med i a . Taking con trol over the po l i tical envi ron m ent is key to ach i eving su ccess in the

press (Wo l fs feld 1997a). The news med i a ,h owever, a re fair- we a t h er fri en d s . Wh en leaders

slip and fall , wh en con s en sus breaks down , the media amplify those failu res into disasters .

The more probl em a tic the pe ace proce s s , the more de s tru ctive the role of the news med i a .

The Influence of the Media Enviro n m e n t

The natu re of the media envi ron m ent also has an important influ en ce on the role of t h e

n ews med i a . As discussed , this stu dy zeros in on two important dimen s i ons of that environ m en t : (1) the ex tent of s h a red news media that can re ach both sides of the con f l i ct ,

and (2) the degree to wh i ch sen s a ti onalism has a major foothold in the media market .

The gre a ter the ex tent of s h a red med i a , the more likely the news media wi ll play a cons tru ctive role in a pe ace proce s s . Th ere are cultu ra l , com m erc i a l , and po l i tical re a s ons for

this dy n a m i c . As noted ,j o u rnalists alw ays wri te stories within a particular cultu ral fra m ework. Presu m pti ons abo ut co ll ective iden ti ty are an espec i a lly important el em ent in the

con s tru cti on of n ews , and co ll ective iden ti ty can provi de a basis for dialog u e . In an environ m ent dom i n a ted by shared med i a , the underlying theme con cerns what can be don e

to re s o lve con f l i ct within “o u r ”com mu n i ty. Wh en , on the other hand, t h ere are few or no

s h a red med i a , the pers pective is inheren t ly et h n ocen tri c . Ro utine covera ge of a pe ace

process focuses on the threat that “t h ey ”pose to “u s .” The news media in each cultu re

rei n force ex i s ting myths and stereo types abo ut the other.

Com m ercial motiva ti ons point in the same directi on . Broadc a s ters and news p a per

p u bl i s h ers working in an envi ron m ent with shared media wi ll be ex trem ely relu ctant to

of fend major segm ents of the audien ce . However difficult, t h ey must find a tone and lang u a ge that speaks to the largest po s s i ble pop u l a ti on .E d i tors also wi ll get con ti nual feedb ack from their audien ce if t h ey appear to move too far in a particular directi on . Th e

most sen s i ble ed i torial po s i ti on in these situ a ti ons is to find a middle ground that appe a l s

to a broad ra n ge of con su m ers .

The ex i s ten ce of a shared news media wi ll also have an important influ en ce on how

po l i tical leaders and groups shape their message s . Le aders em p l oy a less ex tremist form of

rh etoric wh en they find them s elves talking to mu l tiple audien ce s . This process may even

i n f lu en ce the ideo l ogies of the warring groups as more modera te messages become more

1 4 Theoretical Principles
familiar and accept a bl e . Those who have to com mu n i c a te on ly with their own peop l e , on

the other hand, wi ll em ph a s i ze sect a rian loya l ties in order to maintain their power base.

The level of s h a red media should be seen as a con ti nuum ra t h er than a dich o tomy.

While some po l i tical or ethnic overlap of ten exists within the audien ce , the ex tent of t h i s

i n ters ecti on wi ll va ry among con f l i ct s . In gen era l , the gre a ter the level of overl a p, the more

l i kely that overlap wi ll have an impact on media covera ge .

S h a red media are more likely to exist in dom e s tic con f l i cts than in intern a ti onal disp ute s .Wh en a con f l i ct breaks out bet ween different groups within the same co u n try, t h e

n a ti onal news media wi ll be con s tru cting stories that wi ll be con su m ed by mem bers and

su pporters of a ll side s . This is less likely to be the case in attem pts to bring abo ut pe ace in

i n tern a ti onal con f l i ct s . In those situ a ti ons one wi ll find citi zens from each co u n try get ti n g

most of t h eir inform a ti on from their own news med i a . Here too the news media of ten

m a ke a probl em a tic situ a ti on even wors e .

Su ch wors ening of a situ a ti on is espec i a lly likely wh en a high level of s en s a ti on a l i s m

cha racteri zes the media envi ron m en t . Sen s a ti onalism refers to the ex tent to wh i ch journalists feel obl i ged to con s tru ct and pre s ent news stories in a mel od ra m a tic styl e . Sen s ationalist norms place a high va lue on em o ti onalism ra t h er than re a s on , on en tert a i n m en t

rat h er than inform a ti on , on specific events ra t h er than lon g - term proce s s e s , and on pers on a l i ties ra t h er than insti tuti on s .

Th ere has been growing con cern in the field of po l i tical com mu n i c a ti on abo ut the inf lu en ce of s en s a ti onalism on public disco u rs e . The ph en om en on has also been referred to

as “ i n fo t a i n m en t”( Blu m l er and Kava n a gh 1999; Brants 1998; Brants and Neij ens 1998;

Gra ber 1994) or “t a bl oi d i z a ti on” ( Newton 1999; Owen 2000). De s p i te differen ces in emph a s i s , most of these works cen ter on the same poi n t : The gre a ter the influ en ce of comm ercialism on news con ten t , the less likely the media can serve as serious and re s pon s i bl e

forums for public deb a te .

It is important to note that this work focuses on the n o rm s that dom i n a te the med i a

envi ron m en t . While looking at news formats (for ex a m p l e , the size of h e adlines) can also

provi de important inform a ti on , it is cri tical to focus on how norms reg u l a te the interactions bet ween leaders and journ a l i s t s . Jo u rnalists working in a rel a tively sen s a ti onalist 

envi ron m ent feel more pre s su red to su pp ly their ed i tors with mel od ra m a , and they pass

these ex pect a ti ons to their source s . Po l i tical leaders and activists feel forced to dra m a ti ze

t h eir po s i ti ons to com pete for space . This of ten leads to a high degree of ten s i on in the 

rel a ti on s h i p, as leaders become fru s tra ted over the med i a’s unwi ll i n gness to deal with su bs t a n ce . The norm a tive approach all ows us to look direct ly at how su ch codes influ en ce the

beh avi or of both journalists and po l i tical leaders .

Sen s a ti onalist media em ph a s i ze a nu m ber of n ews va lues that are incon gru ent with a

pe ace proce s s .E d i tors and reporters working in a sen s a ti onalist envi ron m ent wi ll be more

l i kely to con s tru ct stories that are simple, d ra m a ti c ,s h ort s i gh ted , and et h n ocen tri c .E m otional news covera ge is de s i gn ed to stir passion s , and nothing could be more damaging for

those en ga ged in con f l i ct re s o luti on .Wh en sen s a ti onalism is con s i dered a cen tral news

va lu e , it influ en ces every stage of the news produ cti on proce s s . Jo u rnalists search for the

most dra m a tic and em o ti onal stori e s , while ph o togra ph ers and camera opera tors attem pt

to captu re the most shocking image s .D rama becomes the pri m a ry cri teri on for dec i s i on s

Theoretical Principles 1 5
a bo ut story prom i n en ce . Those re s pon s i ble for layo ut and gra phics use formats and headlines that magnify the inten s i ty and import a n ce of con f l i ct s .

Here too there are no absolute s : Every modern media sys tem is ch a racteri zed by at least

s ome sen s a ti onalist med i a .Wh en carrying out com p a ra tive work , re s e a rch ers need to

l ook at the rel a tivei m port a n ce of s en s a ti onalist va lues within the overa ll media envi ronm en t . It is not en o u gh to simply look at the audien ce share for tabl oid news p a pers , for exa m p l e . Sen s a ti onalist news va lues can also have an important impact on journ a l i s t s

working for the mainstream med i a . In tervi ews with journalists and po l i tical actors can

provi de important insights abo ut the ex tent to wh i ch su ch va lues influ en ce interacti on s

bet ween them . The high er the demand for dra m a , the more po l i tical leaders wi ll feel pre ssu red to provi de it.

Sen s a ti onalist news media have a ve s ted interest in con f l i ct . The best known histori c a l

example of this ph en om en on is the flagrant attem pt by publ i s h er Wi lliam Ra n do l ph

Hea rst to stir Am erican anger against Spain at the end of the nineteenth cen tu ry. The of t -

repe a ted story claims that a bored illu s tra tor asked to come home from Cuba bec a u s e

“th ere wi ll be no war.” He a rst all egedly rep l i ed ,“You furnish the pictu re s , and I’ll furn i s h

the war.”While some have qu e s ti on ed the verac i ty of the story, t h ere is no dispute that

He a rst and others were able to sign i f i c a n t ly increase circ u l a ti on by sen s a ti onalizing the

S p a n i s h - Am erican con f l i ct .

An even bet ter dem on s tra ti on of this ph en om en on is mu ch less well known . Ito (1990)

reported on a nu m ber of re s e a rch proj ects carri ed out in Japan con cerning media covera ge of the Ru s s o - Japanese war in 1904. This re s e a rch shows that news p a pers that carri ed

“ch a uvi n i s tic and sen s a ti on a l i s t”a rti cles and ed i torials du ring that con f l i ct gre a t ly 

ex p a n ded their circ u l a ti on , while those that did not lost many re aders . An gry mobs set fire

to the premises of one news p a per oppo s ed to the war, and it even tu a lly went bankru pt .All

this may explain the com m ents attri buted to the news p a per journalist Ku roiwa Ru i ko

l a ter in that cen tu ry: “ News p a pers should be anti - govern m ent du ring pe ace time and

ch a uvi n i s tic du ring war ti m e”( Ito 1990, p. 4 3 1 ) .

A cynical saying assoc i a ted with sen s a ti onalist journalism goe s ,“ If it bl eed s , it lead s .”

The practi ce has both long- and short - term implicati ons for po l i tical con f l i cts and pe acem a k i n g. The world con s tru cted by sen s a ti onalist journalism is a fri gh tening place fill ed

with threats and vi o l en ce , one in wh i ch leaders and citi zens must con s t a n t ly worry abo ut

s ec u ri ty. E n emies appear powerful and unwi lling to com prom i s e .G iven this atm o s ph ere ,

those prom o ting pe ace and recon c i l i a ti on appe a r, at be s t ,n a ive , and at wors t , tra i toro u s .

Covera ge of pe ace cerem onies provi des the on ly important excepti on to this ru l e .

When a serious bre a k t h ro u gh occ u rs in the pe ace proce s s , the sen s a ti onalist press becomes euph ori c . The em phasis on immed i acy and drama drives ed i tors and reporters to

pre s ent an ex a ggera ted vers i on of su cce s s e s . The po l i tical leadership is unders t a n d a bly

p l e a s ed with su ch covera ge , and perfect ly wi lling to parti c i p a te in the cel ebra ti on . In the

l ong ru n ,h owever, overs t a ted covera ge may prove co u n terprodu ctive . Rising ex pect a ti on s

can lead to bi t ter disappoi n tm ents wh en the process runs into tro u bl e .

The level of s en s a ti onalism within a media envi ron m ent has an impact not on ly on the

pe ace process itsel f , but also on the internal deb a te abo ut su ch a process (Wo l fs feld 1997a,

1 9 9 7 d ) . The em phasis on drama and con f l i ct leads journalists to seek out the most 

1 6 Theoretical Principles
extreme voi ces and acti ons for the purpose of exc i ting audien ce s . This ro utine can inflame

the internal deb a te over a pe ace process in two major ways : (1) po l i tical actors feel pre ssured to escalate their tactics in order to su cce s s f u lly com pete for access to the media and

(2) high l i gh ting the most angry and vi o l ent forces makes it almost impo s s i ble for leaders

to carry out a re a s on ed deb a te over the issu e .E ach side feels com pell ed to re s pond in kind

to the thre a t s , acc u s a ti on s , and insults that make for su ch dra m a tic headl i n e s . Sen s a ti on a list news media tu rn every public deb a te into a shouting match .

This dynamic is not, of co u rs e ,l i m i ted to public deb a tes over a pe ace proce s s . However,

the po ten tial for damage may be espec i a lly great du ring su ch public del i bera ti on s . Ci tizen s’ feel i n gs abo ut su ch issues are likely to be espec i a lly inten s e , and thus even the smallest of s p a rks has the po ten tial to start a major fire . In ad d i ti on , a calm po l i ti c a l

envi ron m ent is an essen tial el em ent in the prom o ti on of pe ace . It wi ll be difficult for leaders to convi n ce the public abo ut the ben efits of pe ace wh en the pe ace process appe a rs to

be accom p a n i ed by so mu ch con f l i ct . Conven ti onal wi s dom holds that “ we must make

peace among ours elves before we can make pe ace with others .”

This report examines the fo ll owing four aspects of the po l i tical and media envi ronm en t :(1) the ex tent of con s en sus among po l i tical el i tes in su pport of a pe ace proce s s ,

(2) the nu m ber and inten s i ty of c rises assoc i a ted with the proce s s , (3) the ex tent of s h a red

m ed i a , and (4) the degree to wh i ch sen s a ti onalist news or gans dom i n a te the media environ m ent .O f co u rs e ,o t h er factors also are wort hy of s tu dy. Nevert h el e s s , these four va ria bles provi de a starting point for explaining the va rying role of the news media in a pe ace

proce s s .

Theoretical Principles 1 7
Th re e

R e s e a rch Strat e gy

The re s e a rch for this stu dy foc u s ed on two case stu d i e s : (1) the Oslo pe ace proce s s

bet ween Is rael and the Pa l e s tinians and (2) the attem pts to bring pe ace to

North ern Ireland that cen tered on the Good Fri d ay Agreem en t . The similari ti e s

and differen ces bet ween these two processes provi de a ri ch set of data for unders t a n d i n g

h ow the role of the news media can va ry.

In both cases the con f l i cts have been bl oody and lon g. Nei t h er pe ace process has been

e a s y. E ach nego ti a ti on has been difficult, and some oppon ents have used terrorism in an

a t tem pt to halt the proce s s . Al s o, n ews media in Nort h ern Ireland and Is rael are bo t h , for

the most part ,f ree from govern m ent con tro l .

The two con f l i cts also ex h i bit important differen ce s . The con f l i ct in Nort h ern Ireland is

m ore of an internal dispute bet ween two groups living within the same com mu n i ty. Th e

m a j or con f ron t a ti on cen ters on wh et h er that com mu n i ty should remain part of t h e

Uni ted Ki n gdom or become part of Irel a n d . The people share a com m on language and to

a large ex tent com m on med i a . Th ey also, for the most part , vo te in the same el ecti on s . Th e

Is raelis and the Pa l e s ti n i a n s , on the other hand, l ived as com p l etely sep a ra te com mu n i ti e s

u n til 1967. Th ey speak different language s , and while many Pa l e s tinians mon i tor the 

Israeli med i a , most people rely on their own news report s . In ad d i ti on , the ulti m a te goa l

of the Oslo process is to cre a te two sep a ra te po l i tical en ti ties that can coexist in pe ace ,

while in Nort h ern Ireland the aim is for the two sides to live toget h er.

