U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

i 

30–693 2019

[H.A.S.C. No. 115–106] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2019 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR 

AND LAND FORCES HEARING 

ON

GROUND FORCE MODERNIZATION 

BUDGET REQUEST FOR FISCAL YEAR 2019 

HEARING HELD 

APRIL 18, 2018 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio, Chairman 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

PAUL COOK, California, Vice Chair 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

STEPHEN KNIGHT, California 

TRENT KELLY, Mississippi 

MATT GAETZ, Florida 

DON BACON, Nebraska 

JIM BANKS, Indiana 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona 

JACKY ROSEN, Nevada 

SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California 

ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland 

TOM O’HALLERAN, Arizona 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

JIMMY PANETTA, California 

JESSE TOLLESON, Professional Staff Member 

DOUG BUSH, Professional Staff Member 

NEVE SCHADLER, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Tsongas, Hon. Niki, a Representative from Massachusetts, Ranking Member, 

Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces ................................................ 3 

Turner, Hon. Michael R., a Representative from Ohio, Chairman, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces .................................................................. 1 

WITNESSES 

Murray, LTG John M., USA, Deputy Chief of Staff, G–8, Office of the U.S. 

Army Deputy Chief of Staff; and LTG Paul Ostrowski, USA, Military Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and 

Technology ............................................................................................................ 4 

Walsh, LtGen Robert S., USMC, Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat 

Development Command, and Deputy Commandant, Combat Development 

and Integration, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps; and BGen Joseph 

Shrader, USMC, Commanding General, Marine Corps Systems Command .. 5 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Murray, LTG John M., joint with LTG Paul Ostrowski ............................... 32 

Turner, Hon. Michael R. .................................................................................. 29 

Walsh, LtGen Robert S., joint with BGen Joseph Shrader ........................... 43 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Gallego ........................................................................................................ 61 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Bishop ......................................................................................................... 67 

Mr. Carbajal ...................................................................................................... 67 

Mr. Cook ............................................................................................................ 66 

Mr. Turner ........................................................................................................ 65 

(1) 

GROUND FORCE MODERNIZATION BUDGET REQUEST 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2019 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 18, 2018. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:01 p.m., in Room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Michael R. Turner 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL R. TURNER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM OHIO, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES 

Mr. TURNER. The committee will come to order. The subcommittee meets today to review the Army and Marine Corps ground force 

modernization program for the fiscal year [FY] 2019 budget request. 

I would like to welcome our guests: General John Murray, Deputy Chief of Staff, G–8, principal military financial advisor for 

Army program development; Lieutenant General Paul Ostrowski, 

Military Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology; Lieutenant General Robert Walsh, 

Deputy Commandant for the Marine Corps for Combat Integration; 

and Brigadier General Joseph Shrader, Commanding General, Marine Corps Systems Command—you all need longer titles. 

[Laughter.] 

Thank you for—each of you for your service to our Nation. Today 

the subcommittee will review a broad portfolio of ground force 

equipment modernization programs that are associated with acquisition strategies covering over $40 billion in budget authority. 

Our focus today is to conduct oversight on how the budget requests for these modernization programs and acquisition strategies 

are aligned with the new National Defense Strategy and how they 

will begin to restore full-spectrum operational readiness. 

Last year, during a similar subcommittee hearing, General Murray testified that ‘‘the Army has nearly half of the funding for modernization [and] equipment that it had just 8 years ago.’’ And the 

Marine Corps said that between fiscal year 2012 through year 

2016, ‘‘Marine Corps spending on ground procurement decreased by 

48 percent in its base budget.’’ 

Essentially, the Army was both ‘‘outranged, outgunned and outdated,’’ end quote. And the Marine Corps was out of balance and 

requiring accelerated modernization to maintain [overmatch capabilities]. The National Defense Authorization Act [NDAA] for Fiscal 

Year 2018 and the balanced budget agreement for fiscal year 2018 
2 

and 2019 sets the necessary conditions to start the long process of 

repairing the damage resulting from years of combat operations 

compounded with deferred modernization. 

