J udg e Guy took no part in the consider ation or dec ision of this case. * The Honor able He nry

R. W ilhoit, J r., S enior United States District Judge for the E astern ** District of Ke ntucky , sitti ng by desig nation NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 10a0581n.06 No. 09-6033 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
JOSE P H SHAHE EN, ) Anc ill ar y A dm inis tr at or of t he ) Est at e of N adi a Sha he e n, de c e as e d, ) ) P laintif f-App ellant, ) On App eal from the United ) St at e s D ist r ic t C our t fo r th e v. ) We st e r n Di st r ic t o f K e nt uc ky ) BURG ESS HARRISON YONTS, et al ., ) ) De fend ant s, ) ) LA M BD A C HI A LP HA F RA TER NI TY ) INCORP ORATED, et al., ) ) De fend ant s- App e lle e s. )
Be fore : GUY and GRI FF I N, Circuit J udg es; and WI L HOI T, District J udg e. ** * Wil hoit, District J udg e. OP IN ION Na dia Sha he e n w a s kille d whe n str

uc k by an au tom ob ile dr ive n by B ur g e ss H arr iso n Y on ts, a 20-y ear old member of the L ambda Chi Alpha (“LXA”) fraternity at Murra y State University

who was intox icated w hile driving . The e state of the de cede nt sought to impose liability upon L XA, a national social fr ater

nity ; its housing c orporation; the indivi dual member s of the loca l chapter ; andNo. 09-6033

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.

2 the local a lumni advisor. Plainti ff- Appellant Joseph Shaheen appe als t h e Di strict Court’s order g ra nti ngsu mma

ry jud g me nt i n f

a vo r t he De fe nd ants
.

I. A. Around 2:00 a.m. on Nove mber 11, 2005, Nadia Shaheen, a 62-y ear old student at Murray State University

(“MSU”) , was wa lking home f rom the computer

lab on campus. She lived in an apar tment just off c ampus and she w as struck by a ca r driven by

20-y ear old MSU student, Appellee Bur g ess Yonts. Her

body was d i s co v ere d in a ditch along side of the r oad appr ox imately 3/4 of a mile from the LXA house the following morning . She was pronounc ed dea d at the sce ne. On the pr ior e ve nin g , N ov e mbe r 1 0, Yo nts be g an d ri nk inga lc oh ol at hi s apar tmen t w ith roommates and f

ri en d s . He consumed a lar g e bottle of wine or cha mpag ne as w ell as a bottle of Mickey ’s Malt L iquor while at the apar tment. He then went to Nick’ s Sports P ub and, using a fa ke i.d., purcha sed more a lcohol. After leaving Nick’s, Yonts went to the L XA house on c ampus, wher e he wa s a non-r esident member

. Thursday nights we re know n as p arty nights at the L XA house a nd this Thursday

was no exception. At the party , Yonts consumed the a lcohol he had broug ht w ith him. I t is unc lear wher e he ob ta ine d th is a lc oh ol b ut i t is un disput e d th a t it wa s n ot p ro vid e d b y

the De fe nd ants no r w a s it
s t o r e d a tt h e f r a t e r n i t y h o u s e . H e dr an k

f o r a p p r o x i m a t e l y t h r e e h o u r s a tt h e p art y. Yonts left the par

ty at 2:00 a.m. Ther e is testimony that at l east one of hi s fraternity brothers asked him if he ne eded a

ride, but he de clined and dr ove aw ay to the fata l acc ident scene

.No. 09-6033

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3 Although he does not rec all striking Shaheen, Yonts does not dispute that he wa s intox icated while drivi ng and admits responsibility for her death. By criminal judg ment enter ed on F ebrua ry 1, 20 07 he wa s c on vic te d o f w anto n mu rd e r a nd wa s se nte nc e d to a

20 y e ar t e rm

of imp ri so nme nt. B. On Octobe r 17, 2006, Shahee n’s estate filed sui t in the United States District Court for the Weste r n D is tr ic t K e n tu c ky , a g a in s t Y o n ts , L X A , L a mb d a Ch i A lp h a H o u s e Co r p o r a ti o n (“L XA House Corp.” ) and 63 individual member s o f t h e l o cal LXA cha pter at MSU for neg lige nt
su pe rv isi on , n e g lig e nc e and va ri ou s statut or

y vio la tio ns . Th e Com

pla int wa s a me nd e d to br ingsu it ag ainst Appellee Danny

Patterson, the loca l Alumni Advisor to the subject chapter for neg lige nt supervision. I n two s e p ar a te o p in io n s , d a te d M ar c h 3 , 2 0 0 8 an d

