COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Decker, Malveau x and Senior Judge Annunziata

ELNORA MOSES MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record No. 1749- 17-4 PER CURIAM FEBRUARY 20, 2018 ALEXANDRIA DEPARTMEN T OF COMMUNITY AND HUMAN SERVICES

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ALEXANDRIA Nolan B. Dawkins, Judge (Paula M. Potoczak; Cathl een A. Tucker, Guardian ad litem for appellant, on briefs), for appellant. (James L. Banks, Jr., City Atto rney; Meghan S. Roberts, Assis tant City Attorney; Ella A nn D’Amico, Guardian ad litem for the minor child, on brief), for appellee.
Elnora Moses (mother) appeals the orders finding that her son, W.M., is abused or neglected, terminating her parental rights to W.M., and approvi ng the foster care plan goal of adoption. Mother argues that the trial court erred by finding that she “abused and neglected W.M. and that it was in the best interests of the child to terminate the residual parental rights of [mother] to her child, W.M., and to permit the adoption.” Upon reviewin g the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit. Accord ingly, we summarily affirm the decision of the trial court. See Rule 5A:27.
BACKGROUND “On appeal, ‘we view the evidenc e and all reason able inferences in the light most favorable to the prevailing part y below, in this case the Department.’” Farrell v. Warren Cty.

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this op inion is not designated fo r publication.UNPUBLISHED- 2 - Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 59 Va. App. 375, 386, 719 S.E.2d 329, 334 (2012) (quoting Jenkins v. Winchester Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 12 Va. App. 1178, 1180, 409 S. E.2d 16, 18 (1991)). Mother is the biological mot her to W.M., who was born in Texas . While in Texas, the Texas Department of Family Servi ces investigated the family sev en times, between May 2014 and April 2016, for abuse or neglect because mother alleged tha t W.M. was being sexually abused. Each of these investiga tions concluded that there had been no abuse or neglect. In August 2016, mother and W.M. m oved from Texas to Alexandria , Virginia. W.M. was four years old at the tim e. On August 8, 2016, they arrive d in Virginia and stayed at an extended stay hotel. While they s tayed at the hotel, mother be lieved that she was “violated at night by an unknown person.” Despite t he fact that her room wa s locked and furniture was pushed in front of the door and not moved, mother continued to believe that she had been assaulted. She also believed tha t W.M. had been assaulted. On August 30, 2016, mother checked out of the hotel due to insufficient funds. On that same day, mother took W.M. to the Alexandria Police De partment because “she was afraid he [W.M.] would get hurt if he stayed with her and t hat he wasn’t safe with her.” Mother told the police that she thought they were being sexuall y assaulted. When asked why she thought she was assaulted, mother e xplained that when she woke up, she “felt pressure over her entire body.” However, nobody was the re. The room was secure, and she was still fully clothed as she had been when she went to bed. The police called Child Protective Services (CPS), who removed the child from mother and placed him i n foster care. A ccording to the police officer, mother “willfully gave up” W.M . to CPS and said that “it was fo r the best and that he would be better off staying with someone else.” After further discussion wit h the police, mother voluntarily a greed to be admitted to INOVA Alexandria Hospital for a mental evaluation. The police transported mother to the- 3 - hospital on August 30, 2016. How ever, on August 31, 2016, moth er was released and returned to the Alexandria Police Depart ment to inquire about her car. She told the police officer that she was “not properly mentally eva luated” at the hospital. The pol ice subsequently learned that mother was diagnosed as delusion al and left the hospital before a temporary detention order could be issued. As the police c ontinued to talk with mother, mother became more irrational. The police took mother for a m ental evaluation, and an emergenc y custody order was obtained. Mother was transported to INOVA M ount Vernon Hospital for treat ment. Mother remained at INOVA Mount Vernon Hospital until September 6, 2016. While at the hospital, mother refused t o take any type of psychotic medi cation. She disagreed that she had delusional disorder a nd continued to believe that she was being sexually assaulted at night. After her release from the hospi tal, mother went to the Alexan dria Community Shelter. She continued to believe that s he was being sexually assaulted at night, but t here was no evidence that any assaults had o ccurred. Mother was not compli ant with the rules of the shelter. In March 2017, mother was discharg ed from the shelter and had n o transitional housing in place. Mother was homeless from March until May 2017. On May 22, 2017, the Alexandria Juvenile and Domestic Relation s District Court terminated mother’s parental r ights to W.M. and approved the fo ster care plan goal of adoption. Mother appealed the ruling to the circuit court. On August 29 and 30, 2017, the parties presented their evidenc e and argument. Mother testified that she worked at a restaurant in Woodbridge and earned $13 per hour. She explained that she could work up to thirty-si x hours per week at the rest aurant, but she had worked only twenty-eight hours the week prio r to court. She testified that “[n]othing’s in stone” about her hours. Mother also stated that sh e worked as a hospital greete r one day, every other week, for an eight-hour shift. At the time of t he trial, mother was renting a room in a townhome for $1,100- 4 - per month, which included utilit ies. She acknowledged to the s ocial worker that “she has more money going out than coming in” a nd would not be able to sustai n her housing much longer. She testified that she hoped t o move to Woodbridge to be closer to work and W.M.’s school. While W.M. was in foster care , the Department referred mother to Dr. Travis Flower for a parental screening assessment and mental health evaluation. Mother completed the evaluation, and Flower wrote a report on October 31, 2016. Flower diagnose d mother with delusional disorder, persecutory type. Flowe r testified that mother’s “de lusional beliefs refer more or less exclusively to this persistent , fixed concern that she has thatshe is being repeatedly sexually assaulted during her sleep and that her son has been repeatedly sexually assaulted while they are sleeping.” Flower opined that mo ther’s prognosis was “very, ve ry uncertain” because patients with delusional disorder do not alw ays participate in mental he alth treatment. When they do participate, mental health tre atment may not alleviate all of t he symptoms. Mother’s symptoms have existed for approximately ten years, 1 and her insight was “grossly impaired.” Flower explained that mother’s lack of insight meant that she was “at more risk to refuse to participate in treatment or drop out of treatment.” Flower was concerned that mot her’s delusions h ad the potential to harm W.M. Flower explained that mother repeated ly took W.M. to doctors because s he thought he was being sexually abused. Flower feared t hat mother’s actions and state ments could be emotionally disturbing to W.M. As a result of Flower’s examina tion, the Department referred mo ther for individual therapy. In October 2016, mother started meeting with Regina M cGloin, a therapist at

