The U.S. Government has recently issued seven major 

studies that together put forth a comprehensive blueprint for major global changes in U.S. national security 

strategy, defense plans, and diplomacy. These seven studies 

are brought together in this illuminating book, which portrays 

their individual contents and complex interrelationships and 

evaluates their strengths and shortfalls. It argues that while 

these studies are well-written, cogently argued, and articulate 

many valuable innovations for the Department of Defense, 

Department of State, and other government agencies, all of 

them leave lingering, controversial issues that require further 

thinking and analysis as future U.S. national security policy 

evolves in a changing and dangerous world. For all readers, 

this book offers a quick, readable way to grasp and critique 

the many changes now sweeping over the new U.S. approach 

to global security affairs.
New Directions in U.S. National Security

Strategy, Defense Plans, and Diplomacy

 A REVIEW OF OFFICIAL STRATEGIC DOCUMENTS

Published for the Center for Technology 

and National Security Policy 

Institute for National Strategic Studies 

By National Defense University Press

Washington, D.C. 

2011

New Directions in U.S. National Security

Strategy, Defense Plans, and Diplomacy

 A REVIEW OF OFFICIAL STRATEGIC DOCUMENTS

By Richard L. Kugler
Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those 

of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Defense Department or any 

other agency of the Federal Government.

Cleared for public release; distribution unlimited. Portions of this work may be quoted or 

reprinted without permission, provided that a standard source credit line is included. 

NDU Press would appreciate a courtesy copy of reprints or reviews.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Kugler, Richard L.

 New directions in U.S. national security strategy, defense plans, and 

diplomacy : a review of official strategic documents / by Richard L. Kugler.

 p. cm.

 Includes bibliographical references and index.

 1. National security--United States. 2. United States--Military 

policy. 3. United States--Foreign relations--21st century. I. 

National Defense University. Center for Technology and National 

Security Policy. II. Title.

 UA23.K894 2011

 355’.033573--dc23

 2011020782

First printing, July 2011

NDU Press publications are sold by the U.S. Government Printing Office. For ordering information, call (202) 512-1800 or write to the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing 

Office, Washington, DC 20402. 

For the U.S. Government On-Line Bookstore, go to: http://bookstore.gpo.gov/

For current publications of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, please go to the National 

Defense University Web site at: http://www.ndu.edu/inss
v

CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

CHAPTER ONE

National Security Strategy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

CHAPTER TWO 

Quadrennial Defense Review Report. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

CHAPTER THREE

The QDR in Perspective: Meeting America’s National Security 

Needs in the 21st Century. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

CHAPTER FOUR

Nuclear Posture Review Report. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

CHAPTER FIVE

Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

CHAPTER SIX

NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement. . . . . . . . . . . . 103

CHAPTER SEVEN

Leading Through Civilian Power: The First Quadrennial 

Diplomacy and Development Review. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123

CONCLUSION 

A Comprehensive Blueprint with Lingering Issues. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149

BIBLIOGRAPHY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157

ABOUT THE AUTHOR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159

vii

E X E C U T I V E S U M M A R Y 

Where are U.S. national security strategy, defense plans, and 

diplomacy headed in the coming years? One answer to this 

important question comes from seven official studies issued 

in 2010. These studies provide an impressive welter of goals and activities, 

and they announce major innovations in U.S. policies. But they are hard to 

absorb in a single setting, and their interrelationships can be hard to determine unless viewed together. To help readers better understand them, this 

book assembles them into a single exposition, thereby providing “one stop 

shopping.” It describes them individually, shows how they blend together, 

and evaluates their strengths and limitations.

Five of these studies were written by the U.S. Government, and two 

were written by teams of independent experts, working with official sponsorship. The studies are:

•	 National Security Strategy (NSS 2010), issued by the White House in 

May 2010

•	 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR Report), issued by the 

Department of Defense (DOD) in February 2010

•	 The QDR in Perspective: Meeting America’s National Security Needs in 

the 21st Century (QDRP Report), mandated by Congress and DOD 

and issued by an independent study group in August 2010

•	 Nuclear Posture Review Report (NPR Report), issued by DOD in 

April 2010

•	 Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report (BMDR Report), issued by 

DOD in February 2010

•	 NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement (ASDE Report), 

issued by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Group of 

Experts in May 2010
viii

•	 Leading Through Civilian Power: The First Quadrennial Diplomacy and 

Development Review (QDDR Report), issued by the Department of 

State in December 2010.

Separate Reports That Forge a Comprehensive Blueprint. While each of 

these studies deserves to be treated on its own merits, they are collectively 

important as they create a comprehensive blueprint for how future U.S. 

security efforts are to evolve. Together, they argue that if their policies are 

pursued in tandem, the United States can protect its homeland, advance its 

interests abroad, be prepared for future missions, help defend its allies, and 

dampen dangerous international trends while preserving peace and preventing war. NSS 2010 puts forth a new strategy that employs American economic renewal and a “whole of government” approach as engines for driving 

an assertive, refocused strategy of engagement abroad for handling today’s 

challenges and shaping a stable future international security order. Although 

NSS 2010 was issued ex post facto a few months after several of the other 

reports were published, it provides an overarching political framework for 

appraising how the other six studies of defense strategies and diplomacy fit 

together. The QDR Report puts forth a new agenda for U.S. conventional 

defense plans that emphasizes improvements to capabilities for current wars 

while maintaining flexible and adaptable forces for the future. The QDRP 

Report—a critique of the QDR Report—calls for an improved force-sizing 

construct, a larger Navy, more vigorous modernization, and reforms to the 

weapons-acquisition process. The NPR Report calls for strong policies to 

prevent nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism, reduces the role that 

nuclear weapons play in U.S. defense strategy, endorses the New Strategic 

Arms Reduction Treaty (START), and preserves a smaller but modernizing 

nuclear triad posture. The BMDR Report puts forth a sea-change in U.S. 

strategy by calling for widespread deployment of SM–3 missile interceptors 

in order to provide stronger regional missile defenses and security architectures in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. The ASDE Report calls for 

NATO to adopt a new strategic concept and to improve its capabilities for 

expeditionary missions, cyber defense, and other new missions. The QDDR 
ix

Report calls for sweeping reforms of the State Department and U.S. Agency 

for International Development in order to do a better job of carrying out 

U.S. diplomacy and development policies in troubled regions.

Lingering Issues. All of these studies are well written and cogently argued, 

but all leave unresolved issues in their wake. In addition to not fully addressing global political constraints ahead, the NSS 2010 does not provide enough 

analysis of regional priorities, adequately treat the risk of big-power competition, or address strategy options if Iran acquires nuclear weapons. The 

QDR Report fails to give full attention to long-term imperatives including 

force requirements, joint operations, and modernization. The QDRP Report 

fails to address how a larger Navy and a more robust modernization plan 

are to be funded. The NPR Report does not provide enough analysis showing whether its counterproliferation policies will succeed, and does not 

specify how additional nuclear force reductions beyond New START can 

unfold. The BMDR Report endorsement of regional SM–3 deployments is 

predicated on the assumption that regional allies and partners will agree 

with U.S. deployment plans. The ASDE Report agenda for improving 

NATO capabilities does not take into account the negative effects of austerity budgets and defense cutbacks across Europe. The QDDR Report fails 

to adequately address substantive priorities for diplomacy and development 

policies in troubled regions and to analyze how classical diplomacy—for 

example, big-power relations—will need to change.

Future Analytical Challenges. While the seven studies equip U.S. national 

security strategy and defense plans with new goals, policies, and priorities, 

they do not preclude the need for further thinking, analyzing, and refining. 

For example, they will require additional attention to the challenges of 

creating new regional security architectures in Europe, Asia, and the Middle 

East. Thus, they open the door to a new era of studies and analyses whose 

dimensions are only beginning to be understood.

xi

INTRODUCTION

Where are U.S. national security strategy, defense plans, and 

diplomacy headed in the coming years? An answer to this 

important question comes from seven official studies that 

have been issued during 2010. This volume assembles these studies into a 

common framework, examines their individual contents, shows how they 

work together to forge a comprehensive official blueprint for the future, and 

evaluates them individually and collectively. Five of these studies were written by the U.S. Government; two were written by teams of independent 

experts but had official sponsorship. The studies are:

•	 National Security Strategy, issued by the White House in May 2010

•	 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, issued by the Department of 

Defense (DOD) in February 2010

•	 The QDR in Perspective: Meeting America’s National Security Needs in 

the 21st Century, mandated by Congress and DOD and issued by an 

independent study group in August 2010

•	 Nuclear Posture Review Report, issued by DOD in April 2010

•	 Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report, issued by DOD in February 2010

•	 NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement, issued by the 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization Group of Experts in May 2010

•	 Leading Through Civilian Power: The First Quadrennial Diplomacy 

and Development Review, issued by the Department of State in 

December 2010.

The first study describes the basics of U.S. national security strategy for 

the coming years, including core goals, concepts, and activities for guiding 

foreign policy and diplomacy worldwide. The next four studies bore down 

into the associated details of U.S. defense planning, including conventional 
xii

and nuclear forces and missile defenses. The sixth study examines the issues 

surrounding the Alliance’s strategic concept and defense improvement plans. 

The final study analyzes future U.S. diplomacy and development policies, 

and focuses on reforms to the Department of State and U.S. Agency for 

International Development internal structures and operations.

While each of these studies has a purpose of its own in ways that demand 

careful appraisal, they need to be viewed collectively because they are interdependent, and together they aspire to cover much of the waterfront for U.S. security 

strategy and future directions for defense plans and diplomacy. A collective 

appraisal can illuminate their interrelationships, show how they form a cohesive 

whole, and reveal their strengths, shortcomings, and lingering issues. Whereas 

roughly 75 percent of the following pages are devoted to describing and explaining the seven studies, 25 percent are devoted to critiquing them.

The purpose of this volume is not only to help educate readers, but also to 

evaluate emerging U.S. strategies, policies, and plans. This work addresses each 

of these seven studies individually in sequential order. In each case, it endeavors 

to summarize the main features of the study and to evaluate its contents. At the 

end, this book examines how these studies interlock to form an overall blueprint, 

identifies lingering issues that call for further analysis, and offers constructive 

ideas for further research and analyses.

A main theme emerges from the following pages, one that derives from 

the highly interactive nature of each of the seven studies. Taken together, 

these studies provide an impressive edifice of goals, policies, plans, and 

activities in ways that often surpass earlier official efforts. They aptly illustrate the complex challenges facing the United States, the need to handle 

them effectively, and the necessity of employing a wide range of instruments, 

military and civilian. They put forth many fresh ideas and innovative departures—for example, building effective regional missile defenses—even as 

they foster continuity in areas deemed appropriate. They argue that if their 

strategies and plans are pursued with energy and adequate resources, the 

United States can aspire to protect its vital interests and those of its allies in 

the coming years while also contributing to a stable international order. 
xiii

Nonetheless, these studies are not perfect, they do not resolve all controversies, and, at times, they seem to create gaps or at least leave unresolved issues 

in their wake. The task facing the U.S. Government will be one of building 

upon these studies in order to further strengthen them.

CHAPTER ONE

National Security Strategy

A52-page document, the National Security Strategy Report of 2010 

(NSS 2010) puts forth a new U.S. strategy for national economic 

renewal, global leadership, and comprehensive engagement aimed 

at strengthening the capacity for collective action to create a just and sustainable international order that can resolve 21st-century challenges. The document 

is written in a manner aimed at articulating the rationale, goals, and constituent policies of each component of this ambitious, far reaching strategy, 

which is global in conception and focused both on the near and long terms. 

Its strategic approach endeavors to blend the art of the possible with that of 

fostering the desirable. While acknowledging that the United States must 

work within the confines of the often stressful world, with its numerous dangers and threats, the NSS 2010 aspires to employ U.S. energy and purpose, in 

concert with allies and other cooperative partners, in an effort to shape the 

future in ways that produce a more secure, stable, and prosperous world. 

Accordingly, the NSS 2010 calls for the United States to remain in a leadership 

role in global affairs, rather than retreat into disengagement and isolation. 

Furthermore, it calls upon the United States to harness a wide array of civilian 

and military instruments, to continue meeting its security commitments to 

allies, to work closely with many other nations and international institutions, 

and to deal firmly with adversary nations and other actors that threaten U.S. 

security interests and global peace. By any measure, this is a strategy anchored 

in both hopeful goals and commitment to an activist foreign policy and 

diplomacy, but often in ways that differ from those of the past.

More than earlier strategies, the NSS 2010 places considerable emphasis on renewing America’s economic prosperity to create a strong foundation 

for an assertive national security strategy. Accordingly, it calls for national 

1
2 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

policies aimed at reducing the deficit, ending recession, and restoring economic growth. It also calls for investments in education, clean energy, 

infrastructure, technological innovation, and goods and services for export. 

For similar reasons, it mandates close cooperation with the Group of 20 

(G–20) in order to create sustained global economic growth in ways that 

benefit the U.S. economy. A stronger economy, the NSS 2010 contends, can 

liberate the resources needed to fund a whole-of-government approach to 

national security strategy. This approach envisions sustained efforts to 

strengthen policy implementation by integrating a wide spectrum of means, 

including diplomatic, informational, military, economic, intelligence, development, homeland security, and strategic communications instruments. 

Whereas earlier NSS studies often treated defense preparedness as the main 

instrument of power, the NSS 2010 views military forces as one instrument 

among many, all of which require appropriate funding as well as strong 

coordination by the U.S. Government. But it also makes clear that the 

United States must maintain its military superiority in the form of tailored 

deterrence strategies and fully sufficient capabilities across all domains—

land, sea, air, and cyber—to reassure allies, contend with threats, and 

otherwise perform core defense missions.

The NSS 2010 defines engagement as the active participation by the 

United States in relationships beyond its borders, and it proposes to carry 

out engagement more vigorously and in different ways than found in the 

strategy of the George W. Bush administration (2001–2009). It asserts that 

comprehensive engagement must begin with close friends and allies, but 

must reach beyond them to other countries, including great powers and 

adversaries. While the NSS 2010 makes clear that the United States will 

retain the right to use military force when necessary, it disavows unilateralism and regular use of force as well as practices, such as torture, that can be 

viewed as violations of international law. It proclaims that promoting universal values—including democratic practices, respect for human rights, 

and setting a sound moral example—is highly important to enhancing U.S. 

influence abroad.
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 3

Compared to the Bush administration, it places less emphasis on rapid 

global democratization as a central engine of progress and is more prone 

to advance this goal through quiet diplomacy rather than high-profile 

activity. Its approach to global diplomacy emphasizes that multilateralism 

and collective action will be a dominant practice in handling both security 

affairs and the world economy. It calls upon the United States to preserve 

and reform existing alliances, broaden partnerships, pursue cooperation 

with such big powers as Russia, China, and India, and work closely with 

the United Nations and other international organizations. In its view, 

flourishing multilateral partnerships should be a principal mechanism—

more so than in the recent past—for strengthening U.S. influence, mobilizing many nations to address problems from the perspective of common 

shared interests, and isolating countries and actors that threaten peace.

In deciding how the United States should act abroad, the NSS 2010 

views the world as undergoing a major transition propelled by fast-paced 

changes, heading away from the international order inherited from the Cold 

War, and moving rapidly toward an unclear destination, which must be 

proactively shaped by the Nation and its allies. It portrays globalization as 

a main dynamic drawing previously distant regions and countries closer 

together in a growing web of economic, political, and information ties. The 

result, it asserts, is a combination of promising and perilous trends that, 

while yielding progress in many ways, is encouraging and empowering such 

dangerous trends as the persistent rise of terrorist groups and the grave threat 

of nuclear proliferation. In this setting, the NSS 2010 calls for U.S. national 

security strategy to pursue four enduring national interests:

•	 security: the security of the United States, its citizens, allies, and

partners

•	 prosperity: a strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy in an

open international economic system that promotes opportunity and 

prosperity

•	 values: respect for universal values at home and abroad
4 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

•	 international order: an order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation 

to meet global challenges.

Handling Top Security Priorities. The NSS 2010 identifies the following 

top security priorities for U.S. strategy:

•	 strengthen security and resilience at home

•	 disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its violent extremist

affiliates in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and around the world

•	 reverse the spread of nuclear and biological weapons and secure

nuclear materials

•	 advance peace, security, and opportunity in the Greater Middle East

•	 invest in the capacity of strong and capable partners

•	 secure cyberspace.

To strengthen security and resilience at home, the NSS 2010 calls for 

such steps as preventing and interdicting threats, denying hostile actors the 

ability to operate within U.S. borders, doing a better job of reducing vulnerabilities to the national infrastructure as well borders, ports, and airfields, and enhancing overall air, maritime, transportation, and space 

security. It also calls for improved measures to manage emergencies, 

empower communities to counter radicalization, strengthen Federal-statelocal cooperation, and work closely with allies and partners on common 

homeland security agendas.

To wage a global campaign against al Qaeda and its terrorist affiliates,

the NSS 2010 earmarks the importance of homeland security measures, but 

it attaches specialemphasis to defeating al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

In Afghanistan, it calls for an assertive strategy aimed at denying al Qaeda a

safe haven, disallowing the Taliban the ability to overthrow the government, 

and strengthening the capacity of the Afghanistan government and security 

forces, so they can take lead responsibility for their future. Within Pakistan, 

it calls for continuing U.S. efforts to work with the government to address the 
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 5

local, regional, and global threat from violent extremists. In order to attain 

these objectives in both countries, the NSS 2010 puts forth a three-pronged 

strategy aimed at:

•	 employing the U.S. military and International Security Assistance

Force to target the insurgency, secure key population centers, and 

train Afghan security forces

•	 working with partners and the United Nations to improve Afghan

governance and economic conditions

•	 fostering a relationship with Pakistan founded on mutual interests

and mutual respect in ways aimed at both countering terrorists and 

promoting Pakistan’s democratic and economic development.

While the NSS 2010 focuses mainly on Afghanistan and Pakistan, it 

also calls for growing pressure to deny al Qaeda safe-havens in such places

as Yemen, Somalia, the Maghreb, and the Sahel.

The NSS 2010 attaches high priority to reversing the spread of nuclear 

weapons and materials as well as biological weapons. It calls for intensified 

efforts to pursue the goal of a world without nuclear weapons through such 

steps as strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), ratifying the 

New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) with Russia, ratifying the 

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and pursuing a new treaty that verifiably 

ends the production of nuclear materials intended for use in weapons. It 

views the basic bargain of the NPT as still valid: countries with nuclear 

weapons will move toward disarmament, countries without nuclear weapons 

will forsake them, and all countries can access peaceful nuclear energy. The 

NSS 2010 also calls for presenting a clear choice to Iran and North Korea: 

either accept denuclearization or face isolation from the international community. In addition, it puts forth policies aimed at securing nuclear weapons 

and materials, supporting peaceful nuclear energy, and countering biological threats. In particular, it cites the Proliferation Security Initiative and the 

Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism as programs that should be 

expanded into durable international efforts.
6 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

Proclaiming that the United States has important interests in the 

Greater Middle East that include stable security affairs and political-economic progress, the NSS 2010 calls for an American engagement that is 

both comprehensive and strategic and that extends beyond near-term threats 

to include long-term development. In Iraq, it calls for a responsible transition 

to full Iraqi responsibility as U.S. forces withdraw by the end of 2011. As 

the war in Iraq ends, it promises strong U.S. civilian support for the country, 

led by the State Department, coupled with a regional diplomacy aimed at 

ensuring that Iraq emerges as stable, secure, and prosperous with a competent, democratic government.

The NSS 2010 also calls for vigorous efforts to promote Arab-Israeli 

peace rooted in a two-state solution for Palestine and Israel, as well as better 

Israeli relations with Syria and Lebanon. To promote a responsible Iran, the 

NSS 2010 calls for a U.S. policy of engagement in hope that Iran will switch 

course away from threatening behavior and toward constructive participation in regional and global affairs. But it also warns that if Iran fails to 

respond positively, it will face even greater isolation.

Through the lens of the NSS 2010, the practice of investing in the 

capacity of strong and durable partners refers to efforts aimed at helping 

failed and failing states to surmount their internal problems, achieve political-economic progress, and resist radicalization and extremism. This agenda 

has three components: fostering security and reconstruction in the aftermath 

of conflict, pursuing sustainable and responsible security systems in at-risk 

states, and preventing the emergence of conflict by promoting long-term 

development. The desired outcome is not only restored stable states but also 

close friends and partners of the United States. The NSS 2010 cites Iraq and 

Afghanistan as the top near-term priorities for this type of involvement, but 

its open-ended discussion suggests potential involvements elsewhere when 

failing states have strategic importance. The implication is that even if the 

United States ultimately withdraws from Iraq and Afghanistan, it will be in 

the business of stabilization, reconstruction, and comprehensive approaches 

for a long time.
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 7

The final security priority cited by the NSS 2010 is securing cyberspace. 

Stating that the national digital infrastructure is a vital strategic asset, the 

NSS 2010 identifies cyber threats from a wide spectrum of sources: individual hackers, criminal groups, terrorist networks, and advanced hostile 

nations. It demonstrates particular concern about major cyber attacks that 

could cause crippling damage to the U.S. Government, economy, and 

military forces. To protect U.S information networks, the NSS 2010 calls 

for close cooperation among the government, industry, and private citizens. 

It also calls for similar cooperation with partner nations to prevent cyber 

attacks, deal effectively with them when they occur, and recover promptly.

Promoting Prosperity and Values. The NSS 2010 mainly views prosperity in terms of restoring sustained growth to the U.S. economy, but it calls 

for policies aimed at fostering growth by the international economy as well. 

It views pursuit of a healthy global economy and stable security affairs as 

interconnected and mutually reinforcing. It argues that the free flow of 

commerce advances peace among nations by making them more integrated, 

prosperous, and stable. Conversely, it argues that disastrous shocks to the 

world economy, slowdowns, and recessions can damage prosperity in many 

places and help make security affairs more intractable. The challenge facing 

the United States, it reasons, is not only to make its own economy more 

competitive in the world economy, but also to help steer the world economy 

toward open trade, expanding markets, financial stability, and sustained 

growth enjoyed by as many countries as possible.

To achieve balanced and sustainable growth for the U.S. and global 

economy, the NSS 2010 calls for U.S.-led efforts to prevent economic imbalances and financial excesses. It also calls for efforts to increase U.S. exports 

while encouraging other countries to import more U.S. products and services, shift to greater domestic demand abroad, enhance the performance 

of such international institutions as the G–20, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund (IMF), and dampen international economic crime. 

In addition, the NSS 2010 acknowledges awareness that the world economy 

is becoming two-tiered—with Europe, Asia, China, and India experiencing
8 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

steady growth, but other regions lagging behind. Accordingly, it calls for 

assistance policies that can help make poor countries more prosperous. It 

particularly cites sub-Saharan Africa as needing economic and development 

assistance in several areas, including good governance, improvements to 

agriculture, and health care.

In its treatment of values, the NSS 2010 asserts that because the United 

States believes some values are universal, including democracy and human 

rights, it should work to promote them worldwide. Promoting them in 

effective ways makes sense, it states, not only for idealistic reasons, but also 

because the spread of these values encourages peace, international cooperation, and a friendly stance toward the United States. The problem today, 

it further states, is that the spread of democracy and humans rights has 

stalled in worrisome ways. It points out that whereas some autocratic governments have suppressed democracy and human rights in the name of 

economic modernity and national unity, some authoritarian governments, 

while brandishing ostensibly democratic credentials, have taken such steps 

as impeding the electoral process and undermining civil society. Such 

trends, it argues, are not worldwide, but are prevalent in enough regions to 

spell trouble for the continued spread of democracy and human rights.

Faced with this challenge, the NSS 2010 states, the United States can best 

respond by setting a powerful example. Accordingly, it calls for policies that 

prohibit torture, counter terrorism legally, balance the imperatives of secrecy 

and transparency, protect civil liberties, uphold the rule of law, and draw 

strength from diversity. In acting abroad, it states, the United States should 

strive to ensure that new and fragile democracies deliver tangible improvements for their citizens. In dealing with nondemocratic regimes, the NSS 2010 

endorses principled engagement in the form of a dual-track approach. This 

requires the United States to improve government-to-government relations 

and use the resulting dialogue to advance human rights, while engaging civil 

society and peaceful political opposition. In addition, it calls for U.S. policies 

that recognize the legitimacy of all peaceful democratic movements, support 

women’s rights, strengthen international norms against corruption, build 
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 9

broader coalitions to advance universal values, and promote the right to access 

information. Finally, it calls for efforts to promote human dignity by meeting 

such basic needs as health care and access to food.

Promoting International Order. The NSS 2010 calls for creation of an 

international order that is not only just and sustainable, but also capable of 

handing the new challenges of the 21st century. Anchored in the premise 

that the international architecture inherited from the Cold War is breaking 

down, it asserts that a new international order must bind nations together 

in a web of shared interests, accepted rules of the road, a commitment to 

collective action, multinational institutions, and common strategies—all of 

which provide a growing capacity to handle such new-era challenges as terrorism, nuclear proliferation, regional conflicts, economic troubles, climate 

change, pandemic disease, and international crime.

As used by NSS 2010, the term international order does not refer to a 

single hierarchical structure in the manner of the United Nations, but 

instead implies a functioning, flexible cluster of likeminded nations that 

choose to act together in pursuit of their common interests. A key feature is 

that this international order is to be created through cooperation by its 

member nations, is to be as large and powerful as possible, and is to provide 

a usable framework for collective action by coalitions focused on handing 

specific challenges. While acknowledging that creating such an international 

order will be difficult, the NSS 2010 states that the effort is imperative, and 

that if the United States leads wisely and works closely with likeminded 

nations, progress is achievable. It further states that unless such an international order is created, the forces of instability and disorder will undermine 

global security. Accordingly, the NSS 2010 puts forth a four-part plan for 

this endeavor:

•	 ensure strong alliances

•	 build cooperation with other 21st-century centers of influence

•	 strengthen institutions and mechanisms for cooperation

•	 sustain broad cooperation on key global challenges.
10 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

As articulated by the NSS 2010, America’s security alliances, especially those 

in Europe and Asia, will provide a strong foundation for the new international

order. The NSS 2010 argues that these alliances—and their resulting patterns 

of close cooperation among the United States and its many allies—provide 

potent force multipliers that permit participants to pursue more demanding 

security goals than otherwise would be possible by those members acting alone. 

The NSS 2010 also makes clear that the Nation will continue participating in 

these alliances in traditional ways, including multilateral defense planning and 

stronger regional deterrence postures, aimed at protecting their security against 

old and new threats. But it also states that the United States will lead efforts to 

revitalize and reform these alliances so that they can handle new challenges.

In Europe, the NSS 2010 calls for U.S. policies aimed at preserving the

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a vibrant, revitalized, and 

effective alliance that can handle the full range of 21st-century security challenges, while partnering with the European Union to bring security and

democracy to Eastern Europe and the Balkans, and to resolve conflicts in

the Caucasus and Cyprus. It states that NATO’s new strategic concept will 

provide an opportunity to pursue alliance reforms, but it does not specify 

what such reforms should include. In Asia, the NSS 2010 calls for policies 

aimed at deepening and updating U.S. alliances with Japan, South Korea, 

Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand to reflect new-era Asian dynamics 

while preserving security and promoting prosperity for those countries. It 

particularly emphasizes U.S. efforts to modernize alliances with Japan and 

Korea in order to face evolving security challenges, foster equal relationships, 

and preserve a solid foundation for the continuing presence of U.S. military 

forces there. The NSS 2010 also cites America’s close relations with Canada 

and Mexico as central to North American security and economic progress.

The NSS 2010’s call for building cooperation with other 21st-century 

centers of influence reflects awareness that several countries and regions are 

acquiring greater power and asserting themselves more aggressively on the 

world stage. It singles out China, India, and Russia as key actors with whom 

the United States needs cooperative bilateral relationships for addressing 
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 11

common problems. It cites the rise of the G–20 as an example of the growing shift toward greater cooperation between traditional powers and emerging centers of influence. It identifies Asia as an entire region that is 

acquiring greater economic and political weight in world affairs. It calls for 

deep, enduring, and growing U.S. ties with countries of the region anchored 

in mutual interests, close security collaboration with friends and allies, 

flourishing economic and trade relations aimed at enhancing American 

exports, and cooperation with such multilateral Asian institutions as the 

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Asia Pacific Economic

Forum, Trans-Pacific Partnership, and the East Asia Summit.

The NSS 2010’s approach to China reflects the region-wide U.S. strategy in Asia. It seeks a positive, constructive, and comprehensive relationship 

with China. While stating that the United States will monitor China’s 

military modernization program to ensure that American allies are not 

endangered, the NSS 2010 welcomes a China that plays a responsible leadership role in handling security challenges, encourages China to make 

choices that contribute to peace, security, and prosperity as China’s influence 

grows, and encourages a continued reduction in tensions between China 

and Taiwan. The NSS 2010 calls for a growing strategic partnership with 

India based on common interests, shared values, and commitments to help 

solve key security challenges. The NSS 2010 also asserts that the United 

States has an abiding interest in a strong, peaceful, and prosperous Russia 

that respects international norms. While stating that the United States will 

support the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia’s neighbors, it calls 

for a growing partnership with Russia in such critical areas as nuclear arms 

reductions and confronting violent extremism, especially in Afghanistan. 

In addition, the NSS 2010 calls attention to the importance of constructive, 

cooperation-building U.S. policies toward Indonesia, Brazil, friendly Arab 

countries in the Middle East and Persian Gulf, and South Africa. Across

Africa, it urges a strong U.S. engagement focused on assistance policies that 

help foster good governance, economic development, and conflict resolution.
12 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

As part of U.S. strategy for promoting a new international order, the 

NSS 2010 calls for efforts to strengthen institutions and mechanisms for 

cooperation. It encourages a more robust and effective United Nations, 

including Security Council reforms, a more efficient civil service, and 

strengthened operational capacity for peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, 

development assistance, and promotion of human rights. It calls for U.S.-led 

efforts to promote common actions through a wide range of frameworks 

and coalitions, accompanied by policies to spur and harness a new diversity 

of instruments and institutions. The emerging division of labor would be 

based on effectiveness, competency, and long-term reliability. It envisions 

progress on a host of fronts, including international financial institutions, 

multilateral development banks, and the IMF as well as leveraged policies 

for fostering economic progress in poor regions. It also calls for policies 

aimed at investing in improved regional capabilities, including such bodies 

as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Organization

of the Islamic Conference, African Union, Organization of American States, 

ASEAN, and the Gulf Cooperation Council. In guiding these regional

bodies, the NSS 2010 calls for a strategic approach that takes into account 

a sensible division of roles and responsibilities and that encourages reforms 

and innovations in order to address emerging security and economic priorities in multiple areas.

Finally, the approach put forth by the NSS 2010 urges sustained, broad, 

global cooperation on a host of 21st-century challenges that have been resistant to progress in the past. It argues that global cooperation on them is 

necessary because no single nation, or even group of nations, can handle 

them alone. It especially focuses on addressing climate change, peacekeeping to control armed conflicts, prevention of genocide and mass atrocities, 

international justice, pandemics and infectious diseases, world heath, transnational criminal threats, safeguarding the global commons and cyberspace, 

and access to the Arctic. International cooperation in these areas, the NSS 

2010 argues, can help promote progress on difficult challenges that transcend individual regions in ways that often make them truly global.
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 13

Strengths, Shortcomings, and Lingering Issues. By any measure, the NSS 

2010 is a thorough, articulate, and reasoned document that clearly spells out 

main directions for future U.S. national security strategy as seen by the 

Obama administration. Written in a manner evidently designed to capture 

widespread bipartisan consensus in the American political system, it draws 

major criticism mostly from opposite ends of the spectrum—that is, some 

critics see it as too liberal and others as too conservative. If a well-conceived 

national security strategy is defined as a strategic construct for pursuing 

multiple goals in complementary ways, the NSS 2010 meets this standard. 

Judged in such technical terms, it is as good, or better, than similar national 

security strategy studies written by previous administrations. By being so 

comprehensive, it performs its intended role of helping to guide the multiple 

U.S. departments and agencies that play central roles in carrying out national 

security strategy. It leaves few subjects untouched, even if it sometimes 

pursues breadth at the expense of depth.

A key strength is that the NSS 2010 defines national security in broad 

terms that include not only traditional military and security issues, but also 

the full set of wider issues that animate U.S. foreign policy and diplomacy, 

including economic policies, political relations with many countries, institutional relationships, and developmental policies in key regions. Focusing 

on national economic renewal, its whole-of-government approach makes 

sense in an emerging era in which the success of U.S. national security 

strategy will be heavily influenced by the availability of resources and the 

ability of the U.S. Government to orchestrate multiple policy instruments. 

Emphasis on a strategy of U.S. engagement abroad, coupled with its call for

sustained multilateral cooperation, clearly responds favorably to the many 

allies, partners, and friends abroad looking for this blend of leadership and 

collaboration from the United States. Its emphasis on working with the 

G–20 to handle the world economy reflects accelerating globalization 

dynamics as well as the need for common policies by many nations. Its call 

for promoting democratic values mainly by the strength of American example and through quiet diplomacy may seem insufficiently assertive to some 
14 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

critics, but it does not coddle dictators. It does reflect an official judgment 

that this is the best practical way to make progress today.

Virtually all of the dozens of security policy initiatives put forth by NSS 

2010 have generated controversy. The best way to evaluate this document is not 

to ask whether it is correct in its handling of myriad details, but instead to ask 

whether it correctly judges strategic fundamentals. In this arena, it is fair to 

observe that in trying to strike a balance between idealism and realism, the NSS 

2010’s emphasis on shaping the future world, rather than being victimized by 

unwelcome trends, reflects sound reasoning that has been shared by many past 

administrations. The notion, thus, is not new; the question is whether, and to 

what degree, it can be accomplished. Such an analysis needs to be conducted in 

light of the many frustrations encountered by past administrations when they 

set out to shape the future of a rapidly evolving world that responds to many 

complexities, not just American leadership. Whereas optimists might judge that 

important successes are achievable, pessimists, especially those animated by 

concern that U.S. power is declining, might judge that the opposite will be true. 

While the debate between them will be settled only when the future unfolds, 

what can be said now is that the NSS 2010 strikes a hopeful tone partly because 

it is preoccupied with spelling out a large set of goals and their supporting policies—in isolation from constraints on pursuing them. Along the way, it does 

not offer much analysis of whether these goals are feasibly achievable and 

whether their policies will be strong and agile enough to get the job fully done. 

To the extent that the NSS 2010 errs in strategic terms, it may be on the side of 

implying that more can be accomplished than actually will be the case.

