Military 

Perspectives on 

Cyberpower

edited by Larry K. Wentz 

Charles L. Barry 

Stuart H. Starr

PUBLISHED BY THE CENTER FOR TECHNOLOGY AND NATIONAL 

SECURITY POLICY AT THE NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

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July 2009
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Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 
The views expressed in these essays are those of the authors and do 

not reflect the official policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. All information 

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Portions of this book may be quoted or reprinted without permission, provided that a standard source credit line is included.

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iii

Contents

Glossary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

Preface. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

Chapter 1

Military Service Cyber Overview. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Elihu Zimet and Charles L. Barry

Chapter 2

A Unified Field Theory for Full-Spectrum 

Operations: Cyberpower and the Cognitive 

Domain. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Jeffrey G. Smith, Jr.

Chapter 3

Navy Operations to Achieve Military Power in 

Cyberspace: A Draft Concept for Navy Computer 

Network Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

Michael A. Brown

Chapter 4

The Air Force in Cyberspace: Five Myths of 

Cyberspace Superiority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

Forrest B. Hare and Glenn Zimmerman 

Chapter 5

Marine Corps Cyberspace in Support of MAGTF C2: 

By Many a Marine, With a Single Vision. . . . . . . 97

John L. Cloninger

About the Authors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

v

Glossary

Abbreviation Meaning

ABCA American, British, Canadian, and Australian

ACC Air Combat Command

AEHF Advanced Extremely High Frequency

AOR Area of Responsibility

ASD(NII) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Networks and Information Integration)

BDA Battle Damage Assessment

C2 Command and Control

C4 Command, Control, and Communications

C4ISR Command, Control, Communications, Computers, 

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

CCEB Combined Communications-Electronics Board

CCJO Capstone Concept for Joint Operations

CDS Cross Domain Solution

CENTCOM Central Command

CENTRIXS Combined Enterprise Regional Information 

Exchange System

CG Commanding General

CID Center for Information Dominance

CIO Chief Information Officer

CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction

CMO Civil Military Operations

CMOS Cognitive Model of the Simulation

CNA Computer Network Attack

CND Computer Network Defense

CNE Computer Network Exploitation

CNO Computer Network Operations
vi MILITARY PERSPECTIVES ON CYBERPOWER

Abbreviation Meaning

COCOM Combatant Commander

COA Course of Action

COC Combat Operations Center

COG Center of Gravity

COI Community of Interest

CONOPS Concept of Operations

CT Cryptological Technicians

CTI Cryptological Technicians (Interpretive)

CTN Cryptological Technicians (Networks)

CTR Cryptological Technicians (Collection)

CTT Cryptological Technicians (Technical)

DIRSUP Direct Support

DISA Defense Information Services Agency

DOD Department of Defense

DOTMLPF Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, 

Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities

DR Disaster Relief

EDS Electronic Data Systems

EW Electronic Warfare

EUCOM European Command

FCS Future Combat Systems

FIOC Fleet Information Operations Center

FM Field Manual

FOS Family of Systems

GCM GIG Content Manager

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GEM GIG Enterprise Management

GIG Global Information Grid

GND GIG Network Defense

GPS Global Positioning System

HA Humanitarian Assistance
 GLOSSARY vii

Abbreviation Meaning

HW Hardware

I&W Indications & Warning

IA Information Assurance

ICT Information Communications Technology

IED Improvised Explosive Device

IO Information Operations

IP Internet Protocol

IPE Intelligence Preparation of the Environment

ISAF International Security Assistance Forces (Afghanistan)

ISR Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

IT Information Technology

JBMC2 Joint Battle Management Command and Control

JCIDS Joint Capabilities Integration and Development 

System

JC3IEDM Joint Consultation Command and Control 

Information Exchange Model

JFC Joint Force Commander

JFCC-NW Joint Functional Component for Network Warfare

JFCOM Joint Forces Command

JIC Joint Integrating Concept

JIOWC Joint Information Operations Warfare Center

JITC Joint Interoperability Test Command

JNN Joint Network Node

JS Joint Staff

JSTARS Joint Surveillance Target Acquisition System

JTA Joint Technical Architecture

JTF Joint Task Force

JTF-GNO Joint Task Force–Global Network Operations

JTRS Joint Tactical Radio System

JWICS Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System

LAN Local Area Network
viii MILITARY PERSPECTIVES ON CYBERPOWER

Abbreviation Meaning

MAGTF-IO Marine Air-Ground Task Force-Information 

Operations

MANET Mobile, Ad Hoc Network

MCEITS Marine Corps Enterprise Information Technology 

Services

MCSC Marine Corps Systems Command

MCNOSC Marine Corps Network Operations and Security 

Command

MEF Marine Expeditionary Force

MHQ Maritime Headquarters

MNF-I Multi-National Force – Iraq

MOP Measure of Performance

MOC Maritime Operations Center

MSC Major Subordinate Command

MUOS Mobile User Object System

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NCAT Navy Cyber Attack Team

NCDOC Navy Cyber Defense Operations Command

NCES Net Centric Enterprise Services

NCO Net Centric Operations

NCOE Net Centric Operational Environment

NCOW Net Centric Operations and Warfare

NCW Net Centric Warfare

NECC Naval Expeditionary Combat Command

NIOC Navy Information Operations Command

NIPRNET Non-classified Internet Protocol Router Network

NGOs Non-government Organizations

NMCI Navy Marine Corps Intranet

NNEC NATO Net Enabled Capability

NNWC Naval Network Warfare Command

NSA National Security Agency
 GLOSSARY ix

Abbreviation Meaning

NSC Network Service Center

NWDC Naval Warfare Development Center

OE Operational Environment

OGA Other Government Agencies

OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom

OMB Office of Management and Budgeting

OODA Observe, Orient, Decide, Act

OPSEC Operations Security

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

PA Public Affairs

PACOM Pacific Command

PDA Personal Digital Assistant

PSYOP Psychological Operations

QDR Quadrennial Defense Review

RDT&E Research, Development, Test & Evaluation

RF Radio Frequency

SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition

SIPRNET Secure Internet Protocol Router Network

SOF Special Operations Force

SOS System of Systems

SPG Strategic Planning Guidance

SSG Strategic Studies Group

SSTR Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction

STRATCOM Strategic Command

STU Secure Telephone Unit

SW Software

TACTOM Tactical Tomahawk

TCA Transformational Communications Architecture

TD Target Development

TMOS Technical Model of the Situation

TOE Table of Organization and Equipment
x MILITARY PERSPECTIVES ON CYBERPOWER

Abbreviation Meaning

TRADOC Training and Doctrine Command

TPG Transformational Planning Guidance

TSAT Transformational Satellite Program

TTPs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

UCP Unified Command Plan

UOC Unit Operations Center

USFFC US Fleet Forces Command

VA Vulnerability Assessment

VCJCS Vice Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff

WIN-T Warfighter Information Network–Tactical
 Transforming European Forces xi

xi

Preface

During the course of nearly two years, the Center for Technology 

and National Security Policy (CTNSP), National Defense University (NDU), has conducted extensive research to identify and 

explore major cyber issues. These activities were performed in response to 

a request in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The result of 

that research is documented in a book entitled Cyberpower and National 

Security.

As part of that research, CTNSP convened several workshops to 

address challenges in cyberspace, cyberpower, cyberstrategy, and institutional factors. Several representatives from the military Services participated extensively in those workshops. During those workshops, a variety 

of cyber issues emerged about the roles of the Services in the areas of 

roles and missions and the creation of needed intellectual capital. As a 

consequence, we turned to each of the Services and asked if they could 

contribute to the public debate on these cyber issues.

Subsequently, each of the Services identified volunteers who graciously generated white papers to illuminate the cyber debate. It must be 

emphasized that the individual white papers have not been reviewed by 

their Services. They constitute the individual opinions of the contributors who sought to identify and explore the key cyber challenges that the 

Services must address. In addition, to put those contributions in context, 

Dr. Elihu Zimet and Dr. Charles Barry from CTNSP have written an initial chapter that provides a framework for the Service chapters. In that 

chapter, they briefly summarize the major findings and recommendations from the individual authors.

We are delighted to present these white papers in this volume. We 

trust they will help to identify and address many of the key cyber issues 

that the national security community must confront during the coming 

decade.

1

Chapter 1

Military Service Cyber 

Overview

Elihu Zimet and Charles L. Barry

Military cyberpower is the application of the domain of cyberspace to operational concepts to accomplish military objectives and missions, including humanitarian assistance, disaster 

relief (HA/DR), stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) 

operations, and influence operations, as well as warfighting. Military administration, personnel management, medical care, and logistics are also 

enhanced by cyber tools. The growth in information technology and use 

of cyberspace has given the military new capabilities, but has also new 

challenges. Challenges include the need for new operational concepts to 

meet increasingly important military missions that now include appropriate and balanced use of soft and hard power with the need to jointly structure the military to accomplish these missions, including the connectivity 

to coalition partners. Unintended risks and vulnerabilities need careful 

assessment to be effectively managed, especially the increased dependence 

of the military on civilian cyberspace capabilities, products, and services.

This chapter introduces military cyberpower with a discussion of 

military operational constructs including information operations (IO), 

influence operations (mostly soft power), Net Centric Operations (NCO), 

intelligence operations and the normal business and administrative use of 

cyberspace, followed by a discussion on military networks, an overview 

of steps taken across DOD to achieve joint network integration across the 

Services, and an overview of current Service positions and approaches to 

cyberpower. The chapter concludes with some observations on the DOD 

Global Information Grid (GIG), which is the principal common network 

backbone for the Services in the implementation of NCO. 

Two observations are made up front. First, the growth and globalization of cyberspace technology, and the corresponding need for adaptive 
2 zimet and barry

information-based operational concepts to meet new military missions 

that now include the use of both hard and soft power from warfighting 

to HA/DR and SSTR, required development of a military cyberpower 

strategy. The need to jointly structure the military to perform new operations and accomplish new missions, including the connectivity to coalition 

partners, creates an enduring challenge. Operational concepts such as the 

effectiveness of NCO in irregular warfare scenarios are still being tested. 

Second, a single, comprehensive network architecture designed 

to promote maximum connectivity and user-pull based on an open, 

commercial backbone will need separation from the secure connectivity required for sensor-to-weapon operations. The development of the 

GIG, the Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System 

(CENTRIXS) program for information exchange among combined allied 

forces, and new technology initiatives are poised to address the issue of 

comprehensive networks, but not all technology objectives of these programs may be met, and vulnerabilities may exist. In the meantime, the 

military needs secure, closed (separated) networks, as well as fully connected, open networks. The military also needs to wrestle with legacy systems to integrate them into the GIG, to leave them as stand-alone systems, 

or to terminate them.

Introduction

The possession of accurate and timely knowledge and the unfettered 

ability to distribute it as information has always been a sine qua non of 

warfighting. As cyberspace has developed, particularly in the area of networked, computer-based, information systems such as the Internet,1

 the 

introduction of global, cellular-based networks with text messaging, personal digital assistants (PDAs) (such as the BlackBerry), and global satellite 

and cable networks (including radio and TV), the impact of cyberspace on 

military operations has transformed operational concepts such as NCO 

and IO by adding new tools and procedures. In parallel with cyberpower 

in the military—indeed, almost outpacing its development—has been the 

global impact of cyberspace on all the levers of power (diplomatic/political, information, military and economic) as well as the empowerment of 

individuals, groups, and states. The Internet has also provided a “virtual 

safe-haven” for non-conventional threats to the military, including nonstate actors, terrorists, and criminal groups.

In the post–World War II industrial era, U.S. military superiority 

was structured on industrial strength, superior technology in platforms, 

weapons, and C4ISR, and a robust military infrastructure. As we have 
 MILITARY SERVICE CYBER OVERVIEW 3

moved from the industrial to the information age, however, the diffusion 

of information technology has tended to change some of the parameters 

of warfighting, not always to our advantage. Precision weapons and NCO 

have given the United States a decided advantage on the battlefield, but in 

irregular warfare we have had setbacks. While the United States was the 

developer of the cyberspace infrastructure, it is now open and available to 

all who possess the means to access it. The concepts of NCO and IO are 

also available to all, although there is a high cost of entry in developing 

significant capabilities. By its nature, cyberspace is a domain amenable to 

asymmetric warfare, because it can be used anonymously so that deterrence and retribution are difficult, and its immediate effects are usually 

non-lethal, so the risk of escalation is reduced. Cyberspace can also cause 

lethal effects (e.g., by disrupting control systems, causing things to blow 

up) in IO as well as NCO. For example, a computer network attack on an 

unprotected Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) control 

system of a power plant could lead to catastrophic damage to power generators and transformers.

Cyberspace has become a pillar of our national (and international) 

infrastructure. The military owns its tanks, ships, and aircraft but has 

only limited impact on the commercially provided connectivity (e.g., fiber 

optic, satellite) on which the “information superhighway.” Figure 1 depicts 

the communications backbone for connectivity.

Closed

Foreign

Infrastructure

Global Open 

Communications Backbone

(including U.S.)

—Telecom

—Internet

U.S. Military

Allied

Mil.

Figure 1. Cyberspace Connectivity 
4 zimet and barry

The military use of the communications backbone of cyberspace falls 

into three regions on this chart. The military is a general user of the global 

communications backbone. Due to the risks and vulnerabilities inherent in operating in an open architecture, the military has its own specific 

secure networks for warfighting, as shown in the shaded area outside the 

large circle, but also uses networks that rely on commercial connectivity 

where the military controls the nodes, access, and traffic on the networks 

(the area of overlap of the military and the open network, e.g., the Secure 

Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) and Secure Telephone Units 

(STUs)). The area of overlap between the U.S. military and allied militaries 

represents information exchange between combined forces and the joint 

combat commands region-to-region for global operations. A single, common, global, multinational secure data network, the CENTRIXS program, 

is being employed in several operational areas, e.g., to support the MultiNational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) and the International Security Assistance 

Forces (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Security technology to allow information 

exchange between separate, simultaneous communities of interest across 

common, network transport remains a significant technology challenge.

While the military establishment and the defense industrial base 

have been subjected to continuous probing and disruptions and hacking attacks, the concepts and impact of “cyber war” are only now being 

developed in terms of military organization, operational concepts, joint 

doctrine, rules of engagement, and training and education.

A considerable volume of literature continues to be developed on 

both the structure and implications of military cyberpower. In this chapter, an attempt is made to matrix the capabilities enabled by cyberspace 

to both military missions and operational concepts. The military domain 

of cyberspace is characterized in two broad regimes that often require 

different attributes. The first regime is that of an open network in which 

collaboration, information sharing, and situational awareness are principal 

measures of performance (MOP), and connectivity is an essential driver. 

While operating within the time-lines of an enemy is still essential, more 

latency in information transmittal is usually tolerated than in a sensor-toshooter engagement, and shared knowledge gains in importance relative to 

speed of operations. The second regime employs closed, secure networks 

in which speed of operation, assured delivery, and integrity of information 

is paramount.

The concept of an “open” or a “closed” network as used in this chapter is at best an abstraction, in that these terms are really reference states 

and do not exactly correspond to actual employed networks. If fact, open 
 MILITARY SERVICE CYBER OVERVIEW 5

networks are usually capable of supporting some secure transmissions, 

and some closed networks use the communications backbone. An open 

network is defined here as one that is open to any user who wants to dial 

in or log on. Security is usually provided by password protection, encryption, and computer and network protection tools. The principal measures 

of performance are connectivity, availability, and bandwidth. The Internet 

and telecom are examples (although not all of the Internet is open, and the 

communications backbone is also used for secure transmissions). A closed 

network has access by only designated nodes and is “air-gapped” from 

open networks. Principal measures of performance for closed networks 

are security, availability, and assuredness. An example of a closed network 

is the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS).

The Structure of Military Cyberpower 

Military cyberpower is defined here as the application of operational 

concepts, strategies, and functions that employ the tools of cyberspace to 

accomplish military objectives and missions. Often cyberpower is employed in support of operations in other domains, such as maritime operations. However, joint cyberpower sometimes will be employed to prevail 

against an opponent in a contest wholly within cyberspace.

To develop this definition further, military cyberpower is represented as a pyramid as, shown in figure 2. Military cyberpower is then 

seen conceptually as resting on the foundation of cyberspace.

Figure 2. Military Cyberpower—Cyberspace Support to Operational 

Concepts, Strategy and Functions to Achieve Military Missions

:

Phases of

a Joint Campaign:

Shape

Deter

Seize Initiative

Dominate

Stabilize

Reconstruct

Information Operations

NCO/CAISR

Intelligence

Administration

Influence

Networking Attributes:

Connected

Secure

High Bandwidth

Agile

Assured

Open networks } Closed networks

Cyberpower:

Military Missions

Cyberpower:

War fighting Operational

Concepts, Strategies, and Functions

Cyberspace
6 zimet and barry

The base of the triangle is the domain of cyberspace, including types 

of networks (open and closed) and their required attributes. Concepts 

such as the use of hard and soft power are broadly related to the appropriate use of networks in cyberspace for specific military missions. The 

second level of the triangle that is enabled by cyberspace is military cyberpower operational concepts, strategies, and functions that include NCO 

and IO, but also the administrative function of operations including, for 

example, logistics, planning, training, procurement, and personnel. The 

apex of the triangle is “cyberpower: military missions” involving the use 

of cyberpower in prosecuting phase zero to phase five operations in the 

Joint Campaign plans. 

Military Missions: Joint Campaign Plans

The metrics for military effectiveness are the achievement of objectives and the execution of missions. The particular framework to examine 

the role of cyberpower in executing military missions chosen for this 

discussion is taken from the six phases (zero to 5) of the joint campaign 

planning process.2

 This planning process now covers a campaign from 

pre-hostilities to reconstruction and is at the strategic rather than tactical 

level of objectives.

Two caveats in the use of the joint campaign phases need to be mentioned. The first is that the phases are not entirely dissimilar from each 

other. For example phase 2, “seizing the initiative,” and phase 3, “decisive 

operations,” have much in common in terms of tactics and techniques. 

The second caveat is that the phases overlap in time as in a “three block 

war,”3

 in which full-scale military action, peacekeeping, and humanitarian 

assistance may take place simultaneously within three city blocks. Despite 

these caveats, the phases are useful in showing the appropriate and balanced use of soft and hard power with the appropriate uses of cyberpower 

at each phase. The six phases are listed below.

◗ Phase Zero, shaping countries at strategic crossroads, 

◗ Phase One, deterring aggression, 

◗ Phase Two, seizing the initiative and assuming freedom of action,

◗ Phase Three, performing decisive operations and achieving full 

spectrum superiority,

◗ Phase Four, transition to stability operations and establish security 

(including civil security and the rule of law) and restore essential 

Services, and

◗ Phase Five, engage in reconstruction and enable civil authority.
 MILITARY SERVICE CYBER OVERVIEW 7

More detail on the nature of these phases can be found in references 

3 and 4.

Military Cyberpower Operational Constructs

The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) broadly describes how future joint forces are expected to operate across the range 

of military operations in 2012–2025 in support of strategic objectives.4

 To 

enable accomplishment of its particular objectives, the CCJO defines three 

fundamental actions taken by the joint force. These are:

◗ Establish, expand, and secure reach (this includes virtual reach 

through the use of cyberspace, as well as physical and human 

reach), 

◗ Acquire, refine and share knowledge, and

◗ Identify, create, and exploit effects.

For the objective of this paper, and exploration of military cyberpower, 

the above operations and actions are translated into the enabling (and 

synchronizing) hard power and soft power cyberspace concepts that 

support them. These, to be described in more detail below are:

◗ IO,

◗ NCO, a transformational warfare concept whose scope, doctrine, 

and technologies are still under development, and whose broad 

utility is still subject to debate,

◗ Normal and routine business and administrative functions using 

cyberspace-based tools,

◗ Intelligence operations, using cyberspace-based tools, and

◗ Influence operations, using cyberspace-based tools.

Information Operations

Information operations comprise electronic warfare (EW), psychological operations (PSYOP), computer network operations (CNO), 

military deception, and operations security (OPSEC).5 In turn, CNO 

includes computer network attack (CNA), computer network defense 

(CND), and computer network exploitation (CNE). Capabilities that 

support IO include information assurance (IA), physical security, physical attack, counterintelligence, and combat camera. There are also three 

military functions: public affairs (PA), civil military operations (CMO), 

and defense support to public diplomacy specified as related capabilities 

for IO. The relationship of IO to cyberpower is not straightforward due 

to the eclectic nature of IO as well as the support and related capabili-
8 zimet and barry

ties. Some elements of IO, such as EW, might be considered in the realm 

of conventional weapons. PSYOP, however, is integrated in cyberpower 

influence operations, while the other elements of IO are supportive of 

both hard and soft power. 

Network Centric Operations

Network centric operations represent a powerful set of warfighting 

concepts and associated military capabilities that allow warfighters to take 

full advantage of all available information and bring all available assets to 

bear in a rapid and flexible manner. The concepts of NCW were originally 

applied to hard power concepts, in particular strike warfare and air defense, but taken broadly can also be applied to other mission areas and the 

appropriate and balanced use of soft and hard power. As a comparison, an 

Australian view of NCO is articulated by Fewell and Hazen, who describe 

network-centric warfare as follows:

Network-centric warfare is the conduct of military operations using 

networked information systems to generate a flexible and agile military force that acts under a common commander’s intent, independent of the geographic or organizational disposition of the individual 

elements, and in which the focus of the Warfighter is broadened away 

from the individual, unit or platform concerns to give primacy to the 

mission and responsibilities of the team, task group or coalition.6

While this definition is consistent with U.S. definitions, there is 

concern that in the implementation of NCO by our allies (many of whom 

have tailored versions of NCO), the ability to fight jointly may be compromised by non-integrated technologies and different command and control 

structures. To head off such eventualities, DOD engages in a number of 

cooperative forums on interoperability with our most trusted and dependable allies, such as NATO and the cluster of so-called “five eyes” fora—the 

ABCA Armies Standardization Program (for American, British, Canadian, and Australian Armies and as of 2006, includes New Zealand),7

 the 

Multinational Interoperability Council, the Combined-Communications 

Electronics Board (CCEB), and others. A main theme for these interoperability groups is multinational command and control, or determining the 

technologies and procedures for common information sharing. 

The tenets of NCO as articulated by DOD are:8

◗ A robustly networked force improves information sharing,

◗ Information sharing enhances the quality of information and 

shared situational awareness,
 MILITARY SERVICE CYBER OVERVIEW 9

◗ Shared situational awareness enables collaboration and self-synchronization, and enhances sustainability and speed of command,

◗ These, in turn, dramatically increase mission effectiveness.

While broad in nature, these tenets imply military operations in 

which the principal MOPs relate to an enhanced speed of operations and 

operation within an opponent’s OODA loop (the cycle of observe, orient, 

decide, and act). These tenets are compatible with the elements of IO, in 

that both embrace cyberspace, and both deal with military operations. 

However, the two taxonomies are quite different, with IO structured by 

operations and NCO defined by capability. Alternatively, IO is characterized by functionality, while NCO is characterized by speed of operations, 

connectivity, shared decision making, and effectiveness. It is fair to question that, if NCO is the enabling concept of military cyberpower, is the 

military best organized to utilize this growing facet of modern warfighting, and does it have the tools to be agile, to execute, and to adapt?

Normal and Routine Business and Administrative Functions

Normal and routine business and administrative functions are components of military operations heavily dependent on cyberspace that deal 

with the administrative rather than the warfighting and SSTR dimensions. 

This bureaucratic element of operating the military includes the planning, 

programming, budgeting and execution cycle, logistics, training and education, medical care in the field and ashore, procurement and personnel 

actions and records. The principal metrics for business and crisis response 

networks apply here with a strong emphasis on security and information 

assurance.

Intelligence Operations

Intelligence operations are a major military responsibility that relies 

heavily on cyberspace for information retrieval and information processing and dissemination—right place, right person, right time, and right 

quality. 

Influence Operations

Influence operations have grown in importance as the military mission set has expanded to include nation shaping, stabilization, and reconstruction and the threat set has expanded to include counter-insurgency. 

The United States must now deal with the multi-sided nature of the modern world rather than the two super-power world of the past.9
10 zimet and barry

Service Visions and Implementation

DOD’s Goal of Integrating the Services

Moving from theory to practice, it is no surprise that military networks, beginning with the earliest connectivity technologies—telegraph, 

telephone, radio, and now the Internet and private intranets—have followed Service and agency organizational structures and funding channels, 

connecting users along organizational lines: Service and agency staffs, 

field units with higher headquarters, and the Pentagon to all of its subelements. 

As the potential of cyberspace blossomed, DOD began to get serious about joint integration across all the Services, and jointness was 

soon coupled with the concept of NCO. Service-oriented networks had 

to blend into a DOD-wide capability. Successive OSD and Joint Staff 

strategic documents have called for more and better joint interoperability and networking, culminating in the drive for NCO and warfighting 

as the emergent core of U.S. military strategy. The rapid growth and 

convergence of information and telecommunications technologies offers 

significant opportunities for creating network-enabled. joint, operational capabilities. 

Achievement of DOD-wide network integration and operational 

net-centricity are works-in-progress. The Department is only on the 

cusp—perhaps just the leading edge—of that transition. Most of the 

communications and data exchange—strategic, operational, and tactical in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere—remains hierarchical, pushbroadcast, system constrained, and user limiting. Investment in modern 

computing and telecommunications systems alone will not create the 

desired transformation. That requires the build-out of a far more capable global backbone, unrestrained information sharing among commands, and truly interoperable networks wherein every authorized user 

can access directly and instantly any information or other user on the 

network. That is the goal. With unrelenting dedication of resources and 

commitment—and good fortune—DOD may see that reality in a decade 

or so. 

DOD’s bureaucratic processes, procedures, and organizational culture have not evolved as quickly as technology to take full advantage of the 

potential for network integration and interoperability. Significant Servicecentered cultural and programmatic biases remain, and they reinforce 

one another as obstacles to collaborative investments in cross-department 

networking capabilities. However, it is a mistake to attribute parochialism 
 MILITARY SERVICE CYBER OVERVIEW 11

to the military departments alone; the OSD staff, Joint Staff, agencies, and 

combatant commands all seek to protect their own organizational priorities. Breaking down such barriers is the greatest challenge to networking 

all of DOD.

The scope of the network integration enterprise is huge. DOD data 

systems comprise approximately 3.5 million computers running thousands of applications over some 10,000 Local Area Networks (LANs) on 

1,500 bases in 65 countries worldwide, connected by 120,000 telecom 

circuits supporting 35 major network systems over three router-based 

architectures transmitting unclassified, secret, and top secret information. And that is just the fixed-site profile. The most important and 

technologically challenging networks are those of the warfighters—

deployed sea, air, land, Special Operations Forces (SOF), and space 

forces performing missions around the world, and their supporting intelligence networks. 

DOD divides its networking enterprise into three mission areas: 

business, operational, and intelligence. Intelligence networks are not 

wholly managed by DOD but shared with other intelligence agencies. 

DOD business network integration is arguably as important as operational 

integration, yet it enjoys comparatively limited emphasis. Most analysis 

concentrates on operations, the core of NCO. 

DOD has made considerable progress toward joint networking, 

overcoming much parochial resistance and bureaucratic inertia and many 

technological obstacles along the way. Sustained emphasis on joint education, a wealth of commercial experience, and the Internet’s ubiquitous 

presence in everyday lives have been major factors in propelling a cultural 

shift toward broader sharing and collaboration and the breaking down 

of old paradigms. Most members of the military, including its leaders, 

demand to be connected 24/7/365 to whatever systems and users they 

believe essential to their mission—irrespective of parent Service, agency, 

or allied nation.

Across DOD there is heavy investment in integrating command, 

control, computing, and communications capabilities, with numerous 

commands, staffs, agencies, and contractors committed to the goal. 

Many billions have been spent, and ultimately hundreds of billions will 

have been invested. A lot of network integration is already in place, 

although it is still mainly within the Services and Defense agencies and 

along hierarchical lines. Incompatibilities abound. There is less progress 

across joint forces, especially at the tactical level. What does exist is local 

in terms of networking and global connectivity. Few mobile users at the 
12 zimet and barry

tactical level enjoy reliable, sustained, Internet-based enterprise services, 

such as real-time intelligence. However, primary, joint networks do exist 

and have become the strategic and operational backbone of deployed 

forces. The interoperability goal is recognized and accepted, but, as 

budgets tighten, all Services can be expected to cling to internal priorities rather than joint integration when it comes to information technology (IT) and telecommunications investments. That resistance will be 

dampened by the forcing mechanism of essential connectivity, which 

drives commanders to insist on joint architectural standards so they are 

assured of being continuously and reliably “plugged in” with whomever 

and wherever required.

Key obstacles to network integration include an unwieldy standards 

process, limited investment in enabling or replacing Service legacy systems, residual Service parochialism, independent-minded CoComs, a 

non-collaborative culture across the officer corps, and simply the fact that 

DOD is still very much on the front end of a long time line. A lot more 

time and investment must pass to bring the requisite technologies, processes, and systems into being. 

In sum, DOD will get there, though budget pressures seem destine 

to slow progress in network integration as elsewhere. The main obstacle—

usually unrecognized—is time. It simply will take at least another 10 years 

or so of hard work, intense investment, and strong top-down emphasis 

before full net-centricity and network integration are achieved. 