Ja n u ar y 1 3 , 2 0 0 9 , Ch ie f

D is tr ic t C o u rt J u d g e T h o m a s B
. R

u s s e l l g r an t e d

t h e d i s p o s i t v e m o t i o n s o f a l l t h e D e f

e n d an t s an d , s u

b s e qu e n t l y, denied Shahe en’s motion for r econside ration of his dec ision. Th e re a ft e r, Sha

he e n f ile d th is a pp e a l. II. Th e Di str ic t Co ur

t f ound no ba sis in e ith e r K e ntu c ky c omm on or st atu to ry law t o im

po se liability for the death of Nadia Shaheen upon the f rate rnity ’s national cha

pter, its local member s, the local alumni advisor or

the fra ternity ’s housing corpor ation. We review , de novo, an orde r g ranting summary judgme nt. Johnson v. Karnes , 398 F.3d 868, 87 3 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 5) . Summa

ry jud g me nt i s p ro pe r “ if

the ple a din g s, de po sit ion s, ans we rs to interrog atories, a

nd admissions on file, toge ther with the a ffidavits, if any , show that there is no g enuine issue a s to any

materia l fac t a

nd that the moving pa

rty is entitled to a judgme nt as a matterNo. 09-6033

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.

An e xce pti on

to t his ru le ari se s in

sit uatio ns wh e re a

re ta il e sta

bli sh me nt s e lls a lc oh ol t o 1 a mi nor or an obviously

intox icated pe rson. Se e ge ne ra lly Six ty -E igh t Liq uo rs, In c . v . Co lv in , 118 S.W .3d 171 (Ky . 2003). This is known as t he “dram shop rule.” Obviously , it has no application here

. 4 of law.” Fe d. R. Civ. P. 56(c)

. The g overningsubstantive law dictate s what fa cts are materia l to the dispositi on of a claim or defense

. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, I nc. , 4 7 7 U
. S
. 2 4 2 , 2 4 8 ( 1 9 8 6 )

. In a diver sity

action, the c ourt applies the substantive law of the for um state. Se c ura I

ns . v . S tai nle ss Sales, Inc. , 431 F.3d 987, 990 ( 6th Cir. 2005). A. Lambda Chi Frat ernity, Inc

. Ne ith e r t he Ke ntu c ky

le g isl a tur e no r i ts c ourt s of las t r e so rt have re c og nize d s oc ia l ho st liability on the par

t of a priva

te social host for the neg lige nt act of an intox icated g uest who injures a third par

ty . To the contra

ry , in Kent u ck y , i t i s the intox icated individual who be ars pr imary
re sp on sib ili ty

fo r t he inj ur ie s h e or

sh e inf lic ts. KR S 41 3. 24 1( 1) state s: [T] he consumption of intox icating bever ag es, rathe r than the se rving , furnishing , or sale of s u c h b e v e r a g e s , is th e p r o xim a te c a u s e o f an y in

ju r y . . . in f li c te d by an intox icated pe rson upon himself or a nother pe rson.” KRS 413.241(1). 1 Ap pe lla nt s e e ks to c re a te an e xten sio n to the do c tr ine of so c ia l ho st l ia bil ity in K e ntu c ky

to include fr ater

nities and their i ndividual members. Althoug h other jurisdictions have e x tended the doctrine t o i nclude f

rate rnities, that extension has been in ver y limit ed cir cumstance s where the fr a te rn ity e ith e r f ur nis he s a lc oh ol t o a

min or , s ub sta

nti a lly a ssi sts in t

he same or requ ir es that

its
me mbe rs a tte nd

e ve nts wh e re un de ra g e dr ink ingoc c ur s.No. 09-6033

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5 I n J e ffr ie s v . Co mm on we alt

h o f P e nn sy lv an ia , 537 A.2d 355 (Pa.Super. 1988), the Superior Court of Pennsy lvania, re versing , a g rant of summary judgme nt in favor of the national chapter

of

a f r a t e r n i t y, h e l d t h a t t h e n a t i o n a l c h a p t e r c o u l d b e l i a b l e a s a s o c i a l h o s tf