1 Mother told Flower that she “be lieves she was being raped ‘lon g before I knew it was happening,’” but she thinks it started in 2007.- 5 - Alexandria CSB. McGloin provide d supportive counseling to moth er. McGloin testified that they were building rapport and trust, but they were not address ing mother’s delusions. The Department also referred mot her for a psychiatric evaluatio n. Mother missed her first appointment, but did meet with Dr. Dean Inoye on January 11, 2017. Inoye diagnosed mother with provisional delusio nal disorder, persecutory type. Mother disagreed with the diagnosis and refused to take a ny medications. As of the date of the circuit cour t hearing, mother continued to disagree with the di agnosis and refused to take any medications. The Department provided play therapy for W.M. At first, his co unselor found him to be “very angry and hyper-aroused,” whi ch was typical of a child wh o had experienced trauma. Since he has been in foster care, however, W.M. has improved an d is no longer angry. His counselor explained that W.M. n eeds a stable and predictable li ving environment, which he did not have while living with mother. After hearing all of the eviden ce and argument, the trial court found that W.M. had been abused or neglected, and it was in the child’s best interests t o terminate mother’s parental rights. The trial court approved the f oster care plan’s goal of adoptio n. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS “Where, as here, the court hears the evidence ore tenus , its finding is en titled to great weight and will not be disturbe d on appeal unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Fauquier Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Ridgeway, 59 Va. Ap p. 185, 190, 717 S.E.2d 811, 814 (2011) (quoting Martin v. Pittsylvania Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs ., 3 Va. App. 15, 20, 348 S.E.2d 13, 16 (1986)). “When considering ter mination of parental righ ts, ‘the paramount consideration of a trial court is th e child’s best interests.’” Id. (quoting Logan v. Fairfax Cty. Dep’t of Human Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991)).- 6 - Abuse and neglect 2 Mother argues that the trial court erred in finding that mothe r abused and neglected W.M. Mother emphasizes that none of the child protective service age ncies in Texas found that W.M. had been abused or neglected. She f urther stresses that she di d not physically abuse the child. The trial court found that the child was abused or neglected p ursuant to Code § 16.1-228(5), which states that a n abused or neglected child i s a child “[w]ho is without parental care or guardianship caused by the unreasonable absence or the mental or physical incapacity of the child’s parent, guardian, leg al custodian, or other person standing in loco parentis .” “[T]he statutory definitions of an abus ed or neglected child do not re quire proof of actual harm or impairment having been experienced by the child.” Jenkins, 12 Va. App. at 1183, 409 S.E.2d at
19. The trial court explained that it did not believe that the chil d was physically abused. Rather, the trial court believe d that the child’s “care has bee n impacted by the parental issues that [mother] has with her mental hea lth.” The trial court further found that due to mother’s mental health issues, she “is not capab le of providing a safe environm ent for this child.” The evidence supports the trial court’s findings. Mother brou ght W.M. to the police department on August 30, 2016. She reported that she was afrai d for his safety and willingly gave him to the Department. Mot her was hospitalized twice for her mental health issues and diagnosed with a delusional disord er. Mother was unable to car e for W.M. Despite the professionals’ diagnosis and suggest ed treatment, mother refuse d to accept the diagnosis and