Network Integration Management at DOD

Two principal staffs driving network integration for DOD are the 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration 

(ASD(NII)) who is also the DOD Chief Information Officer (CIO), and 

the Joint Staff J-6, Director for Command, Control, Communications and 

Computers (JS J-6), who is also the Joint Community CIO. 

Under ASD(NII)/DOD CIO is DISA, which is the operating agency 

responsible for DOD network operations and management worldwide. 

The Joint Task Force-Global Network Operations (JTF-GNO), which 

supports computer network defense, is currently housed with DISA in 

Arlington, VA. 

On the operational side, Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) is responsible for joint force integration, including network interoperability. In 

this capacity, JFCOM consolidates and harmonizes network requirements 

of the combatant commands and works with the JS J-6 to ensure invest-
 MILITARY SERVICE CYBER OVERVIEW 13

ments in network systems include interoperability criteria as part of any 

approved system design.

The Services are responsible for training and equipping their forces 

to be joint network capable. That means investing in systems that meet 

interoperable protocols and common standards promulgated by ASD 

(NII) for their forces. There are substantial costs to meeting these requirements, and the Services routinely must make tradeoffs among priorities as 

they allocate investments. While the Services give every indication of full 

commitment to achieving network integration as soon as possible, timelines are not hard and fast, and funding is a major factor in determining 

progress.

The Combatant Commands (CoComs) are the managers of operational networks characterized by the architecture, standards, and systems 

established by DOD and provided by the Services, DISA, and JTF-GNO 

(STRATCOM). Most CoCom communications and information networks 

are traditional hierarchical systems tethered to fixed locations, relay sites, 

or satellites. These are managed by the CoCom J-6, who coordinates for 

Service requirements through the JS J-6 as well as through the CoCom’s 

subordinate component commands (e.g., land, air, maritime, SOF). 

Under the Unified Command Plan (UCP) 2002, STRATCOM is 

assigned responsibility for information operations and Global C4ISR, 

including responsibility to operate and defend the GIG. STRATCOM’s 

operational arm for maintaining the GIG is JTF-GNO. The roles of DISA 

and JTF-GNO are similar and overlapping, which is reflected in the dualhatting of their commander. In essence, JTF-GNO is a component command of STRATCOM, uniquely provided by a defense agency rather than 

a military department. 

In network integration, no less than other high priority and costly 

DOD programs, there are many influential external actors. Congress is 

keenly interested in the successful achievement of joint operational capabilities, as is evident in the continued emphasis on Goldwater-Nichols 

goals some 20 years after the Act. Congress is also very focused on the high 

cost of IT systems in DOD and across the government, evident by the 1996 

Clinger-Cohen Act and a host of related legislation since that seeks to ensure we can define the return on IT investments. Other external actors are 

industry, the policy analysis community, and international bodies, such as 

NATO, where similar integration architectures and standards have been 

defined and are the subjects of considerable investment. A new arrival not 

yet well defined is the emergent interagency cluster of Departments that 
14 zimet and barry

increasingly need to network with DOD at all operational levels (e.g., the 

Department of Homeland Security).

Key Guiding Documents 

Reviewing DOD directives and internal guidance over the past several years is one area to take the measure of how serious DOD takes the 

makeover from platform-centered operations to net-centered operations. 

A broad and consistent stream of authoritative guidance establishes both 

legitimacy and logic. It also indicates that DOD top-level management is 

driving toward this goal as hard as they can.

Joint Vision 2020 and CJCSI 6212.01B Interoperability and Supportability of National Security Systems and IT Systems (2000); the 2004 

Transformation Planning Guidance (TPG) and 2006 Quadrennial Defense 

Review (QDR—now gearing up for renewal in 2009); the Joint Technical 

Architecture (JTA) version Six, JBMC2 Roadmap and CJCSI 3170.01C 

(JCIDS) in 2003; and, the Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG) and DOD 

Architecture Framework in 2004. All these are essential references for understanding the depth of DOD-wide commitment, management engagement, and investment in network integration. These same documents also 

signal the complexity and magnitude of the undertaking. 

Earlier foundational underpinnings beyond DOD show that the 

Federal government at large has acknowledged the advent of the Information Age and accepted the need for government as well as industry to 

bring its practices into the new era. This indicates that DOD overall, and 

not merely its military operational side, must achieve network integration. 

Above all, there has to be a clear link between IT investment and outcomes, i.e., the return on investment for the taxpayer. The pivotal legislation and executive regulator policies in this regard are the Clinger-Cohen 

Act and EO 13011 (Federal Information Technology) (1996); OMB Cir. 

A-130 (Management of Federal Information Resources) and the Information Assurance Initiative (2000 National Defense Act) in 2000; and the 

E-Government Act of 2002.

The Role of Joint Forces Command (JFCOM)

JFCOM has been given the task of identifying the C4 requirements 

of the joint community. JFCOM negotiates with its co-equal joint commanders to define a single, coherent set of required capabilities that can 

be passed to the Service providers. Although flexibility and agile designs 

are desired, the reality is that bringing a requirement into operational use 

by a large force is time and resource intensive. Therefore it is essential 
 MILITARY SERVICE CYBER OVERVIEW 15

that required capabilities not be too transient or subject to frequent redefinition. 

CoComs sometimes press for loosening standards to encompass 

new and perhaps immature technologies they have discovered work for 

them. In some cases the systems may already have been procured for a 

pending operational requirement. JFCOM as yet does not exercise sufficient oversight to ensure such add-on network systems do not actually move DOD away from its goal of networked forces. For example, a 

unique new system procured for a limited operational need by PACOM 

may not be compatible with systems in use by CENTCOM or EUCOM. 

However, some of the forces assigned to PACOM for that operation may 

soon be ordered to CENTCOM’s AOR. JFCOM’s role in achieving network interoperability is to adjudicate such inconsistencies to ensure a set 

of common technical standards acceptable across the joint operational 

user community.

JFCOM has a primary role as well in achieving integration with 

interagency and multinational users. Typically there are fewer close allies 

and agencies involved in major combat operations than in stability operations. however, the network integration requirements for combat are more 

critical. The U.S. norm is for coalition combat operations, with some allies 

providing niche capabilities, more partners from outside a CoCom’s AOR, 

and a higher level of interoperability. JFCOM has to meld multinational 

and interagency requirements, as it does for joint operations, focusing on 

key allies and agencies across the range of military operations. JFCOM 

then oversees these requirements as they are fed into the acquisition process, just as it does for joint matters. 

The Joint Interoperability Test Command (JITC) 

JITC is a test and evaluation organization established under DISA to 

advance global net-centric testing in support of joint operational capabilities. It mission is to provide agile and cost-effective test, evaluation, and 

certification services to support rapid acquisition and fielding of global 

net-centric warfighting capabilities. Most all of its projects are related to 

networks—standards, transport, services, applications and platform integration. JITC works with industry and allies as well as DOD to certify 

interoperability and advance solutions as rapidly as possible. 

Service Visions and Implementation

It is apparent from current service actions that the tools of cyberspace have already had a significant impact on Service operational 
16 zimet and barry

concepts and doctrine, systems development, and technology, as well as 

on organizational structure. There are also indications that the Services 

recognize that beyond being just a tool to enhance the effectiveness of 

conventional warfighting, cyber has changed the environment in which 

conflicts are played out. Cyberspace has changed the threat environment, 

as well, and has created new vulnerabilities and introduced a new level of 

global transparency to the execution of internal and external affairs. There 

is significant agreement among the services as to the inherent capabilities 

of cyberpower in the networking, information/knowledge, and people/

social domains. As an example, all the Services recognize the importance 

of dedicated cyber education and training facilities. Having said this, there 

are also currently significant points of disagreement among the Services 

as to definitions and taxonomy of cyberspace, including scope and frameworks. In addition, within each Service different organizational structures 

are being implemented to address this rapidly evolving source of both 

military opportunity and threat vulnerability. To further complicate the 

issue, different voices within the individual Services present different future visions of the role of cyberpower and their Service’s role (usually that 

of leadership) within that vision.

While trying to discern differences between the Service views of 

cyberspace and cyberpower, it is difficult to pick out what differences are 

substantive and which are due to interpretation. For example, discussions 

exist as to whether cyberspace is a “domain” in its own right and what are 

the boundaries between virtual and physical reality. What has become apparent is that engagements can be “fought” solely in cyberspace without 

resorting to the conventional domains. An example is a cyber attack on 

an opponent’s military or civilian information networks that degrades 

military connectivity and warfighting capability or degrades the country’s 

basic infrastructures. In the emerging war of ideas and ideology, events in 

cyberspace are eventually manifested in the physical world. For example, 

the virtual haven of cyberspace has allowed terrorist organizations to recruit, plan, and execute physical acts of terrorism.

From a Service operational point of view, General James Cartwright, 

Vice Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS) (and former Commander, 

USSTRATCOM) has critically pointed to the division of military cyberspace operations among three fiefdoms.10 Under this approach, Joint 

Functional Component Command-Net Warfare (JFCC-NW) is responsible for attack and reconnaissance, the JTF-GNO manages network defense 

and operations, and the Joint Information Operations Warfare Center 

(JIOWC) oversees electronic warfare and influence operations. Strategic 
 MILITARY SERVICE CYBER OVERVIEW 17

Communications are overseen by STRATCOM. In addition to divisions 

in joint military cyberspace operations, there are potential Service and 

DOD C4ISR interoperability issues as OSD proceeds with the development of the GIG and the Services proceed with implementations of NCW 

architectures.

Table 1 highlights Service concepts, architectural approaches, a small 

subset of service systems, and new organizational initiatives.

Table 1. Summary of Service Cyber Programs

Service Concepts Architectures Systems Organization

USAF Cyberspace as 

a Warfighting 

Domain

C2 ConstellationAssurance, 

Data Integration, GIG

Cyberspace 

Command

USA Information and 

Cognition as a 

Domain

LandWarNet FCS, WIN-T, 

GIG

1st IO Command, NETCOM

USN IO, NCO FORCEnet NMCI, GIG NETWARCOM

USMC NCOW MAGTF-IO NMCI, GIG MCSC

Air Force Vision and Implementation

The Air Force has put cyberpower on an even footing with Space 

Power and Air Combat and has defined cyberspace as a “Fifth Dimension.”11 In the chapter by Lt Col Forrest Hare and Col Glenn Zimmerman, the Air Force considers cyberspace superiority an imperative and 

establishes the proposition that cyberspace Superiority is the prerequisite 

to effective US military operations in all other warfighting domains. In a 

discussion on what the Air Force calls the “five myths” of cyberspace and 

cyberpower, the Air Force asserts the following: 

◗ The intelligence collector and the information service provider 

should be separate organizational functions and not dual-hatted.

◗ The domain of cyberspace goes well beyond the Internet. The Air 

Force considers cyberspace a physical domain through interlinking by the electromagnetic spectrum and electronic systems rather 

than a virtual domain.

◗ The battle to achieve cyber superiority in any conflict must be 

fought in a distributed network rather from one location where 

there may be a central coordinating element.

◗ The control of cyber weapons effects and the targeting and collateral damage issues are no different from effects created by explosive or kinetically destructive means.
18 zimet and barry

◗ Defense of the cyberspace domain requires a holistic network approach rather than just increased security at each individual node.

The Air Force transformation Flight Plan12 describes the C2 Constellation initiative as the centerpiece of the Air Force NCW implementation 

efforts: 

The Air Force is transitioning from collecting data through a myriad 

of independent systems (such as Rivet Joint, AWACS, JSTARS, and 

space-based assets) to a C2 Constellation capable of providing the 

Joint Force Commander with real-time, enhanced battlespace awareness. It will provide Ground Moving Target Indicator capabilities 

along with focused Air Moving Target Indicator capabilities for Cruise 

Missile Defense. Additionally, every platform will be a sensor on the 

integrated network. Regardless of mission function (C2, Intelligence, 

Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), shooters, tankers, etc.), any 

data collected by a sensor will be passed to all network recipients. 

This requires networking of all air, space, ground, and sea-based ISR 

systems, command and control nodes, and strike platforms to achieve 

shared battlespace awareness and a synergy to maximize the ability to 

achieve the Joint Forces Command’s (JFC’s) desired effects.

The Air Force has also introduced a significant organizational 

change by standing up the provisional Cyberspace Command as the 8th 

Air Force at Barksdale Air Force Base. The mission of the Cyber Command is to prepare for fighting wars in cyberspace by defending national 

computer networks, running critical operations, and attacking adversary 

computer networks.13

Army Vision and Implementation

In a paper by BG Jeff Smith of the Army’s Network Enterprise 

Technology Command, a future is envisioned in which soft power and 

the human/social impact of cyberpower is matched together with a hard 

power that also is transformed by cyber. Smith considers that cognition is 

the actual goal of military strength, which is at a level above information, 

which in turn is a level above cyberspace. Cognition refers to the human 

element, including: leadership/behavior, understanding /decisionmaking, 

and problem-solving/adapting. Cyberspace is considered a subset of networks, which in turn is related to information and finally cognition. In this 

paper, Smith collapses air/space, land, and sea into one physical environment and cognition into a second environment. His thesis is that Army 
 MILITARY SERVICE CYBER OVERVIEW 19

DOTMLPF is almost only focused on the physical and not enough on the 

cognitive, which is more important.

The Army implementation of NCO is called LandWarNet, which 

comprises the Army’s information infrastructure and is the Army’s contribution to the GIG. LandWarNet consists of all globally interconnected 

Army information capabilities, associated processes, and personnel for 

collecting, processing, storing, disseminating, and managing information 

on demand—supporting warfighters, policymakers, and support personnel. It includes all Army communications and computing systems and 

services, software (including applications), data security services, and 

other associated services. The Future Combat System (FCS) is a principal 

development program in the Army for NCO. It is a modular construct of 

a reconfigurable family of systems capable of providing mobile, networked 

command and control, communication, and computer functionalities; autonomous robotic systems; precision direct and indirect fires; airborne and 

ground organic sensor platforms; and adverse-weather reconnaissance, 

surveillance, targeting, and acquisition.14 The Warfighter Information 

Network-Tactical (WIN-T) is the Army’s tactical digital communications 

system, which has the goal of providing advanced, commercial-based networking capabilities under the umbrella of the GIG. The WIN-T network 

C4ISR support capabilities goals are for a network that is secure, survivable, seamless, and capable of supporting multimedia tactical information 

systems.15 FCS is managed by the Army, which employs Boeing as a lead 

systems integrator. The program is reviewed annually by the U.S. Government Accountability Office, which has questioned the technical maturity 

of WIN-T and the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) in terms of Army 

acquisition goals.16

Navy Vision and Implementation

The Navy perspective on cyberpower shows a structure incorporating the elements of IO and NCW. The Navy Marine Corps Intranet 

(NMCI) addresses the communications network and the business and 

administrative functions of cyberpower in the Navy and Marine Corps.17

The Navy formed the Naval Network Warfare Command, which includes 

a Navy IO core competency that supports the Combat Commander’s ability to: shape and influence potential adversary decisionmakers thinking 

prior to conflict, resulting in deterrence of hostilities; enable decisive, 

non-kinetic (effects-based) operations to complement kinetic warfare and 

defeat the adversary, should conflict ensue; and engage in continuing postconflict shaping/influence operations to maintain stability. To accomplish 
20 zimet and barry

these goals, the Navy must develop an effective structure for IO force 

development, integration, planning, command and control, and execution 

in the joint environment.

FORCEnet is the Department of the Navy’s implementation strategy 

for performing network-centric operations. The Chief of Naval Operations’ accepted definition of FORCEnet is “the operational construct and 

architectural framework for naval warfare in the information age that 

integrates warriors, sensors, networks, command and control, platforms 

and weapons into a networked, distributed combat force that is scalable 

across all levels of conflict from seabed to space and sea to land.”18 The 

Naval Research Advisory Committee defines FORCEnet as “a portfolio 

of programs to enable the gathering, processing, transportation, and 

presentation of actionable information in support of all aspects of joint 

and combined naval operations.”19 Unlike the Army’s WIN-T, FORCEnet 

is not a specific program but rather an architecture, or at best a group of 

programs, that serves as the organizing principle for Naval enablement of 

the GIG. The NMCI is a key component of FORCEnet and has the goal of 

providing the Navy and Marine Corps with a full range of network-based 

information Services on a single intranet. NMCI has the goal of providing 

secure, universal access to integrated voice, video, and data communications. Eventually, the massive NMCI network will link more than 400,000 

workstations and laptops for 500,000 Navy and Marine Corps users across 

the continental United States, Hawaii, Cuba, Guam, Japan, and Puerto 

Rico. Under NMCI, the program office and the prime contractor control 

the layout, distribution, and analysis of the system. The prime contractor, 

Electronic Data Systems (EDS), owns all the IT assets and leases them to 

the government.

In the Navy SSG’s study on “Convergence of Sea Power and Cyber 

Power” an even broader view of cyberpower is taken. The SSG definition 

of cyberspace is:

“An unconstrained interaction space—for human activity, relationships and cognition—where data, information, and value are created 

and exchanged—enabled by the convergence of multiple disciplines, 

technologies, and global networks—that permits near instantaneous 

communication, simultaneously among any number of nodes, independent of boundaries.”

The SSG looks to a future with a more complex world driven by 

many emerging challenges. Cyberpower is seen to converge with the conventional sea power concepts and to transform conventional Navy roles in 
 MILITARY SERVICE CYBER OVERVIEW 21

sea control, power projection, naval presence (both physical and virtual), 

strategic lift, and strategic deterrence.

Marine Corps

The Marine Corps has focused its cyberpower vision on net-centric 

operations and warfare (NCOW and is developing a Marine air-ground 

task force information operations (MAGTF-IO) strategy for operational 

implementation.

The future MAGTF-IO aims to enable decentralized decision making that promotes taking advantage of fleeting battlefield opportunities. 

MAGTF-IO is a cyber strategy, a process, and ultimately a system-of-systems by which the Marine Corps will develop current and future capabilities and programs to achieve NCO and Warfare (NCOW), and implement 

the FORCEnet functional concept of providing robust information sharing and collaboration capabilities. MAGTF-IO is the strategy by which the 

Marine Corps will implement the Naval FORCEnet functional concept and 

is the functional and conceptual equivalent to the other Service net-centric 

concepts of LandWarNet (Army) and C2 Constellation (Air Force). It will 

also be integrated with NATO through the NATO NET Enabled Capability 

(NNEC), and be able to facilitate “coalitions of the willing” as needed. It 

entails a seamless, scalable, modular capability that is relevant across the 

full spectrum of military operations from major combat operations, to irregular warfare operations, to humanitarian assistance operations.

DOD Implementation

Management and development of information-based technology 

and systems are spread through the Services. The Office of Force Transformation20 provided an overall vision for NCO, but the Services develop 

their own systems in conjunction with the development of the GIG. A 

consideration of the GIG is essential in a discussion of military cyberpower, because the GIG has been mandated by DOD directive 8100.1 

from the Deputy Secretary of Defense in September 2002 as the physical 

implementation of the principles of NCW.

While all three Military Departments recognize the GIG as the 

umbrella network under which they will operate, there is no commonality among the Services as to network architecture or their approaches to 

NCW. This approach requires that issues of interoperability be properly 

addressed. Each Service has special requirements, such as submarine communication for the Navy and mobile networked command and control 

for the Army. There are also areas where commonality should be sought, 
22 zimet and barry

such as in aviation connectivity. How well the Services (as well as agencies 

such as the intelligence agencies) develop their C4ISR NCW programs to 

interface seamlessly with the GIG remains to be seen.

DISA heads the GIG project under the leadership of the CIO of the 

ASD(NII). The formal definition of the GIG is “The globally interconnected, end-to-end set of information capabilities, associated processes, 

and personnel for collecting, processing, storing, disseminating and managing information on demand to war fighters, policy makers, and support 

personnel.”21 The architecture for the GIG relies on internet protocol (IP) 

and will be largely reliant on the commercial transmission infrastructure 

and on commercial information and network management technology.22

The vision and proposed architecture of the GIG are very challenging, from the standpoint of both technology development and reliance on 

commercial systems to achieve information assurance. The National Security Agency (NSA) has been tasked by ASD(NII)/DOD CIO to develop an 

end-to-end information assurance plan for the GIG.23 The NSA recognizes 

that information assurance needs to be an embedded feature designed into 

every system in the GIG, and that this requires a shift from today’s model, 

which consists predominantly of link encryption and boundary protection 

between multiple discrete networks. To accomplish the GIG objectives, 

DOD will need to impact the commercial technologies and standards that 

will constitute the GIG architecture. 

As noted above, the Services are all pursuing alternative networking 

architectures under the umbrella of the GIG. The GIG promises to provide a network based on commercial protocols, software, and hardware 

for both tactical and strategic communications, and data links to operate 

in an environment of forces on the move, and the ability to continue to 

effectively operate during network attacks and failures. Shortfalls exist 

in the GIG development to meet certain Service specific needs. For example, with a mobile infrastructure, the Army will require protocols for 

a mobile, ad-hoc, networking (MANET) capability. However, commercial industry is moving toward an all-IP core network (IPv6). The Navy 

may also experience shortfalls from the eventual GIG development. For 

example, the communications requirements for ships at sea depend on 

continuous, high-capacity, low-latency connectivity to be provided by the 

Transformational Satellite Program (TSAT) that is being delayed for cost 

and technology reasons. Even when it is completed and the Navy develops 

suitable shipboard terminals, the Navy’s communications capacity will still 

be limited by capacity and satellite communications interruptions caused 

principally by antenna blockage. Also, the GIG programs do not address 
 MILITARY SERVICE CYBER OVERVIEW 23

the challenging problem of communicating with submarines at speed and 

depth.24 Another quandary for the introduction of communications system that fit under the GIG umbrella is that of legacy systems that do not 

fit into the new architecture and funding for new systems. For example, 

Army officials must determine how to transition the Joint Network Node 

(JNN), a commercial, IP-based mobile communications system deployed 

to soldiers in Iraq, to the WIN-T.25

There are also challenges and risks associated with the use of commercial products, such as Microsoft Windows and Office in which the 

DOD does not have access to the proprietary codes that are typically 

released, with bugs that are later addressed with patches. Additionally, 

commercial off-the-shelf computers, routers, and servers often have “trapdoors” for maintenance that can provide system access to hackers. Internet 

gateways for NIPRNET and other unclassified government networks have 

provided opportunities for attackers to exploit and disrupt. Even secure 

systems with multiple users are susceptible to the insider threat. The access 

to and the sharing of information with Internet portals has benefits, risks, 

and limitations that must be managed, especially for SSTR operations and 

sharing with other nations, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). An additional concern relating to the use 

of commercial products is the outsourcing of IT providers, including both 

products and services in network operations and management in crisis 

situations. This could lead to issues such as embedded Trojan Horses in 

foreign-built equipment and software. National constraints limiting international vendors during a crisis could result in supply problems. Finally, 

there is a trend toward the global IT infrastructure, including IT products, 

services, and networks, such as global internet, Cellular, telecoms, cable, 

and satellites being taken over by foreign ownership that may not be 

friendly to U.S. policy and needs, especially during crisis. 

At this point, the full implementation of a joint, interconnected force 

via the GIG is still in the future. Other issues relating to multi-national 

military actions with coalition operations, as well as civil-military operations in support of HA/DR and SSTR operations, will also need to be 

addressed. Issues to be resolved include the lack of an NCO organizing 

principle and architecture between the Services; related interoperability 

between Services, civil agencies, coalition partners, international organizations, and NGO communities; the impact of a changing threat environment with irregular warfare; new technology developments; the need for 

high-bandwidth, agile connectivity and security; and, finally, the costs associated with the implementation.
24 zimet and barry

Conclusions

Knowledge and information exchange have always been essential to 

warfighting. As cyberspace technology has evolved over the past few decades, the military has adapted the technology to its traditional warfighting paradigms of air, space, land, and sea power. Rather than developing 

its own information communications technology (ICT) knowledge base 

and systems, the military has developed an extensive reliance on commercial ICT and increased dependence on commercial services globally, 

including the use of the Internet to support some elements of command 

and control.26 In addition to the Internet, the military is also a user of 

other commercial products, such as wireless networking, cellular phones, 

BlackBerries, telecoms, satellite and cable-based networks, radio, and TV. 

While it has developed the concepts of network-centric warfare to integrate air, space, land, and sea power, it has maintained the conventional 

warfighting principles of strike warfare, air superiority, and air and missile defense structured to increase the speed and timeliness of operations, 

operate more effectively in extended areas of coverage, and enhance precision. This utilization of cyberpower enhances our hard power capabilities 

and defines the attributes of the network to support these operations. The 

evolutionary growth of these capabilities has maintained the existing organizational, management, and acquisition structure of the military Services 

in dealing with technological advances in cyberspace. Similarly, military 

information operations have maintained their organizational principles, 

even in the face of the extraordinary impact that radical groups have 

exhibited by their adaptation of the Internet to recruitment, planning, 

financing, and influencing. Rather than speed of operations, the defining 

metrics here are large-scale connectivity, user pull, and collaboration. This 

is being accomplished by making more effective use of emerging ICT and 

changing operations to support the increased importance of HA/DR and 

SSTR in phases zero, four, and five as well as warfighting in phases one, 

two, and three.

In this chapter military cyberpower has been described in terms of 

three dimensions: military requirements or missions as described by the 

joint warfighting phases; military information-based capabilities or operational concepts including NCO, IO, military administration, Intelligence 

collection and influence operations; and the dimension of cyberspace, including open and closed architectures employing dedicated networks, the 

Internet, military tactical radios, commercial radio/TV, and telecommunications. Ideally, an integrated cyberspace architecture can be envisioned 
 MILITARY SERVICE CYBER OVERVIEW 25

that supports all the intersections of military requirements and military 

information-based capabilities. It would need to be reliable, available, and 

survivable under attack, and would also need to be scalable and provide 

high bandwidth. While ideal, such an integrated architecture may provide 

multiple unforeseen vulnerabilities and introduce unacceptable cost and 

capability risks. A single, open architecture designed to promote maximum connectivity and user pull based on IP may need separation from the 

secure connectivity required for sensor-to-weapon NCO operations. The 

development of the GIG and new technology initiatives are poised to address these issues, but not all technology objectives of these programs may 

be met. In the meantime, the military requires secure, closed networks, 

including restricted users, highly controlled access arrangements, and 

stringent security protection, as well as fully connected, open networks. 

The military also needs to wrestle with existing legacy systems, many of 

which will not be interoperable with the GIG.

There is no question that the military Services are already adapting to 

and leveraging the new environment in communications and information 

provided by the exponential growth in cyberspace connectivity and information storage and processing. However, risks and vulnerabilities have 

been introduced that need careful assessment to be effectively managed, 

especially the increased dependence of the military on civilian cyberspace 

capabilities, products, and services. The Services are also experiencing 

growing pains as they deal with a different world order and the impact of 

new technology, coupled with the evolving and changing missions of the 

Services in this environment, including HA/DR, SSTR and influence operations. In this chapter, comments were made about Service visions and 

implementation along with comments on the DOD GIG. These challenges 

to moving forward are briefly summarized below.

There is significant agreement among the services as to the inherent 

capabilities of cyberpower in the networking, information/knowledge, and 

people/social domains. There are also currently points of disagreement 

among the Services as to definitions and taxonomy of cyberspace, including the scope, frameworks, and leadership. 

Within each Service, different organization structures are being implemented to address this rapidly evolving source of military operational 

opportunities and to defend against and respond to threat vulnerability.

While all three Military Departments recognize the GIG as the umbrella network under which they will operate, there is limited commonality among the Services as to network architecture or their approaches 
26 zimet and barry

to NCO. This approach will only succeed if issues of interoperability are 

properly addressed.

The GIG has been mandated as the physical implementation of the 

principles of NCO. The vision and proposed architecture of the GIG are 

very challenging from the standpoints of technology development and 

reliance on commercial systems to achieve information assurance.

Notes1

 Defining Internet broadly, this includes e-mail and the World Wide Web, as well as military 

and government Internet protocol (IP) based networks. These include networks that have access to 

the Internet architecture, e.g. NIPRNET, and those that do not, e.g. SIPRNET and JWICS, which are 

secure networks. 2

 “Campaign Planning Primer AY 07,” Department of Military Strategy Planning and Operations, U.S. Army War College, 2006. 3

 The concept of the “three block war” is credited to Gen. Charles Krulak, former Commandant of the Marine Corps. 4

 “Capstone Concept for Joint Operations,” Version 2.0, August 2005, available at DTIC.

5

 Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations, February 13, 2006. 6

 M.P. Fewell and Mark G. Hazen, “Network-Centric Warfare—Its Nature and Modeling,” 

Australian Defense Science and Technology Organization, http://www.dsto.defence.gov.au/cororate/

reports/DSTO-RR-0262, September 2003. 7

 See ABCA, “Purpose and History,” at http://www.abca-armies.org/History/Default.aspx

8

 Alberts and Gartska, DOD Report to Congress on Network-Centric Warfare, July 2001. 

9

 In the book “Cyberpower and National Security”, Potomac Press, January 2009, the chapters 

by Kramer and Wentz, and also by Starr, specifically address cyberpower aspects of influence operations and the role of the military. 10 Josh Rogin, FCW.com, http://aimpoints.hq.af.mil/display.cfm?id=16609.