o r i n j u r i e s s u s t a i n e d

b y a minor after

drinking at a party hosted by a loca l chapter if a jury conclude d that the national cha pter intentionally rende red substantial assistance in the consumption. Id. a t 35 8- 35 9; see also Fassett v. Delta Kappa Epsilon , 8 07 F .2 d 115 0 (3r d Cir. 19 86 )( e xten din g so c ia l ho st l ia bil ity be y on d th os e who phy sically

serve alcohol to minors to those who intend to promote or fa cilitate the consumption of alc ohol by

minors). Acc ord Alumni Association v. Sullivan , 5 72 A. 2d 12 09 (P a . 19 90 )( so c ia l ho st must have “know ingly

furnished” alcoholic be vera g es to a minor to be held liable for injurie s cause d by the minor). I n a similar vein, cour

ts have found soc ial host liabili ty wher e a minor w as pre ssured or

r e qu ir e d to dr ink. I n Qui nn v. Sigma Rho Chapter of Beta Theta Pi , 507 N.E.2d 1193 (I ll.App. 1987), a me mber of t h e De fe ndant fraternity ’s pledg e cla ss broug ht a civil lawsuit ag ainst the fraternity for injuries he sustain ed as a re s u lt of heavy drinking during the fra

ternity ’s initiation
cer emony . The Appe llate Court of I llinois found that beca use the pledg e was require d to drink as part of the initiation proc ess, the fra ternity was c ivilly

liable for his injuries. Id. at 1197. Se e als o Ba llo u v . S

igm a Nu Ge ne ra l F

ra te rn ity , 3 52 S.E .2 d 4 88 (S .C. 19 86 )( fr a te rn ity c ou ld be he ld l ia ble for de ath of a fr ater

nity pledg e whe re it re quired attendance at “he ll night” a nd further require d the consumption of alcohol at the sa me). This Court would not be bound by these opini ons and, more over, the y are inapposite. Ther e i s n o t h i n g i nt h e r ec o rdt h at e s t a b l i s h es a s p ec i fi c i n t en to nt h e p ar to f LXA t o as s i s ti nu n d er ageNo. 09-6033

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6 dr ink ingor

pa rt ic ipate in t

he pla nn ingor fu nd ingof the pa rt y . N or wa s th e re a

re qu ir e me nt, e xplic it or implicit, for Yonts to come to the par ty , much less consume a lcohol and bec ome intox icated. Appellant also see ks to brand L XA with neg lige nce. T he cr ux of neg lige nce is duty . As discussed su

pra , th e re is n o d

uty a t c omm on

law b y wh ic h to imp os e lia

bil ity up on L XAin t

his context. However , cer

tain “spec ial relationships” g ive rise to a duty to supervise a

nd control. F or example, the Restatement (Second) of Torts rec og nizes the relationship between pa rent a nd minor child, master and serva

nt, one who takes char g e of a person with da ng erous propensities and me ntal health prof

essionals and their patients as the t y pe where such a duty arises. Restatement (Sec ond) of Torts §§ 316-319 ( 1965). The re levant law of

Kentucky

is set forth in Grand Aerie Frate rna l Or derof Eagles v. Carneyhan , 169 S.W .3d 840 (Ky

. 2005). I n that case , the Kentucky Supreme Court addressed the issue of “[w]hether a spe cial re lationship ex ist s betwee n a national f rate rnal org anization and one of its local cha

pters, as would g ive rise to an a ffirmative duty of super vision and control....” Id. at 850. I n Carneyhan , pare nts sued for the de ath of their minor c hild who, afte r consuming alcohol at a local chapter of a national fraternity , was invol ved in a fatal ca r cr ash. The c ourt found that the

na ti o n a l f r a te r n it y d id n o t h a v e a s p e c ia l r e lati o n s h ip w it h it s lo c a l f

r a te r n it y s u c h as to support liability under K entucky

law. Id. at 854. I n so doing, the court discussed th e co n t o u rs o f such a d u t y: The key in eac h [special relationship] is that the defe ndant’s re lationship with either the tortfea sor or the pla inti ff p l ac es the def endant in the be st positi on to protect a g a ins t th e ri sk

of ha rm . Id. at 850 (interna l citations omit ted).No. 09-6033

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7 [T] he re lationship must include the r ight or ability t o control anothe r’s c onduct ....[T] he def

