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RENEWING THE TRANSATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP:

A VIEW FROM THE UNITED STATES

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JUNE 11, 2003

Serial No. 108–27

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman 

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, 

Vice Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

AMO HOUGHTON, New York 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

RON PAUL, Texas 

NICK SMITH, Michigan 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

JERRY WELLER, Illinois 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

THADDEUS G. MCCOTTER, Michigan 

WILLIAM J. JANKLOW, South Dakota 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

TOM LANTOS, California 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

CHRIS BELL, Texas 

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel 

ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska, Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

THADDEUS G. McCOTTER, Michigan 

WILLIAM J. JANKLOW, South Dakota 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

VINCE MORELLI, Subcommittee Staff Director 

PATRICK PRISCO, Professional Staff Member 

JONATHAN KATZ, Democratic Professional Staff Member 

BEVERLY HALLOCK, Staff Associate 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Simon Serfaty, Director, Europe Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies ................................................................................................... 6

Daniel Hamilton, Director, Center for Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins 

University School of Advanced International Studies ...................................... 16

John Hulsman, Research Fellow, Davis Institute, The Heritage Foundation .... 29

Christopher Makins, President, The Atlantic Council of the United States ...... 38

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Doug Bereuter, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Nebraska, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Europe: Prepared statement 3

The Honorable Robert Wexler, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Florida: Prepared statement ........................................................................... 5

Simon Serfaty: Prepared statement ....................................................................... 8

Daniel Hamilton: Prepared statement ................................................................... 20

John Hulsman: Prepared statement ...................................................................... 32

Christopher Makins: Prepared statement ............................................................. 41

(1)

RENEWING THE TRANSATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP: A VIEW FROM THE UNITED STATES 

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 11, 2003

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, 

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:34 p.m. in Room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Doug Bereuter [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding. 

Mr. BEREUTER. The Subcommittee hearing on ‘‘Renewing the 

Transatlantic Partnership: a View from the United States,’’ will 

come to order. I am very pleased that we are beginning a series of 

two or three hearings on this important and very timely subject. 

I have an opening statement, then will turn to the Ranking Member, and will introduce our distinguished panel of witnesses. 

During the Iraqi debate, transatlantic doomsayers were, I believe, at their worst declaring transatlantic relations as dead, in 

dismal shape, or, in the words of one, ‘‘lying in rubble.’’

I do not share in those dire conclusions. When it comes to core 

values and common goals, Europe and the United States, it seems 

to me, have not parted ways. The Atlantic alliance is not at an end, 

and European and American security remains, I think, indivisible, 

although there are important challenges that have recently become 

very obvious. While the approaches and strategies needed to accomplish our common or individual national agendas have been the 

subject of much discussion and varying degrees of disagreement, I 

certainly do not believe that Americans and Europeans are, in effect, from two different and distinct planets. 

A recent policy statement which was issued by the board of directors of Notre Europe, a European affairs think tank, perhaps stated it best by saying that,

‘‘The partnership of the United States and Europe not only remains relevant, but it is more necessary than ever in a world 

as uncertain as ours is today. The common values and interests that unite Europe and the United States are infinitely 

deeper than the differences and rivalries that separate us.’’

Understanding the importance of transatlantic relations, however, does not mean such a relationship of course is without problems. In December 2001, long before the Iraq controversy, I gave 

an address to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly gathered here for 

a transatlantic meeting we began holding each year because of our 

concerns about the condition of the alliance. And I expressed then 

2

to my colleagues my concern over the widening perception gap between the United States and our European partners—I believe actually Mr. Makins, you were there at that event and was the 

emcee, as I recall—and our increasingly divergent views about 

issues and about America’s actions and values. I felt that on an increasing number of issues it seemed, in certain areas, the European notions of what are legitimate U.S. national interests and our 

actions to defend them were fundamentally different than the 

views of the majority of Americans. 

The debate over Iraq and the U.N. Security Council 2 years later, 

more recently, seemed to at least substantiate, I think, those observations, but it certainly did not convince me that the death knell 

for the partnership had sounded. 

Recently, I observed to my colleagues in the parliamentary assembly my views that the Iraq dispute was not a total transatlantic 

dispute. Nevertheless, the harsh rhetoric which we heard on both 

sides of the Atlantic did, in varying degrees, I think, damage the 

overall relationship between America and some European nations. 

The American public felt deep disappointment, frustration, and 

anger with several European nations, including France and Germany. The debate also did some, but hopefully not too deep, a damage to the U.N. Security Council’s reputation, NATO, and the European Union, institutions which both sides regard as important. 

I felt probably the biggest damage might have been done to the 

effort within the European Union to develop a common foreign and 

security policy. And that was done not by someone from this side 

of the Atlantic but by President Chirac in his comments directed 

at the aspirant countries for both the EU and for NATO. I can tell 

you they were very angry about it. As Secretary Powell said with 

respect to transatlantic relations, we and Europe have probably 

been in marriage counseling for over 50 years. Whether the differences we had with a few European nations will simply be one 

time or one issue disagreements, or something which will result in 

longer term and stronger anti-American attitudes in Europe, is yet 

to be determined. But do we face an irreconcilable crisis in transatlantic relations? Are we about to divorce? I think not. And I want 

our witnesses to comment in a more colorful academic manner, or 

whatever way you choose, on this issue. Our partners in the transatlantic marriage seem to be providing other forms of evidence that 

the marriage is well worth saving. 

Have we entered a defining moment in the history of American 

relations with Europe, as a recent publication by CSIS asks? I believe so. 

This Member believes that the first step is to reach a common 

understanding of what constitute the greatest threat to our security, and recognize the threats posed by proliferation of weapons of 

mass destruction terrorism, terrorist states, and the nexus among 

those three. No nation alone, it seems to me, can adequately address these threats to our security. Quite simply, we need an international framework to address these interrelated threats. In this 

effort, Europe and North America must be partners or counterparts, not rivals, not counterweights. I think there is a very important difference between counterparts and counterweights. 

3

For over 55 years, the United States-European alliance has been 

tested on numerous occasions and it has survived. 

The question before us is, how do we move beyond the Iraq dispute, find ways to strengthen the partnership, and work cooperatively on those common issues which bind us on both sides of the 

Atlantic? As President Bush said last week at the G–8, we can do 

it. I believe it is imperative that we do mend the transatlantic alliance. I look forward to the statements of our witnesses, but first 

I will turn to the Ranking Member, the distinguished gentleman 

from Florida, Mr. Wexler. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bereuter follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DOUG BEREUTER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEBRASKA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE

During the Iraqi debate, transatlantic doomsayers were, I believe, at their worse 

declaring transatlantic relations ‘‘dead’’, in ‘‘dismal shape’’, or in the words of one, 

‘‘lying in rubble’’. 

I do not share these dire conclusions. When it comes to core values and common 

goals, Europe and the United States have not parted ways. The Atlantic alliance 

is not at an end and European and American security remains indivisible. While 

the approaches and strategies needed to accomplish our common or individual national agendas have been the subject of much discussion and varying degrees of disagreement, I certainly do not believe that Americans and Europeans are in effect 

from two different and distinct planets. 

A recent policy statement which was issued by the Board of Directors of Notre 

Europe, a European affairs think tank, perhaps stated it best by saying: ‘‘the partnership between the United States and Europe not only remains relevant, but is 

more necessary than ever in a world as uncertain as ours is today . . . the common 

values and interests that unite Europe and the United States are infinitely deeper 

than the differences and rivalries that separate them . . .’’

Understanding the importance of the transatlantic relationship, however, does not 

mean such a relationship is without problems. In December of 2001, long before 

Iraq, at an address at the National Defense University, I expressed my concern over 

the widening perception gap between the United States and our European partners, 

and about our increasingly divergent views about issues and about America’s actions and values. I felt on an increasing number of issues, it seemed that in certain 

areas the European notions of what are legitimate U.S. national interests, and our 

actions to defend them, were fundamentally different than the views of the majority 

of Americans. 

The debate over Iraq in the U.N. Security Council two years later seemed to at 

least substantiate these observations but it certainly did not convince me that the 

death knell for the partnership had sounded. 

Recently in a speech to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, I observed that the 

Iraq dispute, in my view, was not a total transatlantic dispute. Nevertheless, the 

harsh rhetoric which we heard on both sides of the Atlantic did, in varying degrees, 

damage the overall relationship between America and some European nations. The 

American public felt deep disappointment, frustration and anger with several European nations, including France and Germany, which many felt took the most irresponsible position of all regarding any conceivable military role in Iraq. The debate 

also did some, but hopefully not too deep, damage to the U.N. Security Council, 

NATO and the European Union, especially its Common Foreign and Security pillar—institutions which both sides regard as important. 

As Secretary Powell has said with respect to transatlantic relations, ‘‘we and Europe have probably been in marriage counseling for over 50 years.’’ Whether the difficulties we had with the few European nations will simply be a ‘‘one-time’’, ‘‘oneissue’’ disagreement or something which will result in longer-term and stronger 

anti-American attitudes in Europe is yet to be determined. But do we face an irreconcilable crisis in transatlantic relations? Are we about to divorce? I think not. 

And, our partners in the transatlantic marriage seem to be providing other forms 

of evidence that the marriage is well worth saving. 

Have we entered a ‘‘defining moment’’ in the history of American relations with 

Europe as a recent publication by CSIS asks? I believe so. When I was elected as 

President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly six months ago, I identified transVerDate Mar 21 2002 15:37 Jul 28, 2003 Jkt 087670 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\EUROPE\061103\87670 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
4

atlantic relations as one of my priorities and acknowledged that the strains in transatlantic relations and the significant and growing differences in attitude and perception between the U.S. and many of our allies, if left unaddressed, would erode the 

solidarity and cohesion of the Alliance. 

For this Member, the first step is to reach a common understanding of what constitutes the greatest threat to our security and recognize the threats posed by proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, terrorist states, and the nexus 

of these three. No nation alone can adequately address these threats to our security. 

Quite simply we need an international framework to address these interrelated 

threats. In this effort, Europe and North America must be partners or counterparts, 

not rivals, not counter [balancing] weights. 

For over 55 years the U.S.-European alliance has been tested on numerous occasions and has survived. This ability to survive has been a testament to the serious 

values we share, the enduring importance of the partnership, and the commitment 

of those who have managed the relationship through all these times. 

The question before us is how do we move beyond this Iraq dispute, find ways 

to strengthen the partnership and work cooperatively on those common issues which 

bind us on both sides of the Atlantic. As President Bush said just last week in 

Evian, we can do it. I believe it is imperative that we do. 

I look forward to the statements of our witnesses.

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding 

this very important hearing on transatlantic relations. And a special thanks to the distinguished guests that join with us. 

This hearing comes on the heels of this month’s U.S.–EU Summit and follows President Bush’s recent visit to Poland, Russia, 

and France. During his trip, the President highlighted the necessity of increased coordination between the United States and Europe on a number of key issues, including the war against terrorism, nonproliferation, peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan, 

and strengthening the global economy. I hope that the Administration’s renewed call to mend transatlantic relations will move beyond rhetoric in the months ahead and result in substantive 

progress on the ground, including United States-European cooperation and rebuilding Iraq, and promoting security and peace 

throughout the Middle East. 

Mr. Chairman, though currently suffering from unprecedented 

strain, the importance of transatlantic relations must not be underestimated. They are strategically vital to both America’s long-term 

security and economic interests, as well as those of our allies. It is 

in this vein that we must consider many areas where transatlantic 

cooperation in the counterterrorism, intelligence, military and economic spheres continued and even increased, despite the disagreement over United States policy in Iraq. 

Since 9/11, America has worked shoulder to shoulder with our 

European allies to counter the funding of terrorist organizations 

and arrest al-Qaeda operatives, while also collaborating on a variety of levels to prevent future attacks. 

In February, Germany and the Netherlands assumed control of 

the international security assistance force from Turkey, where they 

remain in joint command of the peacekeeping force in Afghanistan. 

In the economic field, the transatlantic relationship has actually 

never been stronger. Suggesting that while we may drift apart in 

policy and in rhetoric, our economic futures are inextricably linked 

as evidenced by the $2.5 trillion in transatlantic trade last year. 

Shared prosperity, common security concerns, and historical cooperation in promoting democracy all suggest that the leaders of 

the United States and Europe have no choice but to take steps to 

mend the division stemming from the war in Iraq and simply move 

5

on. It is in America’s best interest to join forces with organizations 

like NATO which has expanded in scope beyond its cold war mandate and engaged in new theaters of cooperation and operation in 

central Asia and the Middle East. 

Today, with seven new members and successful operations in the 

Balkans, NATO has agreed to permanently assume the peacekeeping role in Afghanistan, and assist Poland in its efforts to establish a multi-national force in Iraq. 

These positive developments begin the process of healing, but 

they are only a first step toward the true mending of transatlantic 

ties. Ultimately, both sides must address the policy gaps and personal animosity that divides us. Europe must accept the realities 

of a post-Saddam Iraq and the potential for transformation in the 

Middle East. At the same time, the Bush Administration must understand that military power alone is not a panacea to guaranteeing our security. Fighting terror in Afghanistan and liberating 

the people of Iraq cannot be achieved without the assistance of our 

allies throughout the world. It is this message of friendship, understanding, and cooperation that I hope will lay the foundation for 

the June 25, meeting between the leaders of the United States and 

the European Union in Washington as well as the future of transatlantic ties. 

In conclusion, if I could follow the Chairman’s analogy of a marriage: It would seem to me that the marriage between the United 

States and the European Union is at the point where the kids have 

left home, and both partners are now looking around and determining how it is they engage in a successful completion and extension of their marriage under different circumstances. And I would 

very much appreciate, as the Chairman has stated, the views of the 

witnesses in advising us as to what role Congress can play to further enhance the rebuilding of this relationship. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wexler follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT WEXLER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA

Chairman Bereuter, 

Thank you for holding this vitally important hearing on transatlantic relations, 

which comes on the heels of this month’s U.S.–E.U. Summit and following President 

Bush’s recent visit to Poland, Russia and France. During his trip, the President 

highlighted the necessity of increased coordination between the United States and 

Europe on a number of key issues, including the war against terrorism, non-proliferation, peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan and strengthening the global 

economy. I hope that the Administration’s renewed call to mend transatlantic relations will move beyond rhetoric in the months ahead and result in substantive 

progress on the ground, including U.S.-European cooperation in rebuilding Iraq and 

promoting security and peace throughout the Middle East. 

Mr. Chairman, though currently suffering from unprecedented strain, the importance of transatlantic relations must not be underestimated; they are strategically 

vital to both America’s long-term security and economic interests, as well as those 

of our allies. 

It is this vein that we must consider the many areas where transatlantic cooperation—in the counter-terrorism, intelligence, military and economic spheres—continued and even increased despite the disagreement over U.S. policy in Iraq. Since 9/

11, America has worked shoulder-to-shoulder with our European allies to counter 

the funding of terrorist organizations and arrest Al Qaeda operatives, while also collaborating on a variety of levels to prevent future attacks. 

In February, Germany and the Netherlands assumed control of the International 

Security Assistance Force (ISAF) from Turkey, where they remain in joint command 

of the peacekeeping force in Afghanistan. And in the economic field, the transVerDate Mar 21 2002 15:37 Jul 28, 2003 Jkt 087670 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\EUROPE\061103\87670 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
6

atlantic relationship has never been stronger, suggesting that while we may drift 

apart in policy and rhetoric, our economic futures are inextricably linked—as evidenced by the 2.5 trillion dollars in transatlantic trade last year. 

Shared prosperity, common security concerns and historical cooperation in promoting democracy all suggest that the leaders of the United States and Europe have 

no choice but to take steps to mend the divisions stemming from the war in Iraq 

and simply move on. It is in America’s best interest to join forces with organizations 

like NATO, which has expanded its scope beyond its Cold War mandate and engaged in new theaters of operation in Central Asia and the Middle East. Today, 

with seven new members and successful operations in the Balkans, NATO has 

agreed to permanently assume the peacekeeping role in Afghanistan and assist Poland in its efforts to establish a multinational force in Iraq. 

These positive developments begin the process of healing, but they are only a first 

step toward the true mending of transatlantic ties. Ultimately, both sides must address the policy gaps and personal animosity that divides us. Europe must accept 

the realities of a post-Saddam Iraq and the potential for transformation in the Middle East. At the same time, the Bush Administration must understand that military 

power alone is not a panacea to guaranteeing our security. Fighting terror in Afghanistan and liberating the people of Iraq cannot be achieved without the assistance of our allies throughout the world. It is this message of friendship, understanding and cooperation that I hope will lay the foundation for the June 25 meeting between leaders of the United States and the European Union in Washington, 

as well as the future of transatlantic ties.

Mr. BEREUTER. We have to solve that particular marriage crisis 

before we get to the one where one partner is retired and the other 

isn’t. Mr. Wexler, I appreciated your comments very much, and it 

was a pleasure and very helpful I think to spend some time recently on a trip to Prague with you. 

Without objection, all Members’ statements will be made a part 

of the record. And the full statements of the four witnesses will be 

entered into the record in their entirety. I would like to introduce 

the panelists. And I will to that just before each one presents their 

testimony. 

First, Dr. Simon Serfaty is the Director of European Program at 

the Center for Strategic and International Studies, CSIS, in Washington, DC. He is also a Professor of Foreign Policy at Old Dominion University in Virginia. Dr. Serfaty has also taught at the Johns 

Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, and served as 

the Director of the SAIS Center in Bologna, Italy. He is the author 

of several books and publications, including one which has been 

made available for this hearing. I believe it is this one. 

I think, since you are the prime attractions today, and since I 

think we are going to be uninterrupted for about two votes, I would 

like to give each of you up to 8 minutes for your summary. And 

Dr. Serfaty, you can go first. You may proceed as you wish. 

STATEMENT OF SIMON SERFATY, DIRECTOR, EUROPE PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL 

STUDIES 

Mr. SERFATY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to be 

here with my colleagues to engage into this discussion of the transatlantic partnership at this important moment. 

To conclude earlier references to the image of a marriage, let me 

suggest that Americans and Europeans are at the close of a 50-

year-old marriage. I am told that, after 50 years, love may be fading but that, nonetheless, interests between the two parties are 

such and so very entangled that there cannot be any divorce or 

7

even any meaningful separation. It just would be too complicated. 

And I believe that this is really the situation we face at this time. 

I will not use my few minutes to repeat what is included in the 

prepared statement I provided your Subcommittee and its staff earlier. Let me pursue the discussion that you, Mr. Chairman, and 

Mr. Wexler as well, initiated around three broad questions. Given 

the fact that there is indeed a transatlantic crisis, how serious is 

that crisis? How lasting? Second, assuming the crisis to be serious, 

how significant—should we care? Third, assuming that we should 

care, is the crisis reversible, and to what ends? 

That questions about the seriousness of the crises would be 

asked makes sense to me. There have been many such crisis in the 

past. The history of United States-European as well as interEuropean relations is a history of cooperation, to be sure, but it is also 

a history of discord. Those crises were always settled rather readily. A summit was enough, for example, in Paris in 1954, or in Williamsburg in 1983. Or an assertive display of U.S. leadership 

proved sufficient—in 1995 in Dayton, for example, other circumstances. 

My sense, however, is that this crisis is actually more serious 

than any of those we have seen in the past at both of its main levels, United States-European and interEuropean. I hold this view 

for three reasons. One, this is a crisis that cannot be reduced to 

any bilateral dimension, America and France—or America and Germany or even a united Europe and the United States. 

What we do have, in fact, is a situation whereby the Bush Administration could legitimately argue that it was acting with Europe, or at least most of Europe, in Iraq, while the French government could argue that it was speaking for the Europeans, or at 

least a majority of the Europeans during that same crisis. And that 

introduces into the crisis a complexity that we did not have in the 

past. As a result, Mr. Chairman, what was and remains heard from 

Europe is not anti-Americanism as usual. The recently released 

surveys released by the Pew Foundation a few days ago, as well 

as earlier polls in March and throughout the crisis reflect the depth 

of the divisions between the two sides of the Atlantic but also within Europe. 

Nor is this crisis limited to Iraq. If anything, it seems to me that 

it was easier to achieve followership from some of our European allies over Iraq than might have been the case for any number of 

other issues that will populate the agenda for the next several 

years, including the Middle East, for example, but also Iran, the 

pacification and reconstruction of Iraq, and, last but not least, 

North Korea. 

Accordingly, this is not a crisis that will be resolved as a single 

issue is settled. Rather the crisis is structural. It is as if America 

and Europe were now living in two different time zones. For Europe, a new time zone began on November 9 of 1989, when the end 

of the cold war seemed to introduce a new century of institutional 

peace on the continent after the two World Wars that had conditioned the 20th century. For the United States, of course, the clock 

began to tick on September 11 of 2001, which appeared to introduce a new century of global conflicts in the midst of which miliVerDate Mar 21 2002 15:37 Jul 28, 2003 Jkt 087670 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\EUROPE\061103\87670 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
8

tary power would have to be used assertively rather than the sort 

of institutional discipline to which the Europeans had become used. 

Which brings me to the second question. Given the reality of 

those tensions, should we care? Isn’t there enough preponderance 

in the United States as today’s sole real super power to live without its allies. In other words, how significant is this crisis? 

The answer to this question, Mr. Chairman, may well have more 

to do with interEuropean relations than with transatlantic relations. That such would be the case is first a matter of timing. The 

states of Europe were engaged in the completion of a process that 

began in 1957 when six of them launched a territorial revolution 

that would transform the nation states of Europe into member 

states of the institutions to which they belong. And in the context 

of the current crisis, with the divisions and the bitterness that developed over the past few months, it seems to me that the daunting 

agenda that they had envisioned for the years 2002–2007, regarding CSFP, but also with regard to enlargement, the development 

of a constitution, and the completion of economic monetary union 

has been significantly affected. 

I believe that there are now tensions within the EU that are 

more real than anything we have seen in the past. And I worry, 

therefore, about the troubled and troubling state of the European 

Union. And I worry about the union precisely because the EU has 

become a vital interest of the United States in the context of this 

irreversibly economic ties to which you, Mr. Wexler, referred. 

Now, there is a virtual economic state that links together America and Europe, represented by thirteen hundred billion dollars 

worth of corporate exchanges between American firms in Europe 

and European firms in the United States, and representing a labor 

force of 7.5 million people, as my colleague, Dan Hamilton, has so 

well explained in a study he recently released. And accordingly, it 

seems to me that the contemplation of a troubled EU, of a European continent that would fail to come to grip with new tensions 

resulting from this transatlantic crisis in Iraq is cause for worry. 

But enough gloom. Is the crisis reversible? Is there, in fact, a potential for moving beyond the tensions of the moment and avoiding 

the derailment of either one of the two institutions that define the 

West? I feel actually quite positive about our ability to overcome 

these tensions. The will is there. The will is there in America, but 

the will is also there in Europe, as was shown by the developments 

of the past few weeks. In this context, the talk of a ‘‘weak’’ Europe 

is simply overstated. Europe is not weak by any standard other 

than military power. In fact, outside of military power, the amount 

of economic, societal, political power available in Europe enables it 

to be viewed as a counterpart of American influence and power. 

And we must learn over the next several months and years to use 

that European power in order to complement United States policies 

in the pursuit of the common objectives and shared values that 

now define the West. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Simon Serfaty follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SIMON SERFATY, DIRECTOR, EUROPE PROGRAM, CENTER

FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I want to thank you for the 

invitation to appear before you today. I also want to congratulate you and your staff 

9

for your decision to hold these Hearings at this time. It is a privilege for me, as 

well as for my colleagues on this panel, to have this opportunity to discuss with you 

the current state of transatlantic relations and where this vital relationship may be 

heading in the future. 

Your letter, Mr. Chairman, raised several significant issues that grow logically out 

of the stormy debate that divided Americans and Europeans during the months that 

preceded the use of force in Iraq. I would like to regroup these issues around three 

main questions. 

• How serious is the current crisis? 

Is it merely another dispute over a single area of disagreement? Can it be reduced 

to a simple bilateral clash, especially with France, or to a confrontation with a small 

group of allegedly old European countries that are or can be readily isolated from 

the rest of the continent? Or could this crisis point to a deeper and wider cleavage 

between the two sides of the Atlantic and their respective roles in the world? 

• Assuming such a crisis to be serious, how significant is it? 

Do we need to worry about it—and should we, as Americans, fear that in a postCold War security environment, additionally transformed by the dramatic events of 

September 11, 2001, new instabilities will not be managed in the absence and at 

the expense of our like-minded allies and friends across the Atlantic? Or can we conclude instead that such a new security environment calls for a more fluid multilateral structure than the institutional architecture developed during and for the Cold 

War—a new multilateralism based on multiple coalitions of the willing, the capable, 

and the relevant for preempting the ‘‘new normalcy’’ of global terror inaugurated by 

9/11? 

• Assuming the crisis to be both serious and significant, how reversible is it? 

In other words, does the Atlantic Alliance now lie in rubble, notwithstanding the 

generally soothing tones heard at the G8 Summit held in Evian, France, earlier this 

month—and, equally important, are Europe and its Union now facing genuine risks 

of a divide that might end the process of European unification in a transatlantic 

context at the very moment when these processes seemed to be reaching finality? 

And assuming reversibility, what can be done in the short and long term to heal 

the wounds between heads of state and government, repair current institutional 

damage, and best ensure that the historically daunting vision launched by President 

Truman after World War II, and sustained by every single U.S. president during 

and since the end of the Cold War, can not only endure but also come to full completion? 

IS IT SERIOUS?

There should be little doubt that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 

and the European Union (EU) have been significant institutional casualties of the 

war in Iraq. European heads of state and government who joined the coalition of 

the willing organized by President George W. Bush (with a decisive assist from 

Prime Minister Tony Blair, as well as Prime Minister Jose ́ Maria Aznar and President Aleksander Kwasniewski) often did so in spite of significant opposition from 

their general public. States that gathered, vocally or passively, in the coalition of 

the unwilling organized by President Jacques Chirac (with a decisive assist from 

Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, as well as President Vladimir Putin) did so at the 

expense of a Euro-Atlantic structure within which the states of Europe have gained 

unprecedented security, stability, and prosperity. With the end of the U.S.-led coalition’s combat operations in Iraq, there appears to be renewed ambivalence in the 

United States about the condition and usefulness of these institutions. According to 

some, the EU is a troubled and troubling union: troubled in terms of its internal 

divisions, and troubling in terms of the motivation that seems to underline the actions of its older members. According to others (often the same), NATO is a fading 

Organization with a blocking minority of members that are not only unwilling but 

also broadly incapable and frankly irrelevant. 

We should be under no illusions. The most recent transatlantic debate, if that is 

the appropriate word, occurred on top of an ongoing debate that began in Europe 

after the end of the Cold War, but was accelerated after September 11 (9/11) in the 

United States. That debate confirmed that Americans and Europeans now move in 

two different time zones. While the European side of the Atlantic still celebrates the 

close of a century of total wars, which was welcomed on November 11, 1989, Americans prepare for a new century of global conflicts, which opened on September 11, 

2001. Thus, we as Americans may read the time as half past NATO, because of the 

successful pacification of most of the European continent since 1949, and the related 

10

imperative to turn our attention and energies to the ugly Hobbesian world that still 

prevails elsewhere. But ‘‘they’’ as Europeans can read the time as half before the 

EU, because of the unfinished nature of Europe’s unification within the newly discovered Kantian environment within which Europe now evolves. 

Mr. Chairman, what makes the current divide so very serious is the fact that it 

is between the United States as a whole and the whole of Europe. For Europe to 

believe that post-9/11 America is a passing phenomenon best explained with partisan references to the person of the president and a so-called neo-conservative philosophy, is to misrepresent the nation’s mood and its collective determination to 

wage battle against the criminal forces that made that ghastly day possible. Alternatively, for Americans to believe that the current divide can be limited to a single 

state, or that it can be reduced to a single issue, or that it can be confined to a 

single moment is equally misleading and even dangerously complacent.