In any event, the NSS 2010 puts forth an undeniably ambitious global 

agenda for the United States to pursue as a leader of many alliances, coalitions, and endeavors. These range from handling the high politics of the 

global security system and world economy to carrying out gritty wars and 

reconstruction efforts across the Greater Middle East and adjoining regions.

Nowhere does it discuss in any detail limits to America’s strategic interests, 

geographic and functional areas that fall outside these limits, responsibilities that should be carried out by countries other than the United States, 
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 15

and the need to set priorities so that vital goals are attained even at the 

expense of not achieving less important ones. Critics might judge that, 

although the NSS 2010 cautions against overextending U.S. foreign involvements, it establishes a sweeping strategy framework that risks falling into 

this trap. While only the future will tell, an appropriate conclusion is that 

between the poles of full disengagement and assertive engagement almost 

everywhere, there is a middle ground that calls for strong but selective 

engagement on a manageable list of strategic issues where success is both 

mandatory and achievable. Whether emerging U.S. strategy will find this 

middle ground is to be seen, but the NSS 2010 does not cause the most 

vital goals to be highlighted.

The NSS 2010 tries to establish a sense of focus at least for the near term 

by identifying its six top security priorities. However, questions can be raised 

about this list and the analyses supporting it. No one would quarrel with 

the goals of defending the U.S. homeland, defeating al Qaeda and its affiliates, stopping nuclear proliferation, and protecting cyberspace—or with 

needing to stabilize failed states that have strategic importance. The goals 

of winding down the war in Iraq while succeeding in Afghanistan are 

broadly shared across the United States. But the goal of advancing Middle 

East security and stability is bereft of actionablesteps of what should be done

if, as seems increasingly possible, Iran acquires nuclear weapons and delivery 

systems. Assuming that war against Iran is rejected as a viable choice, presumably a U.S.-led containment and deterrence regime would need to be 

created that compels Iran to keep its nuclear weapons holstered and devoid 

of major influence across the region. Can such a regime be created, how 

would it be established, how would it operate, and would it be successful? 

The NSS 2010 is silent on this vital topic in ways that could neuter its 

Middle East relevance if Iran indeed becomes a nuclear power. Nor did the

NSS 2010 anticipate the wave of revolutions that subsequently broke out in 

Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and elsewhere in the Middle East—all of which will

need to be factored into new U.S. regional policies as the future unfolds.
16 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

Likewise, the priorities offered do not even mention the still paramount 

goals of keeping Europe and Asia stable and peaceful. If these two huge,

powerful regions somehow plunge into instability, they will take the rest of 

the world with them. By not mentioning them, does the NSS 2010 imply 

that handling these two regions is no longer serious and demanding enough 

to be listed as a top security priority? If so, it will be the first major U.S. 

strategy study to reach such a conclusion in many decades. Part of the problem stems from the NSS 2010’s tendency to be so preoccupied with analyzing global trends and policies that, the Middle East aside, it pays insufficient

attention to the various regions. Europe and Asia are especially noticeable

casualties because they have always figured so prominently in U.S. national 

security strategy, and still do so in many important ways. The NSS 2010 

does briefly examine Europe and Asia as part of its general discussion of

creating a new international order. Here, it raises the idea of creating stronger regional deterrence postures in those regions and elsewhere, but it offers 

no further insights on how this important, consequence-laden idea can be 

carried out in political-military terms. Its brief treatment invites more questions than answers. Nor does it answer an even more basic question: How 

are the European and Asian security systems to be structured and operated

in the coming years—similar to now, or differently? Failure to answer this 

question in adequate depth creates a noticeable gap in the NSS 2010.

Moreover, questions can be raised about the NSS 2010’s discussion of 

whether and how a future international security order is to take shape. Clearly, 

the idea of creating a stronger consensus for managing global challenges makes 

sense. But as the NSS 2010 acknowledges, a truly expansive international order 

cannot be imposed from the top. Instead, it must emerge from the bottom up 

in ways anchored in the mutual interests of participating nations. At issue is 

whether, in a world of growing pluralism, such a harmonization of interests, 

especially among the big powers, is possible. Geopolitical theorists aware of 

history likely would raise doubts by arguing that in an era of intensifying multipolarity, growing big-power competition is more likely than not, and that 

before something as visionary as a cooperative international order can be created, 
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 17

a stable structure of security affairs—and even a stable balance of power—must 

first be established.

In its preoccupation with handling such present-day dangers as global 

terrorism and WMD proliferation, the NSS 2010 tends to presume that 

today’s lack of deep rivalry and competition among the major powers can 

be taken for granted as an enduring characteristic. But is this a wise presumption? Today’s relative tranquility is a historical anomaly that may not 

be permanent. In the past, settings of amorphous pluralism among big 

powers have tended to give way to growing political conflict among them, 

followed by a drift toward tense multipolarity and culminated by a descent 

into confrontational bipolarity. Is this historical pattern destined to repeat 

itself? Will such major powers as the United States, Europe, Russia, China,

Japan, and India remain at peace, or will they succumb to the experiences 

of the past by becoming at loggerheads with each other?

Answering this question in forward-looking ways does not require 

accepting rigid theories of historical determinism. But it does require awareness of underlying geopolitical dynamics at work among the big powers now 

and in the future. It also requires acceptance of the proposition that preserving stability among the major powers may not be automatic. Instead, it could 

require hard work by the United States—and if major power rivalry starts 

taking hold, the United States will have to work even harder to contain it. 

Pursuing such a difficult agenda would require a U.S. global strategy 

anchored more heavily in concepts of geopolitical management than now. 

The NSS 2010 does not provide such concepts. Rather, it remains largely 

silent on a strategic task that, to one degree or another, could become an 

increasingly important U.S. preoccupation.

Geopolitical management of the future roles of Russia and China especially enters the strategic equation here because of their power, geographical 

locations astride Europe and Asia, and capacities for causing both good and

ill. Today’s reality is that China is rapidly emerging as a regional and global 

power, and Russia is trying to reassert itself in similar ways. Their future 

strategic agendas are unclear. However, if China emerges as a menace to the 
18 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

United States and its allies in Asia, and if Russian reemerges as a menace to 

Europe and a rival of the United States in the Middle East, both will bring

growing troubles to U.S. national security strategy. If these two major powers start acting in ways that require counterbalancing and restraining, it will 

be the United States that will need to perform this task. Perhaps the NSS 

2010 correctly judges that close cooperation with those two countries can 

predominate and that, apart from taking precautionary steps at the margins 

as a hedge against relations with them souring, future U.S. strategy need 

not think in classical geopolitical terms in dealing with them. But if NSS 

2010 errs on this score, it risks being wrong on something so basic that the 

core concept of creating a new international order is rendered far more difficult, and maybe invalid. Indeed, the underlying global security system 

could become a source of future challenges, not an engine for solving them. 

In such a more dangerous, less tractable world, U.S. national security strategy would need to be perhaps even fundamentally different from the vision 

put forth by NSS 2010.

Finally, the NSS 2010 has a gap that flows from one of its main 

strengths. In its discussion of a whole-of-government approach, it appropriately discusses the key roles that many different policy instruments must 

play in carrying out not only national security strategy, but also traditional 

foreign policy and diplomacy. Along the way, it addresses military and 

defense issues in ways that mainly articulate only basic principles, without 

discussing in any serious way the details of force posture, improvement 

plans, overseas presence, employment strategies, and allied military contributions. Nor does it discuss the military forces of adversary nations—indeed, 

its political treatment of adversaries is mostly confined to North Korea and 

Iran—or contingencies in which U.S. forces might be involved. Perhaps this 

absence of deeper treatment is not a weakness given the larger purposes and 

messages of the document, but previous national security strategy studies 

typically paid more attention to military affairs. This illuminates the importance of examining those five official studies on military and defense affairs 

also published in 2010.
CHAPTER TWO

Quadrennial Defense Review Report 

Written as a complement to the National Security Strategy of 2010 

(NSS 2010), the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report 

of 2010 is a 105-page document that addresses U.S. defense 

strategy, force planning, and resource priorities for the coming years including 

Future Years Defense Plan 2011–2015 and beyond. Claiming to be strategydriven and analytical, it advances two main objectives: rebalancing the U.S. 

Armed Forces to prevail in today’s wars while preparing to deal with future 

threats; and reforming Department of Defense (DOD) institutions and processes to better support urgent needs of the warfighter, buy new weapons 

affordably, and make efficient use of resources. It is mainly preoccupied with 

conventional forces and preparations; it delegates nuclear and missile defense 

forces to two subsequent DOD studies (addressed below).

In his memorandum introducing the QDR Report, Secretary of Defense 

Robert Gates proclaims that because it is a truly wartime document, for the 

first time, it places current conflicts, especially Afghanistan and Iraq, at the 

top of DOD priorities. But he also states that because of the simultaneous 

need to prepare for a wide range of security challenges on the horizon, the 

United States requires a broad portfolio of military capabilities with maximum versatility across the entire spectrum of potential conflict. To meet 

those threats to the U.S. military’s capacity to project power, deter aggression, and aid allies and partners, Secretary Gates calls for more focus and 

investments in a new air-sea battle concept, and long-range strike, space, 

and cyberspace assets, along with other conventional and strategic modernization programs. He also calls for fresh efforts to work closely with allies 

and partners and to better integrate DOD activities with civilian agencies 

and organizations. Secretary Gates puts forth the twin agenda of rebalanc19
20 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

ing and reform as key mechanisms for pursuing this agenda in ways that 

employ scarce resources effectively and field the necessary U.S. military 

forces today and tomorrow.

As Secretary Gates’s memo makes clear, the QDR Report, along with 

accompanying budget decisions, aspires to launch DOD on the path of major 

changes in strategic and military priorities. In particular, it aims at enhancing 

U.S. military capabilities for waging current conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, 

and elsewhere, while trimming some forces and scaling back expensive modernization programs for the distant future. Such cutbacks are partly motivated 

by an assessment of strategic requirements, but they also anticipate a future in 

which DOD budgets will not grow rapidly (if at all), stiff priorities must be 

met, and painful tradeoffs made. A controversial document, the QDR Report’s 

emphasis on enhancing current warfighting capabilities has gained widespread 

support in the United States. At the same time, its handling of the future U.S. 

force structure and modernization plans has attracted stinging criticisms. The 

result has been a mandate by Congress, supported by Secretary Gates, to 

instruct a team of outside experts to prepare an Alternative QDR Report that 

puts forth a different future agenda (discussed below). Past QDR Reports have 

always triggered debates, but this is the first time that a new QDR Report has 

provoked an officially sanctioned competitor.

To accomplish its purposes, the QDR Report contains the following 

sections, which are discussed in sequential order here:

•	 DOD strategy

•	 rebalancing the force

•	 guiding the force posture’s evolution

•	 taking care of DOD people

•	 strengthening relationships abroad and at home

•	 reforming how DOD does business.

Defense Strategy. Similar to the NSS 2010, the QDR Report argues that 

the United States faces a complex and uncertain international security 
QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW REPORT 21

landscape in which the pace of change is accelerating, thereby creating both 

challenges and opportunities. A key trend, it asserts, is that the distribution 

of global power is becoming more diffuse in ways that, while make the 

emerging international system hard to define, will leave the United States 

as the most powerful actor, but one increasingly obligated to work with allies 

and partners. As part of this trend, it continues, new powers are rising, 

nonstate actors are becoming more influential, and proliferation is threatening to spread not only weapons of mass destruction (WMD) but also other 

destructive technologies. In this setting, the QDR Report claims that the 

top DOD priority must be to prevail in current operations, especially 

Afghanistan and Iraq. At the same time, DOD must be mindful of broader 

trends that are shifting the operational landscape. Such trends, it states, 

include efforts by potential adversaries—states and nonstate actors alike—

to offset U.S. military predominance by shifting to such new methods as 

hybrid warfare, antiaccess capabilities, and, by some states, long-range and 

precision weapons intended to contest for control of the land, sea, air, space, 

and cyberspace domains. Moreover, it claims, failing states and growing 

radicalism mean that over the coming decades, conflicts are as likely to result 

from state weakness as from state strength. A major implication, it judges, 

is that U.S. military forces must remain capable of handling a wide spectrum 

of future conflicts and missions even as they attend to current conflicts.

To address these global dynamics in a manner that carries out the strategic guidance of the NSS 2010, the QDR Report states that DOD should 

pursue a defense strategy focused on four priority objectives:

•	 prevail in today’s wars

•	 prevent and deter conflict

•	 prepareto defeat adversaries and succeed in awiderange of contingencies

•	 preserve and enhance the all-volunteer force.

Prevailing in today’s wars, the QDR Report states, requires succeeding 

in Afghanistan and the border regions of Pakistan in ways that defeat al 
22 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

Qaeda, suppress the Taliban, and strengthen the Afghan government, army, 

and police force. Success in Afghanistan, it argues, requires not only the 

ongoing surge of U.S. military forces and partner commitments, but also 

rapidly increasing the number and quality of such key enablers as air transports and helicopters, unmanned aerial systems, and other combat support/

logistic support assets. In Iraq, the QDR Report envisions the continuing 

drawdown of U.S. military forces until total withdrawal is completed by late 

2011. Elsewhere, it states, the ongoing multitheater fight against al Qaeda 

and its affiliates will necessitate a U.S. military contribution focused on two 

basic forms: a highly capable network of special operations and intelligence 

capabilities, and an enduring effort to build the capacity of key partners 

around the world.

Preventing and deterring conflict, the QDR Report argues, should focus 

on existing and potential threats in ways that defend the United States, 

protect allies, foster regional security, and preserve access to the global commons. While this goal requires multiple instruments and all aspects of 

national power, it states, DOD can contribute by assisting allies and partners 

in their defense efforts. It can do so by providing a global defense posture 

of forward-stationed and deployable forces capable of prevailing across all 

domains, protecting critical U.S. infrastructure including cyberspace, and 

sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal at the lowest levels 

consistent with U.S. and allied interests. The task of credibly underwriting 

U.S. commitments while pursuing deterrence, it asserts, requires tailored 

approaches to deterrence that include an in-depth understanding of the 

capabilities, intentions, and decisionmaking of adversaries including states 

and terrorist networks. The United States, it reports, is strengthening its 

approach to deterrence by three steps. The first is enhancing DOD ability 

to attribute WMD, space, and cyberspace attacks to hold aggressors responsible and deny them success. The second is closely consulting allies on creating new tailored regional defense architectures that include conventional 

forces, nuclear forces, and missile defenses. The third is enhancing U.S. and 

allied resilience—that is, the capacity to recover quickly from attack.
QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW REPORT 23

Preparing to defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies, the QDR Report argues, requires that U.S. military forces must 

provide multiple employment options and capabilities now and in the future. 

Such options, it states, stretch from supporting a response to an attack or 

natural disaster at home to defeating al Qaeda and its allies and defeating 

aggression by adversary states. They also include securing or neutralizing 

WMD systems in a state that has lost control of them or thwarting a nonstate actor that is trying to acquire them, stabilizing failed states that face 

internal security threats, and preventing human suffering due to genocide 

or natural disasters abroad. It further states that in the years ahead, DOD 

must be prepared to prevail in operations that may occur in multiple theaters 

in overlapping time frames. This includes the capacity to wage war against 

two capable nation-state aggressors and to carry out other missions in unpredictable combinations. It notes that while recent operations have stressed 

the ground forces disproportionately, the future operational landscape could 

portend significant long-duration air and maritime operations for which 

U.S. military forces must be prepared.

Preserving and enhancing the all-volunteer force, the QDR Report 

states, mandate attaching higher priority to a goal that for too long has been 

underemphasized. The long-lasting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, it points 

out, have greatly stressed military personnel and their families with repeated 

deployments. Pursuing an improved situation, it claims, thus requires transitioning to sustainable rotational rates that protect the force’s long-term 

health, even though DOD must remain prepared for periods of significant 

crises and multiple operations that mandate higher deployment rates, briefer 

dwell times, and use of the Reserve Component. The QDR Report calls for 

stronger efforts to address declining retention levels for key personnel and 

such healthcare problems as increased levels of combat stress, mental health 

issues, and even suicides. In addition, it states, DOD must expand its Civilian Expeditionary Workforce and spend substantial money on resetting 

equipment and platforms lost through combat and the strain of today’s wars, 

although not necessarily on a one-for-one basis.
24 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

Rebalancing the Force. In the eyes of the QDR Report, rebalancing the 

force involves pursuing multiple steps aimed at remedying gaps in capabilities in the existing and future posture. It articulates two primary themes: 

U.S. forces would be better able to perform their missions if they had more 

and better key enabling capabilities at their disposal (for example, helicopters, unmanned aircraft systems [UAS], intelligence analysis and foreign 

language expertise, and tactical communication systems); and U.S. forces 

must be flexible and adaptable, so they can confront the full range of challenges that emerge from the changing international security environment.

By applying available resources wisely, the QDR Report aims at 

strengthening U.S. military capabilities appreciably in ways that reduce, but 

not necessarily eliminate, operational and strategic risks. Rebalancing the 

force, it states, requires investments in six critical mission areas:

•	 defend the United States and support civilian authorities at home

•	 succeed in counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations

•	 build the security capacity of partner states

•	 deter and defeat aggression in antiaccess environments

•	 prevent proliferation and counter WMD

•	 operate effectively in cyberspace.

The mission of defending the United States and supporting civilian 

authorities at home, the QDR Report states, especially requires measures to 

safeguard against terrorist strikes on the homeland. Accordingly, this mission requires investments in multiple areas:

•	 field faster, more flexible consequence management assets by increasing the responsiveness of the original chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive Consequence Management 

Response Force, replacing two other response forces with smaller 

units focused on command, control, communications assets, and 

using the National Guard to create 10 Homeland Response Forces

•	 enhance capabilitiesfor domain awareness by acquiring newtechnologies
QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW REPORT 25

•	 accelerate the development of standoff radiological detection capabilities by acquiring sensors that will permit better wide-area surveillance at home and abroad

•	 enhance domestic counter–improvised explosive devices (IED) capabilities by developing better tactics, techniques, and procedures.

The mission of succeeding in counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations, the QDR Report states, is not a niche area, but 

instead requires high-level competencies from all military Services and will 

remain relevant for the indefinite future. In particular, the report asserts, 

investments are needed in multiple capabilities that are in high demand and 

provide key enablers of tactical and operational success:

•	 increase the availability of rotary-wing assets in the form of more

cargo helicopters, naval support helicopters, and two more Army 

combat aviation brigades

•	 expand manned and unmanned aircraft systems for intelligence,

surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) in the form of such long-dwell 

assets as Predator and Reaper

•	 expand intelligence, analysis, and targeting capability in the form of

more trained manpower and critical support systems

•	 improve counter-IED capabilities, especially in the form of more and

better assets for airborne electronic warfare (EW) currently in high 

demand

•	 expand and modernize the AC–130 fleet in the form of modernizing

and enlarging the number of AC–130 gunships

•	 increase key enabling assets for special operations forces (SOF) in the

form of more gunships plus more organic combat support and combat 

service support assets

•	 increase counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism capacity

in the form of additional Army Stryker Brigades, naval riverine assets, 

and coastal patrol aircraft

•	 expand Civil Affairs capacity in the form of new Active-duty Civil

Affairs brigades and better integration of Civil Affairs activities with 
26 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

stability operations in Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Human 

Terrain Teams

•	 strengthen capabilities for strategic communications in the form of

closer collaboration among multiple agencies at all levels, including 

DOD–Department of State cooperation.

Building the security capacity of partner states, the QDR Report states, 

is a longstanding but increasingly important mission that is carried out not 

only by Foreign Military Sales and Foreign Military Financing and officer 

exchange and education programs; it is also accomplished by new-era security force assistance missions that can involve deployment of sizable U.S. 

military forces to individual countries to help train, equip, and prepare 

host-nation forces and defense ministries. Key initiatives of the QDR Report 

for this mission include:

•	 strengthen and institutionalize U.S. military capabilities for security

force assistance activities in the form of 500 more personnel assigned 

to trainer-to-trainer units of all four Services, more Air Force Regional 

Contingency Response Groups, and more Air Force light mobility 

and light attack aircraft for working with partner air forces

•	 enhance linguistic, regional, and cultural capacities in the form of

additional funds for expanded programs in all three areas

•	 strengthen and expand capabilities for training partner aviation forces

by doubling DOD capacity in this area, including more aircraft for 

the Air Force 6th Special Operations Squadron

•	 strengthen capacities for ministerial-level training in the form of

expanded programs for providing civilian and military training

•	 create mechanisms to facilitate rapid transfer of critical materiel by

reducing delays and bottlenecks

•	 strengthen capacities for training regional and international security

organizations, including the United Nations and international peacekeeping efforts, along with increased training and education of the 

forces of participating nations.
QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW REPORT 27

The mission of deterring and defeating aggression in antiaccess environments, the QDR Report states, requires paying close attention to new 

emerging threats. Gaining access to contested zones, it claims, is critical to 

the U.S. strategy of forward defense and power projection in multiple 

regions, including the Middle East and Asia. In the past, it argues, this 

capacity could often be taken for granted, but in tomorrow’s world, this no 

longer will be the case because potential adversaries are striving to acquire 

military capabilities that, unless countered, could deny access to U.S. forces, 

thereby permitting uncontested aggression by them. The QDR Report notes 

that North Korea and Iran are acquiring new ballistic missile systems that 

could target U.S. forces in ways threatening their sanctuary bases. In addition, it states, the Chinese modernization program is developing and fielding large numbers of medium-range ballistic and cruise missiles, new attack 

submarines, long-range air defense systems, electronic warfare assets, satellite attack assets, and cyber attack capabilities. A further menace, it notes, 

is that Russia is proliferating modern integrated air defenses, and even such 

nonstate actors as Hizballah are acquiring unmanned aerial vehicles and 

man-portable air defense systems. Nuclear proliferation, the QDR Report 

judges, would gravely enhance threats to U.S. forces, but increasingly strong 

conventional capabilities for antiaccess strategies pose significant challenges 

of their own. In particular, U.S. air and naval forces could be threatened, 

thereby making it harder to project large ground forces to contested areas.

To counter this antiaccess threat, the QDR Report advocates the following set of measures:

•	 develop a joint air-sea battle concept, now under study by the Air

Force and Navy, that would enable U.S. forces to work closely together 

in all domains—land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace—to defeat 

antiaccess and area-denial threats

•	 expand future long-range strike capabilities in the form of enhanced

assets for U.S. attack submarines, naval UAS systems, Air Force 

bombers, better surveillance, and other improvements to both penetrating platforms and standoff weapons
28 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

•	 exploit advantages in subsurface operations in the form of a new

unmanned underwater Navy vehicle

•	 assure access to space and use of space assets, including use of growing

international and commercial expertise, implementation of a 2008 

Space Protection Strategy that will reduce vulnerabilities of space systems, and fielding capabilities for rapid augmentation and reconstitution of space capabilities to enhance resilience of space architectures

•	 defeatenemy sensor and engagement systems in theform of increased

investments in capabilities for electronic attack

•	 enhance the presence and responsiveness of U.S. forces abroad by

examining options for deploying and sustaining selective forces in 

regions facing new challenges, such as home-porting of additional 

naval forces.

The mission of preventing proliferation and countering weapons of mass 

destruction, the QDR Report states, is a top national security priority that 

requires many Federal agencies, with DOD playing a critical role. Portraying WMD proliferation and use as a grave threat with global ramifications, 

the report points out that WMD systems may fall into the hands of not only 

hostile states, but also fragile states and ungoverned areas. To counter this 

trend, it argues, the United States must increase its efforts to detect, interdict, and contain the effects of these weapons. Deterring and defending 

against such threats, it states, can be enhanced through measures aimed at 

better understanding them, securing and reducing dangerous materials 

wherever possible, monitoring and tracking lethal agents, materials, and 

means of delivery, and, where relevant, defeating the agents themselves.

The QDR Report states that DOD will expand its efforts to counter 

WMD threats, strengthen interdiction operations, refocus intelligence 

requirements, strengthen international partnerships, support cooperative 

threat reduction efforts, and develop countermeasures, defenses, and mitigation strategies. Geographic containment of areas of concern, it continues, 

will be necessary to ensure that WMD and related materials do not fall into 

the hands of hostile actors and that effectively responding to WMD-armed 
QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW REPORT 29

threats will require an integrated, layered defense network in multiple 

regions, as well as the in United States. Such layered defenses are essential, 

it states, to prevent an attack before it occurs, respond to attack should 

prevention fail, and help deny state and nonstate adversaries the benefits 

they seek through threatened or actual use of WMD by raising the costs 

and risks of such an attack. Accordingly, the QDR Report reveals that DOD 

will undertake the following steps:

•	 establish a standing joint task force elimination headquarters to better plan, train, and execute WMD-elimination operations

•	 research countermeasures and defenses to nontraditional chemical

agents in order to create technologies for meeting and defeating these 

emerging threats

•	 enhance nuclear forensics to improve the ability to attribute nuclear

attacks to their source in ways that enhance deterrence

•	 secure vulnerable nuclear materials by promoting stringent nuclear

security practices for both civilian and military facilities across the globe

•	 expand the biological threat reduction program to countries outside

the former Soviet Union in order to create a global network for surveillance and response

•	 develop new verification technologies to support a robust arms control, nonproliferation, and counterproliferation agenda.

The mission of operating effectively in cyberspace, the QDR Report 

states, requires efforts by DOD to protect its vast information networks 

from cyber attacks from multiple sources by remaining vigilant and prepared 

to react nearly instantaneously. It reveals that DOD is taking several steps 

to strengthen its capabilities in cyberspace:

•	 develop a comprehensive approach to DOD operations in cyberspace

in the form of improved cyber defenses in-depth, resilient networks 

and surety of data, better planning, structures, and relationships, and 

new operational concepts such as dynamic network defense operations
30 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

•	 develop greater cyberspace expertise and awareness in the form of

more cyber experts and greater attention to cyber security

•	 centralize command of cyberspace operations by standing up U.S.

Cyber Command under U.S. Strategic Command

•	 enhance partnerships with other agencies and governments, including

the Department of Homeland Security and international partners.

Guiding the Force Posture’s Evolution. Notwithstanding its emphasis on 

current operations and capabilities, the QDR Report presents material on 

how the future DOD force posture should be guided, sized, and shaped. Its 

portrayal of trends for the main force components includes the following:

•	 U.S. ground forces will remain capable of full-spectrum operations

with continued focus on counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorist operations

•	 U.S. naval forces will remain capable of forward presence and power

projection operations, while being strengthened by missile defenses 

and other capabilities

•	 U.S. air forces will become more survivable as large numbers of fifthgeneration aircraft (for example, the Joint Strike Fighter F–35) are

added and will acquire greater range, flexibility, and versatility

•	 SOF capabilities will continue to increase

•	 across the board, U.S. forces will be improved by acquiring better

enabling systems that include ISR, communications networks, base 

infrastructure, and cyber defenses.

The QDR Report further states that—owing to the DOD assessment 

of future requirements, budget constraints, and the need to make tradeoffs—major cutbacks in procurement programs have been ordered. This 

step, it claims, reflects an effort to direct scarce resources away from lower 

priority programs so that more pressing needs can be met and shortfalls 

remedied. These cutbacks include ending production of the F–22 fighter, 

restructuring procurement of the DDG–1000 destroyer and the Army’s 

Future Combat Systems, deferring production of maritime prepositioning 
QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW REPORT 31

ships, stretching out procurement of a new class of aircraft carrier, and 

retirement of aging fourth-generation fighters (for example, F–16s). In addition, it states, DOD is proposing to conclude production of the C–17 

transport aircraft, delay the LCC command ship program, cancel the CG(X) 

cruiser, and terminate the Net Enabled Command and Control program. 

While acknowledging that these cutbacks will slow the previously planned 

modernization of U.S. forces, the QDR Report states that DOD will be 

initiating studies of new operational concepts and examining future capability needs in several areas. These include ISR, fighters and long-range aircraft, 

joint forcible entry, and information networks and communications.

In addition, the QDR Report puts forth a new force-sizing and forceshaping construct. This construct replaces being prepared for two major 

regional wars as the main template with a broader approach to carrying out 

multiple overlapping operations of different types. The QDR Report states 

that in addition to maintaining ongoing overseas engagement activities, this 

new construct is anchored in the following combination of scenarios and 

associated requirements:

•	 a major stabilization operation, deterring and defeating a highly

capable regional aggressor, and dealing with a catastrophic event in 

the United States

•	 deterring and defeating two regional aggressors while maintaining a

heightened alert posture by other U.S. forces

•	 a major stabilization operation, a long-duration deterrence operation

in a separate theater, a medium-sized counterinsurgency operation, 

and extended support to civil authorities in the United States.

The QDR Report suggests that while the first cluster of scenarios 

stresses the force posture’s ability to defeat a sophisticated adversary, the 

second stresses the posture’s combined arms capability, and the third stresses 

forces that perform counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism 

operations. It envisions that if major regional wars erupt while multiple 

stabilization and counterinsurgency operations are being carried out, forces 
32 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

can be shifted from the former to the latter. By using this combination of 

scenarios, the QDR continues, its new force-sizing construct is aimed at 

supporting the defense strategy’s four main goals while helping guide 

resource allocation decisions in the near and long term. It further states that 

as DOD transitions into a period of less intensive sustained operations, it 

will focus more heavily on preparing for a broader and deeper range of 

prevent-and-deter missions as part of a whole-of-government approach and 

in concert with allies and partners. Accordingly, it calls for the following 

force posture during the 2011–2015 period:

•	 Department of the Army: 73 combat brigades (45 Active and 28

Reserve Component) consisting of a mix of light, Stryker, and heavy 

Brigade Combat Teams, plus 21 combat aviation brigades, 15 Patriot 

battalions, and 7 Terminal High Altitude Area Defense batteries

•	 Department of the Navy: 10 to 11 carriers and 10 carrier air wings, 84

to 88 largesurface combatants (including 21 to 32 Aegis missile defense

combatants and Aegis ashore), 14 to 28 small surface combatants and

14 mine countermeasure ships, 29 to 31 amphibious warfare ships, 53

to 55 attack submarines, and 4 guided-missile submarines, 126 to 171

ISR and EW aircraft, 98 to 109 support ships, and 3 Marine Expeditionary Forces that include 4 divisions and 4 aircraft wings

•	 Department of the Air Force: 8 ISR wing-equivalents with 380 primary mission aircraft, 30 to 32 airlift and air-refueling wing-equivalents with 33 aircraft per wing, 10 to 11 theater strike wing-equivalents

with 72 aircraft per wing, 5 bomber wings totaling 96 bombers, 6 air

superiority wing-equivalents with 72 aircraft per wing, 3 command

and control wings, and 10 space and cyberspace wings

•	 SOF forces: Approximately 600 special operations teams, 3 Ranger

battalions, and 165 tilt-rotor and fixed-wing aircraft.

Compared to earlier plans, this posture calls for similar numbers of 

Army brigades, a similar number of Navy carriers and air wings (but somewhat fewer major combatants and support ships), similar numbers of Air 

Force bombers, fewer tactical fighter wings that are supplemented by new 
QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW REPORT 33

ISR wings, and enlarged SOF forces. The overall implication is that compared to now, the future U.S. military posture will be similar in size in many 

areas, but with somewhat smaller naval and air forces. The QDR Report 

judges that this posture, enhanced by quality improvements in capabilities, 

will be adequate to carry out national defense strategy and the new forcesizing construct while providing the necessary flexibility and versatility. But 

by confining itself to verbal reassurances of adequacy, it does not provide 

penetrating analysis of the reasons why this future posture will be able to 

handle the three sets of scenarios, or why the cutbacks in procurement of 

new platforms and weapons will not unduly retard modernization.

Taking Care of DOD People. Pointing out that years of war have imposed 

considerable strain on the all-volunteer force, the QDR Report articulates 

a multipronged program aimed at elevating the priority attached to handling 

military and civilian personnel. This includes:

•	 caring for wounded warriors

•	 managing deployment tempo

•	 recruiting and retention

•	 supporting families

•	 keeping faith with the Reserve Component

•	 developing future military leaders

•	 developing the total DOD workforce.

The QDR Report’s initiative for improving care of wounded warriors 

includes a set of measures aimed at enhancing funding and health benefits, 

establishing Centers of Excellence for treating traumatic injuries, creating 

a single Disability Evaluation System, improving information-sharing, and 

upgrading mental health care. The QDR Report’s treatment of managing 

the deployment tempo calls for a goal in which Active military personnel 

remain 2 years at home for each year abroad, while Reservists spend 5 years 

at home for each year abroad. Its treatment of recruiting and retention calls 

for policies aimed at meeting future objectives in both areas, coupled with 
34 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

attracting qualified people and providing more flexible ways for military 

personnel to transition between Active and Reserve Components. Policies 

for military family care call for increasing funding by 40 percent in this

area, improving DOD schools, phasing out unaccompanied tours in Korea, 

improving family and community support services, and improving compensation for recovery from catastrophic illnesses.

In addition to highlighting the importance of the Reserve Component 

posture—National Guard and Reserve forces—in national defense strategy, 

the QDR Report calls for an improved incentive structure to create easier access 

to high-demand capabilities, a force-generation model that provides sufficient 

strategic depth, and a comprehensive study on the future balance between 

Active and Reserve forces. The QDR Report calls for improvements regarding 

how the Services generate and sustain their cadres of commissioned and noncommissioned officers. It especially focuses on efforts to improve talents for 

stability operations, counterinsurgency, and building partner capacities through 

better foreign language, regional, and cultural skills. In addition, its emphasis 

on professional military education calls for adequate resources and skilled 

faculty at DOD schools. Finally, its policies toward the total defense workforce 

call for proper training of the new Civilian Expeditionary Workforce, common 

professional training and education for flag officers and civilian senior executives, and a reduction in numbers of private contractors.

Strengthening Relationships Abroad and at Home. Proclaiming that 

cooperative relationships at home and abroad are key to DOD ability to 

pursue its strategic goals, the QDR Report puts forth a three-part agenda 

in this arena:

•	 strengthen relationships with allies and like-minded partners

•	 develop the supporting DOD global defense posture

•	 build close and sustained relationships with U.S. Government agencies and other critical actors at home.

The QDR Report’s assessment of policies for improving relationships 

with allies and partners abroad begins by discussing the transatlantic part-
QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW REPORT 35

nership and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which it 

portrays as the cornerstone of security and stability in Europe and beyond. 

It calls upon DOD to work at ensuring a strong Alliance that provides a 

credible Article 5 security commitment, deters threats to Alliance security, 

has access to U.S. capabilities such as the phased adaptive approach to 

European missile defense against proliferation, and takes on such new 

threats as cyberspace attacks. It further urges NATO to develop its own 

comprehensive civil-military approach in such places as Afghanistan and to 

pursue greater cooperation with the European Union. It also calls for 

increased cooperation with Russia while respecting the sovereignty of Russia’s neighbors, and for improved partner relations with Eurasian countries.