Res e a rch on the role of the news media in the Mi d dle East pe ace process began in the

sum m er of 1 9 9 4 ,a bo ut nine months after the first major bre a k t h ro u gh at Oslo. The central source of data for this re s e a rch comes from forty - one in-depth intervi ews carri ed out

bet ween that su m m er and Decem ber 1995, a bo ut a month after Prime Mi n i s ter Ra bi n

was assassinated . In tervi ews were con du cted with repre s en t a tives from the Ra bi n / Pere s

govern m en t s , the Is raeli oppo s i ti on parti e s , the Pa l e s tinian Aut h ori ty, and the Pa l e s ti n i a n

oppo s i ti on (mostly Ha m a s ) . In tervi ew su bj ects were ch o s en because they had an on goi n g

rel a ti onship with the Is raeli press con cerning the Oslo pe ace proce s s . Th i rteen journ a l i s t s

were intervi ewed who had covered the pe ace process for news p a pers , tel evi s i on , and rad i o.

The journalists were sel ected based on the import a n ce of t h eir news or gan and their are a

of re s pon s i bi l i ty. Most intervi ews lasted for abo ut an hour. All were taped and then tra ns c ri bed .

A similar set of i n tervi ews was carri ed out in Belfast in April 1999. The Good Fri d ay

Agreem ent had been in place for abo ut a ye a r, and the two sides were finding it difficult to

m ove forw a rd . The Un i onist camp had ref u s ed to join a power- s h a ring exec utive unti l

Sinn Fein agreed to decom m i s s i on i n g. Twen ty intervi ews were con du cted with leaders

f rom a va ri ety of po l i tical parti e s ,t h eir spo ke s pers on s , and a wi de ra n ge of reporters wh o

1 8
covered the pe ace process for the local pre s s . The intervi ews were similar in length to

those held in Is rael .

The goal of these intervi ews was to understand the cultu re of po l i tical com mu n i c a ti on

in each co u n try. The best met h od for learning abo ut the rules of the game is to talk to the

p l ayers . These ex pert informants provi de cri tical insights into the norms and ro utines that

govern interacti ons bet ween leaders and journalists and how su ch practi ces influ en ce the

con s tru cti on of n ews stori e s . The intervi ews provi de a ri ch set of data abo ut the natu re of

the po l i tical and media envi ron m ents and how the va rious actors cope with those environ m en t s .

Le aders in both co u n tries con s t a n t ly attem pt to ex p l oit their ex peri en ce in order to

find bet ter ways to prom o te their messages to the med i a . Su ch pra gm a tic ob s erva ti on s

com bi n ed with ex i s ting knowl ed ge in the field of po l i tical com mu n i c a ti on , and the ad ded

pers pective of fered by examining two different co u n tri e s , should provi de po l i c ym a kers

with a bet ter understanding of the role the news media play in attem pts to prom o te pe ace .

This stu dy uses two ad d i ti onal sources of d a t a . The first is an analysis of ed i torials from

f ive news p a pers ,t h ree in Is rael and two in Bel f a s t . The analysis loo ked at the ra n ge and

type of op i n i ons ex pre s s ed abo ut the pe ace process in each co u n try. The Is raeli ed i tori a l s

were wri t ten in the wake of s even major even t s , both po s i tive and nega tive , that took place

bet ween the start of Oslo in Septem ber 1993 and the major terrorist attacks at the end of

Febru a ry 1995.2All toget h er, 229 ed i torials from the news p a pers Ha’ a ret z , Ma’ a riv, a n d

Yed i ot Ah ro n ot were analy zed . Jo u rnalists perm a n en t ly assign ed to ed i torial wri ting wro te

the majori ty of these piece s , wh i ch ref l ected their indivi dual op i n i on s .

By con tra s t , most of the ed i torials in the two Nort h ern Ireland news p a pers—the Iri s h

News and the Belfast Tel egra p h— repre s en ted the official po s i ti on of those news p a pers .3

These papers publ i s h ed a few ed i torials after each even t , so the sample inclu des a larger

nu m ber of events than the Is raeli sample. Twen ty - t wo events were ch o s en that ra n ge from

the vi o l en ce assoc i a ted with an Ora n ge march in Ju ly 1997 to the Hi ll s boro u gh Decl a rati on in April 1999.4 The events took place both before and after the Good Fri d ay Agreem ent was sign ed in April 1998.A total of 147 ed i torials were ex a m i n ed .

The ed i torials in both co u n tries were coded as su pportive of the pe ace proce s s ,

oppo s ed to it, or ambiva l ent tow a rd it. Those who wri te op i n i on pieces make a con certed

ef fort to make their po s i ti on cl e a r, wh i ch fac i l i t a tes the cod i n g. E d i torials coded as 

a m biva l ent ex pre s s ed su pport for the pe ace process but also poi n ted to re s erva ti ons abo ut

its progre s s . To test the rel i a bi l i ty of the coding sch em e ,t wo indepen dent coders ex a m i n ed

10 percent of the ed i torials in Is rael and Nort h ern Irel a n d . The agreem ent ra te was over

90 percent in both co u n tri e s .

News covera ge of t wo major terrorist attacks provi des the final source of d a t a . The firs t

a t t ack took place at the Beit Lid ju n cti on in Is rael in Ja nu a ry 1995 and the second in

O m a gh , Nort h ern Irel a n d , in August 1998. Both attacks sought to end the pe ace proce s s

in each co u n try. De s p i te the similari ti e s ,h owever, the news media in each set ting drew

very different po l i tical lessons from the inciden t s ,t hus dem on s tra ting how the po l i ti c a l

envi ron m ent can affect the con s tru cti on of n ews stories abo ut pe ace .

A gl a ring om i s s i on in the re s e a rch plan demands an ex p l a n a ti on . The re s e a rch doe s

not con s i der the role of the Pa l e s tinian press in the Oslo pe ace proce s s . This seems 

Research Strategy 1 9
e s pec i a lly probl em a tic because the Nort h ern Ireland stu dy inclu des an analysis of the media from both sides of the con f l i ct . However, the Pa l e s tinian press does not opera te by the

same rules as the other media being ex a m i n ed . The Pa l e s tinian media are almost to t a lly

u n der govern m ent con tro l , and ed i tors have little discreti on in deciding what frames to

adopt . Thu s , very few of the theoretical principles discussed here app ly to this type of m edia envi ron m en t . Al t h o u gh a com p a ri s on bet ween dem oc ra tic and non dem oc ra tic environ m ents would be ex trem ely wort hwh i l e , it is beyond the scope of this stu dy.

2 0 Research Strategy
Fo u r

The Israeli Media

and the Oslo Peace Pro c e s s

I

s raeli journalists rec a ll the last days of August 1993 with both em b a rra s s m ent and

exc i tem en t . The media had been con ti nu a lly fo ll owing the on going pe ace talks in

Was h i n g ton , wh i ch seem ed to be going nowh ere . Su d den ly, Is raeli and Pa l e s ti n i a n

l e aders announced that they had ach i eved a bre a k t h ro u gh in sec ret talks that had been

taking place “s om ewh ere in Scandinavi a .” The agreem ent call ed for Is rael to pull back

f rom Gaza and from the city of Jeri cho in the West Bank and for the Pa l e s tine Libera ti on

O r ga n i z a ti on (PLO) to take ad m i n i s tra tive con trol of these are a s . Within a few days the

m edia learn ed that the agreem ent was even bi gger. Is rael inten ded to form a lly recogn i ze

the PLO as the legi ti m a te repre s en t a tive of the Pa l e s tinian peop l e , and the PLO wo u l d

form a lly recogn i ze the Jewish State . In ad d i ti on , the Decl a ra ti on of Principles (DO P )

would set out a series of s teps for moving the pe ace process forw a rd .

The initial weeks after the bre a k t h ro u gh were eu ph ori c , with the Is raeli media joi n i n g

in the cel ebra ti on . This peri od came to be known as the pe ace fe s tiva l , and the news p apers , tel evi s i on , and radio were full of rosy pred i cti ons abo ut the new dawn (Wo l fs fel d

1 9 9 7 b ) . Th ere were stories abo ut Is rael becoming the “Swi t zerland of the Mi d dle East”

and pred i cting that pe ace with Syria was just around the corn er.

The probl em was that pe ace had not arrived—it was not even cl o s e . The DOP sign ed

by Is rael and the Pa l e s tinians merely establ i s h ed a fra m ework for nego ti a ti on s . While the

s i gning of the Oslo accords repre s en ted an important bre a k t h ro u gh , the road to pe ace

would prove to be lon g, d i f f i c u l t , and bl oody. The leaders them s elves were well aw a re of

these difficulties but prob a bly felt that they should ri de the wave of optimism for as lon g

as it might last. The news media served as the major en gine for amplifying that wave and

for raising public ex pect a ti ons abo ut the futu re .

De s p i te initial en t hu s i a s m , the po l i tical envi ron m ent was not con du c ive to the prom otion of pe ace . Prime Mi n i s ter Ra bin had been el ected by an ex trem ely slim margin in

1992 and had a great deal of d i f f i c u l ty maintaining his majori ty in the Kn e s s et du ring the

l ong months of n ego ti a ti on s . The initial agreem ent with the PLO passed the Kn e s s et by a

vote of s i x ty - one to fifty in Septem ber 1993. The “Oslo B” a greem en t ,s i gn ed two ye a rs

l a ter wh en Ra bin headed a minori ty govern m en t ,p a s s ed by a mere two vo te s .

Public su pport for the Oslo pe ace process was som ewhat high er but rem a i n ed ten t ative . While su pport for the process stayed in the mid-60 percent ra n ge du ring the more

po s i tive even t s , it of ten dropped to around 50 percent after terrorist attacks (Stei n m et z

1 9 9 6 ) . Ra bin was never able to mobi l i ze a massive amount of su pport for Oslo ei t h er in

the Kn e s s et or among the publ i c .

The Is raeli po l i ty had long been split over the qu e s ti on of what to do abo ut the

occ u p i ed terri tori e s . Ma ny in Is rael sti ll rega rded the PLO as a terrorist or ga n i z a ti on 2 1
re s pon s i ble for hu n d reds of de a t h s , and the oppo s i ti on to Oslo was both ex ten s ive and

f i erce . Im m ed i a tely after the initial accords were announced , the po l i tical ri ght wing or gan i zed two of the largest dem on s tra ti ons ever held in Jeru s a l em , nu m bering over 100,000

p a rticipants each . Countless pro test movem ents were or ga n i zed against the agreem en t . It

was clear from the beginning that the stru ggle over Oslo would be bi t ter.

The two camps prom o ted major frames in keeping with the previous discussion . Th e

Ra bin govern m en t , for the most part ,t a l ked abo ut the need for com promise to end the

con f l i ct . Forei gn Mi n i s ter Shimon Pere s , perhaps the most el oqu ent spo ke s pers on for this

pers pective , envi s i on ed a “ New Mi d dle East” m a rked by a po l i tical and econ omic boon to

the en ti re are a . The initial en t husiasm of the press ref l ected the power of the Pe ace fra m e .

The ri gh t - wing oppo s i ti on ,l ed by Benyamin Net a nya hu ,p ut forth a Sec u ri ty fra m e ,

arguing that any con ce s s i ons to the Pa l e s tinians would lead on ly to more bl ood s h ed . Th e

term “s ec u ri ty ” has an almost reveren tial status in Is rael , as one would ex pect from a

co u n try that has lost so many lives to war and terrori s m . The minister in ch a r ge of t h e

a rm ed forces is call ed the “s ec u ri ty minister.”The news media try to assess the “s ec u ri ty

s i tu a ti on” or have on going discussions abo ut “s ec u ri ty probl em s .”The Is rael i - occ u p i ed

a rea in Leb a n on to pro tect the nort h ern set t l em ents was call ed the “s ec u ri ty zon e .” Th e

Likud has alw ays played the sec u ri ty card in its stron gest attacks on the Labor Pa rty, for

a ny con ce s s i ons to the Arabs are seen insti n ctively as a threat to sec u ri ty. The oppo s i ti on’s

m a j or hope of defe a ting the Labor govern m ent was to have the deb a te over Oslo fra m ed

as a con f l i ct over sec u ri ty ra t h er than a con f l i ct over pe ace . One of Net a nya hu’s advi s ors

t a l ked abo ut the re s on a n ce of the sec u ri ty message :

The security aspect means something to people. What worries them is security, that 80

percent of the population lives near the coastal plain [which the Likud claimed would be

under direct threat if the territories were given back] or just that it is a real problem that

everyone is worried about [Middle East interview no. 14; August 18, 1995].

The terrorist attacks carri ed out by Hamas and the Islamic Ji h ad movem ent proved to be

the most important veh i cle for prom o ting the Sec u ri ty fra m e . In s te ad of bri n ging pe ace ,

the Oslo accords led to a rapid rise in the death to ll , with hu n d reds of Is raelis being kill ed .

Every terrorist attack provi ded “proof”that the oppo s i ti on had been ri ght all alon g :G iving in to the Pa l e s tinians en co u ra ges more vi o l en ce . Thu s , Prime Mi n i s ter Ra bin found it

i n c re a s i n gly difficult to mobi l i ze su pport for the pe ace proce s s .

This report argues that the Is raeli news media made the situ a ti on even more difficult.

The Israeli media have become incre a s i n gly sen s a ti onalist in recent ye a rs (Peri , in pre s s ) .

In earl i er ye a rs ,i deo l ogical papers own ed by po l i tical parties had a wi de circ u l a ti on .Vi rtua lly all of these news p a pers went out of business as com m ercial news p a pers came to domi n a te the marketp l ace . The two most popular news p a pers —Yed i ot Ah ro n ot a n d

Ma’ a riv— em p l oy a tabl oid format that inclu des large co l orful headl i n e s , the ex ten s ive use

of visua l s , and an ex trem ely dra m a tic and em o ti onal form of covera ge . In tense com petiti on bet ween the two papers has led to an incre a s i n gly high level of s en s a ti onalist reporti n g. De s p i te this, both news p a pers also em p l oy some serious wri ters on their staff, wh i ch

a ll ows them to bri d ge the gap bet ween different types of re aders .5A third import a n t

n ews p a per —Ha’ a ret z—is inten ded for a more soph i s ti c a ted audien ce . It has by far the

2 2 The Israeli Media and the Olso Peace Process
s m a llest circ u l a ti on but is con s i dered essen tial re ading by the soc i a l , po l i ti c a l , and econ omic el i tes in Is rael .

The electronic media in Is rael have also become more sen s a ti on a l i s t . Un til a few ye a rs

a go on ly one tel evi s i on stati on in Is rael — Ch a n n el 1—model ed on the BBC, a publ i c

broadc a s ting sys tem . Ch a n n el 2, a more com m erc i a lly ori en ted stati on , began reg u l a r

broadc a s ting in 1993 using a more dra m a tic form a t . It qu i ck ly became the more pop u l a r

s t a ti on for news . The first ch a n n el has been forced to make similar ch a n ges to com pete .

At the same ti m e , the nu m ber of radio stati ons in Is rael has incre a s ed dra m a ti c a lly, a n d

t h ey, too, use dra m a tic stories to increase ra ti n gs . The term “ra ti n gs cultu re” is of ten used

in Is rael to de s c ri be these ch a n ge s .

When sen s a ti onalist news media cover a probl em a tic pe ace proce s s , the wors t - c a s e

s cen a rio for leaders is cre a ted . A sen s a ti onalist media tu rn every deb a te into a shouti n g

m a tch and every setb ack into a disaster. A calm po l i tical envi ron m ent is an import a n t

con d i ti on for the prom o ti on of pe ace . News is almost alw ays abo ut con f l i ct , and sen s ati onalist news is ded i c a ted to pre s en ting that con f l i ct in as dra m a tic and em o ti onal a packa ge as po s s i bl e .