• The current crisis is not a bilateral clash with one country intent on containing U.S. influence in and beyond Europe by organizing an ad hoc coalition 

of the unwilling for a new multipolar world. This, in other words, had nothing 

to do with the de ́ja` vu of past quarrels between the United States and France, 

or even the de ́ja` dit of French resistance to a unipolar world. Even as a near 

majority of heads of state and government in Europe sided with America during the pre-war months, through the so-called Letter of Eight and the Vilnus 

Letter, President Jacques Chirac could legitimately claim that France, together with Germany and Russia, was in fact speaking for the Europeans. 

Thus, by March 2003, the Pew Global Attitudes Project showed an overwhelming public opposition to the war in Iraq, even in such key allies as Poland (73 percent) and Italy and Spain (81 percent). Victory in Iraq hardly 

helped. Indeed, the reverse seems to be true as a 44-nations survey released 

by Pew earlier this month uncovered that the U.S. image has tumbled further 

in nearly every country for which benchmark measures are available.

Coming only 20 months after a spontaneous display of ‘‘complete solidarity’’ over 

the events of September 11, this surge of near total public hostility and mistrust 

is cause for concern. This is not anti-Americanism as usual—so predictable and 

nearly Pavlovian as to make it frankly boring. Mr. Chairman, this plummeting of 

the American image in 2002 and into the current year suggests a serious failure 

of public diplomacy that must be addressed urgently, especially as the many questions now raised about the conditions that made war necessary threaten to harm 

even further not only the American image in Europe and elsewhere but also the political standing of our closest allies and friends everywhere.

• Nor is this crisis limited to Iraq: indeed, putting aside Iraq we would still be 

facing a critical juncture within both the Atlantic Alliance and with the EU—

though without the passion shown over the past 12 years by repeated transatlantic and intra-European debates about regime change in Iraq.

In effect, the debate is more broadly focused on the kind of international order 

that can be built not only with predominant American power, acknowledged in Europe to be clearly necessary, and occasionally decisive, but also in spite and without 

that power. The risk for the United States, then, is to misunderstand the followership of a number of European countries this spring as a broader agreement over 

all kinds of other pressing foreign policy and security issues for which intra-European differences may be actually lesser than transatlantic differences. In recent 

weeks and during the coming months, for example, pursuit of the road map in the 

Middle East, an enhanced UN role for Iraq, the containment of Iran, and the disarming of North Korea may shape a ‘‘European’’ agenda about which Britain’s views 

(or those of Spain, Poland, or Italy) would parallel the positions maintained in Paris 

and Berlin (though not necessarily incompatible with the views held in Washington).

• Because of its broad dimensions, the crisis is, therefore, also bound to last for 

some time. Admittedly, the apparent end of combat operations in Iraq and abstention from any new imminent use of U.S. military power outside those 

areas where it is already engaged, the Bush administration’s commitment to 

pursing the road map drafted by the Quartet for peace in the Middle East, 

and the muting of earlier threats of ‘‘punishment’’ for some of our more recalcitrant allies seem to point to a reprieve in Euro-American tensions. But that 

reprieve is unlikely to last. Sooner or later, and sooner rather than later, 

there will be another challenge from the allies—not necessarily military but 

in other spheres of trade, economics, or even cultural issues; not necessarily 

with France or Germany leading the way, but with others—even the likes of 

11

Great Britain, Spain, or Poland—whose decision to join our coalition of the 

willing in 2003 may not prove possible under different security or political 

conditions in 2004 and beyond.

Mr. Chairman, the challenge we face in the context of what has been learned over 

the past several months is not over the need to reassert our common values. That, 

I believe, was not in question. No one on either side of the Atlantic was prepared 

to argue that a change of regime in Iraq would not be better for that country and 

its people, as well as their immediate neighbors, the entire region, and indeed the 

world. Nor was anyone prepared to argue that a world without or with fewer weapons of mass destruction (WMD), wherever these might actually be stockpiled or developed would not be preferable. As President Bush affirmed in his eloquent speech 

of May 30 in Krakow, ‘‘the whole civilized world has a stake in this fight.’’ The challenge is to think of ways in which the transatlantic community of values that 

emerged over the past 50 years can be transformed into a community of action 

whenever these values are recognized to be at risk. Whether in a Euro-Atlantic or 

an intra-European context, within NATO or within the EU, no such common action 

could be taken in the case of Iraq. That was a serious failure. 

DOES IT MATTER?

Outside Iraq, the current transatlantic crisis impacts two areas especially significant for the United States—its interests, its values, and its security:

• The unparalleled depth of U.S. economic interests in Europe, interests that 

cannot be protected, let alone enhanced, without an effective and cohesive European Union, and without effective relations between the EU and the United 

States, and

• The historic scope of the EU agenda, understood as an agenda designed to 

complete the process of integration that was inspired by visionary U.S. leadership more than 50 years ago, and has been pursued by persistent European 

leaders ever since.

For allies who have been so successful together, and who have grown such intimacy with each other, Americans and Europeans still fail to understand each other 

well, especially when it seems to matter most. For Americans, the institutional setting within which the countries of Europe now live is especially puzzling, not only 

because it remains incomplete but because its final chapters remain unpredictable—

‘‘the half-imagined, half-written page’’ evoked by William Butler Yeats in his postwar poem, ‘‘Nineteen Hundred and Nineteen’’ that helps remember how much of Europe’s history has been rewritten during the intervening years. In short, post-wars 

Europe remains a difficult partner to understand, address, and even use. 

Not enough Americans truly appreciate the enormity of what has been achieved 

in and by Europe since the Rome Treaties were signed in 1957 by a few states that 

had themselves no explicit vision for the future—beyond the elusive goal of an ‘‘ever 

closer union.’’ There is nothing old in the new Europe. As I stated in an earlier testimony for this Subcommittee two years ago, on April 25, 2001, Europe is now completing its third territorial revolution in half a millennium: at first, there were the 

city states; then, came the nation-states; and now, here are the member-states-elusive political units that attempt to accommodate the collective discipline imposed 

upon them by the institutions to which they belong, with the national sovereignty 

to which they continue to aspire nonetheless. While completing this territorial revolution, three to five hundred million Europeans are doing in their own habitat what 

a few hundred thousands of them set out to do, and did, on this side of the Atlantic 

more than 200 years ago. 

Not the least of my concerns is that recent tensions within Europe, often reinforced by some members’ legitimate exasperation with Franco-German exaggerated 

claims of dominance over the EU agenda, have complicated Europe’s quest for the 

so-called finality of its institutional construction. Looming ahead is a political civil 

war among states that will be more reluctant to make the various trade-offs needed 

to agree on a constitution, to enforce fair terms of enlargement after the 10 new 

members have assumed their legitimate place at the EU table, to complete the eurozone and proceed with economic union, and to live with the consequences of their 

proclaimed commitment to a common foreign, security, and (ultimately) defense policy. But looming ahead, too, are domestic political battles that will have to be waged 

within many of these countries where public opinion may not be ready to accept the 

intrusive consequences of the decisions taken by their governments without prior acquiescence from their national constituencies. In both of these areas—intergovernmental trade-offs and public support—the constitutional debate promises to be especially tense, and its consequences may prove to be especially significant as any refVerDate Mar 21 2002 15:37 Jul 28, 2003 Jkt 087670 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\EUROPE\061103\87670 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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erendum on a European constitution would be in act a referendum over continued 

membership in the Union. 

Mr. Chairman, I worry about the state of the (European) Union in the context 

of our transatlantic partnership with Europe because not only is the idea of a territorial consolidation of Europe an American idea, it is also an idea that has served 

U.S. interests well. There, across the Atlantic, now lies a continent where we should 

and can feel at home at last. But there, across the Atlantic, also lies a continent 

in which we can live well because there more than anywhere else outside North 

America our policies have had tangible benefits. The invisible tunnel that links the 

Old and the New World is paved with the $2,500 billion worth of yearly commercial 

transactions that now entangle nearly every one of the 50 states of our Union with 

each of the 15 current states of the European Union (not to mention the ten candidate states scheduled to join in 2004). How well we have done with each other 

is measured even more concretely by the entangling network of corporate interests 

that bridge the two sides of the Atlantic—a virtual state populated by thousands 

of U.S. firms in Europe, and European firms in the United States, with a labor force 

of nearly 7.5 million and a gross national product of about $1,300 billion a year, 

the total yearly output, that is, of these companies that for the most part did not 

exist a mere 50 years ago. Legislated sanctions from one side of the Atlantic against 

the other are no longer possible because the consequences of these sanctions are no 

longer divisible, no less across the Atlantic than within Europe. Economic harm to 

France and Germany, for example, is likely to cause harm on the rest of Europe, 

but harm on Europe is also likely to cause harm in the United States. 

On most economic matters already, including but not limited to trade, we deal 

with Europe as a single entity, and the EU has already emerged as the virtual sixteenth member of the union. The challenge for America is to use this potential counterweight as an effective counterpart—to rely on the EU’s economic strength and 

political influence in ways that are of benefit to all of us, Americans and Europeans. 

A counterweight need not be intrinsically adversarial, and with a transatlantic will 

to cooperate, on trade and other economic issues, there is little that cannot be accomplished, as was shown in successive rounds of trade negotiations and as should 

be shown for the current Doha round during which the efforts of U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick have been especially impressive and will hopefully be 

met with the needed responses from his EU counterpart Pascal Lamy, in order to 

meet the Doha agenda on schedule in January 2005. 

On foreign policy and security issues, however, there is no plausible alternative 

to dealing with individual EU countries, or ad hoc groupings of EU members. In 

early 2003, neither the Blair-Aznar nor the Chirac-Schroeder positions would have 

gained majority support within the EU by the standards of governance set at the 

Nice summit in December 2001 (or, most likely, by the standards of governance that 

President Vale ́ry Giscard d’Estaing wants to introduce in the constitutional draft he 

will propose at the EU Summit later this month). Dealing with individual European 

states is not an American choice, allegedly aimed at dividing the EU in order to reinforce U.S. influence in Europe. This condition is a European reality, based on Europe’s own inability to agree on significant foreign policy issues, about which they 

are unwilling to relinquish their sovereignty, whether within the EU or relative to 

the United States. Now as before, the larger EU countries, too, favor direct bilateral 

ties with the United States on most non-commercial matters. If anything, the trend 

was confirmed during the recent debate over Iraq. In the fall 2002, the French government came close to achieving an unprecedented status within the alliance. That 

it would have chosen to move in different directions after adoption of UN Security 

Council resolution 1441 would require separate analysis. Suffice it to say that by 

overplaying a weak hand, France did much damage to itself within Europe, a damage that Europeans themselves will now have to mend. But it also did much damage 

to the transatlantic partnership that President Bush began to heal during his successful trip earlier this month. 

There should be no misunderstanding: the EU has become a central, indeed irreplaceable part of its members’ future, including all the leading members of the socalled ‘‘new Europe.’’ Occasional suggestions that some of its members, including 

Britain, should be invited to join the North American Free Trade Association 

(NAFTA), or that the EU might split into sub-unions, as used to be the case when 

a Franco-German-led European Economic Community (EEC) co-existed with a UKled European Free Trade Association (EFTA), are politically dogmatic and historically absurd. More importantly, should these suggestions nevertheless come to pass 

they would profoundly harm the interests of the United States as well as those of 

all of Europe. 

Mr. Chairman, we must expose and end once and for all suggestions that the U.S. 

goal is to divide Europe, and if there is any such temptation, it should be contained 

13

and reversed. That has never been the case in the past, and need not be the case 

now. Voices that have articulated this view are often unauthorized views that have 

no echo in the administration—whether this administration or any of those that preceded it from either political party. American officials need to be better represented 

at significant public discussions of the transatlantic partnership to debate and deny 

such allegations. Anti-Americanism in Europe has become far too often dependent 

on the rhetorical provocations of America’s own version of anti-Europeanism, provocations that reduce Europe and some of its most important countries to a caricature 

of what they used to be, are, or hope to become. An increasingly united, institutionally coherent, and progressively stronger European Union is an important U.S. interest not only because the EU is vital to its members but also because it is essential to the preservation and enhancement of our own interests. Forcing any European country to choose between ‘‘old’’ states within the EU and the United States 

within NATO will not produce the expected results, and even if it did, the outcome 

would be self-defeating, as it would mean the end of the EU without any plausible 

alternative to replace it. 

In sum, the end of the Cold War in November 1989, and the start of the wars 

against global terrorism in September 2001, have created many new realities, alerted us to many new dangers, and opened us to many new tensions. But they have 

not changed our central aspirations for an ever-closer Europe and ever more cohesive transatlantic relations in and beyond Europe. That there would be some ambivalence about this conclusion confirms how serious the recent crisis has been and remains. But is the damage it has caused reversible? And if so, how? 

IS IT REVERSIBLE?

Admittedly, these lofty goals are endangered by the severity of the wounds suffered by the two institutions that best define the unity achieved in the West during 

the Cold War. Yet, however severe these wounds are, they need not be fatal. In 

other words, announcements of an impending death of NATO or of the EU, let alone 

of both, are exaggerated, deceptive, and frankly counterproductive to U.S. interests 

and values. 

That these institutional wounds can be cured is not a conclusion complacently 

based on the knowledge that the many other such moments faced in the past were 

readily overcome, and occasionally helped create more energy within Europe and 

more synergies between Europe and the United States. All too regretfully, some pessimism in 2003 can be healthy and even constructive: To mend the rift and renew 

the Alliance, we will need more than a telephone call or two, like those made by 

Chirac and accepted by Bush; more than an eloquent speech, like the President’s 

speech in Krakow on May 30; more than a moderately successful Summit, like the 

Evian Summit of June 1–3; and even more than a few concession speeches, like 

those heard at the UN when ending the sanctions against Iraq late last month. 

Rather, we need to reassert our commitment, on both sides of the Atlantic and 

in all parts of Europe, to the agenda of renewal and finality that was endorsed by 

all heads of states and government at the NATO and EU Summits held in Prague 

and Copenhagen late last year: in November 2002, when all NATO members endorsed blueprints for a cohesive and united organization at 26 members, ready to 

acquire the needed capabilities and make the required reforms to reassert its relevance to the global conflicts of the twenty-first century; and in December 2002, 

when all EU countries reaffirmed their commitment to a dynamic and stronger EU 

prepared for a constitutional convention in anticipation of its impending enlargement to 10 new countries. 

That the U.S. strategic vision of the world was transformed on September 11, 

2001 is amply justifiable. Most Europeans and a large number of their governments 

still fail to understand fully the impact of 9/11 on and in the United States. For 

most Americans, this was neither terror nor war as usual. Bringing the ‘‘over there’’ 

of war ‘‘over here’’ in continental America threatened to introduce a condition of vulnerability that may be compatible with the ways of European history but is not reflective of the American way. Unprecedented (though not exclusive) emphasis was 

therefore placed in the United States on military power, including its pre-emptive 

use in the aftermath of the ‘‘smoking gun’’ that had been uncovered that day in New 

York City and Washington. 

However understandable that emphasis is, relying on the restored primacy of 

military power for the denigration of a ‘‘weak’’ Europe is a flawed and self-defeating 

argument. By any standard other than military standards, Europe is indeed powerful—and in some areas of economic and soft power the equal of American power. 

In short, a more relevant dichotomy than ‘‘power and weakness’’ must therefore disVerDate Mar 21 2002 15:37 Jul 28, 2003 Jkt 087670 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\EUROPE\061103\87670 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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tinguish between power and order: however necessary military power is for security, 

it is not sufficient for order and stability. 

For many Americans, Europe’s neglect of military power, even as an escape from 

its past history of divisions and violence, seeks to appease the current threats and 

thus reinforces the risks that loom ahead. For many Europeans, the U.S. emphasis 

on power, even in the aftermath of September 11, seems so exclusive as to neglect 

the deeper causes of the threats that the use of force is designed to prevent or preempt. Because neither perspective is entirely wrong, neither perspective is entirely 

right either. Herein lies America’s need for Europe—and Europe’s need for America. 

This is not an argument for a division of labor that implies a rigidity that neither 

side could welcome for long. The case for complementarity within the Atlantic Alliance, as well as between its members and their institutions, is based on a new 

arithmetic of additions and subtractions rather than on the worn out arithmetic of 

divisions: what each ally does is added to what others do, but can also reduce what 

any one ally must otherwise do on its own. 

Complementarity begins, therefore, with an agreement over the legitimacy of our 

differences—what Prime Minister Blair called, in a recent speech in Warsaw, the 

difference between ‘‘subservience and rivalry.’’ There is no single U.S.-European interest—nor even a single European interest—on all matters, but interests can still 

be held in common even when they are not evenly shared. Common interests demand an action that can remain united even when the policies that shape that action are pursued only in parallel. In other words, the United States and the states 

of Europe cannot be expected to take on everything together, but together it must 

be expected that they can and will attend to everything. In this context, U.S.–EU 

cooperation to reach a settlement in Cyprus is a case in point. 

Admittedly, to become a complete security partner, Europe will have to become 

militarily capable—a condition that may remain beyond reach so long as most of its 

members (except Britain and, to an extent, France) fail to spend more, and so long 

as all of them fail to make the institutional adjustments needed to spend better. Unless Europe spends more and spends better, the many gaps that separate them from 

each other as well as from the United States will continue to expand: capabilities 

gaps, technology gaps, governance gaps, policy gaps, credibility gaps, and much 

more. In other words, while the crisis in Iraq has confirmed that divisions within 

the Alliance breed divisions within Europe, there cannot be more unity between the 

United States and Europe without more unity within Europe. Achieving the latter 

is not a U.S. responsibility, even though on occasion the United States has been 

given responsibility for instigating some of the divisions within Europe—whether 

appropriately or not. But beyond military power alone, the toolbox needed for both 

security and stability must be kept full enough to avoid war, wage it as a matter 

of last resort, win it at the least possible cost, and end it after it has been won. 

Whether the United States has enough military power to start and win wars on 

its own terms is beyond doubt; but that power alone may no longer be enough to 

prevent or even contain these wars. Moreover, because the tools of reconstruction 

and rehabilitation needed to end wars do not ‘‘belong’’ to the executive branch to 

the same extent as the tools needed for liberation, the United States must rely on 

significant contributions from allies and friends after the war has been won—to 

achieve pacification, initiate reconstruction, and pursue rehabilitation of the liberated state. Nor can the United States attend to these tasks with one European 

country, or a hand-picked coalition of willing European countries, more effectively 

than with most European members and the institutions to which they belong or 

which they hope to join. 

AN AGENDA FOR ACTION

To work out the terms of complementarity will not be easy. A shared political willingness may be lacking. Assuming that there is shared willingness, capabilities may 

also be lacking, or they may be so far out of balance as to make inter- or co-operability in the military and other areas difficult. Finally, assuming capabilities, time 

may be lacking—time, that is, to recover from the recent wounds and launch an 

agenda that would permit America and Europe to renew, retool, and define their 

new partnership for the twenty-first century. Still, a few items could readily find 

their way into a constructive agenda without too much time-consuming debate and 

on the basis of capabilities that are currently available. 

Thus, even as European countries attend to their daunting institutional agenda, 

more should be done to reassure Americans that they will continue to feel at home 

in Europe. Too much of what is achieved in the EU context is presented by some 

as evidence of Europe’s new ability to challenge the United States. Power is in the 

hands of the beholder: there is nothing intrinsically wrong about a unipolar world, 

15

as some in Europe insist, but there is nothing intrinsically wrong about a multipolar 

world, as some in the United States seem to assume. That such is not the case, and 

that Europe’s added weight can reinforce its stature as a partner of choice for the 

United States (whose dominant weight certainly served Europe well in the past) deserves explanations that NGOs can demonstrate on the field, and think tanks can 

provide far from the field, especially well. More directly, at the ongoing European 

Convention, at the upcoming Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), and with parliamentarians for appropriate issues and at appropriate levels, U.S. representatives 

should have the opportunity to observe proceedings and debates—not to participate 

and to influence, but to hear and to be influenced by their peers’ debates, as well 

as share with them their reactions and even their preferences. 

The issue is not one of U.S. membership in the EU or any of its distinctive institutional bodies, but one of association, dialogue, and cooperation before decisions are 

reached. At some point over the next five years, a mechanism should be adopted 

that allows more direct consultation between the United States and the institutional 

bodies of the EU. The current format of transatlantic (U.S.–EU) summit meetings 

does not satisfy that need. These meetings should help provide strategic direction 

and political momentum, rather than focus on insignificant points of commercial 

concern and political representation. All in all, the states of Europe should leave 

less doubt about their intention to build with their partner across the Atlantic the 

same intimacy that the United States built with the states of Europe within 

NATO—including, ultimately, some sort of a treaty that would be sought when both 

sides are ready for a transatlantic vision that was best articulated by President 

John F. Kennedy in July 1962. 

Meanwhile, even as America intensifies its efforts for a more effective public diplomacy in Europe, Europeans, grouped around their institutions, should improve 

their public dialogue in the United States. For too many Americans, the EU comes 

up primarily to describe barriers to U.S. exporters, obstacles to U.S. foreign direct 

investment, unfair competition for U.S. companies, offensive critics of U.S. values, 

and persistent rivals to U.S. interests. In short, the EU is mainly heard and understood as a dirty, anti-American word. Instead, the American public should gain better exposure to the extraordinary achievements written into the development of the 

EU. That Europe today would be more united, as well as more peaceful, more democratic and more affluent than at any time in history is a tribute to the work and 

vision of past leaders on both sides of the Atlantic. For the benefits of such achievements to be enjoyed by Americans and Europeans alike, and spread to others 

around the world as well, will require close cooperation between the United States 

and the EU. 

To this effect, plans should be made for a joint summit meeting of countries that 

currently belong to, or are about to enter, both of the institutions that together form 

the architecture of our Euro-Atlantic community. That meeting, which could be held 

as early as the spring of 2004, in the dual context of the NATO and EU enlargement 

to the east, would envision further steps to achieve a Euro-Atlantic finality that 

would be celebrated in March 2007, for the fiftieth anniversary of the Rome Treaties. At both of these summits Americans and Europeans should reassert a vigorous 

and credible commitment to common projects based on the values they share to such 

an extent that there can be no debate over the desirability of a common—and even 

single—transatlantic policy. Curing AIDS and controlling infectious diseases are certainly goals worthy of the civilization we share: what was said in Evian had been 

said before, but this time at last it should not be left undone for lack of will or lack 

of commitment. Coordinating aid and humanitarian assistance, and even agreeing 

on some general rules that might condition the distribution of that aid, should not 

be beyond the reach of the feasible. 

In coming months, too, every effort should be made to enforce the agenda developed at the Prague summit of November 2002, for the renewal and reorganization 

of NATO. The Bush administration did not receive enough credit for the Summit, 

which should have been understood as the reaffirmation of its commitment to the 

multilateral institutions inherited from the Cold War. Nor did Canada and the 17 

European members (plus the new seven candidate countries) receive the credit they 

deserved for their endorsement of the U.S.-driven agenda. Part of that credit should 

take the form of a renewed U.S. effort to permit the development of an integrated 

transatlantic defense market: in this area especially, there has been far too much 

talk and much too little action as the risks of two defense fortresses have grown 

rather than receded in recent years. 

As reflective of this shared transatlantic commitment to an alliance that would 

now have a global reach, NATO should be called upon to play a more important 

peacekeeping role in Iraq—and, when the time comes, NATO could also be a significant feature of the guarantees that will have to accompany the final enforcement 

16

of the road map calling for a Palestinian state within three years. In this context, 

the Quartet is a potentially useful tool that enables the United States to avoid some 

of the difficulties inherent in the bilateral management of European allies, but also 

enables the allies to exert influence, short of a veto right, as a sort of collective 

counterpart on issues about which they agree more among themselves than with the 

United States. The inclusion of Russia in the Quartet, together with the global legitimacy brought by the United Nations (UN), adds further weight to balance the 

United States—without, however, truly diluting the fact that the United States and 

the EU remain the operational core of the Quartet. In short, for some of the most 

pressing issues of the moment, the Quartet can be viewed as a multilateral venue 

that avoids an unwanted dependence on the institutional insufficiencies of the UN, 

NATO, and the EU. 

Finally, none of these suggestions, among many others, will be manageable without an improvement in significant bilateral relations between the United States and 

some of the states of Europe, but also among European states. Whatever causes for 

disappointment and even anger, the goal is not to punish but to engage, not to divide but to unite, not to forget but to forgive. ‘‘Most history is guessing, and the 

rest is prejudice’’ wrote Will and Ariel Durant in their monumental Story of Civilization. Mr. Chairman, I do confess to a prejudice, which is to view the development 

of U.S. policies in Europe as the most successful American foreign policy since 

World War II. That prejudice, but also the analytical background I attempted to provide in this short statement, are enough to convince me that the Atlantic Alliance 

is the basis of an indispensable partnership between North America and the states 

of Europe. 

That same ‘‘prejudice’’ but also recollections of the extraordinary transformation 

of Europe and its relations with America over the past 50 years, are also enough 

to convince me that, notwithstanding the tensions and bitterness of the past few 

months, the ‘‘West’’ is alive though ailing, and dynamic though weary. What is needed, therefore, is more, not less, integration so that our Western community of values 

and interests can be translated into a renewed community of action. Among themselves as a mutually shared right of first refusal, but also with new associates and 

partners, the members of the Alliance should be able to agree on some immediate 

priorities and certain key principles on how to define and counter these new threats. 

The ability to do so will define not only the rest of our lives, but possibly the lives 

of our children as well. It will also determine whether the ideas of European and 

transatlantic integration, which were launched along two parallel paths after World 

War II, and were refined—deepened and widened—throughout and since the Cold 

War, can now be completed by and between the United States and the states of Europe for the twenty-first century.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Dr. Serfaty. 

Next, we will hear from Daniel Hamilton, Richard von 

Weizsaecker Professor, and Director of the Center for Transatlantic 

Relations at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International 

Studies, Johns Hopkins University, and Executive Director of the 

American Consortium on EU studies. 

During 2001, he was the Daimler-Chrysler Fellow at the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, where he directed a study on the transatlantic implications of September 11th. 

Dr. Hamilton most recently served as Deputy Assistant Secretary 

of State for European Affairs. He was also United States Special 

Coordinator for Northern Europe and United States Special Coordinator for Southern European stabilization, among his other State 

Department positions. 

Dr. Hamilton, you may proceed as you wish. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF DANIEL HAMILTON, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR 

TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY 

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Wexler, Congresswoman Davis. It is a pleasure to be here. Like my colleague, 

I have a prepared statement which I submit for the record. I will 

17

just summarize it here,and to pick up on a number of the themes 

that you and your colleagues have already addressed. 

Just a brief review of the Iraq issue. I think it was a very damaging episode in transatlantic relations. Most of the wounds, it 

seems to me, were self-inflicted, and that it is not an exaggeration, 

as I think Simon said, to say that it is one of the gravest crises 

we have faced since the birth of the alliance. And I think it is instructive to maybe identify a few of the things that were different 

this time than in the past. 

We had an unprecedented degree of transatlantic recrimination 

and bitterness, really going beyond earlier times. 

We also had, I think, unparalleled disunity, not only between the 

United States and Europe, but within Europe itself, as Simon also 

indicated. And I think the tensions within Europe are just as important as the focus we have on tensions across the Atlantic. 

Third, we had an American Administration, Mr. Chairman, in 

my view, that actively, even eagerly, encouraged these divisions 

and worked to exploit European divisions and really tried to encourage the Europeans against each other. Not the best prospect 

for a relationship. 

And, finally, you had a German Chancellor who, for the first time 

since the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany, chose not 

only to tolerate opposition on policy differences with the United 

States, but encouraged a broader sentiment directed against American society at large, for which there is latent, although not overwhelming, support. And I think that was also damaging and unprecedented. 

And so, in short, this was a real brawl across the Atlantic. But 

I don’t think the differences on Iraq, per se, explain the depth of 

emotion or the bitterness that was felt, because, in my view, much 

of this was less about Iraq, per se, than about what our approaches 

to Iraq were saying about how we might deal with each other in 

the future. And that is the issue here. 