In Asia, the QDR Report states that bilateral treaty alliances provide 

the foundation for U.S. security policies aimed at promoting stability and 

security. It judges that the emerging security landscape requires a more 

widely distributed and adaptive U.S. presence that relies upon and better 

leverages the capabilities of U.S. allies and partners there. In Northeast Asia, 

it states that DOD is working closely with key allies Japan and South Korea 

to implement agreed plans and shared visions in order to build a comprehensive alliance of bilateral, regional, and global scope; to realign force 

postures and restructure allied roles and responsibilities; and to strengthen 

collective deterrence and defense capabilities. In the Pacific Rim, the QDR 

Report states that DOD is deepening its partnership with Australia and 

that, in Southeast Asia, DOD is working closely with longstanding allies 

Thailand and the Philippines, deepening its partnership with Singapore, 

and pursuing closer ties with Indonesia. While endorsing a cooperative 

relationship with China, the QDR Report notes that Chinese military 

modernization and decisionmaking processes raise legitimate questions 

about its future conduct and intentions in Asia and beyond. Accordingly, it 

calls for a U.S. relationship with China that is multidimensional and undergirded by a process that enhances confidence and reduces mistrust in a 

manner that reflects national interests. In South Asia, the QDR Report calls 

for close cooperation with India as its military capabilities continue to grow 
36 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

in ways permitting it to be a net provider of security in the Indian Ocean 

and beyond. It also suggests the further development of a long-term strategic partnership with Pakistan in joint ways that help combat extremism and 

support its democracy and development.

In the Middle East, the QDR states that regional stability is critical to 

U.S. interests. Accordingly, it calls for continued close cooperation with 

Israel as well as growing security partnerships with Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, 

Saudi Arabia, Yemen, other Gulf states, and Iraq. These partnerships are 

aimed at countering emerging threats, including extremism, terrorism, 

nuclear proliferation, and maritime security challenges. It also proclaims 

that the United States will work with Middle East partners to develop a 

regional architecture that broadens and improves interoperable air and missile defenses. In Africa, the QDR Report calls for growing partnerships with 

key countries and international organizations in ways that help foster stability and prosperity, aid fragile and failed states, and cope with such security 

challenges as extremism, piracy, and violence. In the Western Hemisphere, 

the QDR Report states that the United States will work with Canada, 

Mexico, Brazil, and other partners to address such common problems as 

narcoterrorist organizations, illicit trafficking, and social unrest.

The QDR Report’s assessment of regional policies for maintaining alliances and building partnerships provides a framework for guiding how the 

global U.S. defense posture should evolve. Noting that large U.S. military 

forces are deployed abroad for peacetime security-building purposes, it calls 

for the overseas posture to adapt and evolve in ways that respond to and 

anticipate changes in the international security environment. Judging that the 

future will require continuing innovations to meet new challenges, it calls for 

U.S. military overseas involvements that help foster a new architecture of 

cooperation. In this way, openings for U.S. forces to work closely with allies 

and partners can be generated in ways that create efficiencies and synergies 

from collaborating forces. Accordingly, it calls for a regionally tailored 

approach to the U.S. military posture that blends forward-stationed and 

rotationally deployed forces, allows for power projection from the United 
QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW REPORT 37

States when needed, strengthens assured access to key bases and infrastructure, 

and provides a stabilizing influence that is welcomed by host nations.

In Europe, the QDR Report calls for a U.S. posture that protects 

national interests and fulfills NATO commitments, is flexible and deployable, and facilitates multilateral operations inside and outside Europe. 

Accordingly, it calls for the United States to continue deploying four 

ground brigades in Europe pending further review, to begin deployment 

of a revised U.S. missile defense architecture in Europe, and to enhance 

its forward-deployed naval presence to support improved missile defenses 

and increase multilateral cooperation on maritime security. In the Pacific, 

the QDR Report calls for an evolving and adaptive U.S. posture that 

continues to provide extended deterrence to Japan and Korea and preserves 

a strong combined U.S.–Republic of Korea defense posture on the peninsula. It also foresees pursuing the bilateral Realignment Roadmap with 

Japan in ways that retain adequate U.S. force there while transforming 

Guam into a hub for regional security activities, as well as otherwise promoting enhanced access, cooperative basing, and multilateral military 

cooperation on new challenges.

In the Greater Middle East and Africa, the QDR Report puts forth 

broad guidance to sizing and designing the future U.S. military involvement 

there. It calls upon DOD not only to handle the ongoing involvements in 

Afghanistan and Iraq, but also to focus on creating a regional strategic 

architecture that better serves U.S., allied, and partner interests in the 

medium and long terms. To this end, it calls for enhanced multilateral 

cooperation with allies and partners and for a reshaped U.S. defense posture 

that achieves reassurance and deterrence while remaining cognizant of 

regional sensitivities to a large, long-term U.S. military presence. In Africa, 

the QDR Report calls for a limited rotating U.S. military presence focused 

on partnership-building and access to facilities for launching multilateral 

contingency responses. In the Western Hemisphere, it judges, the United 

States does not need a robust forward military presence. Instead, it will 

retain a limited presence that helps foster cooperative multilateral ties and 
38 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

provides capabilities for handling such challenges as control of illicit trafficking, detection and interdiction of WMD, border and coastal security, 

and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

Reforming How DOD Does Business. The QDR Report argues that 

DOD must reform how it operates internally to provide more agile, innovative, and streamlined processes in five critical areas:

•	 reforming security assistance

•	 reforming how weapons are bought

•	 strengthening the industrial base

•	 reforming the U.S. export control system

•	 crafting a strategic approach to climate and energy.

The QDR Report argues that DOD handling of security assistance 

must be reformed in order to improve how a critical new mission is performed. Whereas during the Cold War, security assistance mainly focused 

on providing advanced weapons and related assets to close allies and friends, 

it argues that today it must address how to build defense sectors and pursue 

reforms in failing states and others requiring such help, many of which fall 

into the ambiguous gray zone between war and peace. Iraq and Afghanistan, it states, are examples of modern-day security assistance focused on 

enabling partners to respond to internal and external security challenges. 

In dealing with this mission, the QDR Report asserts, a whole-of-government approach that produces close interagency collaboration is required, 

but the DOD role is especially critical. Today’s DOD system, it states, is 

slow and cumbersome, and often results in approaches that start from 

scratch in each contingency or failure and produces policies limited in 

scope, duration, and resources. Progress, however, is being made. In addition to gaining approval for recent legislation to strengthen security assistance to Afghanistan and Pakistan, the QDR Report states, the 

administration has launched a comprehensive review of security sector 

assistance. Meanwhile, DOD is striving to increase its skilled manpower 
QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW REPORT 39

in this area, meet urgent warfighter needs, and establish a fund that would 

allow it to maintain an inventory of items commonly needed by partners.

The QDR Report emphasizes that pursuing reforms in how DOD 

acquires new weapons and other costly assets is a key goal. Today, it says, 

the DOD acquisition process is encumbered by a small set of expensive 

weapons programs with unrealistic requirements, cost and schedule overruns, and unacceptable performance. Four key problems arise:

•	 requirements for new systems are often set at the far end of technological boundaries

•	 the acquisition workforce has been allowed to atrophy, including in

critical skills

•	 the approach to defining requirements and developing capabilities

too often relies on overly optimistic cost estimates

•	 delivery of logistical support to field commanders suffers from

inefficiencies.

To help overcome these problems, the QDR Report states, the Weapon 

Systems Acquisition Reform Act was signed into law in 2009 with the goal of

limiting cost overruns before they spiral out of control, and of improving 

oversight of major weapon system programs. In addition, it reports, DOD is 

taking steps to develop a larger cadre of trained acquisition professionals. 

Beyond this, it states, DOD will strive to ensure that requirements for all new 

major weapons are subjected to careful analysis and to certify that new technologies are sufficiently mature before the final costly phase of engineering 

and manufacturing development is launched. Additional DOD reforms, it 

continues, include steps to improve cost analysis. They also include means to 

improve program execution by employing fixed-price development contracts, 

constraining the tendency to add requirements to programs, creating competitive prototypes early in the research, development, test, and evaluation 

cycle, certifying technology maturity through independent reviews, conducting realistic testing to identify problems as early as possible, demanding sound 

performance from contractors, and avoiding sacrifices to costs and schedules 
40 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

for promises of improved performance. Finally, the QDR Report calls for steps 

to institutionalize a rapid, agile acquisition capability for speeding delivery of 

new systems and weapons when they are needed and to launch an effort to 

control DOD’s rising costs for health care.

The QDR Report’s treatment of measures to strengthen the industrial 

base calls for market-based efforts to lessen reliance on a few big contractors 

by working with the entire spectrum of defense firms, purely commercial 

firms, and other technologically advanced firms and institutions. Its 

approach to reforming the U.S. export control system claims that today, this 

system is complicated by too many redundancies, tries to protect too much, 

and poses a risk to national security in ways that mandate fundamental 

reform. It calls for steps aimed at lessening redundancies, roadblocks, and 

constraints while improving cooperation, technology-sharing, and interoperability with allies and partners. An overall goal is to strengthen controls 

on new technologies that need protecting, to speed delivery of weapons and 

other systems that should be made available abroad, and to encourage greater 

collaboration between U.S. and foreign industries. Its approach to climate 

and energy calls for greater DOD attention to both arenas in ways that 

increase use of renewable energy supplies, reduce energy demand and greenhouse gas emissions, and make domestic facilities more efficient.

Strengths, Shortfalls, and Lingering Issues. By any measure, the QDR Report 

is a large and comprehensive document, much larger than previous QDR 

Reports issued over the past 15 years. Compared to those documents, it includes 

traditional material, but unlike them, it includes considerable material on new 

issues. Accordingly, it illuminates the extent to which the U.S. defense enterprise has become more complex and demanding in recent years. During the 

1990s, the end of the Cold War in Europe and victory in Operation Desert 

Storm enabled DOD to focus mainly on preparing its military forces for traditional major regional wars, such as against North Korea. Beginning in late 

2001, events compelled DOD not only to consider hypothetical regional wars, 

but also to launch a global war against terror and to invade both Afghanistan 

and Iraq. Simultaneously, DOD launched a major transformation agenda 
QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW REPORT 41

aimed at configuring its military forces with new information networks and 

other systems to wage the high-tech wars of the future.

Looking back from the standpoint of today, even that demanding 

agenda seems relatively straightforward and simple. As the QDR Report 

makes clear, DOD must not only handle traditional missions but also carry 

out demanding stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, build security 

partnerships with internally troubled states, work with other U.S. agencies, 

attend to new homeland security and cyber defense challenges, and improve 

U.S. military forces for the long term with investment budgets that present 

significant shortfalls in available resources. Whether the QDR Report 

adequately addresses all of these challenges is debated by some critics, but 

regardless of how it is appraised, it does successfully illuminate the very 

complex challenges and thorny issues facing DOD today and tomorrow.

The QDR Report is complementary to the NSS 2010 in ways intended 

to harmonize U.S. national security strategy and defense planning, and it 

aptly discusses many defense issues that are not addressed by the NSS 2010. 

Similar to the NSS 2010, it is best evaluated not by how it handles a plethora of details, but by whether it judges the strategic and military basics 

correctly. A mixed appraisal seems appropriate because the QDR Report 

has many strengths but, in the eyes of critics at least, some shortfalls as well.

A main strength of the QDR Report is that it puts forth an overall U.S. 

defense strategy with four organizing concepts of prevail, prevent, prepare, 

and preserve. As it makes clear, prevailing in today’s wars is top priority. 

Simultaneously, DOD must prevent and deter other conflicts and damaging 

trends, while preparing to defeat future adversaries and succeed in a wide 

range of operations and preserving the all-volunteer force. In addition, the 

QDR Report encapsulates DOD’s emerging activities in two action-oriented 

terms: rebalance and reform. Whereas rebalance refers to how the force 

structure is to be strengthened now and in the future, reform mainly refers 

to how DOD acquisition process and security assistance efforts are to be 

improved to overcome their sluggish performance. By mating its fourpronged defense strategy with its two-pronged approach to change, the 
42 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

QDR Report broadly illustrates the strategic agenda that DOD will be 

pursuing in the coming years.

The QDR Report devotes little discussion to how future defense budgets—which probably will not continue benefiting from major real 

growth—will unfold. But since its publication, Defense Secretary Robert 

Gates has made clear that stiff priorities will have to be set and some activities scaled back so that scarce funds can be saved and investment funds 

increased. As Secretary Gates pointed out, peacetime DOD budgets have 

grown by about 40 percent in real terms since 2001, but much of theincrease

has been consumed by rising costs for personnel and operations, thereby 

constraining growth of investment and procurement budgets. In 2009,

Secretary Gates slashed several major programs for acquiring new weapons, 

thereby saving about $350 billion over 10 years and bringing out-year procurement spending into alignment with budget realities. In 2010, he 

announced a plan to shift about 6 percent of DOD’s budget from low-priority programs to high-priority ones, as well as steps to close U.S. Joint 

Forces Command and other staffs while trimming senior civilian and 

military posts and civilian contractors.

Meanwhile, Secretary Gates asked Congress to fund 1 percent annual 

real increases to DOD budgets in the coming years. His actions have been 

controversial in some quarters, but they are designed to harness the DOD 

budget to support the QDR Report’s assessment of future defense strategy, 

rebalance, and reform. Secretary Gates’s call for DOD to find $100 billion 

in savings that could be reprogrammed was successful. It resulted in $70 

billion to be reinvested in the procurement accounts of all Services, and 

the additional savings to be spent on health care and other measures. As of 

early 2011, official forecasts were suggesting that the DOD budget would 

benefit from little real growth through 2011. Projected defense budget cuts 

of about $78 billion through 2015 evidently will require manpower reductions of 27,000 to the Army and 15,000 to 20,000 to the Marine Corps, 

plus trimming of some procurement programs. Larger spending cuts—for 

example, up to $400 billion in reductions over the next 10 years—will
QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW REPORT 43

require even deeper pairing of defense manpower, force structures, and 

improvement programs in ways that will mandate further reviews of U.S. 

military roles, missions, and responsibilities.

Another strength of the QDR Report is its handling of the rebalancing 

agenda by focusing on six key military missions that range from succeeding 

in current conflicts and helping partner states to strengthening U.S. forces 

for antiaccess operations, preventing WMD proliferation, and improving 

homeland security and cyberspace defenses. In addressing these six missions, 

the QDR Report puts forth 35 separate improvement programs and measures, all of which are intended to elevate U.S. military capabilities in their 

respective areas. The mission of succeeding in counterinsurgency, stability, 

and counterterrorism operations—a clear near-term priority—receives 

special attention, with nine improvement programs designed mainly to 

enhance ground force operations. The mission of developing better capabilities for operating in antiaccess environments—a longer term priority—

also is noteworthy because it contains six measures that are mainly focused 

on enhancing naval and air forces against future threats that could be posed 

by such well-armed adversaries as China. A clear implication is that additional funds should be spent in these 35 areas in ways that impinge upon

funds for other investments. Even so, the QDR Report seems correct in 

judging that if U.S. military forces improve in these six areas, they will be 

better prepared for challenges ahead.

Yet another strength is the QDR Report’s treatment of how to bolster 

relationships at home and abroad by working closely with the militaries of 

allies and partners in key regions, deploying missile defenses as part of new 

regional deterrence architectures, and making improvements to U.S. forces 

and operations overseas. In this arena, the QDR Report helps close a gap in 

the NSS 2010, which did not devote adequate attention to regional security 

priorities other than the Middle East. In doing so, however, the QDR Report 

only addresses military issues, not underlying political design concepts. A final 

strength of the QDR Report is its handling of reforms to how DOD does 

business. In particular, its focus on pursuing reforms to weapons acquisition 
44 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

addresses a longstanding problem that, over the years, has produced too many 

overly costly weapons well after they were needed. Whether the QDR Report’s 

reforms will be fully acted upon remains to be seen, but they are pointed in 

the right direction.

A key shortcoming of the QDR Report, as critics have alleged, is a 

lackluster handling of policies and plans for guiding the future evolution of 

U.S. military forces. The QDR Report takes a step in the right direction by 

replacing the old template of two regional wars with a new force-sizing 

construct of three different scenario clusters. These reflect shifting combinations of stabilization operations, deterrence and defeat of two regional 

aggressors, long-enduring deterrence operations, and catastrophic events in 

the United States. Indeed, future U.S. military forces would have impressive 

capabilities if they were sufficiently large, diverse, and versatile to meet 

requirements for all three clusters. But will this be the case?

The QDR Report fails to address, much less answer, this question; it 

provides clarity about how the future force posture will take shape, but offers 

no metrics or penetrating analysis of whether and how this posture will meet 

these clusters of requirements or of risks and insufficiencies that might arise. 

This issue is more than academic. The United States currently has the best 

military in the world, but recent years have shown that it is often stretched 

thin by deployment operations and requirements in multiple theaters. 

Whether it can handle two concurrent regional wars has long been debated, 

and the new force-sizing construct seems to elevate requirements, not diminish them. The problem is that, in naval and air forces, tomorrow’s posture 

will be smaller than today’s. Will quality improvements offset potential 

shortages in numbers? Perhaps so, but the QDR Report does not reveal why 

this will be the case.

Another shortfall is the QDR Report’s failure to discuss the importance 

of joint operations and how they can be improved. For the past decade and 

longer, strengthening the capacity for joint operations that involve land, sea, 

and air components has been a main goal of DOD and the military Services. 

While progress has been made, perfection is far from achieved. Instead of 
QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW REPORT 45

highlighting the need for further progress, the QDR Report discusses the 

ground, naval, and air forces separately, largely in isolation from each other 

rather than in a joint context. The one exception is its endorsement of a new 

air-sea battle concept for dealing with antiaccess threats, but currently this 

is an idea under study, not a tangible program for acquiring new capabilities. 

Otherwise, the QDR Report offers assurances that all Services will be 

strengthened, but at times, its interpretation suggests a future bifurcated 

posture. Thus, ground forces will handle gritty conflicts in the Middle East 

while naval and air forces mainly focus on deterring powerful countries such 

as China. Perhaps a bifurcated posture reflects a natural evolutionary trend 

that responds to current events, but is it safe to assume that future conflicts 

will not require a close fusion of all three components? The QDR Report is 

silent on this question, but it needs an answer because future plausible wars 

with such countries as North Korea, Iran, and Russia could be hard to win 

in absence of one component or another.

A final shortfall comes from how the QDR Report handles future force 

modernization for the long haul. For most of the past decade, a main DOD 

clarion call for improving force capabilities has been transformation—the 

20-year process by which U.S. military forces are not only to be modernized 

with new weapons but also to acquire new information networks, munitions, 

doctrines, practices, and other assets in order to be prepared for a future in 

which technologies and operational concepts will be different from the past. 

The QDR Report does not even mention the word transformation, much 

less describe its future course. Nor does it offer any replacement term or 

concept for guiding DOD in the years ahead. Nor does it address a more 

fundamental issue: the degree to which future U.S. forces are expected to 

retain their current qualitative superiority over adversary forces, which 

themselves will be improving. In principle, a U.S. defense strategy that relies 

on somewhat smaller forces to perform a broad spectrum of missions and 

to wage war against improved adversary forces would seem to place a high 

premium on preserving or enhancing qualitative superiority. The QDR 

Report seemingly shares this approach in its discussion of strategy principles. 
46 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

Yet it does not reveal in any depth how this approach is being applied in 

concrete terms and whether it can be expected to succeed.

Beyond this, the QDR Report neglects to provide guidance on how 

specific modernization plans and programs—key engines for replacing aging 

inventories and building better capabilities—are to unfold. What it offers 

instead is a discussion of the many new weapons that have been cancelled 

or scaled back, some because they seemed gold-plated or low priority, but 

others because they could not be afforded in an era of overloaded procurement budgets. A main impact is that the Army, Navy, and Air Force have 

been stripped of several new weapons that they regarded as cornerstones of 

their modernization—for example, new Army combat vehicles, Navy cruisers and destroyers, and Air Force F–22 fighters and cargo planes. In some 

cases, replacement weapons and systems are being pursued. For example, 

the Air Force will benefit from large numbers of F–35 fighters, unmanned

aerial system (UAS) aircraft, and deep-strike assets that will help offset loss 

of more F–22 fighters. But although the QDR Report proclaims that the 

Army and Navy will remain capable of carrying out their missions, it leaves 

the fate of their modernization plans unclear. Indeed, the QDR Report does 

not even provide the standard feature of most past QDR Reports and Secretary of Defense posture statements: a comprehensive list of major modernization plans that will be pursued by all four Services. As a result, the 

QDR Report fails to provide assurance, much less analysis, that when 

remaining, still-funded modernization programs are added up, they will 

produce an adequately equipped U.S. military posture 10 years from now. 

In this arena, the QDR Report seems so preoccupied with handling nearterm imperatives that it largely produces an analytical void on where the 

distant future should be headed.
CHAPTER THREE

The QDR in Perspective: Meeting 

America’s National Security Needs in 

the 21st Century 

Dissatisfaction with the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 

Report’s alleged near-term, “business as usual” focus as well as 

other perceived shortcomings led Congress, supported by 

Defense Secretary Robert Gates, to mandate preparation of an alternative 

QDR Report by a panel of 20 independent civilian and military experts led 

by Stephen Hadley and William Perry. Written to provide a broader, longer 

term perspective, the resulting 132-page study issued in late July 2010 is 

more alarmist than the QDR Report. Warning of an impending “train 

wreck” ahead for the Department of Defense (DOD), it puts forth numerous recommendations aimed at correcting the problems facing DOD and 

the U.S. Government in pursuing national security strategy and defense 

planning. Some of its recommendations accelerate changes already endorsed 

by the QDR Report, but others pursue new directions. The result is a useful 

complement to the QDR Report, but not a wholesale replacement of it. The 

two studies are best appraised in the context of each other in order to identify similarities and differences.

In crafting a broad strategic approach, The QDR in Perspective: Meeting 

America’s National Security Needs in the 21st Century (QDRP Report) identifies four enduring national interests that will continue to animate U.S. 

defense policy: homeland defense; assured access to the sea, airspace, and 

cyberspace commons; preservation of a favorable balance of power across 

Eurasia that prevents authoritarian domination of that region; and provision 

for the global common good through humanitarian aid, developmental 

47
48 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

assistance, and disaster relief. It also identifies the five grave threats likely 

to arise to those interests over the next generation:

•	 radical Islamic extremism and terrorism

•	 competition from rising global powers in Asia

•	 continuing strugglefor power in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East

•	 accelerating global competition for resources

•	 persistent problems from failed and failing states.

This combination of U.S. interests and dangerous threats leads the 

QDRP Report to conclude that there will be an increased demand on U.S. 

“hard power” to preserve regional balances in ways mandating that security 

concerns will remain quite important. In addition, it states that the various 

tools of “soft power”—for example, diplomacy, trade, and communications—will be increasingly important. The need to apply both hard power 

and soft power leads the QDRP Report to conclude that the United States 

must retain its global leadership role while improving its own assets and 

working to strengthen allies, partners, and international institutions that 

can contribute to security and peace.

The result is a framework that basically endorses the QDR Report’s four 

strategy concepts and six high priority mission areas, but urges a more galvanized and energetic set of activities to increase DOD and U.S. Government capabilities for the long haul. In surveying DOD and the government, 

the QDRP Report warns of an impending train wreck in military personnel, 

acquisitions, and force structure coming from aging equipment inventories, 

declining size of the Navy, escalating personnel entitlements, and growing 

stress on U.S. military forces. To address these and other problems, the 

QDRP Report advances an integrated set of key recommendations:

•	 build an alternative force structure with emphasis on increasing the

size of the Navy

•	 modernize the equipment inventories of all Services
THE QDR IN PERSPECTIVE 49

•	 increase DOD capability to contribute to homeland defense and

handle such asymmetric threats as cyber attack

•	 improve DOD personnel policies in ways that strengthen the allvolunteer force

•	 vigorously reform the DOD acquisition process

•	 foster whole-of-government and comprehensive approaches and better civilian capacity in order to develop better soft power for national 

security challenges

•	 create a new, comprehensive strategic planning process for national

security that provides better management, more holistic planning, 

and improved crisis response.

Building an Alternative, Modernized Force Structure. Focused on ensuring that the U.S. military posture is adequately large and configured to 

handle threats and perform missions 10 or more years from now, the QDRP 

Report is sharply critical of the QDR Report’s force-sizing construct. The 

latter allegedly lacks clarity and analytical insight on the relationship 

between future requirements and force capabilities. In the absence of an 

adequate force-sizing construct, the QDRP Report calls for a return to the 

baseline force structure adopted by the Bottom-Up Review of 1993, which 

was designed to fight two concurrent regional wars. It accepts that U.S. 

ground forces will remain largely focused on Middle East operations for the

foreseeable future, but it wants to ensure that naval and air forces are adequate for future missions in other theaters.

The QDRP Report does not propose major increases to the Army and

Air Force postures, but it doesendorseexpansion of the Navy from 288–322

ships to 346 ships. A key goal, it states, is to increase the U.S. military force

structure in the Asia-Pacific region in ways largely anchored in a maritime

strategy. Worried about China’s rise and a decline of U.S. influence that 

could undermine existing treaty obligations, it emphasizes forward naval 

power there in ways that seemingly tilt away from the QDR Report’s partial 

shift to a standoff strategy focused on long-range strike assets. It supports 
50 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

the emerging DOD attempt to develop a new air-sea battle concept, which 

seems especially relevant to the Asia-Pacific region. The QDRP Report also

calls for parallel increases in force structure in ways that counter antiaccess 

and area-denial challenges, strengthen homeland and cyberspace defense, 

and enhance assets for postconflict stabilization missions.

The QDRP Report is particularly intent on urging a faster, more ambitious pace for recapitalizing and modernizing the U.S. military’s aging 

inventories of major weapons and other equipment. Background information 

here is essential to understanding the differing approaches of the QDR 

Report and QDRP Report in this critical arena. The governing reality is 

that many U.S. military weapons for waging major combat operations were 

procured during the 1980s and 1990s. The Services began developing new

weapons to replace them some years ago, but owing to the focus on Iraq and 

Afghanistan and other constraints, they progressed slowly through the

research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) cycle during 2000–

2009. As the new decade dawned, the Services had planned to use growing

acquisition budgets after 2010 to hasten the development of new tanks, 

ships, and fighter aircraft, and then to procure them in large numbers over 

the following years.

Recognizing that these new weapons would cost more than envisioned 

procurement budgets allowed and doubting the need for some of them, 

Secretary Gates in 2009 announced his decision to cancel or scale back many 

of these programs. The new Air Force F–35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) fighter

survived the chopping block, but the F–22 fell victim as did much of the

Army’s Future Combat System program and the Navy’s plans to acquire

new combat ships. Whereas the QDR Report ratified this choice, the QDRP 

Report questions its wisdom because, in a few years, it allegedly would leave 

the Services with too many aging weapons that ultimately will be unable to 

perform new missions and counter new threats.

Accordingly, the QDRP Report calls for the spigots of modernization

to be reopened over the coming decade. It states that the U.S. military 

should be allowed to acquire a new generation of armored vehicles, warships, 
THE QDR IN PERSPECTIVE 51

fighter aircraft, sensors, munitions, and other weapons to refresh aging 

inventories, maintain an adequately large posture, and preserve the qualitative supremacy of U.S. forces over adversaries. In addition, it states, modernization would add necessary new capabilities in such areas as defeating 

antiaccess and area-denial threats, improving deep-strike assets, strengthening forward presence and power projection, and offsetting adversary acquisition of modern air defenses and precision-strike munitions. In this arena, 

the QDRP Report is pointing to a significantly bigger and faster modernization than envisioned by the QDR Report. It judges that this robust modernization program cannot be fully funded by projected DOD investment 

budgets or even with the reprioritized RDT&E and procurement funds 

being sought by Secretary Gates. Accordingly, it calls for significant, enduring increases to DOD investment spending that would elevate current 

procurement budgets well above today’s level of $120 billion, and keep them 

there for the next decade and beyond. The QDRP Report does not say 

whether this extra spending is to come from elsewhere in the DOD budget 

or from additional congressional appropriations, but it does call for using 

technology to drive down the costs of new weapons so that both adequate 

quantity and quality can be afforded.

Strengthening Homeland Defense and Cyberspace Defense. In both of these 

arenas, the QDRP Report offers judgments similar to those of the QDR 

Report, but expresses them in more graphic ways. The QDRP Report 

expresses concern that during a period of ongoing contingency operations 

abroad, the U.S. military will lack the assets to perform an expansive homeland defense mission on short notice. It worries about a natural disaster, but 

a main concern is the prospect of a weapon of mass destruction (WMD)

detonation on U.S. soil that could cause immense damage. In such a situation, it judges, DOD would transition from supporting the Department of 

Homeland Security to taking charge. DOD, it states, needs proper legal 

authorities to carry out this role, and it should take steps to ensure that a 

portion of the National Guard can be quickly mobilized to contribute. In 

addressing cyberspace, the QDRP Report judges that cyber threats are 
52 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

increasing in ways that menace DOD information networks as well as 

national infrastructure. It calls for DOD to be able to defend its networks 

at home and abroad from attack. However, it also states that DOD should 

possess the capacity to shut down attacks instantaneously at the point of 

origin as part of a larger government effort to identify the types of cyber 

attacks that should be treated diplomatically as acts of war and to eliminate 

them. The QDRP Report calls for major increases in the resources committed to cyberspace security. Similar to the QDR Report, it applauds creation 

of U.S. Cyber Command, but it notes that a larger cadre of trained cyberspace professionals will be needed.

Strengthening the All-Volunteer Force. In this arena, the QDRP Report 

puts forth judgments similar to those of the QDR Report, but offers a 

broader, more penetrating set of improvement measures. The QDRP Report 

proclaims that recent and dramatic growth in the cost of the all-volunteer 

force cannot be sustained for the long term. Failure to address costs, it states, 

likely will result in a reduction of the force structure, fewer benefits, or less 

qualified personnel. Accordingly, it recommends major changes to the

military personnel system. These include greater differences in assignment 

and compensation between one or two terms of service and a career, 

increased cash-in-hand for those serving less than an entire career, and use 

of bonuses and credits to reward critical specialties and outstanding performance. They also include a continuum-of-service model that allows Servicemembers to move fluidly between the Active and Reserve Components

and among the military, private sector, civil service, and other employment. 

Beyond this, the QDRP Report states that current limitations on length of 

service provide insufficient time for personnel to gain the education, training, and experience needed for 21st-century warfare. It recommends lengthening military career opportunities to 40 years, broadening educational 

opportunities, and making military health care more affordable. It calls for 

establishing a new National Commission on Military Personnel to develop

its recommendations and build support for them.
THE QDR IN PERSPECTIVE 53

The QDRP Report also calls for improvements to professional military 

education (PME). It calls for offering full college scholarships on a competitive basis in exchange for 5 years of Active service as an officer. It calls

for Service academies and Reserve Officers’ Training Corps programs to 

offer better education on military affairs and related social sciences. It calls 

for programs that offer early career officers the opportunity to attend graduate schools to study military affairs or foreign languages and cultures and 

that mandate a graduate degree for all officers promoted to the rank of 

lieutenant colonel/commander or above. Calling for efforts to improve the 

quality of intermediate and senior Service schools, it states that service on a 

PME teaching faculty should be a requirement for promotion to flag rank,

and it continues that PME educational curricula need to be given adequate

depth and rigor to better motivate attendees. To upgrade the influence of 

PME in DOD, it calls for creating a Pentagon Chief Learning Officer at

the Assistant Secretary level and for assigning a senior flag officer to be

chancellor for all PME schools.

Reforming the DOD Acquisition Process. The QDRP Report looks favorably upon the QDR Report’s treatment of the need to reform the DOD 

acquisition process for developing and buying new weapons and other systems. Nonetheless, it judges that the QDR Report did not go far enough in 

identifying root causes or proposing effective reforms. Similar to the QDR 

Report, the QDRP Report laments the well documented failures of the 

acquisition process, including lengthy delays in producing new weapons, 

failure to respond to urgent needs of combatant commanders, inflated 

requirements for new technology, lack of competition, and cost overruns. 

The fundamental reason for this poor performance, it states, is fragmentation 

of authority and responsibility for managing acquisition efforts. Such fragmentation, it argues, exists at all levels of the acquisition process, from identifying needs and defining alternative solutions to choosing and resourcing 

acquisition programs and delivering them on schedule at acceptable cost. 

This problem, it states, begins from the moment that a new weapon is 

approved by the Joint Requirements Oversight Committee. It becomes 
54 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

therefore a program of record that is treated as nearly immortal regardless of 

subsequent delays and cost overruns. Performance, it states, is rarely traded 

off, and only in the most egregious cases are flawed programs cancelled; too 

often, success is achieved only with the personal intervention of the Office 

of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and that of other senior DOD leaders.

To solve these problems, the QDRP Report urges a strong effort to vest 

authority and responsibility on individuals in positions of line management 

so that better program management is brought to bear on all major projects. 

With proper managerial authority and responsibility, it judges, relevant 

capabilities for current operational needs (forexample, needs in Afghanistan)

can be delivered within weeks or months, and major new weapons systems 

can be fielded within 5 to 7 years, not the 10 to 15 years often taken now.

Part of the reason for long delays, it claims, is that development projects (for 

instance, the F–22) typically try to produce major leaps in technology and

performance in a single step.

A better model, it judges, is a development process that provides a serviceable weapon within 5 to 7 years—a good time frame for judging achievable

technology—and then makes incremental improvements as subsequent 

models are produced. A good exampleis the F–16 program, which produced

a good fighter in a few years and then subsequently improved it with better 

capabilities as new models were produced over 20 to 30 years. Recognizing 

that some programs nonetheless will face challenges, the QDRP Report 

states, tradeoffs in schedule, cost, or performance may have to be made. It 

reasons that while often the best model will be adhering to original costs and 

schedules and accepting less performance, tradeoffs in performance can be 

judged credibly only by force providers—another good reason for vesting 

authority and responsibility for program management in the military Services 

and defense agencies with proper OSD oversight. In addition, the QDRP 

Report urges greater competition among dual sources before final decisions 

to develop and procure new weapons are made—a strategy that was employed 

in a host of successful weapons development programs. Dual-source competition, it states, will require DOD to reverse its current reliance on a small 
THE QDR IN PERSPECTIVE 55

number of large defense industries by returning to a model of more defense 

contractors and greater competition among them.