endant’ s ability to control the pe rson who ca used the ha

rm must be rea l and not fictional a

nd, if exercised, would mea ningf ully reduc e the r isk of the har m that actua lly

occur red. Id. at 851 (interna l citations omit ted). I n its analy sis of Grand A erie ’s ability to control its chapter s, the Kentuc ky court noted that the national chapte r’s ability to r evoke a local char ter was the sole instrument of control. Id. at 853. The c ourt furthe r not ed the r evoca tion would result in an outcome unre lated to the har m which
occur red. Id. I n the absenc e of an actua l a bility to c ontrol the conduc t at the local c hapter ’s social functions, no spec ial relationship could be g leane d wh i ch would g ive rise to a duty . Thus, the Kentucky Supreme Court absolved the nat i onal cha pter fr om liabilit y

by reve rsing the Court of Appea ls and reinstating the summary judgme nt entere d in its favor by the trial cour

t. Id. at 854. I n the case at bar, both the Ex ecutive Direc tor of L XA National, I nc., Wil liam Far kas, and oth e r c or po rate re pr e se ntativ e s tes tif ie d as to the str

uc tur e of the re la tio ns hip be tw e e n LXAa nd its loc a l cha p t e r s . L X A h a s t h e a

b i l i t y t o r e v o k e a

c h a p t e r ’ s c h art e r

a s w e l l a s e xp e l m e m b e rs . Although individual cha

pters ar e re quired to enac t their own by -laws, they are expected to adhe re to the r u le s an d p o li c ie s o f L X A an d f o ll o w th e d is c ip li n ar

y p r o c e d u r e s e s ta b li s h e d b y it. L XA appoints the alumni advisors t o t h e l o cal chapter s. Howeve r, this is done upon a nomination of a candidate by

the local c hapter . L ocal house s submit t heir budg ets to L XA for approva l. While L XA
ma y h a v e h a d a g r e a t e r r o l e i nt h e o p e r a t i o no f

i t s l o c a l c h a

p t e r s t h ane xe rt e d

b y G r an d A e r i e , its participation is st ill predominantly passive. Withre g ard

to a lc oh ol, sp e c if

ic a lly , F ark a s te sti fi e d th a t no on e at the n a tio na l c ha pte r i s
c ha rg e d w iththe re sp on sib ili ty of mon ito ri ngun de ra g e dr ink inga t th e loc a l ch apt ers . T he re is aNo. 09-6033

Sh ah e e n v . Yont

s, e t al

.

Th is line of re a so nin g is p ro min e nt i n c a se s in vo lvi nge nti tie s c ha rg e d w ithre sp on sib ili ty 2 of a pe rson with da

ng erous propensities, such as a parole e or patient of psy chother apy . See E states of Morgan v. F

a i rfield Family Counseling Center , 673 N.E.2d 1311 (1997) and Division of Correction v. Neakok

, 721 P.2d 1121 (Alaska 1986)

. 8 g ener al policy

statement reg arding social welfare and alcohol. Howeve r, t here are no specific rules
or po lic ie s d e dic a te d to a lc oh ol c on su mpt ion . T he fr a te rn ity is e xpe c te d to a

bid e by fe de ra l, s ta te and loca l law. Period. Howe ver, the re is no over sight in this reg ard. Fo l l o wi n g Carneyhan , cruc ia l to the ana ly sis of the re la tio ns hip be tw e e n th e L XAa nd its local cha pter is whethe r the imposition of a duty would “mea

ningf ully reduc e the r isk of the har m that actua lly

occur red.” Carneyhan , 16 9 S.W. 3d a t 85 1. Th e c on c e rn he re is the imp os iti on

of du ty wher e the responsible party has no rea l me ans of controlling the behavior of the one supervised. 2 So, this Court must ask, assuming a specia l r elationship g iving rise to a duty exis ted, would it have
re du c e d th e ri sk

of Yo nts ’ int oxic a tio n an d c on se qu e nt b e havio r? The ob vio us ans we r i s n o. Yo nts beg an drinking befor e arr iving at the LXA house a nd, while there , consumed his own alc ohol. He was off ere d a ride but declined. He acte d independe ntly from LXA. Simi larl y , th e Ke ntu c ky