I would agree with Simon. In fact, my statement outlines in some 

detail my view that we are approaching the world and Europe and 

the United States through different foreign policy lenses today. For 

many Europeans, November 9, 1989—the day the Berlin Wall 

fell—represents a framework in which to understand developments 

in Europe and the broader world. When people on the other side 

of that wall said we want to return to Europe, they unleashed an 

earthquake that is still shaking the European continent and is 

transforming the way Europeans are dealing with each other in a 

very, very positive sense. It is a goal of a Europe, whole, free, and 

at peace with itself. We might not quite have achieved this goal 

yet, but we can see it from here. It is a goal that Americans have 

shared and successive Administrations have helped to contribute 

to. But it overwhelms European attention. It is the focus of European efforts today. 

I believe Americans also felt November 9th was a catalytic event 

for them, until September 11th; and that, on that day, November 

9th became a bookend to an era of transition, and that many Americans today are focused on simply a different type of prospect of 

this world. In fact, I would go so far to say that the debate we are 

having in this country is analogous to the debate we had in the late 

18

1940s and early 1950s in this country about how to organize ourselves after World War II. And it perhaps is briefly instructive to 

compare the two debates, because at that time, Europe was the 

central focus of American foreign policy. How to stabilize Europe 

was much of what American foreign policy was about in the 20th 

century. Europe was the flash point of two World Wars, and then 

became the front line in a global cold war. One half of Europe was 

threatened, the other half was the danger. 

Today, however, I think Americans believe they are on the frontline, not western Europe. And that the danger doesn’t emanate 

from another part of Europe anymore; it emanates from beyond 

Europe. We simply have a different approach now. And the role 

and the view and the place of Europe in this type of debate is unclear because it is no longer about Europe. 

It also says something about our approach to issues. The November 9th perspective says the worst is behind us. The September 

11th perspective says perhaps the worst is still to come. November 

9th tells Europeans that if they work together, they may be able 

finally, in their history, to manage their own security. September 

11th tells us that, alone, we may not be able to ensure our own security for the first time in our history. The November 9th perspective says the management of global dangers, while important, is 

less an immediate priority than the historic opportunity to transform Europe itself. But the September 11th perspective says that 

a Europe whole and free, and at peace with itself, is basically here. 

So, the more immediate priority now is to transform global relations to meet these new threats. 

I believe we approach issues such as Iraq then from different 

perspectives. Does that mean divorce is inevitable? I would agree 

with you, Mr. Chairman, the answer is no. But how we pick up the 

pieces now is part of the challenge. 

We have no way of having a transatlantic divorce because of our 

economic integration, as Mr. Wexler outlined, and our center’s 

study, Drifting Apart or Growing Together? The Primacy of the 

Transatlantic Economy, which, I think, we provided to the Committee also details with many facts. But we would also be less secure without a European partnership. And the characterization of 

some sort of dichotomy between American power and European 

weakness is a caricature. Europe is powerful in every sense, including militarily. Compared to the United States, they might not be. 

But as the second largest concentration of military power, the ability of Europeans to project power is, compared with most countries, 

really quite important. 

There are also different dimensions of power. We can win wars 

perhaps without many allies, but we can’t secure the peace without 

allies, as we see in Iraq or in Afghanistan. We need peace-winning 

allies. And the tools of peace-winning are European strengths. 

When it comes to reconstruction, post conflict rehabilitation, aid, 

trade, all of the instruments of peace winning, these are complementary strengths to the war-winning strengths of Americans. 

So, it seems to me, our challenge is to reconcile the November 

9th perspective with the September 11th perspective. It seems that 

we do that with three basic bargains. One is, we support a strong 

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weight or as a rival. That is not a self-evident bargain these days, 

and I believe it is important that we get both sides of that bargain 

right. 

The second is to recognize that this relationship is still distinctive than any other relationship this country has with any other 

power or group of powers in this world in this one sense: When we 

agree, we drive any global coalition that is effective; when we disagree, we stop everything. No effective global coalition will exist 

without that transatlantic core. The Bush Administration has put 

this premise to the test in Iraq, and it is a mess. The EU put this 

premise to the test with the Kyoto climate change protocol, and 

that is a mess. I think we have to remember that basic distinctiveness of the relationship. 

And the final bargain, it seems to me, is that if we agree to listen 

to European concerns, they agree to build the capabilities that they 

need to still work on to act and to project their influence with us 

around the world. 

So, to sum up, Mr. Chairman, to get the relationship back on 

track, it seems to me beyond these bargains we have to not dwell 

on the past or apportion blame, but to try to work on common 

projects. And, as I look ahead, I see four that are of highest priority. 

The first is the transformation of the greater Middle East itself. 

We can approach these issues, Iraq, Afghanistan, Middle East 

peace in their own little boxes. But if you look at the region as a 

whole, it is an area where unsettled relationships, conflicts, religious disputes all brew and bubble on a contiguous energy field 

upon which Western prosperity depends. The question of whether 

the Arab world will successfully modernize and transform is the 

strategic challenge of our time. And if Europe and America can 

work together on this challenge, we will all be better off. 

The second priority is to have a serious discussion across the Atlantic on the conception of what constitutes strategic stability today 

in this world. During the cold war, we had two super powers who, 

despite their animosity, had rules of the road, they had negotiations, and the principle of deterrence had some influence on their 

behavior. In today’s world, terrorists are not deterred by suicide. 

We have a different nature of threat. We don’t know what the rules 

of the road are of other nuclear states or groups. They don’t sit at 

negotiating tables. We have to join together different elements of 

our strategic posture and wrap them into a comprehensive approach. And it is a sad fact, it seems to me, that there is a not a 

systematic strategic dialogue occurring across the Atlantic. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Dr. Hamilton, could you mention your last two, 

briefly, please. 

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes. The third is Transatlantic Homeland Security. We will not be successful in our approaches to Homeland Security unless we consider it together with our allies and partners 

across the Atlantic. Uneven Transatlantic Homeland Security 

means one part of the Atlantic will be more vulnerable than the 

other, and there is a whole range of areas from transportation security to bioterrorism preparedness we can work on together. The 

fourth priority is what I would call transatlantic governance. Our 

citizens and our economies are interacting more with each other 

20

than ever before in our history. As Mr. Wexler said, the 

counterintuitive fact is that our societies are actually smashing 

into each other; we are not drifting apart. And that creates new 

problems for governance across the Atlantic, from competition policy to our aviation policies, securities and issues, how we manage 

our financial relations. They are challenging domestic agencies in 

how they can deal across the Atlantic. We require a new framework to cope with frictions that result from our growing closeness, 

rather than our growing distance. I think it is an attractive agenda, in fact, particularly for U.S.-EU relations. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Daniel Hamilton follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DANIEL HAMILTON, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to appear before you and your colleagues today 

to discuss the transatlantic relationship after Iraq. 

It is important that we do so, because the transatlantic partnership was a key 

casualty of the Iraqi war, and most of the wounds were self-inflicted. It is not an 

exaggeration to say that differences over Iraq produced the gravest crisis in transatlantic relations since the birth of the Atlantic Alliance. Of course, we have experienced many transatlantic squabbles over past decades. But our not-so-friendly fire 

over Iraq contained new and troubling elements. 

First, the degree of transatlantic recrimination and bitterness was unprecedented. 

Second, our disunity was unparalleled, both across the Atlantic and throughout Europe itself. Third, for the first time since the end of World War II an American administration actively, even eagerly, encouraged and exploited divisions that set Europeans against one another. Fourth, for the first time since the founding of the 

Federal Republic of Germany, a German Chancellor abandoned his traditional role 

of mediating between Paris and Washington, tied German fortunes to Gallic ambition, and in fact went beyond specific policy differences with Washington to encourage deeper currents of criticism in Germany—and elsewhere—that consider the 

United States to be a greater threat to world peace than those who would threaten 

the Atlantic community. 

Policy differences over a host of other issues beyond Iraq have exacerbated matters. European concerns have been fueled by the Bush Administration’s refusal to 

participate in international agreements ranging from the International Criminal 

Court and the Kyoto Protocol on climate change to a worldwide ban on antipersonnel land mines, a global treaty to protect biodiversity, a verification mechanism for the Biological Weapons Control Treaty, and the Comprehensive Test Ban 

Treaty. Europeans have been critical of the Bush Administration’s treatment of suspected individuals in the United States and suspected terrorist fighters being held 

at Guantanamo Bay naval station in Cuba, its pullout from the Antiballistic Missile 

Treaty, its neglect of the Arab-Israeli peace process, and its embrace of preemptive 

military action as a foreign policy doctrine. 

Americans often retort that their European friends seem eager to lecture Americans about U.S. failings but unwilling to spend the money necessary to make European troops effective, are too absorbed with the details of deeper and wider European integration to recognize the dangers posed by terrorists wielding weapons of 

mass destruction, are eager to trumpet ‘‘noble’’ multilateralist instincts in contrast 

to America’s ‘‘retrograde’’ unilateralism (except when it comes to international rules 

that do not support EU preferences), and have failed to advance economic reforms 

that could sustain European prosperity or anchor world growth in the New Economy. Some accuse Europeans of using antagonism towards the United States as a 

way of defining their own identity. 

These quarrels on international issues are exacerbated by a series of transatlantic 

spats over such traditionally domestic issues as food safety, corporate governance, 

the death penalty, data privacy, freedom of speech and religion, and a range of other 

civil liberties. 

In short, Iraq was a real transatlantic brawl, but differences on that issue alone 

do not explain the emotional or broad-based nature of transatlantic recrimination 

and bitterness. That is because much of the debate both within and between Europe 

and America has been less about Iraq itself and more about what our approaches 

to Iraq may say about how Europeans and Americans may be approaching interVerDate Mar 21 2002 15:37 Jul 28, 2003 Jkt 087670 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\EUROPE\061103\87670 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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national relations in the 21st century, and the nature of our future partnership. 

Transatlantic squabbles are nothing new. But they are taking place in a new context. And in this debate, personalities, policies, catalytic events, and deeper structural changes of world politics all play a role. 

THE NOVEMBER 9 AND SEPTEMBER 11 VIEWS OF THE WORLD

Europeans and Americans are each presently engaged in a rather fluid debate 

about the future direction of their roles in the world, and increasingly appear to be 

viewing international issues through different foreign policy lenses. Each view is 

framed by a separate catalytic event, and, depending on the outcome of our respective debates, each of us may come to view the other in a new light. 

For most Europeans the catalytic event framing much of their foreign and security policy remains the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989 and the accompanying collapse of the Soviet Union and European communism. When the people 

on the streets of Central and Eastern Europe brought down the Iron Curtain with 

their collective cry, ‘‘We want to return to Europe,’’ they unleashed an earthquake 

that is still shaking the continent and its institutions. Europeans are engaged in 

a period of fundamental transformation of their continent, marked by the introduction of a single currency, the Euro; enlargement to 10 new members within the next 

year; serious debates about reforming post-communist economies and retooling social welfare economies that have been the mainstay of Europe for half a century; 

and a ‘‘constitutional convention’’ and an intergovernmental conference intended to 

transform Europe’s basic institutions and to define a role for Europe in this new 

century. Together, these developments represent an historic opportunity to build a 

continent that is truly whole, free and at peace with itself. It is a goal that Americans share, and to which the United States has contributed significantly. But it continues to absorb—almost overwhelm—European energy and attention. 

For most Americans, November 9 also played a catalytic role, and informed much 

of U.S. foreign policy in the ensuing decade. But in American public consciousness 

the horrific events of September 11, 2001 have transformed November 9, 1989 into 

a bookend to an era of transition to a new and newly dangerous century. September 

11 has unleashed a very fundamental debate in this country about the nature and 

purpose of America’s role in the world. 

In many ways, the current debate is analogous to the period of the late 1940s and 

early 1950s, when America had won a war but not yet found a role. In that period, 

the notion of ‘‘containment’’ emerged as an organizing principle for American foreign 

policy. In many ways, the events of November 9, 1989 represented the logical conclusion—and triumph—of that policy. 

Today, the debate is how the threat of terrorism, joined to the proliferation of 

weapons of mass destruction, should lead the U.S. to reframe its foreign and security policy. 

As Americans engage in this debate, some differences with the containment debate of the late 1940s are instructive for transatlantic relations. Then, Americans 

believed that one part of Europe was the front line and another part of Europe 

posed grave dangers. As a consequence, the central premise and preoccupation of 

U.S. foreign policy was the need for European stability. Today, Americans believe 

they themselves are on the front line, and the danger no longer emanates from Europe, but from beyond it. Europe, as a consequence, having already been ‘‘won,’’ is 

seen increasingly by some in the Bush Administration more as a platform than a 

partner in its new global campaign. 

These lenses explain somewhat differing American and European approaches to 

current issues. The November 9 world is one of promise, of new possibilities. The 

September 11 world is one of tragedy, of new dangers. The November 9th perspective says the worst is over. The September 11 perspective says the worst is yet to 

come. November 9th tells Europeans that if they work together, they may be able 

together to manage the security of their continent for the first time in their history. 

September 11 tells Americans that, by ourselves, we may not be able to ensure the 

security of our homeland for the first time in our history. The November 9th view 

says the management of global dangers, while important, is a less immediate priority than the historic opportunity to transform European relations. The September 

11 view says that in its basic contours a Europe whole and free is already here; the 

priority challenge now is to transform global relations to meet new threats. 

As each of our debates proceeds, there is a lazy temptation to use the other—or 

more typically, a caricature of the other—as an instrument with which to bash one’s 

domestic opponents and to advance one’s own political agenda. I don’t want to spend 

much time on the gratuitous insults and cartoon images, the self-righteous 

triumphalism or the hollow posturing of recent months, except to say that style and 

22

1For details on deeper transatlantic integration, see Joseph Quinlan, Drifting Apart or Growing Together? The Primacy of the Transatlantic Economy (Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins SAIS, 2003). 

tone matter, and it should give us pause to see the eagerness with which so many 

on each side of the Atlantic have been willing to sweep away facts and interests 

for the sake of a good stereotype. 

These differing perspectives are serious, and should be taken seriously. But are 

these views irreconcilable? Is transatlantic divorce inevitable? 

The short answer is no, and for a simple reason: we can’t afford it. 

AMERICA’S STAKE IN EUROPE’S FUTURE

Mr. Chairman, a weaker transatlantic bond would render Americans and Europeans less prosperous, less secure, and less able to advance either our ideals or our 

interests in the wider world. 

We will be less prosperous. It is fashionable to suggest that Europeans and Americans are drifting apart. Yet our citizens tell us a different story. Every single indicator of societal interaction—whether flows of money, services, investments, people 

or ideas—underscores a startling fact: our societies are not drifting apart, they are 

growing closer together. The years since the Cold War—the years when the fading 

‘‘glue’’ of the Cold War partnership supposedly loosened transatlantic ties—marked 

in fact one of the most intense periods of transatlantic integration ever. 

One of the most dangerous deficits affecting transatlantic relations today is not 

one of trade, payments or military capabilities but rather a deficit in understanding 

by opinion leaders—in and out of government—of the vital stake Americans and Europeans have developed in the health of our respective economies. The political, economic and media errors that result from this deficit are shortchanging American 

and European consumers, producers, workers and their families. 

The facts are straight forward yet rarely acknowledged. Despite the perennial 

hype about the significance of Nafta, the ‘‘rise of Asia’’ or ‘‘big emerging markets,’’ 

the United States and Europe remain by far each other’s most important commercial partners. The $2.5 trillion transatlantic economy employs over 12 million workers on both sides of the Atlantic who enjoy high wages, high labor and environmental standards, and open, largely non-discriminatory access to each other’s markets. The economic relationship between the United States and Europe is by a wide 

margin the deepest and broadest between any two continents in history—and those 

ties are accelerating.1

Lost in headline stories about banana, beef or steel disputes are two critical facts. 

First, these squabbles represent less than 1% of overall transatlantic economic activity. Second, trade rows themselves are a misleading benchmark of transatlantic 

economic interaction, since trade itself accounts for less than 20% of transatlantic 

commerce. Foreign investment is the backbone of the transatlantic economy, not 

trade, and contrary to common wisdom, most U.S. and European investments flow 

to each other, rather than to lower-wage developing nations. Our companies invest 

more in each other’s economies than they do in the entire rest of the world put together. Such investments are creating jobs for American and European workers, 

profits for American companies, and better choices for American consumers. They 

fusing our societies together far more tightly than the shallow form of integration 

represented by trade flows. 

Over the past eight years alone American investment in the tiny Netherlands 

alone was twice what it was in Mexico and 10 times what it was in China. Europe, 

not Asia or Latin America, is the most profitable place in the world for American 

companies: U.S. companies rely on Europe for over half their total annual foreign 

profits. America’s asset base in the United Kingdom alone is roughly equivalent to 

the combined overseas affiliate asset base of Asia, Latin America, Africa and the 

Middle East. Two-thirds of American corporate international R&D is in Europe, and 

two-thirds of the world’s industrial R&D in concentrated in Europe and the United 

States. Moreover, European companies account for a significant percent of all US 

portfolio inflows—not insignificant for the world’s largest debtor nation, which has 

to borrow more than $1 billion a day to finance its record current account deficits. 

By the same token, Europeans have never been as dependent on American prosperity as they are today. In fact, Europe’s investment stake in America is one-quarter larger than America’s stake in Europe. There is more European investment in 

Texas than all American investment in Japan. German affiliate sales in the U.S. 

are more than four times greater than German exports to the U.S.—a dramatic comparison given that Germany traditionally has been considered a classic ‘‘trading’’ nation. The bulk of corporate America’s overseas workforce does not toil in low-wage 

23

nations like Mexico and China. Rather, they are employed in relatively well-paying 

jobs in Europe. The manufacturing workforce of U.S. affiliates in Germany is double 

the number of manufacturing workers employed by U.S. foreign affiliates in China. 

The number in the UK is five times what it is in China. 

Of course our companies are economic rivals. But so many have fused it is difficult to tell whether they are ‘‘European’’ or ‘‘American.’’ If the Congress wants to 

punish ‘‘German’’ or ‘‘French’’ companies these days because of their government’s 

policies toward Iraq, they are likely to put American workers in Illinois, Texas, 

South Carolina or California out of a job. 

For workers and consumers, economics is not a zero-sum game. If Europe grows, 

Americans prosper. If Europe builds a larger single market without barriers to commerce, Americans profit. Since the European market is so large, a 2% growth rate 

there would create a new world market bigger than Taiwan itself. Unfortunately, 

the Congress and the Bush Administration, together with their EU counterparts, 

have become trapped by mercantilist trade rhetoric. Our trade competition with Europe is not war by other means, but officials and politicians on both sides of the 

Atlantic find it politically attractive to portray the other as a relentless foe in a 

struggle for global market share. This makes it increasingly difficult to focus on our 

much more fundamental common interests in advancing multilateral trade liberalization through the Doha Round, or to build policies that address our growing interdependence. Over time such posturing creates the impression among our publics and 

our media that our relationship is more adversarial than complementary, and we 

are all poorer for it. 

If one uses Tom Friedman’s definition of globalization as farther, faster, deeper 

and cheaper integration at inter-continental distances, then globalization is advancing farthest, fastest, deepest and cheapest between the continents of Europe and 

North America. The networks of interdependence that are being created across the 

Atlantic have become so dense, in fact, that they have attained a quality far different than those either continent has with any other. Many transatlantic tensions 

result less from the fashionable notion that our societies are drifting apart, and 

more from the growing evidence that they are in fact drawing closer together. Often 

these frictions are so severe precisely because they are not traditional ‘‘at-the-border’’ trade disputes, but reach beyond the border and affect such fundamental domestic issues as the ways Americans and Europeans are taxed, how our societies 

are governed, or how our economies are regulated. 

These issues go to the heart of globalization. If globalization is going to proceed 

in ways that make Americans, Europeans, and others more prosperous and secure, 

the U.S. and Europe will have to show that they can deal with the challenges generated by the deep integration of our economies. If the U.S. cannot resolve such differences with Europe, it is unlikely to resolve them with economies much less like 

its own. The possibilities—and potential limits—of globalization are likely to be defined first and foremost by the successes or failures of the transatlantic relationship. 

We will be less secure. In the post-post Cold War world, Americans share a 

strange sense that we are uniquely powerful and uniquely vulnerable at the same 

time, and that the fact of our power may not help us to cope with our 

vulnerabilities, which may derive as much from whom we are as a society as from 

what we do as a government. On September 11, in fact, we learned that perhaps 

our greatest strength—our free society—could be used against us. The attack on the 

World Trade Center was not only an attack on freedom, it was, as The Economist

noted, ‘‘an attack through freedom.’’ Al-Qaeda used the very instruments of a free 

society to achieve their murderous aims. 

In short, power is relative to influence. The mere fact of power does not necessarily mean it can be wielded effectively to maintain order or to enhance stability. 

This is why the prevailing caricature of ‘‘American power and European weakness’’ 

is so fatally flawed. 

First, by any standard, Europeans are powerful: they boast a multi-trillion Euro 

economy, generate a tremendous amount of innovation and technology to the world, 

possess the second largest concentration of sophisticated military power on earth, 

are leagues ahead of all others except the United States in their ability to project 

and deploy their military capacity, are the largest source of humanitarian aid and 

economic assistance in the world, are represented strongly in international organizations, and are the only other grouping of nations with a history of leadership, a tradition of advocating universal values based on democracy and the rule of law, and 

24

2For a detailed view of Europe’s potential as a global partner, see David Gompert and F. Stephen Larrabee, ed., America and Europe: A Partnership for a New Era (Cambridge: Cambridge 

University Press, 1996) 3 ‘‘Europe is too powerful to be ignored,’’ Financial Times, March 11, 2003, p. 13. 

a sense of global responsibility.2 Together with the United States Europe is the core 

of a robust, largely democratic, market-oriented zone of peace and prosperity that 

encompasses more than two-thirds of the world economy. 

Second, those who advance the proposition of American power and European 

weakness reduce the concept of power to its purely military component—a simplistic, unidimensional view of power in a complex, multidimensional world. It’s like 

being forced to watch a black and white, reel-to-reel movie on the wall of your basement when you know the full-color, digital SurroundSound version is playing in the 

theatre next door. Of course there is no substitute for effective military power when 

it comes to certain dangers. But in the post-September 11 world, power is distributed differently on different issues and, as Joseph Nye reminds us, resembles a 

three dimensional chessboard. On military issues, the world certainly is unipolar. 

But on economic issues, as I described above, the world is multipolar, and on the 

third level of play—transnational issues outside the control of governments—power 

is chaotically organized and it makes no sense to speak of a unipolar moment. 

‘‘Those who focus on only one board in a three-dimensional game are likely to lose 

in the long run,’’ 3 Nye cautions. Inordinate attention to one dimension of power deprives you of other tools in your tool box and blinds you to problems for which military power may not be the answer—WMD terrorism, or the peaceful reconstruction 

and rehabilitation of failed or rogue states such as Afghanistan or Iraq, for example. 

Few great goals in this world can be reached without America, but few can be 

reached by America alone. The American people are unlikely to support an approach 

to the world that makes every problem our problem and then sends our warriors 

to conduct our foreign policy. In this era of shadowy networks and bioterrorists, 

failed states and recession, the only way we can share our burdens, extend our influence, and achieve our goals will often be by banding together with others, particularly our core allies. 

U.S. military capabilities are vast. But fire power is not staying power. We can 

win wars without allies, but we can only secure peace with allies. And the most essential allies for winning the pace are our European partners, because the tools of 

peace-winning—trade, aid, peacekeeping, monitoring and policing—are European 

strengths. Europe delivers 70 percent of global civilian development assistance—

four times more than the United States. 90 percent of international aid to Afghanistan flows from Europe. European troops are keeping the peace in trouble spots 

ranging from Afghanistan to Cyprus to Macedonia to Guatemala to Eritrea to the 

Congo. In fact, EU members and applicants contribute 10 times as many police 

forces and peacekeeping troops as the United States. 

Third, we are most likely both to win the wars and secure the peace if our power 

is perceived to be legitimate. The genius of the American-led system constructed 

after the collapse of Europe, following two world wars, was that it was perceived 

to be legitimate by those within its ambit. We have not enjoyed the West’s sixtyyear peace just because our countries are democracies (although democracy is a 

major contributor!), but because we built our success on a dense network of security, 

economy and society, and because those who are our partners have come to believe 

that, by and large, they have had a voice in the overall direction of this community. 

This American-led framework has enabled us to avoid older, more tragic approaches 

to international relations, such as balancing or containing latent rivals within our 

community, by giving others a stake in our success and thus undercutting any motive or opportunity for confrontation by other powers. 

The effective use of power includes the ability not just to twist arms but to shape 

preferences and frame choices—to get others to conceive of their interests and goals 

in ways compatible with ours. As the EU’s foreign policy representative (and former 

NATO Secretary General) Javier Solana has recently reminded us, ‘‘Getting others 

to want what you want can be much more efficient than getting others to do what 

you want.’’

In short, the widely perceived legitimacy of American leadership was essential to 

American success in the past century. It remains essential if we are to wield our 

unprecedented power effectively today. Legitimacy, in turn, depends on creating a 

wide international consensus on controversial issues. Previous U.S. engagement on 

difficult issues—from the Persian Gulf war to Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan—enjoyed enormous international support. U.S. engagement in Iraq did not. In a matter 

of only eighteen months the Bush Administration squandered the tremendous political capital it had amassed following the September 11 attacks, and the huge 

25

resentments generated by the U.S.-led preemptive war, including in such allied 

countries as Britain, Spain and Italy, is acting as a cancer on the relationship. 

As a result, the global legitimacy of American leadership has become a defining 

issue for transatlantic relations and the measure of the Bush presidency well beyond Iraq. The U.S. cannot lead unless others choose to follow, and they will not 

make that choice over and over again unless their perceive it to be in their own best 

interests to do so. This depends on the degree of confidence they have in Washington’s capacity to cope with core challenges, and whether they way in which we do 

so is perceived to be legitimate. The best evidence is North Korea, where we are 

stymied. We cannot antagonize the international community on one issue and then 

expect it to accommodate us on another. 

‘‘If American relinquishes respect and affection in favor of fear and coercion, the 

world will be a colder and more frightening place,’’ John F. Kennedy reminded us 

at American University thirty years ago. A U.S. without the umbilical links to its 

core partners in Europe provided through a revamped NATO Alliance and more effective US–EU channels is an isolated America adrift in a hostile world, a power 

without peers but also a power without reliable partners. 

Posses may be a last resort if the sheriff is desperate and alone. But they tend 

to be rather motley, unreliable affairs. Outlaws armed with weapons of mass destruction are more likely to be subdued by organized forces of law and order that 

employ their power through the consent and prescription of their communities. Any 

approach that willfully seeks to disparage or diminish those forces in favor of whatever international posse we can rustle up shortchanges American security, American 

prosperity, and American freedom. 

Similarly, U.S. efforts to pit some parts of Europe against others is a reversal of 

American support, over six decades, of an ever closer European union, and threaten 

to return that continent to the very pattern of history that in the last century 

brought untold tragedy, not only to Europe but to America and the wider world. 

Such efforts are as inept as they are dangerous, and must be rejected. 

A NEW ATLANTICISM

A new Atlanticism begins by resisting the easy temptation to cast one’s partner 

as the Ugly Other. It also means rejecting lazy ‘‘division of labor’’ arguments. These 

come in two guises. The first says that we should simply stop trying to reconcile 

our efforts: Europeans should manage European security and Americans should 

manage global security. This would be a disaster of the first magnitude, for it would 

leave the U.S. with the more demanding and dangerous assignment by far, relieve 

Europeans of any broader sense of responsibility, and place Europe’s broader global 

security interests in Washington’s hands. It would reinforce European inwardness, 

diminish U.S. influence in Europe, generate new resentments, and corrode our partnership. 