11 Lt. General Bob Elder, “The Fifth Dimension: Cyberspace,” briefing from Headquarters U.S. 

Air Force. 12 The Air Force Transformation Flight Plan, Washington DC, November 2003, p. B-6.

13 As noted by Kevin Fogarty, Defense Systems, October 13, 2008, “the cyberspace initiative 

will become an element of the numbered Air Force, one step down the organizational ladder from the 

top-level major commands and above wings and other independent groups.” 14 2003 United States Army Transformation Roadmap, p. B-3.

15 Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T), Operational Requirements Document, 

November 1999. 16 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07376.pdf, March 16, 2007.

17 Kenneth Jordan, “The NMCI Experience and Lessons Learned,” http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/

pubs/CaseStudy%2012%20-%20NMCI.pdf. 18 VADM Richard W. Mayo and VADM John Nathman, “Sea Power 21 Series, Part V: Turning 

Information into Power,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, February 2003, p. 42. 19 NRAC report, “Naval S&T in FORCEnet Assessment,” NRAC 04-2, July 2004, p. 15.

20 “The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare,” Office of Force Transformation (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 2005). 21 GIG definition available on the DTIC site, http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html2/

d81001x.htm. See also David Alberts and Richard Hayes, “Power to the Edge,” Information Age Transformation Series CCRP Publication, June 2003, p. 187. 22 Ibid., p. 196.

23 http://www.nsa.gov/ia/industry/gig.cfm?MenuID=10.3.2.2.
 MILITARY SERVICE CYBER OVERVIEW 27

24 FORCEnet Implementation Strategy, Naval Studies Board, 2005.

25 “Army Stuck in a WIN-T Quandary,” Frank Tiboni, FCW.COM, http://www.fcw.com/

article92437-02-27-06-Print, February 2006. 26 Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, “Information Technology Program: Report to Congress,” January 2006.

Chapter 2

A Unified Field Theory for 

Full-Spectrum Operations: 

Cyberpower and the 

Cognitive Domain

Jeffrey G. Smith, Jr.

“Any war has its origin in the human brain.” 

 Timothy L. Thomas, USACAC1

“We can get this generally right, and precisely wrong.” 

 GEN Charles C. Campbell, Cdr, FORSCOM2

“The world has gone berserk; too much paperwork.” 

 Bob Dylan3

Introduction

This chapter is the short story of two revolutions, one cyber, the 

other cognitive. One about which we’re generally right; the other 

about which we’re (so far) precisely wrong. One that is well underway, the other just stirring. One makes us merely competitive; the other 

has the potential to make us more secure.

Cyber’s revolutionary ardor is already absorbed within “transformation,” the means by which institutions achieve the broad and deep delivery 

of that which was once rare, uncommon, and controversial. In exchange 

for its undeniable advantages, we have generally agreed to tie a percentage of our GDP and defense force structure (and transformational efforts) 

to the furious wag of its evolutionary tail. We do so to preserve cyber’s 

availability, while denying adversaries an intolerable cyber advantage. 

We do so because we are becoming “paperless ships,” the presumption of 

cyber’s availability now a part of our operational DNA. We do so because 

29
30 SMITH

we have no choice; the world has undergone an information refresh that 

has been as inexorable as the flow of tides; eventually, with notable exceptions, cyber will connect everyone to everything. We’ve placed our lot 

with cyber because our young soldiers deserve the same collaborative advantage while defending their nation that they enjoyed before joining the 

Service. We do so because the foot soldier in the employ of our adversary 

is enabled by the most sophisticated global network in history, at the cost 

of purchasing a peripheral.

Cyberspace, though, is preface (and subordinate) to a revolution that 

is stirring within and across our peer enterprises, a revolution in the way 

humans think, decide, solve, understand, organize, act, and behave collectively. The multi-disciplined fields of the cognitive arts and sciences are 

mapping the metaphysics of the human brain, where the will to wage war 

originates, where passions are born, character resides, decisions are made, 

plans conceived, judgment sits, threat and opportunity are modeled, 

the future simulated, and where, ultimately, human conflict is resolved. 

Within our Armed Forces, operationally engaged leaders are directing 

their brigade and regimental combat and special operations teams as if 

they were surgeons, with tailored teams, tools, and touch meant to shape 

psychological positions. Sun Tzu had a phrase for this cognitive approach 

to combat. He counseled his commanders, over-schooled in the physical 

arts, to “throw rocks at eggs.”4

 Sun Tzu’s elliptical, poetic guidance was his 

way of emphasizing the mental nature of the operational objective, often 

obscured by indiscriminate physical activity on the part of ignorant kings, 

ambitious generals, and desperate soldiers. 

Despite the works of ancients, the precedents of history, and the evidence of our own ongoing operations, we remain institutionally reluctant 

to commit to a taxonomy for cognitive activities that embraces a revolution in the way we solve problems. This despite the profound difference 

in stakes between these two revolutions. Whereas cyber has potential to 

make us merely competitive, the cognitive revolution has potential to 

make us more secure. Where the consequences of cyber failure can be 

temporary and reversible, cognitive failures are often beyond retraction; 

indeed, cognitive consequences—both good and horrific—light the path 

that we know as history. 

The author’s objective is modest enough: to nudge our current battle 

command construct from its doctrinal position as “C2 function” overseeing largely physical operations within the expeditionary environment, to 

the cognitive operation at the core of our operational unified field theory, 

the objective of which is the collective brains of Blue (friendly), Gray (neu-
 A Unified Field Theory for Full-Spectrum Operations 31

tral), and Red (adversarial) constituencies. Within Army Field Manual 

3.0, under the title “Information Tasks,” there is a tantalizing hint of the 

way forward. The mission of a new operational category called “information engagement” is to “influence the behavior of target audiences.”5

 That 

effect, I believe, is the general objective of battle command, which ought 

to lend its name to the operation that achieves it. Battle command, as the 

Army’s preeminent cognitive operation, will inspire nationwide efforts to 

earn the corollary to the catastrophic consequence of cognitive failure: that 

no other activity within our operational environment has more potential 

for revolutionary application than that within the cognitive domain. No 

other activity has such potential to make us more secure. All other operational activities, I believe, derive from it. 

Within the proposed unified field theory, battle command is not an 

operation that is limited to a particular echelon, or Service, or Blue, Gray, 

or Red constituency. Indeed, it is an art that our enemy practices with at 

least equal vigor and intuition, if not study. It is an art that we’ll expect of 

our Commander-in-Chief and a science whose practice must extend to 

Blue leaders at every level and operational location. It is increasingly clear 

that decisions made at departmental, agency, and national levels contributed directly to the difficulty of the expeditionary force to arrive at satisfactory states of accommodations among Blue, Gray, and Red constituents 

during the early stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Said another way, 

operational success depends on the exercise of wise, collective, cognitive 

activity by leaders at national, institutional, global, regional, and expeditionary levels. The inconsistent approach we take toward the education, 

organization, integration, and incorporation of those who are responsible 

for so much of our operational activity is certainly one of the indisputable 

findings of on-going operations.

The subject of this article, then, is battle command in the cognitive 

age. Although the terms and shapes of the unified field theory and its operational model are provisional, their insights are meant to apply equally to 

Blue, Gray, and Red constituencies, and tested over time against historical, 

current, and future operational circumstances. I’ve settled on cognition 

as the core activity within the operational environment (OE) because it is 

the mental activity from which the will to war originates, through which 

operational activity is organized, and by which war is resolved via a series 

of forced or negotiated accommodations among populations. The categories within the cognitive domain are not meant to echo the important 

taxonomical work of Benjamin Bloom, for it is the collective brain and its 

derived collective behavior that is of operational consequence within the 
32 SMITH

operational environment. The activities I’ve categorized within the cognitive domain are more likely the product of observation, whether those of 

operational genius (Sun Tzu, Alexander, Wellington, and Grant, among 

others), personal experience, or extensive discussion with veterans. 

This chapter was commissioned by three sponsors. First, the Center 

for Technology and National Security Policy of The National Defense University solicited papers on cyberspace (its nature, power, and operations) 

from a Service perspective. The chapter is written from the perspective 

of those Forces responsible for land-based operations conducted among 

human populations. Second, LTG Sorenson, the Army G6, asked for an examination of whether the Army got cyberspace generally right with regard 

to its role in support of battle command (the Army’s chief operational C2 

construct). Third, General William S. Wallace, CG Training and Doctrine 

Command (TRADOC), requested that the work be placed in the context of 

his essential effort on what he calls the “human dimension.”6

 This chapter 

is an excerpt from a longer, more deliberately argued effort influenced by 

joint concepts, fresh doctrine, the failures of my own personal experience, 

informal interviews, an angled view of much-travelled historical examples, 

and, finally, selected lessons learned from our Global War. 

This chapter is not meant to represent a staffed position within the 

Army or any other Service. Instead, the model and theory sketched within 

the article are meant to form a doctrinal prequel, or taxonomical ancestry, 

from which, and by which, we can reexamine the basic insights of joint 

and service operational doctrine, disentangle the terms of their taxonomies, and recommend an early entry into the post-IT revolution, or the 

Age of Cognition. The remainder of the paper falls into five general parts. 

Part one defines assumptions and key terms. The second part is a dense 

abstract that describes the modified model of the operational environment, 

its derived field theory, and the full spectrum of its enabling operations. 

Part 3 provides historical precedent for battle command as the cognitive 

operation at the core of the operational environment (OE). Part 4 gives 

the cognitive domain and the metaphysical dimension a taxonomy of their 

own. Part 5 argues that revolution in cyber doesn’t translate to cognitive 

revolution, but serves as preface to this more substantial revolution. 

Assumptions and Key Terms

Assumptions

Thucydides, among others, declared the causes of war to be psychological (honor, fear, greed, and ambition).7

 The field theory proposed 
 A Unified Field Theory for Full-Spectrum Operations 33

within this paper rests on this single assumption. And if war begins in the 

human brain, then war is resolved there as well—in the minds of Blue, 

Gray, and Red constituents expressed as the collective wills of their populations (and subgroups). As the highest category of organized activity within 

the operational environment, operations move populations from the will 

to fight to the willingness to accommodate what were once mutually exclusive goals and objectives. The chief operation, then, is cognitive, directed 

toward the achievement of influence over human choice, specifically the 

decision to act in a particular way, on behalf of a particular constituency, 

and in support of particular objectives. It is from cognitive activity and in 

support of its objectives that the full spectrum of operational activities is 

derived and toward which its effects are directed. 

Key Terms

◗ Blue, Gray, and Red are shorthand for the categories of humans 

encountered in the operational environment. These colors also 

represent the multiple shades within each primary color, each 

of which requires its own nuanced operational approach. The 

primary colors correspond roughly to the doctrinal categories 

of the situation (friendly, environmental, and enemy). Blue refers to those humans whose leaders are explicitly engaged in the 

development, promulgation, and implementation of the nation’s 

(or group’s) security strategy. Red denotes humans whose leaders are in organized opposition to Blue. Gray connotes humans 

whose leaders seek independence from, or accommodation with, 

Blue and Red, but will turn Red or Blue if sufficiently provoked or 

motivated. From the perspective of the individual constituent, all 

constituents are Blue. 

◗ Cognition is derived from Sun Tzu’s famous quotation “know 

yourself and your enemy, and you will never be in peril.”8 Sun 

Tzu presumed that to know is to act collectively—and wisely—on 

behalf of nations (or groups). Cognition comprehends five interrelated activities. First, to shape information into the Janus model 

of Threat and Opportunity. Second, to form a solution that counters the former and seizes the latter. Third, to understand personally and adapt to the continuously evolving Situation. Fourth, to 

translate personal understanding into public, broad-based activity. 

Fifth, to lead in order that Blue behaves is if One.

◗ Battle Command is the art and science of leveraging the full spectrum of operational activity to resolve differences among Blue, 
34 SMITH

Gray, and Red via a series of forced and negotiated accommodations. It is the only operational level that is accountable both for 

tactical outcomes and political objectives. It is the superior cognitive operation within the OE. 

The Unified Field Theory’s Central Idea and Abstract

The Central Idea

The central idea within the unified field theory is formlessness, or 

the ability of Blue to adapt the form of his solution to the continuously 

evolving shape of his situation (to conform to a continuously evolving 

shape implies the ability to change form continuously, hence the name). 

Formlessness requires four distinct and interrelated skills. First, the leader’s ability (and the network’s capability) to build a model of the situation 

from which the shape of threat and opportunity emerges, linked to local 

circumstance and national (or group) objectives. Second, the leader’s ability (and the network’s capability) to form elemental combinations that 

conform to the continuously evolving shapes of peril and opportunity. 

Third, the leader’s ability (and network’s capability) to form operational 

combinations across the spectrum of activity as part of integrated plans 

and orders. Fourth, the leader’s ability (and the network’s capability) to 

assemble, locate, identify, and modify the shape of physical and mental 

objects and project the consequences of their collisions. 

The model of the situation forms the common core to all four activities. The model of the situation tells the interrelated fates of Blue, Gray, 

and Red in order to provide three outputs: (1) the shape of peril; (2) the 

shape of opportunity; (3) and the universal context within which all local 

activity is linked to the achievement of political objectives of the nation 

(or group). The model of the situation exists in two states. The technical 

model of the situation (TMOS) is a collaborative product presented in 

physical form meant to be broadly and simultaneously absorbed by leaders 

at every level and location. The TMOS translates input from across a vast 

collaborative Information Infrastructure (part human, part technological) 

into the story of relevant operational activity in order to recommend to 

leaders the means to resolve it favorably. The cognitive model of the situation (CMOS) is influenced by the TMOS, but exists within the brains of 

leaders. It is through the CMOS that leaders personally comprehend their 

situation, and understand the precise means by which they must conform 

to it. It is from the CMOS that leaders’ intent emerges. It is through the 

CMOS that leaders observe the mental organs of their constituents, and 
 A Unified Field Theory for Full-Spectrum Operations 35

decide precisely how to modify the objects that reside within each. Finally, 

the CMOS continuously modifies the technical and human parameters of 

the TMOS to conform to the leaders’ own cognitive landscape. 

Formlessness also depends on the maturation of two revolutions, 

cognitive and cyber. The cognitive revolution enables leaders to perceive 

the metaphysical landscape within the OE, a mental landscape whose 

terrain is composed of the organs of the human brain: the moral, intellectual, creative, emotive, instinctive, spiritual, professional, and personal 

identities of Blue, Gray, and Red constituents. The shapes of objects within 

those organs determine the nature, duration, and resolution of operational 

activity and constitute the true target of operations. The mental nature of 

the OE, then, demands a much broader, more diverse and nuanced spectrum of elemental and operational combinations than one motivated by 

the physical goal of closing with and defeating an armed opponent. The 

cognitive revolution encourages leaders to shed doctrinal, imaginative, organizational, functional, and professional biases that seek to achieve false 

agility by fitting circumstances into pre-configured information, effects, 

organizational, and operational models. The cognitive revolution achieves 

actual agility by demanding that leaders conform to the situation in which 

they find themselves, requiring leaders to choose from a full spectrum of 

elemental and operational choices, combinations for which doctrine (and 

therefore the enemy) will quite often have no name. Without a cognitive 

revolution, those choices are sharply constrained by policies, permissions, 

regulations, organizational firewalls, personal experience, and institutional-level training and educational opportunities. 

The second required revolution is cyber. Once complete, cyberspace 

coats all activity within the OE with an electronic membrane, until the 

OE pulses like a planetarium. The cyber revolution has four major objectives, or outputs: (1) the technical model of the situation, one that captures 

both the physical and mental shape of the OE, and adapts to the cognitive 

approach of the local leader; (2) the elemental combination, or task organized team, that acts under the influence and authority of the local leader; 

(3) the operational combination that assembles information, humans, and 

their proxies into the coherence of plans, orders, and intent; (4) problemsolving, or the ability to exploit Blue’s collaborative brain to arrive at solutions in time to influence activity on terms favorable to Blue. While the 

cyber revolution can suggest elemental, even operational combinations 

that appear revolutionary, cyber depends entirely on human-provided 

instructions. Short of a cognitive revolution, those instructions reflect the 

doctrinal, operational, organizational, professional, political, and cultural 
36 SMITH

biases of its programmers. This is why cyber is preface to the cognitive 

revolution, which is greater. 

Abstract 

The chief subject of the OE is human activity organized around the 

security, toleration, and demise of nations (or groups). The problem at the 

center of the OE is the failure of the world’s myriad nations (and groups) to 

accommodate one another’s strategic goals and objectives. The solution is 

pervasive, synchronized local activity at every operational level that modifies strategic goals and objectives sufficient to accommodate national (and 

group) diversity. 

The unified field theory (including its operational model and taxonomy) that solves the problem was constructed under four chief guidelines. 

First, the construct must be universal, otherwise our model is self-reflexive, 

revealing only our own biases. Although the unified field theory and its 

operational model are written from the perspective of Blue, that is only 

because all constituents, from their personal perspective, see themselves 

as Blue. If Red applies the model to its own circumstances, then the Red 

terrorist becomes the Blue martyr. Second, the model of the environment 

must proceed from a clear understanding of its chief subject. Environments, 

therefore, are constructed around a particular subject. Domains are used to 

further classify categories concerning the chief subject, while dimensions 

are used to describe the environment around which the subject finds itself. 

Third, the usefulness of the model depends on the extent to which it clarifies complexity; much of that clarity is derived from a clear understanding 

of its chief subject, from which all taxonomical terms proceed. Fourth, 

models must comprehend the totality of the circumstances that influence 

their subject, or else the subject inherits, with little warning, the effects 

launched from outside its model (and therefore the reach of its influence). 

In the longer paper, I’ve more systematically distinguished between 

the current and proposed models for the OE. Here, I’ll merely sum up the 

differences. Joint Publication 3-0 defines our current model of the OE as a 

“composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the 

employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander.”9

The chief subject of the OE is only inferred: human decisionmaking with 

regard to employment of security-related capabilities (under myriad environmental influences and variables)? Less clear is the level and identity 

of the decisionmaker (commander implies military organizations); and 

at what level: tactical unit or strategic organization; and missing from 

the subject, considering the subject matter, is drama. So, within the field 
 A Unified Field Theory for Full-Spectrum Operations 37

theory, the chief subject of the OE is clear, dramatic, and comprehensive: 

human activity organized around the security, toleration, and demise of 

nations (or groups). That implies an additional difference between the 

two models. Where the current model describes multiple OEs that overlap, 

intersect, and integrate, we’ve used a single OE to stand as the highest level 

abstraction for the global situation, one that comprehends all securityrelated activity. 

The unified field theory clarifies the confusion between the terms 

“domain” and “dimension.” Domains constitute the chief categories of essential activities that must be performed by the chief subject. Domains do 

not imply that their particular activities are ever conducted in isolation 

from those of another domain; rather, domains are the means by which 

the nation or group establishes its priorities with regard to the study, development, resourcing, fielding, and adaptation of enabling capabilities. 

Dimensions, on the other hand, clarify or define the environment within 

which the chief subject acts. Without the “coordinates” of dimensions, the 

chief subject is buried in the individual acts that threaten to cocoon him 

in their overwhelming disconnected unreferenced diversity. In this sense, 

dimensions provide order to the chief subject’s circumstances, and do so in 

three ways. First, dimensions provide the coordinates by which objects are 

identified and located; second, dimensions form the media that enables 

collective activity; and, third, dimensions serve as features over which humans collectively approach their objectives. To summarize, it is from the 

chief subject that we draw the domains to distinguish its chief categories 

of activities. Only then do we construct dimensions that provide shape 

to the environment from which the subject approaches his own survival, 

security, and prosperous future. 

The unified field theory has collapsed part of the doctrinal domains 

of Air, Land, Sea, and Space into a single physical dimension that gives 

shape to physical objects; and has diverted the remaining aspects of those 

doctrinal domains into a physical domain that emphasizes four key critical 

activities: move, protect, force, sustain. The unified field theory has built 

a second domain, the cognitive domain, whose chief activities are lead/

behave, form/shape, understand/decide, solve/adapt (all explained later). 

Finally, the unified field theory’s three dimensions closely echo the three 

dimensions of the current theory (physical, cognitive, and information), 

but with two important caveats. The unified field theory replaces the cognitive dimension with “metaphysical” in order to create an image of the OE’s 

collective mental terrain whose features are formed by the metaphysical organs of the human brain. The unified field theory replaces the information 
38 SMITH

dimension with an “information infrastructure,” or II, in order to emphasize the self-constructed nature of this dimension. The most tailored form 

of the II is the network, defined by the leader at its center. This image is an 

evolution of the concept behind net-centric warfare, for it makes explicit 

the role of network in the service of a leader, whose activities are linked to 

both local outcomes and the achievement of political objectives. 

The current model describes the strategic, operational, and tactical 

“levels of war.” The unified field theory modifies the three level model 

so that it more explicitly acknowledges that every operational activity, 

whether campaign, battle, or engagement, has multiple levels to it, each 

of which shares a common core, or orders process, theoretically subject 

to a field order by which effects at the local and strategic levels are linked 

as part of the superior cognitive operation we call battle command. The 

current model describes the six phases of an operation in sequential and 

concurrent terms; we’ve modified the shape of the six operational phases 

so that it forms an ascending spiral, from which leaders at every phase 

share a common core. This is in order to acknowledge that the seeds of 

all phases are in each. Consider, as an example, that in practice, the move 

from dominate to stabilize to civil authority is often one and the same: the 

minute an enemy is defeated, the emergence of a future authority begins, 

usually imperceptibly, and under the watch of the same organization that 

supervised offensive operations. If one isn’t structured for this almost 

simultaneous transition, or trained, or prepared, or equipped for its regulation, then the time/distance variable between liberated citizen and disillusioned Red recruit is too great to bridge.

The most significant change the unified field theory proposes is the 

role of battle command as the core cognitive operation from which the full 

spectrum of organized activity is derived. Within the unified field theory, 

battle command is the art and science of leveraging the full spectrum of 

elemental and operational combinations to resolve differences among 

Blue, Gray, and Red constituents via a series of forced and negotiated accommodations. It is the only operational activity within the unified field 

theory that is responsible for both tactical and political objectives. Battle 

command accomplishes that end via the integrated, synchronized adaptive 

achievement of a trio of continuously evolving cognitive effects: (1) Cognitive Capability, or the ability to reach collective understanding, apply 

collective solutions, regulate collective behavior, and adapt collectively; (2) 

Cognitive Vulnerability, or the ability to render Gray and Red constituents 

susceptible to Blue authority, plans, orders, and intent; and (3) Cognitive 
 A Unified Field Theory for Full-Spectrum Operations 39

Accommodation, or the willingness of constituents to modify their initial 

operational positions on terms favorable to Blue. 

The end to which battle command aspires is the synchronization 

of Effects in order to achieve Operational Objectives, or States of Accommodation. The states of accommodation that presage a nation’s return to 

relative harmony are four: (1) the long-term preservation of Blue; (2) the 

benign neutrality of Gray; (3) the surrender, conversion, assimilation, 

or neutralization of Red; and (4) suspension of hostile activity on terms 

favorable to Blue. These ideal states of accommodation effectively resolve 

the requirement for the most violent kind of operational activity, and set 

the conditions for the eventual satisfaction of a nation’s (or group’s) goals 

and objectives, and their return to a state of tao, or “cosmic harmony.”10

For the achievement of its trio of cognitive effects, battle command 

depends on three derived, integrated, and fully continuous operational 

categories: physical, engagement, and regeneration operations. Although 

these categories are a point of departure from FM 3.0, it is actually an 

elevation of other operations explained, implied, or recognized as gaps 

within this excellent document. Battle command and its three derived 

operations must be entirely integrated within the operational concept and 

reflected in the paragraphs and annexes of plans and orders. Said another 

way, one cannot succeed physically without engagement, and one cannot 

execute engagement operations without significant support within physical operations, and one cannot outflank an adaptive, multi-generational 

enemy without continuously regenerating capability as part of the nation’s 

adaptive strategy. That all three categories are part of virtually every operational plan is now a matter of presumed course by those engaged today. 

Physical operations include the integrated, continuous categories of 

offensive, defensive, stability, and sustainment activities. Battle commanders employ physical operations for four chief uses: first, physical operations achieve sustained proximity to Gray and Red constituents. Second, 

physical operations produce imbalance, or the introduction of capability 

for which Gray and Red have no adequate response. Third, physical operations restore or reinforce stability in order to make Gray and Red vulnerable to Blue’s arguments for cognitive accommodations. Fourth, physical 

operations sustain the life of Blue (Gray/Red as required) and their proxies 

during the span of an operation. 

Engagement operations induce among populations: (1) the collective 

will and approach to war; (2) vulnerability in Gray and Red to the arguments of Blue; and (3) willingness across Blue, Gray, and Red constituencies to accommodate what were once mutually exclusive goals and objec-
40 SMITH

tives. Regeneration Operations preserve the national capacity to evolve 

by (1) adapting to the current situation with the introduction of freshly 

trained and educated elements and tailored proxies; (2) by introducing 

international influences to security-related institutions via education, 

technology, commerce, cultural and other engagement venues; and (3) by 

conserving the sources of national power over the lifespan of a nation. 

Mission Centers are the highest category of operations centers that 

observe, assess, direct, and modify operational activity. The mission centers in their sum provide the means by which leaders control the defense 

of their nation or group. Operations centers feed Missions centers, and 

are charged with building the OE’s dimensional grid, so that all activity is identified and located by its three dimensional construct: physical, 

metaphysical, and information. The operations centers observe or direct 

activity throughout the OE, and are linked as part of a global constellation, so that no activity is ignorant of the other. The unified field theory, 

then, demands a corresponding theory of operations centers to determine 

an enabling architecture of operational control. The cognitive revolution 

ought to permit leaders to leverage the services of particular operations 

centers in the same way that cyber leverages the “footprint” of certain 

satellites.

Historical Precedents for Battle Command as the Core 

Operation From Which All Other Operational Activity 

Is Derived

The Problem

If the origins of war are psychological, rooted in human cognition, 

then so it its resolution. Within the unified field theory, operations are the 

means by which nations are moved from the will to war to the willingness 

to accommodate what were once mutually exclusive goals and objectives. 

That ought to be our core competency: the achievement of influence over 

Blue, Gray, and Red choice. We have no such superior operation, and no 

cognitive taxonomy with which to successfully address its absence. 

We can learn from the way we as a community have approached the 

field of information operations. IO is the only major operational category 

whose explicit target is the human brain. No term in our doctrinal taxonomy has been so enhanced by its assigned mission set, or more diminished 

by the community approach toward its implementation. First, we used 

information in the title, suggesting that information is the decisive factor 

in influencing human choice (when compared, let’s say, with financial, 
 A Unified Field Theory for Full-Spectrum Operations 41

emotional, physical, political, spiritual, artistic, and logical influences). 

Second, we limited IO’s focus to Gray and Red minds, rather than including those minds that need cognitive attention just as much, Blue. Third, 

we assigned the function to an officer who was not also the battle commander (who, presumably, ought to be the cognitive exemplar across all 

constituencies). Finally, in execution, we understandably assigned “soft” 

missions to the IO teams, and “hard” missions to those skilled in creating 

physical effects. As a result, IO became euphemistic for soft operations as 

means to facilitate full spectrum operations, the chief categories of which 

remain implacably physical. In a brave and, I presume, controversial move, 

FM 3.0 drops the term altogether, an implied call to re-examine how the 

community approaches a category that tries to get at operations whose 

objective, theoretically, is preeminent. 

Current efforts at rehabilitation fall short of what this paper proposes: that battle command, itself, moves to the cognitive operation at 

the core of full spectrum operations. Our solution will have to be at the 

expense of our considerable bias for physical operations and their effects. 

I’ll frame our challenge and our opportunity via a vignette. 

The author was tasked by the V Corps Commander and the Army G3 

in 2003 to propose a near-term concept for mobile battle command, some 

of the author’s observations are generally right; some are precisely wrong. 

The pivotal days of combat during Operation Iraqi Freedom were 

marked by classic, simultaneous, layered, synchronized engagement 

of Joint, Coalition, and Inter-Agency Forces. 3rd Infantry Division, 

under the C2 of V Corps, was the tactical Army ground maneuver 

unit poised for the ultimate conquest of Baghdad. Above the Corps’ 

Area of Operations circled Air Force, Marine, and Naval Aircraft in 

Close Support of ground maneuver; on its flank was the 1st Division of the [1st] Marine Expeditionary Force, itself racing to attack 

Baghdad from the East; Special Operations Forces (SOF) and Other 

Governmental Agencies (OGA) maneuvered in, out, and through 

the Corps Area of Engagement. 82nd Airborne and 101st Airborne 

Divisions secured Lines of Communications South, Southeast, and 

West. National Intelligence Assets kept commanders aware of regional influences. On the battle’s forward edge, the fight was raging at 

tactical TEMPO—every forward Command Post sought Situational 

Understanding of Blue and Red Forces as they converged on borders, 

boundaries, corridors, and zones. Time Sensitive Targets required 

Theater-wide clearance in a matter of minutes. Within a 150 square 
42 SMITH

kilometer grid, the CENTCOM Commander’s influence and interests were fully represented—Services, Agencies, Theater Operational 

Commands, Corps, Division, and small unit formations contributing 

to the dissolution of the Iraqi Armed Forces, and setting into motion 

the requirement for branch and sequel operations.11

Blame the late age at which the author experienced war; he was awed 

by the physical might of a nation (and its allies), by war’s physical effects, 

and by war’s geographical scope. This was, in his eyes, a glimpse of the 

future toward which AirLand Battle doctrine12 had years ago pointed his 

generation: a networked environment in which leaders, regardless of level 

or location, their service or nationality, could treat space not as domains 

divided by proprietary proxies and procedures, but as continuous space—

just as Newton conceived it. Physical objects and their effects, whether 

launched from ship, by air, on land, or monitored from space, could be 

traced, identified, synchronized, and sequenced to arrive as if part of a 

common plan or order, and their effects precisely measured. With an 

integrated, pervasive, fully interoperable information infrastructure, classical domains become a single physical dimension by which Blue marches 

relentlessly to meet and rout a thoroughly discouraged Red. 