Accordingly, the QDRP Report puts forth a set of recommendations:

•	 The Secretary of Defense should establish lead acquisition roles in a

manner that assigns responsibility for identifying gaps in capabilities 

and executable solutions to force providers (for example, combatant 

commanders, Services, and defense agencies), uses OSD and Joint 

Staff to make decisions about choosing and resourcing solutions, and 

employs the lead Service/agency to deliver new weapons on schedule 

and within cost estimates.

•	 For each program, an unbroken chain of command should be established within the force provider community, one that runs from 

senior OSD authorities to the relevant Service secretary/defense 

agency, then to the Program Executive Officer, program manager, 

and defense contractor.

•	 When urgent needs arise, adjustments should be made in the formal

process to deliver effective products within a period of weeks or 

months, rather than years.

•	 OSD should return to dual-source competition rather than singlesource contracting.

Fostering Improved Whole-of-government Activities, Comprehensive 

Approaches, and Civilian Capacities. Many future national security challenges,

the QDRP Report states, will require an adroit blending of hard power and 

soft power. For example, the ongoing operation in Afghanistan and efforts

to help failing states necessitate a mix of military forces to suppress violence 

and build host-nation security forces, coupled with civilian assets to promote 

good governance and economic development. To address this need in ways 

similar to the QDR Report, the QDRP Report calls for better capacities to 

pursue whole-of-government approaches and comprehensive approaches. It 

defines whole of government as efforts to merge multiple departments and 

agencies into a coherent enterprise and comprehensive approaches as efforts to 

coordinate U.S. activities with host nations, allies and partner nations, and 
56 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

international organizations. In addition to pursuing progress in both areas, 

the QDRP Report calls for creating greater civilian capacities for carrying 

out future political-military operations in key regions.

Arguing that the U.S. Government does not currently do a good job

of handling whole-of-government and comprehensive approaches, the 

QDRP Report calls for measures aimed at fostering improved interagency 

planning and coordination among DOD, State Department, Intelligence 

Community, and other agencies. It also calls for a rebalancing of military 

and civilian capabilities in ways aimed at lessening demands on the U.S. 

military in stability and reconstruction missions by increasing the cadre of 

civilians in DOD, State Department, and other agencies that are trained 

for deployment missions. In addition, it calls for better management of 

contractors and reforms to expand the scope and flexibility of U.S. security 

assistance policies. Such goals lead the QDRP Report to put forth the following recommendations:

•	 Congress should pursue several legislative steps aimed at reforming

the national security effort, such as restructuring Titles 10, 22, 32, 

and 50 in order to enhance interagency cooperation while clarifying

roles and responsibilities for departments and agencies, strengthening 

educational programs, and creating interagency teams that plan and 

exercise for future deployments.

•	 The executive branch should establish a consolidated budget line for

national security that, at a minimum, includes DOD, State, U.S. 

Agency for International Development (USAID), and theIntelligence

Community; the Office of Management and Budget should develop

a mechanism to track implementation of whole-of-government and 

comprehensive approaches.

•	 Congress and the President should establish a National Commission

on Building the Civil Force in ways aimed at increasing U.S. civilian 

capacities in multiple departments and agencies.

•	 DOD, State, and other agencies should strengthen capacities for pursuing overseas missions and comprehensive approaches.
THE QDR IN PERSPECTIVE 57

•	 The U.S. Government should aspire to reform international security

and assistance efforts in ways aimed at strengthening comprehensive 

approach capacities of allies and partners.

Creating a New Strategic Planning Process for National Security. The 

QDRP Report concludes with a section that is critical of the QDR Report. 

Specifically, the QDR Report demonstrates an alleged lack of strategic guidance for the next 20 years, its domination by staffs that handle narrow program and budget issues in parochial ways, its failure to put forth a better 

DOD force structure and modernization plan for the long term, and its lack 

of vision and innovation. Such problems lead the QDRP Report to conclude 

that in coming years, the entire QDR process should be scrapped because, 

presumably, it is beyond salvation. The QDRP Report calls upon DOD to 

rely on its normal Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System 

(PPBES) to perform functions now handled by the QDR Report. To help 

foster new and better strategic planning across the government and the interagency community, the QDRP Report recommends the following steps:

•	 Congress and the executive branch should establish an Independent

Strategic Review Panel of outside experts that would convene every 

4 years, at the time a new administration is inaugurated, to assess the 

international environment and recommend changes to existing 

national security strategy.

•	 Once this panel has issued its findings, the National Security Council staff would employ them to craft a “grand strategy” that would be 

formalized as the new National Security Strategy reflecting the President’s views and priorities.

•	 This new strategy would drive subsequent strategic reviews by key

executive branch departments, including DOD, State/USAID,

Homeland Security, and Intelligence Community, all of which would 

be animated by the goals of supporting the new National Security 

Strategy, integrating departmental reviews with it, and identifying 

mission critical elements.
58 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

•	 The National Security Advisor will be responsible for guiding and

coordinating subsequent strategy implementation by participating 

departments and agencies.

Strengths, Shortfalls, and Lingering Issues. The QDRP Report effort was 

launched because the QDR Report left critics dissatisfied with its strategic 

reasoning and force enhancement proposals. When it was published, the 

QDRP Report echoed these criticisms, but careful appraisal of its content 

suggests that is best seen as a complement to the QDR Report rather than 

a competitor or a replacement for it. Both documents have important 

strengths, but in differing ways. Whereas the QDR Report does a good job 

of focusing attention on enhancing DOD capabilities for current and nearterm operations, the QDRP Report does a good job of addressing long-term 

goals and priorities. Both perspectives are valuable. Together they crystallize 

a critical issue: How much emphasis should be placed on preparedness for 

near-term operations versus different long-term priorities, and how should 

a proper balance be struck between them? The two studies answer this question in different ways, but a fully satisfactory judgment can be formed only 

by referencing both studies, rather than one in absence of the other. For this 

reason, the two studies feed off each other in ways that are constructively 

interactive, not mutually exclusive.

Notwithstanding their differences, the two documents are similar in how 

they address strategic affairs. Both are global in scope, focus heavily on the 

Middle East and Asia, and warn of troubles and threats ahead such as terrorism, WMD proliferation, rival adversaries, and potential conflicts. Although

the QDRP Report talks in more overt geopolitical terms than the more muted 

QDR Report, they are similar in the ways they endorse national security 

strategies, goals, and missions; handleIraq and Afghanistan; and treat foreign

countries (allies, partners, neutral big powers, and adversaries). In handling 

these strategic affairs, the QDRP Report is more concerned with future management challenges facing DOD and the U.S. Government, and more vocal 

about calls for reforms, but the QDR Report acknowledges these challenges 

and advocates its own case for reforms and rebalancing. Both studies agree 
THE QDR IN PERSPECTIVE 59

that in future years, DOD will need to show greater skill at applying its 

resources because defense budgets will no longer be growing rapidly.

In addressing specific issues, many similarities abound. Both studies 

call for improvements in U.S. military forces and the all-volunteer force, 

better homeland security and cyberspace defense, stronger whole-of-government and comprehensive approaches, better interagency coordination, and 

close working relationships with partners abroad. They both call for 

enhanced civilian capacities for future operations requiring them, as well as 

for close civilian-military coordination and cooperation in the field. Both 

call for reforms to DOD’s troubled, slow, and expensive acquisition process 

to do a better job of producing new weapons and other systems in ways that 

are faster, cheaper, and more effective. The QDRP Report does a better job 

of probing root causes for difficulties facing the acquisition process as well 

as basic management reforms needed to rectify matters, but both studies are 

advocating ways to achieve the same positive results. Conversely, the QDR 

Report does a better job of discussing reforms to security assistance, but 

again, both studies are pushing in the same strategic directions. Because 

each study often provides a detailed treatment of issues not addressed heavily by the other, together the two studies do well at covering the waterfront 

even though both suffer from the drawback of not addressing in enough 

depth DOD/government future budgets and spending patterns.

The QDRP Report is critical of the QDR Report for not proposing a 

better force-sizing construct and for not identifying a better U.S. military 

posture for the long haul. But the QDRP Report proposes no force-sizing 

construct of its own—and in reasoning that the 1993-approved posture 

makes sense for the future, it quarrels with the QDR Report only by proposing an enlargement of the Navy beyond approved levels. More naval combatants may make sense because of emerging requirements in Asia, but

otherwise, the QDRP Report proposes future ground and air forces that 

differ little from the QDR Report. The QDRP Report differs appreciably 

with the QDR Report in its call for a faster, more ambitious force modernization of U.S. ground, naval, and air forces. This recommendation has 
60 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

strategic logic on its side, but in order to carry it out, larger acquisition 

budgets are needed. The QDR Report’s allegedly lackluster treatment of 

modernization priorities derives partly from awareness that future acquisition budgets likely will not be large enough to fund all of the many desirable 

weapons and other programs. The QDRP Report opens the door to additional modernization, but because it does not identify where the necessary 

funds are to come from, it either risks breaking the bank or fails to be clear 

about where sacrifices must be made elsewhere.

Where does sound policy for modernization lie? Perhaps somewhere 

between these two perspectives, but identifying a proper path ahead requires 

a penetrating treatment of future modernization programs and budgets in 

ways that neither document provides. Because future defense budgets will 

not be growing in major real terms, much depends upon whether they can 

be squeezed in ways that channel more funds into procurement and modernization. Part of today’s budgetary challenge stems from a multiyear trend 

that has seen expenses for personnel, peacetime operations, and health care 

soar. The result has been slower growth in investment spending than otherwise would have been the case. In mid-2010, Secretary Gates announced 

a gradual effort to shift about 6 percent of DOD spending from lower priority measures to higher priority ones, with investment accounts to be a main 

beneficiary. If this effort succeeds, it could bolster procurement budgets 

enough to permit faster modernization. But much also depends upon 

whether DOD can reform its acquisition process to speed RDT&E programs and to buy new weapons at affordable costs. On this critical matter, 

the QDRP Report and QDR Report agree.

The outcome of their mutual efforts to reform the acquisition process 

is yet to be seen, and likely will be a function of how multiple RDT&E and 

procurement programs are handled by each Service component. Modernization of U.S. air forces seems best poised to operate at a steady rate that 

provides such new fighters as the F–35 JSF, F/A–18 A/B, and unmanned

aerial systems. Modernization of ground forces is less certain. Cancellation

of the Army’s Future Combat Systems program for high-tech lightweight
THE QDR IN PERSPECTIVE 61

ground vehicles has led the Army to pursue a redesigned Ground Combat

Vehicle program that is less technologically ambitious and less risky. If the 

Army opts for improvements to such existing vehicles as the Abrams tank,

Bradley fighting vehicle, Stryker vehicle, and MRAP (Mine Resistant

Ambush Protected) armored vehicle, new and better vehicles could be available for procurement in a few years in ways that would provide important 

marginal improvements, but not a great technological leap forward. But if 

the Army opts for an entirely new class of vehicles aimed at pushing the

technology envelope further, it could face a more prolonged RDT&E effort 

and thus later procurement, perhaps near the end of this decade.

The Navy faces similar challenges in designing new warships in ways 

that balance near-term achievability with long-term technological progress. 

If by mid-decade or later the outcome is the modernizing of air forces but a 

slower modernization of ground and naval forces, this will produce a stronger U.S. military posture, but not in the faster, comprehensive ways favored 

by the QDRP Report and QDR Report. The key point, which applies to 

both reports, is that advocating reforms to the acquisition process makes 

sense, but actually implementing them is hard because of the many difficult 

RDT&E decisions that must be made one weapon at a time.

Is the QDRP Report too critical of the QDR Report in proposing that 

in the future, it should be scrapped? Although the QDR Report is far from

perfect, a telling observation is that the QDRP could not have been written 

so well in the absence of an already published QDR Report to provide a 

benchmark and a model to criticize. Beyond this, the QDR Report may not 

be popular in some quarters outside DOD, but within DOD, it performs 

valuable analytical and planning functions that help inform many civilian 

and military personnel. Nothing comparable currently exists to take its 

place. Perhaps the QDRP is correct in judging that DOD could use its 

normal PPBES functions and documents to replace the QDR Report. But 

a noteworthy consideration is that the QDR Report was originally commissioned partly because the PPBES process was not producing a synthetic, 

comprehensive document to guide DOD strategy and planning. If the QDR 
62 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

Report is abolished, DOD will need to conduct a formal internal strategy 

review every 4 years, as was done before the QDR Report was created, but 

these strategy reviews were always classified and unavailable across all of 

DOD, the U.S. Government, and the general public. If the QDR Report is 

scrapped, presumably this public communications task would have to be 

handled by restored Secretary of Defense annual posture statements, which 

earlier were as long and detailed as today’s QDR Report. If the QDR Report 

is to be killed off, something similar will have to be created to replace it. 

Perhaps the solution is not to scrap future QDR Reports, but instead to 

prepare them more fully and carefully, with due attention not only to the 

near term, but the long term as well.

As for the QDRP Report’s suggestion that an Independent Strategic

Review Panel of experts be convened to produce strategic guidance before an 

incoming administration has had time to write its own national security 

strategy, this idea seemingly makes sense. In 2010, the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization followed a similar recommendation by convening such a team 

of outside experts to provide guidance in the months before the Alliance set

about the task of writing a new strategic concept. The result was a useful study 

(see chapter 6). Perhaps similarly useful studies could be written by Independent Strategic Review Panels in ways that give incoming administrations a 

useful infusion of outside advice. But ultimately, each new administration will 

need to go through the exercise of preparing its own national security strategy, 

its own QDR Report, and comparable studies by other departments and 

agencies. In this regard, the past and present are prologue.
CHAPTER FOUR

Nuclear Posture Review Report 

To cope with new international dangers while making progress on 

President Barack Obama’s call for ultimately achieving a world 

without nuclear weapons, the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) 

Report—a 49-page document that focuses mainly on the next 5 to 10 years—

identifies five key objectives for forging U.S. nuclear policies and making 

decisions about the future nuclear force posture:

•	 preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism

•	 reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in U.S. national security

strategy

•	 maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at reduced nuclear force

levels

•	 strengthening regional deterrence and reassuring U.S. allies and

partners

•	 sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal.

Pursuing these objectives, it states, will require a sustainable consensus 

that produces concerted efforts by a long succession of administrations and 

Congresses for many years to come.

Handling the Changing International Environment. The NPR Report 

judges that while the risk of global nuclear war has become remote owing to 

the end of the Cold War, the risk that nuclear weapons will actually be used 

has increased owing to other developments. Citing nuclear terrorism and 

nuclear proliferation as two principal dangers, it moves the task of preventing 

these scenarios and strengthening the global nonproliferation regime to the 

top of the U.S. nuclear security agenda. But it also calls for policies aimed at 

maintaining nuclear stability with Russia and China and countering threats 

63
64 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

posed by any nuclear-armed states in ways that protect the United States, as 

well as allies and partners, from nuclear threats or intimidation.

The NPR Report states that the most immediate and extreme threat 

today is nuclear terrorism (that is, al Qaeda or other terrorist groups gain 

access to nuclear weapons and use them against the United States and/or its 

allies). To date, it states, considerable progress has been made toward achieving a global “lockdown” of nuclear weapons, materials, and related technology, but much more work needs to be done; the United States and the 

international community currently have insufficient capabilities to detect, 

interdict, and defeat efforts to covertly deliver nuclear materials and weapons, as well as to minimize casualties and economic impact, and to attribute 

sources if a nuclear attack occurs.

Today’s other pressing threat, the NPR Report argues, is nuclear proliferation. It particularly cites threats posed by North Korea and Iran, whose 

nuclear ambitions are violating nonproliferation obligations, increasing 

regional tensions, threatening to illicitly supply nuclear weapons and materials to other dangerous actors, and weakening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It further states that the potential for regional nuclear 

aggression by these states raises challenges to not only deterrence of them, 

but also the goal of reassuring allies and partners of their security. It holds 

that if allies and partners are not adequately assured of deterrence and their 

security, some will elect to acquire nuclear deterrent postures of their own 

in ways that could unravel the NPT regime and increase the likelihood of 

nuclear use. The NPR Report declares that the NPT remains a cornerstone 

of nonproliferation efforts and that its basic agreement—all parties have a 

right to peaceful nuclear power, states without nuclear weapons forsake 

them, and nuclear-armed states work toward disarmament—remains sound. 

But it also judges that because of ongoing noncompliance with the NPT, 

the nonproliferation regime, including the International Atomic Energy 

Agency (IAEA), urgently requires strengthening.

The NPR Report further judges that the U.S. nuclear interaction with 

Russia and potentially China poses muted but still existing dangers of its 
NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW REPORT 65

own in ways mandating careful management focused on maintaining strategic stability. Noting that both Russia and China are modernizing their 

nuclear postures, it cites the need to sign the New Strategic Arms Reduction 

Treaty (START) with Russia, which further reduces nuclear force levels on 

both sides, and to pursue a stabilizing dialogue with China. The combination of rising threats from nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation and 

still worrisome strategic interactions with Russia and China, it states, has 

altered the international nuclear security environment in basic ways that 

threaten to outpace the rate of U.S. adaptation and modification. Accordingly, it judges that in putting an end to Cold War thinking, the United 

States should:

•	 intensify efforts to build broad international support for the rigorous

measures needed to prevent nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation

•	 pursue steps to enhance regional security architectures to reassure

allies and partners that U.S. commitments to their defense remain 

strong and reliable

•	 continue striving for deeper nuclear reductions in negotiations with

Russia

•	 lessen U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons in national security strategy

in ways that respond to growing U.S. capabilities in conventional 

forces and missile defenses

•	 preserve a fully adequate nuclear force posture while making investments to ensure that the nuclear stockpile can be maintained without 

further nuclear testing.

This strategic agenda, the NRP Report states, has major implications 

for U.S. nuclear weapons policies and force structures. It observes that the 

massive nuclear arsenal inherited from the Cold War is poorly suited to 

addressing the challenges posed by suicidal terrorists and unfriendly states 

seeking nuclear weapons. It also calls for steps to better align nuclear policies and force structures with the most urgent priorities of preventing 

nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation. It acknowledges that for the 
66 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

foreseeable future, a strong U.S. nuclear force posture will be needed to 

safeguard deterrence, reassure allies and partners, and promote regional 

and global stability. But it also judges that because of fundamental changes 

in recent years—including the growth of unrivalled U.S. conventional 

military capabilities, major improvements in missile defenses, and easing 

of Cold War rivalries—the United States will be able to pursue its national 

security goals at significantly lower nuclear force levels and with reduced 

reliance upon nuclear weapons. In aspiring to build a new and deeper 

understanding of how U.S. weapons affect modern-era international 

dynamics, it reasons that:

•	 by reducing the role and number of nuclear weapons and thereby

meeting its own NPT obligations, the United States can strengthen 

its ability to persuade NPT partners to pursue measures aimed at 

reinvigorating the nonproliferation regime and securing nuclear 

materials worldwide against theft or seizure by terrorist groups

•	 by maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent posture while reinforcing

regional security architectures with missile defenses and other conventional military capabilities, the United States can reassure its 

nonnuclear allies and partners worldwide that their security is intact 

and that they do not need nuclear weapons

•	 by maintaining strategic stability with Russia and China while promoting transparency and mutual confidence, the United States can 

help create the conditions for moving toward a world without nuclear 

weapons, while building greater cooperation with them on addressing 

the threats of nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation

•	 by working to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons in international

affairs, partly by further restricting the conditions under which U.S. 

nuclear weapons might be used, the United States can reverse the growing expectation that a world of many nuclear-armed powers lies ahead, 

decrease the incentives for additional countries to acquire nuclear weapons, reduce the likelihood of nuclear use, and promote the eventual 

elimination of nuclear weapons in a step-by-step manner
NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW REPORT 67

•	 by pursuing a sound stockpile management program for extending

the life of existing U.S. nuclear weapons, while modernizing aging 

nuclear facilities and investing in human capital, the United States 

can substantially reduce the number of stockpiled nuclear weapons 

retained as a hedge against technological or geopolitical surprises and 

accelerate the dismantlement of unneeded nuclear weapons.

Preventing Nuclear Proliferation and Nuclear Terrorism. In elevating 

these two goals to the top of the U.S. nuclear security agenda, the NPR 

Report strongly affirms that the United States will lead efforts to strengthen 

the global nonproliferation regime and to accelerate efforts to prevent nuclear 

terrorism. To bolster the nonproliferation regime, it calls upon the United 

States to pursue measures aimed at:

•	 reversing the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran by pursuing

negotiations that offer integration into the international community if 

they comply, while further isolating and pressuring them if they do not

•	 strengthening IAEA safeguards by giving additional resources and

authorities to the agency

•	 creating consequences for noncompliance, including by ensuring that

states cannot escape such consequences by withdrawing from the NPT

•	 impeding sensitive nuclear trade by strengthening export controls and

border controls, disrupting illicit proliferation networks, restricting 

transfer of dual-use enrichment and reprocessing technologies, making the Proliferation Security Initiative into a durable international 

institution, disrupting the financing of nuclear terrorism and proliferation networks, and developing a United Nations (UN) trust fund 

to assist countries in meeting their nonproliferation obligations

•	 promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy without increasing

proliferation by pursuing the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, 

international fuel banks, agreements by suppliers to take back spent 

fuel, creation of fuel repositories, and cradle-to-grave nuclear dual-use 

management.
68 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

To strengthen international efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism, the 

NPR Report calls upon the United States to:

•	 pursue the President’s Prague Initiative, endorsed by UN Security

Council Resolution 1887, to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials 

worldwide

•	 host summits aimed at fighting nuclear smuggling and terrorism, and

at strengthening effective nuclear security measures

•	 increasefunding by 25 percent for national nonproliferation programs

•	 accelerate the Global Threat Reduction Initiative by removing and

securing vulnerable nuclear material, converting reactors to use fuels 

that cannot be used in nuclear weapons, and completing repatriation 

of U.S.-origin and Russian-origin highly enriched uranium from 

world research reactors

•	 accelerate the International Nuclear Material Protection and Cooperation Program to install nuclear security upgrades at Russian complexes and to expand cooperation with new countries beyond Russia 

and the former Soviet Union

•	 secure and eliminate weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their

means of delivery through threat reduction programs at Defense,

State, and other departments, including the flagship Nunn-Lugar 

Cooperative Threat Reduction Program

•	 enhance national and international capabilities to detect and interdict

smuggling of nuclear materials by expanding the Container Security 

Initiative to screen U.S.-bound cargo; pursue the Second Line of 

Defense Megaports Initiative to install radiation detectors at key

borders, airports, and seaports; and build the 77-country Global 

Initiative to Combat Terrorism into a durable international institution

•	 continue to strengthen nuclear forensics efforts

•	 renew the U.S. commitment to hold fully accountable any state, terrorist group, or other nonstate actor that supports or enables terrorist 

efforts to obtain or use WMD.
NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW REPORT 69

In addition, the NPR Report states that the United States can help 

strengthen efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation by 

ratifying New START and later pursing deeper nuclear reductions, ratifying 

the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, initiating negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, working with Russia to eliminate 68 tons of unneeded 

weapons-grade plutonium, and beginning a comprehensive research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) program that develops improved verification technologies and transparency measures.

Reducing the Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in National Security Strategy.

The NPR Review proclaims that the fundamental role of nuclear weapons 

in deterring nuclear attack on the United States, its allies, and partners will 

remain unchanged. But it also announces that the time has arrived to further 

reduce the already declining role that nuclear weapons play in deterring and 

defending against conventional aggression and use of biological and chemical weapons (CBW). This step is possible, it claims, because old Cold War 

threats in Europe are gone and because U.S., allied, and partner militaries 

now provide a wide range of conventional options to deter and defeat conventional aggression by regional adversaries. Accordingly, it declares, the 

United States is now prepared to strengthen its longstanding assurance that 

it will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states 

that are parties to the NPT and in compliance with nonproliferation obligations. This upgraded assurance, it states, is intended to underscore the 

security benefits of complying with the NPT and to persuade nonnuclear 

states to cooperate with efforts to strengthen the nonproliferation regime. 

In making this revised assurance, it continues, any nonnuclear state that 

uses CBW against the United States, its allies, or partners will be held 

accountable and will face a devastating conventional military response. It 

adds the caveat that the United States reserves the right to alter its assurance 

about not using nuclear weapons if warranted by the evolution and proliferation of biological weapons in ways that undermine U.S. capabilities to 

respond effectively with conventional forces.
70 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

In the case of countries that possess nuclear weapons and those not 

meeting their nonproliferation obligations, the NPR Report states, there 

remains a narrow range of contingencies in which U.S. nuclear weapons 

may still play a role in deterring a conventional or CBW attack against the 

United States, its allies, or partners. Therefore, the United States is not yet 

prepared to adopt a universal policy in which the sole purpose of nuclear 

weapons is to deter nuclear attack, but will instead work to establish the 

conditions under which such a policy could be safely adopted. Accordingly, 

the NPR Report adopts four principles for U.S. nuclear policies:

•	 The United States will meet its NPT commitments to pursue nuclear

disarmament and will make demonstrable progress over the next 5 to 

10 years.

•	 The United States will continue strengthening conventional capabilities and reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterring nonnuclear 

attacks, with the goal of making the deterrence of nuclear attack the 

sole purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons.

•	 The United States would consider using nuclear weapons only in

extreme circumstances to defend its vital interests and those of allies 

and partners.

•	 The United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons

against nonnuclear states that are in compliance with the NPT and 

their nonproliferation obligations.

Maintaining Strategic Deterrence and Stability at Reduced Nuclear Force 

Levels. The NPR Report begins this section by noting that although the 

United States and Russia have reduced their operationally deployed strategic 

nuclear force levels by 75 percent since the Cold War ended, both retain many 

more nuclear weapons than needed for deterrence. It portrays New START 

as an initial step toward further reducing force levels while preserving strategic stability. U.S. negotiating positions in the New START talks with 

Russia, it states, were derived from careful NPR analysis aimed at identifying 

emerging requirements for U.S. strategic nuclear weapons, the scope of 

potential reductions below the Moscow Treaty level of 2,200 deployed
NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW REPORT 71

nuclear forces, and subsequent force limitations. After concluding that the 

United States should retain a nuclear triad, it states, the analysis determined 

the appropriate force structure for each leg of the triad: ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and nuclear-capable heavy bombers.

The analysis focused on meeting four requirements:

•	 supporting strategic stability through an assured second-strike capability

•	 retaining sufficient forces in each leg to be able to hedge effectively

by shifting emphasis from one triad leg to another in response to 

technological surprise or operational vulnerabilities

•	 retaining a margin above the minimum required nuclear force structure for the possible addition of nonnuclear prompt global strike 

capabilities, such as ICBMs and SLBMs, that would carry conventional weapons but still be accountable under New START

•	 maintaining the needed capabilities over the next several decades and

more, including retaining a sufficient cadre of trained personnel and 

infrastructure.

Based on this analysis, the NPR Report declares that New START is 

based on the following mutual limits, which reduce force levels below the 

2,200 nuclear warheads and 1,200 strategic delivery vehicles (SDVs)

allowed by the expired Moscow Treaty. Accountable warheads are reduced

by about 30 percent below the Moscow Treaty and SDVs are reduced by

about 50 percent:

•	 a limit of 1,550 accountable strategic warheads

•	 a separate limit of 700 deployed SDVs: ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy

bombers

•	 a combined limit of 800 deployed and nondeployed ICBM launchers,

SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers

•	 dual-capable bombers will count as one SDV and one warhead in

recognition of the fact that heavy bombers do not pose a first-strike 

threat.
72 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

The NPR Report’s conclusion that a triad posture should be retained 

under New START reflects the judgment that each leg of the triad offers 

unique advantages. SSBNs are highly survivable when deployed at sea, and 

SLBMs are not vulnerable to air defenses. Single-warhead ICBMs provide

strong response capabilities and contribute to stability. Heavy bombers can 

be deployed forward in a crisis to signal deterrence and reassure allies and 

partners. Three legs provide a hedge against the risk that one might suffer 

a major technical or operational failure. A three-leg posture, with each leg 

capable of withstanding a surprise attack, is far harder to destroy than a 

single-leg posture. Each leg of the posture offers important targeting capabilities: ballistic missiles can respond rapidly with great accuracy and bombers can strike a wide variety of targets ranging from cities to military 

installations. Beyond this, as the NPR Report states, a three-leg posture 

provides options for uploading additional nuclear warheads as a technical 

hedge against any future problems with delivery systems or warheads or a 

fundamental deterioration in the security environment.

In providing guidance on the future of the triad under New START, 

the NPR Report addresses all three legs individually. The United States, it 

states, will retain all 14 Ohio-class SSBNs for the near term while considering a reduction to 12 SSBNs late in the decade. The development of a new

SSBN to eventually replace the aging Ohio-class SSBNs will commence. 

The United States will retain 450 Minuteman III ICBMs, de-MIRV (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle) them by equipping them with 

only one warhead, extend the service life of the Minuteman IIIs, and initiatestudy of a follow-on ICBM. The United States will retain a heavy bomber

force of 76 B–52H bombers and 18 B–2 bombers that can beequipped with

nuclear weapons but are “dual-use” because they are not placed on nuclear 

alert and can carry conventional bombs and missiles. The B–2 bombers will

be upgraded in the coming years.

In addition, the NPR Report provides steps aimed at maximizing 

presidential decision time in a nuclear crisis:
NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW REPORT 73

•	 maintain the current alert posture of U.S. nuclear forces, with heavy

bombers off full-time alert, nearly all ICBMs on alert, and a significant number of SSBNs deployed at sea

•	 continue the practice of “open-ocean” targeting so that if a missile is

inadvertently launched, it will land in the open ocean

•	 make investments in the U.S. command and control system to

enhance its resiliency and capabilities for fully deliberate control of 

the force in a crisis

•	 explore new forms of ICBM basing that could enhance survivability.

The NPR Report also provides guidance on future nonstrategic (tactical) nuclear weapons. It notes that these weapons have been reduced dramatically since the Cold War ended. Today, it states, the United States keeps 

only a limited number of these weapons deployed in Europe, plus a small 

number stored domestically, that can be promptly deployed in a crisis. All 

such weapons have been withdrawn from Asia. It argues that particularly 

because Russia retains large numbers of nonstrategic nuclear weapons, they 

should be included in any future reduction agreements with Russia beyond 

New START, but in close consultation with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allies. The NPR Report states that, in cooperation with 

allies and partners, the United States has determined the Air Force will 

retain a dual-capable fighter as new F–35s arrive and extend the life span of 

the B–61 nuclear bomb, and the Navy will retire the nuclear-tipped cruise 

missile (Tactical Land Attack Missile–Nuclear).

Looking toward the future of nuclear arms control negotiations with Russia, the NPR Report judges that further significant bilateral reductions below 

New START levels should be pursued. Any such reductions, it cautions, must 

continue to strengthen the deterrence of adversaries, strategic stability vis-à-vis 

Russia and China, and reassurance of allies and partners. The United States, 

it states, is committed to further reducing its own nuclear arsenal, but because 

large disparities with Russian nuclear forces would not be conducive to a stable 

long-term relationship, Russia should join the United States in this enterprise.
74 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

Strengthening Regional Deterrence and Reassuring U.S. Allies and Partners.

In this section, the NPR Report points out that U.S. allies and partners are 

on the front line of a changing global security environment. Some of them 

enjoy unprecedented security and are therefore seeking reduced reliance on 

nuclear weapons, but others—neighbored by major nuclear-armed powers 

seeking stronger regional roles, potential aggressors, nuclear proliferators, 

potential WMD smugglers, and failing states—have been led to seek

enhanced security ties to the United States. This complex milieu dictates that 

the United States must continue to reaffirm its commitment to the security 

of its allies and partners through not only words, but also deeds. Credibly 

underwriting these commitments, it continues, includes maintaining firm 

political ties with them, strengthening U.S. and allied conventional capabilities, and continuing to provide extended deterrence.

Such commitments, the NPR Report states, will retain a nuclear dimension for as long as nuclear threats to allies and partners remain. Today, it 

judges, a credible U.S. nuclear umbrella is provided by a combination of 

means: U.S. strategic forces, nonstrategic weapons that are forward deployed, 

and U.S.-based nuclear weapons that can be deployed forward quickly in 

response to regional contingencies. In Europe, it states, the continuing presence of a small number of nuclear weapons contributes to NATO cohesion 

and reassures member nations who feel exposed to regional threats. As a 

result, decisions to alter the Alliance’s nuclear posture should be taken carefully and only after thorough review. In Asia, it reports, the withdrawal of 

U.S. forward-deployed nuclear weapons means that extended deterrence is 

mainly carried out by bilateral security agreements with several nations, U.S. 

conventional forces, central strategic forces, and the capacity to redeploy 

nonstrategic nuclear forces if necessary. The United States, it states, is pursuing strategic dialogues with its allies and partners in East Asia and the 

Middle East to determine how best to reassure them that U.S. extended

deterrence efforts remain credible and effective.

Enhancing regional security architectures, the NPR Report argues, is a 

key part of U.S. strategy for strengthening deterrence while reducing the role 
NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW REPORT 75

and numbers of nuclear weapons. These regional architectures, it states, are 

to includeeffective missile defenses, counter-WMD capabilities, conventional

power-projection capabilities, and integrated command and control, all 

underwritten by strong political commitments. Although the U.S. nuclear 

posture has a vital role to play in these regional architectures, strengthening 

their nonnuclear elements is vital. Effective missile defenses are essential, and 

credible deterrence requires land, naval, and air forces capable of fighting 

limited and large-scale conflicts in antiaccess environments.

Accordingly, the NPR Report calls for the following initiatives:

•	 continue to work with allies and partners to build enhanced regional

security architectures, including nonnuclear capabilities for deterrence, 

improved partner capacities, and combined exercises and training

•	 continue and expand ongoing bilateral and multilateral discussions

with allies and partners to determine the most effective ways to 

enhance regional stability in Europe, Northeast and Southwest Asia, 

and the Middle East

•	 work with allies and partners to respond to regional threats by deploying effective missile defenses in multiple regions through a phased 

adaptive approach

•	 deepen consultations with allies and partners on policies and combined

postures to prevent proliferation and to credibly deter aggression

•	 strengthen counter-WMD capabilities for defeating chemical or

biological attacks

•	 develop improved nonnuclear prompt global strike capabilities for

defeating time-urgent regional threats

•	 develop and deploy more effective capabilities for real-time intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations

•	 retain the capability to forward deploy U.S. nuclear weapons on fighters and heavy bombers.

Maintaining a Safe, Secure, and Effective Nuclear Arsenal. The NPR 

Report declares that the United States is committed to ensure that its 
76 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

stockpile of nuclear weapons remains safe, effective, and secure. It 

announces decisions on how best to meet this long-term obligation. Today’s 

nuclear weapons, it notes, have aged well beyond their originally planned 

life spans, and many excess nuclear weapons are awaiting dismantlement. 