As discussed , the rel a tive import a n ce of s en s a ti onalism in a given media envi ron m en t

can be best ascert a i n ed by talking with journalists and their source s . These ex pert informants are in the best po s i ti on to explain the rules of the ga m e . Is raeli journalists are

acutely aw a re of the influ en ce of s en s a ti on a l i s m , a familiar topic of d i s c u s s i on .While most

edi tors and reporters would prob a bly prefer to en ga ge in more serious reporti n g, t h ey

h ave re s i gn ed them s elves to the ex i s ting market . The prevailing assu m pti on is that dram a tic covera ge is the on ly way to com pete for audien ce share . One journalist talked abo ut

this on going need for ex a ggera ti on :

The media go too far about every subject under the sun. They went too far about the

Oslo process. They went too far about the peace with Jordan. They go too far when it

comes to terrorist attacks, and they go too far when it comes to scandals. That’s the

“tabloidization” process that all of the media are going through. It’s not related to the

peace process. It has to do with the media [Middle East interview no. 6; May 11, 1995].

The Is raeli aut h ori ties were con ti nu a lly fru s tra ted by the sen s a ti onalist covera ge given to

terrori s m . It was tru e ,t h ey said, that terrorism repre s en ted a significant threat to the pe ace

proce s s , and no one su gge s ted that terrorism was not a legi ti m a te news story. Th ey obj ected to the proporti on and tone of the covera ge . The “m a ra t h ons of m o u rn i n g”wi t h

t wen ty - fo u r-hour call-in shows , constant hours of s ad mu s i c , and lu rid covera ge of t h e

f u n erals made terrorist attacks seem like full-scale war. In previous ye a rs , terrorism had

been given a mu ch less dra m a tic fra m e . One of Ra bi n’s closest advi s ors , a form er journ a li s t ,t a l ked abo ut the ch a n ge in covera ge :

There’s no comparison between the coverage today and what it was like in the past.

Twenty-four soldiers died in an ammunition truck after a mission in Egypt. . . .There

was an ordinary headline in Yediot Ahronot. Nothing like what you have today. There

were two pictures, a list of all the dead and that was it. Two days after that there was

nothing. Today with all of the pictures, the headlines, and the color, it’s a completely different world. . . . I once wrote about a bomb that went off at the central bus station in

The Israeli Media and the Olso Peace Process 2 3
Tel Aviv. It was a one-page story in my paper, one and a half pages in Yediot Ahronot,

and that was the end of the story. People were killed. Today a bomb in the central bus

station in Tel Aviv would be like the end of the world [Middle East interview no. 4;

March 19, 1995].

It is ex trem ely difficult to make lon g - ra n ge policy in this type of ch a r ged atm o s ph ere .

Public hys teria becomes an important el em ent in planning and stra tegy, and peop l e

expect the govern m ent to “do som et h i n g.”Le aders faced with su ch situ a ti ons wi ll of ten

re s pond with sym bolic ge s tu res su ch as set ting up special com m i t tees or carrying out a

few high ly publ i c i zed raids (Wo l fs fel d , in pre s s ) . The goal is to provi de the media wi t h

s om ething to use until the wave passes.

Rabi n’s initial policy was to “con ti nue with the pe ace process as if t h ere was no terrori s m , and to fight terrorism as if t h ere was no pe ace proce s s” ( ed i tori a l ,Jeru s a l em Po s t ,

Decem ber 9, 1 9 9 2 , p. 6 ) . This became incre a s i n gly impo s s i ble as the atm o s ph ere grew

m ore heated . Demands to ret a l i a te against the Pa l e s tinians and halt the pe ace proce s s

grew. Even the pre s i dent of Is rael ,E zer Wei z m a n , who is not su ppo s ed to get invo lved in

pol i tical deb a te s ,a r g u ed for su s pending the talks.

Iron i c a lly, the vast majori ty of Is raeli journalists su pported the pe ace proce s s . Th e

ri gh t - wing oppo s i ti on con s t a n t ly acc u s ed the press of progovern m ent bi a s . But wh en

j o u rnalists have to ch oose bet ween pers onal and profe s s i onal con s i dera ti on s , the latter

a lw ays wi n . As one reporter put it,“The pers on who is going to prom o te me is my ed i tor,

not [then Is raeli Forei gn Mi n i s ter] Shimon Pere s .” ( Mi d dle East intervi ew no. 3 1 ; June 6,

1995) The most important cri teri on was alw ays to come up with the “be s t”n ews story,

meaning one that would beat the com peti ti on . In the case of terrori s m , this led to shocking stories fill ed with gory pictu res and sounds of s c reaming and uncon tro ll a ble cryi n g.

These terrorist acts were a trem en dous ach i evem ent for Ha m a s , and the hys terical covera ge cert a i n ly con tri buted to that su cce s s . One of the most important goals of these act s

was to force the Is raeli and Pa l e s tinian aut h ori ties to pay atten ti on . Wi t h o ut the vi o l en ce ,

t h ey would have ign ored Ha m a s .Af ter the attack s , Hamas became a major player. One of

the Hamas leaders talked abo ut the role of the Is raeli news media in all this:

The enemy can sometimes serve us indirectly. We don’t have any large news institutions

that will publicize and cover the things that we’re interested in. . . .So in the end, the

Hamas actions force the [Israeli] media to report and relate to the activities and positions of the movement. I want to use the military actions to prove my abilities on both

the local and regional level. The Israeli press helps with this. Therefore, through my military action I am trying to pass a message that Hamas is a central force among the Palestinians, and it is impossible to ignore it [Middle East interview no. 17; June 8, 1995].

Hamas leaders see the Is raeli press as a Zi onist tool for oppressing the Pa l e s tinian peop l e .

Yet they depend on the Is raeli media to pass on their message to both Is raelis and Pa l e sti n i a n s .

Pu blic anger was directed at all Pa l e s ti n i a n s , and media covera ge ref l ected this. Th e

voi ces against Pa l e s tinian leader Yasir Arafat su d den ly became mu ch louder, while those

who previ o u s ly su pported him were placed on the defen s ive . Po l i tical actors and journ a lists both understand how su ch ch a n ges in cl i m a te can influ en ce their rel a ti on s h i p.

2 4 The Israeli Media and the Olso Peace Process
Jo u rnalists tend to look for sources and inform a ti on that fit easily into a prevailing story

l i n e .Wh en the pe ace process is going well ,t h ey con s tru ct stories that rei n force this optim i s m , and wh en it goes poorly, t h eir search ch a n ges accord i n gly.

Images of the Enemy

Ima ges of the en emy provi de one of the most important indicators of the rel a tive su cce s s

of com peting fra m e s . The Sec u ri ty frame is based on an on going distrust of the other

s i de ,while a Pe ace frame puts forth a more modera te image of the oppon en t . In the early

s t a ges of the Oslo accord , the Is raeli media showed sign i f i c a n t ly more po s i tive images of

Arafat and the PLO. Before Ra bi n’s el ecti on in 1992, the govern m ent forb ade Is raeli journalists to meet with PLO leaders . Af ter the bre a k t h ro u gh at Oslo, Is raeli reporters su dden ly had access to the en ti re leaders h i p. Af ter ye a rs of reporting abo ut people they had

n ever actu a lly met , reporters were flying all over the Arab world to intervi ew them . Th e

i n tervi ews were co u rteous and re s pectf u l , and for the first time Is raelis saw a very differen t

Pal e s ti n i a n . At least to a certain ex ten t , the masked terrorists had become edu c a ted state sm en .

Nevert h el e s s , the Pa l e s tinians were sti ll con s i dered a thre a t , wh i ch made them newsworthy. This was espec i a lly true for the more sen s a ti onalist news or ga n s , because thre a t s

and vi o l en ce are so cen tral to their ed i torial po l i c y. Ha’ a ret z,the least sen s a ti onalist of t h e

t h ree Is raeli news p a pers , was the on ly one to have a reporter living among the Pa l e s ti n ia n s . Even she, h owever, was Jewi s h .

The media never abandon ed the terrorist image , but merely placed it on the shel f . As

the pe ace process tu rn ed more vi o l en t , the more trad i ti onal frames reem er ged . The Pa l e stinian leadership became incre a s i n gly fru s tra ted by the way the Is raeli media portrayed

t h em . A PLO leader argued that the em phasis of the Is raeli media on terrorism was

de s troying the pe ace proce s s :

I think the Israeli media in general, and Israeli television in particular are not passing on

our message, or to be more exact, they are passing on the unusual situation like the

bombing at Beit Lid. They are using the articles and the pictures to inflame the situation

rather than to calm it. The Israeli press, and especially the Israeli television, should be

reporting in a way that helps the peace process. They attack the Palestinians for the

Hamas actions as if all Palestinians are carrying out these kinds of acts, and they’re trying to destroy the peace process. If they really want peace, Israeli television should be

telling the Israeli viewer about the other side of the Palestinian people [Middle East

interview no. 18; January 16, 1995].

This statem ent illu s tra tes a cen tral probl em con cerning the image of en emies in more

s en s a ti onalist med i a . Meeting the com bi n ed goals of d rama and simplicity leads to on e -

d i m en s i onal portrayal of the other side . The sen s a ti onalist world is alw ays painted in

black and wh i te ;t h ere is little room for grays . Con s equ en t ly, su ch media portrayals make

it difficult for the public to distinguish bet ween prope ace and anti pe ace forces within the

o t h er side . This is espec i a lly dangerous because the terrorist image is more news wort hy.

Moderate , com promising statem ents with the po ten tial to calm the atm o s ph ere and

The Israeli Media and the Olso Peace Process 2 5
i m prove the images of the en emy ra rely su rvive the ed i torial proce s s , even wh en they

come from those in ch a r ge of the govern m en t .

The Pa l e s tinians intervi ewed for this report were ac utely aw a re of the cultu ral probl ems assoc i a ted with dealing with the Is raeli pre s s . Com m ents along these lines inclu ded ,

“The Is raeli press is con cern ed with Is raeli intere s t s , not those of the Pa l e s ti n i a n s” ;“I can’t

get my message ac ross because the media are for the Jews” ; “I would like to have an obj ective pictu re in wh i ch the Pa l e s tinians are tre a ted like human bei n gs” ; and “ Even if t h ere’s

pe ace , the Is raelis wi ll sti ll think they ’re spec i a l .” The Is raeli media were con s i dered hosti l e , et h n ocen tri c , and con de s cen d i n g.While most of those intervi ewed bel i eved that the

i m a ge of Pa l e s tinians had improved since Oslo, t h ey sti ll felt they were a long way from

ach i eving re s pect and legi ti m ac y.

It is also important to understand that the Is raeli press produ ces news for the Jewi s h

pop u l a ti on , wh i ch for the most part con ti nues to vi ew the Pa l e s tinians as en em i e s .6 Contra ry to the situ a ti on in Nort h ern Irel a n d , the Is raeli and Pa l e s tinian media are com p l etely

s ep a ra te and, as a con s equ en ce , et h n ocen tric in their ori en t a ti on .While many Pa l e s ti n i a n s

do mon i tor the Is raeli pre s s ,t h ere is vi rtu a lly no flow of n ews in the oppo s i te directi on .

O n ly news stories from the Pa l e s tinian press that are espec i a lly fri gh tening or insu l ting to

Israelis are tra n s l a ted and publ i s h ed in the Is raeli pre s s .

The lack of s h a red media stems from the absen ce of a co ll ective iden ti ty bet ween the

t wo pop u l a ti on s . This point serves as another rem i n der that the role the news media play

in po l i tical con f l i cts is direct ly rel a ted to the envi ron m ent in wh i ch they opera te .As a cons equ en ce , the news media are least likely to play a con s tru ctive role wh ere they are most

n eeded . The gre a ter the cultu ral distance bet ween two peop l e s , the less likely the news media wi ll be in a po s i ti on to bri d ge that ga p.

The Internal Debate over the Oslo Pro c e s s

The key to understanding the role of the news media in any po l i tical process is to look at

the i n tera cti o n bet ween the po l i tical and media envi ron m en t s . In the Oslo proce s s ,a n

extrem ely po l a ri zed soc i ety, a rash of terrori s m , and sen s a ti onalist media proved to be an

exp l o s ive com bi n a ti on . This point becomes espec i a lly clear wh en examining the influ en ce

of the press on the internal deb a te over Oslo.

The media have become the cen tral arena for su ch deb a te s , and their rules of acce s s

and covera ge help shape public disco u rs e . The deb a te takes place not on ly in news stori e s

and ed i tori a l s , but also on talk shows and in the en tert a i n m ent med i a .E ach of t h e s e

forums has guidelines for deciding who can parti c i p a te and how the antagonists are

ex pected to con du ct them s elve s . In the sen s a ti onalist media su ch rules are de s i gn ed prim a ri ly to en su re the largest po s s i ble audien ce . In evi t a bly, the public is pre s en ted with a

n a rrow, em o ti on a l , and short s i gh ted deb a te in wh i ch va lues and ideo l ogy take a back seat

to en tert a i n m en t .

One of the fo u n d a ti ons of a ny dem oc racy is that citi zens must be given an opportu n i ty

to del i bera te over the major issues of the day. The qu a l i ty of that del i bera ti on cl e a rly depends on the level of i n form a ti on and analysis ava i l a bl e . Those living in non dem oc ra ti c

co u n tries face more obvious difficulti e s , for the aut h ori ties make a con certed ef fort to

con trol the flow of i n form a ti on . The probl ems facing We s tern dem oc rac i e sa re su bt l er and

2 6 The Israeli Media and The Olso Peace Process
less detri m en t a l . Nevert h el e s s , a nu m ber of m edia ro utines pro h i bit serious discussion of

pol i tical po l i c i e s , forcing citi zens to make dec i s i ons based on an ex trem ely slanted set of

i n form a ti on and image s .

The ed i torial secti ons of the Is raeli news p a pers dem on s tra te a re a s on ed , re s pon s i bl e

deb a te over Oslo. In the three major news p a pers , a total of 115 ed i torials favored the pe ace

proce s s , 80 oppo s ed it, and 34 were ambiva l en t . The ed i torials in all of the papers te ach

qui te a bit abo ut the underlying ideo l ogies of the two major camps in Is rael . The propon ents talk abo ut the re a s ons for con ti nuing the pe ace process de s p i te the probl em s , wh i l e

oppon ents point to the dangers in con ti nuing the Oslo proce s s .

The deb a te within the news pages is an en ti rely different matter. Th ere , the con test is

b a s ed on who can provi de the most dra m a tic rh etoric and even t s . While all news med i a

p l ace a prem ium on dra m a , the sen s a ti onalist press places this va lue above all el s e . Th i s

va lue influ en ces not on ly how the events are covered , but also the stra tegies of the actors

t h em s elve s . The intervi ews for this report provi de convincing evi den ce that the Is rael i

n ews media were important agents in inten s i f ying the level of rh etoric and vi o l en ce .