The second version says, since Europe will never catch up to the U.S. in terms 

of military capabilities, it shouldn’t even try. Likewise, since the U.S. will never allocate the resources or develop the inclination for post-conflict civilian peacekeeping, 

monitoring, or rehabilitation, it shouldn’t pretend that it could. Instead of each partner working fruitlessly on its relative weakness, let each partner play to its 

strength: the Americans do the dirty military work and the Europeans do the postconflict cleanup. This is a seductive idea, but again puts U.S. soldiers primarily in 

harm’s way, generating resentment in America; and forces Europeans to clean up 

interventions about which they had little voice, thus reinforcing European 

resentments. Ultimately, such a division of labor would lead to a division of perspective and ultimately divorce, by reinforcing European tendencies to think all conflicts 

can be managed through civilian power and reinforcing American tendencies to 

apply military solutions to non-military problems. 

These are false choices. Our real choice must be a complementary sense of risk 

and responsibility that aligns our respective strengths (and minimizes our respective weaknesses) to respond to the challenges that face our community. This means, 

as matters of priority, greater European efforts to build more effective military capabilities, and greater American support for more effective and sustainable U.S. capabilities in post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation. 

Viewing the world primarily through a November 9 or a September 11 perspective 

is like trying to see though prescription glasses with one lens missing. Much is 

sharp, much is blurred, and the result is a headache. Our common challenge is to 

see through both lenses, to reconcile the promise offered by November 9 with the 

challenges posed by September 11—to reconcile Europe’s grand experiment of integration with a reorientation and strategic transformation of transatlantic relations 

to create a new model, and a new focus, for our partnership. 

26

Taken together, November 9 and September 11 convey a single message. We 

should trade in our old transatlantic barometer, which measured the health of our 

partnership by the degree of U.S. engagement on the European continent, for a new 

measuring stick, which gauges the ability of the United States and Europe to cope—

together—with the promises and dangers of globalization. If the fall of the Berlin 

Wall was the triumph of globalization’s positive elements, the fall of the World 

Trade Tower was the shuddering response by its darker forces. Seen in this way, 

November 9 and September 11 convey both opportunity and obligation to recast our 

partnership, and with it the international system. In fact, two major results of the 

post-November 9 world—peace among the Great Powers and the potential for a 

strong, united Europe at peace with itself—can be major assets in the campaign to 

confront the challenges of the post-September 11 world. 

The greatest security threats to the United States and Europe today stem from 

problems that defy borders: terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, pandemics and environmental scarcities. They stem from challenges that have 

traditionally been marginal but contentious in the transatlantic security dialogue: 

peacekeeping outside the traditional NATO area; post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation; rogue states, failed states and states hijacked by groups or networks. 

And they come from places, such as Africa or Southwest and Central Asia, that the 

transatlantic agenda has often ignored. 

On many of these issues, there is often disagreement within as well as between 

Europe and America. But unless Europeans and Americans find a way to focus together on these challenges, they will surely drive us apart. 

A first step in this direction is to remind ourselves of a simple fact. Our relationship remains distinctive from any other relationship either of us have in the world 

in one sense. When we agree, we are the core of any effective global coalition. When 

we disagree, no global coalition is likely to be effective. More than with any other 

part of the world, America’s relationship with Europe is what one might call an enabling or empowering relationship. When it works it enables each of us to achieve 

goals together that neither of us could alone. The Bush Administration put this 

premise to the test in Iraq, and the post-Iraq situation is a mess. The EU put this 

premise to the test on climate change, and the result is a climate regime in disarray. 

A new Atlanticism must build on this fact through a new set of strategic bargains. 

First bargain: Americans must be clear that they support a strong, coherent Europe;Europeans must be clear that they are building Europe as a partner, not a 

rival, to the United States. 

Second bargain: Together we will supplement our traditional focus on European 

stability with more effective ways to engage together on the global stage. That 

means, as a matter of priority, a Europe that can act and an America that can listen. 

Third bargain: Europeans who believe that robust international norms and enforcement mechanisms are needed to tackle these challenges must focus equally on 

the effective enforcement of such regimes, and be more forthright about the necessity to act when these regimes fail. Americans who see these treaties and regimes 

at best as ineffective and at worst as an unacceptable constraint on U.S. freedom 

of action should heed the costs of unilateral action in terms of less legitimacy, greater burdens, and ultimately the ability to achieve one’s goals. 

Taken together, these bargains promise to underpin a new Atlanticism. The old 

Atlanticism was equated with the institution of NATO. The new Atlanticism must 

include a stronger, larger NATO able to engage wherever Alliance interests are 

threatened. NATO’s roles in Afghanistan and Iraq, together with the NATO Response Force initiative, are important beginnings. But given the nature of our world, 

such a NATO must be seen as perhaps the densest weave in a larger, multidimensional fabric of inner-European and transatlantic mechanisms and networks that 

can enhance our ability to work better together in fast-breaking crises; manage our 

differences before they impair our ability to cooperate; and improve joint efforts to 

address emerging threats and global issues. 

The real question, in fact, is less that of institutions than of complementary perspective and determination. Are we prepared to work together on the broader challenges our community faces in this new century as we did during the last century? 

If we are not, our common future is diminished. Life without the other will be less 

prosperous, less safe, and less free. 

The post-November 9th world offers us an unprecedented strategic window to use 

America’s preeminent position to harness positive forces of integration with our key 

partners, lock in the gains offered by Great Power Peace, and use these to address 

the challenges posed by the post-September 11 challenges of WMD terrorism and 

27

its causes. It is decidedly in American interests to seek a more effective global partnership with a Europe that can act in real-time on pressing international matters. 

Four priorities deserve our attention. 

FIRST PRIORITY: TRANSFORMING THE GREATER MIDDLE EAST

Our most immediate task, of course, is reaching agreement on post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation in Iraq, and the role of the international community. 

This remains difficult and contentious. But we must also frame our continuing debate over Iraq with a wider perspective if we are to pick up the pieces of our broader 

relationship. 

The second area of past European-American tension in this region has been the 

Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Here our governments have been working together 

through the Quartet and do agree on the fundamentals of a road map to peace. 

President Bush’s recent efforts in this area could go far to diminish transatlantic 

tensions. But in the end, both parties must decide that they want a solution. 

If our efforts in these areas are ultimately to be successful, however, they must 

be part of more comprehensive transatlantic strategies aimed at the modernization 

and transformation of the Greater Middle East itself. A circle—with its center in 

Tehran—that has a diameter roughly matching the length of the continental United 

States covers a region that encompasses 75 percent of the world’s population, 60 

percent of its GNP, and 75 percent of its energy resources. The Greater Middle East 

is the region of the world where unsettled relationships, religious and territorial 

conflicts, fragile and failed regimes, and deadly combinations of technology and terror brew and bubble on top of one vast, relatively contiguous energy field upon 

which Western prosperity depends. Transformation of this region is the strategic 

challenge of our time and a key to winning the campaign against terrorism. Choices 

made there could determine the shape of the 21st century—whether weapons of 

mass destruction will be unleashed upon mass populations; whether the oil and gas 

fields of the Caucasus and Central Asia will become reliable sources of energy; 

whether the Arab world will meet the challenges of modernization and globalization; 

whether Russia’s borderlands will become stable and secure democracies; whether 

Israel and its neighbors can live together in peace; and whether the great religions 

of the world can work together. 

This is a long term effort. We cannot hope to transform this turbulent region into 

an area of democratic stability and prosperity soon. But we can act more successfully together to defend common interests, to dampen the negative trends that are 

gaining momentum, and to work with those in the region who seek to carve out 

areas of civil society where the state does not intrude. Such an effort is far more 

likely to succeed if America and Europe were to pool our energies and resources and 

pursue it together. 

SECOND PRIORITY: NEW APPROACHES TO STRATEGIC STABILITY

A second, related priority is to generate a new understanding of strategic stability. During the Cold War the two superpowers preserved stability despite their 

animosity because they felt equally at risk. They shared the view that the prospect 

of suicide would deter anyone from actually using weapons of mass destruction, and 

they were willing to negotiate certain rules of the road together and with other nations. Today, all three of these premises have vanished. Other nuclear powers have 

emerged—and their rules of the road are unclear. Terrorists are not deterred by suicide, and they are not at the negotiating table. They have nothing to protect and 

nothing to lose. In short, Cold War deterrence will not work as it once did, and in 

some cases it will not work at all. 

A new conception of strategic stability must weave what have been separate 

strands—the fight against terrorism, nuclear force posture, non-proliferation and defense efforts—into a comprehensive defense against weapons of mass destruction. 

These strands must be considered jointly, and discussion of the Bush Administration’s doctrine of preemption should be incorporated into a broader discussion of 

what is likely to constitute security and stability in the new century. 

THIRD PRIORITY: TRANSATLANTIC HOMELAND SECURITY

Third, we must develop ‘‘transatlantic’’ approaches to homeland security and societal protection. When the United States was attacked, our allies immediately invoked the North Atlantic Treaty’s mutual defense clause, in essence stating that the 

September 11 attack was an attack on a common security space—a common ‘‘homeland.’’ It is unlikely that a successful effort to strengthen homeland security can be 

conducted in isolation from one’s allies. The U.S. may be a primary target for AlQaeda, but we know it has also planned major operations in Europe. 

28

A terrorist WMD attack on Europe would immediately affect American civilians, 

American forces, and American interests. If such an attack involved contagious disease, it could threaten the American homeland itself in a matter of hours. The 

SARS epidemic, while deadly, is simply a ‘‘mild’’ portent of what may be to come. 

Bioterrorism in particular is a first-order strategic threat to the Euro-Atlantic community. A bioterrorist attack in Europe or North America is more likely and could 

be as consequential as a nuclear attack, but requires a different set of national and 

international responses. Europeans and Americans alike are woefully ill-prepared 

for such challenges. 

In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, it has become very clear that controlling borders, operating ports, or managing airports and train stations in the age 

of globalization involves a delicate balance of identifying and intercepting weapons 

and terrorists without excessively hindering trade, legal migration, travel and tourism upon which European and American prosperity increasingly depends. Efforts to 

protect the U.S. homeland against cyberattack, for example, can hardly be conducted in isolation from key allies whose economies and information networks are 

so intertwined with ours. 

Unless there is systematic trans-European and trans-Atlantic coordination in the 

area of preparedness, each side of the Atlantic is at greater risk of attack. Uneven 

‘‘homeland security’’ coordination and preparedness within Europe renders North 

America more vulnerable, particularly since North America’s security is organically 

linked to Europe’s vulnerability to terrorist infiltration. Similarly, if U.S. and Canadian efforts render the North American homeland less vulnerable to terrorist attack, 

terrorists may target Europe. Just because the Cold War has faded does not mean 

that Europeans and North Americans are less dependent on one another. 

Current efforts are a good start, but still tend to be ad hoc and uneven. Complementary, sustained, and well-institutionalized efforts are needed in areas ranging 

from intelligence, counterterrorism, financial coordination and law enforcement to 

customs, air and seaport security, and other activities. 

FOURTH PRIORITY: NEW MODELS OF TRANSATLANTIC GOVERNANCE

A fourth priority is to develop new models of transatlantic governance. Among the 

nations of the European Union the policies of European integration reach so deep 

that it is common to hear that European policies have become domestic policies, and 

that EU countries have entered a new realm of ‘‘European domestic policy.’’ This 

is very true, but it does not begin to capture the real dynamic of what is happening. 

A similar, if largely unnoticed, process has been underway for some time across the 

Atlantic. Our economies and societies have become so intertwined that in a number 

of specific areas Europeans and Americans have transcended ‘‘foreign’’ relations. 

We have moved into a new arena of ‘‘transatlantic domestic policy’’—a new frontier in which specific social and economic concerns and transnational actors often 

jump formal borders, override national policies, and challenge traditional forms of 

governance throughout the Atlantic world. Many of the issues confronting European 

and American policy makers today are those of ‘‘deep integration,’’ a new closeness 

that strikes at core issues of domestic governance, and that is of a qualitatively different nature than the ‘‘shallow integration’’ model of the Bretton Woods-GATT system established at the end of World War II. Deep integration is generating new 

transatlantic networks and connections. But because it reaches into traditionally domestic areas it can also generate social dislocation, anxiety and friction, as on such 

issues as food safety or competition policy. At the same time, European and American scientists and entrepreneurs are pushing the frontiers of human discovery in 

such fields as genetics, nanotechnology and electronic commerce where there are 

neither global rules nor transatlantic mechanisms to sort out the complex legal, ethical and commercial tradeoffs posed by such innovation. 

Neither the framework for our relationship nor the way our governments are currently organized adequately captures these new realities. Across the Atlantic such 

quasi-domestic issues need to be managed through new and more effective forms of 

transatlantic regulatory and parliamentary consultation and coordination, and more 

innovative diplomacy that takes account of the growing role of private actors. If we 

are serious about a Transatlantic Marketplace, then the U.S. and the European 

Union must work systematically together to develop joint or complementary approaches to such areas as financial services and capital markets, aviation, the digital economy, competition policy, or performance of our regulatory systems. 

Mr. Chairman, Iraq has been a loud wake-up call to transatlantic partnership. 

The question is whether in the wake of this episode Europeans and Americans will 

be led astray by false choices or the lazy temptation of casting blame and pointing 

fingers at an Ugly Other, or whether we will assume the global obligations our partVerDate Mar 21 2002 15:37 Jul 28, 2003 Jkt 087670 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\EUROPE\061103\87670 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
29

nership demands—for history will ultimately judge us not only in terms of how well 

or badly we managed a particular crisis, but also how well we used such crises to 

shape our relationship for the future. Thank you.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you. 

Next, we will hear from Dr. John Hulsman. He is a Research 

Fellow in European affairs at the Davis Institute of the Heritage 

Foundation. In his position, Dr. Hulsman examines European 

Union security in NATO affairs, the European Union, United 

States-European trade and economic relations, and the war on terror. Prior to joining Heritage, Dr. Hulsman was a Fellow in European Studies at the Center for Strategic International Studies, 

CSIS, in Washington, DC. He also taught world politics and United 

States foreign policy at the University of St. Andrews, Scotland. 

Dr. Hulsman, we are pleased to hear from you. You may proceed 

as you wish. 

STATEMENT OF JOHN HULSMAN, RESEARCH FELLOW, DAVIS 

INSTITUTE, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION 

Mr. HULSMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Like my colleagues, I 

will summarize my remarks. 

I am a Burkean conservative. I accept the world as it is and try 

to make it better from there. There is far too much theology in the 

United States-European relationship. There is plenty of blame to 

go around. 

As we were talking before the hearing, two things struck me. In 

the 1990s European and American policy analysts hit the orange 

juice circuit of the same 12 guys going to meetings between Europe 

and the United States. It seemed to me that this led to two problems. 

One, strict unilateralists in the United States didn’t want to go 

to Europe, didn’t want to talk to people because if all the action 

is in Washington, if you believe the world is unipolar strictly, why 

would you go to Europe? There is no point. On the other hand, European Wilsonians have a proclivity for only inviting American Wilsonians to visit, who say: ‘‘There are bumps in the road but the relationship is entirely manageable.’’

I remember in my grad class and the lectures I taught we discussed group think. And I think there is plenty of blame to go 

around on both a bipartisan and transatlantic basis. And I thank 

you for the opportunity to speak my somewhat different views from 

my colleagues. 

In the 1990s there were two really important questions regarding 

the transatlantic relationship before Iraq, which I think catalyzed 

what was already happening in terms of gaullism. First, is Europe 

pulling apart, as my colleagues have suggested in the wake of the 

cold war? Which, to some extent, was natural. Without being forced 

together to really subsume differences in the face of the unifying 

growl of the Soviet bear, and to make us deal with things in a 

somewhat different way than we might, was Europe going to drift, 

and could that drift be managed? I think a lot of people were considering that. I remember a number of people who, even 4 years 

ago, said there really wasn’t a drift, because, again, too many assumed broad agreement. 

30

So that, and if you look at my testimony, my second paragraph 

is full of 23 separate disagreements that I wrote down when I was 

bored as to where there were fundamental disagreements. I think 

that we missed that because we all talked to the same people, who 

aren’t necessarily representative of polities on either side of the Atlantic as the Pew numbers, I think, show that have been mentioned before. 

Secondly, the debate in Washington was, is Europe strong or 

weak? And here, I don’t think European weakness is a caricature. 

I think it is a reality. I think that, despite the things that have 

been said about the economic relationship, particularly by Mr. 

Wexler, I think that is absolutely right. But let us look at things 

as we grade power politically, militarily, and economically. 

Politically, Iraq, to put it kindly, has proven that common foreign 

and security policy remains a myth, believed only by a few commissioners in Brussels. If we look at the big three countries and how 

they reacted to the fundamental issue of war and peace, which, 

after all, is what a foreign and security policy ought to be about, 

we have the British playing Sundance to America’s Butch Cassidy, 

saying: ‘‘We are going along irrespective of what happens and will 

try to influence you by making that first strategic step.’’ We have 

the French saying: ‘‘Well, if this goes through the U.N.—meaning 

we have a veto over your actions—then indeed we would go along 

with that.’’ Lastly, you have the Germans’ noted multilateralists 

saying: ‘‘Whatever the U.N. says, we won’t go along, given our own 

unique history and given the politics encountered by Chancellor 

Schroeder.’’

Thus, entirely different positions on an issue of war and peace. 

The idea that there is a Europe, in quotations, on foreign and security policy simply isn’t true, the Financial Times notwithstanding. 

Secondly, economically. I think this is really the danger. Despite 

the fact that Europe has this tremendous market, let us examine 

the states at its core: France, Italy and Germany are sclerotic, creating no new private sector jobs. Germany, the motor of Europe—

and we would all agree, it being over 30 percent of the Euro-zone 

area—growing at rates of under .5 percent for the last 4 years. It 

is dead in the water. In fact, there are certain suggestions that deflation may be a problem, that Germany may go the way of Japan 

and become an economic basketcase, which would have grave repercussions for the United States. 

But remember in 1990, when all this began, we were talking 

about the Trilateral Commission and how the world is going to be 

managed in a multi-polar way. People wrote books on Japan, and 

we are all going to work for the Japanese. Now we are simply terrified their banking system is going to collapse, with subsequent repercussions. Europe was going to be this other pole that would be 

roughly equal to the United States in some basic way. This simply 

hasn’t happened economically. This is due to structural problems, 

labor rigidities, the demographic time bomb that is assailing Europe’s safety net all contribute to Europe’s woes. Now you see 

Schroeder beginning to try to wiggle out of that, merely allowing 

problems that simply haven’t been addressed to continue. My favorite example of this is Jospin and Chirac in the last French presidential election agreeing beforehand not to discuss the pension reVerDate Mar 21 2002 15:37 Jul 28, 2003 Jkt 087670 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\EUROPE\061103\87670 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
31

form because it might make them unpopular. I don’t see signs of 

political bravery here for dealing with the problems that Europe 

has to address. 

So politically, I think empirically at the moment, CFSP isn’t real 

economically, Torper is what is going on. Structural problems just 

now beginning to be addressed. But whether they are will work or 

not is certainly an open question. 

Militarily, beyond Britain and France, which do have expeditionary power, the rest of Europe—and I, like many here, worked 

on the Prague goals—are there to fulfill a niche role for NATO. The 

idea that any other country is going to do more than that within 

NATO is simply not in the cards, with German defense spending 

being between 1.1 percent and 1.5 percent of GDP, depending on 

how you calculate it; with the Italians around 1 percent and the 

Spanish at .8 percent, it simply doesn’t pass the laugh test that the 

Europeans are going to get their act together in any empirical way. 

And in fact, I would argue the economics actually mean that they 

would be even less likely to get their act together militarily, as it 

is not a high priority given the other things that my 

colleagues . . . 

So rather than seeing a strong Europe, I see a Europe that is politically disunited. Again, the fascinating thing about Iraq isn’t Europe versus the United States, it is Europe versus Europe. It is 

some 18 Europeans countries disagreeing with the French and the 

Germans. It is middle-size Europe, frankly, disagreeing with 

France and Germany running the European show as has happened 

so often. If you listen to what Prime Minister Aznar of Spain has 

to say about this, and why he joined with the Americans, he made 

it very clear that he was tired of deals on the Common Agricultural 

Policy being stitched up in a French chateau to which he was not 

invited; and that he wanted, indeed, to have something to do with 

intra-European politics. If you look at Italy, Britain, the central 

and eastern European members, you have a situation that is far 

more interesting, and far more fluid, than any declarations of unanimity might claim. 

So given that this is the reality that I see, how do we proceed? 

Because like my colleagues, there is no doubt, in my mind, that 

this is a relationship that must be salvaged. But to use the marriage analogy that has been somewhat beaten to death by all of us 

up to now, I would say simply the romance is over, but that doesn’t 

mean the marriage will not continue. 

There are three generations now in the transatlantic era. The 

first generation had a romantic view of the alliance. This was a 

way to come together and stop Europe having wars and to keep the 

United States tuned to Europe. That generation succeeded brilliantly, and that must be remembered and honored. The second 

generation, the 1968’ers, of course rebelling against their parents, 

say this is all an American plot now, and we need to actually get 

out there and be much more vocal about what is going on. 

I am the third generation to come along. And I, in a very 

unromantic way, see this as a tool. That is how I would like to conclude here. There is a way forward, and it is cherrypicking. It is 

saying that on any given issue the Europeans, ‘‘don’t exist.’’ The 

strategy is not like Kyoto, however, where the Administration flatly 

32

1 Ivo Daalder, ‘‘A US View of European Security and Defense Policy,’’ lecture given at 

USAREUR Senior Leadership Forum, Grafenwohr, Germany, March 7–9, 2001, (Brookings Online), 3. 

says ‘‘no’’ and goes away, thereby ironically unifying Europe. Indeed a better approach is on a case-by-case basis as the Administration proceeded on missile defense to try to engage national capitals, to forget what Brussels says primarily, and try to bring along 

8 to 18 countries to follow an American kind of view, doing dialogue in a very fundamental way to make that happen. That is a 

way forward between strict unilateralists who don’t think allies 

matter on the one hand, and strict multilateralists who think Belgium should have a veto over American actions of national security 

on the other. 

I think that this is something that we can all generally agree on. 

And I will just close by saying, look at NATO. I think this is already occurring if you start by saying we should all try to do things 

in a full NATO way. If that fails, let us do a coalition of the willing 

within NATO. If that doesn’t work, let us do a coalition of the willing outside of NATO. If that doesn’t work, let us do bilateral agreements. And only then do we proceed unilaterally. By working down 

that checklist as we go, I think that you can discount a lot of the 

cartoon caricatures of unilateralism and multilateralism in the 

United States, engage European allies on a case-by-case basis, but 

acknowledge the reality that the European Emperor simply isn’t 

wearing clothing. Thank you. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Dr. Hulsman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hulsman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN HULSMAN, RESEARCH FELLOW, DAVIS INSTITUTE, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION

As the fabulously successful twelve-step program pioneered by Alcoholics Anonymous has conclusively demonstrated, one cannot tackle a crisis until acknowledging 

the reality of a genuine problem. Throughout the 1990s, mutual exchanges of pleasantries and vague rhetoric of a ‘Europe whole and free’ obscured the fact that the 

transatlantic relationship was increasingly in crisis, with a significant portion of the 

European political elite viewing the United States as part of the problem in international politics, rather than as part of the solution to global problems. Representative of this trend is the typical anodyne statement that, ‘‘a stronger Europe is also 

more likely to be a reliable strategic partner with the U.S.’’ 1 Given the resurgence 

of a European-wide strain of Gaullism, this platitude is increasingly open to question. 

In the past several years, genuine policy differences between the U.S. and its European allies have emerged over: trade issues such as the ‘banana war’; genetically 

modified foods; the American Federal Sales Corporation (FSC) tax; Europe’s refusal 

to substantially reform the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the repercussions this holds for the Doha global free trade round; the moral justness of the 

death penalty; whether Cuba, Libya, and Iran should be engaged or isolated; Iraq; 

the Israeli/Palestinian crisis; the role international institutions should play in the 

global arena; when states ought to be allowed to use military force; ideological divisions between American realists, neoconservatives and European Wilsonians; the 

Kyoto Accord; the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC); America’s 

increase in steel tariffs; National Missile Defense (NMD) and the US abrogation of 

the ABM treaty; the military debate within NATO regarding burden-sharing and 

power-sharing; American unilateralism; Turkey’s ultimate role in the West; widely 

varying global threat assessments; the doctrine of humanitarian intervention and 

the efficacy of nation-building; and, how to organize an economy for the best societal 

effect, to name a few. This incomplete list should make it crystal clear to the most 

complacent of analysts that drift in the transatlantic relationship is about far more 

than carping, black leather-clad, ineffectual Europeans glowering about American 

dominance from the safety of a Parisian cafe ́. It is a bitter truth that in the runVerDate Mar 21 2002 15:37 Jul 28, 2003 Jkt 087670 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\EUROPE\061103\87670 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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2 Robert Kagan, ‘‘Power and Weakness,’’ Policy Review (online): 6. 

up to the Iraq war, consistent polling in Europe shows a majority of the public more 

worried about unfettered American power than about Saddam Hussein. Instead, the 

drift is at least partly centered on fundamental philosophical and structural differences held by people with a very different view of how the world should be ordered from that of the average American; it should be evaluated far more seriously 

than has been the case in Washington. 

Those Europeans pushing for the creation of a more centralized, federal, coherent 

European Union (EU) political construct do so by increasingly defining themselves 

through their differences with Americans. European Gaullists see the emergence of 

a European pole of power as an effective foil to overwhelming American global 

power. The French position, predictably the most suspicious of America, could not 

have been clearer during the Jospin premiership. A more united Europe was necessary to ‘build counterweights’ to combat ‘the risk of hegemony.’ Any thought that 

classical balance of power thinking was no longer a relevant tool for today’s global 

environment, ought to be put to rest by any vague scrutiny of the French government’s rationale for a more coherent Europe. Across the continent, Gaullism was 

clearly on the rise at the end of the 1990’s. 

The reasons for this resurgence are structural, and are likely to endure. With the 

end of the Cold War, it was to be expected that America and Europe would drift. 

Without the unifying growl of the Soviet bear to subsume the reality that America 

and various European states had quite distinct international interests, there were 

bound to be divergences. The U.S. has emerged as the sole superpower in the postCold War era, while European states, with the partial exception of France and the 

UK, are at best regional powers. This structural difference, unlikely to change in 

even the medium- to long-term, does much to explain the practical policy differences 

increasingly emerging on both sides of the Atlantic. 

Not only has America gone from strength to strength in the new era, Europe has 

conspicuously failed to emerge as a coherent power in its own right. This sense of 

a resurgent and increasingly unfettered America, coupled with an introverted, increasingly marginalized Europe, does much to explain not only the differences in 

policy between the two poles, but also the increased virulence many Europeans feel 

toward American policies. In the end, such differences are less about philosophy and 

more about power; it is not that European Gaullists feel American international 

policies are merely wrong—increasingly they feel they have no power to affect them, 

even at the margins. This change in political psychology does much to explain both 

the rise of an anti-American Gaullism in Europe, as well as the increasing drift in 

the transatlantic relationship. 

The example of European military weakness is instructive. Given anemic European defense spending, it is little wonder that many politicians in Europe are implacably opposed to the military tool being used in international relations, that they 

don’t want strength to matter in the international community, that they want to 

live in a world where international law and institutions predominate, that they 

want to forbid unilateral military action by powerful nations, and that they advocate 

all nations having equal rights that are protected by accepted international norms 

of behavior—the Europeans are merely making a philosophical virtue of a very practical necessity.2

While attempting to limit through diplomacy what is a glaring weakness in their 

own power portfolio, European Gaullists are attempting one thing more—to balance 

the United States in a non-traditional manner, by harnessing overwhelming American power in multilateral institutions in such a way as to have a significant say 

in how such power is used. This reality explains France’s implacable demand that 

all action against Saddam Hussein proceeded institutionally through the Security 

Council, where Paris has a veto. It is an effort by the Lilliputians to tie Gulliver 

up, and it is completely understandable, given the present power discrepancy between Europe and the U.S. It also structurally explains why relations are increasingly frayed between an American Gulliver that naturally wants to preserve its freedom of action as much as possible and European Lilliputians that, given their strategic weakness, want to constrain the American behemoth in multilateral institutions as much as possible. The rise of European Gaullism, the desire to create a 

countervailing pole defined by its very un-American nature, is a logical structural 

response to such a world. The possible rise of a coherent Paris-Berlin-Moscow alliance designed to permanently challenge American power in the wake of the Iraq crisis should be seen as a fledgling effort to tie the Gaullist impulse into a more unified political formation. 