Sup re me Cou

rt de c lin e d to fi nd

that th e fr a te rn ity

vo lun tari ly assumed a duty

to control or super

vise its members. Id. I t is a xiomatic that a br e a c h o f a

vo lun tari ly assumed duty

may g ive rise to tor

t liability

. Louisvill e Cooperage Co. v . Lawrence , 230 S.W .2d 103, 1 0 5 ( K y. 1 9 5 0 )

. T h e t h r e s h o l d i n qu i r y i s w h e t h e r

t h e d u ty w a s “ a c tu a l l y an d

s p e c i f i c a l l y” undertaken. Carneyhan 169 S.W .3d at 847 (interna l citation s o m i t t ed). For the sa me re asons set forth su pra , th e c ourt

c on c lud e d th e natio na l or ganiz ati on ha d n ot u

nd e rt a ke n a

n a ff ir ma tiv e du ty to supervise its local cha

pter.No. 09-6033

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9 Kentucky is not alone in its rea soning. In Garofalo v. Lambda Chi Alpha Fraternity, 616 N.W.2d 647 (I owa 2000) the administrators of a member ' s estate sue d following his death af ter a n eveningof excessive drinking . The c ourt found that the national fraternity had no duty

to protect Gar ofalo fr om his decision to drink follo wing the big brother/little brother c ere mony . “I t neither furnished the alcohol he c onsumed nor for ced him to consume it a s a part of any rec og nized frater nal activity .” Id. at 654. Due to its lack of direc t pa rticipation in the eve nt, the national cha pter wa s not found liable for t h e u n fo rt u nate de ath. This was de spite the national executive’s know ledg e that alcohol consumption was a n important part of the fraternity ’s social func tions and the undisputed fac t that the national org anization did nothi ng to enforc e its own alcohol-r elated policie s. Id

. Simi larl y , th e L ou isi ana

Court of Ap pe a ls he ld that a

natio na l f

rate rn ity did no t ow e a

du ty to the s tudent for the actions of its local cha pter. W alk e r v . Phi B e ta S

igm a F ra te rn ity , 706 So.2d 525 (L a. Ct. Ap p . 1 9 9 7 ). Du ronne Walker was a student at Southern Univer sity in Baton Rouge , L o u i s i an a . U p o n h i s a c c e p t an c e i n t o t h e M e mb e r s h i p In t a k e P r o g r a m ” o f P h i B e t a S i g m a F r a t e r n i t y, Walker alleg ed that h e wa s p hy sically abused a nd beate n during the “intake proce ss.” Id. at 526. Walker further allege d that he “suffer ed severe injuries as a result of these a ctivities.” Id. Walker named the national frate rnity , P h i Be t a S igma Fr ater nity , I nc., as a

Def endant a long w ith the Southern University

Boa rd of Super

visors and the D i re ct o r of Student Activities. The tria l court g rante d the national fr ater nity ' s motion for summary judgme nt, and the Plainti ff s ap peale d. Id. at 527. The c ourt of appe als deter mined that the national fraternity was “not in a position to control the ac tion of its chapters on a day -to-day

basis” because it was locate d in the District of Columbia, while the loca l chapter

was located in Baton Rouge . I d. at 529-530.No. 09-6033

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KRS 446.070 codifies the common law conce pt of neg lige nce pe r seand

pr ov ide s f

or c ivi l 3 liability for those in violation of statutory provisions. Se e als o D av ids on v . A me ric an Fr e igh twa y s, Inc. , 25 S.W .3d 94, 99 (Ky . 2000). 10 I n Millard v. Osborne , 611 A.2d 715 (Pa. S uper. Ct. 1992), a Pennsy lvania cour

t ruled that

a natio na l f ra te rn ity c ou ld n ot b e he ld l ia

ble fo r t he de a th o f a min or wh o wa s kille d in a mot or c y c le

a c c ide nt a ft e r c on su min g a lc oh ol a t a fr a te rn ity pa rt y , fi nd ing that the natio na l fr a te rn ity ha d n o d uty to control the ac tions of its m ember s. Id. a t 71 5. Th e c ourt re a so ne d th at th e natio na l f ra te rnity simply did not have the a

bility to monitor the day -to-day activities of its local cha

pters and only

had the power to discipline after

the fa ct. Id. These case s, while not binding a uthority , are in tandem with Carneyhan . Wit hout a phy sical prese nce at the local cha

pter, the imposition of a duty to supe rv i s e an d o r control is illogica l and untenable. Shaheen a lso alleg es that L XA violated KRS 530.070(1)(b) , there by implicitl y

running afoul of KRS 244.085(3), and w as, thus, neg lige nt per se. 3 Th e se statut e s p ro vid e , in pe rt ine nt p art : (1) A pe rson is g uilty

of unlawf

ul transac tion with a minor in the third deg ree when:

