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“Given its regional ambitions, radical ideology, and 

large recruitment pool of 

existing and potential militants 

in Pakistan, Daesh cannot be 

ignored as a potential threat 

to Pakistan and its consequential fallout for the region.

”

September 2016

Tariq Parvez The Islamic State in Pakistan

PEACEBRIEF213

Daesh in Khorasan

Daesh, the Arabic acronym of the Islamic State, has had an active presence in Afghanistan and 

Pakistan since the establishment of its formal affiliate in January 2015. While it has been more active in 

Afghanistan, the exact threat Daesh poses in Pakistan remains up for debate. In February 2016, Interior 

Minister Chaudhry Nisar stated, “The Daesh has no presence in Pakistan. The other militant groups 

which are already involved in anti-state activities are using its name.”1 On the other hand, Aftab Sultan, 

director general of the Intelligence Bureau, stated before the Senate Standing Committee on Interior 

in the same month, “Daesh was emerging as a threat in the country because certain militant groups 

had a soft corner for it.”2 So far, Daesh’s Iraq- and Syria-based leadership does not appear to have the 

means to direct overt terrorist activities in Pakistan. However, given its regional ambitions, radical 

ideology, and large recruitment pool of existing and potential militants in Pakistan, Daesh cannot be 

ignored as a potential threat to Pakistan and its consequential fallout for the region.3

Origin and Leadership

On January 26, 2015, Daesh announced the establishment of its formal affiliate in the Khorasan, a 

region encompassing “Afghanistan, Pakistan and other nearby lands.” 4 An ex-leader of the Tehrike-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Hafez Saeed Khan, was nominated as the Wali (governor) of the affiliate, 

Summary

• The Islamic State, or Daesh, formally established its Khorasan branch for Pakistan, Afghanistan, 

and nearby areas in January 2015.

• There is currently no evidence of Daesh’s central leadership directing terrorist activities in 

Pakistan, but its ideology has inspired individuals and groups to recruit, raise funds, and carry 

out attacks to demonstrate their support.

• Daesh’s far-reaching ideology—which includes opposition to the Shia minority, the Pakistani 

state, and the West, and support for a global Islamic Caliphate—can make it appealing to both 

existing and potential militants in Pakistan.

• A comprehensive response to this threat by the Pakistani government would include greater 

security cooperation with Afghanistan, the elimination of terrorist safe havens, prioritizing 

police training in national counterterrorism strategies, and promoting programs to counter 

Daesh’s dangerous ideology. 
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The Islamic State in Pakistan

Page 2 • PB 213 • September 2016

which is known as Wilayat Khorasan. Khan became head of a twelve-member shura (committee) 

consisting of nine Pakistanis, two Afghans, and one person of unknown origin.5 A combination of 

“push” and “pull” factors contributed to these local militants’ decision to join Daesh—push factors 

like disillusionment with their leaders in TTP and the Afghan Taliban or TTP’s loss of territorial 

control in the Federally Administered Tribal Agencies (FATA), which forced its leadership to migrate 

to neighboring Afghanistan, and pull factors like attraction of the ideology and successes of Daesh 

or its ability to pay them more than other groups.

To date, most of Wilayat Khorasan activities have been concentrated in Afghanistan, but the 

composition of the shura could lead the group to eventually engage more heavily in Pakistan than 

Afghanistan. The leaders of the Wilayat Khorasan shura, being predominantly Pakistani, have an 

established understanding of the Pakistani terrain and its people. Their influence with local tribes 

could help Wilayat Khorasan build a support base in Pakistan. Shura member Omar Mansoor also 

reportedly has ties to Lal Masjid in Islamabad, which serves as a networking nexus for extremists.6

The shura’s connections with the Lal Masjid could help Daesh develop linkages with multiple 

terrorist groups and recruit from Deobandi madrassas throughout Pakistan, which are connected 

to Lal Masjid.7

Manpower

There are few reliable estimates of the numerical strength of Daesh in Pakistan. According to a 