If battle command was merely the means by which leaders controlled physical operations and their effects, then I was generally right: 

an electronically sophisticated, pervasive network that could keep pace 

tactically would probably complete a revolution in battle command. And 

if operational success was defined by precision engagement, dominant 

maneuver, focused logistics, and full spectrum protection (the capabilities of the future OE as imagined by Joint Vision 2020),13 then networkenabled battle command would be the revolution, and LandWarNet and 

all its like-minded, cyber-based information infrastructures (e.g. the GIG, 

or joint information environment, or the collaborative OE, and so forth) 

would mark the beginning of the end to the Army’s transformational story. 

But the cyber technologies to which I referred, and for which I petitioned, 

would not have solved what we collectively as a nation had failed to account for operationally, which was the cognitive operation at the core of 

all wars. Said another way, today’s cognitive revolution will require us to 

subordinate (or subsume) our growing interest in precise physical engagement in the same way that Einstein’s theoretical revolution expanded 

Newton’s cosmology. 

The objectives of Operation Iraqi Freedom were the same as other 

wars: agreement among populations for the following states of accommo-
 A Unified Field Theory for Full-Spectrum Operations 43

dation: Blue’s long-term preservation; Gray’s emergence as a benign, independent alternative to Red; and Red’s surrender, conversion, assimilation, 

marginalization, neutralization, or destruction. Our objectives (largely left 

unstated) and the means by which to operationally approach each of those 

nuanced constituencies within and across the population groups were 

discontinuous. Lacking an effective institutional approach to cognitive 

operations, we had vocabulary only for the physical. After physical operations put Gray and Red on their heels, that’s where they were largely left 

(despite extraordinary efforts to do otherwise): unmoored from their institutional support, some of their enabling infrastructure disabled by shaping operations, denied meaningful roles in emergent Iraq, and possessed 

of little financial, network, social, or political infrastructure with which to 

enable their own emergence. Both Gray and Red adapted by building new 

alliances within which fresh grievances fueled their psychological migration from humiliation or euphoria to common disillusionment to private 

understanding to personal decision to organized hostility and armed opposition. In this sense, some of liberated Gray emerged as Red and some 

Red remained Red. That situation, ironically, has been relieved only by the 

emergence of a superior cognitive operation (counter-insurgency) under 

the conduct of brigade, regimental, and special combat teams, the stirrings 

of which this paper strives to amplify. 

So, with regard to the author’s concept for a network-enabled 

battle command, the author was precisely wrong. What battle command 

needed—even more than a pervasive cyber network—was a superior cognitive operation and its trio of cognitive effects. First, we’ll provide our 

extraordinary leaders and soldiers across Iraq and Afghanistan with good 

historical company. 

Historical Precedent for Battle Command as the Cognitive 

Operation at The Core of the Operational Environment

The network is the offspring of the leader, provoked by his requirement to exercise influence over operations. That was true when the network and the operational formation were one and the same and primarily 

human (as will be argued in part V); and it is true today, when the network 

is increasingly electronic and provided to him. The network is like man’s 

best friend: if battle command is focused on physical effects, the network 

is focused likewise. If battle command becomes our superior cognitive 

operations, the network will focus on the achievement of cognitive effects. 

What its architects, engineers (social and electrical) need is what the battle 

commanders must give them: a vocabulary, operational taxonomy, and a 
44 SMITH

unified field theory for an OE that is cognitive at the core, that in their 

integrated sum can guide the development of their technical, doctrinal, 

and organizational corollaries. We begin by turning to historical examples 

of operational commanders who, despite having won their fame by waging 

the most violent of physical battles, all considered their tactical fights in 

the service of a superior, cognitive operation. 

The most compressed, complex, and violent category of operational 

events is Battle (whether on land, in air, on sea, from space). Where the 

objective of battle is an (often) unavoidable requirement to defeat (or 

survive) an opponent’s physical activity, the objective of battle command 

is the achievement of a set of cognitive accommodations among local constituencies that set the conditions for states of accommodation across Blue, 

Gray, and Red populations. Cognitive accommodations set the conditions 

for the return (or emergence) of an international harmony, on terms favorable to the long-term preservation of Blue. Said another way, battle 

command is that root category sufficiently comprehensive to link the most 

violent form of operational activity to the political end from which justification for its horrific method is derived. 

Sun Tzu wrote: “to gain a hundred victories in a hundred battles is 

not the highest excellence; to subjugate the enemy’s army without doing 

battle is the highest of excellence.”14 For that, and other similar advice, 

Sun Tzu is occasionally reduced to a kind of anti-Battle guru. Sun Tzu is 

to whom we direct our Information Officers, even as our organic combat 

constituency labors over our core competency: physical operations and 

the achievement of their effects. Yet Sun Tzu was, if legend is history, also 

a great battle commander; and much of his treatise describes the cognitive 

nature of organized physical force. Battle represented failure to achieve 

operational ends by other means, but that didn’t mean it was any less 

regulated or linked to the production of cognitive effects and objectives. 

The superior cognitive operation, from which battle is never discontinuous, is that which governs battle’s violence, keeping it at sufficient pitch 

to gain ascendancy over one’s adversaries; and at sufficient moderation to 

preclude irreparable bitterness between the sponsors of combatants. 

John Keegan cites the example of primitive tribes who turned to battle to force accommodations among constituents whose minds remained 

unmoved by less physical arguments.15 Young warriors led subsets of tribes 

into micro-battle. Within regulatory range, the tribes’ elders stood poised 

to intervene if the sanctioned violence rose to the level that its physical 

damage overwhelmed the psychological benefit of conflict resolution (by 

spawning a bitter post-battle collective dispirit). Elders served to regulate 
 A Unified Field Theory for Full-Spectrum Operations 45

violence, linking its effects to the achievement of battle command’s chief 

objective: cognitive accommodations among disputants for positions that 

were once mutually exclusive. Battle command is not restricted to a particular rank, or echelon, or profession, or location, or event (like battle); but it 

does depend on Sun Tzu’s construction of a moral bloodline that unites the 

mandate of the ruler (or people or government), with the responsibility of 

leaders to secure the “national treasure,” with the willingness of soldiers to 

act as “sons” and die for them.16 Keegan’s elders stood as a kind of surrogate 

orders process—a forward command post that synchronized the activities 

of all engaged constituencies: (1) the tribal leadership/community (nations 

or groups); (2) their battle commanders; and (3) their engaged soldiers; all 

linked to the political ends that underwrote their violence. 

Although not in tactical command of their battles, those elders 

practiced battle command: a multi-level operation that leveraged the full 

spectrum of activity in order to achieve three distinct cognitive effects. 

First effect: cognitive capability, or the ability of Blue to act as if one, united 

by a common understanding of their situation, and able to act out their 

particular role in the proposed solution under the influence of plans, orders, and intent. Second effect: cognitive vulnerability, or the introduction 

of doubt, confusion, fear, or false understanding within the minds of Gray 

and/or Red. Getting routed in battle is one of many ways to achieve this 

effect. Third effect: cognitive accommodation, or the willingness of Blue, 

Gray, and Red to reconsider goals and objectives that once were mutually 

exclusive. The operational activity that provoked the trio of cognitive effects begins well before the outbreak of battle; continues throughout battle; 

and extends well into its aftermath. Otherwise, how to explain the willingness of warriors to recognize the authority of their elders; or the apparent 

ability by elders to assess battle damage sufficient to call it off; or the negotiations that, after the battle’s conclusions, surely must take into account 

the heroic performance and sacrifice of engaged warriors? Although much 

of this taxonomical work is the author’s own extrapolation, it conforms to 

observations of battle commanders across historical generations: there is a 

superior operational weave, within which the peculiar event we call Battle 

erupts and subsides, and the thrust of that weave is toward the production of cognitive effects, in line with political ends at one end and tactical 

objectives at the other.

No leader is more identified with physical battles than the Duke of 

Wellington, but he, like Sun Tzu and Keegan’s elders, would have considered his Battle part of a superior cognitive operation meant to resolve the 

particular origins of the war by forcing new states of accommodations 
46 SMITH

among constituents. Despite being named after the town nearest Wellington’s Headquarters, Waterloo was no “local” battle. The argument over 

which this particular battle erupted concerned the mutually exclusive nature of opposing political systems and the means by which European nations in general were governed (and by whom). That argument, in light of 

Napoleon’s desire to rule Europe, would be resolved only via the removal 

of his army. Said another way, battle had become the only means by which 

to approach the collective brain of France.

Confiding to a journalist shortly after the battle’s conclusion, Wellington confessed that the outcome at Waterloo was “the nearest run thing 

in your life,”17 the success of which he attributed to his own personal presence and the “trouble”18 he took about the battle. Riding into battle with his 

pistol holster containing no weapon but merely parchment, pen, and ink19, 

the trouble Wellington took was largely devoted toward the achievement 

of that same trio of cognitive effects that would have long-term influence 

over the campaign’s outcome. First, he made sure that his own precise 

commands, ubiquitous presence, and wise decisions united and regulated 

the moral spirit of his coalition sufficient to defeat France’s physical argument. The discipline displayed by the British soldier in the face of French 

columns and their enthusiastic battle cries demonstrated to myriad French 

Waterloo veterans the moral superiority of the opposing force.20 Wellington’s social engagements and numerous letters were meant to calm a nervous Belgium. His decision to reward the Prussians for Blucher’s late-day 

rescue by giving them the honor of pursuit went far in satisfying nationalistic pride.21 His own narrative of the Battle was written within hours of 

its conclusions, meant not only to regulate the precise reaction of engaged 

publics to its results (part of a narrative operation I’ll soon address), but to 

raise the morale of an Army whose casualties had exceeded those from any 

of Wellington’s earlier battles. In short, the trouble Wellington took over 

Waterloo was to enable the superior operation and its cognitive objective: 

accommodations among nations for a Europe that resisted the urge to 

export the revolutions of its individual members. 

While Wellington and Keegan’s elders are examples of battles waged 

in the service of superior cognitive operations, Colonel MacFarland’s 

experience in ANBAR province is an example of the superior cognitive 

operation that obviated the need for battle altogether. When Colonel MacFarland took his brigade combat team to ANBAR province in 2006, the 

region was already “liberated,” by which I mean that its pre-war political 

infrastructure had been replaced with something else, although its identity was still emerging, and in ways that made providing it any assistance 
 A Unified Field Theory for Full-Spectrum Operations 47

problematic. Col MacFarland found himself sharing space with multiple 

groups sponsored by organizations across the levels of war. Each built 

their own model of the situation, sent it into cyberspace, where it hung 

in relative isolation from other judgments on ANBAR (most were dire). 

The consequence was a kind of operational paralysis. MacFarland reduced 

those views into a single situation with multiple caveats, and then applied 

his own command presence to serve as a kind of Wellington command 

post around which the multiple levels of constituents still interested in the 

fate of ANBAR rallied. Colonel MacFarland, like the battle commanders 

before him, embodied the shared orders process, and served as the common core of operational activity. And, not insignificantly, if ANBAR was 

to have a single situation with multiple caveats, it was going to be the battle 

commander’s caveat that mattered most. 

ANBAR, like Waterloo, was no “local” operation. When Col MacFarland made accommodations with the Sunnis, he had in practice (but 

not officially) negotiated on behalf of both the United States and the new 

Iraq. By striking a deal, trusting instincts, refusing to condescend, and 

approaching one another across the metaphysical dimension, MacFarland 

and his Sunni counterpart had at some level reconciled the psychological 

consequence from the earlier failure to assimilate what had been the ruling class within an emergent Iraq. Although he lost over 90 remarkable 

members of his joint force, no physical activity ever rose to the level of a 

classic battle. Instead, he had achieved what Sun Tzu considered the greatest good: the subjugation of an army without battle.

Within the context of this unified field theory, Col MacFarland had 

executed battle command as the superior cognitive operation. He used the 

full spectrum of operational activity not as distinct and phased events, but 

as operational combinations in the service of the trio of cognitive effects. 

First, he built a team, not all of which fell under him, that acted with uncommon character and uniform behavior; then leveraged physical force to 

put them in the heart of the population centers. Second, through direct engagement with constituents, discovered and exploited vulnerability within 

the seams of the Red alliance. Third, he used narrative, emergent, and 

negotiation operations (discussed below) to convert vulnerability into the 

willingness to accommodate Blue and Gray objectives. Word of his gains 

travelled across Iraq, went by cyberspace straight to the national command 

authority, and entered the public consciousness via USA Today and other 

media. Battle command, as the superior cognitive operation, had achieved 

its interim objectives: an agreement between the United States, Iraq, and 

McFarland’s alliance to facilitate the emergence of a new kind of Gray (in 
48 SMITH

this case Sunnis who had been formerly Red), the marginalization of a 

subset of Red within the region (Al-Qaeda in Iraq), and the assimilation 

of those who would have otherwise joined their ranks.22

Battles are those rare events that usually earn start and end dates. 

On the other hand, battle command, as the examples of Wellington and 

MacFarland demonstrate, is the continuous “trouble” that leaders take to 

keep their activities aligned with the cognitive effects that power operational objectives. Part of that trouble begins well before the conditions for 

battles are ever met, and extend well beyond their conclusion. Said another 

way, there are operations that only under tortuous logic fall under the 

categories of offense, defense, stability, and support to civil authority, but 

are often so decisive that they demand equal status to the physical four. 

The unified field theory broadens full spectrum in two distinct directions. 

The first is by way of engagement operations, for which I will provide a 

few examples. The second is regeneration operations, which is developed 

in the fuller article to follow. We’ll consider three examples of engagement 

operations: narrative, emergent, and negotiation. To do so, we need to face 

the political nature of our profession head on. And by way of introduction, a little obligatory Clausewitz to loosen whatever constraints readers 

remain under. 

Full Spectrum Operations Reconsidered

“The primary colors are only five in number but their combinations 

are so infinite that one cannot visualize them all.”23

If war is, as Clausewitz states, “a continuation of politics by other 

means,”24 then operations are perhaps the most comprehensive (or inclusive) political activity known to social man, for they are regulated, supervised, professional, voluntary, noble, vulgar, honorable, heroic, spiritual, 

hellish, violent, sanctioned, occasionally illegal, patriotic, legislated, and 

civilized—all at once. At various times during its phases, war’s operations 

extend (essentially) the same services as the body politic: economic, political, cultural, informational, educational, services, and physical security. At 

other times, war exhibits what politics cannot: a willingness, quite often an 

impatience, to use force that leverages every element of national (or group) 

power. In all circumstances that I can think of, only war comprehends the 

full spectrum of organized human activity conducted by, among, and between psychologically disharmonic populations. And battle command is 

the highest level of organized activity that comprehends the full spectrum 

of operational activity permitted it by war. 
 A Unified Field Theory for Full-Spectrum Operations 49

Sun Tzu (and his Chinese contemporaries in general) took for granted 

that most engagements with an enemy would require “normal force”25: the 

kind that moved and fed an army, projected force to gain presence or create imbalance, protected the army to sustain its presence and preserve its 

authority.26 But victories required the use of “extraordinary force,”27 the 

basis for which was the leader’s grasp of metaphysical terrain (the art of 

war): the emotional, physical, moral, political, professional, psychological, 

spiritual, and cultural identities of Blue, Gray, and Red and their proxies. 

Emerging from this landscape was the leader’s understanding of his opponents’ vulnerabilities or strengths, from which emerged a plan to organize 

his own elements into teams, activities into operations, and operations 

into plans. Those plans were tied to political intent, which in the case of 

Sun Tzu was the preservation of an intact nation. Said another way, Sun 

Tzu’s ideal general required mastery of a broad spectrum of operational 

combinations that included not only “normal force,” but “extraordinary 

force” that kept the nation under attack, intact. Applying that intent to our 

current circumstance in Iraq and Afghanistan, to what end is liberation, if 

the liberated don’t emerge? 

In theory, full spectrum operations is a term that conveys diversity 

and should provoke the kind of operational improvisation that permits 

Blue to rapidly exploit physical success by gaining access to the human 

brain. If AirLand Battle Doctrine expanded the kinds of elemental combinations theoretically available to the engaged ground commander to 

achieve physical effects, then battle command as the superior cognitive 

operation expands the kinds of operational combinations that will be 

required if we are to approach and shape mental effects within the metaphysical dimension. 

If this is the case, then each single operational activity must have as 

part of its DNA an understanding of the broader effect for which its particular activity is in support. That broader effect has three chief currents, 

each of what operates at different speeds: (1) an engagement story that 

seeks accommodations, or relative harmony with all constituents on terms 

favorable to Blue; (2) a physical story that gets us “over there,” sustains 

and protects our physical presence; and permits us to force agreements, 

if required; and (3) a story of regeneration that permits our continuous 

adaptation so that we aren’t swallowed by another nation (or group) more 

“fit” than we to govern. Corresponding to these movements, the unified 

field theory has built three categories of enabling operations: engagement, 

physical, and regeneration. We’ve fitted each with a starter kit, or sampling 

of proposed doctrinal operations. Leavened effects depend on Blue’s abil-
50 SMITH

ity to combine operational activity across all three categories, as part of 

each activity (one of FM 3-0’s important insights). 

It is through elemental and operational re-combinations that Blue 

achieves its greatest advantage. Sun Tzu called it a kind of formlessness, 

or the ability to conform to a continuously evolving situation as “water 

shapes its flow in accordance with the ground.”28 The enemy acknowledges 

the effect of Blue activity, but cannot describe the form it took. Under this 

approach, our institutional formations that I’ll sum up metaphorically as 

tables of organization and equipment (TOEs) and doctrine, dissolve into 

their elements so that leaders can rapidly recombine them into teams and 

operational combinations that conform to the dynamics of a situation defined by peril and opportunity. To succeed in this space, we must transcend 

the cognitive constraints that we have imposed on the shape of teams and 

the combinational diversity of operations. To what advantage is network 

connectivity within Blue, if Gray’s internal connectivity is non-existent? 

To what advantage is Blue’s combat superiority or ability to topple governments, if it doesn’t presage political opportunity from Red’s rubble? And 

to what advantage is our current success with our current threat, if we’re 

not institutionally adapting to the situation that has not yet fully arrived? 

Stated differently, “full spectrum operations” has two interrelated meanings: first, it means that we combine at the elemental level activities across 

engagement, physical, and regeneration categories; second, it means that 

we do so in order to create the full spectrum of effect across populations: 

from cognitive capability, through vulnerability, to accommodation. 

A few examples are introduced to expand the Army’s notion of full 

spectrum operations so that it addresses directly the political nature and 

responsibilities of the profession. Within the unified field theory, battle 

command is the operation held responsible for both tactical outcomes and 

setting the conditions for the achievement of political objectives. We speak 

obliquely about our political responsibilities in our doctrine, because we’ve 

spent careers avoiding the subject. Certainly, the Soviet Union’s cadre 

of political officers did nothing to rehabilitate the term within our operational tradition. And, finally, the role of nation-building is considered 

condescending by some, evidence of hubris by others. But I believe that 

such objections are voided by the nature of war itself; it demands that its 

military leaders, most especially its commanders, understand the nature 

of politics in the purest sense of that word. “I don’t know what else to call 

them, but governors.” That’s the language I used in private correspondence 

to describe our Divisional commanders during OIF 1. Sun Tzu, Wellington, and Grant, as well as those many leaders who oversaw the post-World 
 A Unified Field Theory for Full-Spectrum Operations 51

War II emergence of Europe and Japan would have empathized. There 

are three operational categories for which I believe the senior mission 

commander is personally responsible. Each is essential to the success of 

tactical outcomes, each is decisive with regard to setting the conditions 

for the achievement of political objectives, and each requires that leaders 

throughout an organization exhibit the most acute of political sensibilities. 

Those operations are narrative, emergent, and negotiation. 

Narrative Operations. Narrative operations have three chief ends. 

First, they justify operational activity and tell the story of on-going operations, in order to sustain Blue’s will to war and retain authority for the 

war’s strategic direction. Second, they build the rhetorical basis for the 

emergence of Gray constituencies. Third, they contribute to the rhetorical 

underpinnings of models designed to deceive, or influence, confuse, or 

discourage Red’s cognitive processes. Counter-Narrative Operations perform two different, but related, and equally decisive roles. First, they translate Blue activity into Gray and Red narratives to make sure that Blue’s 

plans, orders, and intent cannot be exploited by Gray or Red (a kind of 

Red team approach).29 Second, counter narratives recommend changes to 

operational activity in order to reinforce, undercut, subvert, counter, and 

seize Gray and Red rhetorical operations. It is essential to the comprehension of the unified field theory that readers recognize that all operations, 

when written from the perspective of the constituent, are Blue.

Leaders must understand that all operational activities are acts of 

rhetoric, and form a narrative pattern that is leveraged and exploited 

by all constituents. Narrative operations amount to storytelling via art, 

literature, imagery, narratives, and patterns of operational activity that, 

over time, coalesces into story. Narrative operations tell the story of the 

bound fates of Blue, Gray, and Red as they seek accommodations within a 

competitive world. Most significantly, narratives are rooted in national or 

group myth, the short hand version of the story of national or group birth 

and emergence, survival and enlargement. The best narratives—especially 

the narratives that justify operations—force readers to see themselves and 

their acts as the newest chapter of their national or group myth, for better 

or for worse. But under no circumstances can narrative operations remain 

distinct from the plan that visualizes the means by which operations are 

eventually resolved. How will this story end? And that which links operational activity in general to narrative operations specifically is this: when 

the reason for fighting can no longer be related to a nation’s (or group’s) 

security, narrative operations will be perceived as propaganda. 
52 SMITH

Poorly designed narratives, therefore, can have huge strategic consequences. For example, Blue’s invasion of Iraq was justified by a narrow 

national narrative that emphasized clear and present danger (weapons 

of mass destruction). That narrative, in turn, drove a force composition 

that emphasized physical effects and an urgent timeline that limited the 

amount of force structure available for the ground invasion. Shaping operations compensated by facilitating early physical success but at some cost 

to Blue enabling Gray’s benign emergence. Finally, the decision to preclude 

the conversion or assimilation of former Baath officials was certainly influenced by the tone of a narrative that had so thoroughly demonized a 

party willing to launch WMD against its own. 

But for those charged with enabling transition between decisive and 

stability operations, this was a war about understanding the mental states 

of multiple shades or Red and Gray (even Blue); it was about encouraging 

and facilitating the emergence of Gray from Red. The narrative that spoke 

to these nuanced constituencies was added only later, by engaged formations that had inherited the circumstances of their war, complete with a 

nearly-fleshed character. Cognitive revolution permits the narrative that 

justifies war to be broadened at its origin, shaped by narrators from combat teams destined to inherit operations in later phases. 

Because the vast majority of operations take place outside the view 

of its key constituencies, narrative operations provide “witness” to the 

on-going war in the service of the superior cognitive operation. Wellington used his battle narratives as “instruments” by which he influenced 

the way constituents behaved. First, his narratives were meant to buoy 

the morale of a nation that had been at war almost continuously for six 

decades; secure resources for subsequent operations; and perpetuate his 

role as their strategic author. Second, his narratives judged military performances, and the consequent reward or punishment that came with those 

public judgments inspired emulation or provoked conformation across 

his formations. Third, his narratives were virtually devoid of literary effect, providing the Red reading public little emotional provocation for 

further resistance; providing the Blue public little with which to inflame 

their already aroused passion for achieving rapid, declamatory defeat of 

their cross-channel rivals; and providing the Gray public with an image 

of the kind of wise, restrained leader that would preside within a postNapoleonic Europe.30

The expectation that one’s participation in national or group operations becomes story remains powerful—if not the most powerful—incentive 

to fight in a particular way. Western minds recoil at the narrative compensa-
 A Unified Field Theory for Full-Spectrum Operations 53

tion provided suicide bombers, but western narratives that publicize heroic 

activity can provoke similarly suicidal behavior. Wellington was so frustrated 

by ill-advised cavalry charges that provoked the premature commitment of 

his formations that he refused to give the charge any narrative space in his 

dispatch as means to discourage the practice.31 Sun Tzu warns of generals 

whose operations are undertaken as means to earn glory and promotion, 

the outcomes of which were almost always disastrous. We all know the fate 

(and psychological origin) of the disastrous charge of the Light Brigade. As 

part of narrative operations, we must consider kinds of counter-narratives 

that are used to remind readers of the kinds of behavior that will win them 

roles to relish. Certainly, the act of taking photographs by those who abused 

prisoners at Abu Ghraib is an example of perverse heroic story-telling, for 

which we had little in the way of narrative art to counter. 

On the other hand, battle commanders use their narrative operations to provide their adversaries with a deliberate look into the collective 

character of their formation (and, by extension, into the character of the 

nation or group that sponsors it). On the eve of the Battle of Guagamela, 

Alexander the Macedon faced Darius the Persian to determine the destiny 

of both kings and their armies. Alexander was advised by his chief strategist to take no chances, attack at night and rout the Persians in surprise. 

Alexander chose to attack in broad daylight, partly to preclude the emergence of apologists who might diminish the circumstances surrounding 

what would be a flood of witnesses to Alexander’s almost super-human 

prowess.32 While his advisers were focused on battle and its effects, Alexander was involved in battle command, linking the effects of battle to the 

superior operation: securing the loyalty of the Persian population for a 

Macedonian who was heretofore its arch rival and who from here on out 

would rule in absentia. 

In a similar sense, Washington led his army on a bold crossing of the 

Delaware on what surely should have been a doomed attack against Great 

Britain’s Hessian mercenaries garrisoned at Trenton, New Jersey. It was 

Washington’s intent to have the story of that battle deliver what no physical blow could: evidence of the mental objects that occupied Washington’s 

remarkable brain. The object that stood out most was the character of an 

emergent nation that would under no physical circumstances submit. If, as 

some historians suggest, Washington had a shaky command of battles, he 

certainly had a firm grasp on battle command, or the cognitive operation 

designed to make Great Britain reconsider its opposition to American independence. In summary, narrative operations are part of the continuous 

fabric of operational activity. 
54 SMITH

Emergent Operations. If we went to war to remove the threat of 

Iraqi’s weapons of mass destruction, and that required the removal of 

Saddam Hussein, then the real story of Operation Iraqi Freedom was about 

the emergence of a post-Saddam Iraq. The removal of a corrupt Red political landlord necessarily gives way to groups who emerge from its shadow, 

and certainly the nation that provokes that dynamic must account for its 

consequences. We had no institutional or taxonomical vocabulary for this 

kind of operational responsibility, no means to quantify or qualify the 

force structure required to encourage its benign evolution, and therefore 

had no basis with which to mount a powerful argument to expand the 

composition of the invasion force. After all, even with a robust lexicon for 

physical operations, we had problems enough marshalling an argument to 

earn sufficient forces to secure a “liberated” Iraq. 

Ultimately, emergent operations reduce the time, resources, and danger implied by Blue’s long term operational occupation of nations whose 

political infrastructure has been removed but not yet replaced. It does so 

by encouraging the emergence of multiple shades of Gray as benignly neutral, and independent of a much diminished, marginalized Red authority. 

Emergent operations may be about the post-combat phase, but their effects 

are among the first achieved during any kind of operational activity. First, 

emerging operations establish among Blue leaders their pre-operational 

understanding of optimal mental end states for Gray and Red constituents 

(all shades of Gray and Red). Second, emerging operations filter all shaping activity to encourage those ends, from staged contracts, loans, cognitive 

experts, knowledge experts, to protection of key infrastructure (even at 

the expense of facilitating early physical activity). Third, emerging operations must reexamine from the wreckage of regime change, the emergent 

nature of the defeated army, liberated village, individual groups and alliances, and any surviving government to comprehend the nature of the 

new thing that is becoming. Stability and advisory operations are best seen 

in operational and concomitant combination with emerging operations. 

Stability operations restore those basic services that prevent constituents 

from considering the advantages of benign independence. In their absence, 

a group’s devolution toward chaos is unconstrained. Advisory operations 

are distinct from emerging operations in that they take place after groups 

have found their political identities (in a relative sense). Advisory activities 

develop long term relationships between institutional counterparts of Blue 

and Gray (and Red, as part of Intelligence operations). 