Since 1992, the United States has not developed, procured, and tested new

nuclear weapons to replace aging weapons. Instead, it has stopped nuclear 

testing and relied upon a Stockpile Stewardship Program to ensure the 

safety and reliability of existing weapons while extending their lives by 

refurbishing them to nearly original specifications. Calling for a continuation of this practice, the NPR Report reaches the following conclusions 

regarding future stockpile management decisions:

•	 The United States will not conduct nuclear testing, and will pursue

ratification and entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban 

Treaty.

•	 The United States will not develop new nuclear weapons. Life Extension Programs (LEPs) for existing weapons will use only nuclear 

components based on previously tested designs, and will not support 

new missions or capabilities.

•	 The United States will study options for ensuring the safety, security,

and reliability of nuclear warheads on a case-by-case basis consistent 

with the congressionally mandated Stockpile Management Program,

and will consider the full range of LEP approaches: refurbishment of 

existing warheads, reuse of nuclear components from different warheads, and replacement of nuclear components.

•	 In engineering development for warhead LEPs, the United States will

give strong preference to refurbishment or reuse. Replacement of 

nuclear components will be undertaken only if absolutely necessary.

•	 The United States will retain thesmallest possiblestockpile consistent

with military and strategic needs.

•	 Using this approach, the NPR Report urges full funding of ongoing

LEPs for the W–76 submarine-based warhead, completion of the LEP 

study and subsequent activities for the B–61 bomb, and initiation of 

an LEP study for the W–78 ICBM warhead.
NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW REPORT 77

In addition, the NPR Report calls for stronger efforts to improve the 

eroding complex of laboratories and supporting facilities that handle nuclear 

weapons, recruit a skilled workforce, and strengthen science, technology, 

and engineering assets for addressing future warhead policies and programs.

Is a World Without Nuclear Weapons Achievable? In addressing this question, the NPR Report acknowledges that nuclear weapons continue to play 

a major contributing role in U.S. national security strategy and its quest for 

stable international security affairs. It also acknowledges the importance of 

efforts to strengthen U.S. nuclear forces even as negotiations seek deeper 

reductions than envisioned by New START. Creating a world without 

nuclear weapons, it judges, will be a long-term and demanding proposition 

that will require not only ambitious arms control negotiations but also the 

settlement of regional disputes and the halting of nuclear proliferation. But 

unless the effort is launched and pursued seriously, the NPR Report concludes, it will never succeed or even make significant headway, and if abject 

failure is the result, the nuclear world of tomorrow could be significantly 

more dangerous.

Strengths, Shortfalls, and Lingering Issues. Compared to earlier U.S. Government unclassified studies on nuclear issues, the NPR Report is longer, more 

complete, and more informative. The report’s most ambitious goal is fostering 

a world without nuclear weapons—a vision that has been praised by some 

observers, but dismissed as naïve and unachievable by others. Notwithstanding its admission that this goal is a long-term prospect for the far-distant 

future, the NPR Report is mostly preoccupied with practicalities of handling 

emerging challenges in the near- and mid-term, and here its approach is decidedly pragmatic. To handle these challenges, it puts forth a large set of policies 

and initiatives intended to achieve U.S. national security objectives. The key 

issue is whether these actions are well conceived and sufficiently comprehensive, and whether they will succeed in ways that accomplish their purposes.

A main strength of the NPR Report is its elevation of countering nuclear 

proliferation and nuclear terrorism to the top of the U.S. nuclear security 

agenda. Nobody would question that handling these dangerous challenges 
78 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

is compellingly important, and that the QDR Report makes a concerted

effort to chart the path ahead. But while many of its ideas are widely supported, others are controversial. Its agenda for preventing nuclear proliferation 

reflects a mixture of both. In a bold departure, the NPR Report advances 

the proposition that nuclear restraint by the United States—for example, 

such actions as reducing its own nuclear posture and further restricting the 

conditions under which it would use nuclear weapons in war—will help 

motivate countries to embrace the NPT and the global nonproliferation 

regime. Restraint will also prompt others to refrain from acquiring or using 

nuclear weapons themselves. Is this proposition a reliable guide to effective 

U.S. policies? Perhaps so but, to a degree, it seems to suggest that past U.S. 

policies for deploying nuclear forces and using them to enhance deterrence 

have played a role in accelerating WMD proliferation rather than retarding

it. The historical record on this offers a rather mixed appraisal.

Most likely, the powerful U.S. nuclear arsenal helped stimulate the

Soviet nuclear buildup early during the Cold War, but had the United States 

forsaken its own nuclear buildup, it likely would have found itself unable to 

contain and deter a nuclear-equipped Soviet Union. In recent years, U.S. 

nuclear weapons may have played a contributing role in motivating North 

Korea and Iran to pursue their own nuclear weapons. However, these two 

countries are dangerous adversaries that may have sought these weapons 

irrespective of whether the United States was reducing its nuclear posture 

at a faster rate than has been pursued over the past two decades. Beyond 

this, U.S. nuclear guarantees have undeniably played a strong contributing 

role in persuading allies and partners—for instance, Germany and Japan—

not to acquire their own nuclear weapons. Also, the U.S. nuclear arsenal 

seemingly played no role in motivating India and Pakistan to acquire nuclear 

weapons; the two countries were acting for reasons that reflected their own 

rivalry in South Asia as well as China’s nuclear posture, not the U.S. nuclear 

posture or the global nuclear balance.

The key point of this historical record is that nuclear proliferation 

responds to underlying geopolitical imperatives and a complex action-
NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW REPORT 79

reaction cycle in which the U.S. nuclear arsenal is not always a potent influence on other countries and sometimes retards nuclear proliferation rather 

than stimulates it. Precisely for this reason, the NPR Report makes clear 

that U.S. nuclear commitments to allies and friends will remain strong, as 

will deterrent warnings to nuclear-equipped adversaries, even as the United 

States strives to scale back the role of nuclear weapons in its global security 

strategy and reduces its nuclear posture. If nuclear proliferation accelerates 

in dangerous ways in future years, it likely will compel the United States to 

extend its nuclear umbrella over a larger number of states than today, including in the Middle East. In this setting, the NPR Report is undoubtedly

correct in judging that the United States can help set an example that 

encourages membership in the nonproliferation regime by showing selfrestraint in its own nuclear activities. Whether this approach can be an 

across-the-board coda for future U.S. nuclear strategy, force posture, and 

deterrence commitments is another matter entirely. When the dust settles 

some years from now, U.S. nuclear weapons may play a role that is as large, 

or even larger, than they play today.

U.S. self-restraint aside, the NPR Report puts forth a set of wide-ranging political and diplomatic steps aimed at halting nuclear proliferation, 

including a stronger IAEA, impediments to sensitive nuclear trade, peaceful 

uses of nuclear energy, and consequences for noncompliance. All of these 

steps make strategic sense. At the top of this list is a U.S. policy to reverse 

the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran by engaging them politically 

with offers of favorable treatment if they comply, and threats of further 

isolation and pressure if they do not. Thus far, this well-oiled approach has 

not prevented North Korea from openly developing nuclear weapons, and 

it does not seem to be derailing Iran from its nuclear path. What will happen 

if, a year or more from now, Iran emerges with nuclear weapons and longrange missiles for delivering them? Will diplomatic engagement and political pressure still be appropriate, or will the United States need to apply 

nuclear deterrence to Iran, or even launch military strikes against its nuclear 
80 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

weapons, missiles, and facilities? The NPR Report is silent on these sensitive 

questions, but clear answers may soon be needed.

The NPR Report also puts forth a large set of measures and programs 

to prevent nuclear terrorism, including enhanced homeland defense programs 

and accelerated international cooperation in this domain. These steps all 

make sense. But will they be adequate to get the job done by both denying 

terrorists access to nuclear weapons and preventing their use if acquired? Only 

in-depth technical analysis can answer this question, but the NPR Report 

does not provide such analysis. At the end of its list of measures and programs, 

the NPR Report renews the U.S. commitment to hold “fully accountable” 

any state, terrorist group, or other nonstate actor that supports or enables 

terrorist efforts to obtain or use nuclear weapons or other WMD. But what

does fully accountable mean, and how can it be applied not only to states that 

can be attacked but also to terrorist groups and other nonstate actors that are 

often hard to attack and, under some circumstances, even hard to identify? 

The NPR Report is silent on retaliatory mechanisms, but if deterrence is to 

work in this arena, in-depth analysis of such mechanisms and associated 

strategies will clearly be needed—perhaps sooner rather than later.

One of the NPR Report’s most high-profile measures is its strengthening of already existing assurances that U.S. nuclear weapons will not be 

used against nonnuclear states that are meeting their nonproliferation 

obligations. As intended, this step likely will play a role in enhancing the 

attractiveness of membership in the NPT club. But it is not new when 

judged in historical terms. In the last 50 years, the United States has fought 

multiple conventional wars against adversaries that were not nuclear armed, 

and it has never seriously intended to use nuclear weapons against them. 

In the future, the NPR Report implies, the United States will never use 

nuclear weapons against nonnuclear powers even if they are attacking close 

American allies with conventional weapons and are threatening to conquer 

them. If this is new U.S. strategy, it may come as a disturbing surprise to 

several close allies—for instance, those in NATO and South Korea—that 

have faced serious conventional threats and always have taken comfort in 
NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW REPORT 81

the idea that if combined U.S.-allied conventional defenses buckle, U.S. 

nuclear weapons will come to the rescue. After all, NATO military strategy 

during the Cold War called for nuclear weapons to help offset the Alliance’s 

vulnerable conventional defenses, and, in recent years, NATO has not cast 

aside this provision or embraced a “no first use” doctrine. Nor have key 

allies in Asia done so.

Troubling questions arise about the theory and precepts of the new 

nuclear non-use pledge. Why does the lack of nuclear weapons make a 

conventional aggressor entirely immune from U.S. nuclear reprisals? Why 

is U.S. military strategy determined not by the safety and security of vulnerable allies that belong to U.S-led alliances, but instead by the presence or 

absence of nuclear armaments in the hands of aggressors? Is U.S. strategy 

now stating that if vital American interests are threatened by an adversary 

with imposing conventional forces but no nuclear weapons, the United 

States will keep its nuclear weapons holstered even if they are the only 

recourse for protecting those interests? If such a nonnuclear adversary can 

conduct conventional aggression without fearing U.S. nuclear reprisals, why 

would a nuclear-armed power hesitate to commit similar aggression if it 

promises to keep its own nuclear forces out of the contest? If the United 

States is unwilling to pursue nuclear escalation against enemies that lack 

nuclear weapons, why should allies and partners trust that it is willing to 

escalate in the more dangerous presence of enemies with nuclear weapons? 

In trying to answer these questions, the NPR Report states that if nuclear 

weapons are to be safely forsaken, future U.S. and allied conventional postures will need to be made strong enough to perform their defense missions. 

Doubtless so, but sometimes achieving this goal is easier said than done.

Although stalwart conventional defenses can be erected, normally they cannot be made impregnable. There will almost always be a degree of risk that 

nuclear forces were, in the past, designed to lessen, even after they already 

had been relegated to the backwaters of common defense strategy. To claim 

that nuclear weapons are a last resort is one thing, but to assert that they are 
82 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

no longer any resort at all is something else, even if the caveat is that this 

formula applies only to nonnuclear adversaries.

The NPR Report tries to work its way out of its strategy conundrum in 

this area by stating that U.S. nuclear weapons could still be used to counter 

conventional aggression or CBW use by nuclear-armed states. In doing so, it 

seems to presume that if future adversaries possess menacing conventional 

forces, they likely will come equipped with nuclear weapons. Furthermore, it 

states that owing to superior U.S. and allied conventional means, such contingencies are narrow in range yet plausible. As a result, it declares, the United 

States is not yet prepared to adopt a universal policy that the sole purpose of 

nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack. Clearly this is a wise decision. But 

is the NPR Report correct in judging that plausible contingencies involving 

successful conventional aggression by a nuclear-armed adversary are truly small 

in number? What if Russia attacks the vulnerable Baltic states, or North Korea 

attacks South Korea, or China attacks Taiwan, or a nuclear-armed Iran attacks 

the Gulf Cooperation Council states of the Persian Gulf and tries to close the 

Strait of Hormuz? If plausible contingencies can be easily imagined in all major 

regions, this suggests that the era of nuclear-backed conventional aggression 

is far from being over, is still flourishing, and may be growing. If so, U.S. 

strategy for blending conventional defense with nuclear deterrence has more 

to consider than the NPR Report implies.

The NPR Report’s advocacy of New START is controversial in some 

quarters because this treaty allegedly may be manipulated to constrain the 

United States from such measures as deploying mobile ICBMs and missile

defenses, and may leave the Russians too much wiggle room for modernizing 

their nuclear forces. After a vigorous debate, the Senate ratified New START 

by 71 to 26 in December 2010. Regardless of how New START criticisms

are appraised, the underlying issue is whether the proposed future U.S. 

nuclear posture—a still existing triad with 700 deployable SDVs and 1,550

warheads—will be adequate to meet enduring U.S. nuclear requirements for 

deterrence and warfighting. Confident adequacy seems the appropriate judgment, but questions begin arising when ever deeper force cuts are contem-
NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW REPORT 83

plated. On the surface, only a few SDVs and warheads appear capable of

inflicting all the nuclear damage that could be wanted. But over past years, 

many studies have shown that when the demands of deterrence, survivable 

retaliation, and wartime targeting are added up, nuclear force requirements 

multiply rapidly and soon reach unanticipated levels. Beyond this, the new 

global nuclear setting involves more than the U.S.-Russia bilateral relationship; it now includes China, North Korea, potentially Iran, and possibly other 

countries that might have to be factored into the future U.S. force-sizing 

equation. A sensible conclusion is that if the U.S. Government is to pursue 

nuclear force cuts far deeper than New START, it is best advised to have its 

analytical house in order. Among other things, studies should examine the 

detailed mathematics of how U.S. and Russian nuclear forces should be 

reduced safely in a global setting of multiple nuclear-armed powers, so that 

the consequence is existing deterrence and stability, not the opposite.

The NPR Report makes an important contribution by calling for 

creation of new regional security architectures in such key regions as 

Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. As it implies, each region must be

treated on a case-by-case basis. In this arena, the NPR Report is strong in 

its assessment of military requirements; it implies that such architectures 

can be built on a combination of improved conventional forces and missile 

defenses that lessen the traditional roles of nuclear weapons. Perhaps this 

treatment is correct, but in its preoccupation with military preparations, it 

neglects to discuss in any depth the underlying political foundations for 

such regional architectures. Years of U.S. experience going back to the Cold 

War and afterward have shown that the task of building solid political 

foundations is complex and hard, but must be undertaken well before the 

military superstructure is added. Perhaps Europe and Asia already possess 

much of this political foundation as well as the necessary military superstructure, but if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, the same cannot be said of 

the Middle East and Persian Gulf, where discussions with allies and partners are in early stages. If the United States, its allies, and partners must 

erect new security architecture there with the deterrence of Iran foremost 
84 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

in mind, they will have their work cut out—even if the NPR Report is not 

explicit on this point.

Finally, the NPR Report puts forth a coherent agenda for maintaining 

a safe, secure, and effective nuclear stockpile by not testing nuclear weapons, 

upgrading existing warheads and components, retiring unneeded warheads, 

and improving the facility infrastructure with better complexes and competent people. It prescribes a way to support the force posture with fewer 

warheads, avoid the contentious path of developing new warheads, and lower 

budget costs. But this agenda is neither inexpensive nor devoid of controversies. Its rejection of new weapons in favor of upgrading old weapons is 

controversial among some critics, who believe that new weapons are needed. 

Its proposals for facility infrastructure improvements are criticized by some 

observers who judge that the necessary funds and activities will not be 

forthcoming. Such criticisms aside, the NPR Report’s basic policies make 

sense on issues of great technical complexity, but debates over specific warheads, development designs, and investment plans are likely to linger.
CHAPTER FIVE

Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report 

The Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) Report is a 48-page 

document that establishes new strategic and military directions for 

the coming phases of U.S. missile defense efforts over the next 

decade and beyond. Not intended to defend against the large Russian intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force, the missile defense is principally 

focused on providing protection against nuclear attacks launched by North 

Korea, Iran, and other regional adversaries. It does so mainly by scaling 

back, but not eliminating, the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) 

system inherited from the Bush administration, canceling the so-called 

GMD Site Three in Poland, and accelerating plans to deploy increasingly 

sophisticated Standard Missle–3 (SM–3) interceptors, sensors, and command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3

I) systems. Whereas 

the GMD system was focused primarily on providing homeland defense of 

the United States, the SM–3 program is mainly intended to provide missile 

defense protection of key regions, including Europe, Asia, and the Middle 

East. As Secretary Robert Gates states in his memorandum introducing the 

BMDR Report, defense against near-term regional threats is now a top 

priority of U.S. missile defense plans, programs, and capabilities.

The historical context is important to understanding the BMDR 

Report’s contents. At the height of the Cold War during the 1960s, the 

Department of Defense (DOD) was pursuing vigorous research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) programs for shooting down Soviet 

ICBMs and warheads with interceptor missiles. Careful study of the offensedefense interaction, however, showed that the United States could not be 

protected against massive damage in a nuclear war, that an ineffective and 

costly missile defense system could not be risked, and that such a system 

85
86 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

would accelerate the nuclear arms race. The result of subsequent U.S.-Soviet 

negotiations was an arms control treaty of the 1970s that ruled out large 

missile defenses on both sides, in the hope of fostering greater stability in 

the arms race. As a result, the United States was left wholly unprotected 

against missile attack.

When the Reagan administration took power in 1981, it questioned the 

wisdom of having no missile defenses and therefore launched a major 

RDT&E effort—called the Strategic Defense Initiative—to investigate the 

prospects for employing new technologies and systems that could work 

effectively. Despite large expenditures in multiple areas, no missile defenses 

were deployed during the 1980s and 1990s. But RDT&E efforts began 

focusing on the idea of creating a small missile defense posture that could 

protect the United States against limited ICBM threats posed by such 

regional adversaries as North Korea. Maturation of this idea and its technologies led the Bush administration in 2002 to authorize deployment of 

the GMD system, which was composed of 44 missiles at two sites in the 

United States (Alaska and California), and 10 missiles at the third site in 

Poland. Focused mainly on protecting the U.S. homeland, the GMD system 

did not provide significant missile defenses for protecting overseas-deployed 

U.S. military forces or key regional allies against threats to them.

The BMDR Report argues that missile threats from such adversaries as 

North Korea and Iran are growing in quantity and quality. Over the coming 

decade, it states, such adversaries can be expected to develop short-range 

ballistic missiles (SRBMs), medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), and 

intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) that can strike targets in 

nearby regions, and perhaps ICBMs capable of striking the United States. 

For both countries, such missiles are already being tested, and their future 

deployment in menacing numbers seems likely. In addition, North Korea 

already has nuclear weapons, while Iran may be developing them. The worrisome risk is that for North Korea and Iran, and perhaps for others over the 

long haul, nuclear weapons could be mounted atop long-range ballistic 

missiles, thereby rendering them capable of inflicting immense damage on 
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW REPORT 87

neighboring states and even the United States. Beyond this, the BMDR 

Report argues, nuclear-tipped missiles could enable North Korea, Iran, and 

others to pursue peacetime coercion of neighbors that include many allies 

and partners of the United States. Defending against these threats, it judges, 

is imperative.

Credible hope, the BMDR Report asserts, comes from the rapid progress that U.S. RDT&E programs for missile defense have been making 

recently in the form of better interceptors, radars and sensors, and C3I systems. The principal challenge, it states, is to take advantage of this progress 

by forging a revised missile defense strategy anchored in new programs. 

Together these provide deterrence of attack on the U.S. homeland, extended 

deterrence of attacks on allies and partners, and reassurance of those allies 

and partners. In this new strategy, deterrence is achieved not mainly by 

threatening nuclear retaliation, but by possessing interceptors capable of 

shooting down enemy nuclear missiles during the midcourse phase of their 

trajectory, thereby denying the adversary confidence that a nuclear attack, 

or the threat of such an attack, could achieve its strategic goals.

Accordingly, the BMDR Report puts forth six policy priorities for guiding ballistic missile defense efforts:

•	 The United States will continueto defend the homeland from limited

ballistic missile attack.

•	 The United States will defend deployed U.S. forces from regional

missile threats while also protecting allies and partners and enabling 

them to defend themselves.

•	 New missile defense capabilities must undergo realistic operational

testing that demonstrates their effectiveness before they are 

deployed—a “fly before buy” approach will be followed.

•	 The commitment to new BMD capabilities must be fiscally sustainable over the long term—affordability will be important in the strategic calculus.

•	 U.S. BMD capabilities must be adaptable and flexible to adjust to

changing future threats.
88 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

•	 The United States will seek to lead expanded international efforts for

missile defense.

Defending the Homeland. The BMDR Report judges that currently the 

United States is adequately defended against limited ICBM attacks by the 

already deployed GMD posture of 30 Ground-based Interceptors (GBI, 26 

in Alaska and 4 in California), early warning radars at four sites at home 

and abroad (Greenland and the United Kingdom), afloat radar systems, and 

a sophisticated command and control infrastructure. Accordingly, it states, 

DOD will scale back the original continental United States missile deployment plan from 44 GBI to the 30 GBI already deployed, and cancel or 

restructure some RDT&E programs (for example, the Airborne Laser 

Program) that have not succeeded. To preserve an adequate capability for 

the future and hedge against uncertainty, it states, DOD will pursue a vigorous RDT&E effort in GMD system enhancements that include more GBI 

testing, the SM–3 Block IIB missile, new missiles for intercepting long-range 

missiles early in flight, improved capacity to defeat countermeasures and 

achieve kinetic kills, and improved sensor networks that include airborne 

and space-based sensors. In addition, it states, DOD will complete construction of the final 14 GBI silos, which will provide a reserve capacity to rapidly 

deploy 8 more GBI missiles from the test pool.

Defending Against Regional Threats. In pursuing regional defense, the 

BMDR Report states, the United States has made considerable progress at 

developing and fielding essential capabilities for protecting against SRBMs 

and MRBMs. These assets, it continues, include increasingly capable Patriot 

batteries for point defense against SRBMs, the powerful AN/TPY–2 X-band 

radar for detecting and tracking ballistic missiles, soon-to-be-deployed 

Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) batteries for intercepting 

SRBMs and MRBMs, and the sea-based SM–3 Block 1A interceptor aboard 

Aegis-equipped ships. Judging, however, that current capabilities are modest against emerging missile threats, it provides added funds for procuring 

more THAAD and SM–3 Block 1A interceptors, upgrading more Navy 
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW REPORT 89

ships to incorporate Aegis BMD capabilities, and acquiring more AN/TPY 

radars. In addition, it puts forth an expanded program for the near term by 

developing a land-based SM–3 system, called “Aegis Ashore,” that can be 

moved from one site to another. Aegis Ashore is to be ready by 2015. The 

report notes that DOD expects to have available a more capable SM–3 

interceptor, the Block 1B, by 2015. The Block 1B, it states, will have an 

improved seeker capability for better target discrimination and greater area 

coverage. Additional near-term measures will include the continued development of an improved C3

I and battle-management system, improved sensors 

and situational awareness, an airborne infrared sensor, and an exploratory 

effort to develop improved early intercept capabilities by shortening the time 

needed to identify and track incoming missiles.

Turning to long-term measures, the BMDR Report states that toward 

the end of the decade, the new SM–3 Block IIA will have a higher burnout 

velocity and a more advanced seeker that will make it much more capable 

than the SM–3 Block IA and IB and provide greater regional coverage. It 

further reports that a SM–3 Block IIB missile is in the initial phase of technology assessment and development. This missile, it states, will provide 

added improvements in burnout velocity, divert capability, and regional 

coverage, and will provide some early intercept capability against long-range 

missiles. Investments, it states, are also being made to develop a better capacity to uplink data from multiple sensors as well as persistent overhead sensors 

in space that could detect and track launching of multiple missiles in ways 

that would reduce the need for terrestrial sensors and the size of deployed 

missile defenses. Funding this Precision Tracking and Space System, it states, 

is an important priority for the current DOD budget and Future Years 

Defense Plan.

Pursuing Integrated Regional Postures. Arguing that while past approaches 

to building regional missile defenses have proceeded from the bottom up, the 

BMDR Report asserts that future policies must be based on “top-down” thinking in strategic terms. It states that planning must begin with overarching, 

integrated core concepts that take U.S. and allied roles into account and then 
90 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

address the details of programs to create the appropriate set of missile interceptors, C3

 systems, sensors, and other assets. Accordingly, the BMDR Report 

puts forth three principles to guide development of regional approaches to 

achieve deterrence and pursue such other security goals as enhanced alliance 

cohesion, effective use of scarce resources, and focus on real threats and proven 

solutions. These goals are:

•	 Regional missile defense must be built on a strong foundation of

improved security, cooperative relationships, and appropriate burdensharing between the United States and its allies and partners in ways 

that, along with enhanced conventional capabilities, reduce reliance 

upon nuclear weapons for deterrence.

•	 The United States will pursue a phased adaptive approach (PAA)

tailored to the individual requirements and opportunities of each 

region in ways that do not require a global structure that integrates 

all allies into a uniform architecture.

•	 The United States will develop flexible and mobile missile defenses

that can be relocated among theaters and scaled upward or downward 

because the demand for missile defenses within each region over the 

next decade will exceed supply.

The BMDR Report focuses especially on the agenda of applying the 

PAA to Europe. It states that the earlier plan to deploy a GMD defense site 

in Poland along with radars in the Czech Republic was cancelled not because 

it failed to make sense some years ago, but because the emerging SM–3 

missile and associated assets provide a more effective approach to defense 

against missile threats from the south. For Europe, the BMDR Report puts 

forth a four-phase plan:

•	 In Phase 1 (2011 timeframe),existing missile defenses will be deployed

to defend against SRBM and MRBM threats. By using Aegis ships, 

SM–3 Block IA interceptors, radars, and associated assets, the resulting missile posture will aspire to protect vulnerable portions of southern Europe.
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW REPORT 91

•	 In Phase 2 (2015 timeframe), missile defenses will be enhanced by

deploying SM–3 Block IB missiles, additional sensors, better C3

systems, and a land-based SM–3 site to expand coverage to additional 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allies.

•	 In Phase 3 (2018 timeframe), coverage against MRBMs and IRBMs

will be improved with a second land-based SM–3 site located in 

northern Europe as well as deployment of the SM–3 Block IIA missile, thereby extending coverage to all NATO Allies in Europe.

•	 In Phase 4 (2020 timeframe), additional capability will come from

deployment of the SM–3 Block II B, which will provide protection 

against ICBMs launched from the Middle East against the United 

States and Europe.

The BMDR Report’s discussion of future U.S. PAAs for Asia and the 

Middle East is less concrete. It notes that although the United States works 

through the NATO multilateral defense structure in Europe, it relies on 

bilateral alliances with key states in Asia and less formal relationships with 

a number of allies and partners in the Middle East. These dissimilar situations, it states, produce differing patterns of cooperation with the United 

States on ballistic missile defense, and have implications for the authorities 

under which the United States is able to operationally employ defenses to 

protect local allies and partners. In Asia, the BMDR Report states, the 

United States and Japan already cooperate in interoperable ways and are 

working together to develop a future missile defense system. In the Middle 

East, the United States and Israel are involved in production of the Arrow 

2 missile and other RDT&E activities, and the United States is beginning 

to work with some Gulf Cooperation Council partners. Its main conclusion 

is that because the foundations for applying the PAA in these three regions 

are different, the pathways forward for U.S. missile defense deployments 

will be different, too—but it is vague on the exact pathways for Asia and 

the Middle East.

Strengthening International Cooperation. The BMDR Report asserts that 

the goal of expanding international efforts and cooperation on missile 
92 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

defense is being pursued on a dual track: developing and fielding robust, 

pragmatic, and cost-effective capabilities; and engaging in international 

cooperation on a broad range of missile defense–related activities, such as 

technological and industrial cooperation with multiple countries including 

Russia. As part of this effort, the BMDR Report states, the United States is 

engaged in an interagency review of its export control system in order to 

provide improved ways to facilitate allied missile defense efforts while denying transfer of technology to adversaries.

In Europe, the BMDR Report states, the United States is committed 

to implementing the PAA within a NATO context. In late 2009, NATO 

foreign ministers welcomed the U.S. PAA and declared that it reinforces the 

Alliance’s central role in missile defense in Europe. In practical terms, this 

means that the European PAA will be the U.S. national contribution to a 

NATO missile defense capability. Accordingly, the BMDR Report states, 

the United States supports a potential NATO decision to adopt the role of 

missile defense of allied territory and population. Likewise, it continues, the 

United States supports NATO’s ongoing effort to build and strengthen its 

program for an integrated command and control system for missile defense, 

which is called Active Layered Theater Missile Defense (ALTMD). The 

BMDR Report declares that while the ALTMD is currently designed to link 

together Allied assets for protecting deployed forces, it could be expanded 

to coordinate missile defense efforts to protect Allied populations and territory. In this context, it states, Poland and the Czech Republic will play a 

role in the PAA, and the United States is working with multiple Allies to 

develop and deploy missile defenses such as naval vessels with Aegis capabilities that could be linked together to create a networked NATO defense 

system. A primary U.S. emphasis, it claims, is to produce effective Alliance 

missile defenses and appropriate burden-sharing.

In East Asia, the BMDR Report states, the United States has a range of 

cooperative relationships, with Japan being a principal BMD partner. Japan, 

it judges, has acquired a layered integrated missile defense system that includes 

Aegis ships with SM–3 missiles, Patriot PAC–3 missiles, early warning radars, 
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW REPORT 93

and a command and control system. The United States and Japan are pursuing regular training for cooperative missile defense, and are co-developing the 

SM–3 Block IIA interceptor. It lists South Korea as another important BMD 

partner that has indicated an interest in acquiring a missile defense capability 

that includes land-based and sea-based systems, as well as early warning radars 

and a command and control system. Bilateral discussions, it states, are also 

taking place with Australia and other countries in the region. In the Middle 

East, the BMDR Report portrays Israel as a leading BMD partner through 

common RDT&E programs such as the Arrow missile, plus training and 

exercises aimed at promoting operational cooperation. In the Persian Gulf, it 

states, the United States has a continuous missile defense presence and is seeking to build upon a Bilateral Air Defense Initiative to strengthen cooperation. 

A number of states, it continues, are exploring purchase of some missile defense 

capability under the Foreign Military Sales program.

The BMDR Report declares that the goal of renewing cooperation with 

Russia on missile defense is receiving special emphasis, but without negotiating constraints on future U.S. BMD capabilities. One purpose of political 

dialogue, it states, is to convince Russia’s leaders that better U.S. regional 

missile defenses are needed for reasons of international security and do not 

pose a threat to Russia’s nuclear deterrent posture. An attractive feature of 

the European PAA, it continues, is that it allows for a potential Russian 

contribution—for example, early warning radars—if politically feasible.

The United States, it states, is pursuing a close dialogue with Russia on 

such issues as a joint assessment of ballistic missile threats and a new 

approach to strategic stability that integrates offensive and defensive capabilities in the hope of producing deeper nuclear reductions by both countries. 

In addition, the BMDR Report states, the United States is pursuing diplomatic engagement aimed at convincing China that its nuclear deterrent 

posture is not threatened by U.S. missile defense efforts. But it further states 

that China must understand that the United States will work to defend its 

Asian allies and partners from all regional ballistic missile threats. The 

future, it judges, requires a substantive and sustained dialogue with China 
94 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

focused on enhancing confidence, improving transparency, and reducing 

mistrust on strategic security issues.

Managing the Missile Defense Program. In its final section, the BMDR 

Report addresses the new DOD approach to managing the missile defense 

enterprise so that effective capabilities are acquired, rigorous testing is accomplished, and programs are affordable. In earlier years, the Missile Defense 

Agency (MDA) was assigned main responsibility for handling the effort in 

absence of strong guidance from elsewhere in DOD. During 2007–2008, 

this practice was altered. DOD created a Missile Defense Executive Board 

(MDEB) to bring together top DOD senior executives as well as Department 

of State and National Security Council officials to provide guidance on missile defense. Office of the Secretary of Defense staffs, military departments, 

Joint Staff, and combatant commands were provided authority to influence 

preparation of the MDA annual program plan and budget submission. In 

addition, a Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) Life Cycle Management 

Process was created to provide continuing overview of missile defense programs as they transition from MDA to implementation by the military 

departments. In the context of this strengthened approach to missile defense 

management by DOD, the BMDR Report addresses four specific questions:

•	 Whatmore can orshould be done nowto strengthen thetesting program?

•	 Can missile defense be made more cost-effective?

•	 Is internal DOD oversight of the program adequate?

•	 Is external transparency adequate?

In addressing the testing program, the BMDR Report states that the 

2002 approach, which called for simultaneous development and deployment 

of GBI missiles, was a high-risk acquisition strategy intended to quickly field 

missile defenses before testing was complete. The new approach, it states, 

reflects a commitment to fielding proven technologies and missiles. Thus, 

it urgently requires new testing practices aimed at validating capabilities 

before they are procured and deployed. Accordingly, it states, MDA is now 
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW REPORT 95

producing an Integrated Master Test Plan in concert with the Office of the 

Director, Operational Test & Evaluation, that addresses the testing of each 

system through the entire development process, rather than looking only 2 

years into the future. This plan, it states, outlines a combination of models, 

simulations, and actual flight tests that can be used to evaluate operational 

effectiveness and reliability before procurement decisions are made. The new 

approach to testing and evaluation, it argues, represents a major step forward 

and addresses concerns, including the need for better metrics for evaluating 

reliability and performance that arose with the prior test construct.

In addressing cost-effectiveness, the BMDR Report advances key metrics 

for performance: cost in comparison to other available options, affordability, 

and the relationship between incurred costs and costs avoided. The BMDR 

Report thereby implies that missile defense programs will be judged costeffective if they meet desired performance standards, are less expensive than 

other options, are affordable within realistic budgets, and help offset costs in 

such other areas as nuclear forces. But if they fail to meet these criteria because 

their costs are too high in relation to their effectiveness, they face potential 

cancellation. Noting that the BMD effort is consuming 2 percent of the 

DOD budget, it states that the actual life-cycle cost of new missile defense 

programs is hard to gauge because at early stages, there is no final configuration for the system. As a result, development and procurement costs become 

variables that depend upon the number of missiles ultimately deployed and 

their desired performance characteristics. Because of high costs, it states, 

DOD will not be able to buy enough interceptors to match adversary shortrange missiles on a one-for-one basis. This constraint, it judges, enhances the 

importance of fielding mobile systems that allow missiles to be concentrated 

quickly in order to address the most immediate threats.