2016 Royal United Services Institute report, there were 7,000–8,000 Daesh members based in 

Afghanistan and 2,000–3,000 based in Pakistan, including fighters and support elements.8 For 

Pakistan, this includes recruitment networks in several major urban areas. In April 2016, Karachi 

police released a statement alleging that more than two dozen Daesh-linked militants were 

operating in Karachi.9

These estimates do not account for supporters of Daesh who either have left Pakistan to join the 

fight in the Middle East or covertly support its ideology. Pakistani authorities have offered varying 

estimates; in early 2016, a government official from Punjab estimated that no more than one 

hundred persons had left Pakistan to join Daesh.10 In its annual report on foreign fighters in Syria, 

the Soufan Group estimated that as of August 2015 some 70–330 Pakistani nationals had travelled 

to Syria to fight for Daesh.11

Funding

Daesh in Pakistan draws funding primarily from donations, particularly from Turkey and Saudi 

Arabia, through groups like Abtal-ul-Islam. Normally the funds are transferred through hawala 

networks, a common method in the region for transferring funds from overseas.12 Daesh also 

accepts donations from sympathizers in Pakistan. Several Daesh supporters were arrested in Karachi 

in 2015, revealing a network of educated, middle-class professionals who regularly donated to the 

group. Before joining Daesh, many—like Adil Masood Butt, Khalid Bari, and Naheed Baji—previously donated funds to Al Qaeda.13 Pakistani authorities uncovered a similar network of women in 

Lahore in December 2015.14

Daesh also raises funds through criminal activities. In Karachi, a police detainee with alleged 

ties to Daesh confessed to committing a series of bank robberies in Sindh and Balochistan to fund 

terrorist acts.15
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Ties to Daesh in Iraq and Syria

In the past year, Pakistani authorities have discovered Daesh supporters who, though they had 

no ties to Wilayat Khorasan, had established links with Daesh in Iraq and Syria. In 2015, one such 

group—based in Sialkot, Punjab and comprised of former Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jamaat-ud-Dawa 

members—was sending Pakistani volunteers to Daesh training camps in Syria.16 Another cell uncovered in Lahore consisted of well-educated women, who reportedly left for Syria with twenty others to 

fight alongside Daesh in 2015.17

There are also groups that have embraced Daesh’s ideology and tactics despite having no direct 

link to Daesh or its regional affiliate.18 Such a group was responsible for the massacre of forty-two 

Ismailis in the Safoora Goth neighborhood in Karachi in May 2015. Although Wilayat Khorasan initially 

claimed responsibility, the attack appears to have been orchestrated by a Pakistan-based cell led 

by Saad Aziz, a former supporter of Al Qaeda who did not have any discernible links to or contact 

with Wilayat Khorasan or Daesh in Syria and Iraq.19 This type of group could open the possibility for 

Daesh to establish operational ties to or inspire the actions of unconnected local networks that share 

its sectarian agenda, which could significantly enhance Daesh’s capacity to carry out sophisticated 

attacks in Pakistan.

Cooperation and Rivalry with Pakistani Militant Groups

Daesh’s ideological appeal, global reputation, and substantial financial resources have afforded it 

room in Pakistan’s already crowded jihadi space. Its agenda—which includes anti-Shia, anti-Pakistan, 

anti-West, pro-Caliphate, and pro-Kashmir liberation sentiments—can make it appealing to several 

militant organizations. The Sunni sectarian groups Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Ahle-Sunnat-Wal-Jamaat 

have supported Daesh in the past, although neither group has pledged allegiance.20 Still, these 

groups could choose to support or cooperate operationally with Daesh due to their shared anti-Shia 

agenda.21 More recently, Sawt-al-Ummah pledged allegiance to Daesh.22 This group is an offshoot 

of Hizb-ut-Tahrir, whose campaign of support for an Islamic Caliphate could sway its members to 

gravitate toward the Daesh brand.