2 Appellant mentions Code § 16.1-22 8 in her brief, but fails to cite any other legal authority to support her argum ent. Assuming without deciding t hat such a reference is sufficient to meet the requirements of Rule 5A:20(e), we address the merit s of her argument regarding the trial court’s finding that the child was an abused and neglecte d child.- 7 - comply with the treatment. The t rial court did not err in find ing that the child was an abused or neglected child. Termination of parental rights Mother argues that the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights and approving the foster care plan’s goal of adoption. Mother contends that she complied with the Department’s requests and remed ied the situation that led to th e child being placed in foster care. The trial court terminated moth er’s parental rights pursuant t o Code § 16.1-283(C)(2), which states that a court may terminate parental rights if: The parent or parents, wit hout good cause, have been unwilling or unable within a reasonable period of time not to exceed 12 months from the date the child was placed in foster care to remedy substantially the condi tions which led to or required continuat ion of the child’s foster care p lacement, notwithstanding the reasonable and appropriate efforts of social, medical, mental h ealth or other rehabilitative agencies to such end. The Department provided numerous services to mother. Several mental health professionals diagnosed mother w ith delusional disorder and rec ommended medication and counseling. The trial court rec ognized that “treatment in this kind of case can only be successful, if at all, if the patient is willing to accept that treatment.” Despite the counseling and testing, mother refused to acknowledge tha t she had a menta l illness, an d she would not take medication. She continued to have delusions a nd believe that she was sexual ly assaulted at night. Mother’s counselor stated that they had not confronted the delusions. F lower opined that mother’s prognosis was “very, very uncertain.” Furthermore, the trial court e xpressed concern about mother’s plans to move out of the area, which mother told Flower a nd her counselor that she would do after she received custody of her child. The trial court s tated that if she moved without first seeking mental health treatment, then the court woul d be transferring a problem to an other jurisdiction.- 8 - In addition, the trial court not ed that mother’s housing situa tion was precarious. Mother was employed, but her income was not sufficient to cover her re nt, much less her other living expenses. Mother sta ted that if the chil d was returned to her, then she would place him in day care while she worked. However, t he trial court questioned how she could afford to pay day care with her salary. At the time of the trial, the c hild had been in foster care fo r twelve months. His counselor testified that he was improvi ng and needed a stable home. “It is clearly not in the best interests of a child to spend a lengthy period of time waiting to find ou t when, or even if, a parent will be capable of resuming his [or her] r esponsibilities.” Tackett v. Arlington Cty. Dep’t of Human Servs., 62 Va. App. 296, 322, 746 S.E.2d 509, 522 (2013) (quoti ng Kaywood v. Halifax Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 10 Va. App. 535, 540, 394 S.E.2d 492, 495 (1990)). Contrary to mother’s arguments , the evidence supports the trial court’s ruling that it was in the child’s best interests to terminate mother’s parental ri ghts pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). Mother was unable to remedy the situation th at led to the child being placed in foster care. The trial cour t did not err in approving the f oster care plan’s goal of adoption.
CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s ruling is summaril y affirmed. Rule 5A:27. Affirmed.