In addition, the BMD Report announces decisions to cancel two troubled programs and to restructure a third:

•	 The Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV) has been terminated. Originally

intended to equip midcourse interceptors with a capacity to destroy 

all lethal objects in a threat cluster, the MKV program was terminated
96 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

because its technology was not maturing well enough and a continuing effort to strive for effective performance was deemed too costly 

and time-consuming.

•	 The Kinetic Energy Intercept (KEI) program has been terminated.

Originally intended to intercept enemy missiles in the boost-phase of 

flight, the KEI program was neither affordable nor proven, and its 

cost had ballooned from $4.6 billion to $8.9 billion, with production 

costs growing from $25 million per interceptor to $50 million.

•	 The Airborne Laser (ABL) program was restructured because it had

experienced repeated schedule delays and technical problems since 

inception in 1996, and its operating concept was not adequately 

defined. Plans for a second ABL aircraft were cancelled, and the first 

ABL aircraft was shifted to a technology demonstration program.

In addressing internal DOD oversight, the BMDR Report observes that 

in earlier years, MDA was exempted from DOD standard acquisition rules 

and the requirements generation process. The new management structure, 

it states, will correct this problem by bringing multiple actors into the decisionmaking process for missile defense. Stronger internal oversight, it continues, will be provided by the MDEB, by a warfighter-involvement process 

chaired by U.S. Strategic Command, and by the BMDS Life Cycle Management Process. As a result, the MDA budget now moves through a process 

that begins with top-level strategic direction, incorporates guidance from 

the military Services on requirements and desired capabilities, and is subject 

to final review by the MDEB and Deputy Secretary of Defense. The overall 

result, the BMDR Report judges, is an improved management process that 

draws upon MDA’s still important strengths in systems engineering and 

allows other DOD agencies to exert leadership aimed at ensuring that missile defense programs are affordable and meet the needs of the Services and 

combatant commanders.

In addressing external transparency, the BMDR Report states that 

earlier MDA special responsibilities and exemption from internal DOD 

oversight created concerns about congressional oversight and the transpar-
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW REPORT 97

ency of missile defense plans, programs, and commitments. To correct this 

problem, the BMDR Report promises enhanced efforts to keep Congress, 

committees, and staffs properly informed. This effort, it claims, will include 

detailed reports on substantive contents typical of all major acquisition 

programs, numerous special reports per year, and support for Government 

Accountability Office studies.

Strengths, Shortfalls, and Lingering Issues. The BMDR Report provides 

the best, most comprehensive DOD analysis of missile defense issues and 

programs released to the public in many years. Its importance is reminiscent 

of the famous DOD Damage Limitation Study of 1964, which was a classified study whose landmark contents were publicly released in Secretary of 

Defense annual posture statements over a period of 4 years. The main effect 

of the study was to close the door to major BMD deployments because they 

allegedly were too expensive, too ineffective, and likely to intensify the 

nuclear arms race. For 35 years after, the United States deployed no missile 

defenses, trusting nuclear forces to deter nuclear attack. The BMDR Report, 

in contrast, changes the longstanding U.S. strategic calculus by opening the 

door to building new but limited BMD defenses that are designed not to 

protect against Russia’s still large nuclear posture, but instead to defend 

against the smaller, but potentially menacing, offensive missiles of such 

regional adversaries as North Korea and Iran. Using U.S. missile defense 

commitments as an important new instrument for achieving greater security 

in key regions introduces a sea change in U.S. defense strategy, whose implications will take a long time to be fully understood and mastered and will 

generate a host of technical and strategic issues that will be studied and 

debated in the coming years. The BMDR Report should be judged in the 

context of its attractive promises and potent contents, as well as the new and 

unsettled issues it raises.

Whereas DOD’s initial foray into BMD defenses was the 2002 decision 

to deploy a small GMD posture to protect the U.S. homeland from smallscale missile attacks, the BMDR Report shifts attention away from the 

GMD posture of 30 ground-controlled interceptors already deployed in 
98 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

Alaska and California. Instead, it focuses on deploying a larger posture of 

different missile interceptors that can defend U.S. military forces as well as 

allies and partners in multiple regions: Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. 

The centerpiece of this new regional strategy is the SM–3 missile, which 

originally was intended to protect U.S. warships from missile attack, but 

now is intended to protect entire countries and regions from enemy missile 

threats and attacks aimed at cities and other vulnerable targets. The SM–3 

program is not the sole beneficiary of the new missile defense strategy, but 

it is the main beneficiary when judged in strategic and budgetary terms.

The viability of the new strategy depends heavily on anticipated 

improvements to the technical performance capacity of the SM–3. As many 

studies have pointed out, the act of employing “hit to kill” technology to 

shoot down enemy missiles and warheads during their midcourse trajectories 

is anything but easy; it requires precise hits against targets flying at very fast 

speed. In recent years, considerable progress has been made on developing 

the necessary technologies and systems, but as the BMDR Report acknowledges, the current SM–3 Block IA interceptor’s capabilities against emerging 

missile threats are only modest. As a result, the BMDR Report calls for 

vigorous RDT&E efforts to field successor models. Of these, the Block IB 

is to be available in 2015 and the more capable Blocks IIA and IIB around 

2018–2020. Much depends upon the ability of ongoing RDT&E programs 

to meet this schedule, but at best, the improved SM–3s are not to be available for 5 to 10 years. Whether this development and deployment schedule 

will be fast enough to counterbalance adversary efforts to field nucleartipped missiles is yet to be seen. Even if this schedule proves adequate, the 

BMDR Report acknowledges, DOD will face a demanding management 

agenda to produce improved SM–3s that are effective and affordable. The 

new DOD management structure seems aligned with meeting this challenge, but only future results will tell.

In gauging the future SM–3 posture, a key issue arises: How many 

SM–3 interceptors will be needed, how many will be available, and how are 

they to be fielded? Today, SM–3 interceptors are mounted aboard Aegis
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW REPORT 99

warships. Although each Aegis ship can carry multiple SM–3 launchers, 

currently the Navy has only about 25 such ships in its inventory, and at any 

given time, only about one-third of them will be deployed abroad. If they 

are scattered among European, Persian Gulf, and Asian waters, only two to 

three Aegis warships will be available in each region. To handle this constraint, the BMD Report calls for a mobile practice that relocates these ships 

in ways that can increase SM–3 concentrations in a single theater to meet 

the demands of a crisis. But a strategy of rapid relocation means that other 

theaters could be deprived of SM–3 defenses needed for deterrence and 

defense in normal peacetime conditions, as well as simultaneous crises. 

DOD is endeavoring to increase the number of current warships equipped 

with Aegis radars and launchers, but in future years, construction of additional Aegis ships might be needed—a trend that could bolster arguments 

for a larger Navy. Beyond this, DOD is proposing to deploy Aegis systems 

and SM–3 missiles ashore at two sites in Europe. Expansion of this shorebased practice seems likely to spread to Asia and perhaps the Middle East. 

Moreover, key allies (for instance, NATO Allies in Europe and Japan) are 

expected to acquire defense missiles of their own—if not the SM–3, then a 

comparable capability. The future remains to be seen, but when the total 

number of required SM–3s and other interceptors is added up, the result 

could be larger missile defense inventories than were foreseen only a few 

years ago.

Another issue revolves around how much defense capability the future 

posture of SM–3s and other missile interceptors will provide. Ideally, they 

should furnish an impregnable roof over regional allies and partners. But the 

complex physics and mathematics of hit-to-kill practices mean that while 

numerous enemy missiles can theoretically be shot down, a barrage attack is 

likely to produce a few that escape and hit their targets. A strong but not 

impregnable missile defense posture may be potent enough to deter enemy 

attack in most cases, but most likely, the act of ensuring deterrence in all cases 

will require a U.S. strategy of still relying upon the threat of nuclear retaliation 

against aggressors. Indeed, a strategy that relies only upon potentially leaky 
100 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

missile defenses could leave aggressors free to launch missile attacks with 

impunity, with confidence that they likely will succeed to some degree, and 

that, in any event, they will not suffer reprisals. As a result, the future likely 

will yield a U.S. strategy that combines nuclear forces and widespread missile 

defenses in a setting of proliferating adversary nuclear-tipped missiles. Indeed, 

some adversaries may enlarge their offensive missile inventories to offset U.S. 

missile interceptors. Perhaps such an outcome will provide strategic stability, 

but the BMD Report does not seem poised to ease the transition to a nuclearfree world as envisioned by the Nuclear Posture Review Report. If so, it seems 

likely to produce a more complex international security system than exists 

today, one with new dangers of its own.

Yet another issue is whether allies and partners will perform the roles 

expected of them in the new missile defense strategy. When the decision to 

cancel the GMD Site Three in Poland and the Czech Republic was announced, 

several East European and Baltic members of NATO perceived that the step 

was intended to mollify Russian objections to GMD in Europe. These countries 

expressed worry, couched in historical memory, that the U.S. decision would 

leave them exposed to Russian political and military measures. Announcement 

of the SM–3 PAA for Europe helped quiet these fears and provide reassurance 

that Europe will be defended against future missile threats from Iran. But while 

the PAA is intended to form the U.S. contribution to European missile defense, 

it is expected to be accompanied by complementary missile defense efforts by 

NATO Allies. At the moment, NATO has its ALTMD concept, but no NATO 

members have plans and programs to field midcourse interceptors comparable 

to the SM–3. Appropriate burden-sharing seems likely to mandate European 

financial contributions to the U.S. PAA. This could require deployment of 

European defense missiles if the PAA does not provide enough SM–3s to defend 

the entire continent against future threats. But Europeans face tight budget 

constraints in ways that could leave them reluctant to spend sizable amounts on 

missile defenses. If they do not contribute in meaningful ways, the United States 

could find itself providing missile defense to Europe alone, a development that 

would add further strains to the already stressed transatlantic relationship.
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW REPORT 101

Similar issues arise in gauging the reactions of allies and partners in Asia 

and the Middle East.

In Asia, Japan is participating robustly in the U.S. SM–3 program, but 

South Korea has only begun to consider its requirement for missile defenses, 

and the same conclusion applies to Australia and other regional allies and 

partners. The looming prospect is that most of these countries could be 

threatened by not only Chinese nuclear missiles but also those of North 

Korea. Defending Europe against new era missile threats from Iran is relatively easy because Europe is small and compact—a modest posture of 

properly situated SM–3s and other interceptors can provide a protective 

umbrella over the entire continent. But the Asia-Pacific region is another 

matter as its island countries are mostly separated by long distances. Short 

of each country building its own missile defenses or relying on each other 

for deterrence and defense, protection of this entire vast region will have 

to be handled mainly by U.S. SM–3 interceptors. While such area coverage 

by SM–3s may be a manageable proposition for the U.S. military, the act 

of protecting multiple countries from the same threats raises questions 

about whether the existing U.S. pattern of purely bilateral treaties with 

allies can continue to suffice. A collective U.S. missile defense concept 

could mandate creation of some form of multilateral alliance. So far, 

enhanced multilateral defense planning has made only initial progress 

across Asia. Wrestling with the collective and multilateral implications of 

region-wide U.S. missile defense could become a defining challenge in 

future U.S.-Asia security affairs.

What applies to Asia holds doubly true in the Middle East and Persian 

Gulf, where bilateral U.S. security relationships, not collective security, are 

the dominant pattern. If Iran emerges as a nuclear-armed power in ways 

mandating U.S.-provided missile defenses across the region, some form of 

collective multilateral collaboration will be needed. Creating it could be 

easier said than done.

Finally, how will Russia and China react to a U.S.-led effort to deploy 

SM–3 missile defenses across multiple regions, including in their own back 
102 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

yards? Thus far, Russia has expressed satisfaction with cancellation of

GMD Site Three, and it does not seem to fear an initial SM–3 deployment 

that will be located in southern Europe and pointed further southward. 

But if SM–3 radars and interceptors begin appearing in northern Europe 

in ways that could menace Russian nuclear missiles, the government in 

Moscow can be expected to react negatively. Under the New Strategic Arms 

Reduction Treaty (START), the Russians will still have ample nuclear 

missiles to overpower modest SM–3 defenses. For example, a Russian 

posture of 700 strategic delivery vehicles and 1,550 nuclear warheads would 

not be menaced by 100 U.S. SM–3 missile interceptors in Europe. But will 

this continue to be the case as SM–3 defenses grow in number and capability, even as future U.S.-Russia arms control negotiations strive for deeper 

reductions in offensive missiles? As the BMDR Report acknowledges,

future negotiations will need to address both offensive and defensive forces 

if stability is to be enhanced. But reaching an accord with Russia may be 

a difficult task that could compromise the quest for deeper nuclear cuts. A 

similar judgment applies to future relations with China. Although current 

U.S. concepts for deploying SM–3 missiles in Asia are mainly focused on 

protection against North Korea, modest numbers of them could menace 

China’s currently small nuclear posture. Will China react by enlarging its 

nuclear posture, or will U.S. discussions with China produce a mutual 

understanding that leaves China’s arsenal secure but Asian allies and partners protected from North Korea? Such an understanding is a desirable

goal, but whether it can be achieved is uncertain.
CHAPTER SIX

NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic 

Engagement

Whereas the preceding five chapters do not provide much detailed 

analysis and guidance on how U.S. overseas alliances should 

be reformed, this sixth study helps to fill this gap by examining North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) future challenges, prospects, and priorities in considerable depth. NATO 2020: Assured Security; 

Dynamic Engagement (ASDE Report) is a 47-page document released in May 

2010. Led by former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, a multinational 

team of independent experts wrote it to advise the NATO Secretary-General 

on how to write a new Alliance strategic concept that would replace the 

outdated version adopted in 1999. The ASDE Report provides not only advice 

on the new strategic concept, but also a welter of analyses and recommendations on how NATO as a whole should be reformed to enhance its capabilities for performing old and new strategic missions.

Crafting a Forward-looking NATO Strategic Agenda. While not pretending to offer a crystal ball for predicting where the world is headed, the ASDE 

Report appraises emerging global security affairs in terms that can be characterized as a blend of guarded optimism and pensive worry. Guarded 

optimism is appropriate, it judges, because of such positive trends as economic and political progress in Europe and elsewhere, as well as the willingness of many countries to collaborate together to handle common problems. 

Pensive worry is appropriate, it counters, because of multiple hazardous 

trends and problems in numerous regions, as well as uncertainty about 

unpleasant surprises that could lie ahead. The challenge facing NATO, it 

asserts, is to continue evolving and improving in ways that better equip itself 

103
104 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

to deal with a fluid, rapidly changing security environment, one that is 

radically different from the old bipolar structure of the Cold War. In Europe, 

it states, conventional aggression against the Alliance or its members is 

unlikely, but the possibility cannot be ignored. The most probable threats 

to NATO in the coming decade are unconventional: attack by ballistic missiles (nuclear-armed or not), strikes by international terrorist groups, and 

assaults against NATO’s cyber networks. But in a larger strategic sense, it 

acknowledges, the greatest dangers to Europe’s security are arising in the 

Middle East and other distant regions in ways that compel the Alliance to 

adopt a broader global outlook.

To deal with this menacing security environment, the ASDE Report 

urges, NATO should adopt a new strategic concept and associated policies 

for a two-fold purpose: to assure the continuing security of all Alliance 

members, and to engage dynamically outside the NATO area to minimize 

emerging threats. The study sees NATO as a confident and effective but 

challenged alliance that must muster new types of resolve, cohesion, and 

capabilities to deal with such new perils as potential troubles with Russia, 

terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, regional 

conflicts, and threats to cyberspace and energy security. In the years ahead, 

it calls upon NATO to perform four basic tasks:

•	 maintain the ability to deter and defend member states against any

threat of aggression

•	 contribute to the broader security of the entire Euro-Atlantic area

•	 serve as a transatlantic means for security and crisis management

along the entire spectrum of issues facing the Alliance

•	 enhancethescope and management of partnerships with nonmember

countries, international organizations, and other actors.

Accordingly, the ASDE Report puts forth a 15-part strategic agenda for 

moving NATO toward 2020. NATO, it states, should act by:

•	 reaffirming NATO’s core commitment to Article 5 collective defense

missions in ways that shield new and old members from aggression 
NATO 2020 105

by maintaining adequate military capabilities plus contingency planning, focused exercises, force readiness, and sound logistics

•	 protecting against such new unconventional threats as WMD attacks,

terrorist strikes, and disruption of critical supply lines by updating 

NATO’s approach to defense of security while enhancing the ability 

to prevail in military operations and broader security missions beyond 

its borders

•	 establishing guidelines for operations outside NATO borders in ways

that effectively perform agreed-upon missions while reflecting limitations on Alliance interests, scope of external involvements, and 

resources

•	 creating conditions for success in Afghanistan by contributing adequately to International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) missions as 

well as following such principles (there and elsewhere) as cohesion, 

desirability of unified command, value of effective planning and 

public diplomacy, aptness of a comprehensive civil-military approach, 

and need to deploy forces at a strategic distance for an extended time

•	 employing consultations under Article 4 to prevent or manage crises

in ways that share information, promote a convergence of views, avoid 

crippling disputes, and provide a clear path for successful actions that 

could be diplomatic, precautionary, remedial, or coercive

•	 pursuing a new era of partnerships by deepening relationships with

existing partners, establishing new partnerships, and expanding the 

range of partnership activities

•	 participating in a comprehensive approach to complex problems by

being capable of operating in demanding situations that require both 

military forces and civilian assets, and by collaborating with other 

countries and organizations that may play lead roles in handling key 

missions

•	 engaging with Russia in constructive ways while assuring NATO

members that their security and interests will be defended if troubles 

arise with Russia

•	 maintaining an open door to potential new members including the

Balkan states, Ukraine, and Georgia
106 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

•	 developing new military capabilities for an unfolding era by pursuing

transformation and reform, so that future NATO forces can defend 

their borders, undertake demanding missions at strategic distance, 

and provide the mobility, flexibility, and versatility needed to be 

prepared for unpredictable contingencies

•	 maintaining Alliance-wide solidarity on nuclear weapons policy by

keeping secure and reliable nuclear forces for security, employing the 

Alliance as a whole in making any decisions that alter current deployments or geographic distributions, and supporting global efforts 

aimed at halting nuclear proliferation

•	 pursuing the new mission of missile defense by reacting constructively

to the U.S. phased adaptive approach (PAA) and jointly carrying out 

other NATO-wide steps to enhance future capabilities while consulting with Russia and other partners

•	 responding to the rising danger of cyber attacks by accelerating

NATO efforts to respond to such attacks, protect its own communications and command systems, help Allies improve their ability to 

prevent and recover from such attacks, and develop an array of 

improved cyber defense capabilities for detection and deterrence

•	 implementing reforms to create a more agile Alliance by pursuing

administrative and other steps aimed at producing a grouping that is 

leaner, better able to make timely decisions, and more efficient and 

cost effective

•	 strengthening NATO’s capacity to tell its story to its own population,

the entire Euro-Atlantic community, and other regions by widely 

disseminating the new strategic concept and pursuing other public 

communications.

Handling NATO Political and Organizational Issues. The ASDE Report 

states that a new strategic concept offers NATO the opportunity to take stock 

of recent events and forge a fresh consensus on issues likely to be central to 

the management and direction of the organization. Those issues are:

•	 lessons of Afghanistan

•	 guidelines for missions outside Alliance borders
NATO 2020 107

•	 administrative reforms

•	 decisionmaking procedures

•	 open door policy

•	 NATO’s role in conventional arms control.

In addressing the lessons of Afghanistan since NATO assumed ISAF 

leadership in 2003, the ASDE Report states that although ISAF has achieved 

much, its experience has led to concerns within the Alliance about unity of 

command, restrictions or caveats placed on use of troop contributions by some 

members, tactics and goals, and civilian casualties. Key lessons learned are:

•	 NATO must be able to deploy units that are tailored to specific and

sustained operations at a distance beyond Alliance borders.

•	 To the maximum extent feasible, NATO forces should operate under

a unified chain of command.

•	 The need to shield civilians must continue to be emphasized in training and field operations.

•	 Prisoners and detainees should be treated in accordance with international law.

•	 Stability in Afghanistan will not comethrough military means alone:

as with other counterinsurgency situations, it requires a civil-military 

approach that enables local government to earn the trust and loyalty 

of the population, works closely with partner organizations, and 

provides help for host-nation security forces.

In addressing guidelines for operations outside NATO borders, the ASDE 

Report states that while NATO should be firm and resolute in the use of force 

and related security actions, it should be cautious about undertaking missions 

not truly necessary and careful not to overextend the Alliance beyond its capacities and its internal consensus. Accordingly, it puts forth three recommendations:

•	 The new strategic concept should include a set of guidelines for

informing NATO decisionmaking about undertaking new missions 

or responsibilities.
108 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

•	 NATO should maintain a level of preparedness and operational

tempo that responds to the security needs of its members, thus avoiding both overreach and complacency.

•	 Through transparency and effective public communications, NATO

must strive to attract and maintain public and legislative backing for 

its operations.

In addressing administrative reforms, the ASDE Report states, a farreaching reform agenda should be pursued that strengthens the authorities 

of the Secretary-General, reduces the number of committees and staffs, 

reduces costs of headquarters personnel, and otherwise streamlines in ways 

that produce financial savings. In addressing NATO decisionmaking procedures, the ASDE Report points to an inherent tension between an alliance 

that always strives for unanimous consensus among 28 members before it 

acts, and the demands of a new security environment that often require 

prompt action. It judges that the unanimous consensus rule should be preserved for such critical NATO decisions as commitments, budgets, operations, and new members. But it also calls for more flexible rules on less vital 

decisions, quicker implementation of decisions that reflect an agreed-upon 

consensus, and predelegation of some authorities to the Secretary-General 

and NATO military leaders to respond to such emergency situations as 

missile or cyber attack. In calling for NATO to preserve its open door 

policy to new members, it states that further enlargement should continue 

to be guided by such principles as requiring that new members embrace 

democratic values and NATO’s visions, are implementing necessary military 

reforms to meet NATO standards, and can contribute to security. In addressing conventional arms control, the ASDE Report states that NATO should 

support revival of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 

(CFE) process, which has been stalled by Russian foot-dragging.

Building Partnerships. The ASDE Report declares that productive partnership relationships with other countries and organizations enable NATO 

to be more vigilant, better prepared to handle threats, smarter in its actions, 

and more operationally effective when partners contribute resources to com-
NATO 2020 109

mon enterprises. The first generation of partnerships, it states, was mainly 

intended to facilitate entry of new members into the Alliance, and the second 

was aimed at recruiting partners for operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan. It judges that a shift to recruiting and nurturing more partners for 

pursuing broader NATO security activities is now needed. Accordingly, it 

recommends that NATO should:

•	 maintain Partnership for Peace activities while strengthening use of

the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council for consultations

•	 strengthen partnership activities with the European Union (EU) in

such areas as developing and using common military capabilities, 

addressing terrorism, cyber attacks, and energy vulnerabilities, and 

pursuing comprehensive approaches for handling complex operations 

in distant areas

•	 enhance institutional links and cooperative security activities with

the United Nations (UN)

•	 preserve already existing close ties with the Organization for Security

and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) while making use of the OSCE’s 

toolbox of soft power assets

•	 preserve appropriate partnership activities with Russia whileensuring

that the security of all NATO members is protected, and strengthen 

use of the NATO-Russia Council

•	 strengthen NATO’s ongoing dialogue with Ukraine and Georgia on

common security issues

•	 strengthen NATO partnerships in the Mediterranean and Middle

East by employing the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul 

Cooperation Initiative

•	 deepen existing operational partnerships with countries outside the

Europe-Atlantic area, including Australia, New Zealand, South 

Korea, and Japan, all of which have contributed importantly in 

Afghanistan. In addition, look for ways to cooperate with China on 

common endeavors and strengthen formal ties to such bodies as the 

African Union, Organization of American States, Gulf Cooperative 
110 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

Council, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and Collective Security Treaty Organization.

Strengthening NATO’s Forces and Capabilities. The ASDE Report 

launches its discussion of Alliance defense priorities by pointing out that for 

several years, NATO leaders have been calling for steady force improvements. 

During this time, they have endorsed the Defense Capability Initiative (DCI) 

of 1999, Prague Summit declaration of 2002, Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG) of the Riga Summit in 2006, and Strasbourg-Kehl Summit 

declaration of 2009. All of these proclamations called upon NATO and its 

members to strengthen forces and capabilities for new missions including 

expeditionary operations outside Europe. For example, the DCI encouraged 

NATO force enhancements in five broad areas such as mobility and the 

ability to deploy, the Prague Summit expanded the list to eight categories 

and created the new Allied Command Transformation (ACT) and NATO 

Response Force (NRF), and the CPG called for NATO’s land forces to be 

40 percent deployable and for 8 percent to be deployable on a sustained basis 

(the targets were later raised to 50 percent and 10 percent, respectively).

Despite this drumbeat of official encouragement, the ASDE Report 

declares, NATO forces have improved only slowly, with the result that a 

significant gap still exists between the requirements of potential missions 

and actual capabilities. The principal cause for this slow progress, the ASDE 

Report argues, has been the lack of adequate European defense spending. 

Today, it states, European defense budgets average well below 2 percent of 

gross domestic product (GDP) (a standard suggested by many leaders). Only 

about a dozen members have met goals on their ability to deploy and sustainment. And because most defense budgets are consumed by spending on 

operations and personnel, not even half of NATO members meet the official 

benchmark of allocating 20 percent of budgets to investment and procurement. Although encouraging progress has been made by some countries 

such as Great Britain and France, the predictable result has been a slow crawl 

toward the future.
NATO 2020 111

To encourage faster improvements, the ASDE Report calls on the new 

strategic concept to be accompanied by an agreed upon set of priorities for 

improved capabilities and military reforms. In the coming years, the ASDE 

Report declares, NATO will need a flexible, deployable, networked, and 

sustainable military posture that can meet the full range of Alliance responsibilities at affordable cost. NATO’s future military posture will need to be 

capable of performing four central missions:

•	 deter, prevent, and defend against any threat of aggression in order

to protect the political independence and territorial integrity of all 

Alliance members in accordance with Article 5

•	 cooperate with partners and civilian institutions to protect the treaty

area against unconventional security challenges (for example, cyber 

attack)

•	 deploy and sustain forces for expeditionary operations beyond the

treaty area when required to prevent an attack on NATO or to protect 

the legal rights and vital interests of Alliance members

•	 help shape a more stable and peaceful international security environment by enhancing partner interoperability, training partner military 

and police forces, coordinating military assistance, and cooperating 

with the governments of key countries.

If NATO is to fulfill these four missions, the ASDE Report argues, it 

must halt the decline of defense spending, implement new reforms and 

efficiencies, and set priorities for future capabilities. To strengthen NATO 

conventional forces and capabilities, the ASDE Report calls for the following steps:

•	 provide members reassurance of Article 5 commitments through

enhanced contingency planning, preparations for crisis management, 

equipment assessments, and appropriate military exercises

•	 achieve ability-to-deploy and sustainability goals by restructuring

more forces away from traditional fixed territorial defense missions 

and creating better strategic lift
112 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

•	 broaden the role of the NRF to perform both Article 5 and non–

Article 5 missions

•	 capitalize on the commonality of Article 5 and expeditionary missions

by improving capabilities that can be employed in both

•	 strengthen command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4

ISR) architectures and 

information networks

•	 strengthen special operations forces and capabilities

•	 upgrade ACT by giving it a bolder mandate, greater authorities, and

more resources in order to guide force transformation

•	 improve education and training

•	 enhance maritime situational awareness around NATO’s periphery,

the High North, Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean, and other areas.

Defense reforms and efficiencies, the ASDE Report states, will be 

needed to make effective use of scarce resources, acquire new capabilities, 

and combine the often separate defense efforts of many countries. It declares 

that NATO should encourage:

•	 new, truly multinational formations with unified command and control, interdependent logistics, and integrated civil-military components

•	 new informal pooling arrangements, especially for strategic lift

•	 increased common funding and interoperability for C4ISR

•	 common approaches to logistics

•	 further evolution and coordination of national specialization and

niche capabilities

•	 exploration of opportunities for additional multinational procurement

programs

•	 development of a NATO/EU defense capabilities agency

•	 use of common funds for costs for selected deployments, including

an annual NRF exercise
NATO 2020 113

•	 further review of NATO’s command structure to reduce costs while

enhancing force flexibility and ability to deploy.

To strengthen capabilities for common approaches that employ military 

and civilian assets, the ASDE Report recommends that NATO should:

•	 prepare at all levels to be part of integrated civilian-military missions

•	 maintain up-to-date memoranda of understanding with the UN, EU,

OSCE, other regional bodies, and nongovernmental organizations

•	 identify civilian capabilities to be deployed along with combat forces

for stability operations

•	 ask members to identify a cadre of civilian reservists with experience

in complex operations that could be deployed when needed

•	 help partners improve their capacity to contribute to complex operations and comprehensive approaches.

In addressing policies for nuclear weapons and arms control, the ASDE 

Report states that the Alliance should be prepared for in-depth consultations 

on the role of nuclear weapons in its deterrence strategy. These consultations 

should take into account the growing roles of other capabilities as well as 

the desire to negotiate deep reductions in nuclear weapons. The ASDE 

Report offers several parameters for consultations and recommendations:

•	 As long as nuclear weapons remain a reality in international relations,

NATO should retain a nuclear component to its deterrence strategy, 

but at the minimum possible level.

•	 Currently, the retention of some U.S. forward-deployed nuclear

weapons in Europe reinforces extended deterrence and collective 

defense.

•	 Broad participation by nonnuclear Allies is an essential sign of transatlantic solidarity and risk-taking—for example, by hosting nuclear 

deployments on their territory.

•	 NATO should continue to ensure the absolute physical security of

nuclear weapons stored on European soil.
114 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

•	 There should be ongoing dialogue with Russia on nuclear issues,

including negotiations aimed at reducing or eliminating substrategic 

nuclear weapons.

•	 NATO should reestablish the Special Consultative Group on Arms

Control to facilitate its internal dialogue on key issues.

•	 NATO should endorse a policy of not using or threatening to use

nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states that are party to the NonProliferation Treaty and its provisions.

In addressing future missile defenses, the ASDE Report endorses the 

U.S. PAA, and states that NATO should recognize territorial missile defense 

as an essential Alliance mission. It calls for NATO to agree to expand its 

ALTMD system to provide the core command and control capability for a 

NATO territorial missile defense system. It does not specify whether, and 

to what degree, European missile interceptors should be acquired to complement the U.S.-provided SM–3 missiles.

In addressing how NATO should prepare to respond to unconventional 

dangers, the ASDE recommends that:

•	 NATO’s Defense Against Terrorism Program should be expanded

beyond technology-related work to include research on investigative 

techniques, deterrence, and social networking.

•	 NATO should strengthen itsefforts and capabilities to defend against

cyber attacks.

•	 NATO should give thought to how to respond to energy supply disruptions in order to mitigate harm to its members and to find alternative sources of supply.

Strengths, Shortfalls, and Lingering Issues. By presenting a comprehensive 

and detailed analysis of future NATO security challenges and priorities, the 

ASDE Report fulfills its mandate to provide NATO constructive, usable 

guidance on how a new strategic concept should be written. It also provides 

a host of good ideas for shaping NATO plans and programs in the years 

following adoption of a new strategic concept. It is especially strong in its 
NATO 2020 115

efforts to identify future Alliance tasks and missions, to call for renewed 

efforts to protect members in exposed regions, and to urge improvements 

in NATO conventional forces and capabilities for expeditionary missions. 

In addition, it correctly calls for focused attention on new threats such as 

cyber attack and terrorism, improved assets for comprehensive approaches 

to complex operations, accelerated cooperation with old and new partners, 

and serious NATO pursuit of defense reforms and efficiencies. All of these 

strengths make the ASDE Report one of the best NATO studies to emerge 

in recent years. It ratifies the practice of assembling a team of outside experts 

to conduct a detailed appraisal of strategy challenges and priorities before 

U.S. Government and Allied officials begin making official decisions on 

them, and it provides a model for how U.S. goals and priorities in other 

regions can be addressed in comprehensive, thorough ways.

Events since its publication show that the ASDE has achieved a major 

success because many of its analyses and principles were adopted when the 

Alliance issued its new strategic concept of “Active Engagement, Modern 

Defense,” along with an official communiqué, at the Lisbon Summit in 

November 2010. Together, the two documents call upon NATO to perform 

three core security tasks in the years ahead: collective defense of members, 

crisis management in the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond, and cooperative 

security by working closely with other allies and partners outside Europe. 

To carry out these tasks, the two documents state that NATO will:

•	 keep as its highest priority ISAF success in Afghanistan, transition to

full Afghan responsibility and leadership during 2011–2014, and

withdraw gradually and only upon proper conditions

•	 remain steadfast in its commitment to regional stability and security

throughout the Balkan region including Kosovo, continue to perform 

such operations as Active Endeavor in the Mediterranean and Ocean 

Shield off the Horn of Africa, and support the African Union in 

Somalia and elsewhere and the NATO Training Mission in Iraq

•	 work closely with the UN and OSCE and strive to strengthen its

partnership with the European Union
116 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

•	 remain open to new European members that meet Alliancestandards,

including such candidates as Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia and 

Herzegovina, and Georgia, and continue pursuing close partnership 

activities with Ukraine and other countries

•	 pursue a revitalized strategic partnership with Russia in areas of

mutual interest and reciprocity

•	 strive to strengthen its cooperative partnerships with the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, Partnership for Peace, Mediterranean Dialogue countries, and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative countries

•	 continue to promote arms control through such efforts as New

START, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the CFE Treaty 

Regime.

The two documents also establish important goals and principles for 

guiding NATO defense planning in the coming years:

•	 NATO’s future military forces should be capable of performing all

Article 5 missions and carrying out expeditionary operations outside 

Europe.

•	 NATO will pursue reforms, modernization, and transformation

toward creating a more effective, efficient, and flexible Alliance so its 

taxpayers get the most security for the money they invest in defense.

•	 NATO’s military command structure and agencies will be streamlined to conserve manpower and funds.

•	 Deterrence based on conventional and nuclear capabilities remains a

core element of NATO strategy: the Alliance does not consider any 

country to be an adversary, but no country should doubt NATO 

resolve if the security of any member is threatened.

•	 U.S. strategic nuclear forces, supplemented by those of Great Britain

and France, provide the supreme guarantee of Alliance security, and 

NATO will remain a nuclear power for as long as nuclear weapons exist.

•	 While the threat of conventional attack on NATO territory is low, it

cannot be ignored, and Alliance forces must be capable of performing 

missions to defeat all forms of attacks and threats.
NATO 2020 117

•	 NATO will maintain the capacity to conduct and sustain concurrent

major joint operations and several smaller operations for collective 

defense and crisis response at strategic distances.