Emergent operations, then, have pure political ends: the ability of 

Gray to emerge from the shadows of an old Red political landlord. Emer-
 A Unified Field Theory for Full-Spectrum Operations 55

gent operations require formations whose leaders have inculcated them 

with a psychological sensibility toward how liberated groups are shaped, 

formed, developed, destroyed, and recovered. So essential is its success to a 

war’s timely resolution that it cannot be delegated: if the emergence of liberated groups is not under the gaze of a liberating Army, then it’s performed 

under the pay of an insurgent. As the CG, 101st Airborne Division, General 

Petraeus employed his own combat formations as part of a broad emergent 

operation in and around Mosul. In every meeting I can recall, General 

Petraeus argued with exceptional passion and inescapable logic for the 

resources required to translate the momentum of our physical success into 

what he clearly viewed as the emergence of Mosul. He used the same tone 

and level of indignation I’d heard him apply to another kind of demand: 

sufficient network capability to enable him to fight his physical battles (our 

Divisional commanders were remarkably consistent in their expressed 

frustration with availability of resources for emergent operations). 

Negotiation operations translate effects into early, temporary, provisional, incremental, or final accommodations. Just as narrative operations 

translate effects into stories that make mental impressions across multiple 

levels of constituents, negotiation operations seek from every operational 

activity the evidence of concession, or the evidence of opportunity to accommodate. Among some of the concessions that negotiation operations 

seek include meetings between constituencies; cease-fires; agreements 

with regard to services of any kind; public acknowledgements; truces; land 

exchange; terms of surrender; Blue’s role in Gray’s institutional construction; Red’s role in Gray’s emerging institutions. Negotiation operations 

produce gains that in their accumulated march lead to states of accommodation where populations agree to reconsider positions that were at the 

outset of hostilities considered mutually exclusive. They close the deal so 

to speak, even if they do so inch by inch, day by day. 

We must avoid equating negotiation operations with the war’s final 

movement. Negotiation is a persistent and pervasive operation by which 

leaders apply a range of concessions in order to achieve a more favorable 

position. Whatever McFarland did in ANBAR, part of it was negotiating 

concessions that weren’t on any official gift list in exchange for the kind 

of metaphorical higher ground McFarland considered decisive. That way 

revolution—the right kind—leans. The Sunnis received a U.S.-trained, 

trusted Sunni security force that was returned to the neighborhoods from 

whence they came; and the Americans received a powerful ally in their 

war against what had become a common enemy. That cognitive accom-
56 SMITH

modation soon gave way to an Iraqi-wide alliance between many Sunni 

tribes and the U.S.-led coalition. 

Wellington negotiated with the French for the use of their markets, 

thus creating an ironic demand for the presence of an army that was, after 

all, intent on eliminating their head of state.33 The cognitive accommodations between local French citizens and Wellington served the latter well 

in his role as de facto leader of post-war France. Finally, permitting a 

vulnerable opponent the right to negotiate how he wishes to cede, or surrender, or make a particular statement may be the most efficient means to 

save thousands of lives. For example, by preserving the dignity of Hirohito 

in the closing days of World War II, the Allies leveraged the authority 

the Emperor retained over his subjects: when he asked his armies to lay 

down their arms, divisions across China, who had never known defeat in 

battle, surrendered their swords to the tattered Nationalists who had never 

known victory (at least against the Japanese).34

Without a formal name for this decisive activity, how do we discover 

if there is a science to the art? What signs emerge when opponents who are 

vulnerable give way to a willingness to negotiate, and what kind of operational activity best seals the deal at least cost to the future? For negotiations 

take time, and while they are waged, the full spectrum of operations is also 

underway. In between the time the armistice that concluded the Great War 

was signed (approximately 0510 hours) and the time it took effect (1100 

hours), military operations proceeded virtually unabated. On Armistice 

Day, 1918, all sides suffered 10,944 casualties, a loss that exceeded the 

war’s daily average. Certainly much of that loss had to do with the attitudes of the prosecuting generals toward negotiation operations, heavily 

influenced by political views that had never been subjected to operational 

scrutiny—despite their potential consequences. When Pershing sent out 

the message that announced the “cease fire” that would take effect 1100 

hours that morning, he did so without providing any orders that countermanded planned attacks or combat activity.35 Certainly, those deaths 

changed or altered the personal histories of those affected. 

The heartbreaking, almost absurd conclusion to Grant’s pursuit 

of Lee is impossible to comprehend unless to presume that Lee had to 

demonstrate an absolute abhorrence for surrender, in order to surrender 

on the most favorable terms possible.36 Was there some way to operationally account for that psychological insight short of virtual annihilation? 

What significant insights are to be learned by an examination of their 

exchange of messages, the precise terms over which they haggled, and the 

ceremony designed to establish optimal mental states for both victor and 
 A Unified Field Theory for Full-Spectrum Operations 57

vanquished. In the absence of a name for these decisive operations, we lack 

a corresponding science. 

The Taxonomical Model of the Operational 

Environment, Its Two Domains, and Its Three 

Dimensions 

“[T]he primary purpose of any theory is to clarify concepts and ideas 

that have become, as it were, confused and entangled.”37

Taxonomic models matter. The taxonomy of life classifies over five 

million living species, of which we are merely one, and permits scientists 

to clarify from the clutter of diversity those patterns that explain the origins, adaptive progress, and even likely fate of essential species. The alternative to taxonomical work is individual explanations for Earth’s endless, 

present, and diminishing variety. And while we may exhibit empathy for 

life’s diversity, that withers when some subset refuses in its evolutionary 

path to accommodate our own adaptive, evolutionary way. The taxonomical model is, in this sense, the dramatic story of accommodation: how its 

chief subject successfully competes for room within an environment that 

is characterized by the overwhelming biological urge to survive by any 

and all means available. Considering the stakes, taxonomies seek universal 

applicability in order to accelerate insights into the nature of their subject, 

thus the universal nature of this particular Unified field theory. And, from 

a security perspective, taxonomic models help focus the resources of a 

nation that are finite, on an essential subject whose potential capabilities, 

activities, and mysteries threaten to break our organizational and financial 

capacity. For example, the use of the taxonomic term, domain, to describe 

a particular capability is so tightly bound with fiscal permission and service sponsorship, that any recommendation to add a “new” domain excites 

an enervating, but necessary debate at the highest levels of the nation’s 

security organizations. 

Dimensions and the Problem of Operational Approach

If the origins of war are rooted in human psychology, then the only 

way to move populations from the will to war to the willingness to accommodate what were once mutually exclusive goals and objectives is to 

change minds (or annihilate or exterminate implacable constituents, an 

outcome that does not lend itself to long-term inter-group harmony). How 

does one approach such delicate mental organs, usually surrounded by significant physical protection, guarded by bias, under mysterious influences, 
58 SMITH

and often located at some remove, without putting themselves and their 

nations at risk, or planting the seeds of future conflict? 

The overriding problem, then, that battle command must solve is one 

of approach. Consider Sun Tzu’s advice, rendered as poetry and delivered 

as intent: “throw rocks at eggs.”38 This is no pitch for the use of overwhelming force, but an image that conveys the role of operational approach: first, 

one must get close enough physically to recognize Red’s vulnerability (it 

is an egg,); second, one must engage with Red with sufficient delicacy to 

preserve Red’s ability to negotiate, accommodate, convert, surrender (otherwise, the objective of operations is annihilation or extermination); third, 

one must do so without surrendering one’s inherent physical advantage 

(Blue is still a rock). At some level, then, The Art of War is a meditation on 

the matter of operational approach, an examination of the means by which 

constituents approach one another in order to provoke three major effects: 

the collective will to war; the collective vulnerability of Gray and Red; and 

the collective accommodations among Blue, Gray, and Red that preserve 

the conditions necessary for a return to (or emergence of) international 

(or group) harmony. 

Our own OE is self-cast and constructed around three dimensions 

in order to secure the collective survival of nations or groups. In our doctrinal approach toward dimensions, we’ve articulated only one, and ceded 

much of the description, development, and integration of the other two to 

an ad hoc chorus of diverse advocates. The three dimensions that extend 

our operational environment as means to approach our objectives are (1) 

the physical, within which constituents perform their physical acts (move, 

force, sustain, and protect); (2) the metaphysical, within which constituents perform their cognitive acts (lead/behave; shape/form; understand/

decide; solve/adapt); and (3) the information infrastructure that unites the 

activities of the two, by providing form to thought, sufficient to enable collective understanding, behavior, regulation, and adaptation. Battle command supervises the construction of all three dimensions, and depends on 

all three to approach, pursue, and achieve their operational objectives. 

We’ll begin with a short examination of the dimension with which 

we are most familiar: the physical dimension. We currently refer to that 

dimension in terms of the four doctrinal domains of air, land, sea, and 

space. The unified field theory applies the term “dimension” to echo the 

approach science takes to explain natural phenomena. Physical dimensions (length, width, height, time, space) describe the nature and location 

of physical objects, thereby enabling a common picture of physical activity capable of being comprehended across broad and diverse populations. 
 A Unified Field Theory for Full-Spectrum Operations 59

Our current approach that emphasizes four distinct domains that fall 

under service sponsorships (and service common operational pictures) 

obscures the continuous nature of the physical activity that takes place 

across this dimension. Operational dimensions, as with their scientific 

counterparts, are human constructs overlaid on natural phenomenon. We 

overlay our maps, doctrine, coordinating instructions, proxies, and human 

organizations over earth, its geography, and its atmosphere in order to 

facilitate four primary physical acts: strategic movement and tactical 

maneuver; employment of force; protection of our physical objects; and 

their protracted sustainment. The end of such self-construction is a kind 

of Burma Road: the means by which we gather like-minded groups into 

tailored formations; move them to proximity with the enemy; then engage 

the enemy for effect. 

If that were our sole objective, then dominance in this dimension 

would guarantee our nation’s security. But we know that physical dominance 

doesn’t guarantee national survival or security. If the origins of wars are psychological, then their resolution depends on changing minds; not merely the 

minds of our opponents, who may submit to our arguments from a variety 

of selfish motives, but the minds of Blue whose own resistance to adaptive 

change over multiple generations may have formed war’s disharmonic root 

in the first place. The dimension by which we approach human brains is the 

metaphysical. For those who consider the term too philosophical, consider 

the alternative: the physical mass of human brain that serves as source to 

human identity. Even in casual conversation, we approach the subject using 

metaphors: from names we give each other (personal, professional, and 

role); to the names we give the organs of the brain: character, mind, soul, 

imagination, spirit, personality. We even measure these organs with words 

that qualify them: judgment and wisdom; charisma and spiritual; obstinate 

and intellectual. Even as science begins to map this mental landscape, and 

uncover how minds metabolize influences into mental objects that are in 

some sense visible, we have failed to direct cyber’s attention to locating and 

identifying these mental objects as part of a cognitive common operational 

picture. And the object that matters the most is the decision to behave in 

a particular way, on behalf of a particular constituency, and in pursuit of 

a common objective. That decision is the ultimate cognitive act. That’s the 

target of battle command. Leaders may need the physical dimension to get 

them physically close; but they’ll need the metaphysical dimension and the 

cognitive activities it enables to close the deal. 

Where sustained physical proximity, freedom of maneuver, and 

physical imbalance are the chief objectives of the physical domain and its 
60 SMITH

dimension, the objective of activity within the metaphysical dimension is 

the achievement and application of knowledge. 

“Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will 

never be in peril”39

This is the sine qua non for Sun Tzu devotees. Even FM 3.0 alludes to 

it by way of introducing the subject of information superiority.40 But Sun 

Tzu’s understanding of knowledge implied a range of cognitive activity 

that exceeds most of our current definitions, and encompasses what the 

unified field theory would call the core cognitive operation from which all 

other operational activity is derived, or battle command. His Art of War is 

an extended meditation on what precisely Sun Tzu meant by knowledge. 

First, and above all, knowledge meant to lead as part of a political 

and spiritual mandate; from that comes an army that acts as one, with 

common character. Knowledge means to shape information into the 

cognitive model of the situation, one that tracks not only physical objects (weapons, organizations, log trains, transportation, environmental 

features), but the location and nature of mental objects, including the 

psychological, emotional, intellectual, and spiritual state of enemy and 

friendly minds. It is from this cognitive model that leaders draw an 

understanding of the peril they are in, as well as the opportunity that is 

within their grasp. Knowledge is to conform to the Janus-shape of situation like “water over earth,” until threat is countered, and opportunity 

seized. Sun Tzu regularly objectified the mental states of his own generals, his opponents, and their formations, drawing from those insights 

the method for his approach: give the enemy no egress, Sun Tzu warned, 

and transform the human who is vulnerable and willing to accommodate 

into the animal that fights to its death.41

To know is to understand the situation so personally, that it becomes 

the leader’s own conception—not that of the enemy, or staff, or public 

pundit. Leaders transform their understanding into metaphor or image, 

by which operations adopt the cognitive character of its leader. To know 

is to translate personal understanding into collective activity, as leaders 

and their staffs measure ground, estimate “quantities,” calculate distance, 

compare plans, and project the “chances of victory.”42

Finally, knowledge means using personal presence and intent to 

regulate the spirit of operations, so that its cognitive objectives are never 

compromised, “[f]or while an angered man may be happy, and a resentful 

man again be pleased, a state that has perished cannot be restored, nor can 

the dead be brought back to life.”43
 A Unified Field Theory for Full-Spectrum Operations 61

To know, then, is to operate wisely. It is how “the state is kept secure 

and the army preserved.”44 So, now that we’ve established the physical approach, articulated a metaphysical landscape by which leaders approach 

knowledge, all that’s left is to approach the objective together as collective 

body and mind. It is here that the metaphysical and physical dimensions 

need the assistance of an information infrastructure. 

The Third Dimension: The Information Infrastructure, 

the Network, and Cyberspace

The information infrastructure enables organized human activity, 

for it gives form to the thoughts inside human brains and their proxies. 

Without the Information dimension, there is no coordinated physical effort, no delivery of intent, no coherent, synchronized collective approach 

to the objective. This third environmental dimension is not new, but interest in it is fresh, thanks to the emergence of a revolutionary component: 

cyberspace, or man-made code imposed on electricity that travels at the 

speed of light. 

The author was General William Wallace’s Signal Officer when he 

commanded V Corps during the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Wallace’s scoff 

was almost audible when in response to his query as to what the author’s 

job was, the author answered, “C2.” He said, “The hell it is. Your job is to 

enable it.” This sharp distinction between the role of C2, which served as 

metaphor for the commander’s cognitive authority over operations, and 

the role of an enabling information infrastructure is as profound and old 

as war itself. True to Wallace’s word, the author was never consulted with 

regard to determining optimal avenues by which to approach V Corps’ 

operational objectives (although the author would have been happy to 

oblige). The author’s job was to surround the commander and his key 

leaders (above and below) with their network, a tailored type of information infrastructure from which they modeled their situation, and by which 

they formed teams, assigned them roles and responsibilities within the 

narrative of plans and orders, under the influence of intent, in order to 

counter threat and seize opportunity. That’s a tall order, for which I was 

famously unsuccessful. 

As with the physical and metaphysical dimensions, the information 

dimension is a self-constructed weave of enabling technologies (some 

human, some physical, some electrical, some mechanical, some pure 

animal), bent to a loose chain of command. I’ve added Infrastructure to 

the Information dimension in order to remind readers that this dimension is self constructed, self-directed, self-resourced, and requires the 
62 SMITH

same exceptional engineering, management, centralized planning, and 

significant resources that we devote toward enabling our transportation 

infrastructure. This Information Infrastructure (II) provides the means 

for leaders to collectively approach their operational goals and objectives. In the most fundamental sense, this information infrastructure 

gives form to operational thought, and is as personal as a voice in the 

ear, as intimate as shared understanding, and can carry a kind of spiritual authority when expressed as order or intent. The relationship, then, 

between the originator of thought, the information infrastructure, and 

the leader who tailors thought to local application is almost parental, 

certainly possessive. So entangled are the two that there are those who 

feel that the cyber and cognitive revolutions are one and the same. This is 

not the case. To continue to think so is to postpone the cognitive revolution that will make us more secure. 

To disentangle the two, we’ll ground our network discussion in history. First, we’ll define the information infrastructure as the more global 

capability that serves the universal user, and use the word “network” to 

describe that portion of the II that is devoted to the needs of a particular 

leader, who is always at the center of his network. This network is not 

merely cyber, for how else to incorporate the non-electronic exchange 

and maturation of information? The network existed well before the 

birth and evolution of cyberspace. Our historical examples devoted significant personal effort to the design of their networks. Networks relied 

both on loose confederation of strategic assets (ships, trains, horses, 

wagons, messenger), and tightly controlled capabilities carved like an 

Adam’s rib from their own formations (aides, dispatches, signals, sounds, 

meetings, and their own physical gestures). In many cases, the network 

that conveyed information was the same network that directly engaged 

a commander’s opponents. 

The ancient Chinese designed their chief combat formation around 

the central position and role of the leader, who was also the greatest warrior. That was done so that he could rapidly convey his personal example 

as a form of instructions to the members of his organization.45 Wellington, 

likewise, interwove his experienced units from the Peninsular Campaign 

with inexperienced Belgian and Dutch formations in order to provoke 

consistent behavior.46 Sun Tzu’s describes the “drums, gongs, flags, and 

pennants” that conveyed his personal instructions in the most personal 

of terms, calling them the means by which “men’s eyes and ears” are 

“unite[d].”47 The Chinese staff included organizations whose job was to 

translate plans into feasible orders; another team was required to question 
 A Unified Field Theory for Full-Spectrum Operations 63

the wisdom of the General’s provisional decisions, acting as an Army’s 

strategic conscience.48 Alexander collapsed his strategic network, bringing knowledge centers with him, augmenting his expeditionary staff with 

national-level experts so that their spiritual, historical, political, engineering, tactical, and rhetorical advice were within physical reach during the 

course of his campaigns.49 Both Napoleon and Wellington were known to 

have brought with them personal libraries/databases that augmented their 

own private knowledge.50

No one understood the nature of the need for a global network at the 

center of which stood the battle commander better than Wellington. In 

fact, he was able to build a global information infrastructure over which he 

actually managed to enjoy loose configuration control. At the tactical level, 

Wellington’s personal presence was ubiquitous; his exquisitely crafted 

dispatches to subordinate leaders were exchanged via an infrastructure of 

aides, and included words that were not meant to be altered by those who 

delivered them. They were sacred exchanges, and placed in hands that 

were trusted by commanders. These aides, who too often lost their lives 

in service to Wellington, were also the future commanders of regiments, 

brigades, and divisions (his personal aide, the future Lord Raglan, lost 

an arm at Waterloo, then earned command of the British Expeditionary 

Army during the ill-fated Crimean Campaign). Wellington was equally 

adept at what we might call the “operational level” of the information infrastructure, carving time to meet or exchange letters with allies, regional 

authorities, neutral population, even the deposed French family. His exchange with Blucher was particular decisive, for while it involved little in 

the way of written dispatch, it included a personal metaphysical connection that provoked a most improbable, almost inexplicable, Don Quixotelike performance and rescue by Blucher. At the strategic level, Wellington 

composed the Waterloo dispatch, from multiple locations, within hours of 

the battle’s conclusion, conveyed over an infrastructure that included pen, 

ink, parchment, messenger, horse, ship, train, aide, editor, printing press, 

delivery boys, political forums, public and governmental authorities. The 

evidence that Wellington had established at least a loose hegemony over 

his global network is that, despite all those pieces and parts (as near many 

as our own!), when Wellington’s strategically phrased account of the Waterloo Battle was published in The Times of London, it stood as the only 

published official word of its outcome.51

Building and defending a network, then, was part of a battle commander’s job description. The network consisted of, for the most part, the 

personal skills of the individual commander: whether exchanging infor-
64 SMITH

mation in person; or via the use of superior equestrian skills to convey 

orders and intent; or applying rudimentary code to messages interpreted 

by combatants themselves. The substructures that carried information beyond the engagement area were the same structures that conveyed soldiers 

and logistics (ships, rails); the dispatches that contained instructions and 

messages, orders and plans, were hand written, quite often by the senior 

leader themselves, whose selection of phrases were instrumental in conveying intent. 

The historically underrated Albert Myer, the founder of the United 

States Army’s Signal Corps, changed all that (or at least understood that 

all must change). His vision was that of Wellington’s: a global network bent 

to the needs of the critical leader, regardless of location, level, or circumstance. The sticking point, of course, was that this Information Infrastructure would be under the relative command of the signal corps (and Myer 

as its leader), but with the promise that it would remain loyal to its local 

leader, whether it was the President and Secretary of War at their level, the 

Army Chief, the Army commander, or the engaged Corps Commander, 

Division, and Brigade Commanders at their levels. Soldiers and officers 

were detailed from the combat arms to form the bulk of what became a 

shadow formation, a corps of signalers whose description of Blue, Gray, 

and Red activity were conveyed by visual code. The codes were beyond 

the comprehension of the combat commanders, and the formations that 

transmitted them were independent of the engaged force. It was Myer’s 

intent that the chief signal officer compose the intelligence conveyed 

(often observed personally) by the shadow network, assemble a model of 

the situation (Blue, Gray, and Red), along with a map that grounded their 

observations in a common picture, along with the atmospheric conditions 

that might influence the leader’s decisions with regard to response.52 The 

chief information officer must brave the mood of the mission commander, 

and hand the model of the situation—not his words, mine—to the man in 

the tent before the evening work was concluded. What he did with that 

model was a matter left to the metaphysical dimension (and the cognitive 

revolution). 

This “Adam’s rib,” or signal service plucked from the combat corpus, 

had its triumphs, but at war’s conclusion was considered by the Army’s 

leadership a luxury enjoyed only at the expense of the indisputably indispensable combat formations from which most members of the Signal 

Corps came. Myer’s vision, which included a single, common telegraph 

system that integrated all levels of war (a vision that was frustrated by 

Secretary of War Stanton’s retention of direct control over the national 
 A Unified Field Theory for Full-Spectrum Operations 65

telegraph network),53 was revolution. He recommended that manned 

signal capability form part of every expeditionary element; that it shadow 

Red, Gray, and Blue formations, and integrate their information within a 

common model tailored to the local leader’s circumstances. Once in place, 

it was up to “[t]he Generals of our armies, and the officers commanding 

fleets” to discover “thousands of applications” for this network that “are 

not now thought of.”54

He’d be glad to know that the joint network revolution he provoked 

is well on its transformational way—150 years later. The Army’s contribution to Myer’s explicitly joint vision is LandWarNet, but it is the network 

service center (NSC) construct that makes the vision practical. The NSC 

is the outgrowth of various white papers written in the wake of the Iraqi 

invasion, matured by a group of brilliant majors, chief warrants, and senior 

non-commissioned officers as an Army/Marine concept within the LandWarNet construct, provisionally approved by CG, TRADOC, the Chief of 

Staff of the Army, and the Secretary of the Army in October, 2006, recently 

reconfirmed by the current Chief of Staff, and now sits as the number one 

priority of the CIO/G6. 

The NSC provides the same four basic services that Myer asked of 

his signal “servicemen:” (1) the technical model of the situation; (2) the 

means to connect tailored teams and control their operations; (3) the 

ability to simulate human problem-solving, by expanding the network 

of co-located minds; and (4) the ability to defend his enterprise, at considerable cost to his corps.55 And, just as Myer envisioned, the NSC delivers the network by folding much of its enabling infrastructure, within 

a network chain of command (and accompanying TTPs and activities), 

itself nested within mission commands at every level and location. The 

network that results is segmented much in the same that a worm survives 

whether permitted to wiggle whole, or in sections that travel in opposing 

directions, under the influence of their local leaders. From global to regional centers that gird the earth, to tactical extensions that accompany 

expeditionary formations, it is a network that is at once universal and 

centralized, local and deeply personal. And that is because battle command must link every local activity and effect to the global operation 

and its political end. 

There are six operations that permit an information infrastructure 

to perform as a network. NetOps keeps the leader at the center of his elemental combinations, aware of his situation, and capable of continuously 

reshaping formations to counter threat, seize opportunity, and solve problems. NetOps performs four functions: (1) NetOps builds and defends a 
66 SMITH

tailored network for leaders at every level and location; (2) NetOps enables 

leaders to shape their circumstances into the Model of the Situation that 

conveys peril and opportunity; (3) NetOps enables leaders to form tailored 

solutions to counter the former and seize the latter; (4) NetOps enables 

leaders to turn to the collective cognitive brain to solve problems. ISR

keeps Blue connected to Gray and Red, and feeds the Network’s model 

of the situation. Intelligence locates and identifies threat and opportunity 

(penetrates Gray and Red as required); feeds the network’s model of the 

situation. CyberOps is subordinate to multiple superior operations, and 

never acts outside an operational combination, for the consequences of 

cyber operations will provoke, potentially, the enemy’s own full spectrum 

response. First. In support of NetOps, CyberOps extends insights with regard to network threat and vulnerabilities as part of Blue network defense. 

As authorized, and as part of myriad operational combinations, CyberOps 

attacks Gray or Red threat at the source. Second. As part of ISR and Intel 

operations, CyberOps exploits access to Gray and Red networks to mature 

the Model of the Situation. Third. In combination with myriad operational 

activities, CyberOps helps to deceive, discourage, persuade, degrade, or 

destroy Gray and Red cyber and cognitive capability. StaffOps debates, 

measures, quantifies, publicizes, and translates private understanding and 

provisional decisionmaking into collective plans, orders, and broadly apprehended intent. Knowledge operations gather from historical, scientific, 

cultural, social, political, and spiritual sources the cognitive context for all 

decisions, projecting their consequences into the near, long, and multigenerational futures. Knowledge operations require significant skills in the 

fields of modeling and simulation. For optimal effect, all network-related 

operations are fully integrated within mission and operations centers (see 

abstract). 

The Army’s chief battle and battle command transformation programs, Future Combat Systems (FCS) and LandWarNet, integrate the 

Wellington approach and the Myer vision. In combination both programs 

return the network to the engaged combatants, and permit them to play 

roles at every level of war and during each operational phase, regardless of 

echelon, location, and time. In the manner of Myer, LandWarNet (and its 

family of like-minded information infrastructures) is an electronic echo 

of the physical formations of Blue, Gray, and Red. LandWarNet-enabled, 

FCS-equipped formations engage at a level of collaboration that treats all 

the objects across the physical dimension as subject to their authority, 

warning Blue of physical peril, or pivoting to exploit opportunity. This 

kind of networked force has reinvigorated our combat formations, sustain-
 A Unified Field Theory for Full-Spectrum Operations 67

ing their viability as physical presence. There can be no question with regard to the necessity of this essential act of transformation: we must never 

cede physical strength to an enemy, for it means ceding our ability to get 

close enough to engage Gray and Red metaphysically. 

But so far, the purpose for our cyber-enabled transformation is not 

to revolutionize operations, but to restore viability to traditional capability. 

We have transformed our powerful capabilities into cognitively agile capabilities, because the enemy is either less awed by our physical advantage, or 

because they are less vulnerable to our physical force—most likely because 

our opponents’ objectives are psychological, and notoriously resistant to 

physical force. But has our physical advantage made us more secure? Does 

this extraordinary physical capability inform a cognitive activity whose 

consequences are always national and global; whose failures risk national 

prestige, exhaust the source of elemental power, and prevent the application of resources to resolve situations not yet underway? Without a cognitive revolution that provides it an operational and organizational context, 

will a LandWarNet-enabled, FCS-equipped Brigade Combat Team change 

the conditions that established OIF’s peculiar character in the first place? 

Will it discover along with the facts and figures of its physical dimension, 

those mental objects that swim by undetected, shapes on their way toward 

making dangerous alliances? Can a LandWarNet-enabled, FCS-equipped 

BCT form elemental and operational combinations from across all sources 

of power at the origins of operational activity, within metaphorical moments of their engagement? Do our institutional doctrines—across the 

departments, agencies, and services—demand that leaders articulate the 

cognitive end states of their human targets before they apply their full 

spectrum solutions? 

I’ll use some short examples of the difference between networkenabled, FCS-equipped transformation and the need for cognitive revolution. When network-enabled, FCS-equipped combat teams squeeze 

triggers, those acts initiate an ammunition resupply; those acts do not 

demand a corresponding account for the fate of each individual round. 

We have always excused the soldier from such unconscionable accountability. A cognitive revolution, on the other hand, enables the staging of 

funds in the figurative hands of the triggerman within minutes following 

the liberation of Gray (or Grays). Cyber can’t solve our inability to perform 

this mission. It is Blue’s self-imposed cognitive constraint that currently 

demands an accounting for every dollar spent under the most god-awful 

circumstances, and fails to permit soldiers to extend such services to those 

whom they’ve physically dominated. Despite the evidence that we usually, 
68 SMITH

if not always, win physical “battles” and we usually, if not always, struggle 

with stability and transition operations, we still spend the preponderance 

of our training, doctrine, and organizational structure on reinforcing 

our physical success. My military education and training has focused on 

battles. And the story of battle, as I’ve argued, is always in the service of a 

superior operation. 

We must do three things simultaneously. First, we must continue 

with cyber transformation, and complete the institutionalization of that 

technical revolution. Second, we must direct our technical efforts to establishing the conditions for the emergence of the cognitive revolution. 

Third, we must amplify by orders of magnitude the voice of this cognitive 

emergence that is stirring among engaged formations. This revolution has 

been only marginally reinforced by the application of our arts, sciences, 

technologies, and their associated laboratories. And, as a reminder of the 

scope of the unified field theory, those resources must be applied to the 

transformation of operational and strategic leaders, organizations, and 

doctrine in order to prevent the launching of a war whose early character 

resists the influence of a future tactical presence, regardless of how superior its cognitive advantages are.