Ma ny of these probl ems rel a te to the rules of access to the news . Th ere are two major

doors for en tering the news media (Wo l fs feld 1997a). The front door is re s erved for a

s el ect group of V I Ps . These are people with su ch po l i tical and social status that almost

everything they say and do is con s i dered news wort hy. The back door is re s erved for the

rest of s oc i ety. The on ly way to gain access is thro u gh novel ty or devi a n ce . This makes it

ex trem ely difficult for mem bers of the oppo s i ti on to prom o te their ideo l ogical frames to

the publ i c . Th ey are forced to ch oose bet ween ob s c u ri ty and ex trem i s m . A leading member of the oppo s i ti on de s c ri bed the rules of en try:

What do the journalists see as newsworthy? Violence and riots, that’s what they’re waiting for. So when you bring them reasonable opinions, it doesn’t interest them. They

want blood. . . . They want something drastic, some type of scoop that will get them a

medal from their editor [Middle East interview no. 15; August 21, 1995].

Ch a ll en gers for media access com pete not on ly with the govern m ent but also with each

o t h er. The rules of this daily com peti ti on are simple: The media prefer more powerf u l

cha ll en gers to we a ker ones (Ben n ett 1990; Pa l etz and Entman 1981; Gans 1979). Am on g

the we a k , wh oever provi des the best show gains en tra n ce (Gitlin 1980; Ryan 1991). Th i s

s el ection process has two important influ en ces on the tone of the public deb a te : (1) the

p u blic is disproporti on a tely ex po s ed to the more radical voi ce and (2) these journ a l i s ti c

n orms place pre s su re on oppo s i ti on groups to use disorder and vi o l en ce to be heard .

The rel a ti onship bet ween disorder and access means that sen s a ti onalist news med i a

provi de an inverted pictu re of the po l i tical worl d . The small er, m ore radical gro u p s

become the most significant players , while el ected leaders from the oppo s i ti on appear less

i m port a n t .A con tent analysis carri ed out on news p a per stories abo ut the pe ace proce s s

du ring the first year of Oslo con f i rm this noti on (Wo l fs feld 1997b). Seven percent of a ll

s tories dealt with oppo s i ti on by ex tra p a rl i a m en t a ry movem en t s , while on ly 2 percen t

rel a ted to the oppo s i ti on in the Kn e s s et . In ad d i ti on ,i n tervi ews with leaders from the

m ore modera te movem ents reveal an on going fru s tra ti on over the amount of a t ten ti on

given to the small er, m ore vi o l ent groups (Wo l fs fel d ,1 9 9 7 a ) .

The Israeli Media and the Olso Peace Process 2 7
At first gl a n ce it might appear that this dynamic would have made it easier for the govern m ent to prom o te the pe ace proce s s : The more the oppo s i ti on appe a rs ex tremist and

vio l en t , the bet ter the govern m ent loo k s . However, pe ace requ i res a calm envi ron m ent to

t a ke roo t . Any govern m ent finds it ex trem ely difficult to persu ade people of a “n ew dawn”

in a cl i m a te marked by vi o l en ce and vi n d i ctiven e s s .The lack of pe ace within the co u n try

is a serious imped i m ent to establishing pe ace with on e’s nei gh bors .

The veh em en ce of po l i tical rh etoric re ach ed an all - time high in Is rael after the secon d

Oslo agreem ent was narrowly approved in the fall of 1 9 9 5 . Kn e s s et mem bers ,s et t l ers , ra bbi s , and oppo s i ti on movem ent leaders grew incre a s i n gly de s pera te to halt the wi t h d raw a l

f rom the occ u p i ed terri tori e s . Acts of c ivil disobed i en ce had become both more com m onp l ace and more vi o l en t . Th ere were also a nu m ber of a t t acks on govern m ent ministers .

Jud ging from the headlines Is rael appe a red to be on the brink of c ivil war. This rise in vi ol en ce re ach ed its peak with the assassinati on of Prime Mi n i s ter Ra bin in Novem ber of t h a t

ye a r.

It would be a mistake to su ggest any one cause for this rise in vi o l en ce . Im portant po l i tical forces were at work , and the set t l ers and their su pporters bel i eved that the Oslo

accords repre s en ted a direct threat to their ex i s ten ce . Nevert h el e s s ,t h ere is good re a s on to

bel i eve that the news media played at least some role in inflaming the atm o s ph ere du ri n g

this peri od . A revi ew of the ex a ggera ted , hys terical covera ge of terrorism and the insisten ce that any Jewish ch a ll en gers pay the media the “dues of d i s order ”in order to be heard

support su ch an acc u s a ti on . Sen s a ti onalist news media tra n s form public deb a tes into

s h o uting match e s .

In su m , a good deal of evi den ce indicates that the Is raeli news media played a mostly

n ega tive role in the Oslo pe ace proce s s . Most of this evi den ce comes ei t h er from those

who were direct ly invo lved in the process itsel f or from the journalists who covered it. Almost all of these informants ex pre s s ed a sense of f ru s tra ti on and anger. Most bel i eve that

the Is raeli press was more intere s ted in en tertaining than in inform i n g, in escalating conf l i cts than in helping to re s o lve them , and in ch e a pening po l i tical disco u rse than in

enri ching it. The Is raeli press appe a rs bet ter equ i pped to build walls than bri d ge s .

However, it is cri tical to place these findings within a broader fra m ework . Oslo never

en j oyed a high level of con s en su s , and nei t h er Ra bin nor Arafat was su ccessful in his efforts to halt terrori s m . It was an ex trem ely difficult and painful pe ace proce s s . The Is rael i

n ews media simply made it mu ch wors e , providing a perfect example of an interactive effect . Wh en sen s a ti on a l i s t , et h n ocen tric news media cover a probl em a tic pe ace proce s s ,t h e

com bi n ed impact is espec i a lly de s tru ctive .

It is worth looking bri ef ly at the pe ace process with Jordan to furt h er illu s tra te this

point thro u gh a co u n terexample (Wo l fs feld 1997b). Is rael and Jordan sign ed a pe ace

tre a ty in the Arava de s ert on October 26, 1 9 9 4 . The Ra bin govern m ent had no probl em

m obilizing a large amount of el i te con s en sus around this agreem en t : It was approved in

the Kn e s s et by a vo te of n i n ety - one to three . Al s o, no vi o l en ce was assoc i a ted with the

a greem en t . It was a short ,s m oo t h , and su ccessful proce s s .

The Israeli media became an en t hu s i a s tic participant in the cel ebra ti on over the agreem ent with Jord a n . A con tent analysis of n ews p a per arti cles publ i s h ed at the hei ght of t h i s

process found that 74 percent of the news items du ring this peri od were po s i tive ,

2 8 The Israeli Media and the Olso Peace Process
21 percent mixed , and a rem a rk a bly small 5 percent nega tive (Wo l fs feld 1997b). G overnm ents ra rely en j oy this type of su pport ,e s pec i a lly in pe aceti m e .7

This is why it is so important to look at both the po l i tical and the media envi ron m en t s .

This point becomes even cl e a rer wh en one analy zes the role of the news media in the

North ern Ireland pe ace proce s s .

The Israeli Media and the Olso Peace Process 2 9
F i ve

The Case of Northern Ire l a n d

The news media played a very different role in the Nort h ern Ireland pe ace proce s s .8

The re a s ons for this differen ce have to do with the natu re of the po l i tical and

m edia envi ron m ents in wh i ch the news abo ut pe ace was con s tru cted . The po l i tical envi ron m ent in Nort h ern Ireland was marked by a large degree of el i te con s en sus in

support of the agreem ent and by rel a tively little vi o l en ce on the part of those oppo s ed to

the accord s . The media envi ron m ent was ch a racteri zed by many shared news or gans and

by a rel a tively low level of s en s a ti on a l i s m . This set of c i rc u m s t a n ces tu rn ed the news

m edia into an important tool for prom o ting the pe ace proce s s .

This does not mean that the media played an ideal role in Nort h ern Irel a n d . Ma ny of

those intervi ewed ra i s ed a nu m ber of complaints against the pre s s . Un i onists who were

oppo s ed to the Good Fri d ay Agreem ent bel i eved that media bias preven ted any seri o u s

del i bera ti on abo ut the risks and costs assoc i a ted with the proce s s . Mem bers of the nati onalist party Sinn Fein were also dissati s f i ed . While they were pleased with the ch a n ges that

h ad taken place in their media image ,t h ey sti ll bel i eved that the press was bi a s ed aga i n s t

t h em . One also heard from many different groups con cerns abo ut the growing ten den c y

tow a rd “s o u n d bi te news” a m ong journalists in Nort h ern Irel a n d . The difficulty leaders

f aced in attem pting to send com p l ex messages in twen ty seconds or less para ll el ed those

found in other We s tern co u n tri e s .

Nevert h el e s s , wh en one com p a res this situ a ti on to that of Oslo one finds a world of

d i f feren ce . The discussion that fo ll ows de s c ri bes some of those differen ces and ex p l a i n s

s ome of the re a s ons for them .

The Political Enviro n m e n t

Building a wi de con s en sus in su pport of the Good Fri d ay Agreem ent was a long and difficult proce s s . All of the leaders invo lved had been thro u gh a large nu m ber of previous 

a t tem pts that had en ded in failu re . The most recent example was the An gl o - Irish agreem ent sign ed in Novem ber 1985, wh i ch all Un i onist parties had rej ected . It was clear that

on ly an agreem ent en j oying a wi de spectrum of po l i tical su pport could have any ch a n ce

of su cceed i n g. Le aving out parties assoc i a ted with the va rious para m i l i t a ry groups wo u l d

be espec i a lly dangero u s , for this would increase the likel i h ood of vi o l en ce .

The intern a ti onal com m i s s i on headed by Geor ge Mi tch ell worked for more than two

ye a rs on the agreem en t . In Mi tch ell ’s boo k , Making Pe a ce( 1 9 9 9 ) , he talks abo ut how difficult it was to keep all of the va rious groups at the same tabl e . His ef forts even tu a lly proved

succe s s f u l , and the Good Fri d ay Agreem ent received more su pport ac ross the po l i ti c a l

s pectrum than any previous attem pt . Not on ly was the agreem ent su pported by the major

p a rties from each camp (the Ul s ter Un i onist Pa rty and the Social Dem oc ra tic and Labo u r

3 0 p a rti e s ) , it was also en dors ed by the po l i tical parties assoc i a ted with para m i l i t a ry gro u p s
( Sinn Fei n , the Progre s s ive Un i onist Pa rty, and the Ul s ter Dem oc ra tic Pa rty ) . The Dem o -

c ra tic Un i onist Pa rty (DUP) and the Un i ted Ki n gdom Un i onist Pa rty were the on ly major

groups to oppose the accord .

The level of po l i tical con s en sus was rei n forced by the dec i s i on to carry out a nati on a l

referen dum on the Good Fri d ay Agreem ent in both Nort h ern Ireland and Irel a n d . Th e

accord received 71 percent su pport in the North and 94 percent in the So uth—a cri ti c a l

turning point for the pe ace proce s s . The very fact that the plan had been put to a dem o -

c ra tic vo te placed those who would con ti nue to oppose the agreem ent at a con s i dera bl e

d i s adva n t a ge . The peoples of Nort h ern Ireland and Ireland had spo ken and even those

who lost would be ex pected to re s pect that dec i s i on .

No su ch referen dum was ever held in Is rael . Ma ny of the oppon ents to the Oslo pe ace

process argued that the Ra bin govern m ent had never been given a mandate to recogn i ze

the PLO or to give up terri tori e s . Th ey argued that nei t h er of these policies had been put

forth in Ra bi n’s el ecti on campaign , and thus the govern m ent had no legi ti m ac y. Th i s

claim became a com m on theme for oppo s i ti on po s ters and bu m per sti ckers . A referendum on the Oslo pe ace process might have underm i n ed su ch a cl a i m ,e s pec i a lly if i t

received a sizable majori ty.

Table 1 pre s ents a ro u gh su m m a ry of the rel a tive levels of po l i tical con s en sus in the two

co u n tri e s . The first measu re is based on the nu m ber of el ected repre s en t a tives who su pported the va rious pe ace agreem en t s . The Is raeli tally inclu des the Kn e s s et vo tes on bo t h

the first and second agreem ents with Pa l e s ti n i a n s . As discussed , the Oslo B agreem en t

b a rely passed (sixty - one vo tes to fifty-nine) while the first Oslo agreem ent received som ewhat more su pport . The Nort h ern Ireland figure is based on the re sults of the el ecti ons to

the Nort h ern Ireland As s em bly, wh i ch were held in June 1998. Al t h o u gh these party leaders did not actu a lly vo te on the Good Fri d ay Agreem en t ,t h ey were all active du ring the

referen dum campaign . The figure of 75 percent is based on the proporti on of repre s en t atives who were el ected from parties that su pported the agreem en t .9

The Case of Northern Ireland 3 1

Table 1. Estimates of Elite and Public Consensus Surrounding Peace Processes in Israel

and Northern Ireland

a . The Israel figure is based on first and second votes in the Knesset on Oslo agreements. The Northern

Ireland figure is based on the number of representatives elected from parties that supported the Good

Friday Agreement. (See footnote 9.)

b . The Israel figure is based on seventeen monthly polls of the Jewish population carried out by the Tami

Steinmetz Institute for Peace at Tel Aviv University. (See footnote 10.)
E s ti m a tes con cerning the amount of p u blic su pport also come from two different type s

of m e a su re s . The Is raeli figure is based on an on going su rvey con du cted by the Ta m i

S tei n m etz Cen ter (1996) at Tel Aviv Un ivers i ty examining public op i n i on abo ut the Oslo

peace proce s s . It is based on a total of s even teen su rveys con du cted bet ween June 1993

and October 1995 (wh en the Oslo B agreem ent was sign ed ) .1 0 The Nort h ern Ireland figu res are based on po lls carri ed out by the Irish Ti m e s(1998) du ring the referen dum camp a i gn .

Alt h o u gh these figures cannot be con s i dered perfect measu res of po l i tical con s en su s ,

t h ey do provi de a gen eral sense of the po l i tical cl i m a te in the two co u n tri e s . As discussed ,

the differen ces in con s en sus among the po l i tical el i te are espec i a lly likely to have an imp act on the role of the news med i a . The po l i tical parties in Is rael were com p l etely divi ded

over Oslo, wh i ch came as no su rprise to those familiar with Is rael ’s po l i tical history. Th e

l evel of el i te su pport in Nort h ern Irel a n d , on the other hand, was mu ch high er and

i n clu ded almost all of the major po l i tical parti e s . Here too it is important to take an historical pers pective .O n ly a few ye a rs earl i er, the po l i tical envi ron m ent in Nort h ern Irel a n d

was qu i te similar to that in Is rael .

Evi den ce ga t h ered from intervi ews carri ed out in Nort h ern Ireland dem on s tra tes the

i m p act this ch a n ging level of con s en sus had on the local news med i a . One of the most

m e a n i n gful insights rel a tes to how assu m pti ons abo ut po l i tical con s en sus influ en ce the

l a n g u a ge and tone of n ews reports abo ut the pe ace proce s s .In the past, j o u rnalists in

North ern Ireland had to be cautious because any implicit su pport for the pe ace proce s s

would bring ch a r ges of bias or even disloya l ty. The more po l a ri zed a soc i ety, the more

l i kely journalists are to come under attack . Wh en all of the major po l i tical forces are

poi n ting in the same gen eral directi on , it becomes easier for journalists to frame news

s tories ref l ecting that fact . One news p a per reporter talked abo ut this ch a n ge :

There was almost a discomfort of even using the term peace process in the media for a

long time, because a lot of Unionists wouldn’t accept it was a peace process. It was a surrender process, or an appeasement process. I feel more comfortable using it now

because the Ulster Unionists have embraced it to a degree and are starting to take ownership of the peace process. But up until 1996, the Unionists saw the peace process as a

conspiracy by the Republicans to lure them into a united Ireland [Northern Ireland

interview no. 7; April 13, 1999].