... (b) He knowing ly

induces, a ssists, or causes a minor to eng ag e in any o t h e r c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t y; KRS 530.070(1)(b). KRS 244.085 provides the g ener al prohibitions and restric tions pertaining to m i n o rs and a lc oh ol: (3 ) A p e r s o n u n d e r 2 1 y e ar s o f a g e s h a ll n o t p o s s e s s f o r h is o r her ow n use or purcha se or attempt to purchase or have a nother purc hase fo r h i m o r her any al co h o l i c b ev er age s . No p er s o n s h al l ai d o r a s s i s tan y

p er s o nu n d er

2 1 y ea rs o f a ge in p ur c ha sin g or

havin g de liv e re d o r s e rv e d to him or he r a ny a lc oh oli c beverage s.No. 09-6033

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11 KRS 244.085(3). S h ah ee n co n t en d s t h at t h es e pr o v i s i o n s , t o get h er , p ro h i b i t o n e fr o m kn o wi n g l y i n d u ci n g,
a ssi sti ng or c a us inga pe rs on un de r t he a g e of 21 to p os se ss a lc oh ol. Even a ssu m i n g S h ahee n’s strained a malg amation of the statutes is cor rec t, there is no evidenc e that LXA knowing ly induced, a ssisted or cause d Yonts to posses alcohol. I t is undisput ed that he obtained the alcohol consume d by him on the night in q u es t i o n wi thout the knowledg e or assistance of L XA and w ithout the use of fraternity funds. I t is also undisput ed that L XA d i d not pr ov ide a lc oh ol, or fu

nd the purc ha se of

the same , f

or the pa rt y . Ind e e d, Yo nts be g an d

ri nk ingwe ll befor e he a

rrived at the party
. The frater nity was sim ply too remote from the facts g iving rise to the
acc ident which re sulted in the death of N adia Shahe en. B. In div idu al M

e mb e rs The a naly sis for the cla ims ag ainst the individual membe rs of the fraternity is the same as the analy sis pertaining to the claims ag ainst L XA. As discussed su pra , n ega t i n g any

alleg ation of liability is the undisputed fac t that none of the me mbers of LXA g ave Y onts alcohol. C. LXA House Corp. L XA House Corp. i s a n o n p rofit org anization which serve s as a holding company for fr a te rn ity pr op e rt y . I t le a se s sp a c e a t th e loc a l Cha pte r pr e mis e s to hous e va

ri ou s f rate rn ity me mbe rs .No. 09-6033

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.

§ 318 has bee n applied, re peate dly , in Kentucky

. See e .g., Grimes v. H ettinger , 566 S.W .2d 4 769 (Ky . App. 1978). 12 Shaheen a

rg ues for an imposition of lia b i l i t y u p on L XA House Corp. by way of the Restate ment (S e c on d) of

To rt s § 31 8. Th is Se c tio n p ro vid e s:

4 I f t he a c tor pe rm its a thi rd pe rs on to us e land or c hatte ls in his po sse ssi on oth e rw ise than as s ser

vant, he is, if

pr ese nt , und e r a

du ty to e xer c ise re a so na

ble c are so to control the c onduct of the third pe rson as to prevent him from intentionally harming others or f rom so conductinghimself as to cre ate a n unrea sonable risk of bodily harm to the m, if the actor (a) knows or has r eason to know that he has the a bility to control the third person, and (b) knows or should know of the nece ssity and opportunity

for e xer c isi ngsu c h c on tr ol. Restatement (Sec ond) of Tor ts § 318 (1965)(e mphasis added)

. I t is undisput ed that the LXA House Corp. had no prese nce a t the subject par

ty . There was no require ment for it to be pre sent at social f unctions. Nor did L XA House Corp. provi de or otherwise f

urnish alcohol for

it. I ndeed, the re is no evidence L XA House Corp. was e ven aw are of t h e p art y. As discussed su

pra , th e ba sis of

a du ty in t his c on te xt is t he exte nt t o w hic h LXAHo us e Corp. controlled the da

y -to-day operations at the fraternity

. There is nothing i n the record which sug g ests that L XA House Corp. had the a bility or the op po rt un ity to c on tr ol t

he a c tio ns of the fr a te rn ity me mbe rs wi th re g ard to any a sp e c t of fr a te rn ity life. I t ha s no disciplinary power . Although it c ould ha ve evicted the fraternity , there by forc ing the m to hold parties elsew here , this may or may not have affe cted Yonts’ actions as he does not reside at the L XA house.No. 09-6033

Sh ah e e n v . Yont

s, e t al

.