These advantages notwithstanding, Daesh’s ambitions for the region and its virulent ideology 

have put it at odds with other militant groups. The most lethal militant group in Pakistan, TTP, has not 

expressed support for Daesh elements in the region, likely due to the TTP’s alliance with the Afghan 

Taliban, which has lost territory to Daesh since 2015. LeT is hostile to Daesh because LeT does not 

attack targets within Pakistan; however, there have reportedly been ex-LeT members who have 

fought for Daesh in Syria.23

Improving the Government’s Response

Pakistan’s response to Daesh must be a multifaceted effort. What little action the government has 

taken against Daesh has been focused militarily. Military operations in 2015 cleared out militant safe 

havens in the FATA, but these groups, including Wilayat Khorasan, simply shifted to Afghanistan or 

Balochistan. Pakistan must seek a joint effort with Afghanistan to combat this threat, focusing on 

border control to stem the flow of militants between the two countries. Both countries must also 

work to reach a final resolution on the dispute over their border to enhance these efforts. 

An effective effort to combat Daesh requires a civilian organization at the national level to assess, 

plan, and orchestrate the national counterterrorism effort against Daesh. The National Counter 

Terrorism Authority should play a leading role in developing such a national counterterrorism 

strategy. The movement of the militants to urban areas following operations in the FATA necessitates 
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The Islamic State in Pakistan

Page 4 • PB 213 • September 2016

a greater involvement of the local police, who can be more effective than the military due to their 

permanent presence in their communities. A national counterterrorism strategy should confine the 

use of paramilitary elements for operations in semi-governed areas like the FATA and Balochistan and 

should instead prioritize training and capacity building for police and civilian intelligence services to 

root out extremist elements in these areas.

The counterterrorism strategy must also address the main strength of Daesh in Pakistan: the resonance of its ideology with different segments of Pakistani society. The plan should address Pakistan’s 

emerging sectarian divisions, which Wilayat Khorasan has already proven it is able to exploit to gain 

recruits.24 The government must designate organizations at the federal and provincial levels focused 

on developing a national narrative of tolerance, pluralism, and rule of law to counter the spread of 

Daesh ideology. Finally, this strategy must counter Daesh propaganda targeting women and youth 

through comprehensive and sustained outreach aimed at these two segments of Pakistani society.

Notes

1. “Nisar Says Daesh Has No Presence in Pakistan,” Pakistan Herald, February 13, 2016, www.pakistan

herald.com/news/9551/13-february-2016/nisar-says-daesh-has-no-presence-in-pakistan.

2. Iftikhar A. Khan, “IS Emerging as a Threat, Warns IB Chief,” Dawn News, February 11, 2016, www.

dawn.com/news/1238771.

3. Ibid.

4. “Al-Furqān Media Presents a New Audio Message from the Islamic State’s Shaykh Abū Muhammad al ‘Adnānī al-Shāmī: ‘Say, Die In Your Rage,’ ” Jihadology, January 26, 2015, http://jihadology.

net/2015/01/26/al-furqan-media-presents-a-new-audio-message-from-the-islamic-statesshaykh-abu-mu%E1%B8%A5ammad-al-adnani-al-shami-say-die-in-your-rage.

5. “Pakistani Taliban Splinter Group Again Pledges Allegiance to Islamic State,” Long War Journal, 

January 13, 2015, www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/01/video_pakistani_tali_2.php.

6. Ibid. 

7. Rao Kumar, “ISIS in Afghanistan, part 3: Analyzing Wilayat Khorasan’s Propaganda,” Al-Jibaal Fi 

Hadha Dunya, February 20, 2016, https://themountainsinthisworld.com/tag/wilayat-khorasan. 

8. Dr. Antonio Giustozzi, “The Islamic State in ‘Khorasan’: A Nuanced View,” RUSI, February 5, 2016, 

https://rusi.org/commentary/islamic-state-khorasan-nuanced-view.