Our failure to distinguish between the cyber and cognitive revolutions has left the cyber revolution stalled at the entry to the brain of the 

man in the tent. I believe that the conditions for victory have not historically changed: powerful nations will always need “normal force” that permits them to compete with their international (or inter-group) peers over 

space within a finite universe. Nations and groups who seek long-term 

preservation, though, seek “extraordinary force” to secure their prospects. 

It is increasingly clear that “extraordinary” force requires mastery of the 

metaphysical dimension, into which science and art and their technologies 

have begun to direct their considerable light as means to enhance man’s 

natural insights. When the man in the tent or the leader on horseback demand a cognitive model of the situation, shaped to inform all organs of the 

human brain; when leaders demand a picture that captures the shapes of 

both mental and physical objects—past, current, and future; when leaders 

demand elemental combinations that modify more precisely the shape of 

mental objects; and when leaders demand operational combinations that 

respond to cognitive opportunities as rapidly as their proxies respond to 

physical danger, then the cognitive revolution will take off. When that 

happens, we’ll appreciate LandWarNet-enabled, FCS-equipped formation 

for the extraordinary achievement it is, but one that serves as preface to 

one that is greater still.
 A Unified Field Theory for Full-Spectrum Operations 69

Conclusion

Our doctrinal bias for physical operations is not shared by our 

current enemy, whose decisive operation is psychological, for which his 

physical activity is in support. A growing voice across those forces held 

accountable for land-based outcomes have arrived at similar conclusion: 

that their root operation is cognitive. Our brigade, regimental, and special 

operations combat teams are among history’s finest examples of formations organized around the production of cognitive effects in pursuit of 

mental accommodations among and across constituencies.56 They would 

agree that failure to gain early mastery of the cognitive domain and its 

essential activities unnecessarily initiates, extends, modifies, and resolves 

operations at an elevated cost in human life, and multi-generational diminution of international influence and national power. No other activity has 

that kind of catastrophic potential for mischief. Yet, we remain without a 

viable vocabulary with which to even approach the subject, certainly nothing sufficient to excite the kind of attention that, say, the tank did in the 

1930s; or, for that matter, all things Cyber today. 

The consequences of this failure are large. While we are understandably concerned about the implications of a cyber domain that captures 

the interest of Congress and potentially an ill-advised service sponsor, the 

land forces are justifiably in need of a strategic message that demands a 

revolution in the way we conceive operations. That won’t happen unless 

we are willing to risk the prestige of our core competency, and lend the 

name battle command to our effort. It has been the central thesis of this 

paper that battle command must emerge as the evidence of a cognitive 

revolution, complete with a taxonomy of its own, if we are to enjoy the 

potential applications of our cyber revolution. As long as battle command 

remains primarily focused on closing with and destroying the enemy, 

cyber will continue on the path it has taken: transforming the way our 

grand formations network their physical effects. 

Battle commanders will eventually revolt. Our formations in Iraq 

are examples of the future, but they dissolve upon return, and the forcing 

function for their reconstitution is precisely what we wish our cognitive 

revolution to obviate. The evidence of revolution will be in the composition of force structure, whether we continue to treat cognitive operations 

by adding staff officers, or whether we approach the kind of resource investment similar to that required to incorporate the capability of the tank. 

I also believe that even the mere acknowledgment that battle command 
70 SMITH

is our core cognitive operation will redirect some of cyber’s attention, for 

wherever battle command goes, so goes its loyal greyhound, the network. 

The goal of revolution is to make common that which was once rare. 

That’s the promise of battle command once it assumes its role as the superior cognitive operation at the core of the operational environment: to 

make the wisdom, judgment, acumen, imagination, instincts, and mental 

courage that mark the professional lives of Sun Tzu and Wellington and 

Col McFarland (among many others) common across all levels of war. 

That kind of revolutionary transformation bodes well for the security of 

our nation.

Notes1

 Timothy L. Thomas, Dragon Bytes: Chinese Information-War Theory and Practice (Foreign 

Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2004), 44. 2

 General Charles C. Campbell, USA, FORSCOM Commander, from his remarks with regard to the promise of LandWarNet at the LandWarNet Conference, August 2007, Fort Lauderdale, 

Florida.3

 Bob Dylan, Modern Times (New York: Sony Music Entertainment, 2006). 4

 Martin Van Creveld, The Art of War (New York: Harper Collins Publisher, 2005), 37. 5

 United States. Department of Army, Field Manual 3-0: Operations (Washington, DC, 2001) 

7-3, table 7-1. 6

 See, for example, The U.S. Army Concept for the Human Dimension in Full Spectrum Operations 2015–2024 (TRADOC, June 11, 2008), available at http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/

p525-3-7.pdf. 7

 Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War, Trans. Richard Crawley. Project Gutenberg, December 2004. 14 June 2008. http.//Gutenberg.org/etext/7142. 8

 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 

1971), 84. 9

 17 September 2006 Joint Publication 3-0 (all comparisons between the two models are based 

on this publication). 10 Van Creveld, 29.

11 COL Jeffrey G. Smith, Jr., V Corps White Paper, Battle Command Concept Derived from the 

Experiences of Operation Iraqi Freedom (Sep 2003), 9–10. 12 United States. Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5, Operations (Headquarters 

Department of the Army, 20 August 1982). 13 United States. Joint Staff, Joint Vision 2020 (Washington, DC, 2006), 8–26. 14 Tzu, III.3. 

15 John Keegan. The Mask of Command (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), 8. 16 Tzu, I.4.

17 Keegan, 103.

18 Keegan, 92.

19 Elizabeth Longford. Wellington: The Years of the Sword (New York: Konecky & Konecky, 

1969), 424. 20 Jeffrey G. Smith, Jr. The Literature of Disillusionment: Public War Correspondence from 

Waterloo to Khe Sanh (Dissertation, Princeton University, 1992), 87. 21 Debate over whether Wellington sufficiently recognized Prussia’s contribution to victory at 

Waterloo continues today. 22 Jim Michaels. “An Army colonel’s gamble pays off in Iraq,” USA Today, April 30, 2007.
 A Unified Field Theory for Full-Spectrum Operations 71

23 Tzu, V.9. 

24 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War. Trans. and Ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, 

NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 17. 25 Tzu, V.3. 

26 Van Creveld, 35. 

27 Tzu, V.3.

28 Tzu, VI.28.

29 An approach institutionalized by the Army’s recent change to TOE, authorizing such teams 

at Divisional and Corps HQs. 30 Smith, Literature, 81–94. 

31 Smith, Literature, 61–62. 

32 Keegan, 44. 33 Keegan, 134.

34 LTG(R) Jeffrey G. Smith. One-on-one meeting. Eyewitness account of the surrender of 

Japanese forces in China at the conclusion of World War II. 35 Joseph E. Persico. “World War I: Wasted Lives on Armistice Day.” Military History Quarterly

(Winter 2005). http://www.historynet.com. 36 Jay Winik, April 1865 (New York: Harper Perennial, 2001), 301–363. This final section describes the last few battles between Lee and Grant, their negotiations with regard for the terms of Lee’s 

surrender, and the actual ceremony of surrender. 37 Clausewitz, 7.

38 Van Creveld, 37 . 39 Sun Tzu, III.31. 40 FM 3.0, 7–1. 

41 Tzu, VII.31. 

42 Tzu, IV.16–19. 

43 Tzu, XII.18. 

44 Tzu, XII.19.

45 Van Creveld, 32. 

46 Keegan, 127.

47 Tzu, http://www.sonshi.com/sun1.html. 1999–2004. Sun Tzu: The Principals of Warfare 

“The Art of War, VII.19. 48 Van Creveld, 32. 49 Keegan, 40. 

50 Keegan, 136.

51 Longford, 485.

52 Albert Myer, A Manual of Signals: For The Use Of Signal Officers In The Field (Washington, 

DC, 1864), Part VIII. 53 Rebecca R. Raines, Getting the Message Through (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1996), 21. 54 Myer, Part VIII. 

55 Raines, 29.

56 Barry R. McCaffrey. “Visit Iraq and Kuwait 5–11 December 2007” (USMA: Department of 

Social Sciences), 7.

73

Chapter 3

Navy Operations to 

Achieve Military Power 

in Cyberspace: A Draft 

Concept for Navy Computer 

Network Operations

Michael A. Brown

The essential elements of national power have been characterized as 

diplomatic, information, military and economic in order to relate 

them to the primary means by which nations, groups, and people 

orient and order themselves in the real world. Governments have devoted 

substantial research and analysis to understanding if and how national 

power can be characterized in the ill-defined, complex, physical/virtual 

world of cyberspace. The United States Government and the Department 

of Defense have sought such understanding, and the National Military 

Strategy for Cyberspace Operations (NMS-CO) received the Secretary’s 

approval in December 2006 as the basis for more substantive, operational 

work. Within DOD, the Services have been framing references and building concepts under which they can organize, train, and equip the forces to 

deliver military power in cyberspace. In the United States Navy, the doctrinal constructs of information operations (IO) and Computer Network 

Operations (CNO) have become the framework for empowering Sailors to 

achieve our nation’s military objectives in cyberspace. The Navy has prepared a draft concept for CNO as an ordered, sustainable maritime means 

of realizing military power in cyberspace. That draft concept forms the 

remainder of this paper for the National Defense University.

The Navy has four years of success in organizing, training, and 

equipping forces for CNO. The ubiquitous expansion of globally distributed information networks now challenges us to accelerate the develop-
74 BROWN

ment, deployment, and employment of full-spectrum CNO forces to fulfill 

Naval, Joint, and Commanders’ requirements, as well as national requirements, for information dominance in all phases of conflict. The Navy’s 

CNO forces work at the cutting edge of exploitation, attack, and defense of 

global information networks. With these forces, operating under a Maritime Headquarters/Maritime Operations Center (MHQ/MOC) or Joint 

Task Force (JTF), we will detect and defeat network threats; defend against 

them; find and attack adversaries throughout the information environment; and help shape and influence with traditional Naval forces. Navy 

CNO will be access-driven based on persistent 24x7x365 presence in the 

network and robust capabilities for exploitation, defense and attack.

Why Navy CNO Matters

The nature of military operations has radically changed since 1990. 

In a world of distributed information networks, built on proliferating 

information technologies, individuals, businesses, non-state entities, and 

governments now process and disseminate terabytes of information across 

the globe instantaneously. Traditional boundaries between military and 

civilian infrastructures are blurred. Point-to-point radio frequency (RF), 

terrestrial and satellite communications, RADAR, sensors, and control 

devices are networked together into a sophisticated global network of information providers and information users. 

Never before has mankind enjoyed so much rapid access to data 

and knowledge via a single medium. This information explosion presents 

enormous challenges to operating forces charged with defending national 

interests and advancing U.S. policy. Conversely, because adversaries operate (or strive to operate) in the same environment, U.S. forces possess unprecedented opportunities to shape and control the battlespace to achieve 

national objectives. Thus, CNO is a core Naval mission.

Most U.S. kinetic weapons are fully integrated into networks and 

are accounted for in network-centric operations (NCO). Those that are 

not are scheduled for replacement or upgrades to enable such employment. The Tactical Tomahawk (TACTOM) AN/BGM-109E exemplifies 

an NCO-enabled weapon that receives pre-flight targeting data from national, operational, and tactical command centers and real-time in-flight 

updates from multiple sensors (aircraft, unmanned platforms, satellite, 

and personnel in the field, tanks, and ships). Equipped with onboard sensors, the TACTOM is also capable of sending sensor data and status information back to feed common operating pictures. If an adversary became 
 Navy Operations to Achieve Military Power in Cyberspace 75

able to block or manipulate targeting, guidance, or command and control 

data to turn the TACTOM against U.S. forces or civilian populations, the 

enormous advantages of employing such NCO-enabled kinetic weapons 

in an information-dependent environment could become a severe liability. 

The need for information superiority to prepare, employ, and protect an 

NCO-enabled kinetic/non-kinetic campaign is real and immediate. As 

our potential adversaries apply the same technology and network-centric 

strategy to their command and control and weapons systems, information 

superiority provides real asymmetric advantages.

Successful IO is a vital foundation for joint and naval warfare when 

they contribute directly to information superiority to reduce risk in other 

lines of operation. CNO is one of five functional areas of IO and is a 

powerful contributor to information superiority. It is also a key element 

of modern warfare. The Navy has more than four years experience in 

planning and executing CNO during joint operations. From actions that 

contribute to finding, fixing, and capturing high-value targets, to those 

that help shape the battlespace during all phases of conflict, the Navy 

must remain well-prepared to lead DOD in establishing and maintaining 

information dominance.

Multiple elements are critical to the success of CNO, including: 

initial target intelligence, access, target development, weapon or tool development/certification, cyber counter intelligence, rules of engagement, 

and reporting processes. Historically, the most challenging element has 

been gaining access to target networks. The Navy aligns CNO forces in an 

access-based model, postured to engage threats at all levels of operation in 

any phase of conflict. Access is achievable through multiple means: the RF 

spectrum proximity, IP-based networks, and physical connections. When 

access and knowledge of an operational target are matched with certified 

weapons and operators, the commander may be confident that this precise 

targeting will achieve the desired effects. In addition to enabling offensive 

action, access increases our ability to recognize and identify adversary 

capabilities and methodologies and to counter attempts to limit or counteract U.S. presence in the information environment. 

Computer Network Operations Processes

Well-planned, access-based CNO provides critical U.S. advantage 

across global networks. CNO actions are computer network exploitation (CNE) for permanent and scalable presence in global networks that 

provides the foundation for successful CNO; computer network defense 

(CND) for detecting and defeating threats; and computer network attack 
76 BROWN

(CNA) for denying adversaries any advantage in the network environment. CNO provides national decisionmakers and tactical commanders 

the information and freedom of action necessary to maintain strategic, 

operational, and tactical advantage in the information environment.

The Navy organizational construct enables synchronization of CNO 

activities, and requires Navy CNO forces to satisfy tactical, operational, 

and strategic objectives from sensor to weapon to effects assessment. 

MHQ/MOC will identify CNO requirements based on Combatant Commander tasks and plans and execute them in synchronization with national and joint warfare commanders.

Dependable CNO requires interactive, long-term contact with adversaries and full-time presence in the global network environment across 

physical domains. Creating and maintaining these accesses enable threat 

profiling, target development, adaptive weapon development (to react to 

changes in the target), and, when necessary, offensive operations. Forward-deployed naval forces provide unique target access. However, longterm deployed operations to maintain and expand these accesses may not 

be practical or sustainable. It is essential that tactical CNO capabilities (in 

aircraft, ships, submarines, expeditionary, and unmanned forces) be ready 

to enable, via CNO reach-back, fully-staffed Navy shore commands (such 

as our Navy Information Operations Commands NIOCs) to take over 

exploitation and execute CNO via access points achieved through tactical 

presence and action. This requirement reinforces the need for cross-platform, network-enabled CNO capabilities employed by the widest possible 

range of Navy forces and linked back to shore facilities.

Conversely, shore-based commands must also be able to push access 

forward to an operational or tactical unit that is equipped to expand such 

access for theater and national operations. This reciprocal access development capacity is critical for the synchronization of CNO with theater 

operational plans and bringing CNO in phase with the Combatant Commander’s battle rhythm.

Given pervasive threats in the information environment, and our 

military’s increasing dependence on networked operations, defense must 

often be the first consideration. Informed and warned by energetic CNE, 

Navy CND operators will actively defend U.S. networks against a wide 

array of threats by fusing all-source intelligence, network attack analysis. 

and known threat profiles to identify threat indicators and develop defense 

strategies to counter adversary attempts to degrade Naval operations. 

CND operators will apply the full range of CNO analytic methodologies in 

providing defense in depth. 
 Navy Operations to Achieve Military Power in Cyberspace 77

CND operators analyze network anomalies through counterintelligence operations, open-source information, and Red and Blue team 

vulnerability assessments (VA). Assessments orient results to intelligence 

products, including those from CNE, to identify threat patterns of operation, capabilities, intentions, and true points of origin. If these operators 

detect a compromise, they will employ in-depth diagnostics to identify 

“electronic fingerprints” and profile the threat and scope. Although passive collection at network management centers can determine some identifying information, cuing and engagement of CNO forces for precise and 

direct exploitation of adversary network activity will push U.S. network 

defense beyond the firewall. Such network activities may include CNA to 

enable CNE and CND, active defense techniques that require deconfliction with other activities and physical interdiction of adversary network 

operations. By synchronizing Navy CNE, CNA and CND capabilities, we 

will shift from a react/report/repair response to an active prove/predict/

prepare defense. Success is possible only if CNE, CNA and CND are 

planned and executed as an integrated effort in a command and control 

structure that compliments National and Joint operations centers.

To achieve synchronization, the Navy will leverage the global access 

provided by our NIOCs, Naval Cyber Defense Operations Command 

(NCDOC), and forward forces to recognize and monitor adversaries, 

create new access points, profile threats. and plan and execute IO from 

the maritime domain. The Navy will coordinate with national and joint 

partners to operationalize network access for the execution of national, 

joint and naval CNO courses of action (COA). In this expanded, scalable, 

access-based environment, CNO is more demanding and dependent upon 

specialized forces, tailored access, and integrated command and control.

The sum of CNO processes is the end-to-end cycle of capability 

development, employment, and assessment. Each step in the cycle is described below.

Capability Development

Navy CNO research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) is 

centralized to respond to operational and tactical commanders’ defensive 

and offensive requirements. The Navy will leverage internal and external 

partnerships to build widely applicable solutions. By centralizing RDT&E 

efforts, the Navy minimizes duplication of effort and applies a holistic 

perspective of technology across global regions (in response to commercial technology proliferation, among other trans-regional concerns). 

Vulnerability analysis on both technology and target network topologies 
78 BROWN

provides the foundation to build hardware and software (HW/SW) solutions to satisfy commanders’ operational objectives. Although the core of 

capabilities development will be centralized, weaponization will occur at 

NIOCs as necessary to achieve specific operational objectives. 

Capability Tailoring

NIOCs will have the lead, and NCDOC will provide iterative data 

regarding Navy network processes and technical configurations for fratricide review. Sailors will take the HW/SW solutions provided by the 

RDT&E effort and weaponize them for use within appropriate target domains. This weaponization process includes tailoring the HW/SW to the 

target network(s) and verifying that it is conformed to and interoperable 

with access method(s). The verification process validates that the capability is effective against the target network. The certification process ensures 

that the operator and the weapon can deliver the desired effect to support 

COA objectives. 

Operations

The specific aspects of CNO will require specialized operations, but 

the dependence on global persistent access remains the same. Specific 

considerations follow:

CNE

Intelligence preparation of the environment (IPE) and access development are ongoing operations. We will invest people and resources 

against high-profile targets that provide the best opportunities for national, joint and maritime operations. CNE operations will be critical 

throughout the operational cycle to develop target expertise, measure 

effectiveness of operations, and conduct battle damage assessment (BDA). 

CNE sailors will be trained to conduct both CNA and active defense as 

operationally appropriate. 

CNA

The Navy will task organize to meet the requirements of national, 

joint and maritime Commanders. For instance, Navy cyber attack teams 

(NCAT) are flexible and scaled to fulfill mission objectives and skill requirements. NCATs will be either virtually or physically aligned with the 

Maritime Component Commander to provide planning, capabilities expertise, access, and attack operations. The NCAT will create access and/or 

leverage access points already developed through CNE. The ultimate goal 

of the NCAT is to deliver capabilities via access points to achieve opera-
 Navy Operations to Achieve Military Power in Cyberspace 79

tional effects including: denial, degradation, disruption, and/or destruction of network/critical nodes; manipulation of information or information paths; injection or projection of information; and tracking and tracing 

of adversary operations. However, we must not simply rely on NCATs as 

the organizing principle, but look to regularize and operationalize wherever we have capability and capacity. 

CND

The Navy must be able to detect, usurp, and counter all on-network 

threats. The fusion of network analysis, a clear understanding of adversary 

activity, and detailed forensics are required before covert activity against 

the U.S can be detected and countered. Threats to U.S. information systems are dynamic and rapidly evolving. Agile and flexible intelligence 

becomes critical for early warning and enables sailors to counter threats in 

advance. NCDOC is the Navy’s primary command responsible for CND, 

but to evolve from reactive to predictive defense, the Navy must synchronize CNE and CND operations to characterize the threat while leveraging 

all-source intelligence for cues to adversary intent. Through the combined 

efforts of CND, CNE and CNA operations, the Navy will implement an 

active defense strategy that can counter both initial activity and retaliatory 

moves and continually improve the network defensive architecture. 

Analysis

Although understanding the technical aspects of an adversary’s networks and their capabilities are two primary objectives, understanding 

the human, cultural, and procedural factors that govern the adversary’s 

command and control (C2) are equally important. Initial analysis, target 

development (TD) and post-operations analysis are interlinked. They must 

share the same regional and technical analysts. TD sailors will possess indepth target knowledge critical for developing concepts to deliver IO effects 

through Navy CNO. This team will fuse information derived from opensource information and all-source intelligence to visualize adversary networks and determine their capability to impact U.S. military operations. 

Planning

IO planners are directly responsible for achieving Commanders’ effects by integrating network-targeting priorities into mission task orders 

(e.g., air tasking order, integrated tasking order), while simultaneously addressing counter-targeting strategies to defend network-centric weapons, 

C2 and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). Navy IO planners incorporate CNO courses of action into adaptive planning processes 
80 BROWN

(e.g., OPLANs and CONPLANs) and theater guidance, while providing 

specialized support to operational commanders whenever crisis planning 

is initiated. Planners synchronize CNO initiatives with air, land, sea, and 

special operations to attain naval, joint, national, and multi-national objectives. When an NCAT is activated, CNO planners provide expertise in 

the strike planning cell to ensure CNO plans are fully coordinated with all 

warfare commanders. Operational planners will leverage partnerships to 

enhance target development, indications and warning (I&W) and BDA. 

Navy CNO Alignment 

Navy CNO personnel will be integrated at all levels of command to 

provide unique expertise to the mission accomplishment of the assigned 

command. Whether they are at OPNAV conducting programming and 

developing policy and strategy or planning with national and joint warfighters, Navy CNO forces will be trained and ready to advise on the full 

range of IO options. 

Strategic Support 

National partners will have organic Navy assets assigned, augmented 

by the NIOC aligned to them. This partnership will allow for a mutually 

beneficial relationship to enhance naval CNO capabilities, while providing 

a ready force for the broad scope of tasks assigned to the national agencies. 

Through strategic partnerships, the Navy will leverage dual-use, nationaltactical access points and capabilities to meet requirements. This strategy 

maximizes resources to engage in an ongoing, synchronized campaign for 

conducting CNO end-to-end. 

Operational Support 

Through the fleet information operations centers (FIOCs), Naval 

Network Warfare Command (NNWC) will deliver direct support (DIRSUP) CNO personnel to operational commanders tasked with CNO 

planning and execution. Navy CNO capabilities will be task-organized 

and scoped for the assigned mission. It may be a single CNO professional 

DIRSUP to a ship, airplane or submarine. It may be a full NCAT vulnerability assessment (VA) team, or regional target planning and capabilities 

experts.

MHQ/MOCs will also receive augmentation for planning and execution of IO, including CNO. NNWC will be responsible for building and 

managing Naval networks and CND through the NCDOC, which has 

special responsibility to the Navy for protecting naval networks and representing the health of those networks to joint commanders.
 Navy Operations to Achieve Military Power in Cyberspace 81

Tactical Support 

Tactical assets will enable access to high-profile targets to meet Navy 

and national priorities. Similarly, Navy assets will weaponize national access points to meet JFMCC operational goals. CNO will be conducted 

where it makes the most sense operationally to maintain persistent access, maximize effect to target, and prevent disruption of U.S. sensor-toshooter-to-sensor paths. CNO forces will also be embedded in tactical 

units, such as Naval Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) and NSW 

teams, provided through a mix of organic assets and DIRSUP augmentation from the FIOCs. This investment will be a critical contribution to 

NSW’s find, fix, and capture/kill strategy.

Implementation Actions

While a full implementation plan is not the focus of this vision paper, 

it is important to recognize the major actions that must be taken to realize 

this vision.

Policy and Doctrine: Implement CNO Policy and Doctrine to Enable 

CNO Alignment

OPNAV N3IO, NNWC and Naval Warfare Development Center 

(NWDC) will develop policy and direct doctrine development, to include 

tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) that integrate, synchronize, and 

deconflict CND, CNE, and CNA. This policy and doctrine must enable 

precise, repeatable CNO in an ever-changing information environment 

through rapid fielding of advanced capabilities. Policy and doctrine will 

also enhance training and mission effectiveness and improve resource 

allocation efficiency. Policy and doctrine enable effective command and 

control, mission synchronization, sailor training, and target development. 

Operations: Execute Effective Computer Network Operations

Command and control (C2) 

The NIOC structure enables Navy CNO forces to transition seamlessly between Navy joint and national missions. Maritime commanders can leverage co-located national and Navy CNO forces at NIOCs to 

achieve Navy objectives while also fulfilling national requirements. Benefits of this force partnership are:

◗ increased CNO access opportunities,

◗ shared national and tactical CNO target development,

◗ improved Battle Damage Assessment,
82 BROWN

◗ shared CNA/CND/CNE physical infrastructures, tools, and techniques,

◗ improved CNA/CND/CNE planning and operations deconfliction,

◗ improved training and certification of personnel.

OPNAV N3IO and NNWC will collaborate to develop a C2 architecture to ensure that CNO forces have the authority to conduct timesensitive operations and deconflict those operations with national and 

joint missions focused at the NIOCs. NNWC will pursue clear alignment 

of CNO authorities and clear rules of engagement that enable mutual satisfaction of Navy, joint, and national objectives. 

Alignment of C2 must enable NIOCs to conduct CNO in support of 

Navy, joint and national objectives as forces TACON to their associated 

JFMCC; as a force provider conducting CNE or target development under 

national authorities; or as the execution element for USSTRATCOM Joint 

Force Maritime Component Commander JFMCC (that is, NNWC) CNO 

tasking.

Planning

United States Fleet Forces Command (USFFC) and NNWC will train 

Navy IO planners in CNO capabilities and TTP so they can coordinate 

Navy CNO efforts as an integral part of the adaptive operational planning 

cycle. 

Networks

NNWC will plan, deliver, and operate networks with security as a primary design factor. NNWC will coordinate with RDT&E centers to use the 

latest technology to develop automated mapping tools. They will have the 

availability, confidentiality, and integrity suitable for a weapons system.

Access

NNWC will develop persistent logical or physical access to targeted 

networks.

Network Awareness

NNWC will train IO forces to conduct network mapping and target 

development as part of CNO. These operations will facilitate understanding of potential adversarial networks, lay the groundwork for future missions, and provide sailors with opportunities to build their technical skills 

and cultural awareness. NNWC should coordinate with ONI to identify 

all-source intelligence products that refine and complement these onnetwork efforts. 
 Navy Operations to Achieve Military Power in Cyberspace 83

Tool and Weapons Building 

NNWC will build the process to efficiently move tools from the 

RDT&E centers to the NIOCs for weaponization and use. This process 

will ensure partnering with national agencies through the NIOC structure 

to leverage unique capabilities to meet Navy, Joint and national objectives. 

It is imperative that CNO Sailors be collocated with national forces at the 

NIOCs to speed weaponization and use based on tailored access and deep 

technical and cultural understanding of targets. 

People: Deliver Cyber Forces with the Right Skills and Target 

Knowledge to Execute CNO Mission Objectives

CNO Workforce

USFFC and NNWC will ensure that Sailors remain the premier CNO 

force in DOD. information warfare (IW) officers (1610/6440/7440) and 

cryptologic technicians (CT) must have the skills to analyze threats, write 

and evaluate requirements, gain access, develop targets, design weapons, 

plan strikes/counter strikes, and execute courses of action (COA). IW 

Officers and CTs must also understand how to employ CNO capabilities 

through RF and physical access. 

Information warfare officers must be trained in both planning and 

execution and have the technical expertise necessary for access, target, and 

weapon development. They also must be able to lead sailors with in-depth 

target expertise to develop CNO COAs. 

Cryptologic technicians (networks) (CTNs) must be the Navy’s CNO 

professionals and be able to work closely with information technicians at 

network management centers. CTNs’ specialized skills must be applicable 

to CNA, CNE, and CND. NNWC will move quickly to provide these specialized, highly technical sailors with an innovative and rewarding career 

path.

Cryptologic technicians (collection) (CTRs) and cryptologic technicians (technical) (CTTs) are critical members of the target development 

team who will analyze how CNO can affect the performance of adversary 

C2 networks. NNWC will train these sailors in CNO fundamentals so that 

they can best apply their technical abilities to enable integrated IO. 

Cryptologic technicians (interpretive) (CTI) are critical for content 

analysis required before, during, and after CNO. NNWC must train these 

sailors in CNO fundamentals so they can best apply their language skills, 

regional expertise, and cultural awareness to enable integrated IO.
84 BROWN

Training, Education, and Certification

NNWC and Center for Information Dominance (CID) will enable 

education, training, and certification across all aspects of CNO, emphasizing the cooperative and integrated nature of CND, CNE, and CNA. 

Training will ensure that operational experiences reinforce technical skills 

against specific target sets throughout each sailor’s career. Training and 

certification should include cultural awareness, employment of technology, best practices, and adversary TTPs and mindsets.