Se e Ha mi lto n v . S

e als , 2007 WL 2332556 (Ky . App. 2007). 5 13 D. Alumni Advisor At the time of Nadia Shaheen’ s death, Da nny Patterson was the alumni advisor to the L XA Chapter at MSU, also known as the “High Pi .” I t is an unpaid position, elected by the local c hapter and appr oved by

L XA. He serve s as the chief judicial office r for the local cha pter, sitting a s “judg e” at the “tr ials” of loca l members facing formal charg es. He is charg ed with imparting the views of L XAto i ts l oc a l c ha

pte r b ut t

he re c or d s ho ws that th e Cha pte r O ff ic e rs re c e ive d th e same information di rec tly from the national orga nization. He was not require d to file written re ports. Nor did he have any

di sci pl in ary

a uth or ity . T he re is n oth ingin p oli c ie s o f LXAwh ic h im po se responsibility , much less liability , upon the individual, alumni advisors of its local cha pters. S hah een’ s argume nt a g a ins t Patte rs on is b a se d u

po n th e Re state me nt ( Se c on d) of To rt s § 32 4, wh ic h p ro vid e s: On e wh o, be ingun de r n o d uty to d o s o, take s c ha

rg e of ano the r w ho is h e lpl e ss a de qu a te ly

to a id o r p ro te c t hi mse lf is s ub je c t to lia bil ity to t he oth e r f or any bo dil y harm c aused to him by (a) the fa i l ure of

the ac tor to exercise re asonable car e to sec ure the safe ty of the other

while within the actor ' s char g e. Restatement (Sec ond) of Tor ts §324 (1965). Although not spe cifica lly adopted in Ken t u ck y , § 324 finds expression in numerous 5 Ke ntu c ky c a se s su c h a s Grand Aerie v. Carneyhan and Louisvill e Cooperage Co. v . Lawrence , b oth cited su pra . A s d i s c u s s e d

h e r e i n , t h e p i v o t a l i s s u e i s w h e t h e r a d u t y w a s “ a c tu a l l y an d

s p e c i f i c a l l y” undertaken. Carneyhan 169 S.W .3d at 847 (interna l citations omit ted).No. 09-6033

Sh ah e e n v . Yont

s, e t al

.

Kentucky ’s Rules of Civil P roce dure pr ovide for the cer tification of questions of law

. 6 Spe c if ic a lly , CR

76 .3 7( 1) state s: I f there are involved in any proce eding befor e the Supre me Court of the United States, any Court of Appea ls of the United States, any District Court of t h e U nited States, the hig hest appe llate cour t of any other state, or

the District of Columbia, questions of law of this state whic h may be dete rminative of the c ause the n pending befor e the or iginating c ourt and a s to which it appea rs to the par

ty or the orig inating court that there is no controlling pr ece dent in the dec isions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Ap pe a ls o f t

his state , th e Ke ntu c ky

Sup re me Court

may ans we r t ho se questions of law whe n cer tified to it by

the orig inating c ourt, or af ter judg ment in the Di s t ri ct C o u rt u

p o np et i t i o no f a n y

p ar t y t o t h e p ro ce ed i n g. CR 76.37(1). 14 Al tho ug h Patte rs on

wa s d e e me d th e “ c hie f j ud ic ia l of fi c e r, ” a t the loc a l cha

pte r, he ha d, in fac t, no disciplinary

authority over the members. His role appea rs to be esse ntially

cer emonial and his a bil ity to c on tr ol t

he da y -t o- da y e ve nts a t th e fr a te rn ity

no ne xiste nt. Th e re is n o e vid e nc e that Patte rs on “ a c tua lly and sp e c if ic a lly” un de rt oo k a du ty

to s up e rv ise
o r c o n t r o l t h e L X A m e mb e r s . A l t h o u g h h e s a ti nana d v i s o r y p o s i t i o n , h e d i d n o to c c u p y a supervisory

position; a distinction which is disposit ive in this case. Moreove r, Patterson wa s not present at the subject party