•	 NATO will develop and maintain robust, mobile, and deployable

conventional forces to carry out both Article 5 missions and expeditionary operations, including with the NRF.

•	 NATO will carry out the necessary training, exercises, contingency

planning, and information exchanges for providing viable reassurance 

and reinforcement for all Allies.

•	 NATO will ensure the broadest participation of Allies in collective

defense planning in nuclear roles, including peacetime basing, C3I 

systems, and consultations.

•	 NATO will develop ballistic missile defenses against future threats

by expanding the ALTMD to protect European countries and welcoming the U.S. PAA as an important contribution to meeting missile defense requirements.

•	 NATO will develop improved capabilities for defending against

chemical, biological, and radiological/weapons of mass destruction

threats, cyber attacks, terrorism, and threats to energy security and 

supply lines.

•	 NATO will develop doctrine and capabilities for expeditionary operations, including counterinsurgency, stabilization, and reconstruction 

operations as well as better civilian assets for comprehensive operations involving other partners and institutions.

•	 NATO will sustain the necessary level of defense spending so that its

armed forces are sufficiently resourced.

•	 To use available resources effectively and efficiently, NATO will

maximize the deployment capacity of its forces, undertake efforts to 

meet usability targets, reduce duplication and redundancy, focus 

development of capabilities on modern requirements, develop and 

operate capabilities jointly, and preserve and strengthen common 

capabilities and standards.

•	 NATO civilian and military authorities will conduct a review of Alliance military forces, capabilities, improvement priorities, reforms, 
118 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

and innovations that will be ready by the time of Foreign and Defense 

Ministerial meetings that will be prepared in the coming months.

Overall, the new strategic concept is a solid and workmanlike document 

that does a comprehensive job of identifying most key issues, establishing 

clear goals, and articulating future policies. Critics are likely to accuse it of 

being so lofty, general, and abstract that it papers over unresolved issues and 

controversies (for example, future tactical nuclear warheads in Europe, 

realistic prospects for cooperation with Russia, strategy for dealing with a 

nuclear-armed Iran, and willingness to launch future Afghanistan-like 

operations). While some of these criticisms may have merit, it is fair to 

conclude that the new strategic concept establishes a solid planning framework whose many details will now need to be decided in future months and 

years. The bottom line is that the new strategic concept will succeed only 

to the extent that it is actually implemented, and doing so promises to be 

challenging. The new concept is best seen as an indispensable part of the 

solution, but not the whole solution.

Similar conclusions apply to the principles established by the new strategic concept for guiding future NATO defense planning and preparations. 

Individually and collectively, all of them make sense. But they are long on 

generalities and short on specifics. While they establish abstract goals, they 

provide almost no guidance on such critical issues as:

•	 the extent to which existing NATO defense capabilities are either

adequate or inadequate

•	 the degreetowhich enhanced capabilities in multiple areas must be built

•	 required targets for defensespending, investment budgets, manpower,

and force levels

•	 thespecific planning and programming agendas that NATO militaries should be pursuing over the coming decade

•	 how modernization and improvement priorities are to be set in a

period of austere budgets
NATO 2020 119

•	 how NATO and European force structures should pursue innovations, including multinational forces, pooled assets, and common 

procurement programs, in the future.

The lack of attention to these concrete issues, and the abstract nature of 

the defense principles put forth by the new strategic concept, owe partly to 

the decision of the Lisbon Summit to refrain from issuing a special communiqué on defense planning. Such communiqués were issued by three 

NATO summits over the past years: the Defense Capabilities Initiative of 

1999, the Prague Capabilities Commitment of 2002, and the Comprehensive 

Political Guidance of 2006. All three of these provided the type of detailed 

defense guidance lacking in the Lisbon Summit and new strategic concept. 

The task of remedying this deficiency has been handed to NATO defense 

ministers and foreign ministers in subsequent meetings. In the intervening 

period, NATO civilian and military officials will have a great deal to consider 

as they shape the specific defense agenda of the coming decade.

While much will depend upon official guidance emanating from 

NATO Headquarters, much also will depend upon the defense budgets 

and improvement efforts pursued by European countries. As the ASDE 

Report acknowledges, Alliance military forces and capabilities currently 

are deficient in multiple ways when judged in relation to the requirements 

and missions facing them in coming years. European defense spending is 

too low, too few forces are capable of deploying outside their borders, 

critical enablers are lacking, modernization programs are too slow, and 

reform efforts are far from complete. The austerity budgets now sweeping 

over Europe, moreover, are raising the prospect of worrisome cutbacks in 

spending and forces. For example, Britain recently announced a future 8 

percent reduction of its defense budget and 10 to 15 percent cutbacks in its 

combat forces, the Netherlands has announced a 16 percent cut in its force 

posture, and Germany has announced a 13 percent reduction to its defense 

budget by 2015 and a 25 percent reduction to its military manpower. Other 

countries seem likely to follow suit. The ultimate outcome of this down-
120 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

ward trend remains to be seen, but if it spirals out of control, NATO could 

find itself hard-pressed to fund adequate budgets, perform key missions, 

acquire vital new capabilities, and modernize and transform its forces at an 

appropriate rate. In the extreme case, NATO’s military strategy and capability could become stuck in a stall pattern—that is, still able to perform 

old continental defense missions, but no better able to protect the Baltic 

states and other new members, deploy missile defenses, perform demanding 

expeditionary operations outside Europe, or pursue comprehensive 

approaches in unstable areas.

As worried observers are pointing out, such a defense stall pattern could 

have larger political consequences across the Alliance. The combination of 

anemic defense efforts, crippling cutbacks in budgets and forces, premature 

withdrawal from Afghanistan, and unwise decisions to remove U.S. nuclear 

weapons from Europe could produce not only lowered strategic horizons in 

Europe but also growing American doubts that the Europeans are willing 

to carry their weight in Europe and in modern-era security affairs. The 

interaction of doubtful Americans and inward-looking Europeans, in turn, 

could erode the transatlantic bond, damage Alliance cohesion, and produce 

a weakened NATO that is less able to defend Europe, much less play a 

weighty role in the Middle East and other endangered regions. Such dire 

consequences are not inevitable, but the key point is that in the emerging 

situation, they are becoming possible.

Can such a disastrous outcome be avoided? Can the Alliance ensure 

that the Lisbon Summit and the new strategic concept produce more than 

fine sounding rhetoric that is not acted upon? Part of the solution can be 

found if NATO members avoid damaging cutbacks to their defense budgets. 

The defense budgets for most members are already so small that they are 

“austerity budgets.” Major cuts to them would risk slashing muscle, not just 

fat. Rather than cutting them unilaterally in large ways, a better practice is 

to adopt a coordinated multilateral approach, and if some programs are cut, 

to channel the savings into high priority improvement areas. Once the current emphasis on austerity has passed and sustained GDP is reestablished 
NATO 2020 121

across Europe, perhaps NATO members can begin restoring real growth to 

their defense budgets. If so, austerity may become a brief phase that gives 

way to better funding later in this decade.

Damaging cutbacks to NATO military forces also should be avoided. 

The Alliance may not need its current posture of 2.1 million European 

military personnel on active duty or a full gleaming inventory of new weapons. But it needs enough flexible, mobile, deployable forces to handle two 

major contingencies and several minor ones. Because current military forces 

can provide only about one-half of this capability, improvements to NATO 

expeditionary forces and capabilities are badly needed. Fortunately, this 

agenda is affordable because the necessary enabling assets (better interoperability for joint operations, training and exercise regimes, C4

ISR systems, 

strategic lift, and logistic support) are not highly expensive. They can be 

funded if room is made for them in European defense budgets and investment budgets. Over a period of 10 years, a large number of improvement 

programs in these areas could be funded if only about 5 percent of total 

European defense spending annually is devoted to them.

In addition to pursuing such programs, NATO will need to take care 

that it preserves enough high-quality combat forces in the face of potential 

manpower cuts now under way. On the surface, European members of 

NATO currently field large forces: their 2.1 million active military personnel 

generate a huge posture of 165 ground brigades, 2,685 fighter aircraft, and 

196 naval combatants. But many of these forces come from Southern Europe 

and new members in Eastern Europe, and are not well trained or properly 

equipped for deployment missions. Deployable forces come mainly from 

Europe’s premier, most modern forces—those of Great Britain, Germany, 

France, Italy, the Netherlands, and a few others. Together, these forces total 

40 ground brigades, 1,220 fighter aircraft, and 136 naval combatants.

Judged in relation to potential deployment requirements, this is not a 

huge posture with plenty to spare. For example, the bulk of these forces could 

be required if two demanding simultaneous contingencies are encountered 

(for example, preparedness for defense of the Baltic states against Russia and 
122 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

a major stability operation in the Middle East that requires a sustainable 

presence). The existing posture, plus U.S. forces deployed in Europe, may be 

large enough to meet such requirements. But if such key countries as Great 

Britain, Germany, and France reduce their manpower and forces too far, the 

outcome could be a smaller posture that is no longer large enough to meet 

Alliance needs. Maintaining a sufficient posture of modern deployable forces, 

while improving them qualitatively, should be a central focus of future 

NATO defense planning even in the face of tight budgets.

In addition to funding expeditionary forces and improvement capabilities, NATO should pursue the reforms and efficiencies endorsed by the 

ASDE Report and the new strategic concept. Because NATO is a large 

alliance of many sovereign nations, most of which still plan their defense 

efforts on a national basis, it does not have a stellar reputation for being 

efficient and effective in how it applies scarce resources. But much could be 

accomplished by pursuing common acquisition programs and pooling 

arrangements, emphasizing niche areas and role specialization, strengthening and enlarging multinational formations, fostering multinational logistic 

support, and trimming excess or redundant assets. An encouraging step in 

the right direction has recently been taken by the signing of a British-French 

cooperation agreement, which calls upon the two countries to create a joint 

expeditionary force, share use of their aircraft carriers, and jointly develop 

weapons systems and technologies in the coming years. A broadening of this 

agreement to include other nations, or the signing of similar agreements by 

other countries on a bilateral basis, could greatly expand the scope of multinational collaboration across Europe in both funding acquisition programs 

and generating usable forces. The Lisbon Summit communiqué and the 

new strategic concept recognize the possibilities and potential for enhanced 

multilateral cooperation in such areas. The challenge facing NATO and the 

Europeans is to act vigorously on the idea of multilateral cooperation, for it 

may be key to the Alliance remaining a potent force in world affairs.
CHAPTER SEVEN

Leading Through Civilian Power: 

The First Quadrennial Diplomacy 

and Development Review 

Aproduct of an intense study launched by Secretary of State Hillary 

Rodham Clinton during 2009–2010, the Quadrennial Diplomacy 

and Development Review (QDDR) Report is the Department of 

State’s first attempt to appraise its strategic goals, internal operations, and 

resource management efforts in the lengthy, full-fledged manner done by the 

Department of Defense for its Quadrennial Defense Review Report. For this 

reason alone, the QDDR Report is a landmark accomplishment, regardless 

of how its many specific judgments and reforms are appraised. Going back 20 

years and more, previous administrations regularly published detailed defense 

reports on military issues, but none of them offered comparable analysis of 

the State Department and related diplomatic tools in an era when the demands 

facing U.S. diplomacy were changing and growing. A step in the right direction was taken by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s report, Transformational Diplomacy, in the previous Bush administration. Building on these and 

other efforts, the QDDR Report goes a long way toward closing a still existing 

wide gap, thus offering readers a powerful tool for judging how U.S. diplomacy 

and development efforts are intended to work alongside defense efforts in the 

quest for protecting U.S. security interests and advancing other strategic goals.

A main strength of the QDDR Report is its penetrating treatment of 

the complex interplay between U.S. diplomatic operations and development 

endeavors, along with associated crisis prevention and response missions, 

in such troubled regions as the Greater Middle East, South Central Asia, 

and others with fragile states that are a breeding ground for violence and 

123
124 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

terrorism. Beyond question, successfully handling this interplay is centrally 

important to contemporary U.S. foreign policy and, indeed, to the ongoing 

U.S. interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other troubled countries. In 

addition, the QDDR Report pays attention to such important new-era 

issues as the global economy, energy, climate change, and multilateral 

activities. In virtually all of these areas, the QDDR Report largely focuses 

not on substantive policies, but instead on the internal structure and operations of the State Department, U.S. Agency for International Development 

(USAID), and interagency community, and it puts forth many constructive 

reform measures. The result is a clear, detailed sense of how the State 

Department and USAID should evolve and improve in these critical areas.

At the same time, the QDDR Report suffers from its lack of in-depth 

discussion of substantive policies in several key areas, thus producing a 

document that does an excellent job of looking inward, but not a comparable 

job of looking outward in all critical directions or of setting priorities among 

demanding goals and missions. An additional problem is a lack of material 

regarding how the State Department intends to form concrete political and 

diplomatic approaches for handling traditional diplomatic missions that are 

producing fresh challenges and for carrying out associated guidance on key 

strategic policies issued by the 2010 National Security Strategy. For example, 

the QDDR Report devotes little penetrating attention to handling big power 

relations and associated geopolitics, such as U.S. relations with China, Northeast Asian security affairs, and Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons, or to pursuing alliance reforms in key regions. Although the QDDR Report was not 

written for such purposes, this drawback means that it falls short of putting 

forth a comprehensive theory of U.S. foreign policy and associated strategic 

policies in the coming years. But a well-developed partial theory focused 

mainly on internal U.S. Government structures and operations for new-era 

diplomacy and development is far better than no theory at all.

Secretary Clinton’s Introduction. The QDDR Report was issued in 

December 2010, the last of the major administration studies on national 

security issues, and totals 238 pages counting the executive summary and 
THE FIRST QUADRENNIAL DIPLOMACY AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW 125

text. It is a product of an extensive effort to consult not only State Department 

and USAID officials but also outside experts at home and abroad. The study’s 

broad scope and attention to detail manifest the extent to which many 

people contributed to the process. In her transmittal letter, Secretary Clinton 

poses a key question: “How can we do better?” To answer this question, she 

directed that the QDDR Report should provide a thorough review of U.S. 

diplomacy and development, the core missions of State Department and 

USAID. The result, she states, is a QDDR Report that provides a sweeping 

reform agenda regarding how State Department and USAID are to operate 

collaboratively together and how U.S. civilian field missions in troubled areas 

are to be carried out.

Secretary Clinton’s central argument is that in order to cope with a 

changing world, the United States must significantly enhance its civilian 

power: the combined force of civilians working together across the U.S. 

Government to practice diplomacy, carry out development projects, and 

prevent and respond to crises. She further argues that although many different agencies contribute to these efforts today, their work must become more 

unified, focused, and effective. To achieve this goal, she states that the State 

Department and USAID must play the lead role by providing a strategic 

framework and oversight on the ground, and by eliminating overlap, setting 

priorities, funding effective programs, and empowering U.S. officials. This 

empowering effort, she continues, begins with the overseas ambassadorial 

Chiefs of Mission, which now are to function as chief executive officers 

(CEOs) of multiagency missions and to play a bigger role in Washington 

policymaking. In addition, she calls for USAID to be reestablished as the 

world’s premier development agency, to focus on core areas of expertise, to 

pursue innovation, and to develop better ways to measure results. Finally, she 

announces a host of structural and operational reforms within the State 

Department, all intended to upgrade its performance in handling new missions and remedying previous weaknesses.

In reflecting her guidance, the QDDR Report is anchored in the premise that State is already successfully handling classical diplomacy and related 
126 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

traditional missions, and that the same positive judgment applies to USAID. 

Accordingly, the QDDR Report does not address these topics in any detail. 

Instead, it focuses on new challenges and missions, opportunities for 

improvement, areas of adaptation, and needs for further efficiencies. With 

this problem-oriented agenda in mind, the QDDR Report is organized into 

five chapters:

•	 Global Trends and Guiding Policy Principles

•	 Adapting to the Diplomatic Landscape of the 21st Century

•	 Elevating and Transforming Development to Deliver Results

•	 Preventing and Responding to Crisis, Conflicts, and Instability

•	 Working Smarter.

Global Trends and Guiding Policy Principles. In chapter one, the QDDR 

Report’s call for enhanced civilian power and effectiveness reflects the judgment that current U.S. foreign policy is under-resourced in this important 

arena, and that emerging international trends mandate significant improvements to carry out new forms of diplomacy, development, and crisis management. While not questioning the continuing importance of U.S. military 

power, the QDDR Report points out that in many ways and places, U.S. 

foreign policy is carried out either mainly by civilians or by civilians working closely with military forces, as is the case in Iraq and Afghanistan. These 

civilian efforts typically are led by State Department and USAID personnel, 

but often involve close collaboration with other government agencies such 

as the Departments of Treasury, Commerce, Homeland Security, Justice, 

Agriculture, and Energy. A main challenge, the QDDR Report states, is to 

integrate such multidimensional civilian activities to form a whole-of-government approach so that they carry out U.S. foreign policy effectively and 

efficiently in complex, demanding settings. More civilian resources are 

needed, it judges, but equally important are improvements to attitudes, 

programs, and procedures so that maximum effectiveness is achieved with 
THE FIRST QUADRENNIAL DIPLOMACY AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW 127

available resources. The QDDR Report focuses squarely on identifying 

effects-producing reforms for meeting this challenge.

Chapter one initiates its analysis by putting forth a strategic perspective 

that reflects the 2010 National Security Strategy’s main judgments regarding 

global threats, current opportunities, challenges, and future opportunities. 

The task of advancing U.S. interests, the QDDR Report states, involves 

ensuring deterrence and defense, preserving alliances, preventing new threats 

such as terrorism and nuclear proliferation, managing the global economy, 

and upholding American values. It further argues that:

•	 New global threats areemerging, including terrorism, violentextremism, economic shocks and disruptions, irreversible climate change, 

cyber attacks, transnational crime, and pandemics of infectious 

diseases.

•	 A new geopolitical and geo-economic landscape is evolving that is

creating new centers of influence—for example, China, India, Brazil, 

and others—that are seeking greater voice, representation, and 

impact.

•	 Power is diffusing to a wide range of nonstate actors, including nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and others.

•	 Today’s world, in many regions, is marked by costly conflicts, armed

violence, and weak states.

•	 The information age has accelerated the pace of international change

and produced a new era of connectivity.

To handle these trends, which embody a mixture of opportunity and 

danger, the QDDR Report puts forth a set of seven broad principles for 

guiding U.S. foreign policy, diplomacy, and development efforts:

•	 restore and sustain American leadership so that the United States is

strong at home and influential abroad

•	 build a new global architecture of cooperation that willenable nations

to form enduring partnerships for addressing common problems in 
128 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

all critical regions, including Europe, Asia, the Middle East, South 

Asia, Africa, and the Western Hemisphere

•	 elevate the role of development in U.S. foreign policy and better

integrate the power of development and diplomacy: development will 

require a new operational model that maximizes U.S. leverage at 

producing broad-based economic growth, democratic governance, 

major innovations, and sustainable systems for meeting basic human 

needs

•	 mobilize civil society and business to address common problems, thus

creating partnerships with governments aimed at fostering development

•	 prevent violent conflict and reduce the growing costs of conflict by

strengthening weak governments and their political leadership, 

thereby enhancing stability, peace, and progress in endangered regions

•	 integrate gender into U.S. diplomacy and development work by protecting and empowering women and girls in U.S. foreign policy 

agencies and abroad

•	 facilitate innovative, flexible, and tailored responses in an age of

uncertainty, thereby enabling the United States to react effectively to 

fast-changing problems and opportunities.

Adapting to the Diplomatic Landscape of the 21st Century. Chapter two 

begins with a brief narrative asserting that although classical diplomacy—

that is, state-to-state diplomacy among big powers—is still important, the 

new diplomatic landscape of the 21st century extends far beyond this traditional province. The new landscape, it argues, includes a more varied set of 

actors, including many more nation-states pursuing activist foreign policies 

as well as nongovernment actors (such as NGOs) and complex interactions 

in multiple arenas far beyond foreign ministries. Effective U.S. diplomacy, 

it states, must not only adapt to this new landscape, but also strive to shape 

it. As a result, it argues, U.S. diplomacy must be prepared to handle three 

new domains: lead demanding global civilian operations and whole-ofgovernment approaches, deal with transnational forces and emerging centers 

of influence by building new partnerships and institutions, and deal with 
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new networks from the private sector to the private citizen. Handling these 

three domains, the QDDR Report states, will become core missions of the 

State Department. Accordingly, chapter two puts forth an ambitious agenda 

of 90 internal reform measures—for the State Department, Overseas Missions, Foreign Service, and civil service personnel—that is clustered into 

four sections:

•	 leading the implementation of global civilian operations within a

unified strategic framework

•	 building and shaping a new global architecture of cooperation

•	 engaging beyond the nation-state

•	 equipping our people to carry out all our diplomatic missions.

The QDDR Report’s analysis of reform measures to enhance implementation of global civilian operations is focused on two subsections: strengthening the role of Ambassadors as CEOs of multiagency missions; and 

improving interagency collaboration. It strives to upgrade the role of Ambassadors by taking steps to ensure that the National Security Council, other 

agencies, and U.S. Government personnel understand their accountability 

to Chiefs of Missions, engage Chiefs of Missions in interagency decisionmaking in Washington, prioritize interagency experience as a key preparation for 

service as a Chief of Mission, enhance the training and evaluation of Chiefs 

of Missions, and foster whole-of-government Embassy teams under leadership 

of Chiefs of Missions. Its analysis of measures to reform interagency collaboration includes steps to leverage the expertise of other agencies, prepare 

State Department personnel to operate effectively within the interagency, 

and enhance the State Department operational effectiveness in managing 

multiagency missions.

The QDDR Report’s analysis of reform measures for better building and 

shaping a new global architecture of cooperation is clustered into five subsections: structuring the State Department for 21st-century global affairs, deepening engagement with close allies and partners, building relations with 

emerging centers of influence, building the State Department’s capacities to 
130 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

organize regionally and work through regional organizations, and updating 

the State Department’s approach to handling multilateral diplomacy.

Within the first subsection, the QDDR Report offers multiple steps to 

internally restructure and reform the State Department. Prior to this report,

the State Department had, in addition to USAID and the U.S. Mission to 

the United Nations, a structure of six Under Secretaries, each with separate 

responsibilities and multiple subordinate staffs, plus 14 smaller offices 

reporting directly to the Secretary of State. To reform this complex structure, the QDDR Report proposes measures to upgrade and expand the 

missions and capabilities of three functional Under Secretaries, maintain 

the Under Secretary for Political Affairs as a repository of classical diplomacy with some new assets for working with other offices, and improve 

the State Department in other ways. The central aim of these reforms is to 

preserve the State Department’s well-developed assets for performing traditional missions while adding significant assets and organizational muscle 

for handling a wide spectrum of new-era challenges and responsibilities 

that range from managing the global economy and dealing with energy 

issues to addressing such threats as terrorism, cyber attack, and proliferation. The main measures include:

•	 creating an Under Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy, and the

Environment—thus adding environment to this position’s portfolio

•	 creating an Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and

Human Rights—thus adding security and human rights to this 

position’s portfolio

•	 expanding the capacities of the Under Secretary for Arms Control

and International Security Affairs

•	 establishing a new Bureau for Energy Resources

•	 appointing a chief economist for global economic issues as a key element of U.S. foreign policy

•	 establishing a Bureau for Counterterrorism

•	 establishing a Coordinator for Cyber Issues
THE FIRST QUADRENNIAL DIPLOMACY AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW 131

•	 creating a new Bureau for Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance

•	 restructuring the Bureau ofInternational Security and Nonproliferation.

Within the second subsection—deepening engagement with close allies 

and partners—the QDDR Report proposes to strengthen the U.S. Mission 

to the European Union, create a more systematic trilateral process with key 

Asian allies, bolster the U.S. commitment to Middle East partners, and 

strengthen North American institutions and relations with our closest neighbors. In addition, the QDDR Report proposes to work with North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization (NATO) Allies and partners to develop improved Alliance capabilities, and to use the newly created U.S.–European Union Energy 

Council to forge stronger transatlantic cooperation on global energy issues. 

Within the third subsection—building relations with emerging centers of 

influence—the QDDR Report proposes to strengthen strategic dialogues 

with these actors, deploy more U.S. personnel to these actors, and shift the 

U.S. consular presences to engage beyond national capitals. Within the fourth 

subsection—building regional capacities—the QDDR Report proposes to 

expand its internal focus beyond bilateral relationships to address regional 

priorities, elevate U.S. efforts to engage regional organizations, coordinate 

regional responses in the field by creating regional hubs in key U.S. Embassies, improve communication with regional actors and institutions, partner 

closely with the Defense Department in key places where U.S. military forces 

are present, and support such innovative regional initiatives as the Pathways

to Progress in the Americas and the Lower Mekong Initiative. Within the

fifth subsection—improving multilateral diplomacy—the QDDR Report 

proposes to strengthen the State Department’s Bureau of International Organization Affairs, strengthen the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, and 

elevate multilateral affairs in regional and functional bureaus.

Chapter two’s section on engaging beyond the nation-state begins by 

declaring that although state-to-state relations remain important, modern 

U.S. diplomacy requires the State Department to reach out to a broad set of 

nonstate actors. Such efforts, the QDDR Report asserts, must begin with 
132 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

outreach to civil society in multiple regions and globally. Accordingly, it 

states, Secretary Clinton is launching a Strategic Dialogue with Civil Society 

aimed at advancing initiatives in areas where the United States and civil 

societies share objectives. In addition, this section advances analyses and 

recommendations in three subsections: public diplomacy, community diplomacy, and 21st-century statecraft. The overall aim is enhancing the State 

Department’s capacities to support the important U.S. foreign policy objective of strengthening engagement not only with foreign governments, but 

also with their societies and cultures in ways that bolster communication and 

dialogue, and thereby to expand awareness of American intentions, purposes, 

and contributions to the common good.

The subsection on public diplomacy announces a roadmap, prepared by 

the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, that is intended

to align public diplomacy with U.S. foreign policy goals in ways that inform, 

inspire, and persuade foreign publics. As part of an effort to shape the global 

narrative, this subsection proposes to establish a new Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Public Affairs who will oversee global media and

outreach and expand media regional hubs to increase official U.S. voices and 

faces on foreign television, radio, and other outlets. In an effort to strengthen 

people-to-people relations, this subsection proposes to upgrade American 

Centers abroad, expand English language training and access to academic 

opportunities, and invest more in science, technology, and information networking. In an effort to counter violent extremism, this subsection proposes 

to create, within the State Department, a new Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communication that will work with other offices and agencies that 

deal with this mission. In addition, this subsection proposes to establish 

Public Diplomacy Deputy Assistant Secretaries in all regional bureaus and

to perform regular internal reviews aimed at setting proper goals, resources, 

and priorities for public diplomacy activities.

The subsection on community diplomacy aims at encouraging U.S. 

diplomats and other personnel to increase their efforts to build networks of 

contacts with foreign communities and showcase U.S. commitments to com-
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mon purposes and universal values. The subsection on 21st-century statecraft 

proposes to use diplomats and modern technologies, such as computer networks and mobile phone networks, to enhance public-private partnerships 

that link American diplomats and development experts with the business 

community and civic leaders to advance such common goals as economic 

growth, public health, climate control, and human rights. In addition, it calls 

upon the State Department to streamline and improve the process by which 

public-private partnerships are developed by using the Global Partnership

Initiative Office. Both subsections call for U.S. diplomats and other officials 

to develop improved skills in such outreach efforts to foreign communities.

Chapter two’s final section—on equipping U.S. people to carry out all 

diplomatic missions—focuses on efforts to empower diplomats and other 

officials with the right tools, resources, and flexibility for performing new 

missions that require outreach to foreign governments, other actors, and civil 

society. It begins by noting the importance of developing new policies and 

procedures for protecting the safety and security of U.S. foreign-based personnel, balancing mission requirements against risks, and expanding the 

training of U.S. people for dealing with security challenges. It also calls for 

a streamlining of workloads and reporting requirements so that U.S. officials 

have greater time to perform their outreach and engagement missions. Finally, 

it calls for efforts to equip U.S. overseas personnel with improved digital 

information technologies to accomplish their jobs.

Elevating and Transforming Development to Deliver Results. Chapter three 

of the QDDR Report proposes to elevate development to become an equal 

pillar alongside diplomacy and defense as top U.S. foreign policy priorities, 

and to improve the process by which U.S. development policies are crafted 

and implemented so that better results are achieved. Fostering development, 

it argues, is a strategic, economic, and moral imperative because it offers a way 

to build an inclusive and prosperous global economy, strengthen failing states 

and combat violent extremism, encourage democracy and human rights, and 

acquire larger numbers of reliable, capable partners that can assist the United 

States in its strategic endeavors. Consistent with prior administration decisions 
134 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

that created the first U.S. national development policy since 1961, the QDDR 

Report calls upon U.S. policies to focus on several areas where they can deliver 

meaningful results: food security, global health, global climate change, sustainable economic growth, democracy and governance, and humanitarian 

assistance while also elevating and redefining the approach to women and 

girls. To achieve results in these areas, it calls for vigorous development efforts 

by the U.S. Government that employ partnerships with domestic philanthropists and private remittances, foreign governments, multinational agencies, 

and corporate businesses. Such partnerships, it argues, can help add leverage 

to the limited U.S. development budgets that will be available in the coming 

years. Accordingly, the QDDR Report puts forth an agenda of change, 

reforms, and greater energy and effectiveness in four sections:

•	 focusing U.S. investments

•	 seeking high-impact development based on partnerships, innovation,

and results

•	 building USAID as the preeminent global development institution

•	 transforming the State Department to support development.

Chapter three’s section on focusing U.S. investments calls attention to 

three already launched administration initiatives as examples of how development efforts can be properly targeted: the Global Hunger and Food Security 

Initiative—Feed the Future (FtF), the Global Health Initiative (GHI), and 

the Global Climate Change Initiative (GCCI). Whereas FtF seeks to increase 

food supply in impoverished regions, GHI seeks to strengthen public health 

and reduce disease, and GCCI seeks to make low-emission, climate-resilient 

sustainable growth a key U.S. diplomatic priority. Building on these initiatives, the QDDR Report seeks additional ways to hone U.S. comparative 

advantages in economic growth, democracy and governance, humanitarian 

assistance, and empowering women. Fostering sustainable economic growth, 

it states, is the single most powerful force for eradicating poverty and expanding prosperity, and is best achieved when governments are committed and 

accountable, and can be motivated to encourage entrepreneurship, spend 
THE FIRST QUADRENNIAL DIPLOMACY AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW 135

capital wisely, invest in infrastructure and education, and expand trade. The 

challenge facing U.S. diplomacy and development policy, it states, is to 

encourage governments to pursue this path in ways that already have occurred 

in such countries as South Korea and Taiwan, which have transitioned from 

relative poverty to sustained growth and prosperity. In addition, the QDDR 

Report states, efforts to promote democracy and effective governance in 

responsive regions, provide humanitarian assistance to help alleviate emergencies and disasters in places such as Pakistan and Haiti, and promote gender

equality by empowering women are important to helping underdeveloped 

countries not only to pursue economic growth, but also to achieve capable 

representative government and build modern civil societies. In all of these 

areas, the QDDR Report states, the United States can help achieve these 

critical goals, but its development policies must be focused wisely and effectively so they achieve their desired results.

Chapter three’s section on seeking high-impact development judges that 

although past U.S. assistance has done considerable good across the world, 

the United States has too often focused on delivery of services rather than on 

producing systemic changes in the economies, governments, and societies 

being assisted. Accordingly, it calls for U.S. assistance to transform the ways 

in which it does business by shifting emphasis from aid to investment with 

more emphasis placed on helping host nations build sustainable systems of 

growth and development, and by crafting multiyear plans aimed at having 

cumulative impacts over the long term. A key element of this new strategy is 

to strengthen U.S. partnerships with host nation governments, other public 

and private donors that include 56 nations and 260 multilateral aid organizations, local implementers, the U.S. interagency community, and U.S.-based 

organizations. Another element of the strategy is to foster innovation as a key 

engine of economic growth by promoting new discoveries and scientific 

breakthroughs, by using new State Department and USAID offices for 

innovation in science, technology, and research to seek game-changing solutions to specific development problems, to increase research funds for highrisk, high-reward projects, to invest in promising new technological programs, 
136 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

and to leverage the assets of the full Federal science community to find 

solutions to the next generation of shared development challenges. A final 

element of this strategy is a strong focus on achieving positive, concrete results 

by strengthening monitoring and evaluation and fostering greater predictability and transparency.

Chapter three’s section on building USAID to become the preeminent 

global development institution acknowledges that over the past 15 years, 

USAID, which reports to the Secretary of State, has lost much its autonomy, 

many of its resources, and some of its key talent, all of which have conspired 

to diminish its operational effectiveness. The QDDR Report endeavors to 

reverse this downslide by rebuilding USAID capabilities so that it can play 

a leading role in future development efforts. Accordingly, it launches a 

rebuilding strategy with three elements. The first element calls for strong 

efforts to build better USAID human capital by hiring more top development 

professionals as well as experts on evaluation, planning, resource management, research, and innovations. The second element calls for efforts to 

strengthen strategic capital and operational capacity by establishing better 

planning capacities, empowering multiyear development planning in the 

field, improving management of budgets and resources, and improving 

performance of field offices in delivering new services faster and more flexibly. The third element calls for steps to elevate the USAID voice in interagency deliberations in Washington, DC, in overseas field missions, and with 

foreign governments and other development institutions.

Chapter three’s section on transforming the State Department in order 

to support development is also anchored in a strategy of three elements. The 

first element calls for the State Department to pursue “development diplomacy” by using its prowess to proactively support U.S. development policies 

and activities. The second element calls for measures to build development 

diplomacy as a discipline within the State Department by fostering development skill sets among its personnel and establishing institutional mechanisms to develop and promulgate guidance on best practices and 

management of resources. The third element calls for measures to strengthen 
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management of foreign assistance budgets and eliminate fragmentation by 

using a new Office of Foreign Assistance to work with senior State and 

USAID officials to review budgets, analyze new proposals, and allocate 

resources among programs in ways that produce better strategic planning 

and enhanced cost effectiveness.

Preventing and Responding to Crisis, Conflict, and Instability. Chapter four 

asserts that handling fragile states with weak or failed governance, internal 

conflict, and humanitarian emergencies has become a central security challenge for the United States. It argues that fragile states are often a breeding 

ground for not only internal violence but also terrorist groups that project their 

destructive actions outward, as occurred in 2001 when the Taliban government in Afghanistan enabled al Qaeda to gain the foothold that allowed it to 

attack the United States. For the past two decades, it states, the U.S. Government has recognized the need for an effective approach to fragile states, but 

has struggled to understand this challenge and organize its civilian institutions 

to cope with it. It states that while many of the necessary skills and capabilities 

exist at State, USAID, and other Federal agencies, these assets are not organized and focused to address the problem in sustained, effective ways. Too 

often, it asserts, U.S. reactions have been post hoc and ad hoc in ways that 

miss early opportunities for conflict prevention, struggle to organize U.S. 

responses properly, rely on outmoded strategies and field missions that are not 

prepared for the task, fail to properly coordinate resources and multiple agencies, fail to work closely with multilateral institutions and foreign governments, 

and do not cope adequately with unanticipated consequences of interventions. 