OPNAV N3IO will lead work with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the other Services, and strategic partners to centralize CNO 

standard development and decentralize certification authorities. NNWC 

will work with other operational commanders to enable distributed training and certification at CNO-capable NIOCs, using all appropriate service, 

joint, and national education and training. 

Technology: Develop Capabilities to Plan and Execute CNO Courses 

of Action

Navy RDT&E organizations will continue to aggressively exploit 

current and future technologies and techniques to develop innovative capabilities and accesses to provide full-spectrum CNO effects at the lowest 

possible classification. This is accomplished through a centralized effort 

that leverages strategic partnerships, acquisition authorities, and organic 

development efforts to reduce duplication of effort and provide a variety 

of effects-based capabilities across targets and technologies. 

To maximize the return on investment for personnel and resources, 

the Navy’s CNO capability and access development occurs on three parallel axes:

◗ Leverage existing and future partnerships to apply National, Joint, 

and Service developed capabilities and accesses to address warfighter requirements in the Navy mission areas;

◗ Contract with industry experts to develop new capabilities and accesses to meet National, Joint, and Navy requirements;

◗ Indigenously develop CNO capabilities and access methods to 

meet maritime requirements.

NNWC will fill key development and influence billets in national 

agencies and joint organizations and will partner with other services to 

share capabilities at the earliest stage of development. NNWC will leverage 

streamlined acquisition authorities and rapid prototyping to develop new 

and innovative network capabilities and access methods.
 Navy Operations to Achieve Military Power in Cyberspace 85

Summary

As the Navy operates in a network-centric environment, we must 

rapidly organize, train and equip for CNO. The global landscape is filled 

with rapidly evolving networks. Navy CNO must evolve as fast or faster. 

The Navy must capitalize on its experience and talents and prepare sailors 

and capabilities for daily, sustained CNO.

Navy CNO sailors will be a new class of warrior, fully equipped with 

CNO weapons to serve alongside those who conduct surface, air, subsurface, and expeditionary warfare, from a vantage unique in the maritime 

domain and with combat skills commensurate with the risks they will 

overcome.

Through CNO the Navy will detect, defend against, and defeat adversaries in the information environment. As technology advances, this 

vision must evolve. As we implement this vision and capitalize on our past 

successes, we will depend upon our information warfare component to lead 

full-spectrum CNO, fully aligned with naval, joint, and national priorities, 

requirements, policy and doctrine to achieve information dominance.

Chapter 4

The Air Force in 

Cyberspace: Five Myths of 

Cyberspace Superiority 

Forrest B. Hare and Glenn Zimmerman 

I

n 2005, the Secretary of the Air Force revised the U.S. Air Force mission statement to recognize that cyberspace is a key domain for the 

warfighter today, along with air and space.1

 The mission statement 

now reflects Air Force recognition of cross-domain interdependence and 

emphasizes a commitment to deliver dominant options for the United 

States not only through air and space, but also through the domain created 

from the electro-magnetic environment: cyberspace.

To help frame the Air Force way ahead in this domain, the Secretary 

and Chief of Staff of the Air Force established a Cyberspace Task Force. 

The next step is to communicate that the way to achieve cyberspace superiority is by holding our adversaries at risk in the domain, ensuring freedom of action for friendly forces, and exploiting the resulting advantage to 

its fullest potential for cross-domain dominance. 

It is helpful, first, to identify what cyberpower and superiority are 

not. therefore, this chapter describes five common myths encountered by 

the Cyberspace Task Force. Some myths arise from a simple lack of understanding of our capabilities and vision; some represent rationalizations 

to justify misallocation of scarce resources; and some are red herrings 

presented to promote agendas and protect resources. In all cases, myths 

hinder efforts to build a robust warfighting capability in the cyberspace 

domain. The chapter then explains why achieving cyberspace superiority 

is a prerequisite to cross-domain dominance. 

Five Myths: What Cyberspace Superiority Is Not

The Cyberspace Task Force has encountered five myths repeatedly. 

This section explains why each of these myths is false. 

87
88 HARE AND ZIMMERMAN 

Myth No. 1: “Dual-Hatting” 

Myth No. 1 is that, because the technical skills are the same, it is advantageous to “dual-hat” the intelligence collector or information service 

provider as the lead cyber warrior. This myth is false for two reasons. First, 

dual-hatting is not effective when the tasks may compete for priority and 

advocacy. In the case of dual-hatting the intelligence collector, the competition is the traditional one of intelligence gain/loss. In all operational 

scenarios, the final authority on intelligence gain/loss is the operational 

commander, who alone must accept the potential risks. However, if the 

authority also has the role of intelligence collector, the tendency will be to 

avoid any operations jeopardizing collection activities. This conflict will 

be exacerbated in a large organization. Even if the leader accepts the dualhatted responsibility, the staff, which is devoted to collection, will tend to 

impede all other effects-producing operations. 

There is also inherent conflict between the role of cyber-warrior and 

that of information service provider. Service provision implies the imperative to counter threats to the network. Since the responsibility for protecting the network normally lies with the information service provider, 

the latter will most often emphasize ensuring service availability, while 

downplaying threats, due to a lack of tangible impacts. This imbalance is 

reinforced when the operational commander lacks an understanding of 

the potential operational impact of threats, but pressures the information 

service provider to ensure information availability at all costs. Though the 

threats and their operational impact on mission accomplishment may be 

difficult to quantify, the service provision decision should still be subject to 

an “information service gain/loss” evaluation. There may actually be times 

when incomplete or suspect information is preferable to no information, 

but the final “service gain/loss” decision must be made by the operational 

commander, who is ultimately responsible for the success of the operation. 

He or she must understand the trade-offs, and must accept the risks. 

Second, possession of technical skills is an important foundation, 

but not automatically equivalent to possession of warfighting skills. Just as 

we would not send an aeronautical engineer straight from the lab bench 

to lead a four-ship of bomber aircraft over Baghdad, we should not expect 

the computer-science engineer to be prepared for the cyber fight, just 

because he or she understands networks. The abilities required to be a 

warfighter are not the same as the engineering skills obtained in school or 

the lab. Computer network exploitation experts may be excellent analysts 

and engineers who understand ways to defeat the adversary, but they must 
 The Air Force in Cyberspace 89

also grasp issues such as integration with other operations, translating 

effects to tasks, collateral damage estimation, weaponization, standardization, combat assessment, and laws of armed conflict. Cyber attack is not a 

mouse click away from computer network exploitation, and characterizing 

it as such is dangerous and reduces the commander’s confidence it will be 

done right. It requires specific training for the actual task. 

Myth No. 2: “Nature of the Domain” 

Myth No. 2 is that the domain is a “virtual” one characterized by the 

Internet. This might be a convenient label for teenagers, but it has proven 

costly to the Department of Defense. General Ronald Keys, USAF, commander of the Air Combat Command (COMACC), discussed issues arising in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan:

We have to have more visibility of what’s going on and where. Right 

now we don’t. We didn’t anticipate there was going to be this level 

of jamming.... At the same time, we’ve got people trying to listen 

[to insurgent conversations], a lot of it on the same or overlapping 

frequencies.2

The cyberspace domain encompasses far more than the Internet and 

is anything but virtual. It is not a mere “cognitive concept,” although it 

transcends and often links the other physical domains to our perception 

of what occurs around us. In the cyberspace domain, the electromagnetic 

environment is the maneuver space. The domain is a physically manifested 

space with closed or wired segments as well as free space segments. Just as 

the boundaries between air and space may sometimes be blurred, cyberspace can occur within the other physical domains. If we do not recognize 

cyberspace as a physical domain—occurring wherever we interlink the 

electro-magnetic spectrum (EMS) and electronic systems—we allow for 

seams and access points where the adversary can hold us at risk. As described by General Keys above, we also risk committing fratricide as we try 

to conduct operations in the domain without understanding it correctly.

Recognizing cyberspace as a physical domain can improve our ability 

to develop and field capabilities that operate in and through the domain, 

expanding the opportunities to execute influence operations. However, 

influence operations—that is, the planning and execution of operations 

with the intent to affect cognition—can be executed across all the physical 

domains and should be effectively integrated with all operations in all the 

physical domains. Thus, they should not be linked with the cyberspace domain any more closely than with the others. Such an unnecessary linkage 
90 HARE AND ZIMMERMAN 

confuses operational planners and leads to a sub-optimal organization of 

capabilities at the operational and tactical level. For example, when there 

are limited seats at the strategy table, the cyberwarrior may be tagged to 

be the “deception rep.” However, there is no reason to believe that a person 

trained in cyberspace operations is any more capable of being a deception 

planner than a tank driver or logistician would be.

Myth No. 3: “Fight from One Location” 

Myth No. 3 is that the battle to achieve cyber superiority in any conflict can be fought from one location having independent, full situational 

awareness. Cyberspace is an extremely dynamic domain. Critical vulnerabilities and centers of gravity (COGs) can shift at the speed of light. Points 

of access into adversary systems can open and close in seconds. Although 

the United States is linked extensively through the inter-connected portion 

of the domain, operations in this segment may comprise only a fraction of 

the fight against many potential enemies to dominate cyberspace. 

For example, much of the adversaries’ use of cyberspace can only be 

held at risk by capabilities operating in the line-of-sight of radio networks 

and closed battlefield command networks, in the footprint of satellites, 

with human-enabled access, or within the range of future, high-powered, 

energy wave devices. Capabilities must not only be expeditionary, they 

must be flexible, adaptable, and integrated with the rest of the operational 

fight. The necessary level of situational awareness cannot be achieved independent of regional operations. Although a cyberwarfare commander 

may have command and control (C2) capabilities that can create effects 

globally from a single location, the C2 mechanism must be linked with 

other operations globally to achieve the necessary situational awareness. 

It is true that the global nature of the fight in cyberspace may sometimes require a central coordinating element to integrate global operations 

and ensure proper allocation of low-density, high-demand assets to tactical 

operations. The nature of many attacks in cyberspace, and the ability for 

the adversary to conduct those attacks at many locations simultaneously, 

make it imperative to improve global situational awareness and to be able 

to respond to those attacks globally via the most effective means. 

Myth No. 4: “Control of Cyber Weapons” 

Myth No. 4 is that effects of cyber weapons are difficult to control. 

This is not nuclear warfare; we have in fact been conducting cyberwarfare 

with cyber weapons for many decades. Cyberwarfare with decidedly noncyber weapons (e.g., a pair of scissors cutting telegraph lines) goes back 
 The Air Force in Cyberspace 91

much farther. Even with the development of computer network attack 

capabilities, the targeting and collateral damage issues are analytically no 

different than issues of explosive or kinetically destructive means. 

All combat operations have potentially cascading effects. If we drop 

a bomb on a hydro-electric power facility, or destroy an electrical transformer yard, the impact can cascade to many different systems. In some 

instances, this is the exact intent of the attack. It is even possible that an 

activity that we do not intend to affect, such as telephone service to a 

hospital, may be degraded by shutting down power to a military target or 

destroying a communications link that serves the facility. In all instances, 

the potential unintended consequences must be considered with respect 

to proportionality and other laws of armed conflict considerations. The 

United States would never conduct a cyber attack without first exercising 

and developing the proper understanding of the effects, so that an informed operational decision could be made with the proper legal reviews. 

In other words, cyber weapons should be used in the same professional 

manner and with the same operational rigor with which we employ with 

all other conventional weapons. 

Myth No. 5: “Defense of the Domain”

Myth No. 5 is that increasing security at every node will allow for effective defense of the domain. While it is imperative that we improve the security of our networks and systems, this alone will not ensure friendly freedom 

of maneuver. If the adversary were intent on conducting multi-pronged 

attacks throughout the domain, we could be quickly overwhelmed. Physical 

security is dependent on cybersecurity, while cybersecurity is dependent on 

the systems that control our use of the domain. All of the networks are interdependent. We currently have problems ensuring that we do not inadvertently degrade or otherwise damage our own operations, even in the absence 

of concerted adversary attacks. We must begin to conduct real maneuver in 

the domain and be prepared to operate with degraded capabilities. There 

must be a coordinated effort across the entire joint team. 

Considering the multitude of connections created by each service 

operating in cyberspace, multiplied by several service or functional components, a well-secured segment might still be rendered ineffective if a weaker 

link in the joint chain is attacked. History is instructive here. After World 

War I, the French vowed to defend their shared border with Germany at all 

costs; unfortunately for them, the 1939 attack occurred through Belgium. 

The Air Force’s Constellation Net may be the securest section of the global 

information grid, but if the rest of cyberspace is left under-defended, we 
92 HARE AND ZIMMERMAN 

will only be able to communicate with ourselves. Even worse, we will only 

be inter-connected with a sub-set of ourselves. All of the non–Internet 

Protocol (IP) Air Force segments of the domain may still be “outside the 

Maginot Line,” or may provide a tunnel to get under the line. Assuming 

that the line will be breached and the adversary will be operating behind 

our defenses, we must be prepared to fight in a contested domain. Rapid 

reconstitution, redundancy, and maneuver will provide the means to remain effective. Taking lessons from the spring 2007 cyber attack in Estonia, 

we must plan to continue operations even when cyberspace is contested.3

We must be prepared to counter an attack in cyberspace, just as we do in 

the other domains. For example, we do not rely just on Patriot batteries 

to defend the airspace; the Air Force also must hunt down and neutralize 

the adversaries’ offensive air and missile capabilities. With this in mind, a 

robust ability to conduct maneuver and counter-attacks in cyberspace may 

become an effective deterrent in and of itself.

Finally, it is important to realize that we would not necessarily counterattack on American soil, just as we would not bomb the flight school in 

Florida that trained the 9/11 terrorists. We will take the fight to cyber attackers at a time and place of our choosing. Trying to respond on the same 

vector as that of the attack would be pointless. By the time the response 

occurred, the adversary would already have relocated to a different firing 

position in anticipation of the counter-battery fire. 

Cyberspace Superiority

Based on this understanding of what cyberspace is and is not, we 

now turn to the imperative of cyberspace superiority. Cyberspace operations and its roles, purposes, and relationships to other aspects of the Air 

Force mission, reflect two fundamental propositions. First, cyberspace is 

a COG for all aspects of national power spanning economic, financial, 

technological, diplomatic, and military capabilities of the United States. 

Second, cyberspace superiority is the prerequisite to effective U.S. military 

operations in all other warfighting domains. We explain these propositions in this section. 

Proposition 1: Cyberspace is a Center of Gravity 

Cyberspace is a COG for all aspects of national power spanning 

economic, financial, technological, diplomatic, and military capabilities. 

According to Clausewitz, a COG is “the hub of all power and movement 

on which everything depends.”4

 We have evolved from reliance on physical 

activities to convey information or conduct transactions, using pen and 
 The Air Force in Cyberspace 93

paper, hard currency, and the like; now we can move digital representations through cyberspace of both information and wealth. Thus, the importance of this domain has increased exponentially. Fifty years ago, the 

loss of access to cyberspace would have been an inconvenience to a few. 

Today, it could cause communication systems, financial markets, transportation, and power generation facilities to fail as they became isolated 

or corrupted. One might argue such systems are not fully automated, that 

they retain a human in the loop, but the great blackout on the East Coast 

in 2003 indicated just how little this might help. The human operators 

ignored the alarms and activated shutdowns that worsened the blackout 

and extended it far beyond where it would have occurred without human 

intervention. Thus, humans may be just as vulnerable as the automated 

system. There is no doubt, then, that cyberspace is a COG. 

Proposition 2: Cyberspace Superiority is Crucial 

It follows, then, that cyberspace superiority is a prerequisite to effective 

operations in all other warfighting domains. Without cyberspace superiority, hence, with loss of access to the Global Positioning System (GPS), precision munitions become mere dumb bombs, and command and control are 

crippled as communications become unreliable and unavailable. Without 

cyberspace superiority, military operations in all domains are at risk. Operations are degraded, with potentially severe consequences to the warfighter. 

Regardless of whether one is prepared to acknowledge that cyberspace 

is truly a warfighting domain, our adversaries have been operating there 

uncontested. They have successfully exploited the cyberspace domain repeatedly in a variety of contexts. For example, in the attack at Khobar Towers 

in June 1998, the attackers employed radio communications for coordination and radio frequency (RF) detonators for remote detonation of the 

explosives. On September 11, 2001, the attackers utilized a variety of online 

coordination including e-mail, Web sites, and file transfers. They had also 

trained virtually, through the use of commercial flight simulators. 

Current areas of emphasis in the ongoing cyberspace conflict include 

data collection, reconnaissance, and the online recruiting of potential terrorists. The cyber Jihad is growing in both influence and capability. Recent 

operations in Iraq exemplify this trend: insurgents employ RF systems to 

trigger improvised explosive devices (IEDs), while displaying the resulting mayhem in digital video across the airwaves and the web. Just as in air 

and space, it is imperative that we dominate the cyberspace domain. Due 

to the all-pervasive nature of this particular domain, mastering it presents 

new challenges. The emphasis placed by both traditional state actors and 
94 HARE AND ZIMMERMAN 

non-state entities on operations in cyberspace is a strong call to action for 

the United States to assert itself. 

Without cyberspace primacy, operations in all of the warfighting 

domains run risks. An example would be employing kinetic assets when 

non-kinetic cyber alternatives might have the same effect faster and with 

reduced risk of collateral damage. 

Cyberspace permits easy entry at low cost and can provide tremendous return with relatively little investment or resources, hence, offers 

unequaled ability to prosecute asymmetric warfare. Even a relatively poor 

nation or non-state actor can readily obtain the tools and access necessary 

to become a threat to the United States. By contrast, both air and space 

require substantial infrastructure and resource capabilities for even a marginal level of participation.

The very capabilities that allow the United States to dominate in air 

and space are those most at risk in the cyber realm. As a nation and as a 

military, we are heavily reliant on advanced technology to leverage a strategic and tactical advantage against our adversaries. The fundamental capability that brings us these advantages also makes us more vulnerable to cyber 

attack. Conversely, we have the opportunity to leverage our technological 

advantage not only to protect our own capabilities in the other domains, 

but also to expand our ability to attain superiority and dominance in cyberspace, if we can effectively counter an adversary’s cyber attacks. The nation 

must become capable of holding enemy COGs at risk through cyberspace, 

if necessary. These COGs will vary widely depending on the adversary’s 

level of development and extent of operations in the domain. For the more 

advanced adversary, areas of vulnerability will be much like our own—a 

significant infrastructure with electronic tendrils extending into many or 

all aspects of the society and the economy. Less developed and more erratic 

opponents will also be vulnerable, but typically tied more to a mobile ad hoc 

communications system, such as wireless local loop telephones or cellular 

communications, and little, if any, fixed cyberspace assets. 

Based on its importance to all our operations, achieving superiority in the cyberspace domain is a prerequisite for U.S. dominance across 

all the warfighting domains. While each of the warfighting domains 

represents a significant component of the overall battlespace, we cannot 

achieve victory without dominating across all three domains: air, space, 

and cyberspace. Air superiority, for example, cannot be achieved purely 

by air-based operations, but depends on intelligence and surveillance data 

obtained from space-based and air-breathing platforms, as well as targeting provided by GPS for both aircraft and precision-guided munitions. 
 The Air Force in Cyberspace 95

Similarly, future conflicts will depend on the cyberspace domain, as more 

and more of our combat capability operates within or from this domain. 

This transformational trend will be driven by a variety of factors, including technological development, the ever increasing costs, both direct and 

indirect, of air-breathing manned platforms, and public opinion regarding 

the consequences of kinetic attack with respect to collateral damage and 

noncombatant casualties. As cyberspace becomes ever more intrinsic to 

combat operations, it takes on increasing visibility and criticality to the 

overall cross-domain fight as well. 

Conclusion

To fully integrate and implement this transition to cyberspace superiority, we need to transcend paradigms entrenched in the purely kinetic 

traditions of warfare, and transform the force to achieve cross-domain 

dominance of air, space, and cyberspace. This is a transformational event 

in modern warfare no less dramatic than the leap from the concept of 

cross-domain attacks espoused by Billy Mitchell in Winged Defense to the 

combat reality of land and air in the Blitzkrieg a mere 14 years later.5

 Cyberspace is a complex domain where the Air Force has recently begun to 

acknowledge its roles to contribute to the national defense. Other Services, 

the Joint community and the larger national security field have also joined 

forces to chart the way ahead in cyberspace. Our nation’s leadership role 

in cyberspace is not assured. While some academic debates are important 

to ensure rigor in our analysis, we must swiftly move our Services, and 

the Nation, forward to maintain our leadership in the domain. We must 

separate the real issues from political agendas and overcome genuine 

misunderstanding of the task at hand. The next few years and our actions 

during that time will determine if we prove to be the masters in this new 

realm or merely an also-ran.

Notes1

 Master Sergeant Mitch Gettle, “Air Force Releases New Mission Statement,” Air Force Link, 

available at http://www.af.mil/news/story-asp?id=123013440. 2 Amy Butler, “Holistic Approach,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, January 22, 2007, 

46–47. 3

 “A Cyber Riot,” The Economist, May 10, 2007, available at http://www.economist.com/world/

europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=9163598. 4

 Carl von Clausewitz, On War (London: N. Trubner, 1873), 577–627. 5

 Billy Mitchell, Winged Defense (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1925). 

Chapter 5

Marine Corps Cyberspace 

in Support of MAGTF C2: 

By Many a Marine, With a 

Single Vision

John L. Cloninger

“The Marine Corps’ path to fully leverage Cyberspace’s potential will 

require continued diligence to ensure Net-Centric Enterprise Services 

interoperability, detailed data strategy development, and vigilance in 

maintaining a secure and trusted network environment. Realizing 

the full capabilities of such a Cyberforce requires an appropriately resourced plan embodying an appropriate spirit of transformation. My 

commitment: to leveraging joint capabilities in Cyberspace, to partnering fully in joint Cyberpower solutions, and to adopting effective 

information technology efficiencies in support of our Cyberstrategy 

and warfighting domains.”

Brigadier General George J. Allen, Director, Command, Control, 

Communications and Computer—C4 Headquarters, United States 

Marine Corps

S

eptember 11, 2001, soon after the initial horror, we knew who was 

behind it. To get the attackers, and ensure they did no more, we 

insisted the Taliban grant us access into Afghanistan to root out al 

Qaeda. They refused.

In November 2001, we sent a massive Naval Task Force off the coast 

of Pakistan, implementing a mission capability only envisioned a decade 

before. From carrier decks and amphibious assault ships, the Marines flew 

over Pakistan into Afghanistan onto a long-ago dried lake bed. Upon landing, the Marines secured the area, reinforced, and spread throughout the 

country. From 6,000 miles away, Brigadier General Robert Shea, USMC, 

97
98 CLONINGER

watched the scene unfold on SIPRNET Cyber Screens. BGen Shea, Senior 

C4 Marine, at the time Director, C4 Headquarters Marine Corps, was 

eventually to become Lieutenant General Shea, Joint Chiefs of Staff J-6. In 

his words, “10 years before [i.e., during Desert Storm] we could not have 

done this.”

He went on to explain (translated into 2007 cyber terminology for 

this summation) that though the leveraging of cyberspace always existed, 

leveraging cyberpower with 21st century technology on a grand integration of air, land, and sea operational, medical, logistical (fuel, food, munitions), intelligence, and administrative forces, all under a high-bandwidth 

network secure umbrella just had not been possible any earlier. Only technological advances in communication systems made this possible. “We 

could not have leaped thousands of Marines 800 miles across one country 

into an adjacent landlocked hostile one.” 

Not until then did we have, on a large scale, our command and control land, air, and sea operational and logistic capabilities so thoroughly 

integrated to allow continuous awareness, interface and interaction. This 

incredible event is easily arguable as the first major adaptation of what we 

now call cyber power to a core doctrine known as Marine Air-Ground 

Task Force Command and Control: MAGTF C2.

For the Marine Corps, cyberpower is primarily focused on supporting the needs of the Warfighting, Intelligence, Business, and Enterprise 

Management areas. Many organizations within the Marine Corps are 

working together to develop an integrated concept of cyberpower that 

includes many other elements, such as computer network attack (CNA), 

computer network defense (CND) and C4 net operations (NetOps) (which 

in itself could have a book dedicated to its cyberpower implementation: 

GIG enterprise management (GEM), GIG network defense (GND), and 

GIG content management (GCM)), but these efforts are beyond the scope 

of this discussion. In these areas, the Marine Corps seeks to leverage best 

practices from other organizations to seamlessly interoperate with other 

organizations. Where practical, it shapes its people, processes, and technology to imbue its warrior ethos and warfighting capabilities into traditional information technology, mission assurance, information assurance, 

and business management approaches. An example is beginning work to 

evolve Lean Six Sigma into Security Six Sigma. 

While the term may change in the future, the Marine Corps uses the 

term C4 (command, control, communications, and computers) for the 

cyberpower infrastructure that supports MAGTF C2. 
 MARINE CORPS CYBERSPACE IN SUPPORT OF MAGTF C2 99

MAGTF C2 is a core Marine Corps vision and concept that shapes 

its application of cyberpower. Understanding MAGTF C2 will bring the 

reader much closer to understanding where the Marine Corps is moving 

in the area of cyberpower. 

MAGTF C2: The Vision

“This Vision is intended to initiate the process of discussion, research, 

experimentation and development necessary to help us find new solutions to the Command and Control challenges of the 21st Century.”1

The commander’s ability to exercise his authority over assigned 

and attached forces to accomplish the mission is the primary objective of 

MAGTF C2.

The United States is currently engaged in a long-term, global conflict of competing wills and ideologies. As the premier expeditionary 

“Total Force in Readiness,” the Marine Corps requires a robust and secure 

command and control (C2) capability to leverage cyberpower across the 

cyberspace spectrum of joint and coalition military operations and to 

maximize the kinetic capabilities of Marine forces, thereby increasing 

strategic agility, operational reach, and tactical flexibility of the MAGTF 

and our coalition partners. 

Command and Control

Joint Publication 1-02, “DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated 

Terms,” defines C2 as “the exercise of authority and direction by a properly 

designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission.” 

From a Marine Corps cyberpower perspective, C2 consists of the 

means and methods by which a commander recognizes what needs to be 

done in any given situation, and then sees to it that appropriate actions are 

taken (MCDP 6). Further, the foundations of Marine Corps C2 are rooted in 

their warrior ethos and their warfighting philosophy of maneuver warfare. 

As the creation of MAGTF C2 evolves, the term “Command” will 

refer to all of the functionality that supports the commander’s contribution to the planning phase and the decision-making processes from 

pre-deployment planning to execution and redeployment. Regarding 

“Control,” MAGTF C2 envisions a process incorporating multiple technologies leveraging the vastness of cyberspace that captures feedback—the 

continuous flow of information about the unfolding situation returning 

to the commander—in all planning, execution and specified/implied re-
100 CLONINGER

porting functionality and imbeds it within the philosophy of command. 

Marine leaders will use MAGTF C2 systems to issue mission-type orders 

and commander’s intent, then exert control through improved situational 

awareness and shared understanding, enabling rapid collaborative maneuver, engagement and support. Marines acknowledge that the fog of war can 

never be eliminated, nor will any of us ever achieve perfect clarity or total 

knowledge superiority. Therefore, the intended effect of MAGTF C2 is 

decentralized execution that provides subordinates the latitude to accomplish assigned tasks in accordance with the commander’s intent. 

The commander’s ability to exercise authority over assigned and 

attached forces to accomplish the mission is the primary objective of 

MAGTF C2. MAGTF structure assures unity of command and facilitates 

the full integration of air, ground, and logistics operations in support of 

the commander’s overall mission. The challenge at this stage is that there 

is no single C2 cyberpower capability in place to facilitate the full potential 

of the MAGTF command structure. In the past, Marines have adopted 

individual stove-piped pieces to address individual functional areas, which 

then left to the commander the responsibility to splice them together. In 

the future, Marines will incorporate new technologies in a manner that 

will promote enhanced informed decisionmaking at appropriate echelons. 

The future command and control capability must evolve to a comprehensive approach to C2 that will enable any commander across the globe 

to leverage and focus not only MAGTF capabilities, but all elements of 

Marine Corps, naval, joint, national and multinational power. The future 

MAGTF C2 must enable decentralized decisionmaking that promotes taking advantage of fleeting battlefield opportunities. The Marine approach 

to C2 must enhance understanding of the commander’s intent, emphasize 

initiative of small units, and provide relevant displays that promote understanding throughout the MAGTF.

MAGTF C2: Strategy and Cyberstrategy, Process and System

MAGTF C2 is a strategy and a cyberstrategy, a process, and ultimately 

a system-of-systems by which the Marine Corps will develop current and 

future capabilities and programs in order to achieve net-centric operations 

and warfare (NCOW), and implement the FORCEnet Functional Concept 

of providing robust information sharing and collaboration capabilities. 