This ob s erva ti on , and others like it, i llu s tra tes that po l i tical ch a n ge precedes ch a n ges in

m edia covera ge . The Ul s ter Un i on i s t s’ wi ll i n gness to accept this particular pe ace proce s s

was the re sult of a long and difficult process of n ego ti a ti on and po l i tical maneuveri n g. As

the po l i tical cl i m a te began to ch a n ge ,j o u rnalists felt “m ore com fort a bl e” adopting the

prope ace frames that had previ o u s ly been con s i dered con trovers i a l . The re acti ons journalists receive from their audien ces tell them wh et h er their stories fall within the realm of

con tem pora ry po l i tical con s en su s .

Nevert h el e s s , wh en the media do adopt a particular fra m e , it can have a sign i f i c a n t

i m p act on the po l i tical proce s s . An important example of this ch a n ge occ u rred wh en the

Uni onist Ul s ter News l et ter and the Na ti onalist Irish News p u bl i s h ed a series of com m on

ed i torials in favor of the pe ace proce s s .As the po l i tical camps began to move cl o s er on

3 2 The Case of Northern Ireland
the pe ace proce s s , so did the news p a pers . In the culminati on of this coopera ti on , bo t h

n ews p a pers asked their re aders to vo te yes in the referen du m . A Bri tish official cl a i m ed

that the News l et ter ’s en dors em ent was espec i a lly important for the proce s s :

The fact is that the Ulster Newsletter—which in the past was a decidedly pro-Unionist

newspaper, not a moderate Unionist newspaper, but I would say actually a newspaper

that was to the right of center within the Unionist community—actually advocated a

Yes vote in the referendum. It led the way at a time when it wasn’t at all clear which way

the Unionist community was going to go on this. . . . The paper was prepared to take a

lead role in advocating endorsement of the agreement [Northern Ireland interview no.

6; January 13, 1998].

This provi des an excell ent illu s tra ti on of the po l i ti c s - m edia cycle of i n f lu en ce . Ch a n ges in

the po l i tical envi ron m en t — po l i tical parties moving cl o s er — l ed to ch a n ges in med i a

n orms and ro utines—a more prope ace stance—that then led to furt h er ch a n ges in the

envi ron m ent—the rising legi ti m acy of the pe ace process among Un i on i s t s . If the of f i c i a l

qu o ted above is correct , the News l et ter p l ayed a cri tical role in moving the pe ace proce s s

forw a rd .

When the pe ace process was no lon ger con s i dered con trovers i a l , the news media co u l d

t a ke an active role in prom o ting it. An analysis of ed i torials appe a ring in the Na ti on a l i s t

n ews p a per, the Irish News , and the Un i onist paper, the Belfast Tel egra p h , provi des stri k i n g

evi den ce abo ut the ex tent of this su pport . As noted , the analysis is based on ed i tori a l s

wri t ten after twen ty - t wo events that took place bet ween Ju ly 1997 (ei ght months before

the Good Fri d ay Agreem ent) and mid-April 1999. The final tally for the Irish News s h ows

a rem a rk a ble sixty - four ed i torials in su pport of the pe ace proce s s ,f ive that ex press a more

a m biva l ent atti tu de , and on ly one that oppo s ed the proce s s . The distri buti on of op i n i on

in the Belfast Tel egra p h is equ a lly on e - s i ded :s i x ty - t wo ed i torials in favor, ei gh teen ambival en t , and again on ly one oppo s ed to the proce s s . This finding is espec i a lly su rprising given

that these ed i torials were wri t ten du ring peri ods of vi o l en ce , wh en the process appe a red

to be in danger. E d i tors in Nort h ern Ireland app a ren t ly felt little need to provi de a balance

bet ween propon ents and oppon ents of pe ace .

Th ere is also good re a s on to bel i eve that this same vi ewpoint carri ed over into the news

s ecti on . This helps explain the fru s tra ti on of those who were against the Good Fri d ay

Agreem en t . The Dem oc ra tic Un i onist Pa rty (DUP), l ed by Ian Pa i s l ey, was the most outs po ken abo ut media bi a s . The party argued that it was not being given a fair share of ti m e

and space to explain its po s i ti on s . A spo ke s pers on for the party de s c ri bed the difficulti e s

in swimming against the media stre a m :

They want the world to be soft and easygoing and people to talk, and we all sit around

the table and everybody’s good friends and pals, and love, peace, and harmony breaks

out, and everything’s wonderful, and this man [Paisley] comes along and says, “Wait a

minute! That’s not right. It’s not right to kill people. . . . We’re not going to suffer this.”

And you know, right’s right and wrong’s wrong. And this man upsets them, and he stirs

things up, and he’s a thorn in the side of the establishment. They would love Ian Paisley

not to be there. They would love the DUP not to be there [Northern Ireland interview

no. 10; April 14, 1999].

The Case of Northern Ireland 3 3
None of those intervi ewed could think of a single journalist who oppo s ed the pe ace

proce s s . Wh en asked if t h ere was som ething inheren t ly unfair abo ut the way the med i a

rel a ted to the oppo s i ti on , a reporter for one of the radio stati ons rep l i ed :

Unfair to an extent. There’s no doubt about it that both governments are pushing the

pro-peace line, and I think that no matter who you are, you can’t fail but want that line

to work. Everybody has that sense of wanting it to work so badly that you feed into it.

But I believe also that in Northern Ireland you would fail abysmally unless you took

both sides . . . everything is sensitive and you’ve got to balance everything [Northern

Ireland interview no. 1; April 14, 1999].

E d i tors do make room for other voi ce s , but one gets a sense that the playing field is uneven. Wh en so many forces work to prom o te the pe ace proce s s ,m edia norms and ro utines rei n force the deviant status of oppon en t s .

The August 1998 terrorist bom bing at Omagh most tell i n gly dem on s tra tes the influen ce of con s en sus on media covera ge . In the most de s tru ctive attack ever carri ed out in

North ern Irel a n d ,t wen ty-nine people were kill ed and over two hu n d red inju red .Wh i l e

no group cl a i m ed re s pon s i bi l i ty, most su s pected that the ‘ Re a l ’ Irish Rep u blican Army

( R I RA) carri ed out the attack in an ef fort to derail the pe ace proce s s .

On the basis of Is rael ’s ex peri en ce , one would have ex pected this bom bing to dra m a tic a lly set back the pe ace proce s s . However, the re s ponse within Nort h ern Ireland was

ex act ly the oppo s i te : The tra gedy provi ded a major impetus for the prope ace force s .

The news media played an important role in con s tru cting and amplifying this re acti on .

The front page of the B ri tish Tel egra p h ( August 16, 1998) illu s tra tes the differen ce in

covera ge . At first gl a n ce the news stories look familiar.As in Is rael , the faces of the vi cti m s

s t a re out at the re ader. The lesson to be learn ed ,h owever, is very differen t , for amid those

p i ctu re s , the fo ll owing message appe a rs :

Let our entire community unite against this evil. Let us commit ourselves to peace and

peace alone. Let us back the forces of law and order. Let us resolve to build a new future

together, unionist and nationalist alike. Let this be our sincere and lasting tribute to the

victims of Omagh. 

The Pe ace frame also dom i n a tes the ed i torial secti on of the news p a per. In the days fo ll owing the Omagh attack , the Irish News pri n ted nine ed i torials in favor of con ti nuing the

pe ace proce s s , and the Belfast Tel egra p h p u bl i s h ed three . Not a single ed i torial appe a red in

eit h er paper su gge s ting the process should be slowed or halted . The DUP was calling for

just su ch a move , but it was not given any ed i torial space to ex press its vi ew.

The com p a ri s on bet ween covera ge in Is rael and Nort h ern Ireland provi des stri k i n g

evi den ce of h ow po l i tical con text influ en ces the con s tru cti on of n ews stori e s . Con s i der, for

ex a m p l e , the front page of the news p a per Ma’ a riv that appe a red the day after a terrori s t

a t t ack in Beit Lid in Ja nu a ry 1995. Ni n eteen were kill ed in that incident and sixty - ei gh t

i n ju red . Accom p a nying the pictu res of the vi ctims were two large headl i n e s :“With Te a rs

of Ra ge”and “Com p l ete Cl o su re of the Terri tori e s .” The front page inclu ded a call by Pre si dent Ezer Weizman of Is rael to su s pend nego ti a ti ons with the Pa l e s ti n i a n s ,s t a ting that

“m aybe Ara f a t’s not the ri ght partn er.”

3 4 The Case of Northern Ireland
The anti - Pa l e s tinian theme was a major el em ent in all covera ge abo ut Beit Lid (Wo l fsfel d , in pre s s ) . The front page of Yed i ot Ah ro n ot (Ja nu a ry 23) con clu ded that Arafat had

been relu ctant to con demn the attack . The same day, a story in Ha’ a ret z, b a s ed on inform a ti on su pp l i ed by a form er advi s or to the previous govern m en t ,t a l ked abo ut an audio

t a pe in wh i ch Arafat was purported to have said,“We are all su i c i de bom bers” ( p. 5 ) . Th e

s tory did not reveal how long he had had the tape , but this was cl e a rly an appropri a te ti m e

for him to release it and for the media to publish a story abo ut it. The next day Ha’ a ret z

p u bl i s h ed an arti cle that con t a i n ed a leaked report from the meeting of the Ra bin governm ent headl i n ed ,“Sec u ri ty forces at the govern m ent meeti n g : Arafat is not keeping his

com m i tm ent to opera te against ex trem i s t s”( p. 5 b ) . Yed i ot h ad a similar story, i n d i c a ti n g

that a sec ret report prep a red by the military ’s legal dep a rtm ent su gge s ted that the PLO

was con s t a n t ly breaking the agreem ent (Ja nu a ry 24, p. 3 ) . Here too, the arti cle gave no

i n form a ti on abo ut wh en the report had been wri t ten . Ot h er stories foc u s ed on calls by

va rious leaders to end all cultu ral con t acts with the Pa l e s tinians and on those Pa l e s ti n i a n

groups that were “cel ebra ti n g”the attack on Beit Lid.

These differen ces in covera ge can be attri buted to differen ces in the two po l i tical environ m en t s . Is rael rem a i n ed divi ded over Oslo, and a large proporti on of the pop u l a ti on

con ti nu ed to hold Arafat re s pon s i ble for all terrori s m . Su ch frames had dom i n a ted med i a

d i s co u rse after every previous attack , even though Arafat con dem n ed the vi o l en ce . Th e

u n i ty of p u rpose that had ch a racteri zed the Good Fri d ay Agreem ent in Nort h ern Irel a n d ,

on the other hand, a ll owed the major po l i tical parties to work toget h er against those wh o

w a n ted to stop the pe ace proce s s . The Omagh bom bing marked the first time that Si n n

Fein issu ed an unequ ivocal con dem n a ti on of a terrorist act , and this had a po s i tive influence on many in the Un i onist camp.

O m a gh and Beit Lid powerf u lly dem on s tra te the influ en ce of po l i tical con s en sus on

the con s tru cti on of m edia fra m e s . The on going com peti ti on bet ween the sec u ri ty and

Peace frames in Is rael meant that every act of terrorism would evo ke the Sec u ri ty fra m e .

Indeed , Prime Mi n i s ter Ra bin himsel f em p l oyed the Sec u ri ty frame after su ch attacks by

sugge s ting that the on ly soluti on to terrorism was to find a way to keep the Pa l e s ti n i a n s

o ut of Is rael .O n ly sep a ra ti on of the two peop l e s , he argued , would accomplish that. In

North ern Irel a n d , on the other hand, the wi de con s en sus in su pport of the Pe ace fra m e

meant that it was app l i c a ble even in the wake of a terrorist attack su ch as Omagh . In the

Israeli case, the “n a tu ra l ”re acti on was to halt the pe ace proce s s , while in Nort h ern Irel a n d

the re acti on was to accel era te it.

The ex p l o s i on at Omagh kill ed people from every camp, providing furt h er impetus to

a unified re s pon s e . Wh ereas most previous attacks had been directed at ei t h er Pro te s t a n t s

or Ca t h o l i c s , the shock waves from this attack ran thro u gh both com mu n i ti e s . A sen i or

j o u rnalist discussed this factor:

You had members of the Gaelic Association, of the DUP, of the Ulster Unionists, you

had women out buying clothes for their children going back to school, Catholics,

Protestants, you had people from the Irish Republic, you had people from Spain killed

there. It was a bomb that touched everybody’s life in some way. . . . That bomb was

pretty unique in the sense that it was a bonding bomb. It actually drew people closer

together [Northern Ireland interview no. 11; April 15, 1999].

The Case of Northern Ireland 3 5
As noted ,s ome in the DUP attem pted to prom o te a different frame abo ut Omagh . Si m ilar to the oppo s i ti on’s claims in Is rael ,t h ey argued that the attack proved that the Iri s h

Rep u blican Army would never re s pect the ce a s e - f i re . Repre s en t a tives of the oppo s i ti on

a ppe a red on a nu m ber of talk shows , but here too they felt sorely outnu m bered . As one of

t h eir key spo ke s pers ons put it,“The press bo u ght into this process before the referen du m .

Th ey bo u ght into at the As s em bly el ecti on s , and they bo u ght into it at Omagh” [ Nort h ern

Ireland intervi ew no. 1 0 ; April 14, 1 9 9 9 ] .

A Sinn Fein leader who was espec i a lly em ph a tic abo ut the role of the media after

O m a gh argued that the brunt of the media ra ge was targeted at the RIRA . The media in

the So ut h , for ex a m p l e , pri n ted a full - p a ge ph o togra ph of the all eged head of that or ga n iz a ti on .This led to a boyco t t , and the man app a ren t ly lost his bu s i n e s s . The same source

cl a i m ed that press covera ge also had a more significant impact on the pe ace proce s :

The media coverage made it very difficult for anybody to oppose the Good Friday

Agreement, particularly from within Republicanism or Nationalism. A lot of people I

know who are very anti-agreement but not necessarily pro-armed struggle just went into

hiding for a week or two . . . because people would say “well, it’s the agreement or it’s

over.” I think the media very definitely did the opposite of inflaming the conflict. It genuinely and probably very consciously worked overtime to make conflict, in terms of military conflict, all the more difficult [Northern Ireland interview no. 3; April 13, 1999].

This leader also bel i eved the media re acti on to Omagh may have influ en ced the RIRA to

decl a re a ce a s e - f i re after that attack .

It was argued earl i er in this report that the Is raeli news media ten ded to blur the distin cti on bet ween the Pa l e s tinian aut h ori ties and the rej ecti on i s t s ,e s pec i a lly after terrori s t

a t t ack s . In the case of O m a gh , Nort h ern Irel a n d ’s news media did ex act ly the oppo s i te .

They cre a ted a bon d ,a l beit tem pora ry, a m ong the prope ace groups from both camps, a n d

m ade a clear disti n cti on bet ween Sinn Fein and the terrori s t s . Su ch a disti n cti on can be an

i m portant tool in the process of recon c i l i a ti on .