The time has arrived, it judges, for a new U.S. approach that transforms this 

recipe for failure into a strategy for effective responses and sustained success, 

one taking into account the likelihood that future operations will differ from 

those in Iraq and Afghanistan. Building on lessons learned from past failures 

and successes, the QDDR Report calls for efforts to:

•	 adopt a lead-agency approach between State and USAID as well as a

complementary division of labor and joint operations between them
138 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

•	 bring together a cadre of experienced personnel to fill out a standing

interagency response corps that can deploy quickly and operate effectively in the field

•	 develop a single planning process for conflict prevention and resolution missions in fragile states as well as standing guidance that does 

not depend on individual Embassies

•	 create better ways to coordinate civilian and military operations in

the field in order to prevent and resolve conflicts, counterinsurgencies 

and illicit actors, and bring security to local populations

•	 coordinate and integrate assistance to foreign militaries, civilian

police, and justice sectors

•	 work closely with such partners as host nations, other countries, and

multilateral institutions

•	 strengthen U.S. capacity to anticipate crises and conflicts and to apply

scarce resources wisely.

To carry out this agenda, the QDDR Report divides chapter four into 

three sections:

•	 embracing conflict prevention and response within fragile states as a

core civilian mission

•	 executing conflict prevention and response in the field

•	 building a long-term foundation for peace under law through security

and justice sector reform.

The first section strives to put forth measures aimed at enhancing U.S. 

capacity to treat conflict prevention and response as a core civilian mission. 

It puts forth a five-fold agenda of measures to better define missions, execute 

missions, reshape State Department structures to fit missions, expand USAID 

capacity for missions, and pursue whole-of-government approaches. The act 

of better defining missions, it states, requires recognition that U.S. operations 

will be required to cope with a wide spectrum of situations ranging from 

preventing conflict, to resolving conflict and violence, to fostering stability, 

to engaging in postconflict reconstruction and recovery. The act of better 
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executing such missions, it states, requires a U.S. Government division of 

labor in which the State Department will lead operations in response to 

political-security crises and conflicts, and USAID will lead humanitarian 

response operations. State and USAID, however, will cooperate closely in 

missions that require involvement from both, and proper leadership and 

coordinating authority will be delegated to field missions. The act of reshaping the State Department, it states, will require steps to unite departmental 

capabilities through the Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, 

and Human Rights, to create a Bureau for Conflict and Stabilization Operations under the Office of Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization 

(S/CRS), and to build a stronger Civilian Response Corps. The act of expanding USAID capacities, it asserts, requires strengthening the Office of Transition Initiatives and regional bureaus as well as better staff assets for recovery 

and stabilization programming and operations. The act of pursuing wholeof-government approaches, it states, requires close civilian-military cooperation, a new International Operational Response Framework, and joint 

training of civilians in multiple Federal agencies.

Chapter four’s section on executing conflict prevention and response in 

the field calls for creating a better deployable surge capability by upgrading 

the Civilian Response Corps with an active component that has appropriate 

skill sets and replacing the unfunded civilian reserve of 2,000 personnel with 

a smaller “Expert Corps” consisting of a roster of technical experts willing to 

participate in deployment operations. This section also calls for steps to better organize Embassies and USAID missions for conflict, crisis, and stability 

operations through better technical training, management skills, security 

arrangements, logistical support, and flexible use of resources. In addition, 

this section calls for better use of data and evidence to deliver results through 

such measures as state-of-the-art knowledge and training, sound operational 

and strategic guidance, careful measurement of operational effectiveness on 

the ground, and improved crisis forecasting. Finally, this section calls for 

improved operational coordination with allies and multilateral organizations, 
140 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

building of better foreign police and military capacities, and modernization 

reforms for United Nations peace operations.

Chapter four’s section on building a long-term foundation for peace 

under law through security and justice reform argues that if fragile states are 

to be stabilized, they require better internal security forces and judicial systems capable of maintaining law and order, protecting citizens, and administering justice against criminals. It further argues that although current U.S. 

capabilities often excel at training foreign militaries and police forces, they 

lack comparable assets at building judicial systems and rule of law programs. 

Accordingly, it asserts that U.S. assistance efforts in this critical arena need 

to be more comprehensive and better integrated in ways that enhance U.S. 

capabilities, create models for better in-country management, and foster host 

nation ownership of better security and justice systems.

Working Smarter. Chapter five aspires to improve the efficiency of the 

State Department and USAID at using scarce resources by proposing reforms 

to their personnel policies, procurement practices, and planning capabilities. 

Internally focused on how to shift emphasis from inputs to outputs, it contains four sections:

•	 building a 21st-century workforce

•	 managing contracting and procurement to better achieve missions

•	 planning, budgeting, and measuring for results

•	 delivering mutually supportive quality services and capturing further

efficiencies in the field.

The first section observes that in recent years, demands on State Department and USAID personnel have expanded in order to perform new missions, and that the field presence of both agencies has enlarged significantly 

in frontline states such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq. It argues that

shortages in staffs and skills have been growing impediments to meeting new 

challenges there and elsewhere. Accordingly, it calls for larger numbers of 

personnel for both agencies, beginning with the 3,000 new Foreign Service 

and civil service personnel already authorized by Congress. But it also calls 
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for strong efforts to get maximum performance from the workforce by 

increasing its effectiveness and efficiency. Accordingly, it calls for steps to:

•	 marshal better expertise to address 21st-century challenges by hiring 

skilled personnel from outside State and USAID

•	 reward and better use the civil service by expanding overseas deployment opportunities, create new opportunities for converting to the 

Foreign Service, and strengthen career pathways for civil service 

personnel

•	 close the experience gap in the Foreign Service by tripling midlevel

hiring at USAID, create more limited-term appointments for experienced personnel, and prepare surge hires to assume midlevel 

responsibilities

•	 recruit and retain highly skilled locally employed staff by establishing

a new senior staff cadre and by ensuring that compensation and 

benefit plans reflect local markets

•	 train U.S. personnel for new missions by expanding training staffs,

pursuing cross-training between State Department and USAID, tying 

training to promotion, increasing rotation assignments to other agencies and from other agencies to State and USAID, strengthening 

management training, launching a development studies program, and 

encouraging interagency training across the U.S. Government

•	 align incentives and recognize performance by rewarding innovation

and entrepreneurship, and by aligning performance tools with new 

skills and priorities.

The second section notes that as State Department and USAID mission 

demands have increased, both agencies have resorted increasingly to hiring 

contractor personnel. To reduce resulting problems, this section calls for 

measures to balance the State and USAID workforce by relying more on 

direct-hire employees, elevating the performance of contracting officers, 

establishing a budget mechanism to fund contracting needs at USAID, using 

more fixed-price contracts, and establishing better oversight of large contracts. In addition, it calls for steps to increase competition among contractors 
142 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

by using smaller and more focused awards at USAID and to increase small 

and disadvantaged business participation in foreign assistance contracting. 

Finally, this section calls for steps to build better local development leadership 

in this arena by strengthening the contracting capacities of foreign governments, local society, and the private sector.

The third section asserts that in order to use their resources efficiently, 

the State Department and USAID need an improved planning and budgetary process that allows for sound policy decisions and effective implementation. Important steps already have been taken by creating a Deputy Secretary 

of State for Management and Resources, which has brought greater coherence 

to strategic planning and budgeting, and by creating at USAID a new Office 

of Budget and Resource Management that will enhance that agency’s capacity for executing the budget for development programs. As of 2013, it states, 

USAID will submit a comprehensive budget proposal that will be included 

in the broader State Department foreign assistance budget. It declares that 

further reforms are necessary in the following areas:

•	 elevate and strengthen strategic planning by establishing improved

multiyear strategic plans at the State Department and USAID as well 

as associated plans for regional and functional bureaus and integrated 

country strategies with diplomatic and foreign assistance components

•	 align budgets to planning by transitioning to a multiyear budget

formulation based on strategies for countries and bureaus

•	 create better monitoring and evaluation systems aimed at strengthening capacity to develop improved indicators, measure performance, 

and identify best practices

•	 streamline and rationalize planning, budgeting, and performance

management by creating a coherent process that establishes priorities, 

translates these priorities into budgets, and provides accountability

•	 transition to an integrated national security budgeting and planning

process by working with National Security Council staff, Defense 

Department, and other departments and agencies to create whole-ofgovernment approaches in this arena—and use this process to 
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resource changing missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, establish an 

overseas contingency operations budget, pool funding for common 

projects, and achieve better budgetary coordination among contributing departments and agencies.

The fourth, final section deals with measures to deliver mutually supportive quality services and capture further efficiencies in the field. It mainly 

addresses steps to consolidate administrative services and to pursue information technology modernization at overseas posts. It establishes a high-level 

Administrative Board initially composed of State Department and USAID 

officials to pursue these aims.

Strengths, Shortfalls, and Lingering Issues. Because the QDDR Report is 

the first such report on the State Department and USAID, it must be judged 

on its own merits and unique features rather than in comparison to preceding documents. Owing not only to its length and detail, but also to its comprehensive treatment of many important issues, it makes a large contribution 

to crafting new approaches for managing the State Department and USAID, 

and it will serve as a standard bearer for writing future QDDR Reports in 

ways that complement the Defense Department’s QDR Report. When read 

alongside the QDR Report of 2010, the QDDR Report helps fulfill the 

administration’s mandate of putting forth coherent analyses for determining 

how diplomacy, development, and defense are to work together to advance 

U.S. security and strategic interests abroad. It makes a convincing case for its 

judgment that strengthening U.S. civilian power is critical to carrying out 

modern-era foreign policy and national security strategy. In reflecting Secretary Clinton’s guidance on shaping its contents, it puts forth a sweeping 

reform agenda for the State Department and USAID that includes many 

provisions for changes in their internal structures and operations at home 

and abroad.

While many of its reforms are likely to be appraised as wise and constructive, others may be debated and challenged by critics. Regardless, the 

QDDR Report is best judged as a whole rather than for its particulars and 

details. The bottom line is whether the QDDR Report charts a sound path, 
144 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

as Secretary Clinton argues, for enabling U.S. foreign policy to “do better” 

in future years. Whether it will succeed in this regard is to be seen. Deciding upon internal State/USAID reforms to structures and operations is one 

thing; fully implementing them so that they work effectively is something 

else again—and, in key ways, more challenging. As an old slogan holds, the 

proof of the pudding lies in the eating. Several years are likely to pass before 

the QDDR’s many reforms can be judged on the basis not only of their 

theoretical soundness, but also, more importantly, on their actual performance. For now, an appropriate conclusion is that the QDDR’s reform 

agenda seemingly is pointed in the right strategic direction.

The QDDR Report makes a strong case for more resources in manpower 

and budgets for the State Department and USAID. Its argument is fair; in 

particular, many outside observers have judged that U.S. foreign policy and 

diplomacy suffer from underfunded budgets, and that more skilled professionals are needed in multiple areas. The political problem, however, is that 

the era of ever expanding Federal budgets seemingly has passed, as Defense 

and other agencies are now finding out. The State Department and USAID 

are likely to be affected by future budgetary austerity in similar ways. If so, 

this will compel both of them to extract the maximum mileage from the 

budgets and manpower that will be available—a judgment about the need 

for efficiency and effectiveness that the QDDR Report shares.

If the QDDR Report is to be criticized on its own terms, its internal 

focus on reforming structures and operations rather than on outwardlooking policies results in a lack of insightful material about the difficult 

task of setting priorities among new, proliferating State Department and 

USAID roles and missions. The QDDR Report puts forth a lengthy but 

abstract and general agenda on overseas goals to be pursued, missions 

performed, and responsibilities accepted, especially in unstable regions such 

as the Greater Middle East and South Central Asia. In the process, it does 

not convey a clear sense of limits and constraints or describe endeavors that 

must be sacrificed on behalf of other higher priorities. As the report makes 

clear, the United States will need to pursue demanding activities in its 
THE FIRST QUADRENNIAL DIPLOMACY AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW 145

diplomacy, development efforts, and crisis management policies in such 

regions in the coming years. But, just as clearly, the United States will not 

be able to handle all potential challenges at once with equal vigor. Priorities

will have to be set and frustrating limitations acknowledged. A key question 

arises: What diplomatic, development, and crisis management goals must 

be scaled back and activities truncated in their pursuit? Owing to its inward 

focus, the QDDR Report does not answer this question or even seriously 

address it, but this does not make the question any less imperative as the 

future unfolds.

The QDDR Report’s effort to restructure the State Department internally reflects the judgment that new and improved assets are needed to 

handle the rapid proliferation of new missions, responsibilities, and challenges 

facing U.S. foreign policy and diplomacy. The measures to upgrade several 

Under Secretaries, to add new bureaus and offices in such areas as foreign 

economic policy, energy, counterterrorism, and cyber security, and to beef 

up public diplomacy all arguably make sense. The payoff will be a new State 

Department that can strongly perform more functions in policy analysis and 

diplomatic leadership than now, including in areas critical to the administration’s national security strategy. The drawback will be a State Department 

that, already known for its internecine battles and struggles to forge coordinated decisions, is more complex than now—and more challenging to lead. 

Even more than now, future Secretaries, Deputy Secretaries, and Under 

Secretaries will have their work cut out for them. A similar judgment applies 

to the idea of empowering Ambassadors as Chiefs of Missions so that they 

can better function as CEOs for directing multiagency activities in their 

countries and regions. This reform is clearly needed, especially in troubled 

spots where U.S. diplomacy and development require a host of different 

agencies pursuing distinct agendas plus close cooperation with host countries, 

partner countries, international organizations, and other actors. The challenge facing future Chiefs of Missions, even if they are empowered, will be 

to perform this difficult job and juggling act while also maintaining influential positions in Washington policymaking.
146 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

The QDDR Report’s efforts to strengthen USAID internally, to grant 

it a newly influential role in forging development policy as part of the State 

Department, and to make it the world’s preeminent development agency 

respond to the multiregional challenges facing the United States in this 

critical arena. As these reforms are implemented, time will tell whether 

USAID evolves along these desired lines and delivers better results than now. 

An equally important issue is whether, in response to the QDDR Report, 

U.S. development policy is now pointed in better strategic directions that 

could produce improved concrete results. The QDDR Report argues in favor 

of revised U.S. development and assistance efforts focused on making investments rather than on delivering services in ways that help targeted countries 

and regions to achieve self-sustaining economic growth and political progress, 

and on achieving high-impact results by working closely with other countries 

and actors to provide coordinated assistance efforts. This basic development 

strategy makes sense as a way to get more mileage out of scarce U.S. development and assistance resources and to achieve better collaboration with the 

plethora of aid efforts flowing from multiple countries, international organizations, and other actors. But the QDDR Report advances this strategy in 

abstract terms without providing much analysis of how individual regions 

and countries will be affected in ways that could require differing investment 

strategies and development agendas. Beyond this, the QDDR Report can be 

read as seemingly aspiring to ambitious worldwide development goals because 

it does not discuss specific priorities for U.S. regional strategies and country 

agendas, not all of which can be transformed overnight or even over many 

years. This is a shortfall; a better sense of priorities is needed to determine 

whether future U.S. development policies and strategies will be targeted in 

wise and effective ways.

The QDDR Report acts sensibly and insightfully in its efforts to elevate 

the goal of preventing and responding to crisis, conflict, and instability in 

fragile states to a key imperative of U.S. foreign policy and diplomacy. As it 

states, the multiplicity and diversity of challenges in this arena, which go 

beyond Iraq and Afghanistan, require a better planning process and sound 
THE FIRST QUADRENNIAL DIPLOMACY AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW 147

strategic guidance for shaping and calibrating U.S. activities in differing 

places. Keys to this endeavor are the acts of defining and executing missions, 

achieving close civilian-military collaboration, pursuing whole-of-government approaches, and working with partners in sustained, effective ways. 

The QDDR’s division of labor between the State Department and USAID, 

with the former leading political-military crisis missions and the latter leading humanitarian assistance efforts, provides a path to deconflicting and 

harmonizing the activities of both agencies. Of special significance is the 

QDDR Report’s decision to create, at the State Department, a Bureau for 

Conflict and Stabilization Operations under S/CRS. Also important is the 

decision to continue building a strong Civilian Response Corps of active 

personnel, but the accompanying decision to scale back its civilian reserve 

component to a smaller Expert Corps risks having too few personnel if multiple missions must be performed.

Throughout, the QDDR Report strongly emphasizes the need for the 

State Department and USAID to do a better job of managing resources. It 

makes the case for more State/USAID personnel, but it also puts forth an 

activist agenda for better using existing manpower resources by hiring more 

skilled experts from outside the two agencies, doing a better job of training, 

and fostering other improvements to the Foreign Service and civil service. Its 

measures to improve contracting procedures and to do a better job of relying 

upon government employees to reduce reliance on private contractors are 

sound. The QDDR Report also deserves high marks for its emphasis on 

fostering improvements to strategic planning, multiyear budgeting, and use 

of output measures and metrics—areas where State traditionally has not been 

as strong as Defense. Whether the State Department and USAID will succeed in their agenda to better link plans and budgets to personnel and operations is to be seen. The QDDR Report also calls for efforts to do a better 

job of developing interagency plans for budgets and resources, but progress 

in this important arena lies mainly beyond its province.

Finally, the QDDR Report suffers from a key shortfall in its failure to 

address emerging changes to classical diplomacy and the need for the State 
148 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

Department to pursue internal reforms to deal with them. Possibly because

the QDDR Report was not written to address this issue in any detail, it tends 

to assume that classical diplomacy will be a constant in the future strategic 

equation and that the State Department is both handling associated challenges effectively and is properly organized for dealing with them. In its first 

two chapters, the QDDR Report earmarks these challenges, but it discusses 

them only briefly, and it does not put forth a well-articulated set of policies, 

strategies, and efforts to deal with them. A strong case can be made, however, 

that classical diplomacy is a fast-changing variable, not a constant. New 

challenges are emerging in such areas as handling big power geopolitical 

relations with Russia and China, creating new regional security architectures, 

deterring new nuclear powers and other potential rivals, and reforming alliances so that new missions can be performed. In these areas, new types of 

thinking and calculating will be needed about U.S. foreign policy, the relationship between civilian and military power, and diplomatic goals and 

strategies. To address this demanding agenda, the State Department may 

need to address how its Office of the Under Secretary for Political Affairs

and its Bureau of Political-Military Affairs are to be staffed, structured, and

operated. For both offices, an agenda of reform may be necessary. The 

QDDR Report’s silence does not make this issue any less important.
CONCLUSION

A Comprehensive Blueprint with 

Lingering Issues

By any measure, the seven official studies surveyed in the preceding 

pages are extensive and wide ranging in the issues that they raise and 

the departures that they promote. Together, they put forth fully 671 

pages of analysis for launching the national security strategies and defense 

plans of a new administration, a total that far surpasses the comparable publications of other incoming administrations for more than the past two 

decades. All of these studies are excellently written and cogently argued. They 

succeed in their core task of providing high-level, path-setting guidance to 

U.S. Government departments and agencies on creating new-era strategic 

goals and implementing agendas. In the process of providing an unusual 

degree of transparency, they offer the American people, as well as foreign 

countries, a great deal of material to chew on and digest. Regardless of whether 

their key judgments are accepted or rejected, those who read these studies will 

come away with a better sense of what the administration is thinking and 

where it proposes to lead the United States and the world.

Each of these seven studies is important in its own right and deserves 

to be read and evaluated on its individual merits. Equally important, they 

should be read and judged collectively because they combine to create a 

comprehensive blueprint for guiding how future strategies, policies, and 

plans are to unfold in ways intended to be mutually reinforcing and to 

produce cumulating results. This blueprint is not heavily infused with ideology from either end of the U.S. political spectrum. Instead, it comes across 

as mostly centrist, pragmatic, and technical in its thinking, but with features 

149
150 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

that have left some liberals perceiving too much conservatism at work, and 

some conservatives perceiving too much liberalism. Taken as a whole and 

judged in strategic terms, this blueprint can help promote bipartisan consensus in the field of national security strategy and defense planning. However, to the extent that it triggers partisan debate, it illustrates the difficulties 

of building full-fledged bipartisanship in today’s polarized political climate.

A Blueprint of Continuity and Change. The seven studies form a comprehensive blueprint because they perform different functions that are designed 

to interlock in complementary ways. Essentially, the National Security Strategy of 2010 (NSS 2010) provides the political foundations for a new U.S. 

strategy that employs American economic renewal and a whole-of-government approach as engines for driving an assertive, refocused strategy of 

engagement abroad. A blend of continuity and change, this new strategy is 

focused on such top strategic priorities as strengthening homeland defense, 

defeating al Qaeda and succeeding in Afghanistan, preventing further proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), making the Middle East 

more secure, and building improved alliances and partnerships. These are 

all part of a larger effort aimed at creating a cooperative international order 

for handling common security challenges. Mainly preoccupied with articulating an integrated set of goals, this new strategy is both hopeful and ambitious. It not only employs multiple instruments, including diplomacy and 

civilian assets for comprehensive approaches in turbulent places, but it also 

acknowledges a need for strong U.S. military forces to help achieve national 

goals in peace, crisis, and war. By providing this political foundation for U.S. 

national security strategy, the NSS 2010 creates a framework for determining 

how the five subsequent studies, which mainly focus on military and defense 

issues, can be incorporated into the comprehensive blueprint.

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report aspires to provide a 

new approach to U.S. defense planning that can serve the new national 

security strategy. Aimed at pursuing four strategic goals by strengthening 

U.S. military forces for six high-priority missions, it calls upon the Department of Defense (DOD) to pursue an agenda of rebalance and reform in 
A COMPREHENSIVE BLUEPRINT WITH LINGERING ISSUES 151

ways that devote special attention to improving capabilities for current wars 

while remaining attentive to longer term imperatives. Its top priorities for 

rebalancing include defending the U.S. homeland, succeeding in counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations, building the security 

capacity of partner states, improving U.S. military capabilities for performing 

in antiaccess environments, preventing WMD proliferation, and operating 

effectively in cyberspace. It calls for future U.S. military forces that are flexible and adaptable in ways enabling them to handle a wide spectrum of 

contingencies, including two concurrent major operations. Although it 

cancels or scales back several expensive weapons acquisition programs, its 

reform agenda is focused on making DOD efforts in that area more effective, 

timely, and affordable.

Although written as a criticism of the QDR Report, the congressionally 

mandated QDR in Perspective (QDRP) Report is valuable as a complementary contribution because of the heightened attention that it devotes to forcesizing constructs, the need for a larger Navy, long-term modernization of 

U.S. forces, and vigorous reforms to the weapons acquisition process. It also 

calls for changes to the interagency process in ways that will enhance strategic planning at the onset of each administration. Together, the QDR Report 

and QDRP Report in particular provide a framework for judging how U.S. 

conventional forces should be improved and how new regional security and 

deterrence architectures are to be built.

The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) Report complements the QDR 

Report and QDRP Report by providing a new strategy toward U.S. nuclear 

forces and preparations. It is focused on preventing WMD proliferation and 

WMD terrorism, reducing the role of U.S. nuclear forces in national security 

strategy, maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at reduced force 

levels, strengthening regional deterrence, reassuring allies and partners, and 

maintaining a safe and effective nuclear arsenal. As part of a large set of 

policies for reducing the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. strategy and preventing WMD proliferation, it strengthens already existing assurances that 

U.S. nuclear weapons will not be used against nonnuclear states that comply 
152 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

with Non-Proliferation Treaty provisions. In addition, it introduces the new 

and distant goal of ultimately achieving a world without nuclear weapons. 

For the long period until this goal can be accomplished, the NPR Report is 

attentive to U.S. requirements for capable nuclear forces at lower levels than 

now. It endorses the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) reduction of U.S. and Russian forces to 700 strategic delivery vehicles and 1,550 

warheads and calls for even larger reductions in subsequent negotiations. 

But it also calls for retaining a sizable triad of intercontinental ballistic missiles, ballistic missile submarines and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, 

and heavy bombers, for modernizing them in moderate ways and for 

strengthening management of the nuclear arsenal.

Of the five defense studies, the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) 

Report puts forth the biggest change and newest thinking of all. Rather than 

continue solely with the Ground-based Midcourse Defense program aimed 

at defending the U.S. homeland from ballistic missile threats posed by such 

countries as North Korea and Iran, it proposes instead to broaden the ballistic missile defense effort by deploying significant numbers of SM–3 interceptors to defend regional allies and partners in Europe, Asia, and the 

Middle East. Judged in historical and strategic terms, this missile defense 

program is truly a sea-change in U.S. defense strategy with wider implications. The BMDR Report proposes to blend enhanced missile defenses with 

U.S. conventional forces and nuclear commitments to provide integrated 

military forces for underwriting efforts to create new security and defense 

architectures in all three regions. It suggests that as the contributions of missile defenses as well as U.S. and allied conventional forces increase, nuclear 

forces and commitments can play a reduced role. Consequently, the BMDR 

Report ushers into existence a new era for U.S. thinking about how best to 

achieve security and stability in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East.

Whereas all of these defense studies largely focus on U.S. military preparedness efforts, the NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement

(ASDE Report) focuses intently on how to energize the defense efforts of 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allies in Europe. Written to 
A COMPREHENSIVE BLUEPRINT WITH LINGERING ISSUES 153

help advise NATO on how to write a new strategic concept, it calls upon 

NATO strategic planning to address new-era missions in Europe and distant 

regions. It proposes a set of changes aimed at enhancing the NATO ability 

to protect its exposed borders and to defend against such new-era threats as 

missile attack, terrorism, and cyber attacks. In addition, it calls upon the 

Alliance to improve its military forces and capabilities for expeditionary 

missions, embrace comprehensive approaches, and broaden its cooperation 

with partners from multiple regions. The effect is to give NATO plenty of 

new ideas and departures to think about as it charts the future over the 

coming decade.

The Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) Report 

puts forth a lengthy, intensive analysis of how U.S. civilian power should be 

increased, how diplomacy and development policies in troubled regions 

should be carried out, and how internal Department of State and U.S. Agency 

for International Development (USAID) structures and operations should 

be reformed. Provided it is strongly implemented, it will enhance the capabilities of State and USAID to operate effectively in the coming years. The 

effect is to give the State Department and USAID a demanding but promising agenda to carry out in future years.

Lingering Issues. The comprehensive blueprint created by the seven official 

studies leaves lingering issues and controversies in its wake, all of which create 

reasons for further analysis aimed at resolving them in ways that further 

strengthen the blueprint while eliminating gaps and inconsistencies:

•	 The NSS 2010 may be so hopefully ambitious in its global designs

that it overly discounts the constraints facing the United States, and 

fails to adequately treat the risks of potential major power competition. In addition, it fails to address future U.S. strategy in the Middle 

East if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, and does not provide long-term 

political and strategic concepts for guiding security affairs in Europe 

and Asia.

•	 The QDR Report is so preoccupied with handling near-term priorities

that it fails to give full attention to long-term imperatives including 
154 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

U.S. force requirements, joint operations, and modernization. In 

addition, its call for creating new regional security architectures seems 

focused on handling military forces in the absence of larger political 

purposes and designs.

•	 The QDRP Report is attentive to long-term force sizing, modernization, and acquisition reform, but it fails to illuminate how a larger 

Navy and a more ambitious modernization effort are to be funded.

•	 Although the QDR Report and QDRP Report urge enhanced security assistance for troubled states, they do not provide strategic design 

concepts for determining how the forces of allied countries in Europe, 

Asia, and the Middle East are to be improved, made more interoperable with U.S. forces, and integrated to perform common deterrence 

and defense missions.

•	 The NPR Report does not provide sufficient analysis of whether its

complex approach to preventing further WMD proliferation and 

nuclear terrorism will succeed. While it provides a viable triad under 

New START provisions, it does not specify how far additional reductions can be taken.

•	 The BMDR Report puts forth a new and ambitious strategy for

deploying regional missile defenses, but this strategy is highly dependent upon successful SM–3 development programs as well as the 

willingness of allies and partners to cooperate in the enterprise.

•	 The ASDE Report articulates an ambitious agenda for improving and

reforming NATO, but it was issued before the emerging wave of 

European defense spending cuts, which will affect how NATO’s 

future is best handled.

•	 The QDDR Report puts forth an ambitious agenda for U.S. diplomacy and development policies in troubled areas, but it does not set 

clear priorities in these areas or articulate a new-era agenda for how 

classical diplomacy is to be carried out.

•	 All of the official studies on U.S. national security strategy and

defense planning assume that adequate budget resources will be available to carry out their future policies and programs. Growing political pressures to reduce Federal deficits partly by cutting expenses are 
A COMPREHENSIVE BLUEPRINT WITH LINGERING ISSUES 155

calling this assumption into question. Once firm decisions are made 

about potential budget cuts to national security programs, careful 

reviews of these programs and their associated policies likely will be 

needed. A key bottom line, noted by the NSS 2010, is that sustained 

growth by the U.S. economy will be critical to carrying out the coming future national security agenda.

Future Analytical Challenges. In addressing these lingering issues, future 

analyses and studies will be well focused if they include the following topics:

•	 how U.S. national security strategy can best be adapted if the future

world proves less tractable than now hoped, and if serious competition 

emerges among the major powers, including with Russia and China

•	 how U.S. national security strategy and defense plans can best adapt

if efforts to prevent further WMD proliferation and nuclear terrorism 

do not adequately succeed

•	 how a containment, deterrence, and defense strategy can best be

pursued in the Middle East if Iran acquires nuclear weapons and how 

democratization of the region can best be pursued in an era of revolutions against tyrants

•	 how new-era political concepts for guiding security affairs in Europe

and Asia can best be designed in ways that provide appropriate strategic guidance for handling future military commitments and related 

military and security issues

•	 how U.S. conventional forces can best besized, configured, and modernized for the long haul in ways that are effective and affordable, and 

that maintain adequate capabilities for both hybrid warfare in the 

Middle East and high-tech deterrence and defense missions in Asia

•	 how future U.S. overseas forces are to be sized and designed in ways

that help lead NATO in Europe, perform new-era missions in the 

Middle East while keeping a suitably low political profile, and achieve 

key security goals in Asia while adapting to China’s growing antiaccess and area-denial capabilities

•	 how new-era nuclear commitments, conventional forces, and missile

defenses are to be blended together in all three regions to provide 
156 NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

extended deterrence, reassurance of allies and partners, and crisis 

response capabilities

•	 how future U.S. nuclear forces are to be sized and structured if future

negotiations produce deeper reductions than envisioned by New 

START

•	 how adequate U.S. forces and improvements are to be funded and

prioritized, along with enhanced civilian capabilities and homeland 

security assets, in an era of tight interagency budgets and scarce 

resources

•	 how U.S. allies and partners can best be approached to elicit their

support for the new regional missile defense strategy and deployments, and how shortfalls in SM–3 can best be handled

•	 how NATO improvements can best be pursued in an era of shrinking

European defense budgets in ways that pursue reforms, efficiencies, 

and adequate deployable forces and capabilities

•	 how the forces and capabilities of allies and partners in Asia and the

Middle East can best be improved and integrated in ways that produce interoperability with U.S. military forces and enhance common 

deterrence and defense efforts

•	 how the State Department’s Office of Under Secretary for Political

Affairs and its Bureau of Political-Military Affairs should be reformed 

to carry out new-era classical diplomacy.

Bottom Line. Individually and collectively, the seven official studies go a 

long way toward equipping the new U.S. national security strategy and 

defense plans with sound intellectual capital, including goals, policies, and 

improvement priorities. But they do not preclude the need for further thinking, analyzing, and refining. Indeed, they open the door to a new era of 

studies and analyses whose dimensions are now only beginning to be understood. Meeting this challenge will be a key part of handling the security, 

defense, diplomatic, and development agenda ahead.
157

BIBLIOGRAPAHY

National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: The White House, May 

2010), available at <www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/

national_security_strategy.pdf>.

Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: Department of 

Defense, February 2010), available at <www.defense.gov/qdr/qdr%20as%20

of%2029jan10%201600.pdf>.

The QDR in Perspective: Meeting America’s National Security Needs in 

the 21st Century, Final Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel, by Stephen J. Hadley and William J. Perry, co-chairmen (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2010), available at <www.usip.

org/files/qdr/qdrreport.pdf>.

Nuclear Posture Review Report (Washington, DC: Department of 

Defense, April 2010, available at <www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20

nuclear%20posture%20review%20report.pdf>.

Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: Department 

of Defense, February 2010), available at <www.defense.gov/bmdr/docs/

BMDR%20as%20of%2026JAN10%200630_for%20web.pdf>.

NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement (Brussels: NATO 

Public Diplomacy Division, May 2010), available at <www.nato.int/strategic-concept/expertsreport.pdf>.

Leading Through Civilian Power: The First Quadrennial Diplomacy and 

Development Review (Washington, DC: Department of State, December 

2010), available at <www.state.gov/documents/organization/153108.pdf>.

159

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Richard L. Kugler is a Senior Consultant to the Center for Technology and 

National Security Policy (CTNSP), Institute for National Strategic Studies, 

at the National Defense University. Formerly, Dr. Kugler was Distinguished 

Research Professor in CTNSP, and earlier, Director of the Department of 

Defense’s Strategic Concepts Development Center, a Senior Executive in the 

Office of Secretary of Defense, and a Senior Defense Analyst at the RAND 

Corporation. He has been awarded the Distinguished Civilian Service Medal 

and other high-level decorations. He has published 17 books on national 

security strategy and defense planning, and multiple articles in Foreign Affairs, 

Survival, and other journals. He holds a Ph.D. from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.



The U.S. Government has recently issued seven major 

studies that together put forth a comprehensive blueprint for major global changes in U.S. national security 

strategy, defense plans, and diplomacy. These seven studies 

are brought together in this illuminating book, which portrays 

their individual contents and complex interrelationships and 

evaluates their strengths and shortfalls. It argues that while 

these studies are well-written, cogently argued, and articulate 

many valuable innovations for the Department of Defense, 

Department of State, and other government agencies, all of 

them leave lingering, controversial issues that require further 

thinking and analysis as future U.S. national security policy 

evolves in a changing and dangerous world. For all readers, 

this book offers a quick, readable way to grasp and critique 

the many changes now sweeping over the new U.S. approach 

to global security affairs.