34

3 John Hulsman, ‘‘A Grand Bargain With Europe,’’ The Georgetown Public Policy Review, .6(1), 

(Fall 2000): 73. 4Gerard Baker, ‘‘NATO’s welcome imbalance in military might,’’ Financial Times (February 

7, 2002). 5 ‘‘Transformation postponed,’’ The Economist (February 16, 2002). 6 ‘‘New studies highlight higher taxation and unemployment in Eurozone,’’ Business for Sterling Bulletin, (49), (June 29, 2000). 7 ‘‘Room to improve,’’ The Economist (March 16, 2002). 8 ‘‘Gerhard Schroeder’s rocky new start,’’ The Economist (November 16, 2002). 

THE REALITY OF EUROPEAN WEAKNESS

Just as all is not well in the transatlantic relationship, rhetoric should not replace 

reality as to Europe’s capabilities to emerge as a major power, even in the mediumto long-term. While the desire to successfully compete with America may be 

ensconced in many European chanceries, the ability to do so appears to be well beyond Europe’s means. Militarily, despite a collective market that is slightly larger 

than that of the United States, Europe presently spends only two-thirds of what the 

U.S. does on defense (with American defense increases, even this paltry amount is 

due to relatively decrease) and produces less than one quarter of America’s 

deployable fighting strength.3 German defense spending has dropped to a laughable 

1.5 percent. Likewise, besides the UK and France, all other European countries are 

presently incapable of mounting an expeditionary force of any size anywhere in the 

world without resorting to borrowing American lift capabilities. Current U.S. defense increases are greater than the entire defense budgets of any of the individual 

European allies.4 As Richard Perle bluntly put it, Europe’s armed forces have already ‘‘atrophied to the point of virtual irrelevance.’’ 5

Given the moribund state of the European economies and the proclivity of the European publics to eschew significant defense spending, there is absolutely no empirical evidence to suggest that this trend of relative military decline will change in 

the long-term. At best, the United States can expect a multi-tiered NATO, where, 

beyond the British and the French, individual European member states will, optimally, fill niche roles in the overall American strategic conception. American decision-makers used to positive spins on the Alliance must acknowledge that not all 

the allies are equal—that real differences exist between European capitals over how 

often to militarily side with the US, and how much capability individual countries 

can bring to bear. 

Economically, the latter part of the 1990s has not led Europe into the promised 

land, so confidently predicted by many. Rather, massive and largely ignored, structural problems—labor rigidities, a demographic/pensions time-bomb, a safety net 

that precludes significant cuts in unemployment, too large a state role in the economy stifling growth—have led Europe into a cul-de-sac. Staggeringly, according to 

the OECD, since 1970, the euro-zone area has not created any net private sector 

jobs.6

Germany is emblematic of this Western European problem. Its economy grew at 

a rate of only 0.2 percent in 2002. Germany’s public deficit overshot EU Stability 

Pact strictures at a rate of 3.7 percent this year and probably will next year as well. 

Efforts to lower unemployment remain stalled, with over 4.5 million Germans remaining out of work. This economic snapshot is also representative of Germany’s 

longer-term economic performance. After an initial, post-reunification surge, over 

the past ten years, German GDP increased by a mere 1.5 percent a year on average.7 The reasons for this are as simple as they are politically intractable—Germany’s non-wage labor costs are among the highest in the world, well over 42 percent of gross wages.8 This factor, combined with excessive labor rigidities, a virtually unfunded pensions system, and a looming demographic crisis means that the 

motor of Europe will continue to sputter. Whether Chancellor Schroeder’s most recent effort to begin the reform process amounts to anything is certainly open to 

question. Structural economic problems common to Italy, France, and Germany, as 

well as the accompanying lack of political will to deal with them, signify that the 

only question facing Europe is whether it continues to limp along or falls into a 

Japan-style torpor. 

In some ways, the euro has made this difficult economic situation even worse. Its 

one-size-fits-all macroeconomic policy has led interest rates to be set far too high 

for a sputtering German economy, while threatening a booming Ireland with the 

danger of inflation in the long-term. The euro zone is far from an optimal currency 

area. It remains to be seen whether the economies of Europe are sufficiently in-sync 

to make the project flourish in the medium-term. 

The Stability Pact is emblematic of Europe’s overly rigid macroeconomic approach. 

Ironically enacted to quell German fears about the long-term economic soundness 

35

of countries such as Greece, Italy, and Portugal, it is Berlin itself (as well as Lisbon) 

that has been most hamstrung by the new strictures—limiting budget deficits to 3 

percent per year. Already in recession and faced with a certain warning from the 

EU and the possibility of massive fines amounting to 0.5 percent of the GDP if it 

fails to correct its budget imbalance, Germany has been forced to enact austerity 

measures at a time of economic decline—the worst short-term fiscal policy imaginable. Such a rigid economic approach seems politically doomed in the long-term; 

already, critics ranging from EU Commission President Prodi to the French and 

German governments are signaling the need to fundamentally reform the process. 

In the short run, the Stability Pact has proved to be just another unnecessary constraint on a German economy already caught in the doldrums. There is little sign 

that either Germany, or Europe as a whole, is likely to gain economically relative 

to the U.S. in the medium- to long-term. Rather, the challenge is to avoid the permanent economic stagnation of the continent. 

As with military matters, the overall view must be qualified. Over the past five 

to eight years, the British, Spanish, Dutch, and Irish economies have been growing 

at very respectable rates. Given their more open pensions systems, neither Dublin 

nor London face the same demographic crisis currently looming in Italy, France, or 

Germany. Great Britain remains the largest direct investor in the United States, 

as America does in the UK. Moving geographically around the traditional motor of 

EU integration—France, Germany and Italy—economic liberalism is found flourishing on the European periphery. It is hard to characterize a common European 

economic state of being, as the differences outweigh the economic commonalities. 

This is even truer in the political realm. Contrary to any number of misleading 

commission communique ́s, the Europeans are light years away from developing a 

Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). One has only to look at the seminal 

issue of war and peace during the past year- what to do about Saddam Hussein’s 

Iraq—to see a complete lack of coordination at the European level. Initially, the UK 

stood shoulder-to-shoulder with the U.S., Germany’s militant pacifists were against 

any type of military involvement, be it sanctioned by the UN or not; with France 

holding a wary middle position, stressing that any military force must emanate from 

UN Security Council deliberations. It is hard to imagine starker and more disparate 

foreign policy positions being staked out by the three major powers of Europe. 

Even on issues relating to trade, there are vast differences within the EU. The 

recent spat between President Chirac of France and British Prime Minister Blair 

was about far more than atmospherics. It was about whether northern European 

countries, such as the UK, would continue to countenance southern EU countries’ 

(such as France) dogged desire to protect the wasteful Common Agricultural Policy 

(CAP), even though it may well prove to be a deal-breaker at the Doha global free 

trade round. On missile defense, relations with Turkey, and critically, the future 

course of the EU—with Germany for deepening and widening, the UK for widening 

primarily, and the French stressing deepening of EU institutions—one finds a cacophony of European voices, rather than everyone singing from the same hymnal. 

Military weakness, economic stagnation and political disunity—this is the reality 

that confronts American decision-makers today when looking at Europe. Despite 

overly cheerful rhetoric and the hopes of many on the continent, Europe is not likely 

to challenge American primacy in the long-run. This is not due to any general, continental love of Washington or its policies. Rather, it is the result of European political, military and economic weakness. 

CHERRY-PICKING AS THE AMERICAN ANSWER TO A WEAK, BUT GAULLIST EUROPE

In separating rhetoric from reality there is a comforting final conclusion that 

needs to be drawn by American policy-makers—the very lack of European unity that 

hamstrings European Gaullist efforts to challenge the United States, presents 

America with a unique opportunity. If Europe is more about diversity than uniformity, if the concept of a unified ‘Europe’ has yet to really exist, then a general 

American transatlantic foreign policy based on cherry-picking—engaging coalitions 

of willing European allies on a case-by-case basis—becomes entirely possible. Such 

a stance is palpably in America’s interests, as it provides a method of managing 

transatlantic drift while remaining engaged with a continent that will rarely be 

wholly for, or wholly against, specific, American, foreign policy initiatives. Such a 

sensible middle course steers between the Scylla of not caring about bringing along 

allies, and the Charybdis of allowing a perpetually divided Europe to scupper all 

American diplomatic and military initiatives. 

For such an approach to work, it is essential to view Europe as less than a monolithic entity. The differences in approach the Bush administration took regarding 

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structive. By condemning out of hand the Kyoto agreement and offering no positive 

policy alternatives, the Bush administration found itself in a public relations disaster in its early days. By failing to engage the Europeans, the White House unwittingly succeeded in uniting them. Embracing the learning curve in the wake of 

Kyoto and refusing to believe reports that ‘Europe’ was implacably opposed to American desires to abrogate the ABM treaty and to begin constructing a missile defense 

system, the White House sent its representatives to the capitals of Europe where 

they found the ‘European’ stance on missile defense to be predictably far more fragmented than had appeared at first glance. Intensive diplomatic efforts led Spain, 

Italy, the UK, Poland, Hungary and ultimately, Russia, to embrace the administration’s initiative to one degree or another. By searching out potential European allies 

at the national level, Washington engaged in successful cherry-picking and avoided 

the kind of diplomatic and public relations disaster that had occurred in the wake 

of Kyoto. 

Ironically, this realist policy actually calls for more diplomatic and political engagement with Europe at a national level, even if Brussels is to be generally taken 

less seriously. As the Kyoto episode makes abundantly clear, in order for cherrypicking to work for the U.S., it is vital to note divisions in ‘European’ opinion based 

on differing conceptions of national interest. America should be constantly engaged 

in evaluating differences within Europe in order to still be able to work with allies, 

bringing along a coalition of the willing on any given policy initiative. Europe, such 

as it presently exists, suits general American interests—its member states are capable of assisting the U.S. when their interests coincide with America, yet it is feeble 

enough that it cannot easily block America over fundamental issues of national security. Cherry-picking as a general strategy ensures the endurance of this favorable 

status quo. 

Militarily, such an approach explains present efforts at NATO reform. Beyond the 

sacrosanct Article V commitment, the future of NATO consists of coalitions-of-thewilling acting out-of-area. Here, a realist cherry-picking strategy confounds the impulses of both unilateralists and strict multilateralists. Disregarding unilateralist 

attitudes towards coalitions as often not worth the bother, this strategy calls for full 

NATO consultation on almost every significant military issue of the day. As was the 

case with Iraq, if full NATO support is not forthcoming, realists would doggedly continue the diplomatic dance, rather than seeing such a rebuff as the end of the process, as many strict multilateralists would counsel. A Combined Joint Task Force 

(CJTF) where a subset of the Alliance forms a coalition of the willing to carry out 

a specific mission using common NATO resources would be this strategy’s second 

preference. If this too proved impossible, due to a general veto of such an initiative, 

a coalition of the willing outside of NATO—composed of states around the globe 

committed to a specific initiative based on shared immediate interests—would be 

the third best option. Only then, if fundamental national interests were at stake, 

should America act alone. Cherry-picking is a way around what has become a 

cartoonish debate, as very few decision-makers are either entirely unilateral or multilateral in orientation; the world is simply more complicated than this. 

While agreeing with unilateralists that full, unqualified approval of specific missions may prove difficult to diplomatically achieve with NATO in the new era, cherry-pickers disagree with them about continuing to engage others at the broadest 

level. For, as the missile defense example illustrates, there are almost always some 

allies who will go along with any specific American policy initiative. That is, if they 

are genuinely asked. By championing initiatives such as the CJTF and the new 

NATO rapid deployment force, the Bush administration is fashioning NATO as a 

toolbox that can further American interests around the globe by constructing ad hoc

coalitions of the willing that can bolster U.S. efforts in specific cases. 

Less developed than the NATO process, free trade coalitions of the willing hold 

out intriguing possibilities for a future that may well see the breakdown of the Doha 

free trade process. As with NATO, there is no doubt that a comprehensive, all-inclusive liberalizing deal built around the Doha process (involving agricultural, services, 

and manufacturing liberalization) would best suit both the world and the United 

States. However, given the great disparities in world opinion over the efficacy, and 

even the definition, of free trade, the United States must be prepared to enact freetrading coalitions of the willing if the Doha round stalls over European failures to 

respond to the developing world’s demand for significant agricultural liberalization. 

Certainly, the ‘free trade by any means’ mantra emanating from United States 

Trade Representative Bob Zoellick’s office is an indication that the Bush administration is moving in this direction. 

Beyond efforts to make the regional Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and 

bilateral deals with countries such as Singapore, Chile, and Australia viable, the 

Bush administration needs to embrace the idea of a Global Free Trade Association—

37

9 John C. Hulsman and Sudabeh Koochekzadeh, ‘‘A Global Free Trade Association to Preserve 

and Expand the US–UK Special Relationship,’’ Orbis, (Summer 2002). 10 Based on these criteria the following countries would be eligible: Austrailia, Botswana, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Hong Kong, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Singapore, 

United Kindom, United States. 

a coalition of the willing determined to maximize trade liberalization throughout its 

member states.9 States around the globe that meet certain, predetermined, numerical criteria relating to trade policy, capital flows and foreign investment, property 

rights, and regulation would automatically qualify for the grouping. Members 

would, thus, select themselves based on their genuine commitment to a liberal trading order. Given the politico-economic commonalities such a grouping would share, 

it is to be hoped that the GFTA would allow for the freer movement of capital within the grouping, establish common accounting standards, set very low rates of subsidies across the board, and diminish overt and hidden tariffs. What must not happen to global trade if the Doha round stalls is that the U.S. takes its ball and goes 

home; again a coalition of the willing, this time in trade, is the way forward.10

Politically, American policy-makers must ignore soothing EU communique ́s and 

recognize that Europe speaks with many voices. For example, during the Iraqi crisis, while France, Germany, Russia, and Belgium led opposition to the war, Britain, 

Spain, Italy, Poland, and most Central and Eastern European governments ignored 

Paris and supported the American position. Indeed, there is a growing divide on 

issues of war and peace between more traditional European social democrats and 

the more modern, aggressive Blairite centrists on the continent. New Labour will 

remain available as a central ally in assembling coalitions of the willing in the future. 

In addition, the cherry-picking strategy is the best way to combat French efforts 

to challenge American predominance. While it is certainly true that the Paris-Berlin-Moscow anti-war coalition resembled Dorothy’s friends in the Wizard of Oz (each 

of the countries lacks something to be a great power on its own-Russia, a first-world 

economy; Germany, real military power; France, raw materials and an extensive industrial base), it is also true that such a coalition taken together has all the attributes of a balancing pole of power, with France providing the political and ideological leadership, Germany the economic power, and Russia the military wherewithal. While winning over Paris in a fundamental way is hopeless in the near 

term, both Germany and Russia remain at least as attuned to Washington as to 

Paris. By working together on a case-by-case basis, and not forcing Germany and 

Russia to choose between France and the U.S., Washington can effectively dilute the 

prospects of such a permanent coalition forming. Cherry-picking allows the Germans 

a way out of their self-inflicted diplomatic isolation, just as it allows Russia a chance 

to regain momentum in what has been a blossoming relationship with the U.S. I 

think National Security Adviser Rice was incorrect when she recently said, ‘‘Punish 

the French, ignore the Germans and forgive the Russians.’’ A cherry-picking strategy would lead to a different conclusion. ‘‘Ignore the French (and work with them 

where possible), and engage the Germans and the Russians on a case-by-case basis.’’ 

This is by far the best way to secure America’s diplomatic advantage in the wake 

of the Iraq war. 

Nor should America be seen to actively divide the European allies—such an approach would merely throw Germany into the arms of France. During a recent conference in Paris, when challenged by a member of the French foreign ministry that 

my plan was dividing Europe, I replied that I left that to President Chirac—that 

perhaps Chirac’s threats to keep pro-American Central and Eastern European states 

out of the EU if they did not tow the French line on Iraq might be more at fault 

than my policy proposals. I was merely trying to cobble together coalitions of the 

willing based on the fact that the most interesting diplomatic result of the war was 

a Europe versus Europe reality, not Europe as a whole standing against the United 

States. Cherry-picking forces no one to irrevocably choose between Paris and Washington; it engages countries on a case-by-case basis merely by dealing with Europe 

as we find it-divided, weak, but on a country-by-country basis more than available 

to participate in coalitions of the willing. More ham-fisted efforts to divide Europe 

would be entirely counterproductive. 

A strategy of cherry-picking will preserve the status quo, where the transatlantic 

relationship, despite fraying a bit at the edges, continues to provide common goods 

to both sides of the Atlantic. As such, the Europe of today suits America’s long-term 

strategic interests. Cherry-picking will allow the U.S. to make the appearance of a 

Gaullist, centralized, European rival far less likely, while distributing enough 

shared benefits that the overall transatlantic relationship will continue to provide 

Europeans, as well as Americans, with more benefits than problems. Such an accuVerDate Mar 21 2002 15:37 Jul 28, 2003 Jkt 087670 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\EUROPE\061103\87670 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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rate assessment, fitting the realities of the world we now live in—where the United 

States behaves multilaterally where possible and unilaterally where necessary—is 

likely to endure. 

OVERVIEW

Too often foreign policy practitioners successfully manage problems while wholly 

missing out on creatively taking advantage of opportunities. The Continental Europe of today presents us with just such an opportunity: it remains divided into 

Gaullist and Atlanticist camps, with the anti-American grouping splintering and 

discredited because of American success in Iraq. A Europe of many voices, where 

the nation-state is again seen as the primary unit of foreign policy decision-making, 

will best suit American interests well into the future. In addition, helping to retard 

the perpetuation of a Franco-German-Russian alliance designed to balance against 

the US must be seen as a primary American national interest. In both cases, the 

general cherry-picking modus operandi would seem to be the template that American policymakers can best use to take advantage of the present situation in Europe. 

In the particular case of the anti-American coalition constructed over Iraq, there 

seems to be ample evidence that Germany (and to a lesser extent Russia) is amenable to such a strategy. Cherry-picking is an idea whose time has come.

Mr. BEREUTER. Next, we will hear from Mr. Christopher Makins. 

He is the President of the Atlantic Council of the United States. 

He has had a long career in the area of international relations, 

serving as Senior Advisor to the German Marshal Fund, as Vice 

President of the Aspen Institute, and in management positions at 

the Carnegie Endowment and the Roosevelt Center. Mr. Makins 

has also spent several years in the diplomatic service of the United 

Kingdom, although he is an American citizen. 

Mr. Makins, we are pleased to hear from you. 

STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER MAKINS, PRESIDENT, THE 

ATLANTIC COUNCIL OF THE UNITED STATES 

Mr. MAKINS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I, like 

my colleagues, would like to thank you and your colleagues very 

much for inviting me to testify today on a subject that is so critical 

for our foreign policy. 

My full statement first addresses the question what are the foundations on which a renewed transatlantic partnership, which is the 

subject of your hearings today, can and should be built? Here, I 

would emphasize the recent statements of the leaders of the Bush 

Administration in favor of a strong transatlantic relationship, because this Administration is often accused of indifference toward 

its European allies and toward the alliance itself. These statements, which I believe would be echoed by most, if not all, European leaders, underline the three principal foundations of the relationship: Shared values and objectives, growing economic integration, and the fact that, in the President’s words in Krakow on May 

31st, when Europe and America are united, no problem and no 

enemy can stand against us. 

As to the shared values and objectives, like you, Mr. Chairman, 

I take issue with those who claim that they have been eroded in 

recent times and no longer serve to anchor the relationship. 

What are the obstacles to a renewed transatlantic partnership? 

First, I would note an important change in the international situation since the early 1990s, in which the strategic center of gravity 

has shifted away from Europe, an area about which we and our allies have historically agreed, to the Middle East and the Gulf, an 

area about which we have typically substantially disagreed. 

39

I would also mention three other key factors. The differentiated 

reactions here and in Europe to the tragedy to 9/11, the rivalry between, to put it crudely, the French and British conceptions of the 

future of the European Project, which has already been mentioned, 

and transatlantic differences about the role and importance of 

international rules and institutions, especially the United Nations. 

Against the background of these key factors, can the allies reach 

a common strategic assessment on enough of the critical challenges 

they face to make a meaningful and enduring partnership possible? 

Many well-known United States and European commentators are 

extremely pessimistic on this score. But if one looks carefully at the 

evolution of attitudes on the two sides of the Atlantic toward the 

key factors I have addressed, I believe there are good grounds for 

thinking that such agreement can be reached. The importance of 

achieving it in the interest of both sides makes the search for 

agreement imperative. 

How can we surmount the obstacles to a renewed partnership? 

I will deal with three sets of issues: The role of leadership, the potential for policy cooperation on critical challenges, and the need 

for changes in the institutions through which the relationship is 

managed. 

On leadership, the impetus for renewal must come from the top 

and must be enforced against those at lower levels with different 

ideas that might tend to undermine the relationship. Transatlantic 

dialogue, especially at the highest levels, has been seriously deficient in recent years, and government leaders need to be more 

frank with one another about their concerns and political constraints and more tolerant of honest disagreements. 

Responsibility for the present difficult situation, including 

strained personal relationships among leaders, lies on both sides of 

the Atlantic. But I believe that the case for renewing the partnership, for reasons articulated by President Bush and others, is so 

persuasive that the recent tensions should be as much as spur as 

hindrance to a serious effort to repair the damage it has sustained. 

And I welcome the signs in the last few weeks that this is indeed 

how they are being treated by many of the leaders concerned. 

On policy cooperation, my statement addresses seven separate 

sets of critical issues, and concludes that on each, there is the potential for substantial cooperation, or at least complementarity of 

policy, across the Atlantic. These sets of issues are NATO’s Prague 

agenda, the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, security in the Gulf, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, international economic 

and social development, Russia, and U.S.-EU cooperation in trade 

and investment. 

I do not claim that there will be an identity of views on these 

issues, merely that there is enough potential agreement to permit 

serious transatlantic cooperation in dealing with them. 

There are other important issues on which significant policy cooperation is unlikely at present. These include agriculture, global 

environmental policy, the International Criminal Court, and the 

role and reform of the United Nations. But the transatlantic partnership has never been characterized by across-the-board agreement and never will be. The areas in which close cooperation does 

appear possible if the governments are willing to make the effort 

40

to achieve it, and those in which such cooperation is actually occurring, as you and your colleague Mr. Wexler mentioned at the outset, are impressive. We need to be sure that we have institutions 

that can further reinforce that cooperation and assist in managing 

inevitable differences. 

On institutions, perfection is impossible, especially at a time in 

which the power of the United States is disproportionately large 

and the EU is only a partially integrated political entity that aspires to, but cannot yet achieve, greater cohesion and unity as an 

international actor. 

By far the most important thing is that all available institutions 

should be used as channels for the necessary sustained and intense 

transatlantic dialogue. Beyond that, however, I suggest four areas 

for possible institutional improvements: 

First, reinforcing cooperation among legislatures, and especially 

between the Congress and the European Parliament, which will 

steadily grow in importance in the next few years. I will mention 

three ideas. Reinforced exchanges among the members of the two 

bodies; the institution of early warning or consultative periods for 

certain types of legislation to ensure that avoidable conflicts and 

tensions do not occur; and the institution of official staff exchanges 

on the model of the longstanding Congress-Bundestag exchanges. 

Second, developing further the role of the North Atlantic Council 

as the chamber of first resort for consultations on all international 

security issues, now that the alliance has unambiguously confirmed, at the Prague Summit, its intension to be ready to respond 

to security challenges and threats that emanate from outside the 

traditional NATO area. If, as European integration and the development of the common European Foreign and Security Policy proceed—and I do believe, contrary to what I think John Hulsman 

thinks that it will proceed—the EU begins to act as a more single 

unit in these consultations within the alliance, I would argue that 

this need not be a threat to U.S. interests. 

Third, developing new procedures for consultation and dialogue 

among regulators on the two sides of the Atlantic to avoid unnecessary trade and investment disputes, somewhat as Dan Hamilton 

mentioned earlier. 

Fourth, establishing ways in which to broaden transatlantic dialogues to include important third parties, such as Russia, India, 

and others, on particular issues on which they are key to effective 

action. 

In conclusion, the renewed transatlantic partnership for the future will be very different from that of the cold war, if only because 

the strategic challenges it will exist to meet are different. Such a 

partnership will only develop if both sides make a serious effort to 

come to a common assessment of the nature, dimensions, and urgency of these critical challenges. While there may be a temptation 

on each side to postpone this effort until there is, to coin a phrase, 

a regime change on the other side, the world is unlikely to stand 

still long enough to permit us this luxury. 

A degree of flexibility will be needed on both sides. Europeans 

will need to recognize that the Bush Administration’s international 

agenda has more to recommend it than they may have considered 

hitherto, and that pursuing that agenda effectively may require the 

41

selective and judicious use of military force with or without a U.N. 

mandate. 

On the U.S. side, we will have to recognize that systematic rather than ad hoc cooperation with Europeans is more likely to serve 

U.S. objectives best. And, that U.S. interests require that we reengage with the century-old effort to build international norms and 

institutions by which the United States as well as other countries 

will be bound, but which are more suited to our times than elements of the current U.N. system. 

These are, indeed, tasks worthy of the heirs of the great period 

of creation after the Second World War and ones that will require 

the same degree of support and focused attention from legislatures 

and executives on both sides of the Atlantic. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Makins. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Makins follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER MAKINS, PRESIDENT, THE ATLANTIC

COUNCIL OF THE UNITED STATES

RENEWING THE TRANSATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP: WHY AND HOW?

OVERVIEW

Adequately addressing the subject of these hearings requires answering three 

questions. First, what are the foundations on which a renewed transatlantic partnership can and should be built? Second, what are the obstacles to building such 

a partnership? Third, how can those obstacles be overcome or managed? This statement will cover each of these three questions in turn. 

In answering the first question, emphasis will be placed on the policies of the 

Bush administration, both because it is those policies that are often alleged to have 

weakened the transatlantic relationship and because U.S. leadership will be the essential basis for its renewal. The conclusion will be that the foundations for a strong 

transatlantic partnership remain in place and are recognized by leaders and experts 

on both sides of the Atlantic. 

A response to the second question is essential because of the mass of commentary 

from both official and unofficial sources in recent months about the problems of 

achieving greater transatlantic cooperation. The analysis here will focus on the concrete changes in the United States, Europe and the world beyond that have challenged the policies and practices of the transatlantic partners in the past several 

years, especially since September 11, 2001. It will highlight the ways in which these 

changes opened the door to the acute transatlantic tensions and disagreements of 

recent months. The conclusion will be that the damage wrought by these disagreements will not be easily or quickly repaired, but that repair is both possible and 

necessary in the interests of both the United States and European countries. 

This analysis lays the foundation for answering the third, and most important, 

question about how to overcome the obstacles to renewing the partnership. Three 

dimensions will be emphasized: the role of leadership; the potential for policy cooperation on the central international challenges of the coming months and years; 

and the institutions within which the partnership must be renewed and more effective dialogue conducted.

• On leadership, the emphasis is on the need for action at the highest levels 

of government and the restoration of frank and open dialogue at those levels.

• On policy cooperation, the analysis outlines the basis for common or complementary policies among the partners on both sides of the Atlantic on 

issues such as the future of NATO, the problems of the Middle East and the 

Gulf, the challenges of international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, the future role of Russia, and U.S.–EU cooperation on trade and investment.

• On institutions, some practical suggestions are made to deal with the weaknesses inherent in the relationship as it will exist for some time to come.