The media em phasis on the Pe ace frame repre s ents a rel a tively new ph en om en on in

North ern Irel a n d . Ch a n ging media frames are roo ted in ch a n ges in the po l i tical envi ronm en t . As poi n ted out by Mc L a u ghlin and Mi ll er (1996), the trad i ti onal media frame for

dealing with su ch attacks in Nort h ern Ireland had foc u s ed on the need to find a soluti on

to terrori s m . Similar to the Sec u ri ty frame used in Is rael , it gen era lly opposes making any

con ce s s i ons to the “en emy.”At issue is how to re s tore law and order ra t h er than how to

find a po l i tical soluti on .A good deal of the re s e a rch dealing with the media in Nort h ern

Ireland has been cri tical of this bias (for a revi ew, s ee Cottle 1997). The local and Bri ti s h

n ews med i a , it was argued , were nothing more than govern m ent mout h p i eces prop a ga ting the anti terrorist them e .

Some might argue that the Nort h ern Ireland news media con ti nue to do that. It’s ju s t

that most of the major po l i tical forces are now prom o ting a different frame abo ut the

con f l i ct . While leaders su ch as Ian Pa i s l ey en j oyed some of the ben efits of this cozy rel ati onship in earl i er ye a rs ,t h ey now find them s elves in an uph i ll battle to prom o te their less

popular frames to the med i a .G iven the re sults of the referen du m , those oppo s ed to the

3 6 The Case of Northern Ireland
G ood Fri d ay Agreem ent should be en ti t l ed to abo ut 30 percent of the public space

devoted to this issu e . Th ere is little evi den ce that they receive this space .

The po l i tical envi ron m ent su rrounding the Nort h ern Ireland pe ace process was also

mu ch calmer than in Is rael , and this too had an influ en ce on the role of the med i a . In Israel ,n ews stories abo ut vi o l en ce con s ti tuted a major part of the Oslo covera ge . Not on ly

was there a mu ch high er level of terrorism but , as discussed , the internal pro tests were

both massive and vi o l en t . Most of the oppo s i ti on to the Good Fri d ay Agreem en t , on the

o t h er hand, was verb a l . Acts of vi o l en ce occ u rred ,e s pec i a lly du ring “m a rching season ,”

and there were several casu a l ties in both camps, but these were the excepti ons ra t h er than

the ru l e .

This is not meant to imply that the pe ace process was smoo t h . Bi t ter argumen t s

eru pted along the way, and many de adlines passed wi t h o ut agreem en t . Al s o, t h ere is no

g u a ra n tee that the pe ace process wi ll con ti nu e .S ti ll ,a ll major para m i l i t a ries opera ting in

North ern Ireland decl a red a ce a s e - f i re , and there were no massive pro tests against the

a greem en t ,t hus providing leaders with an ex trem ely con du c ive envi ron m ent for nego ti ati on . These con d i ti ons also en su red that the news stories abo ut the pe ace process foc u s ed

on nego ti a ti ons ra t h er than on vi o l en ce ,a ll owing for a rel a tively re a s on a ble deb a te over

the proce s s , at least tem pora ri ly.

All of these different factors have a strong con n ecti on . The high level of el i te con s en su s

su rrounding the agreem ent provi ded a sense of u n i ty that made vi o l ent dissent more diff i c u l t . This was espec i a lly true after Omagh because of h ow the leaders and the news

m edia re acted to that attack . The rel a tively low level of vi o l en ce led to a rel a tively calm

envi ron m ent for nego ti a ting pe ace and also had an important impact on the tone of covera ge . In short , nothing su cceeds in the media like po l i tical su cce s s .

The Media Enviro n m e n t

The natu re of the local media envi ron m ent also influ en ced the role of the press in the

Nort h ern Ireland pe ace proce s s . Two aspects are espec i a lly wort hy of n o te : (1) the two

com mu n i ties share many media and (2) the level of s en s a ti onalism in most of the pre s s

is rel a tively low. Un l i ke the va ri a bles discussed earl i er, these factors are more cultu ra lly

en du ri n g, and thus po l i tical leaders have less direct con trol over them . Fortu n a tely for

a ut h ori ties who su pported the pe ace proce s s , these factors worked in their favor.

It is espec i a lly significant that so many Pro testants and Catholics get their news from

the same med i a . The gre a test overlap in audien ce com po s i ti on occ u rs in tel evi s i on and

rad i o.According to Tim Coo ke (1998), t wo daily tel evi s i on news progra m s — Ul s ter Tel evi s i on’s U TV Live and BBC Nort h ern Irel a n d ’s News l i n e— account for a com bi n ed audience share of a bo ut 70 percen t . The on ly way to maintain su ch large audien ces is to adopt

a po l i tical pers pective accept a ble to both sides of the con f l i ct . Own ers , ed i tors , and journalists all have a clear com m ercial interest in appealing to as wi de an audien ce as po s s i bl e .

While there is more sep a ra ti on among news p a per re aders , a significant amount of

overlap also exists within this audien ce .The Irish News and the News l et ter a re more sect a ri a n , but the Belfast Tel egra p h pri des itsel f on attracting re aders from both com mu n i ti e s .

The less partisan Tel egra p h has by far the largest audien ce , with almost three times as

m a ny re aders as the other two papers (Ro l s ton 1991). Ro l s ton states that the ra tio of

The Case of Northern Ireland 3 7
Pro testant to Catholic re aders is similar to that of the gen eral pop u l a ti on .1 1 The Bri ti s h

press also attracts a wi de re adership from both com mu n i ti e s .

Thu s , while all news media are not shared , the sharing cert a i n ly is mu ch gre a ter than

found in most con f l i ct s . Coo ke (1998) also notes this differen ce in his arti cle abo ut the

role of the news media in this pe ace proce s s :“ Nort h ern Ireland does not fall vi ctim to on e

of the difficulties app a rent in some other divi ded soc i eties—that of a media divi ded by

l a n g u a ge and speaking to on ly one side in the con f l i ct” ( p. 4 ) . This report argues that

s h a red media in Nort h ern Irel a n d — m edia that target people from both sides of the conf l i ct — h ave a major impact on covera ge of the proce s s .1 2

The abi l i ty to bri d ge the gap bet ween the two com mu n i ties begins at the hiring stage .

North ern Ireland has an ex trem ely stri ct Fair Employm ent Com m i s s i on that en su res that

a ll com p a n i e s ,i n cluding the news med i a , em p l oy people from both com mu n i ti e s . Alt h o u gh the com m i s s i on cannot prevent all forms of d i s c ri m i n a ti on , it does en su re that

every news or ga n i z a ti on em p l oys both Pro testants and Ca t h o l i c s . People from both commun i ties also work on the more partisan news p a pers . A leader from Sinn Fein talked

a bo ut the overl a p :

. . . for example, I think the new editor of the [Nationalist] Irish News may have worked

for the [Unionist] T e l e g r a p h at one stage. . . . You wouldn’t go into the Irish News a n d

say, “Yes, there are all Nationalists,” and go into the T e l e g r a p h and say, “They’re all

Unionists.” It’s not like that. And of course, the difference is because here it’s much

more difficult to assess ethnic differences [than in the Middle East] and . . . it’s not polite

[to do so]. In middle class circles, which are of course where the newspapers circulate,

it’s not polite to ask somebody’s religion [Northern Ireland interview no. 3; April 13,

1 9 9 9 ] .

Nort h ern Ireland has a large nu m ber of s h a red media in part , too, because ethnic differen ces are not obvi o u s . In the Mi d dle East, l i n g u i s tic and cultu ral gaps dividing Is raelis and

Arabs are ref l ected in their sep a ra te news med i a . The people of Nort h ern Ireland have

mu ch more in com m on , wh i ch fac i l i t a tes movem ent bet ween the two soc i eti e s . This mixing of the pop u l a ti ons also makes it easier for reporters to gain access to sources from

both com mu n i ti e s . None of the journalists who were intervi ewed for this report had any

probl ems intervi ewing people from ei t h er side .

Here too the role of the media in con f l i cts can be unders tood on ly by looking at the

l a r ger social and po l i tical con text in wh i ch they opera te . At the hei ght of “the Tro u bl e s ,”

j o u rnalists found it more difficult to wri te news stories that would be con s i dered fair to

both side s . The narrowing of the divi de bet ween the major antagonists made it easier for

the news media to bri d ge that ga p, too. Pa rt of the recon c i l i a ti on process in any con f l i ct is

to build a set of terms and con cepts that wi ll be accept a ble to all side s . A Nort h ern Irel a n d

u n ivers i ty profe s s or who has stu d i ed these issues talked abo ut this ch a n ge :

Years ago that’s where you would’ve seen differences. For example, look at the mideighties when the N e w s l e t t e r constantly fumed against the Anglo-Irish Agreement,

refused to call it the Anglo-Irish Agreement even. What did they call it then, the AngloEire Dictat? Whereas the Irish News was much more positive about that [Northern

Ireland interview no. 12; April 16, 1999]. 

3 8 The Case of Northern Ireland
As noted , the Un i onist Belfast Tel egra p h m a kes a con certed ef fort to attract Catholic re aders . A nu m ber of those intervi ewed referred to the paper as Un i onist “ with a small ‘u .’”A

j o u rnalist who wri tes for the paper talked abo ut how assu m pti ons abo ut the audien ce inf lu en ced covera ge :

I’m working for a paper that has a mostly Unionist readership, but is cross-community,

has a Catholic readership, so it is the only main paper in Northern Ireland that can boast

a sizeable section of its readership coming from the two communities, although, we’re

still predominantly a small “u” Unionist paper. . . . So you’re trying to straddle two

communities. It’s very difficult with the T e l e g r a p h. If you’re with the N e w s l e t t e r or the

Irish News you can just do whatever the hell you want, and you’re not going to offend

your readers [Northern Ireland interview no. 7; April 13, 1999].

It is far easier to produ ce news stories that echo local myths and preju d i ces than it is to

find com m on ground bet ween hostile gro u p s . Ma ny journalists in Nort h ern Ireland are

forced to make an ex tra ef fort to attract a larger audien ce . Nort h ern Ireland provi des perhaps the on ly example in wh i ch the com m ercial interests of the news media actu a lly ben ef i t those attem pting to prom o te pe ace .

The media envi ron m ent in Nort h ern Ireland is also more con du c ive to pe ace in part

because journalists have adopted a less sen s a ti onalist approach to covering the con f l i ct

than in Is rael . The BBC trad i ti on of p u blic broadc a s ting remains an important influ en ce

on all of the el ectronic med i a ,t hus raising the level of d i s co u rs e . This trad i ti on em ph as i zes two important va lu e s :d i s t a n ce and re s tra i n t . While drama sti ll plays an import a n t

p a rt in the con s tru cti on of n ews in Nort h ern Irel a n d , these va lues serve as import a n t

co u n terwei gh t s .

Popular sen s a ti onalist tabl oid news p a pers inclu de the “Su n d ay papers ,” wh i ch are

b a s ed in Lon don . But the three regi onal news p a pers—the Ti m e s, the Tel egra p h, and the

News l et ter— provi de the most ex ten s ive print covera ge of the pe ace proce s s , and they are

not sen s a ti on a l i s t . Al t h o u gh the Tel egra p h and the News l et ter do som etimes run large

h e adl i n e s , the reporting is not overly dra m a ti c . Th ere almost seems to be a divi s i on of

l a bor in wh i ch citi zens tu rn to the tabl oids for en tert a i n m ent and to the more seri o u s

n ews media for inform a ti on .

Jou rnalists and po l i tical leaders who were invo lved in the two pe ace processes of fer the

most important evi den ce abo ut the different level of m edia sen s a ti onalism in Is rael and

North ern Irel a n d .As discussed , su ch intervi ews are the optimal met h od for gaining ins i ght into the profe s s i onal norms and ro utines that distinguish each cultu re and how they

i n f luen ce the po l i tical proce s s . A telling indicator of these differen ces is the manner in

wh i ch po l i tical leaders in the two co u n tries rel a te to the pre s s . Every single Is raeli leader

and spo ke s pers on who was intervi ewed for this report referred to the sen s a ti onalism of

the Is raeli news media and the probl ems assoc i a ted with that. Le aders in Bel f a s t , on the

o t h er hand, h ad con s i dera ble re s pect for their med i a ,e s pec i a lly in that rega rd .

This sense that the Nort h ern Ireland news media were gen era lly serious and re s pon s ible could be found ac ross the po l i tical spectru m .An Ul s ter Un i onist Pa rty (UUP) assemblyma n ,for ex a m p l e ,t a l ked abo ut the good fortune of not having “too many tabl oi d

j o u rn a l i s t s”whose major goal is to “s tir up tro u bl e”( Nort h ern Ireland intervi ew no. 9 ;

The Case of Northern Ireland 3 9
April 15, 1 9 9 9 ) . A Sinn Fein repre s en t a tive said the more re s tra i n ed tone of covera ge in

North ern Ireland might be rel a ted to its rel i gious cultu re .1 3 He talked abo ut the differen ces bet ween local covera ge of the con f l i ct and covera ge in English news p a pers :

One of the differences between journalists in England and journalists here, or journalists

who have lived here for some time and journalists who come from the outside, is that

journalists here are much more tuned into the sensitivities of reporting a conflict and

reporting all of the death and tragedy, and they are therefore much more careful. This

makes sensationalizing very difficult. Now it still happens with the Sunday tabloids, but

it makes it much more difficult, whereas when you’re coming over from England and

maybe to a lesser extent when you’re coming from Dublin, it’s much easier to want the

big, simple, sexy story and to be really blasé about . . . trampling over people’s feelings

[Northern Ireland interview no. 3; April 13, 1999].

A similar message comes from the journalists them s elve s . Ma ny of the reporters interviewed talked abo ut the dangers of i rre s pon s i ble reporti n g. One journalist was both vivi d

and su cc i n ct :“Sen s a ti onalism can cost live s .”In deed , ed i tors in Nort h ern Ireland think

very caref u lly before sending reporters to cover street vi o l en ce . This is app a ren t ly a profe ss i onal norm that has devel oped over time part ly because of the nega tive impact reporters

with tape recorders ,m i c roph on e s , and cameras can have on su ch inciden t s . A corre s pondent for one of the radio stati ons talked abo ut this ch a n ge in po l i c y:

Initially any street violence, any civil disorder at all, we would have had a reporter out on

the scene reporting there. . . . As the situation developed further and the media, I’m not

speaking just purely about our station but more generally, accepted and realized that

people were playing to the camera, they backed off. I mean there have been nights when

there’s been quite a lot of violence, a high level of violence compared to the start of it,

and no reporters have gone. It’s just been a case of ongoing violence, don’t exacerbate

the situation by being there, let them sort out whatever they can as best they can, but

don’t give them the oxygen of publicity to further hurt and insult the opposite side

[Northern Ireland interview no. 1; April 13, 1999].

Is raeli reporters would argue that su ch beh avi or amounts to sel f - cen s ors h i p. The publ i c

has a ri ght to know what is happen i n g, and journalists have a duty to tell them . The differen ce in the two sets of n orms cen ters on wh et h er or not journalists should be con cern ed

with the social and po l i tical con s equ en ces of t h eir reporti n g. In Is rael and many other

co u n tri e s ,j o u rnalists assume that the press can remain indepen dent on ly if it reports on

everyt h i n g, rega rdless of the outcom e s . One could easily defend each of these approach e s .

However, the ch oi ce of one model over another can have a significant impact on the ro l e

of the news media in the escalati on of vi o l en ce .