9. Imtiaz Ali, “25 ‘IS Inspired Militants’ Operating in Karachi: CTD Police,” Dawn News, April 7, 2016, 

www.dawn.com/news/1250400/25-is-inspired-militants-operating-in-karachi-ctd-police.

10. “About 100 Left Pakistan for Syria, Iraq to join Daesh: Sanaullah,” National International, January 4, 

2016, www.thenews.com.pk/latest/86330-About-100-left-Pakistan-for-Syria-Iraq-to-join-DaeshSanaullah.

11. “Foreign Fighters: An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria and 

Iraq,” Soufan Group, December 2015, http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/

TSG_ForeignFightersUpdate3.pdf.

12. Ibid. 

13. Imtiaz Ali, “Four Well-Educated Men Held on Terrorism Charge,” Dawn News, December 9, 2015, 

www.dawn.com/news/1227381; Salls Bin Parwaiz, “In Karachi ISIS Present in Spirit Only,” News 

International, January 25, 2016, www.thenews.com.pk/print/93457-In-Karachi-ISIS-present-inspirit-only.
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Page 5 • PB 213 • September 2016

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14. Abid Hussain, Umer Farooq, Ghulam Dastageer, and Shair Ali Khan, “Islamic Republic versus

Islamic State,” Herald, March 2016 (updated August 2016), http://herald.dawn.com/

news/1153362.

15. “Daesh Commander Claims 44 Terrorism Acts in Deathbed Confessions,” Frontier Post, March 18, 

2016, www.thefrontierpost.com/article/379368/daesh-commander-claims-44-terrorism-actsin-deathbed-confessions.

16. Asif Chaudhary, “IS Cell Busted in Sialkot, Claim Officials,” Dawn News, December 29, 2015, 

www.dawn.com/news/1229341.

17. Umar Cheema, “20 Men, Women, Children from Lahore Join Daesh, Go to Syria,” Geo News, 

December 31, 2015, www.geo.tv/latest/8925-20-men-women-children-from-lahore-join-daesh-

-go-to-syria.

18. Interview with police officials by the author, April 7, 2016.

19. Bin Parwaiz, “In Karachi IS Present in Spirit Only”; interview with police officials by the author, 

April 7, 2016.

20. Tufail Ahmad, “Massacre of Ismaili Muslims in Karachi Indicates Islamic State’s (ISIS’s) Rise in 

Pakistan; South Asia’s Shi’ites Could Face Serious Danger,” MEMRI, Inquiry & Analysis Series no. 

1158, May 14, 2015, www.memrijttm.org/massacre-of-ismaili-muslims-in-karachi-indicatesislamic-states-isiss-rise-in-pakistan-south-asias-shiites-could-face-serious-danger.html. 

21. Interview with Tahir Ashrafi, head of Pakistan Ulema Council, April 5, 2016; “Malik Ishaq’s Killing a

Big Blow to Daesh,” News International, August 1, 2015, www.thenews.com.pk/print/13889-malik

-ishaqs-killing-a-big-blow-to-daesh; interview with police officials by the author, April 7, 2016.

22. Interview with police officials by the author, April 7, 2016. 

23. Chaudhary, “IS Cell Busted in Sialkot.”

24. “Interview with the Wali of Khurasan,” Dabiq, Issue 13, 48-58, accessed via Clarion Project, 

www.clarionproject.org/factsheets-files/Issue-13-the-rafidah.pdf.

About This Brief

This brief assesses the activities 

of the Islamic State, or Daesh, in 

Pakistan, drawing on interviews 

with Pakistani security officials and 

other open sources. Tariq Parvez 

retired as director general of the 

Federal Investigation Agency of 

Pakistan and was the first national 

coordinator at the National Counter 

Terrorism Authority in Pakistan. 

He was awarded Sitara-e-Imtiaz, 

the third highest civilian award, for 

his role in combating terrorism in 

Pakistan. The author would like to 

thank Mehwish Rani for research 

assistance and the United States 

Institute of Peace for comments.