A brief conclusion argues that if the governments on both sides of the Atlantic 

are willing to make the effort required to strengthen their cooperation in the 

42

changed international circumstances they confront they will create a new partnership that, while inevitably and appropriately quite different from that during the 

Cold War, will enable them to advance their interests more surely than either could 

do without the support and assistance of the other. 

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee on Europe, I would like to thank 

you for giving me this opportunity to appear today to discuss a matter of critical 

importance to our foreign policy and one that is at the heart of the mission of the 

Atlantic Council of the United States. I commend you for your decision to hold hearings on the transatlantic relationship at one of the most difficult times in the modern history of that relationship. 

THE FOUNDATIONS OF A RENEWED TRANSATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP

Recent months have seen an almost unprecedented amount of commentary about 

the transatlantic relationship by political leaders and nongovernmental analysts 

alike on both sides of the Atlantic. The reasons for this wave of attention are not 

far to seek. But the volume and nature of this commentary are in themselves revealing. Not only have they confirmed the commonplace observation that relationships 

of any kind are hard to capture adequately in words. But they have also strongly 

suggested the importance that people on both sides of the Atlantic attach to this 

relationship. The fact that the commentary often invokes the imagery of a marriage 

relationship and seeks conclusions by analogy with marriage merely confirms this 

impression and underlines what anyone concerned with transatlantic relations 

should keep constantly in mind—that the state of those relations is often as much 

a matter of psychology as of reality. 

In this situation it is perhaps useful to review some basic propositions about the 

first question posed by the title of these hearings: Why renew the transatlantic partnership? Given the alleged lack of concern of the Bush administration for transatlantic relations, a good place to start is with some of the relevant recent statements of the administration’s leaders. For example, President Bush in his speech 

in Krakow on 31 May:

The United States is committed to a strong Atlantic alliance, to ensure our 

security, to advance human freedom and to keep peace in the world . . . Europe 

and America will always be joined by more than our interests. Ours is a union 

of ideals and convictions. We believe in human rights, and justice under the 

law, and self-government, and economic freedom tempered by compassion.

The President gave another reason for the importance he attaches to the relationship, none the less important for its pragmatism:

To meet these goals of security and peace and a hopeful future for the developing world, we welcome, we need the help, the advice and the wisdom of our 

European friends and allies. New theories of rivalry should not be permitted to 

undermine the great principles and obligations that we share. The enemies of 

freedom have always preferred a divided alliance because when Europe and 

America are united no problem and no enemy can stand against us.

In the same vein, Secretary of State Colin Powell, in a press conference in Paris 

on 22 May, outlined a conception of the relationship as it is likely to evolve in the 

future:

There will be disagreements, there will be fights, but there will be more on 

which we agree, more areas on which we can come together as a transatlantic 

community to deal with some of the transatlantic and now increasingly international problems we face . . . let us remember what keeps us together: shared 

values, shared beliefs, and a commitment to help our people to a better life. But 

more importantly, as the wealthiest part of the world, a commitment on the 

part of all of us to help the people around the world to a better life. As long 

as we keep our eyes on those values, the transatlantic community is going to 

be fine, and I’ll let others decide whether unipolar, multipolar, bipolar, whatever, you know. [sic] I don’t use those terms very often because I am not sure 

what they mean.

Some will doubtless say that statements of this kind are mere rhetoric designed 

to calm European fears about current U.S. policy, but unlikely to be observed in 

practical policy. Time alone will tell. Yet others will note, equally cynically, that the 

U.S. administration means everything it says on this subject provided that Europeans are willing to follow the U.S policy lead uncritically. But several recent events 

43

1 I have commented at greater length on this issue in a commentary on Robert Kagan’s now 

notorious article Power and Weakness. See Christopher J. Makins: ‘Power and Weakness’ or 

Challenge and Response. This can be found online at www.acus.org/publications/

occasionalpapers/Transatlantic/KaganRiposte.pdf 2 A classic recent statement of this view can be found in Clyde Prestowitz, Rogue Nation, New 

York, Basic Books, 2003. Thomas L. Friedman has also commented on this issue extensively in 

his recent columns in The New York Times.

suggest that one should consider the possibility that the rhetoric means very much 

what it says. The increasingly close U.S.-European cooperation on the post-war reconstruction of Afghanistan, the engagement of NATO in post-war security arrangements in Iraq, initially in a supporting role, continuing close transatlantic cooperation on the Balkans, the agreements at the Prague NATO summit, the contentious, 

but real cooperation within the Quartet on the Israeli-Palestinian problem, close cooperation on counterterrorism—all these testify to an ongoing pragmatic U.S. and 

allied approach to difficult challenges even when there may not be complete agreement on every aspect of policy. 

The Committee will be hearing separately from European experts, but as one who 

spends much time in discussion with Europeans of many different stripes, I believe 

that most Europeans engaged in international relations would endorse the sentiments of the U.S. leadership quoted earlier concerning the importance of a strong 

transatlantic partnership. This is not to deny their anxieties, for which they can, 

and no doubt will, produce ample chapter and verse, that the United States has lost 

interest in Europe or sees it as too weak and divided to be a useful partner in dealing with the most important international challenges. Nor does it deny their skepticism as to the U.S. intention to follow through on its words. But those anxieties 

and that skepticism lead back into the psychology of the relationship. 

This broad similarity of opinion on the relationship underlines an important point 

that is often lost in the discussion of disagreements across the Atlantic, namely that 

the range of views on most policy issues in the United States and Europe is substantially the same. What differs is where the political center of gravity of opinion 

lies at any given time. Just as there are prominent Americans who strongly criticize 

the way in which the Bush administration has dealt with its European allies in recent months, so there are prominent Europeans, including in France and Germany, 

acutely distressed at the course their governments have taken in recent transatlantic arguments. There are no greater risks in trying to understand the future 

of the relationship than overgeneralizing trends and attitudes and relying on snapshots of opinion instead of looking at the moving picture formed by the evolution 

of thinking on both sides of the Atlantic.1

In summary, as the statements quoted above show for the U.S. side, there are 

several components of the foundation for a strong transatlantic relationship in the 

future as in the past that are widely accepted on both sides of the ocean. At the 

risk of gross oversimplification these can be expressed as follows:

• Shared values and objectives. These values are rooted in the principles of 

open democratic societies, respect for human rights and the rule of law, and 

the belief in market-based economic policies. The common objectives relate, 

among other things, to the establishment of a peaceful and secure international order and an open international trading system. There is much debate as to whether these values and objectives have come to be less strongly 

held in common or are more likely to be differently interpreted on the two 

sides of the Atlantic than in the past. Likewise, there has been much commentary to the effect that certain societal values are less common across the 

Atlantic than in earlier times. The death penalty and attitudes toward risk 

(for example in genetically modified food) are often given as examples. And 

most recently, there is widespread discussion as to whether the United States 

has moved away from beliefs and objectives that it previously supported, to 

the extent that it has become a ‘rogue nation’ within the international system.2 This is not the place for an extensive analysis of these questions, although more will be said on some of them below. Suffice it to say that attitudinal differences and societal values across the Atlantic (and indeed within 

Europe) were in many ways even more marked in the 1950s and 1960s, when 

the transatlantic partnership is widely believed to have been at its closest, 

than they are today. Those who wish to argue that current differences are 

greater and in some way more dysfunctional in terms of a transatlantic partnership have not yet made a wholly persuasive case, least of all to those outside the North Atlantic region who tend increasingly to see a world divided 

into the ‘West vs. the Rest.’

44

3See, for example, Joseph P. Quinlan, Drifting Apart or Crowing Together?: The Primacy of 

the Transatlantic Economy, Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2003. http://sais-jhu.edu/transatlantic/Quinlan%20Text.pdf. For an assessment of the potential policy implications of the transatlantic interdependence, see Changing Terms of Trade: Managing the New Transatlantic Economy, The Atlantic Council of the United States, April 2001. 4See Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order, New York, 

Knopf, 2003. This is a revised and expanded version of his article Power and Weakness, in Policy 

Review no. 113, June/July 2002. 

• Economic integration. The extent and significance of this component of the relationship has recently been powerfully documented.3 Its implications will be 

discussed further below. 

• The practical advantages of cooperation. As President Bush stated in Krakow, 

when the United States and Europe act together they are much more likely 

to achieve their objectives, and at lower cost, than when they are disunited. 

There have been numerous graphic examples of this fact in recent years, not 

least the debacle at the Seattle meeting of the WTO in 2000 and the history 

of the Balkans in the 1990s.

If the assessment that there are powerful forces pushing governments on both 

sides of the Atlantic toward renewing and preserving a strong transatlantic partnership is correct, the second question in the title of today’s hearing immediately 

arises: How can that partnership be renewed? Answering that question requires an 

assessment of the obstacles to doing so and the ways in which those obstacles can 

be overcome. 

THE OBSTACLES TO A RENEWED TRANSATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP

First, the obstacles. Many theories and images have become part of the currency 

of the recent debate. None have been more widely commented on than Robert 

Kagan’s statements that Americans are from Mars and Europeans from Venus and 

that the United States lives in a Hobbesian world and Europe in a Kantian one.4

But others have spoken equally vividly of the United States as a contemporary Gulliver being tied down by European Lilliputians, of a U.S. insistence on unipolarity 

contrasted with a European preference for multipolarity, of the confirmation of the 

realist theory that every international hegemon evokes a countervailing alliance of 

weaker states, of the ‘continental drift’ of societal values that will force the two sides 

of the Atlantic further apart, of separation and divorce, and so on. 

Many of these analyses and images contain grains of truth, but all contain a large 

amount of chaff. None satisfactorily accounts for the ambiguous, complex and multilayered reality of the relationship as it is today and will remain tomorrow. Unfortunately for analysts, that is a goal at which they can continually strive, but rarely, 

if ever, attain. Several aspects of the profusion of analysis are, however, worth noting as the foundation for prescribing a remedy for what ails the transatlantic relationship at present. 

First, the relationship has lived through many cycles in which the countries on 

the two sides of the ocean have had to adjust with more or less ease and grace to 

new realities concerning both themselves and the world outside the North Atlantic 

region. This is not the place to rehearse the history of these various cycles. In many 

ways history is quite likely to judge the present trough in the relationship as the 

most serious and most difficult to overcome, if indeed it is successfully overcome. 

But the point remains that the current problems fit well into a pattern that has 

become familiar. As often as not, the root of the problem has been a shift in the 

relative power of the United States and a Europe recovering its strength and international aspirations following the Second World War. It should be no surprise that 

a major constituent of the current tensions is the unresolved issue of how far the 

recent move within Europe toward closer cooperation in foreign policy is likely to 

go and the implications of this both for the United States and for the institutions 

of transatlantic cooperation. The suspicions aroused in the United States by the 

EU’s adoption of its European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) initiative in the 

1990s illustrate this point. 

Second, underlying the recent tensions has been a major strategic shift to which 

both the United States and European countries are still adapting. This is the shift 

from the Cold War situation in which the security of Europe was a, if not the, primary strategic concern of the United States (though it was certainly never the only 

such concern) to a situation in which the principal strategic challenges have their 

geographical source in what has been variously called the arc of crisis, the axis of 

evil, the Greater Middle East, and other terms. Thus, the strategic center of gravity 

has moved from an area in which the interests of the United States and European 

45

5For a fuller treatment of this subject, see Rita Hauser et al., Elusive Partnership: U.S. and 

European Policies in the Near East and the Gulf, The Atlantic Council of the United States, September 2002. 

countries were broadly similar (though still a continuous source of policy debates) 

to another area on which the track record over the same period has been one of almost continuous and substantial transatlantic policy disagreement. Only in the unusual circumstances of the 1990s, when first the Gulf War and then the Oslo peace 

process brought a remarkable convergence of policy across the Atlantic for much of 

the decade, have the transatlantic allies managed to achieve substantial cooperation 

on the Middle East broadly understood. With the collapse of the Oslo process in 

early 2001 and growing differences of view on the management of the post-Gulf War 

situation, that brief period of relative harmony ended.5

Third, although the deterioration in the transatlantic relationship was already 

evident well before late 2001 and even before the advent of the second Bush administration, the impact of the attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 was 

very differently felt on the two sides of the Atlantic both by the publics and, equally 

importantly, in terms of the obligations they imposed on the leaderships. Much was 

known in advance of 11 September about al-Qaeda and the threat it represented 

to both the United States and European countries. But on neither side of the Atlantic was there a clear disposition or a political consensus for a strong and decisive 

reaction to this threat. 

The intensity of the reaction on the U.S. side after 11 September was both inevitable and warranted. It created a situation in which political leaders had no choice, 

even had they wished to find one, but to treat the prevention by all reasonable 

means of a recurrence of the disaster as the highest political priority. In Europe, 

by contrast, the threat still seemed somewhat distant and abstract. It was arguably 

much more directed at the United States than at any European countries, especially 

ones that elected not to associate with U.S. policy too closely. And it was also plausibly comparable to the internal terrorist threats that many European countries had 

confronted in recent years and in several cases either faced down or contained. 

Arising from this differentiated reaction to the events of 11 September there developed a series of episodes which aggravated the transatlantic rift. With its understandable and correct sense of urgency, the U.S. administration saw little reason to 

plan and undertake the military operation in Afghanistan jointly with its allies, 

given the premium on speed and efficacy and the novelty of both the theater and 

the type of warfare contemplated, for neither of which was NATO policy or planning 

prepared. That sense of urgency carried forward into the development of U.S. policy 

on Iraq during 2002 and the elaboration of the administration’s much discussed National Security Strategy. It was only slightly slowed by the president’s decision to 

seek United Nations consensus on the need to tackle the Iraqi problem, by force if 

necessary, as a matter of high priority. 

Given the sense of urgency and priority widely attached to these actions in the 

United States, it is not obvious how any ally that had principled doubts about the 

wisdom of U.S. policy could have expressed those doubts effectively, and certainly 

publicly, without attracting the displeasure, or worse, of the U.S. administration. 

Few would dissent in principle from the proposition that the status of ally and 

friend differs from that of uncritical follower. But the situation in 2001–2003 has 

been such as to make acting on that proposition highly risky for any would-be friend 

of a U.S. administration publicly dedicated to the proposition that other countries 

are either with it or against it. 

Yet this very history also suggests that the adaptation of policy and strategy that 

9/11 forced on both sides of the Atlantic has been, and remains, incomplete.

• On the European side, governments have increasingly come to accept essential elements of the emerging U.S. consensus on the need to use military force 

in certain circumstances to confront the potentially related threats of terrorism, the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and regimes that 

are either unwilling to join the substantial international agreement in confronting these problems or too weak to control their own territory. The agreements at the European Council in Thessaloniki in late June on a new EU 

strategic document and on policy toward Iran represent important steps in 

this direction.

• On the U.S. side, the distinction between what can be achieved by military 

action to deal with these problems and what is needed in the way of broadlybased multilateral civil and economic measures to ensure that they do not 

recur is increasingly well understood in the aftermath of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

46

6See Quinlan, op. cit. 

This gradual evolution of the approaches and assessments—both on the two sides 

of the Atlantic and among Europeans—is likely to continue as the experience of recent years is assimilated. To what extent there will be a complete convergence of 

opinion is hard to foresee, however, and will in any case depend to a large extent 

on events yet to occur. 

Fourth, recent events have cast into sharp relief a longstanding difference of view 

within Europe as to the proper course of development of the European Union. 

Crudely represented as a disagreement between Britain and France, this difference 

of view dates back at least to the founding of the European Economic Community. 

But the decision of the European Union (EU) to enlarge substantially by 2004, with 

the attendant threat that enlargement will undermine the ability of those countries 

that have largely dictated the direction of the Union hitherto to continue to do so, 

has given a new salience to an old divergence. The fact that Britain is, for the first 

time since it joined the EEC in the early 1970s, led by a prime minister with both 

the ambition and, at least in theory, the potential to challenge French leadership 

of the EU has merely made the situation more delicate. The Iraq crisis, and the distinctive pro-U.S. position taken by Tony Blair from early on, brought this hitherto 

largely latent rivalry to a head and invested it with significance going well beyond 

the confines of Europe. 

Notwithstanding this disagreement, there is a shared commitment by all the EU 

member countries to continue to work toward greater cooperation in the foreign and 

security policy arena through the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and 

the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). In part this determination is a 

consequence of U.S. strength and the perception among Europeans that they will 

only be heard in the United States if they speak with a single voice. But it is also, 

in part, a reaction to the perceived inconstancy of U.S. policy across several administrations and a consequent sense that Europe needs to acquire the ability to act 

in circumstances in which the United States, for reasons good or bad, does not wish 

to act or tires of doing so. This was a lesson that Tony Blair, among others, drew 

in the summer of 1998 in connection with Kosovo and that subsequently catalyzed 

the British decision to try to accelerate defense cooperation in the EU. 

It would be unwise to believe that this shared commitment on CFSP and ESDP 

will be a casualty of differences among Europeans over Iraq. While there is certainly 

nothing inevitable about the development of closer European cooperation in these 

areas, especially in the light of the forthcoming enlargement, the long, if episodic, 

movement in this direction responds to a certain logic that is more likely than not 

to continue. The Thessaloniki summit has reinforced this conclusion. The question 

for the United States, therefore, is whether it should attempt to stand in the way 

of this development, despite having generally encouraged it for so long, or whether 

it should seek to accommodate and even support it. 

The former course may seem irresistible in the heat of the crisis of transatlantic 

confidence over Iraq, especially as many Europeans are already convinced that the 

U.S. administration is doing precisely that. To this observer, however, that would 

be a misguided conclusion. Better by far to calculate that the United States has 

enough friends within the EU, including many of the soon-to-be new members, to 

be confident that the CFSP will not evolve in such a way as to make the EU an 

adversary of U.S. interests and to realize that a more coherent Europe represents 

a potential asset to the pursuit of those interests. 

Fifth, as mentioned earlier, the increasing economic integration of the countries 

of the North Atlantic region represents a strong bond engaging them with one another. Admittedly, history abounds with examples of erroneous predictions that increasing economic integration is both irreversible and a source of greater cooperation among nations. There is no certainty that those who make such predictions 

today are any more correct. But for the time being the welfare of all the societies 

in the region is dependent on the depth of that integration, which has recently been 

amply documented.6

As the process of integration proceeds and as what were once indisputably domestic policy concerns increasingly affect the interests of other countries, new disputes 

are bound to occur, as they have done continually in the past. It is the nature of 

boundaries, political and economic alike, that they are the focal points of friction. 

At present, the area in which such frictions are most likely in the transatlantic context is that of economic regulation, as has already been apparent on issues as diverse as aircraft noise, genetically modified organisms (GMOs), and corporate taxVerDate Mar 21 2002 15:37 Jul 28, 2003 Jkt 087670 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\EUROPE\061103\87670 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
47

7For a fuller treatment of this issue see the report of the Atlantic Council Working Group 

Risk and Reward, published in November 2002. This report can be found at www.acus.org/Publications/policypapers/Transatlanticrelations/Risk%and%Reward.pdf. 

ation.7 Many ideas have been proposed to enable the United States and the EU to 

manage these frictions better than they have often done in the past, but it is notable 

that even in his relatively conciliatory Krakow speech, President Bush saw fit to 

take the EU to task for its policy on GMOs. 

Sixth, the frequently heard, and rather simplistic, allegation that the current U.S. 

administration is ‘unilateralist’ whereas most European governments are 

‘multilateralist’ does serve as a proxy for real issues concerning the proper role of 

international norms, agreements and institutions in shaping and limiting the power 

of nations. The majority of leaders on both sides of the Atlantic have for many decades shared the view that the best interests of all the countries concerned and of 

the world as a whole would be best served by the development of such international 

instruments and institutions. Consequently, the United States and its allies in Europe, under strong U.S. leadership, have made a considerable investment of time 

and effort in creating a new international system based on agreements and institutions in the security as well as the economic arenas. Few would deny that this effort 

has been only partly successful and that the centerpiece of the system, the United 

Nations, has proven to have serious flaws in its structure and operations. As a result, both the United States and European countries have been willing to act without the authority of the United Nations on many occasions. 

The problem of the legitimacy of action without U.N. sanction has, however, been 

made considerably more difficult and sensitive by at least two factors: the progressive emergence, mostly since the 1990s, of the concept of legitimate ‘humanitarian’ 

intervention in what hitherto had been regarded as the internal affairs of states; 

and the multiplication, beyond anything imagined at the time of its creation, of 

independent countries members of the United Nations. The NATO interventions in 

the Balkans in the 1990s were classic examples of the dilemma presented by the 

former development. The difficulty of reaching consensus within the United Nations 

has been greatly affected by the latter. 

Moreover, although the structure of the Security Council has come to reflect poorly the real distribution of weight within the international system, there is no incentive for those countries which benefit disproportionately from the existing system, 

notably France and Britain, to accept any change that would undermine their position. Quite the contrary, that position offers them the congenial opportunity to continue to play a role in world affairs beyond their true power and influence. 

Taken together, these and other factors have resulted in a concern about the legitimacy of the use of power—and especially the power of the strongest country, the 

United States—without U.N. approval. This concern has divided the allies without 

leading to any serious attempt on their part to come to a common understanding 

of the extent and significance of the problem and how it can best be addressed. 

On one side, many in the United States assert that all countries, and especially 

the United States, as the country primarily responsible for the maintenance of peace 

and security in the world and as the primary target of the forces of disorder, will 

on occasion have to act without the formal legitimacy of a U.N decision. Some would 

press this view to the point of suggesting that U.S. interests would be best served 

if the United Nations were to disappear and the United States were to be freed from 

the constraints of many international agreements to which it is a party. 

By contrast, many in Europe believe that the propensity of the United States to 

exploit its power in this way represents, except in the most egregious cases, the application of double standards and will undermine such progress as has been made 

toward a rule-based international order. In this European view, the United States 

needs to be constrained to act within internationally agreed limits. 

These are the principal features of the current international landscape that, taken 

together, raise the question whether the transatlantic allies can reach a common 

strategic assessment on enough of the critical challenges they face to make a meaningful and enduring alliance or true partnership possible. The least that can be said 

in answer to this question is that it will not happen easily or quickly. Not only are 

the wounds incurred in the recent disputes quite deep and painful on both sides, 

but the real issues underlying those disputes are difficult and complex. As President 

Bush said in Krakow, equipping the Alliance to meet the challenges of our times 

is a matter of capability and will. At the present moment, neither exist in adequate 

proportion. 

Perhaps they never will. Many well qualified and perceptive observers have concluded that the Alliance is essentially beyond repair. One typical such analysis, 

under the heading of The End of Atlanticism, argues that the Bush administration’s 

48

8See Ivo H. Daalder, The End of Atlanticism, Survival, vol. 45, no. 2, Summer 2003. Daalder 

concludes with a provocative paraphrase of George Washington’s Farewell Address in which ‘Europe’ is replaced by ‘the United States.’ Thus, the contemporary European Washington would 

conclude, ‘Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of [the United States], entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of [American] Ambition, Rivalship, Interest, Humour 

or Caprice?’ 9See Daalder, op. cit. 

policies and diplomatic style, notably its certitude and ‘religiosity,’ represent a tipping point in transatlantic relations which, while not leading inevitably to the end 

of the Alliance, will do so unless there is a change of approach soon.8 Yet others, 

from the opposite perspective, believe that President Chirac has irrevocably set 

France on the path of creating an international counterweight to challenge U.S. 

power and that this French decision precludes the reestablishment of any real 

transatlantic partnership worthy of the name. Many citations of this pessimistic 

view could be made from commentators on both sides of the Atlantic. 

Yet if one believes, with President Bush as quoted earlier, that the renewal of the 

Alliance is of critical importance to the interests of Americans and Europeans alike, 

finding the cooperative policies and processes which can catalyze that renewal is an 

urgent task. It is to this final question—how the current problems in the partnership can be overcome—that the analysis must now turn. 

OVERCOMING THE OBSTACLES TO A RENEWED TRANSATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP

Renewing the transatlantic partnership will require actions of several different 

kinds—relating to leadership, policy cooperation and institutions. Each will be addressed in turn. 

Leadership. The impetus for renewing the partnership will have to come to a substantial extent from the top. The leaders of the major countries must state clearly, 

as President Bush has done recently, the importance they attach to reweaving, and 

indeed strengthening, the fabric of the relationship. And they must enforce their 

stated intentions on their governments at all levels and make plain that they will 

not allow those intentions to be undermined by people with different views. As part 

of this process, the leaders need to speak more frankly with one another about their 

concerns and political constraints and seek, as the practical politicians they are, to 

find ways of accommodating their respective positions to the extent possible. One 

of the characteristics of recent years has been for high level meetings, both bilateral 

and multilateral, to become occasions for public displays of harmony unaccompanied 

by serious discussion of difficult and sensitive issues. This is no basis for partnership. 

This assertion that there has been a deficiency of dialogue among the key governments, and between the United States and the EU on areas within the competence 

of the Commission and the High Representative of the Council of Ministers, may 

seem paradoxical. Surely, it will be objected, there has been a profusion, if not a 

proliferation, of transatlantic meetings, visits, exchanges of all kinds and at all levels in recent years. Scarcely an hour goes by when ministers or presidents are not 

meeting somewhere or picking up the telephone to talk (although some observers 

have claimed that in quantitative terms meetings at the highest levels have not 

been as frequent as in the past 9). Yet for all the contacts that undoubtedly occur, 

many participants as well as observers admit that there has been a deficit of serious, intensive and sustained strategic dialogue such as typified the relationship on 

European security during much of the Cold War period. 

Even with the best dialogue in the world, however, consensus will not always be 

possible. In such cases, the governments must accept that honest disagreement honestly arrived at need not be a sign of disloyalty to the partnership. In a relationship 

characterized by such close and intense dialogue, which is certainly not what we 

have witnessed in recent times, there would be no place, or need, to consider punishing or ostracizing partners with whom agreement on a particular issue proved 

impossible to reach. Such forbearance, especially at a time of great anxiety about 

security and economic growth, may seem a lot to ask. But it should not be too much 

to grant in view of the priority that all the major governments concerned profess 

to attach to the outcome. And the failure to do so will only lead to repeating the 

experience of recent months in increasingly adverse situations. 

Some might object that the state of personal relationships among several of the 

key leaders at present is such as to preclude their acting together decisively to 

renew their partnership. Without doubt the different styles and political ideas of 

Presidents Bush and Chirac and Chancellor Schroeder, not to mention their recent 

experiences with one another and public reactions to their differences, make their 

task a difficult one. But if politics makes strange bedfellows, national interests often 

49

10See for example, the Atlantic Council’s reports Elusive Partnership, op. cit.; New Capabilities: Transforming NATO Forces, September 2002; Risk and Reward: U.S.–EU Regulatory Cooperation on Food Safety and the Environment, November 2002; Winning the Peace: Managing 

a Successful Transition in Iraq, January 2003; U.S.-Libyan Relations: Toward Cautious Reengagement, April 2003; The Twain Shall Meet: Prospects for Russia-West Relations, September 

2002. All can be found on the Council’s web site at www.acus.org on the publications page. 11The text can be found at www.cer.org.uk. 

make for uncomfortable ones. If the logic of a strong partnership is as persuasive 

as is argued here, the recent tensions should be as much a spur as a hindrance to 

a serious effort to repair the damage it has sustained. 

The failures of communication of recent times have been the responsibility of leaders on both sides of the Atlantic. But there is one challenge that is specific to Europeans. For too long, European leaders have been prone to determine their approaches toward many international problems as a function of their relations with 

the United States. Agreeing, or in some cases disagreeing, with the U.S. position 

has been almost more important than the merits of the issue at hand. For the 

United States, by contrast, transatlantic relations have increasingly been seen as 

a function of approaches to the international problems themselves. As the strategic 

center of gravity has moved outside Europe to the Middle East and beyond, it has 

become vital for Europeans to shoulder a greater degree of strategic responsibility 

for dealing with these problems and to be less inclined to shape their policies toward 

them as a function of what the United States thinks or wants. While this might on 

the face of it seem to imply that there would be more rather than fewer transatlantic policy disagreements, paradoxically there is a good chance that the result 

would be a stronger partnership in which each side would have more to contribute 

to the other. 