None of this is meant to su ggest that the press in Nort h ern Ireland is free from the ill s

that plague the media in other co u n tri e s . Nort h ern Irel a n d ’s po l i tical leaders and journ a lists them s elves com p l a i n ed abo ut how difficult “s o u n d bi te news” m ade it to pre s ent serious ideo l ogical discussion s .A repre s en t a tive from the DUP also cri ti c i zed the med i a’s

preferen ce for news from para m i l i t a ri e s . He argued that the small er Progre s s ive Un i on i s t

Party (PUP) received more covera ge than his own party because it po s ed more of a thre a t :

4 0 The Case of Northern Ireland
[It’s] because they’re an armed terrorist group. That’s it, there’s no doubt about that. If

you’ve got guns in this country, you’re important. It doesn’t matter how many votes you

get or how many people you help in a year. If you’ve got a gun, you’re important. We

can’t threaten anybody [Northern Ireland interview no. 10; April 14, 1999].

These rem a rks sound similar to ones made by nonvi o l ent groups in Is rael . The news media in Nort h ern Ireland sti ll look for dra m a , a ten dency that can cre a te serious probl em s

for those unwi lling to produ ce it.

In gen era l ,h owever, po l i tical leaders and spo ke s pers ons in Nort h ern Ireland feel less

pre s su re than those in Is rael to use ex tremist language and tactics to gain access to the med i a . This is a cri tical differen ce bet ween the two po l i tical cultu re s . Sen s a ti onalist med i a

pre s su re actors to use ex tremist rh etoric and acti ons—a great danger. Di f fering po l i ti c a l

s ys tems may also account for va ri a ti ons in the amount of press sen s a ti on a l i s m . The institution of pri m a ries in Is rael has incre a s ed the need for Is raeli po l i ticians to obtain the

m a x i mum level of m edia ex po su re (Peri , in pre s s ) . The strong po l i tical party sys tem in

Nort h ern Ireland serves to lower incen tives for gra n d s t a n d i n g.

A more modera te media cre a te an atm o s ph ere more con du c ive to internal as well as

external pe ace : A more re s tra i n ed media envi ron m ent can lead to a more modera te po l i tical envi ron m en t . One of the most significant influ en ces the news media can have on public disco u rse is to raise the vo lu m e . The level of a m p l i f i c a ti on is direct ly rel a ted to the

n orms and ro utines adopted by journ a l i s t s .Th ey can tu rn the knob ei t h er up or down ,

d i rect ly affecting everyone invo lved .

The con cern abo ut sen s a ti onalism ex pre s s ed by many of the journalists in Nort h ern

Ireland may also be rel a ted to their en t hu s i a s tic su pport of the pe ace proce s s . It is clear to

t h em that sen s a ti onalist news covera ge has po ten tial for inflaming an alre ady dangero u s

s i tu a ti on .While some might obj ect to su ch a partisan approach , one can cert a i n ly apprec i a te journ a l i s t s’ de s i re for pe ace . One of the most re s pected journalists in Nort h ern Ireland put it like this:

I’m unapologetic in saying I want peace. I want an end to all this violence, this war.

Journalists come into journalism to have wars. Many of them want to see themselves as

war correspondents. I certainly don’t want to be a war correspondent. I’ve seen it all. I’ve

been to the bomb scenes. I’ve seen life desecrated, wiped out. I’ve seen my own local

pub and shop at home where my sister worked for many years as a student. I saw young

Michael Donnelley killed at a petrol pump serving petrol. I saw the bomb attack on

those premises. I’ve seen dozens and dozens of attacks, many of my school friends are

dead as a result of violence. So I want an end to it all [Northern Ireland interview no. 11;

April 15, 1999].

The Case of Northern Ireland 4 1
S i x

Conclusions and Implicat i o n s

The res e a rch for this report foc u s ed on the two major aspects of the po l i tical environ m ent most likely to influ en ce the med i a’s role in a pe ace proce s s : (1) the level

of eli te con s en sus in su pport of the proce s s , and (2) the nu m ber and inten s i ty of

c rises marring the proce s s . The Ra bin govern m ent failed in both of these are a s , and the

Is raeli news media played a mostly nega tive role in that proce s s . The med i a’s nega tive ro l e

became espec i a lly clear after terrorist attack s , wh en hys terical news covera ge qu e s ti on ed

the en ti re pe ace proce s s .

Aut h ori ties in Nort h ern Irel a n d , on the other hand, en j oyed both a high er level of el i te

con s en sus and a small er nu m ber of c ri s e s . These con d i ti ons hel ped mobi l i ze the news

m edia in su pport of the proce s s . Covera ge of terrorist attacks dem on s tra tes this pri n c i p l e

bes t . Wh en reporting on terrori s m , in direct con trast to the Is raeli med i a , the Nort h ern

Ireland press stre s s ed the need to accel era te the pe ace process to prevent furt h er acts of

terror.

The differen ces bet ween media envi ron m ents in the two con f l i ct areas con ti nue in that

vei n .The Is raeli press was more sen s a ti onalist and more et h n ocen tric than the news

m edia in Nort h ern Irel a n d , wh i ch also con tri buted to the different roles the media played .

L a r ger nu m bers of j o u rnalists in Nort h ern Ireland produ ced news stories for both Pro te stants and Ca t h o l i c s , forcing them to adopt a more balanced and con s tru ctive form of covera ge . These journalists were also more con cern ed abo ut the damaging ef fect s

s en s a ti onalist covera ge might have on the con f l i ct . In Is rael , on the other hand, the battle

over audien ce share appe a rs to overs h adow con cerns abo ut social re s pon s i bi l i ty.

This report contains good news and bad news for those intere s ted in prom o ting pe ace .

The bad news is that leaders cannot depend on the news media to help them wh en they

a re in tro u bl e . Po l i tical leaders of ten buy into the myth that if on ly they could hire the

ri ght publ i c i ty people or produ ce the best spin, t h ey could cre a te a po s i tive image for

t h em s elves and their po l i c i e s . The con s tru cti on of n ews abo ut pe ace ,h owever, is direct ly

rel a ted to the state of the po l i tical envi ron m en t . Le aders who are unable to mobi l i ze a

broad po l i tical con s en sus for their policies wi ll have little su ccess in prom o ting those po l icies to the med i a .

The news med i a ,e s pec i a lly sen s a ti onalist news med i a ,m a ke a probl em a tic pe ace

process mu ch wors e . Th ey have a ve s ted interest in dra m a tic con f l i ct , and this has a negative impact on both the pe ace process itsel f and the internal deb a te over it. The news media not on ly amplify the ten s i on and vi o l en ce assoc i a ted with su ch con f l i ct s ,t h ey of ten

en co u ra ge it. As devi a n ce is one of the pri m a ry cri teria for access to the med i a , those wh o

want to be heard must prove that they are more ex tremist than their com peti tors . Modera te voi ces are ro uti n ely exclu ded from the discussion because they are not con s i dered

4 2 n ews wort hy.
This dynamic has a nu m ber of u n fortu n a te implicati ons for those intere s ted in the

prom o ti on of pe ace .F i rs t , it means that the news media are least likely to help in those

cases wh ere they might do the most good . Wh en el i tes and the public are fairly divi ded

over a pe ace proce s s , the media have the po ten tial to tilt the balance in one directi on or

the other. G iven the way news is con s tru cted ,t h ey are most likely to tilt the scales aga i n s t

pe ace . Some might argue that this is for the be s t ; a pe ace process wi t h o ut a broad ra n ge of

i n ternal su pport is in any case doom ed to failu re . Nevert h el e s s , almost every pe ace proce s s

eventu a lly runs into tro u bl e . It is at just these ju n ctu res that the media impact can be so

c ri ti c a l .

In deed , this is ex act ly what took place as this report was going to pre s s . A new In ti f a d a

bro ke out in Septem ber 2000 after a summit at Camp David had failed to bring abo ut a

n ew agreem en t . The Is raeli media again fra m ed Pa l e s tinians as vicious terrori s t s , and the

Sec u ri ty frame retu rn ed in full force . The Pa l e s tinian news media played a similar role in

fanning the flames of h a tred and vi o l en ce .E ach soc i ety retu rn ed to its own priva te worl d ,

with its media con ti nu a lly repe a ting that its people were the true vi cti m s . Ba s ed on the

h e a rtbreaking images and stori e s ,h ow could anyone fail to re a l i ze the evil of the en emy ?

The news media had on ce again made a bad situ a ti on even wors e .

An o t h er nega tive con s equ en ce is assoc i a ted with this ph en om en on . As is of ten said, i t

is mu ch easier to de s troy than to bu i l d , and this is cert a i n ly true in the area of m edia and

peace .Hamas was ex trem ely su ccessful at using terrorism to derail the Oslo pe ace proce s s ,

and the hys teria of the Is raeli news media was an important el em ent in this dy n a m i c . As

n o ted ,t h ere is an inherent con trad i cti on bet ween the demands of a pe ace process and the

n eeds of the news med i a . A pe ace process is com po s ed mostly of l on g, com p l i c a ted negoti a ti ons wh ere the need for sec recy far out wei ghs the need for publ i c i ty. Oppon ents can

e a s i ly ex p l oit this situ a ti on by providing the media with the drama they de s i re .

It is important for po l i c ym a kers to understand this situ a ti on and find bet ter ways to

deal with it. It is cri tical to devel op a lon g - ra n ge po l i tical stra tegy that also takes into account the needs of the med i a . The Ra bin govern m en t , for ex a m p l e , was ex trem ely meti culous in planning the pe ace cerem onies that fo ll owed every su cce s s . Th ere was little

prep a ra ti on , on the other hand, for dealing with disasters , wh i ch provi ded Oslo oppon ents with important adva n t a ge s . The bet ter leaders understand how and why the role of

the news media can ch a n ge , the bet ter prep a red they wi ll be to ex p l oit their opportu n i ti e s

and to limit the damage assoc i a ted with their failu re s .

The adopti on of su ch a stra tegy might inclu de two major com pon en t s . The firs t

i nvo lves con ti nu a lly prom o ting a lon g - ra n ge pers pective to journalists and the publ i c .

Le aders and spo ke s pers ons would have to fight their natu ral po l i tical ten dencies to ex a ggera te su ccesses and con s t a n t ly pre s ent opti m i s tic vi s i ons of the futu re . It is import a n t

that they also provi de warn i n gs abo ut crises that might occur down the road ,l ower

expect a ti ons abo ut wh en to ex pect a bre a k t h ro u gh , and con s t a n t ly attem pt to place current events within a lon ger historical con tex t . While this would invo lve going against journ a l i s t s’preferen ce to focus on the immed i a te , su ch ef forts could make a differen ce .At the

very least, this stra tegy would put leaders in a bet ter po s i ti on to re act to disasters by poi n ting to their previous warn i n gs .

Conclusions and Implications 4 3
The second com pon ent of su ch a policy entails set ting up a crisis team to deal wi t h

such situ a ti on s . In qu i et times the team could devel op crisis scen a rios and policy recomm en d a ti ons for dealing with news media du ring su ch situ a ti on s . Wh en a crisis does bre a k

o ut , this team could form the equ iva l ent of a “war room” that would implem ent the po l icies as ra p i dly and ef f i c i en t ly as po s s i bl e . It is important for po l i tical leaders to look at the

s tru ggle for pe ace as part of an on going campaign .

Ot h er important implicati ons of this report deal with how journalists opera te . Th e

i dea of a shared media is an important on e . Al t h o u gh it is not re a l i s tic to attem pt to cre a te

s h a red media wh ere they do not alre ady ex i s t , it is po s s i ble to increase the level of i n teracti on among different news med i a .O r ganizing joint meeti n gs of ed i tors and reporters

f rom rival com mu n i ties could lead to gre a ter coopera ti on bet ween them . The or ga n i z ati on Se a rch for Com m on Gro u n d ,b a s ed in Wa s h i n g ton , D. C . , con du cts su ch sem i n a rs in

a nu m ber of con f l i ct are a s ,i n cluding the Mi d dle East. E f forts might also be made to persuade certain news media to hire journalists from the oppo s i te camp in an ef fort to provide their audien ce with an altern a tive pers pective .

It is also worth con s i dering more significant ch a n ges within the news med i a . The differen ces in the journ a l i s tic cultu res of Is rael and Nort h ern Ireland dem on s tra te that profe s s i onal norms and ro utines do va ry over time and circ u m s t a n ce . The noti on of et h i c s

should not be limited to the single va lue of “obj ectivi ty.” Jo u rnalists working in con f l i ct -

rid den areas could adopt norms that would minimize the risk of e s c a l a ting con f l i ct and

m a x i m i ze the po ten tial for recon c i l i a ti on . Robert Ma n of f ( 1 9 9 6 ,1 9 9 7 , 1998) is one of a

nu m ber of s ch o l a rs who have put forth a model of “pe ace journ a l i s m” that inclu des a series of practical su gge s ti ons for ch a n ging ed i torial policies along these lines.1 4 Ex a m p l e s

i n clu de co u n teracting mispercepti ons abo ut the con f l i ct and the other side , using analytical fra m eworks that have been devel oped in the field of con f l i ct re s o luti on , and reporti n g

on areas of coopera ti on bet ween the antagon i s t s .

It must be em ph a s i zed ,h owever, that a more con du c ive form of j o u rnalism depen d s

on making s tru ctu ral ch a n ge s in the news produ cti on proce s s . Su ch ch a n ges might inclu de

c re a ting special secti ons in news p a pers and programs in the broadcast media ded i c a ted to

pe ace issu e s . Su ch secti ons and programs would force reporters to search for materi a l s

that would be con s i s tent with the va lues of pe ace journ a l i s m . The stories could inclu de

e s s ays wri t ten by foe s ,s tories abo ut the other side’s cultu re and soc i ety, s tories that de a l

with va rious pe ace propo s a l s , and stories abo ut indivi duals and groups that are work i n g

for pe ace and recon c i l i a ti on .

Ma ny news people would obj ect to su ch ch a n ge s , arguing that they vi o l a te import a n t

j o u rn a l i s tic va lu e s . Nevert h el e s s , the goal of su ch secti ons and programs is not to rep l ace

con f l i ct journalism but merely to add pe ace stories for balance .G a l tung (1998) has su gge s ted an intriguing para ll el in this rega rd . How, he asks, would the health secti on of t h e

n ews p a per look if it were devo ted on ly to the stu dy of diseases? Th ere would never be any

n ews devo ted to preven tive med i c i n e , re s e a rch on po s s i ble cure s , or adva n ces in understanding and curing disease. In s te ad , the health secti on would focus almost exclu s ively on

the most fri gh tening diseases, a ny illnesses or ep i demics on the hori zon , and sad stori e s

a bo ut the sick and the dyi n g. Su ch is the natu re of con f l i ct journalism tod ay.

4 4 Conclusions and Implications
An o t h er approach would be to wage war against sen s a ti on a l i s m . Su ch a battle is never

e a s y, because own ers and ed i tors are unders t a n d a bly relu ctant to risk losing audien ce

s h a re . However, the noti on that “s en s a ti onalism can cost live s”can be a powerful message

in war- torn soc i eti e s . If pe ace groups and other or ga n i z a ti ons attem pted to place this issu e

on the nati onal agen d a , ed i tors might adopt more re s pon s i ble po l i c i e s . The su ccess enj oyed in recent ye a rs by wom en’s groups and minori ties in ch a n ging media ro uti n e s

dem on s tra tes that su ch ef forts can produ ce re su l t s .