MAGTF C2 will support and enable joint, multinational, and interagency interoperability.
 MARINE CORPS CYBERSPACE IN SUPPORT OF MAGTF C2 101

Strategy and Cyberstrategy

MAGTF C2 is the strategy, with an associated C4 cyberstrategy, by 

which the Marine Corps will implement the Naval FORCEnet Functional 

Concept and is the functional and conceptual equivalent to the other Service net-centric concepts of LandWarNet (Army) and C2 Constellation 

(Air Force). The Marine Corps will be fully engaged with the development of the net-enabled command capability (NECC) effort to ensure that 

Marine Corps requirements are fully considered and to also ensure that 

Marine Corps programs align to this concept. The Marine Corps will engage in the development of command and control concepts with the other 

Services, on a service-to-service basis, to ensure interoperability between 

Services below the level that will be accomplished by NECC. Key will be 

the ability to engage in the joint arena, and to function effectively within 

the labyrinth of interdependencies that will exist. MAGTF C2 systems and 

the associated C4 cyberstrategies will also integrate with formal alliances, 

like NATO, and be able to facilitate “coalitions of the willing” as needed.

MAGTF C2 entails a truly interoperable Marine Corps C2 capability 

that is seamless, scalable, modular, and relevant across the full spectrum 

of military operations, from major theater war, to irregular operations, 

to humanitarian assistance operations. It is oriented around the Marine 

Corps C2 philosophy, is derived from the Naval FORCEnet Functional 

Concept, and is agnostic of the limited perspectives imposed by ground, 

air or logistics “formations.” It is a capabilities-based approach for the development of Marine Corps C2 that will be expeditionary in nature; will be 

fully capable in an austere forcible entry environment; and will enable joint 

task force capabilities from the seabase while being essentially transparent to the commander. Overall, MAGTF C2 provides the strategy needed 

to synchronize C2 requirements generation and acquisition in the force 

development process. Marine Corps cyberstratergy provides the needed 

infrastructure and capabilities to support these C2 requirements.

Process

As a process, MAGTF C2 constitutes an approach to commanding 

and controlling Marine forces that drives the creation of networked capabilities. Every node in the network—commander, staff, unit, riflemen, 

supporting organization, platform, piece of equipment or item—can be a 

producer, processor, and user of information, and all information must be 

readily available to any node without overloading or paralyzing any node 

with irrelevant information. Many of the nodes in the network will be required to perform multiple functions. Thus, the essence of MAGTF C2 is a 
102 CLONINGER

decentralized and highly adaptive form of command and control that uses 

the digital, global network to foster and exploit the human capacity for 

mutual understanding, implicit communication, and intuitive decisionmaking. The cumulative network effect achieved by organizing all nodes 

into an information-rich, collaborative, global network is expected to enhance these inherently human qualities.

MAGTF C2 enhances the ability of commanders at all levels to gain 

and maintain situational awareness, make decisions at an increased tempo, 

and exercise authority through commander’s intent and mission-type orders. It will facilitate planning and execution by providing the warfighter 

with distributive and collaborative planning tools, an accurate user-defined, fused common operational picture of the operational environment 

to facilitate more rapid decisionmaking through increased situational 

awareness, and shared understanding. The intent is to increase freedom of 

action and small unit initiative through decentralized C2, while minimizing the requirement for specified and implied linear control measures that 

limit the initiative of subordinates in a complex and increasingly ambiguous operational environment. 

In seeking to exploit the power of cyberspace, the Marines Corps is 

considering the potential needs levied by operations in an austere environment, or when temporarily disconnected from the network. All Marine 

operations must be equally capable of operating either within the global 

information grid (GIG), or without the benefit of its full range of services. 

As a result, it is critical in leveraging cyberspace to ascertain the proper 

balance between GIG services and organically deployable networking capabilities. The expansion of MAGTF C2, to include the non-warfighting 

or business operations of the Marine Corps, will likewise require greater 

exploitation of cyberspace: network, integration of additional processes, 

and vastly improved interoperability. The goal of the expanded C4 net 

operations (NetOps) processes that support MAGTF C2 will be to ensure 

that the entire Marine Corps and all of its supporting elements become 

nodes in the network that can share information seamlessly, thereby 

attaining the true, end-to-end capability fundamental to the future netcentric environment.

System-of-Systems

As a system, MAGTF C2 must constitute the adaptive, distributed 

network of commanders, staffs, operating units, supporting organizations, 

sensors, weapons and other C2 nodes interacting with one another over 

an underlying supporting information infrastructure, as well as the asso-
 MARINE CORPS CYBERSPACE IN SUPPORT OF MAGTF C2 103

ciated equipment communications, facilities, and personnel necessary to 

allow them to interact. The most important function of MAGTF C2 is to 

enhance the strategic agility, operational reach, and tactical flexibility of 

Marine Corps forces across the warfighting functions and cyberspace in 

support of naval and joint operations. To achieve this agility, and to lessen 

the doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, personnel, and 

facilities (DOTMLPF) impacts of migrating to MAGTF C2, Marines will 

align where appropriate with the NECC program.

C2 and Communication Systems

MAGTF C2’s vision is, unquestionably, locked into encompassing 

the cyber elements of communications and information technology, without which the vision of C2 cannot be achieved. A significant element of 

MAGTF C2 will track the cyberspace communications and network requirements needed to support C2 functions. Constant attention to current 

and emerging technologies will be required to ensure that commanders 

have the best possible cyberspace infrastructure within which to work. 

Marines envision the use of a cyberpower architecture and hardware that 

integrates software solutions that permit timely upgrades at reduced costs. 

The capabilities, requirements, architecture, process and material solutions 

will be developed with the complete integration of C2, communication 

systems, and information technology in mind. Agility is key—jokingly 

referred to as “Semper Gumby,” which translates to “Always Flexible.”

MAGTF C2 Implementation

In The Near-Term

MAGTF C2 will migrate to a fully integrated, cross-functional set 

of C2 capabilities that include forward-deployed as well as reachback capabilities, and the C4 infrastructure will grow and adapt to support these 

capabilities. As Marines pursue this goal, they will also examine other options, such as enhanced forward data storage that could free up significant 

portions of reachback-related bandwidth that could be better used for 

other aspects of warfighting. 

In The Mid-Term

MAGTF C2 will become an integrated C2 solution that will migrate 

the current multiplicity of stove-piped, disparate systems into an integrated system-of-systems that will support deployed aspects of Marine 

Corps C2 requirements from pre-deployment planning to execution and 

redeployment via multi-functional C2 nodes. Marines will accomplish this 
104 CLONINGER

in great measure through an increased reliance upon common hardware 

and software to reduce costs and minimize operations and training impact 

on the warfighter as updates are fielded. 

In The Far-Term

Marines envision that MAGTF C2 will be expanded and extended 

to include all elements of the Marine Corps global enterprise, to include 

business, garrison, and administrative C2 processes.

Timeframe For Implementation

Timeframe for MAGTF C2 implementation is from the present to 

2015. The approach, though, must comprise a full DOTMLPF solution set, 

to include the migration of MAGTF C2 systems in the near-term (FYDP), 

mid-term (FYDP plus five), and far-term (FYDP plus ten). The goal is 

to achieve a full, integrated MAGTF C2 capability by 2015, within the 

constraints of technology and funding. But, in contrast, a focused sense of 

urgency must pervade all aspects of the Marines “C2 Harmonization” effort 

to achieve maximum MAGTF C2 integration as rapidly as possible.

MAGTF C2: The Harmonization

The Marine Corps C2 Harmonization, which could be considered 

by some as the 30,000-foot view of the MAGTF C2 cyberstrategy, received 

requests for Congressional testimony in 2007 and Secretary of Defense 

briefing in 2006. Additionally, the MAGTF C2 harmonization effort is 

one (of only seven) Marine Corps C4 formal priorities established by the 

Director, C4 Headquarters. The following is a summary of the C2 harmonization being implemented to make MAGTF C2 a reality:

Bottom-Line

The C2 harmonization strategy incorporates joint integrating concepts and C2 mandates, and is a holistic approach that integrates warfighter requirements into a common capability to deliver an end-to-end, 

fully integrated, cross-functional set of capabilities, including forwarddeployed and reach-back functions. The strategy’s end state is a seamless 

capability that crosses warfighting functions and supports Marines from 

the supporting establishment to Marines in contact with the enemy, taking 

the best of emerging capabilities and joint requirements to build a single 

solution. With Common Aviation C2 System, CAC2S, and C2 Harmonization, a joint task force commander will discover that his MAGTF battlespace offers maximum flexibility due to seamless integration with joint 

and coalition partners.
 MARINE CORPS CYBERSPACE IN SUPPORT OF MAGTF C2 105

Key Points

The C2 harmonization strategy synchronizes top down direction and 

bottom up requirements to create a joint integrated and resource informed 

vision for MAGTF command and control.

It is the Marine Corps’ application of naval FORCEnet capabilities 

and the service “plug-in” to the NECC.

The holistic approach represented by the C2 harmonization capabilities framework is used to inform and guide C2 requirements development 

and integration. The C4 infrastructure and NetOps support MAGTF C2 

with the needed cyberpower and: 

1. Is composed of four fundamental service layers: 

a. Applications/Systems, 

b. Enterprise Services,

c. Network Services, and

d. Transmission Tactical/Transmission Operational. 

2. Includes cross-functional integration across warfighting functions.

3. Spans strategic, operational, and tactical C2 requirements.

4. Uses proven capability identification and synchronization tools to 

support C2 portfolio management linking requirements and directives to program of record development. Specifically, the tools link 

complex, and sometimes divergent, C2 requirements developed independently by JROCM 161-03 (Joint Blue Force Situational Awareness), the joint battlespace management roadmap, and the NECC 

linked with service C2 requirements.

The C2 harmonization strategy takes the best of emerging service capabilities and joint requirements to build a single end-to-end C2 solution.

1. CAC2S fuses data from sensors, weapon systems, and C2 systems 

into an integrated display. It allows rapid, flexible operations in a 

common, modular, and scalable design by reducing the current five 

stove-pipe systems into one hardware solution with streamlined 

equipment training. CAC2S will enable MAGTF commanders to 

control timing of organic, joint, and coalition effects, assault support, 

and ISR in their battlespace while operating within a joint task force. 

2. Unit Operations Center (UOC), the material solution for O5 and O6 

commands, is already fielding across the MAGTF.

3. Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) Combat Operations Center 

(COC) is being fielded.

4. Major Subordinate Command (MSC) COC is still being developed.
106 CLONINGER

5. Marine Corps Systems Command (MCSC) is in the process of deploying initial Marine corps enterprise information technology services MCEITS (SharePoint) capabilities to all MEFs.

6. Numerous operational and tactical bandwidth solutions are being 

fielded.

7. DC DC&I has directed the stand-up of the MAGTF C2 Transition 

Task Force to ensure that all aspects of DOTMLPF are duly considered 

and planned for prior to the fielding of new MAGTF C2 capabilities.

MAGTF C2: Concept of Operations

“The MAGTF C2 CONOPS describes steps on the path to achieving 

the MAGTF C2 Vision. It lays the foundation for developing and 

fielding the C2 capabilities....”2

The MAGTF C2 concept of operations (CONOPS) contains the 

details of the cyberstrategy behind C2 harmonization: required USMC 

future MAGTF C2 capabilities, programmatic information, 500-day plan, 

service layer taxonomy, approach and methodology ... in short, this is 

the MAGTF C2 cyberstrategy playbook to leverage the capabilities of the 

technology and Marine Corps support cyber-infrastructures.

The framework for developing the MAGTF C2 capability is the 

“MAGTF C2 Capability Model,” which addresses the fundamental need 

to integrate Marine Corps C2 and communications systems capabilities 

with each other and with existing and future Joint and multi-national capabilities. It is the primary component of the MAGTF C2 strategy that will 

migrate today’s stove-piped C2, communications, and networking capabilities to a future integrated system-of-systems across all echelons of the 

Marine Corps and across all warfighting functions. The model provides a 

foundation to create the verifiable, repeatable processes that are necessary 

to enable spiral development of end-to-end, holistic C2 capabilities.

The MAGTF C2 Capability Model is based on the principle that 

C2 systems are underpinned by a support structure of capabilities and 

services. By grouping together services of similar function, it becomes 

easier to identify redundancies. This enables re-use of existing services 

and reduces development of redundant or stove-piped capabilities. The 

services that embody MAGTF C2 are organized by the MAGTF C2 Capability Model into those that directly support C2 and communications 

processes. The underlying C2 support structure enables critical information exchange and shared services that create an information-rich environment. The communication system support structure is further divided 
 MARINE CORPS CYBERSPACE IN SUPPORT OF MAGTF C2 107

into three components consisting of those services that support the requisite information transport services, those that connect distributed nodes 

and services into an integrated network, and those that provide necessary 

bandwidth for communication. The support structure supports all of the 

warfighting functions and the business mission area, and is critical to coordinating and integrating to achieve the mission. 

The following contain summary descriptions of each system and 

layer in the capability model:

System-of-Systems (SoS): A set or arrangement of interdependent 

systems that are related or connected to provide a given capability. 

The loss of any part of the system will significantly degrade the performance or capabilities of the whole. An example of an SoS would 

be a combat aircraft. While the aircraft may be developed as a single 

system, it could incorporate subsystems developed for other aircraft 

(e.g., the radar from an existing aircraft may be incorporated into 

the aircraft being developed rather than developing a new radar. The 

system of systems in this case would be the airframe, engines, radar, 

avionics, etc. that make up the entire combat aircraft capability). 

Family of Systems (FoS): A set of systems that provide similar capabilities through different approaches to achieve similar or complementary effects. For instance, the warfighter may need the capability 

to track moving targets. The FoS that provides this capability could 

include unmanned or manned aerial vehicles with appropriate sensors, a space-based sensor platform, or a special operations capability. Each can provide the ability to track moving targets, but with 

differing characteristics of persistence, accuracy, timeliness, etc.

Applications (applications and end-user equipment): End-user information technology programs (software) and equipment (hardware) 

that enhance the ability to perform C2:

Enterprise Services: Provides the operating environment and 

other supporting applications, services and interfaces (i.e., 

Shared Data Environment, storage, collaboration, messaging, 

etc.) to users throughout the network.

Network: Provides basic DISN services pulled from the GIG; 

DSN, the IP backbone (NIPRnet and SIPRnet) connectivity to 

the GIG.
108 CLONINGER

Bandwidth, Tactical: The bandwidth communications essential 

for the planning, directing, and controlling of fires, movements 

or maneuver within the operational area to accomplish missions and tasks.

Bandwidth, Operational: Provides mobile, robust bandwidth 

communications essential for the employment of military 

forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through 

the design, organization, integration and conduct of strategies, 

campaigns, major operations and battles between specified 

nodes.

The MAGTF C2 Capability Model expands upon the joint expertise 

of the Marine Corps to integrate and be interoperable with joint and other 

Service concepts for C2 and communications systems. It is the Marine 

Corps equivalent of the system framework that guides C2 for all services 

put forth by the DOD in the Net-centric Operational Environment Joint Integrating Concept (NCOE JIC)3

 and is consistent with current and evolving 

DOD policies for the management of information technology (IT). 

MAGTF C2: Foundation Building-Blocks for the Marine 

Corps Cyberspace Vision

To get where you want to go, you must know where you are. So, 

where are we? As illustrated, MAGTF C2’s vision is not starting from a 

cyber Big Bang. It is starting from a foundation steadily evolved. The most 

potent foundation building-block being in the lever-of-power IT advantage held by U.S. forces and our ability to collect, process, and share data 

within a trusted environment. Well known is that the keys to the maintenance and future growth of this advantage are the extension of enterprise 

services to the tactical edge, a data cyberstrategy that facilitates data exposure and transparency across functional domains, and fully joint operation 

and defense of our networks. Where the Marine Corps currently stands in 

the cyber world is summarized in a synopsis of the statement of Brigadier 

General George Allen, Director, C4 Headquarters Marine Corps, to the 

House Armed Services Committee on 6 April 2006:

USMC computing and communications environments have evolved 

over the past 20–30 years to meet specific Marine Corps requirements. As with the rest of DoD and Department of the Navy, this 

initially occurred in a highly stove-piped manner leading to a proliferation of systems, applications, and data. As a result, the USMC IT 
 MARINE CORPS CYBERSPACE IN SUPPORT OF MAGTF C2 109

infrastructure became difficult and expensive to maintain and support. However, early in the 90’s the Marine Corps began managing 

its own enterprise network and in the years prior to the Navy Marine 

Corps Intranet (NMCI) embarked upon a series of programs designed to standardize policies, funding, acquisition, technical specifications, security, and life cycle management of systems. In 2003, with 

a basic foundation in enterprise-level IT management and operations 

established, the Marine Corps began transitioning to the Navy Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI). Today the USMC IT environment is 

supported by continuously evolving Service-wide IT management 

processes focused on integrated IT support for the warfighter from 

the business operations of the USMC Supporting Establishment to 

MAGTF operations in the deployed tactical environment. While the 

Marine Corps has experienced progress in enterprise-wide IT management, much additional work is needed. Improvements in the areas 

of NMCI provided capabilities and management, enterprise-wide 

application and data management, and a complete suite of mature 

ITIL processes remain if the Marine Corps is to successfully adopt 

technologies and concepts needed for Network Centric Operations 

and Warfare (NCOW).

The Marine Corps Enterprise Network (MCEN) is the backbone of Marine Corps’ cyberpower. The Marine Corps defines the MCEN as the 

totality of the Marine Corps’ general service (collateral) network and 

voice, video and data services environment from wide area network 

circuits to the desktop. The MCEN is a global network environment 

that includes all capabilities necessary to execute Joint NetOps including GIG Enterprise Management, GIG Network Defense, and 

GIG Content Management. The MCEN is comprised of Supporting 

Establishment networks (both NIPRNET and SIPRNET; NMCI and 

non-NMCI), deployed/tactical networks (both NIPRNET and SIPRNET) and infrastructure that provides access to DoD/DISA services 

(mainframe, Defense-On-Line, etc.) and coalition networks. The 

USMC Community of Interest (COI) within NMCI provides the Marine Corps the ability to independently provide operational direction 

to the NMCI vendor to control the Marine Corps portion of NMCI 

and ensure network operations and defense are tightly integrated 

with and directly supportive of USMC operations around the world. 

The USMC NMCI COI is a subset of the MCEN. The Marine Corps 

Enterprise Information Technology Services (MCEITS) program rep-
110 CLONINGER

resents a maturing set of capabilities designed to address enterprise 

application and data services that will meet the requirements for GIG 

Content Management and NCOW. Net-Centric Enterprise Services 

(NCES) provides the Department-level capability to provision a common suite of services and tools to the Services. 

Capitalization on NCES and adherence to NCES standards are keys 

to the architecture and design of MCEITS and will that ensure joint information technology services are extended to the warfighter. MCEITS 

capabilities reside within and are a part of the MCEN. The bottom-line 

is that the MCEN is the Marine Corps area of operations within the GIG 

and includes all IT systems, data, people, and processes governed and 

controlled by the Marine Corps in support of the Marine Corps mission 

of making Marines and winning battles.

The future extension of cyber infrastructure and services across the 

battlefield will be facilitated by the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS), the 

Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) program, the Mobile User 

Object System (MUOS) and the Transformation Communication Satellite 

(TSAT), as part of the joint Transformation Communication Architecture 

(TCA). As evidenced by the ongoing war on terrorism, wideband, onthe-move, over-the-horizon communications enhance the mobility, flexibility, accuracy, and lethality of our forces, but place greater information 

demands on the cyberspace network. TSAT will provide on-the-move, 

satellite-based C2 access within a theater of operations, allowing Marine 

commanders to maintain battlefield tempo and exploit initiatives gained 

through mobility. The Marine Corps will leverage JTRS-like assets to 

transform our battlefield radio capability from a loosely integrated collection of legacy systems into an integrated, end-to-end networked system of 

systems. The combination of TSAT, AEHF, MUOS, and JTRS-like capabilities will create and extend secure mobile, ad hoc, battlefield networks 

to last-tactical-mile, including extension of net-centric services and data.

The added value of extending joint tools and services to the cyber 

and operational battlefield is enhanced through the deliberate and logical 

creation, storage, discovery, and processing of data. The DOD and Marine 

Corps data strategies require tremendous coordination among numerous 

domains. Subject matter experts within each domain at the DOD and service level define the relevant data, structure of the data, and data-tagging 

standards, thus enabling cataloging and discrete discovery of data. Accurate, timely, and consistent access to data on the battlefield by joint forces 

depends on a measured enterprise data strategy effort. The Marine Corps 
 MARINE CORPS CYBERSPACE IN SUPPORT OF MAGTF C2 111

has adopted the Joint Consultation Command and Control Information 

Exchange Data Model (JC3IEDM). JC3IEDM is an information model 

that is being used by several DOD components, coalition forces, and 

commercial organizations. Regarded as an information exchange model, 

JC3IEDM is being used as the Marine Corps’ primary tool for integrating 

DOD and Marine Corps data strategies into requirements definition, acquisition, and Clinger-Cohen Act compliance.

The net-centric approach to network operations and network defense underpins and protects our network services and data. Under the 

auspices of United States Strategic Command, the operational control of 

Joint Task Force Global Network Operations (JTF-GNO), and administratively controlled by the Marine Corps Director of C4, the Marine Corps 

Network Operations and Security Command (MCNOSC) ensures all 

Marine Corps portions of the Global Information Grid are operated and 

defended in a joint manner. The malicious cyber forces arrayed against 

our networks are adaptive and continually upgrade their capabilities and 

methods of attack. A wide range and variety of skill sets exist within these 

forces, from the use of pre-packaged tools to highly customized vectors, 

employed by rogue individuals, crime syndicates, and nation-states. The 

Marine Corps has robust means to defend, but currently lacks the ability 

to clearly identify the individual conducting the network attack. Further 

enhancements to information assurance and network defense, to include 

increasing network vulnerability assessments, establishing blue/red training teams, and provisioning improved tactical and coalition network 

security tools are being worked. A standardized cross-domain solution 

(CDS) implementation, with a robust and consistent configuration, and 

an increased level of assurance is eagerly anticipated and needed by the 

Marine Corps. This latter is an area where the Marine Corps leverages the 

work of outside expertise, including that of the National Security Agency, 

as it aggressively identifies solutions meeting these standards, and will 

draw from a short list to build out the Marine Corps portion of the Global 

Information Grid.

Closing Thoughts: “Pointy-End-of-the-Cyber-Power-Spear”

Over the next 7–10 years, the Marine Corps will begin employing 

the MAGTF C2 strategy to transform existing C2 systems and supporting 

communications capabilities to the integrated system of systems depicted 

by the MAGTF C2 vision. The migration will begin by building from an 

established cyberspace foundation using the MAGTF C2 Capability Model 

to consolidate redundant capabilities across all existing programs into a 
112 CLONINGER

single set of services. It will include initiatives to standardize non-materiel 

C2 and communications systems across the Marine Corps enterprise, 

as necessary. As successes supporting the MAGTF C2 Capability Model 

are reached, the process will add operational perspective to enable spiral 

development of enhanced C2 cyberpower and leverage the full potential 

cyberspace offers. 

“We are what we do everyday.”4

Notes1

 Lieutenant General James N. Mattis, Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force; and 

Commander, U.S. Marine Corp Forces Central Command. 2 Lieutenant General James F. Amos, Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command. 3 Available at http://www.defenselink.mil/cio-nii/docs/netcentric_jic.pdf.

4 Colonel Eric Rolaf, Commanding Officer, Marine Corps Network and Operations Security 

Command.
113

About the Authors

Charles L. Barry is a Senior Research Fellow at CTNSP and President of 

Barry Consulting, Inc. He is a retired Army officer with extensive experience 

in joint and multinational operations. His areas of specialization include 

international relations, U.S. military strategy, joint command and control, 

land warfare, and information networks related to command and control. 

Barry received his doctorate in public administration with a concentration 

in information resource management from the University of Baltimore. 

He holds a BA in political science from Loyola University, Chicago. 

Michael A. Brown graduated from the United States Naval Academy in 

1980 with a bachelor of science degree in mathematics. His first three 

years as a commissioned officer were in the Surface Line Community, 

where he served on board USS Vogelsang (DD 862) and USS Connole 

(FF 1056). After a lateral transfer to Cryptology, he attended the Naval 

Postgraduate School graduating with his Masters of Science, Systems 

Engineering (Electronic Warfare) in 1985. Following Naval Postgraduate 

School, he was assigned to the National Security Agency/Central Security 

Service (NSA/CSS) in the Electronic Warfare and Technology Directorate. 

In August 2005, he reported to the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations 

as Director, Information Operations Division (OPNAV N3IO) and Deputy 

Director for Cryptology Division (OPNAV N2C). Rear Adm. Brown also 

serves as the Senior Advisor for Information Operations and Signals 

Intelligence to the Commander Naval Network Warfare Command. 

John L. Cloninger, Col USMCR, entered the Marine Corps through 

the U.S. Naval Academy, Class of 1980. Upon graduation, he entered the 

Marine Corps Basic School followed by graduating with honors from 

Naval Flight School. From 1981 through 1985 he served as a Marine Corps 

Naval Aviator in Marine Fighter/Attack Aircraft F/A-4 Phantoms. From 

1985 through 1989, after completing Marine Corps Computer Sciences 

School, he was assigned as Head of Automatic Data Processing Liaison 

Officers (ADPLO), staffs and supporting computer sections to the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff. From 1989 through 1992, he fulfilled duties as Marine 

Corps Computer Sciences School Dean for USMC Data Systems Officers 

studying toward the Data Systems Officer MOS.

From 1992 through 2001, he transitioned and fulfilled multiple leadership roles as Federal Government Computer Scientist/Defense Information 
114 MILITARY PERSPECTIVES ON CYBERPOWER

Systems Agency (DISA) while preserving USMC Reserve Commission. His 

IT Program and Project Manager (PM) positions included Global Command and Control System (GCCS) Information Security PM, GCCS Y2K 

Command Center PM, Data Standards Tools PM, Software Reuse Initiative 

PM, HQMC C4 Information Assurance (IA) Awareness PM, and Global 

Network Operations Systems Center (GNOSC)–Computer Network Defense (CND) USMC Team PM. During evening hours, he served as Information Systems Adjunct Professor, University of Southern California.

On September 12, 2001, Col Cloninger returned to active duty as 

USMC Head C4 Continuity of Operations/Homeland Defense, followed 

by assignment as Joint Matters/Spectrum/Science and Technology IT 

Head. In Col Cloninger’s final tour until his active duty retirement in January 2009, he serves as the C4 Headquarters Marine Corps’ Liaison Officer 

to the Department of the Navy Chief Information Officer. 

Col Cloninger holds a Master of Science in Systems Management, 

University of Southern California; BS in mechanical engineering, U.S. 

Naval Academy; Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Marine 

Corps Amphibious Warfare School, Marine Corps Data Systems Officer 

Computer Sciences School, Naval Flight School.

Forrest B. Hare, LtCol, USAF, is an intelligence officer assigned to Headquarters U.S. Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans and 

Requirements Cyberspace Operations Directorate. Lt Col Hare recently 

served for one and a half years on the AF Cyberspace Task Force. He has 

also served as the commander of the AF Information Operations detachment in the European Air Operations Center and Chief of Targeting Intelligence for the Korean Theater.

Jeffrey G. Smith, Jr., BG USA, is Deputy Commander, United States Army 

Network Enterprise Technology Command/9th Army Signal Command, 

Arlington, Virginia. Previously, he has serves as Director, United States 

Training and Doctrine Command Program Integration Office-Networks, 

United States Army Signal Center and Fort Gordon, Fort Gordon, Georgia. 

Brigadier General Smith holds a BA from the Virginia Military Institute 

and an MA and PhD from Princeton University. He has also attended the 

United States Army Command and General Staff College and the National 

War College.
 ABOUT THE AUTHORS 115

Stuart H. Starr is a Distinguished Research Fellow at the Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, Fort 

McNair, Washington, DC. Concurrently, he serves as President, Barcroft 

Research Institute (BRI), where he consults on Command and Control 

(C2) issues, serves on senior advisory boards to defense industry (e.g., 

Northrop Grumman, Titan), lectures to audiences world-wide on C2 issues, and participates on blue ribbon panels (e.g., the Army Science Board 

and the National Research Council Task Force on Modeling and Simulation to support the Transformation of DoD). 

Elihu Zimet is a Distinguished Research Fellow at CTNSP, The National 

Defense University. Prior to this he headed the Expeditionary Warfare 

Science and Technology Department at the Office of Naval Research. 

In this position he directed science and technology (S&T) programs in 

missiles, and directed energy, aircraft, and stealth as well as S&T support 

to the Marine Corps. Dr. Zimet holds a BS (ME) from the Polytechnic 

Institute of Brooklyn and a PhD from Yale University.

Glenn Zimmerman is the Chief of Strategic Outreach, Chief of Staff Strategic Studies Group, CHECKMATE, Headquarters, United States Air Force. 

Colonel Zimmerman graduated from the University of Colorado, Boulder 

Colorado, in 1985, with a BS in electrical engineering and computer science 

and was commissioned through AFROTC that same year. He completed 

his MBA in 1991 with specialization in statistics and finance. He holds 15 

current national and international Information Technology certifications. 

Colonel Zimmerman has commanded at the detachment and squadron 

level and held staff positions at the wing, intermediate headquarters, and 

Air Staff levels including a tour as the Director, Air National Guard NOSC. 

Preceding his current assignment, he was handpicked to serve as a senior 

cyber strategist with the CSAF Cyberspace Task Force in 2006–2007. In 

this role, he helped craft the foundational framework that led to the standup of the AFCYBER major command scheduled for October 2008.

Note: Authors’ positions and assignments were current as of the time of writing in 2008.