Policy Cooperation. The governments need to proceed issue by issue to define 

those areas on which they agree and can cooperate and to narrow and understand 

better those on which they cannot find a basis for cooperative or complementary 

policies. In recent months, the Atlantic Council has convened working groups on a 

broad range of issues—including trade and regulatory issues, European security, the 

future of Russia-West relations, the Middle East and the Gulf, and Asia—with a 

view to outlining areas of potential transatlantic cooperation.10 Others have also 

worked along similar lines. One such exercise resulted in the Declaration on Transatlantic Relations, issued in May and signed by 21 European and U.S. foreign policy 

experts and former officials, including myself.11 This declaration outlines a basis for 

restoring transatlantic cooperation on a broad range of critical issues. One may hope 

that these efforts outside governments can stimulate and inform the needed work 

by the governments themselves. 

For present purposes, it is worth outlining how transatlantic policy cooperation 

might be effectively pursued in a number of key areas.

• NATO’s Prague Agenda. NATO’s Prague summit in November 2002 represented a major step forward in the transformation of the Alliance from a 

Cold War organization intended to defend European territory into an alliance 

ready and able to deal with the strategic challenges of the 21st century, including those that arise outside the traditional NATO area. However the key 

elements of the Prague consensus—notably the NATO Response Force (NRF) 

and the Prague Capabilities Commitments—must now be implemented. The 

intra-Alliance disagreements related to the war in Iraq, and in particular the 

issue of support for Turkey, have made this somewhat more difficult. But the 

Alliance agreement on assuming responsibility for the International Security 

Assistance Force in Afghanistan and on supporting Poland’s assumption of responsibility for a contribution to the post-war stabilization force in Iraq have 

shown that the Alliance’s ability to act has not been fatally damaged. All the 

allied governments must put their full weight behind the implementation of 

the Prague consensus and the related work of the two major allied commands—SHAPE and the recently created Allied Command Transformation. 

One further step is important—the development and full-scale activation of 

the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) in close cooperation with SHAPE. 

Recent events in the Gulf have made abundantly plain that the ERRF as 

originally planned could make an invaluable contribution in the coming years 

if the EU can develop and support it. While there are residual questions 

about the desire of some EU countries to see the ERRF emerge wholly independent of NATO, which would result in undesirable duplication of capabilities and command structures, these questions should be manageable within 

the context of a renewed partnership of the kind outlined in this paper.

50

12 An analysis of this point can be found in Elusive Partnership, op. cit.

• The Israeli-Palestinian Dispute. Even those allies who supported U.S. policy 

on Iraq underlined the importance of making a serious effort after the war 

to achieve the implementation of an Israeli-Palestinian settlement along the 

lines of the Quartet’s road map. This effort is now under way with the full 

participation of President Bush. The Aqaba and Sharm-el-Sheikh summits in 

early June have already generated more movement in the right direction than 

has been seen for over two years. But there is a long path ahead and the ability of the extremists on both sides to disrupt progress is all too apparent. 

From the point of view of transatlantic relations, the importance of the continuing engagement of the U.S administration, with visible support from the 

U.S. Congress, in ensuring that the momentum does not flag is hard to overstate. This is not the place to describe at length the reasons for which European countries attach so much importance to this issue.12 Suffice it to say 

that many Europeans see this as a test of the sincerity of the stated purpose 

of U.S. policy to achieve a new, just, democratic and secure Middle East. If, 

as is inevitable, the implementation of the road map encounters serious obstacles in the coming months, the U.S. and European governments must consult 

in the closest possible manner in order to ensure that their combined weights 

are used in support of the common objective and to avoid the kind of tensions 

seen in the past, with the U.S. side criticizing Europeans for being pro-Palestinian and Europeans responding with criticism of the United States for giving Israel a blank check. During the last period of significant movement on 

this issue, in the late 1990s, there was, as was noted earlier, a brief period 

of unprecedented complementarity of policy across the Atlantic. Both sides 

need to work to reestablish that situation and to dispose of the considerable 

mutual suspicion among the allies that has developed since the collapse of the 

Camp David/Taba process. 

• Security in the Gulf. The Iraq war and the continuing tensions concerning 

Iran have underscored, as if it were necessary, the failure of Western policy 

over several decades to achieve a stable and enduring security arrangement 

in the Gulf. This is an area on which there is a great deal of experience and 

expertise in Europe and on which European countries have strong and well 

articulated views as to the appropriate policy approaches. For the most part 

U.S. and European goals in the region are similar, including the promotion 

of democracy, the ending of government support for terrorism, and the halting 

of WMD programs, although at present the two sides of the Atlantic have 

rather different approaches to achieving those goals. Many observers believe 

that there is scope for complementary policies to be pursued, notably with respect to Iran, that could better serve the Western interest in general than the 

recent disarray in Western policy. In particular, the current EU policy of pursuing a parallel political and economic ‘conditional engagement’ with Iran offers an opportunity to test the willingness of the Iranian regime to bring its 

behavior into line with international norms. But this policy is currently being 

pursued without any deep transatlantic understanding on strategy or tactics 

in relation either to Iran or to other policies in the Gulf, including the postwar political and economic reconstruction of Iraq. This lack, coupled with 

abiding suspicions in many U.S. quarters about EU intentions and seriousness and parallel European suspicions of U.S. intentions and motives, could 

easily lead to renewed and acute transatlantic tensions.

• Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction. Transatlantic cooperation on 

counter-terrorism has remained one of the bright spots in the relationship, 

even during the difficulties of recent months, and has resulted in a strengthening of U.S. cooperation with the EU as such. As mentioned earlier, for the 

most part Europeans were less deeply affected by the tragedy of 9/11 than 

Americans and more inclined to judge it in the context of Western Europe’s 

experience of terrorism both in Europe and in former colonial territories. But 

their views and policies have converged substantially with those of the United 

States at the practical level, even if at the strategic level there remains more 

skepticism in Europe about the threat that international terrorism and WMD 

will coalesce in the manner feared by the U.S. administration. As to WMD, 

Europeans and Americans generally agree in principle on the need for resolute action to stop and if possible reverse the spread of the relevant capabilities and technologies. And all recognize that this goal will not be achieved 

without the closest cooperation across the Atlantic. Nevertheless, there remains a need for much closer dialogue both on the threat and on possible reVerDate Mar 21 2002 15:37 Jul 28, 2003 Jkt 087670 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\EUROPE\061103\87670 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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13See, for example, Risk and Reward, op. cit., on regulatory cooperation associated with food 

safety and the environment.

sponses than has been typical of recent years. The announcement of the Proliferation Security Initiative by President Bush in Krakow suggests a renewal 

of such dialogue, at least among some of the transatlantic countries. Moreover, the final communique ́ of the G–8 meeting in Evian implied a new willingness on the part of all the governments to accept that strengthening the 

nonproliferation regime may need in some circumstances to be supplemented 

by more forceful measures. This willingness has been confirmed, for the EU 

countries, by the decision of the Thessaloniki summit concerning Iran. But 

there remain many practical questions on which there is less identity of 

views, including the role of the United Nations in enforcing the nonproliferation regime and, in relation to the Middle East, the future of Israel’s nuclear 

weapons capability and its connection to the denuclearization of other countries in the region.

• International Economic and Social Development. Both in the Middle East and 

beyond the countries of the North Atlantic world need to cooperate in promoting the economic and social development that will be the surest guarantee 

of free democratic institutions and security. The Doha Development Agenda 

offers one good opportunity to make progress in this direction, although it 

often appears as though both the EU and the United States see the development part of the Doha agenda as a cross between an inconvenient necessity 

and a basis for scoring points against their transatlantic rivals. Ensuring that 

development is properly integrated into the broader international economic 

agenda is essential and should be the subject of continuing transatlantic dialogue. The same is true in more specific areas. One such area, of perhaps 

unique importance in present circumstances, is the social and economic development of the Middle East. It is regrettable that the U.S. administration decided to launch its chronically underfunded Middle East Partnership Initiative in December 2002 as a unilateral initiative, rather than coordinating it 

with European countries so as to make it a more substantial effort from the 

start. Nevertheless, it should urgently be broadened in such a way as to bring 

European and other countries into both the planning and implementation. 

Such an effort could provide an essential dimension of Western policy in the 

region that could undercut the appearance that the West is embarking on a 

new crusade to dominate the Moslem Arab world politically, if not in a strictly imperial manner, and precipitating a ‘conflict of civilizations.’ There are 

other development initiatives on which closer transatlantic cooperation should 

also be possible. These include the U.S. government’s Millennium Challenge 

Account initiative and the international effort to deal with HIV/AIDS, to 

which President Bush has made a strong personal commitment and to which 

the EU and its member countries are poised to make a matching contribution.

• Russia. Managing the progressive integration of Russia into the Euro-Atlantic 

institutions remains an important challenge facing the United States and the 

EU member countries. The development of the NATO-Russia Council in 2002 

represented an important step in this direction. But more recently Russia has 

found itself the object of the competing attentions of the United States and 

France in connection with Iraq. There should, however, be no reason why the 

three parties—the United States, the countries of the EU and Russia—cannot 

work together more closely to address the problems they all face, including 

terrorism and WMD, Russia’s membership of the WTO, instability in the 

Caucasus and Central Asia, and the Middle East and the Gulf.

• U.S.–EU Cooperation in Trade and Investment. U.S.–EU relations in the 

trade arena are hard to put on the same level of strategic significance as the 

major questions of international security. Nevertheless, they are important 

both in themselves and as a potential source of friction that can adversely affect relations in other areas. As has already been mentioned, the scope for 

new and more troublesome differences has grown as economic integration 

across the Atlantic has developed. Issues once considered as being solely within the purview of domestic politics, notably regulatory issues, have become 

sources of real or perceived unfairness in international economic relations. 

Several new policy approaches have been proposed in recent years to mitigate 

these risks and deal with actual problems.13 Many of these, such as early 

warning and consultative mechanisms, fall into the realm of process and institutions. But most have a characteristic in common with the discussion in 

preceding sections concerning international security issues, namely that there 

52

14See, for example, Simon Serfaty, ‘‘American Reflections on Europe’s Finality,’’ in The European Finality Debate and its National Dimensions, S. Serfaty ed., Washington, DC, The CSIS 

Press, 2003, p. 5. 15 It is notable that the NATO Parliamentary Assembly maintains a much higher level of activity than is seen in exchanges between the Congress and the European Parliament.

is a need for more systematic and thorough consultation across the Atlantic 

before policies and regulations become so definitively established that changing them represents a major political challenge. 

There are other issues of great importance on which it is harder to see a basis 

for transatlantic cooperation in the near future. These include agriculture, global environmental policy, the International Criminal Court, the role and reform of the 

United Nations, and so on. Some of these stand as testimony to the failed management of the relationship in earlier years. Others reflect strong domestic interests. 

Yet the number of areas in which the prospect of serious cooperation is good, not 

to mention those on which such cooperation is already occurring, is impressive. The 

transatlantic partnership has never been characterized by across the board agreement on critical issues and it never will be. The essential point is that there should 

be a set of institutions through which the partners can work to find common or complementary policies wherever possible and which can help them manage their inevitable differences. 

Transatlantic Institutions. The search for better institutional arrangements 

through which to build a stronger transatlantic partnership is a quest for perfection 

in which the seeker is doomed to disappointment. Nevertheless, it is important to 

understand the ways in which the deficiencies of existing institutions make the improvement of the relationship harder and to look for devices which can ameliorate 

this situation. 

There are many factors that make current transatlantic institutional arrangements unsatisfactory—among them the asymmetry of power between the United 

States and European countries and the differing memberships of NATO, the EU and 

other institutions. Of these factors, none is more problematic or, in present circumstances more intractable, than the condition of the European Union as a partially integrated political entity which aspires to, but cannot yet achieve, greater cohesion and unity in its international presence. As a result, European countries collectively have difficulty delivering on the promise of greater integration, for their 

own and U.S. interests, while at times appearing to expect that they will be able 

to act as if that promise had already been realized. 

The general dissatisfaction with the institution of the U.S.–EU summits, the current structure of which almost inevitably means that the European leaders able to 

decide and act on the most important issues are not present, is a consequence of 

this problem. The U.S. frustration at often being unable to bring its concerns to bear 

on the EU’s multi-dimensional decision-making process as effectively as it would 

like is another example of the problem. The United States is in effect a non-member 

member of the EU, as Simon Serfaty has put it.14 But that status is still hardly 

satisfactory, especially during this transitional period in the development of the EU. 

This situation is not susceptible of perfect resolution. The best that can be hoped 

for is that the countries in question will make the most they can of the institutions 

to hand and improve them in ways that are within the realm of the possible. By 

far the most important thing, as already mentioned, is the launching of sustained 

and intense transatlantic dialogue on the most important issues in whichever institutional venues seem most appropriate—whether it be NATO, U.S.–EU channels, 

more restricted (and therefore more controversial) groups such as the Quad or the 

Quint, ad hoc contact groups, or bilaterally. Beyond that, however, there are some 

areas in which institutional improvement can be realistically considered. Among 

these are:

• Reinforcing cooperation among legislatures, especially the Congress and the 

European Parliament as the latter gains in significance within the EU institutions. Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) already play a significant role in setting EU regulatory and environmental policies and, in all probability, will play a similar role in determining domestic security and law enforcement policy by 2005, as recommended by the recent constitutional Convention. For this reason it is worth considering how relations between the 

Parliament and the Congress could be strengthened. One idea is simply to expand the scale and frequency of exchanges among the members themselves.15

This idea will prove more attractive on the U.S. side to the extent that European governments decide, as a result of constitutional changes within the EU, 

to enhance the standing and authority of MEPs. A second possibility would 

53

16See Managing Risk Together: U.S.–EU Regulatory Cooperation, The Atlantic Council of the 

United States (forthcoming).

be to establish a more formal set of procedures for early warning and/or consultative periods among the two legislatures on certain types of legislation 

that by their very nature have an impact on international trade and investment. Obviously there can be no question of infringing on the sovereign prerogatives of either body, but to the extent that these devices only involved 

mutually agreed periods for reflection and dialogue, they need not do so. A 

third proposal would be to institute a formal process of dialogue among key 

staffs in the two bodies along the lines of the longstanding Congress-Bundestag staff exchanges. Although there are a number of ad hoc staff exchange 

visits, a more systematic series of exchanges with official status could be helpful in enabling the two sides to understand each other’s perspectives and priorities better. 

• Developing further the role of the North Atlantic Council as the chamber of 

first resort for consultations on all international security issues. Considerable 

progress seems to have been made in this direction in the last few years, but 

more could be done now that the Alliance has unambiguously, during 2002, 

expanded the scope of its common concerns to threats from wherever they 

come. As time goes by, the EU members of the Alliance may come to act in 

a more united way in such consultations, but that need not be a threat to 

the interests of the United States or other non-EU member allies if properly 

handled.

• Developing new procedures for consultation and dialogue among regulators on 

the two sides of the Atlantic. While constitutional asymmetries can make 

such arrangements difficult to establish, the growing importance of regulatory 

issues within the relationship makes it important to try to find ways to do 

this.16

• Establishing ways of broadening transatlantic dialogues and institutions to 

include important third parties such as Russia, India, China and other countries, depending on the issues involved. The G–8 provides a venue for doing 

this to some degree, but its meetings are at such a high level and increasingly 

so formalistic that it is not a particularly useful institution for this purpose 

in its present form.

No doubt there are other ideas that should be pursued. The purpose of this discussion is to establish the importance of identifying the institutional deficits that exist 

and to suggest that there are incremental ways of dealing with them. 

OF ALLIANCES, PARTNERSHIPS, POSSES, COALITIONS, UNIONS AND FUNCTIONAL

FAMILIES

In the welter of recent commentary about the future of the transatlantic relationship the prospects have been variously described as an elective partnership, pragmatic cooperation, a` la carte partnership, coalitions, of the willing, posses, and so 

on. This debate about nomenclature is relatively unenlightening. Of greater importance is the substance and spirit of the relationship. On this there are a few things 

that can be said with certainty. 

First, the relationship will be very different from that of the Cold War, when one 

of the greatest challenges was to mount a static defense against a well-defined and 

presumptively overwhelming threat coming from a fixed direction. Since the challenge inevitably to some extent determines the response, the welcome disappearance 

of that particular threat means that whatever response the countries of the North 

Atlantic region offer to new challenges will be different in nature. 

The second, equally obvious, but no less important, observation is that the future 

of the relationship depends to a considerable extent on what the leaders of the countries concerned choose to make it. What can be inferred from what we know about 

the current intentions of both Americans and Europeans? 

On the U.S. side, the stated intentions of the current administration have already 

been cited at some length. If, as the administration’s spokesmen insist, with a good 

deal of chapter and verse to support them, President Bush’s word is as good as his 

bond, there should be no doubt about his intention to work strenuously to reaffirm 

a close transatlantic partnership in the U.S. interest. This conclusion is certainly 

not taken as axiomatic in Europe, at least if by ‘close’ the President is also assumed 

to imply ‘balanced,’ with mutual respect for the judgments and policies of both sides. 

Nevertheless, any European not pre-committed to building Europe as an indeVerDate Mar 21 2002 15:37 Jul 28, 2003 Jkt 087670 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\EUROPE\061103\87670 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
54

pendent counterweight to the United States would certainly seem to have an interest in acting as if the President’s words mean exactly what they say. 

This raises the further question of the kind of Europe that the current and future 

U.S. administrations are willing to entertain as true partners. Many Europeans believe that the Bush administration is already working to divide Europe and to isolate those countries that are not willing to accept U.S. priorities and policies on U.S. 

terms. Whatever the truth of this claim (and to this observer, the critics of the 

United States are far from having made their case), there remains a real question 

whether the United States would willingly contemplate a partnership with a Europe 

that was more nearly a unitary international actor in security and political matters 

as well as in trade and economic ones. This has, of course, been a concern of Europeans at almost every stage of the process of European integration. Thus far the 

European skeptics have been proved wrong. 

This pattern is likely to continue. The reasons for which European integration in 

partnership with the United States has prospered with U.S. support are likely to 

remain persuasive. U.S. and European interests in the world remain sufficiently 

similar and closely tied together that the opposite outcome—a Europe united in opposition, or as a counterweight, to U.S. power—remains less likely, although it is 

certainly not inconceivable. 

On the European side, the continuing rivalry between the French and British conceptions of Europe will make the willingness of the major European countries to put 

their shoulders to the wheel of renewing a strong transatlantic partnership uncertain for some time to come. The paradox is that neither of the protagonists in the 

intra-European struggle is well placed to prevail. On the British side, the persistence of public and political skepticism about the European project means that Mr. 

Blair will have difficulty pursuing his goal of establishing strong British leadership 

within the EU effectively, not least as he cannot for the foreseeable future take his 

country into the European Economic and Monetary Union, which is increasingly a 

key element of European integration. On the French side, German support for the 

line adopted by President Chirac seems essential to its success. Yet the Germans 

are evidently unhappy with the position in which they find themselves and anxious 

to find ways to restore a more normal set of relationships, notably with the United 

States. The U.S. interest lies in doing everything reasonably possible to encourage 

them in this direction. 

This being so, the most likely outcome is a gradual return to a process of slow 

European integration which will not confront the United States with unacceptable 

choices and will leave it with strong supporters within Europe. However, this happy 

outcome could be severely compromised if in the coming months both sides fail to 

make a major commitment to rebuilding their partnership, instead of taking the line 

of least resistance and preferring to abandon the quest, or at least to postpone it, 

until there is ‘regime change’ on both sides of the Atlantic that will make a fresh 

start easier politically. The world is unlikely to stand still long enough to permit 

them this luxury. 

Third, renewing the partnership will require above all a systematic effort to come 

to a broadly common assessment of the nature, dimensions and urgency of the critical challenges that the partners need to confront together and the policy options 

that they have for doing so. This will require a degree of flexibility on both sides. 

Europeans must be ready to accept that the Bush administration’s international 

agenda not only has more to recommend it than they may have thought hitherto, 

but will also require the selective and judicious use of military power to achieve its 

objectives with, or occasionally without, a U.N. mandate. Americans, by the same 

token, must be willing to recognize two things: first, that they are more likely to 

achieve their objectives if they enter into systematic and not just ad hoc cooperation 

with the major European governments; and, second, that the interests of the United 

States in the longer term require the resumption of the massive task of building 

international institutions and norms within which international relations can be 

conducted and by which the United States is prepared to bind itself and the use 

of its power. 

Fourth, success in renewing the partnership is unlikely if governments on both 

sides of the Atlantic are not willing to lower the rhetorical temperature and concentrate on conducting their relationship and managing their disagreements with a 

higher degree of discretion. Debates such as those of recent months, in which Europeans have tended to accuse the United States of being arrogant and simplistic 

unilateralists, and Americans have accused Europeans of being, at best, irrelevant 

wimps, are no way in which to work toward improved relations. The media can be 

relied on to sniff out enough of the flavor and substance of inevitable disagreements 

and give them more than adequate airing without their being aggravated by official 

statements either on or, as is more often the case, off the record. 

55

Fifth, and finally, governments will need to pay heed to trends in public opinion, 

which have recently been in the wrong direction if one is concerned about renewing 

the transatlantic partnership. Such trends are notoriously ephemeral and susceptible to change in the light of both strong political leadership and the evidence of 

policy success. At the least, governments, whose control of ‘messages’ is ever more 

sophisticated, should ensure that they do not, advertently or inadvertently, encourage public opinion to move in directions opposite to those of their intended policies 

in relation to the transatlantic partnership. 

Such an effort conscientiously undertaken would lead to the reestablishment of 

habits of cooperation and mutual comprehension, as well as corresponding capabilities for action in the economic and security fields, that would fully justify the term 

partnership. Just as the United States has developed a new concept of ‘capabilitiesbased’ military planning to deal with the world in which threats can emanate from 

many different directions, so the transatlantic partnership will need to become more 

‘capabilities-based,’ with the same sense of both flexibility and intensity, for dealing 

with a world in which uncertainty and unpredictability are likely to be the rules 

for some time to come. It is a task worthy of the heirs of the great period of creation 

that enabled the world to prosper after the Second World War and to survive the 

challenges of the Cold War that succeeded it. But success will require the same degree of support and focused attention from the Congress as well as the Executive 

Branch, and from European governments and legislatures alike, as was manifested 

in the 1940s and 1950s.

Mr. BEREUTER. We are looking at Mrs. Davis because she has 

some of those responsibilities now in working with the European 

Parliament. And I appreciate your focus in one respect of your 

paper on the role that legislators directly can play in this. 

I wish that I had a chance to hold these hearings before 9/11, because I think that what happened after 9/11 and what has happened as a result of the Iraq crisis is really exacerbating some 

problems that were already being noted and developed. And they 

had a lot to do with the very different attitudes on important 

things and different perceptions about them. And when I would 

read, with some help from translators, the European press, I was 

amazed at the difference and the orientation and all the, I guess 

you would have to say, anti-American rhetoric already prevalent at 

that point, though not extreme. And, since 9/11, I see the kind of 

animosity toward a couple of countries, such as France, which is 

really intense, well outside the Beltway, across our whole country. 

This is not just a page you turn over. 

But I think those differences were very apparent. And I wonder 

if they had—I will posit they have had something to do with the 

evolution of the European Union and with the dominant position 

of the United States in the world, probably the most dominant 

country since the Roman Empire, but probably even more so than 

that since that was a Eurocentric kind of look at what the world 

was. 

And so, in part, I think it is the Gulliver syndrome. But mostly, 

I think it is because European countries are giving up elements of 

their sovereignty, which is an appropriate decision, in all probability for them, and we have endorsed the evolution and the 

strengthening of the European pillar in NATO but also the European Union, especially the latter. 

So, I am wondering if we can sort through what it is that are 

some of the elements. I posited two elements that seem to be driving apart American and European, or at least some European, perceptions and attitudes. 

And if you want, you can distinguish between the two or three 

or four parts of your—I won’t use the particular phrase that has 

56

been—received so much attention. I would like to see if any way 

you want to try to respond or to say you have got it all wrong or 

how you would like to look at it. Mr. Makins, you are the brave 

one. 

Mr. MAKINS. Well, I am happy to make a few comments, Mr. 

Chairman. I think one of the difficulties in talking about this relationship is to remember what it was really like in the past. I was 

talking earlier this afternoon to some of the interns at the Atlantic 

Council, and a question came up which caused me to recall some 

of the events of the immediate postwar period. I was asked about 

the special relationship between Britain and the United Kingdom, 

and I recall that in that period, in the immediate years after the 

Second World War, one of the first things that happened was that 

the United States decided to cut off the war time lend-lease and 

economic support arrangements to Britain despite the perception of 

the British Government that it was imperative that those arrangements continued, and John Maynard Keynes spent quite some time 

in Washington trying to negotiate a new arrangement and was 

rebuffed. 

Britain decided suddenly and without ceremony to abandon its 

support of the anti-Communist effort in Greece and to add one 

other thing, the United States terminated the nuclear cooperation 

arrangements that there had been with Britain during the war. 

So there was a period of extremely difficult Anglo-American relations. It really is a mistake to recall a golden age of the transatlantic relationship in which there was unceasing agreement even 

on all the major security issues, let alone on others. 

I was in France in 1966 and 1967 in the immediate aftermath 

of the General De Gaulle’s decision to withdraw from NATO, so I 

didn’t experience the reaction here in person, but people tell me 

that the reaction here was not unlike the reaction that we have 

seen here recently across the country to France and things French. 

So on the one hand, I think we need to keep some balance. On 

the other hand, as I said in my statement, there are things that 

are different and that have caused some differences of view on critical issues, partly because the geographical locus of those critical 

issues has changed, partly because, as Dan Hamilton mentioned, 

our societies are colliding with one another rather than pulling 

apart, and we find differences in what were previously domestic 

policy areas of regulation and domestic environmental policy, food 

safety and so on, which on the whole we have worked to overcome. 

So my initial comment would be let’s keep a perspective on the 

balance of agreement and disagreement and not abandon the effort 

to find the common cooperative basis for policy, which I believe exists on many of these most important issues. 

Mr. SERFATY. May I follow up on this? 

Mr. BEREUTER. Certainly. 

Mr. SERFATY. Again, the emphasis can be placed, at least for the 

moment, on the positive. Dan referred to this as a period that is 

somewhat reminiscent of the post-World War II period. At that 

time we set out to build a euro-Atlantic structure based on two fundamental ideas that would link American power and capabilities 

and leadership to not only the recovery of Europe, but also to the 

end of the cycle of violence that had conditioned the history of EuVerDate Mar 21 2002 15:37 Jul 28, 2003 Jkt 087670 PO 00000 Frm 00060 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\EUROPE\061103\87670 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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rope during the previous decades. That Atlantic idea came together, therefore, with the idea of a strong and united Europe that 

would indeed enable us to fulfill the extraordinarily daunting goals 

that we had set out for ourselves. 

Those two ideas were not just compatible, they were complementary, and they worked remarkably well. They worked remarkably 

well to the extent that they helped us build within Europe as well 

as between Europe and the United States, Mr. Chairman, a community of shared values, as you indicated, and converging interests. The building of that community did not end with the end of 

the cold war, because the search for that community was not merely tied to the cold war, but to the acknowledged failures that had 

conditioned the two wars that preceded it. 

Now, anti-Americanism was always a factor during those years 

when values began to be shared and interests began to converge. 

There was always a great deal of anti-Americanism in Europe. ‘‘I 

want to be like Mike’’ is an obsession for some in Europe, and for 

some specific states in Europe the idea is not only to be like Mike, 

but to play him one on one, which is going to be very difficult without the athleticism, i.e., without the capabilities. 

Anti-Americanism cannot be used as an explanation for genuine 

differences of interest that will continue to emerge on occasion between the two sides of the Atlantic, as it did in the case of Iraq. 

These differences were not a matter of anti-Americanism, but were 

real and involved a lot of European states and even a majority of 

Europeans. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you. My time is expired. 