At the very least there is a need to begin a dialogue abo ut these issues among po l i c ym a kers ,j o u rn a l i s t s , re s e a rch ers , and pe ace activi s t s . As noted in the introdu cti on , little res e a rch has been done on this top i c , even among those who stu dy con f l i ct re s o luti on . Th i s

is in stark con trast to the en ormous amount of re s e a rch and public discussion abo ut the

role of the news media in terrorism and war. It is to be hoped that a growing aw a reness of

the cen tral role the media play in other po l i tical processes wi ll lead to an incre a s ed foc u s

on the role they play in attem pts to bring pe ace .

Conclusions and Implications 4 5
N o t e s

1 . A number of studies deal with such topics as the role of the media in foreign policy and diplomacy (Cohen 1987; Cohen 1986; Fromm et al. 1992; Gilboa 1998; Gowing 1997; Henderson

1973; O’Heffernan 1993, 1991; Serfaty 1991; Strobel 1997); several relate to the problems

peace movements face in attempting to mobilize the news media (Glasgow University Media

Group 1985; Gitlin 1980; Hackett 1991; Ryan 1991; Small 1987); a few articles deal with the

role of the news media in disarmament and international cooperation (Bruck 1988, 1989;

Dorman, Manoff, and Weeks 1988; Gamson and Stuart 1992); and several have to do with

images of the enemy (Ayres 1997; Becker 1996; Eckhardt 1991; Ottosen 1995). Some work has

been done on “peace journalism,” which talks about the need to change journalists’ norms

and routines for covering peace and conflict (Adam and Thomotheram 1996; Bruck and

Roach 1993; Galtung 1998; Himmelfarb 1998; Lynch 1998; Manoff 1996, 1997, 1998; Roach

1993; Shinhar, forthcoming). 

2 . The seven events were the opening week of the peace process (September 1993), the Baruch

Goldstein massacre (February 1994), the terrorist attacks in Afula and Hadera (April 1994),

The Cairo Agreement (May 1994), the terrorist attack in Dizengoff (October 1994), the attack

on Beit Lid (January 1995), and the terrorist attacks in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem

(February–March 1995).

3 . The Unionist Belfast Telegraph was selected, rather than the N e w s l e t t e r, because it has by far

the largest circulation. Rolston estimated its readership at 500,000, which is three times the

audience of either the Irish News or the N e w s l e t t e r. This tells us something about the potential

impact of such a paper on the political climate. However, the N e w s l e t t e r is a more purely

unionist newspaper, and thus an analysis of its editorials might have produced somewhat different results. 

4 . The twenty-four events are the violence associated with an Orange March (July 1997),

announcement of an IRA cease-fire (July 1997), Sinn Fein joins the talks (September 1997),

Sinn Fein leaders meet with Prime Minister Blair (October 1997), Sinn Fein leaders first visit

Downing Street (December 1997), LVF leader shot in Maze prison (December 1997), Loyalist

and Catholic killed (January 24, 1998), UDA member killed (February 1998), IRA terrorism,

Sinn Fein expelled from talks (February 1998), attack on Armagh police station (March 10,

1998), Sinn Fein back in talks (March 1998), Good Friday Agreement (April 1998),

Referendum (May 1998), Drumcree standoff (July 1998), Omagh bombing (August 17,

1998), meeting between Adams and Trimble, first Assembly meeting (September 1998),

Hume and Trimble nominated for Nobel Peace Prize (October 1998), Loyalists murder

Catholic (November 1998), violence following Protestant march (December 1998), Loyalist

violence (January 1999), human rights activist murdered (March 16, 1999), and Hillsborough

Declaration (April 3, 1999).

4 6
5 . Caspi and Limor (1999) argue that “although both dailies adopt many of the features of the

popular press, one could hardly label them ‘sensationalist.’ Even if their editors are at times

guilty of banner headlines that border on the hysterical (after a terror attack, for example),

they are careful not to adopt the more common features of yellow journalism such as nude

photos or low-level language” (p. 81). I would argue that the level of sensationalism is a variable that can be placed along a continuum. Israeli newspapers are not the worst of the lot, but

they are certainly not the best, especially (as Caspi and Limor suggest) when it comes to the

coverage of political violence. 

6 . This ethnocentric orientation is also a problem for the Arab citizens of Israel, who represent a

significant minority in that country (Avraham, Wolfsfeld, and Aburaiya 2000; Wolfsfeld,

Avraham, and Aburaiya, forthcoming). 

7 . The Israeli news media played a less positive role in the post-agreement stage. Preliminary

findings from research under way reveal that the Israeli press now mostly ignores Jordan

unless something particularly negative occurs.

8 . Much has been written on the media and the conflict in Northern Ireland. Most of this work

takes a critical view of the local media’s willingness to cooperate with the British government

against Sinn Fein and the IRA in the years leading up to the Good Friday Agreement. For an

excellent summary of this literature see Cottle (1997). Two other important works in this area

are a volume written by Miller (1994) and one edited by Rolston and Miller (1996).

McLaughlin and Miller (1996) as well as Cooke (1998) have carried out more recent studies

that deal with changes that have occurred in light of the peace process. Another comparison

between the role of the media in the two peace processes can be found in Shinhar (forthcomi n g ) .

9 . The political parties in favor of the agreement in Northern Ireland included the Ulster

Unionist Party (28 representatives), the Social Democratic and Labour Party (24), Sinn Fein

(18), the Alliance Party (6), the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition (2), and the Progressive

Unionist Party (2). Opposing the agreement were the Democratic Unionist Party (20), the

Northern Ireland Unionist Party (4), the United Unionist Assembly Party (3), and the UK

Unionist Party (1). A number of other political parties that also favored the yes vote (Unionist

Democratic Party, the Greens, Labour Coalition, and the Workers’ parties) did not win any

seats in the Assembly. 

1 0 . The average level of support among all of these surveys was 37.6 percent, with an average of

23.8 percent saying they were undecided. If the Arab citizens of Israel (almost all of whom

supported the Oslo accords) had been included in these surveys, the average amount of support would probably have risen to about 45 percent. This is still far from a consensus. In addition, previous research suggests that the Hebrew press mostly ignores the Arab population in

Israel (Avraham, Wolfsfeld, and Aburaiya 2000; Wolfsfeld, Avraham, and Aburaiya, forthcoming). The voting figures from the Knesset include both Jewish and Arab representatives. 

1 1 . The figures are based on a readership survey from 1988. An estimated 61 percent of readers

were Protestant and 32 percent Catholic. The proportion in the population was about 57 percent Protestant and 37 percent Catholic.

Notes 4 7
1 2 . Alan Bairner (1996) makes exactly the opposite claim about the media in Northern Ireland,

arguing that the fact that so much of the press is partisan reinforces the divisions in the area.

The disagreement between us has to do with the difference in perspective. This report emphasizes the comparative perspective. Northern Ireland, compared to other areas in conflict, has

more political overlap in audience composition. 

1 3 . It is interesting to note in this context that none of the religious newspapers in Israel are sensationalist. 

1 4 . For a list of scholars who have written on this topic, see note 1.

4 8 Notes
R e fe re n c e s

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Geneva, Switzerland: Media Action International. 

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The case of the Arab citizens of Israel.” Journal of Communication Inquiry 2 4 : 1 1 7 – 1 3 3 .

Ayres, R. W. 1997. “Mediating international conflicts: Is image change necessary?” Journal of Peace

R e s e a r c h 3 4 : 4 3 1 – 4 4 7 .

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Becker, J. A. 1996. “A disappearing enemy: The image of the United States in Soviet political cartoons.” Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly 7 3 : 6 0 9 – 6 1 9 .

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features.” Political Communication 1 6 : 2 0 9 – 2 3 0 .

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Bruck, P. A., ed. 1988. A proxy for knowledge: The news media as agents in arms control and verificat i o n . Ottawa: Carleton International Proceedings.

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Bruck, P. A., a n dRoach, C. 1993. Dealing with reality: The news media and the promotion of

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Caspi, D., a n d Limor Y. 1999. The in/outsiders: Mass media in Israel. Cresskill, N.J.: Hampton

Press. 

Cohen, R. 1987. Theatre of power: The art of diplomatic signaling. London: Longman.

Cohen, Y. 1986. Media diplomacy: The foreign office in the mass communications age. L o n d o n :

Frank Cass.

Cooke, T. 1998. Prepared for war, ready for peace? Paramilitaries, politics, and the press in Northern

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Cottle, S. 1997. “Reporting the troubles in Northern Ireland: Paradigms and media propaganda.”

Critical Studies in Mass Communication 1 4 : 2 8 2 – 2 9 6 .

4 9
Dorman, W., Manoff, R. K., and Weeks, J. 1988. American press coverage of U.S.-Soviet relations,

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5 2 References
About the Au t h o r

Gadi Wolfsfeld holds a joint appoi n tm ent in po l i tical scien ce and com mu n i c a ti on

at the Hebrew Un ivers i ty of Jeru s a l em . He has served as chair of the dep a rtm ent of commu n i c a ti on at that insti tuti on and as director of the Sm a rt Fa m i ly Com mu n i c a ti on

Ins ti tute . Profe s s or Wo l fs feld was a sen i or fell ow at the Un i ted States In s ti tute of Pe ace in

1 9 9 8 – 9 9 . His major field of re s e a rch deals with the role of the news media in po l i ti c a l

con f l i cts and pe ace proce s s e s . His most recent boo k , Media and Pol i tical Co n f l i ct: News

From the Mi d dle Ea s t , was publ i s h ed by Ca m bri d ge Un ivers i ty Press (1997).

5 3
About the Institute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan federal institution created by Congress to promote research, education, and training on the peaceful management and resolution of international conflicts. Established in 1984, the Institute meets its

congressional mandate through an array of programs, including research grants, fellowships, professional training, education programs from high school through graduate school, conferences

and workshops, library services, and publications. The Institute’s Board of Directors is appointed

by the President of the United States and confirmed by the Senate.

Chairman of the Board: Chester A. Crocker

Vice Chairman: Max M. Kampelman

President: Richard H. Solomon

Executive Vice President: Harriet Hentges

Board of Directors

December 2000

Chester A. Crocker (Chairman), James R. Schlesinger Professor of Strategic Studies, School of Foreign

Service, Georgetown University

Max M. Kampelman, Esq. (Vice Chairman), Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver and Jacobson, Washington,

D.C.

Dennis L. Bark, Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University 

Stephen J. Hadley, Esq., Shea and Gardner, Washington, D.C.

Theodore M. Hesburgh, President Emeritus, University of Notre Dame

Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Corporation, Washington, D.C.

Seymour Martin Lipset, Hazel Professor of Public Policy, George Mason University

W. Scott Thompson, Professor of International Politics, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts

University

Allen Weinstein, President, Center for Democracy, Washington, D.C.

Harriet Zimmerman, Vice President, American Israel Public Affairs Committee, Washington, D.C.

Members ex officio

Paul G. Gaffney II, Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy; President, National Defense University

J. Stapleton Roy, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research

Walter B. Slocombe, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Richard H. Solomon, President, United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting)

5 4
OTHER TITLES IN THE PEACEWORKS SERIES

Conflict Manangement Training: Advancing Best Practices, by Robert M. Schoenhaus (No. 36, January

2 0 0 1 )

Coercive Prevention: Normative, Political, and Policy Dilemmas, by Bruce W. Jentleson (No. 35, October

2 0 0 0 )

Women in War and Peace: Grassroots Peacebuilding, by Donna Ramsey Marshall (No. 34, August 2000)

Grappling with Peace Education in Serbia, by Ruzica Rozandic (No. 33, April 2000)

Three Dimensions of Peacebuilding in Bosnia: Findings from USIP-Sponsored Research and Field Projects,

edited by Steven M. Riskin (No. 32, December 1999)

Building Security in Post–Cold War Eurasia: The OSCE and U.S. Foreign Policy, by P. Terrence

Hopmann (No. 31, September 1999)

New Approaches to International Negotiation and Mediation: Findings from USIP-Sponsored Research,

edited by Timothy D. Sisk (No. 30, August 1999)

Training to Promote Conflict Management: USIP-Assisted Training Projects, edited by David Smock (No.

29, July 1999)

The Challenge of Regional Cooperation in Central Asia: Preventing Conflict in the Ferghana Valley, b y

Anara Tabyshalieva (No. 28, June 1999)

Territorial Conflicts and Their Resolution: The Case of Ecuador and Peru, by Beth A. Simmons (No. 27,

April 1999)

The Quest for Democratic Security: The Role of the Council of Europe and U.S. Foreign Policy, by Heinrich

Klebes (No. 26, January 1999)

Nagorno-Karabakh: Searching for a Solution, by Patricia Carley (No. 25, December 1998)

Removing Barricades in Somalia: Options for Peace and Rehabilitation, by Hussein Adam and Richard

Ford, with Ali Jimale Ahmed, Abdinasir Osman Isse, Nur Weheliye, and David Smock (No. 24,

October 1998)

Muddling toward Democracy: Political Change in Grassroots China, by Anne F. Thurston (No. 23,

August 1998)

Preventing Genocide in Burundi: Lessons from International Diplomacy, by Stephen R. Weissman (No.

22, July 1998)

The China Challenge in the Twenty-First Century: Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy, by Chen Jian (No.

21, June 1998)

Private Peacemaking: USIP-Assisted Peacemaking Projects of Nonprofit Organizations, edited by David R.

Smock (No. 20, June 1998)

Sovereignty after Empire: Self-Determination Movements in the Former Soviet Union, by Galina

Starovoitova (No. 19, October 1997)

Keynote Addresses from the “Virtual Diplomacy” Conference, by Richard H. Solomon, Walter B. Wriston,

and George P. Shultz (No. 18, September 1997)

Greek-Turkish Relations and U.S. Foreign Policy: Cyprus, the Aegean, and Regional Stability, by Tozun

Bahcheli, Theodore A. Couloumbis, and Patricia Carley (No. 17, August 1997) 
OF RELATED INTEREST

Many other publications from the United States Institute of Peace address issues related to the media,

the Middle East, and Northern Ireland. 

RECENT INSTITUTE REPORTS INCLUDE:

Women in War and Peace: Grassroots Peacebuliding by Donna Ramsey Marshall

(Peaceworks No. 34, August 2000)

How Terrorism Ends (Special Report, May 1999)

To obtain an Institute report (available free of charge), write United States Institute of Peace,

1200 17th Street NW, Suite 200, Washington, DC 20036-3011; call (202) 429-3832; fax (202) 429-6063;

or e-mail: usip_requests@usip.org.

RECENT BOOKS FROM USIP PRESS INCLUDE:

A Very Political Economy: Peacebuilding and Foreign Aid in the West Bank and Gaza, by Rex Brynen

( 2 0 0 0 )

The Enemy Has a Face: The Seeds of Peace Experience, by John Wallach (2000)

Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World, edited by Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler

Hampson, and Pamela Aall (1999)

Late-Breaking Foreign Policy: The News Media’s Influence on Peace Operations, by Warren P. Strobel

( 1 9 9 7 )

To order books, call 800-868-8064 (U.S. only) or 703-661-1590, or fax 703-661-1501.

Pe a c ewo rks 37

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Institute of Pe a c e

1200 17th Street NW

Washington, DC 20036