. Nor did he furnish alcohol for the
s am e. I n d ee d , t h er e i s n o ev i d en ce t h at wa s ev en aw ar e o f t h i s s p ec i fi c ga t h er i n g. III . Pur su ant t o CR

76 .3 7( 1) , App e lla

nt ha s mov e d the Court to c e rt if y the piv ota l iss ue s o f t

his 6

a pp e a l to the Ke ntu c ky Sup re me Court
. We de c lin e , how e ve r, to do s o. Ap pe lla nt f a ile d to re qu e st
cer tification when the ca s e wa s befor e the district cour t. L ate r equests for

cer tification are disfavore d. See Penning t o n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. , 553 F.3d 447, 450 ( 6th Cir.No. 09-6033

Sh ah e e n v . Yont

s, e t al

.

15 2009)(de clining to certify in part because moving pa rty “fa iled to reque st certific ation . . . when the
c a s e w a s b e f

o r e t h e d i s t r i c tc o u rt ” )

. In d e e d , w e f i n d t h e m o t i o nu n t i m e l y. Fur ther, at least one c ircuit co u rt has re cog nized that certification is not favor ed whe n the moving pa

rty chose the fede ral forum, as Appellant did in this case . See Cantwell v. Unive rsity of Mass., 551 F.2d 879, 880 ( 1st Cir. 1977)(“[O]ne who chooses the fede ral c ourt chooses the fede ral courts in diversity ac t ions is in a peculiarly poor position to seek ce rtification. We do not look favor ably , either on try

ing to take two bites at the cherry by applying to the state cour t after failing to persuade the fe dera l court, or on duplicating judicial e ffor t.”) Moreove r, ce rtification is not appropr iate her e. This pr ocedur e is r eser ved for case s which prese nt a novel or unse tt l ed question of state law. See P ennington , 553 F.3d at 450 (internal quotation marks and c itation omit ted) (“ Certification is m ost appropriate when the question is new and state la

w is unsettled.”). Where state law p ro v i d es sufficie nt guida nce to a llow...a clea

r and pr inc ipl e d d e c isi on ” a

re qu e st fo r c e rt if

ic a tio n o f l aw m ay

be de nie d e ve n if

it i s a qu e sti on of fi rs t impression under state law. Id. Appellant’s c ontention that there are “ unresolved que stions of state law” a nd an “a bsence of controlling Kentucky prec edent” with which to adjudicate this case is without merit. I n Carneyhan, the Kentuc ky

Supreme Court dec lined to ext end socia l host li ability to the national fraterna l org anization, goinginto de tail its rea soning for doing so. There is no indication within t hat opinion, or elsew here in exis ting law, that the Kentucky court would impose social host upon the individual
me mbe rs un de r t

he se c ir c ums tanc e s. We are mindful that in the context of a request for cer tification, the state c ourt nee d not have addre ss ed t h e ex ac t question at issue, so long a s well-esta blished principles exist t o g overn aNo. 09-6033

Sh ah e e n v . Yont

s, e t al

.

The Te nth Circuit noted: 7 [F]ederal courts ‘will not trouble our sister state c ourts ever y time an arguab ly un se ttl e d q

ue sti on of state law c ome s a c ro ss o ur de sk s. When w e see a rea sonably clea r and princ ipled course , we will see k to follow it ourselves.’ Pino v. United States , 507 F.3d 1233, 1236 ( 10th Cir. 2007). 16 decision. Id. at 450 , citing Pino v. United States , 507 F.3d 1233, 1236 (10th Cir. 2007). See als o 7 Transam er i ca Insuranc e Company v . Duro Bag Manufacturing Company , 50 F.3d 370 ( 6th Cir. 1995). We find that the exist ing c asela w addr essing social host liability provides g uidance to allow us to make a c lear

and princ ipled decision and A ppellant’s Motion for Cer tification is denied. IV. F or the se re a so ns , we ho ld that De fe nd ant- Ap pe lle e s be ar n o li a bil ity fo r t he de a th o f N a dia Sha he e n a nd AF F I RM the jud g me nt o f t he Di str ic t Co ur

t.