I would like to turn to Mr. Wexler. 

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you very much. 

It would seem to me that the greatest factor in the context of the 

transatlantic relationship in terms of what will mold the relationship will be the evolution of NATO. Chairman Bereuter referenced 

a meeting in Prague that we both had the opportunity of attending. 

One of the things that made such an impact on me at that meeting 

was the opportunity to hear Lord Robertson in terms of his objectives, particularly in the short term, in that he is leaving, in terms 

of what NATO will be doing, which in effect will have great ramifications in the context of the assistance of Poland and NATO’s potential role in Afghanistan, a very significant role in repairing the 

transatlantic relationship. 

It is not hard to imagine that if the road map plan in the Middle 

East with respect to the Israelis and the Palestinians gets anywhere, to the extent there are multinational forces asked to participate, that NATO’s role will be discussed and analyzed. It would 

seem to me that more than anything, the bottom line in how NATO 

evolves will determine how the transatlantic relationship evolves 

with Lord Robertson ending his leadership. 

What evolution do you foresee in NATO, and how do you foresee 

that evolution relating to the transatlantic relationship? 

And to the extent you believe there is any relevance, the more 

marginal issues, but yet, fairly important, the evolution of the Cyprus issue and Turkey’s entry or nonentry into the European 

Union. What impacts do you think the nonresolution—or however 

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ropean Union, how do you foresee that impact on the transatlantic 

relationship? 

Mr. BEREUTER. Then Dr. Hamilton. 

Mr. HULSMAN. Thank you. 

I think this is key, because, of course, Mr. Wexler, you are right 

that our link to Europe, our institutional link at the moment, isn’t 

through the European Union, it is through NATO. And one of the 

things people talk about is whether NATO is good or bad, another 

theological discussion that I as a third-generation, unsentimental 

realist discounts. NATO has a value in that you see when you are 

that you can close a door and do some of the things Mr. Makins 

says. You can avert calamities by saying, for instance, on Iraq, 90 

percent of your people are against this. You are for it. What does 

that means in terms of support? Can you give me diplomatic support? Can you give me basing? Can you send troops? 

That level of support is really the reality. We are not going to 

get full military support for everything we want from every European member anymore. I think that day is ending, but that doesn’t 

mean—and often I hear this—well, then take your ball and go 

home and do absolutely nothing. I think the Robertson agenda at 

Prague is a great way forward. 

And just three brief points. First, using the combined joint task 

force mechanism for political decision-making is critical. Up to now 

in NATO, we have, in effect, very artificial answers. Yes, we all go 

into something with full NATO support out of area; or, no, we don’t 

do something, we decide there isn’t consensus, and we don’t proceed. In a world where Europe speaks with a cacophony of voices, 

where it is the Tower of Babel, that is simply not good enough; it 

leads, as we have seen, to institutional paralysis. 

The CJTF is a kind of ‘‘yes-but’’ mechanism where you say, as 

the Americans did in Macedonia; look, we don’t have primary national interests at stake in Macedonia given the realities of what 

we are facing; but if you are an Italian, you may have a very different view of that, as Macedonia is next door to you. We therefore 

will certainly not stop Europe from using NATO wherewithal, 

which is 85 percent American, nor from using American intelligence. We’ll work with you diplomatically and economically for 

you to send a small number of troops to help keep the peace in 

Macedonia. 

This middle kind of gray area is, I think, where the alliance is 

going. There is no reason for the United States to stand in the way 

of its European partners, and out of area there may be times when 

European partners say the same thing to the United States, making NATO viable for some of the matters that you talk about. I 

think Lord Robertson has championed that, and that is a great 

thing. 

The second point is moving eastward. Increasingly there is talk 

about moving basing to where the action is. I think this can probably be worked out in a fundamental way with Germany so there 

aren’t any bad feelings. We are certainly not going to get out of 

Germany, nor should we, but to really level the strategic load so 

Turkey isn’t left as the only country out there, I think, is critical. 

Lastly, the niche goals. I think this is critical from a political 

point of view in America. I think people are sick of Europeans signVerDate Mar 21 2002 15:37 Jul 28, 2003 Jkt 087670 PO 00000 Frm 00062 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\EUROPE\061103\87670 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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ing on to NATO declarations and not living up to them. I think 

that the niche goals represent things the Europeans can do in a 

fundamental way to meet those alliance goals; and those of us who 

believe in the alliance can then politically say we have made our 

goals realistic, they have hit their goals, and we can move forward 

together. This is a good way to revitalize the alliance. 

Mr. BEREUTER. I think Dr. Hamilton wanted to respond to you, 

too. 

Mr. HAMILTON. Just briefly, I agree with much of what John just 

said. The alliance has moved from a focus on Europe, per se, to a 

broader range of missions, and I think that is a good thing. It is 

essential to succeed in Afghanistan and that NATO provide the 

type of support that is required now. I think consideration of a 

NATO role—a more serious NATO role in Iraq as we move forward 

is a good thing. 

But NATO has to then be equipped back home in Brussels and 

elsewhere with the capabilities to do that. A more flexible NATO, 

also as John said, is essential. The cold war view of NATO that either eveyone acts together all at once, or the alliance doesn’t move 

at all, really isn’t attuned to the post-post-cold war world, and that 

is what the Prague agenda has been about. 

The idea of a NATO response force that is able to move quickly, 

a serious high-end response force, is a serious proposal put forward 

by the Administration that should deserve good support. It is not 

a rival or a counterweight to the Europeans’ own effort, which is 

a somewhat different enterprise. 

New missions for NATO require a fresh approach to U.S. basing 

policies. This has to be managed well politically, as John also said, 

so that the Germans are understanding why this is happening, but 

I think they will. 

Besides new missions or new capabilities, the alliance should 

also strengthen its relations with its partners, in Europe and beyond. We have seen in Bosnia United States and Russian forces 

moving ahead in all sorts of areas. We should strengthen that relationship. I think we are doing that. 

So the NATO agenda seems to me to still be on target, but we 

have to pursue it and treat NATO as a place where you actually 

go for consultation. I think part of the damage of the last months 

was that it was not seen as that first resort. It was seen sort of 

as an afterthought. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you. 

I would like to call on Mrs. Davis now, the Vice Chairman. You 

are recognized. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to go back. We hear a lot about the French and Germans and how they were against us in the Iraq conflict, and with 

regards to that, do you have any idea what the French-German-led 

opposition to the United States was really all about, your thoughts 

on it? Do you think it was about France and Germany protecting 

their own economic interests in Iraq, or do you think it was about 

France and Germany trying to counter the world’s want for power 

and to inhibit the United States from acting by controlling United 

States policy through multilateral constraints? What are your 

thoughts and your opinions on this, anybody? 

60

Mr. SERFATY. My sense is that there was nothing fore-ordained 

about it; that, in other words, on November the 8th when resolution 1441 was adopted unanimously, the French, as well as others 

within the Security Council that voted on behalf of that resolution, 

understood that war was likely and that military force would be 

used. 

That was based on two assumptions, however, that proved to be 

wrong. The first assumption was that Saddam, as had been the 

case in the past, would make such a dramatic mistake, would show 

such disdain for what was being put his way, as to make a second 

resolution automatic. 

The second assumption was that if that were not to be the case, 

then in any case we in the U.S. had enough intelligence to provide 

the evidence of a smoking gun. 

When neither of those assumptions was fulfilled, that ‘‘opportunity’’ to desent seemed to emerge, especially after the Administration failed to engage Germany in October and November, culminating with the otherwise highly successful NATO summit in 

Prague. Left alone then, Germany embraced a French-led axis of 

discontent that progressively widened and deepened as its members’ opposition to the use of force escalated, due possibly to an inability to explain as well as we should have what was in the works. 

And that led us to January 20th–25th after which everything got 

out of hand, and the French increasingly overplayed a weak hand. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Makins and Mr.—Dr. Hulsman as well. 

Mr. MAKINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I agree with what Dr. Serfaty said about this. I think that I 

would add that the issue of intervening in a state essentially to depose its government is something that within the context of recent 

history—obviously not within the context of ancient history—has 

been a relatively exceptional action and one which people feel—particularly many people in Europe feel—should be embarked on only 

in exceptional cases. 

The whole question of intervention in the internal affairs of 

states is something which is relatively recent in the tradition of the 

United Nations, and I think there is a much stronger sense in 

many European countries, and particularly in France, that we do 

need to observe a certain decent minimum of international oversight and management of actions of that kind. And I think that it 

is true that during the latter part of December and into January 

and February, the French and a number of other Europeans concluded, rightly or wrongly, that basically the decision to go to war 

in Iraq had been taken in the United States, and that the United 

States were essentially using the international discussions through 

the United Nations as a means of coming up with the right answer. 

As I said, I am not judging the rights and wrongs of this, but I 

think that part of the opposition that became firmer and firmer in 

France, and with France and Germany, was as a result of the fact 

that they felt that the international oversight that should apply to 

intervention of this kind was not really being applied in a proper 

manner. 

Mrs. DAVIS. However, the bulk of the European countries supported the United States in what they did. 

61

Mr. MAKINS. Yes, they did, and this was a question, I think, of 

there being a disagreement within Europe as to how exceptional 

this case was. I am only saying that I don’t think that French commercial interests, let’s say, which are not all that large in Iraq if 

you look at the French economy as a whole, were the decisive factor. I think these other factors on which the French arrived at a 

different judgment from the British and many other European 

countries was a large contributory factor to the judgment that they 

reached. 

Mr. HULSMAN. I think you have to play Russia into this, too; and 

I agree with Dr. Serfaty. I think that after 1441, the French began 

without prepossession to become a counterweight to the United 

States. I think this was ad hoc-ery on both sides and brinksmanship at its worst. Let’s put it that way. 

If you see Russia and you assume Russia will go along with the 

United States, as many analysts did, obviously their rejection is 

disappointing. The United States should have made much more of 

an effort to personally get out there, give Putin some cover by 

sending Powell to Moscow. I felt the Secretary of State should have 

gone to Russia. We should have sent many people over to Europe, 

particularly to Putin, because if Russia comes along in the end, it 

could be seen to be consulted. Remember, Putin has Parliamentary 

elections brewing in December. He has made a fundamental turn 

toward the West already, which is under a great deal of controversy, and I think that still remains good news, but for Putin 

to be seen as an equal and being consulted certainly would be 

throwing him a bone, which might be a good thing. 

If Russia goes along with the United States, China abstains, as 

invariably they do on major matters in the U.N. Security Council. 

So you are left with what? Germany is not in that, and you are left 

with France. Then I think France, having scored its rhetorical 

point to the world that we want a multipolar world, that at some 

deep dreaming level we would like to be a counterweight, using 

multilateral institutions to nontraditionally balance America where 

it can, would ultimately allow a deal to have been cut; but when 

Russia doesn’t come along in that process, I think then people 

begin to look around and say, wait a minute, we have the beginnings of real opposition. To some extent that was the fault of American diplomacy. 

The problem for France is they got carried away by their own 

rhetoric, and, as Dr. Serfaty said, they played a weak hand badly; 

and the Gaullist dream of being this counterweight that has been 

around since De Gaulle—and Malraux talks about the certain 

sense of France, this different kind of culture, got the better of the 

Gaullist nightmare, which is impotence; and the problem for them 

now is having misplayed this—where do they go from here? I don’t 

think they should be punished. If you really want to hurt Gaullism, 

ignore them, have them come along when the rest of us do. It will 

absolutely drive them crazy. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you. 

I would say I would really like to have seen a Pew Trust poll before 9/11 and one during the last year of the Clinton Administration and then compare it to today, because it seems to me that 

62

President Bush started out in a hole in terms of European attitudes. He was seen as a gun-toting Texan who had—was probably 

a unilateralist, and even though he brought in what most people 

on a bipartisan basis would say is a first-class, experienced foreign 

policy and defense team, as good a group as you probably have 

seen in our country in a long period of time in terms of experience, 

the attitudes toward him were really quite negative; and perhaps 

a comparison to President Clinton who seemed to favor 

multilateralism, who signed the Kyoto Treaty even though he knew 

that the Senate wouldn’t even give it a second thought and voted 

down a resolution, on that subject at least, unanimously. And this 

is despite the fact that President Bush and the Administration has 

done a whole range of things to reassure Europeans, that the Congress has been extraordinarily supportive of NATO by a variety of 

votes here in the last several years, that the Congress has been extremely patient with the European Union when it comes to a variety of trade issues. 

So I wonder to what extent this is really driven by the media and 

by the so-called intellectual elite being predisposed to President 

Bush and his Administration from the beginning. Would anyone 

like to suggest an answer to what is undoubtedly a bit more provocative a question? 

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, Mr. Chairman——

Mr. BEREUTER. Dr. Hamilton, and then we will go to Mr. Makins. 

Mr. HAMILTON. Since we are back on to history, I think there 

was that predisposition that you mention, but we should recall that 

before September 11th, there was a series of actions by the Bush 

Administration, basically once a month, announcing that the 

United States would not participate in this or that multilateral effort. 

The Europeans particularly point to a meeting with Dr. Rice at 

the beginning of the Administration which she flatly announced the 

U.S. was not going to participate in Kyoto. It was the manner in 

which it was done as much as the fact of it, and that successively 

month after month there was one or another of these issues. The 

result, it is important to recall, was that the relationship was already experiencing some difficulty. 

So I think that perceptions certainly play a role, but I don’t think 

one should deny that there weren’t particular actions by the Administration that contributed to transatlantic tensions. 

Mr. BEREUTER. I am not. I am just suggesting even before he 

took office, there seemed to be a very negative attitude toward that 

Administration, toward this President before those actions took 

place. There is no doubt that those actions could have been handled 

better and that they did affect Americans’ image in terms of the 

Europeans. 

Dr. Serfaty, I think you wanted to comment, and then Mr. 

Makins. 

Mr. SERFATY. There is a Bush thing clearly, but the fact of the 

matter is that President Bush was not worse off in early 2001 than 

President Clinton had been in early 1993, or that President Reagan 

had been in early 1981, or that President Carter——

Mr. BEREUTER. You are talking about European attitudes? 

63

Mr. SERFATY. Right. Every newly elected President tends to set 

new standards of impopularity in Europe upon his assuming office, 

and that is part of the game. In fact, I thought President Bush, 

quite frankly, was much better off than three out of four of his immediate predecessors following his second trip to Europe in June 

and July 2001, as he was beginning to become what he had not expected to be—and certainly quite different from what the European 

media had defined him as being. 

What did happen is that that transformation in the image of 

President Bush was interrupted by the events of September 11, 

and then all of the misgivings came back under war-time circumstances that made the Europeans even more apprehensive of 

this kind of leadership with such preponderant power at this specific moment. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Makins, I know you wanted to respond. 

Mr. MAKINS. Thank you. I was going to go through very much 

the same historical litany as Simon Serfaty just went through. I 

think if one does think back to those earlier transitions of power 

in the United States, particularly ones when the party changes and 

not just the person of the President, they do provide a certain context for what happened in 2001. I think also they reflect the fact 

that European countries are enormously sensitive to the way in 

which the United States exercises its international power, and they 

are concerned about how a new Administration is going to affect 

the sorts of understandings that they have had with the previous 

Administration. 

I think, however, it was a little bit worse this time in some respects. I do think that some Europeans were waiting to find evidence of President Bush’s stumbling internationally, and I remember being in Europe in early 2001 and feeling that I met a quite 

different level of skepticism and cynicism about the new Administration than I had met during previous transitions. 

But like Simon Serfaty, I believe that was being overcome during 

the course of the early summer of 2001, and I think it was the 

shock to the entire international system and international agenda 

that the events of 9/11 represents that set back what would probably have been a normal process of readjustment within the relationship, maybe a little bit more difficult, maybe a little bit longer, 

that would have occurred otherwise. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Makins, I can’t help but ask you as a former 

senior adviser to the German Marshall Fund, do you think there 

has been a permanent deterioration in attitude by the German people toward the United States? Not toward the Administration, and 

I am not talking about the German Government. I am talking 

about the German people toward the United States and toward 

Americans. 

Mr. MAKINS. I have to say, Mr. Chairman, that I don’t think having been an adviser to the German Marshall Fund well qualifies 

me to answer that question, since it is a United States organization, and I don’t have anything like as deep a knowledge of Germany as Dr. Hamilton does. So with respect, I would urge you perhaps to redirect your question to her. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Dr. Hamilton, do you remember the question? 

Mr. HAMILTON. Certainly. 

64

There is the issue of Chancellor Schroeder facing reelection, deciding in the heat of that last election campaign that to gain the 

extra 2 percent he needed to win was to do what he did and oppose 

the Administration on Iraq. It really did win him the election. 

This was unprecedented in ways that went beyond specific policy 

differences. For the first time in post war German history, a German Chancellor opportunistically exploited a policy difference to 

encourage a certain climate of critique of American society itself. 

There has always been a latent critique of American society in 

Germany. It is nothing compared to that which exists in France; 

it has been very latent and at the margin. Over the past 2 years 

this critique has gained momentum in Germany. In many ways it 

is borne less out of anti-Americanism than with disappointment 

with what is perceived by many Germans to be a widening gap between America’s aspirations and America’s achievements, particularly regarding civil rights, relations between races, and issues 

such as social welfare. I would not go so far to say that this is a 

permanent rupture or that there is a deep-seated popular resentment against the United States. There is clearly a particular critique of this Administration in Germany that ranges across the 

parties——

Mr. BEREUTER. Can I ask you is there a permanent deterioration? 

Mr. HAMILTON. There is not a permanent deterioration. It is a 

question of how we pick up the pieces. But there is widely shared 

popular skepticism right now regarding the policies of this Administration in particular. 

Mr. BEREUTER. How much partisan difference is there between 

the SPD and the CDU? 

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, Frau Merkel, who is the head of the CDU, 

was here about a month or so ago, did support the Administration 

on Iraq and has been quite supportive. She has come under considerable criticism back home, including within her own party, but 

that is the party. So they have made a clear break with the SPD 

on a question of support with the United States, and I believe that 

that, you know, would carry into government should the CDU come 

into government. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you. 

Dr. Hulsman, did you want to—please. 

Mr. HULSMAN. Just briefly. I think you are on to something, Mr. 

Chairman. Many governments supported us, and again, I think 

that is the fundamental salient fact here; Europe doesn’t speak 

with one voice, and it is that variance that offers America opportunities to deal with allies on a case-by-case basis. Those who did disagree with us began to disagree with us, and as a man who, like 

my colleagues, reads European papers every day and does a BBC 

interview each day in my case, they faulted us not for what we are 

doing, but for what we are—a fundamentally different kind of argument. 

I spent 8 years growing up in Scotland and working in Europe, 

and I can attest that there has always been anti-Americanism—

such virulence comes with the territory of being top dog. But this 

was of a different nature, and I think in Germany that is very true 

in particular. 

65

I totally agree with Dr. Hamilton: Schroeder knew what he was 

doing; and it worked. I mean, he got the left wing of the SPD, who 

are very anti-American—the unilateral nuclear disarmers of the 

1980s—to get out and vote. That isn’t Schroeder’s wing of the 

party. The Greens, who are pacifists, were always likely to support 

him; and the East German floating voters, who aren’t loyal to either of the major parties in Germany, but, given their background, 

less likely to support America; and he played that brilliantly. 

The good news is beneath all this. Although we are near deterioration, it hasn’t happened yet. The opposition party, in particular 

the shadow foreign secretary, is making the critique that Schroeder 

is straying from the Adenauer legacy of being both pro-French and 

pro-American; that by cutting off the pro-American end of this, he 

is the one who is at variance with German history, and that is a 

dangerous isolation. That seems to me a very hopeful argument to 

make, because you are not saying you have to agree with America. 

You are saying you can’t close the door to America, thus submitting 

to tender mercies of Paris. And I think that sophisticated argument 

is beginning to play. So I think Germany is a relationship worth 

fighting for. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Dr. Hulsman. By the way, I think 

that we are—whether we are doing it systematically or consciously, 

we are going down the checklist that you described before. 

Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I will see if I can phrase this question in a way that makes 

sense. Mr. Makins, I think it was you who suggested we keep a 

strong relationship going with the European Parliament. We are 

going to be taking a delegation over there in a couple weeks to 

Rome to meet with a group from the European Parliament, we had 

several over here a month or so ago, and the inter-European arguments were so strong when they were here I didn’t have to say 

much, they said plenty amongst themselves. How do you suggest 

we keep a strong dialogue with them when they can’t even agree 

amongst themselves—and as I understand it, they still haven’t 

been able to get a unified security policy. I think that the EU 

would like to be a strong political power, which I assume goes back 

to what you said, Dr. Hulsman, is that it is who we are that bothers them more than anything, which causes the anti-American sentiment. I guess I am not real sure where to start with them, because I am not sure where there is any common ground, and that 

is what I am asking for. Where do we start with the common 

ground? And can we overcome the anti-American sentiment when 

there is—I perceive it as—some jealousy because we are seen as a 

superpower. I am just looking for comments on that. Whoever 

wants to tackle it first, go for it. 

Mr. HULSMAN. It seems to me that you are right, there are a lot 

of voices, but I think the method to find common ground is to say 

that you engage those voices where you can begin dialogue. There 

are certain voices that are going to say categorically, we don’t agree 

with you; there is no point in discussion. One should be polite to 

them, because on the next issue, much as the Hill works, they may 

be my ally, and that is why I am not for punishing France or punishing anybody. 

66

You know, France has a proud tradition, a military expeditionary 

power, isn’t afraid to take casualties, a significant economy, and 

when the chips are down historically has often come along with the 

United States—perhaps grumbling since World War II, but come 

along nonetheless. In the future why take that off the table? 

I don’t have to agree with them. We can agree to disagree more 

civilly and have them on the table for the 20 percent of the time 

or more that they happen to agree with us; but on any given issue, 

you are going to find Europeans out there who do agree with us, 

who are willing to have dialogue to reach that common ground. So 

when I go to meetings, I talk to those people and then talk to the 

couple on the issue that I want, and see if we can generate some 

sort of common ground through that. 

I think the other thing to say in forming of advice to the Europeans is forget this dislike for Bush, I believe that is real, too, by 

the way—but say, look, who has been more successful since the 

Suez kind of paradigm? The British at Suez. They say the Americans are wrong, this is terrible. We must never again leave the 

Americans alone to think for themselves without us at their side. 

We must engage them on everything to maximize our influence. 

The French look at Suez and say: ‘‘This is terrible what the Americans have done; we must set ourselves up in opposition to them in 

one form or another. 

As I said to friends of mine in Paris simply on that basis: ‘‘If 

there is one superpower in the world, which of those strategies is 

more likely to accrue you influence? The Blair strategy. Tony Blair 

is no poodle of the United States. He got us to help go through the 

U.N. process. He certainly got us to be more fundamentally engaged in the road map. He has gotten the United States to help 

in Northern Ireland on a more significant level than before. He can 

bring home positive things.’’

If we say and prove to people that we are open to this dialogue 

and common ground, that they attain tangible diplomatic benefit 

from doing so, I think then that process of picking through the 

issues will actually lead to many coalitions forming. But you are 

right, if you look for unanimity on the European side, stay in your 

hotel room. 

Mr. HAMILTON. Congresswoman, I think your question is directed 

particularly to ways to deal with the European Parliament in your 

particular role. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Right. 

Mr. HAMILTON. If I could give some very specific things, I think 

it is important to engage the European Parliament. They don’t 

have the same powers as the national Parliamentarians, and you 

are right, it is a very diverse group, but it is important because of 

the role they are now playing in public opinion in Europe and also 

in Brussels to engage them as well. So simply your engagement 

with them, the fact that you receive them and pay attention, plays 

a certain role. 

The other is that they have now more authority over budgetary 

policy for the European Commission and some oversight there, and 

so helping to shape their discussions about their own budgetary 

priorities and maybe sharing your own discussions here can be a 

very useful thing to do. It is really where the rubber meets the 

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road in terms of where the U.S. and the EU put their resources. 

I think that is a very useful discussion to have with European Parliamentarians. 

The third is common legislative priorities. When you and your 

staff and others in the Congress are drafting legislation, it is useful 

to see whether similar or conflicting legislation is being drafted in 

Brussels on similar topics, and simply to have sort of an early 

warning legislative dialogue on those issues. It might head off later 

problems, and so it is very practical. 

The last aspect has to do with the Congress itself. Many of the 

domestic issues that we face are becoming transatlantic issues, because, as I said, we are kind of smashing into each other as societies. This Subcommittee, of course, deals with Europe. Many of 

your colleagues who are on other Subcommittees, however, are 

drafting legislation primarily for American domestic society, and 

yet because European and American societies have been interacting so intensively in recent years, much of this legislation can 

have a huge impact on transatlantic relations. The more that you 

could engage your other colleagues in the Congress, not on this 

Subcommittee necessarily, but on all the other ones, could be a 

very valuable contribution to the transatlantic relationship. 

So there are, I think, very practical things to be done with the 

European Parliament beyond simply getting together and talking. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Makins wants the last word here. 

Mr. MAKINS. If I might, I would like to endorse what Dr. Hamilton said. I think he is exactly on the right track. I would not 

think that these broad issues of security policy are the areas on 

which it is most productive for you to try to engage your colleagues 

in the European Parliament. I think Chairman Bereuter, others of 

your colleagues have their work through the NATO Parliamentary 

Assembly, which is a much more productive legislative venue, I 

think, in which to talk about many of those issues. 

But the European Parliament does have very specific areas of 

competence in terms of the oversight of legislation and the passage 

of legislation, many of which are indeed in these areas of regulatory policy and trade policy and so on that are central to the competence of the European Union proper at the moment. And those, 

I think, are many of the areas where we run the risk of colliding 

with Europeans in ways that can potentially be very damaging. 

There are, for example, issues associated with chemicals and various environmental issues. All of these are things over which the 

European Parliament actually either has direct responsibility or is 

likely to get direct responsibility very soon. I think it is in that 

area that exchanges with the European Parliament can most productively be focused. 

I believe that there also need to be closer legislative contacts 

through other channels on other subjects. But I think the specific 

issue of the European Parliament has maybe received enough attention although I know that you and a number of your colleagues 

have been very active in that area. But I think the more that you 

can spread the word and create an understanding of how it is that 

the European Parliament is going about exercising its real responsibilities in these areas and how that intersects with the way in 

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which you and your colleagues exercise your responsibilities on the 

same issues can be helpful in averting some of the kinds of frictions in these areas that we have seen in recent years and that I 

fear, if left unchecked, we could see more of in the future. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BEREUTER. I think Dr. Serfaty wants to give us some advice 

on that, too. So we are going to hear from him. 

Mr. SERFATY. Actually there is a wider dimension to the question 

you raised, and that wider dimension should not be ignored. It 

seems to me that when dealing with divisions within Europe, we 

should avoid to take sides or to force interlocutors into choosing 

sides. 

Now, we could proceed in that direction and do what John suggested as cherry-picking and pick out the winners and the losers 

in the argument. I am willing to accept that suggestion. But that 

would imply that we have actually transformed the most fundamental United States policy of the past 53 years, which has been 

to aim at a united and progressively stronger Europe in a powerful 

and cohesive transatlantic context. 

My concern is that if we ask others to choose sides, their choice 

will not always be what we wish or anticipate that choice to be. So 

I would be very careful about an either/or approach, when managing those divisions. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you. 

The Subcommittee has one item of business it needs to take up, 

so I will encourage Members to stay for that purpose, but I was 

thinking as I read the first of your prepared written statements 

today, the first one of the four, this is really excellent, insightful, 

very helpful. And then I went through the rest, and I felt the same 

way. So not only were your comments here very helpful to us, but 

the written statements are very well done, and I want to compliment you, but also thank you very much on behalf of the Subcommittee for launching us into this short series of hearings on 

transatlantic relations. 

Thank you, gentlemen. 

We would appreciate a little advice from you on the ICC and how 

we make our points that we have some legitimate concerns about 

lawsuits in Belgium against General Frank and Colin Powell and 

so on. 

The hearing stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:23 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

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