We all acknowledge this damage did not occur in a single year 

and it will take consistent levels of long-term increased investment 

to rebuild. The Army’s modernization budget request for this year 

represents a 22 percent increase over last year’s modernization 

budget request. 

I am pleased to see the Army is requesting enough funding to 

modernize one and a half armored brigade combat teams [ABCTs] 

as opposed to last year’s plan to modernize only half of the requirements for one complete ABCT. 

The Marine Corps procurement request for ground equipment this year is $2.9 billion which if enacted would be 80 percent increase over last year’s budget request of $1.6 billion. 

So, it does appear that the Army and Marine Corps are taking 

the necessary steps to accelerate modernization and mitigate existing capacity shortfalls and capability gaps. 

For example, the Army has identified six modernization priorities that include long-range precision fires, next-generation combat 

vehicles [NGCVs], future vertical lift, Army network, air and missile defense, and soldier lethality. To help streamline procurement 

of these capabilities, I understand the Army has also established 

eight cross-functional team pilot programs to expedite the requirements process and accelerate these priorities. 

The subcommittee expects to hear how the fiscal year 2019 request is addressing these modernization priorities and better understand program schedules and fielding timelines that will enable 

acceleration of these capabilities to the soldier. 

As a follow-up to the subcommittee’s hearing from last September on Army tactical network modernization, we expect our witnesses to provide additional details and justifications underpinning 

this new strategy and ask how the fiscal year 2019 request enables 

it. 

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 also 

directed the Army to develop a long-term modernization strategy. 

Today is a good opportunity for the witnesses to provide us with 

an update on where the Army is with developing this strategy. 

From a Marine Corps perspective, this year and next will represent critical milestones for the amphibious combat vehicle [ACV] 

program, the CH–53K heavy lift helicopter program, as well as accelerated ground-based air defense initiatives. We expect to receive 

updates on all of these issues today. 

In summary, we cannot dig ourselves out of this readiness and 

modernization hole in just a couple of years or NDAA cycles. I want 

to again place emphasis on what I said at last week’s committee 

hearing: we are experiencing a crisis in military readiness. 

Over the last 31⁄2 weeks, we have witnessed a series of aviation 

accidents where 16 service members have tragically lost their lives. 

Many of these tragic events are a result of lack of training hours 

due to constrained resources and/or the current state of aging 

equipment, all of which resulted from years of underfunding our 

military and clearly shows the magnitude of the problem we are all 

dealing with. 
3 

This increase in modernization funding is absolutely required to 

maintain our competitive advantage against strategic competitors 

and improve overall readiness. However, with the increased funding comes additional responsibility. If we are to sustain higher topline defense budgets, we need to be assured that the military services and the industrial base can execute the funds that Congress 

has authorizes and appropriates. 

The bottom line is, we have to get this right and we have to do 

it now. 

Before I begin, I would like to recognize my colleague and good 

friend from Massachusetts, Ms. Niki Tsongas, for any comments 

she would like to make. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Turner can be found in the Appendix on page 29.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. NIKI TSONGAS, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM MASSACHUSETTS, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good afternoon. 

I would like to thank our witnesses for being here today to discuss Army and Marine Corps modernization budgets for fiscal year 

2019. Good to have you with us. 

Based on an initial review of the budget request, both the Army 

and Marine Corps appear to have received significant funding increases in most areas. This has enabled in several cases both services to accelerate procurement of needed items, hopefully providing 

stability while also leading to lower costs through buying in bulk. 

For example, the Army has increased its procurements of armored combat vehicles of several types to approximately one and 

a half brigades per year, a dramatic increase from the half a brigade per year or less of recent budgets. 

The Marine Corps has been able to simultaneously buy more 

Joint Light Tactical Vehicles [JLTVs] while also pursuing healthy 

production rates of other vehicle upgrade programs. 

As our witnesses will recall, this subcommittee had a hearing 

last year focused on the Army’s new plans in the area of communications networks and associated programs. At the time, I was 

very concerned that the Army might be making hasty decisions regarding eliminating current programs in favor of chasing new and 

potentially unproven technology. 

Now, after reviewing the Army’s updated budget request in detail, I am cautiously optimistic that the Army is pursuing a more 

conservative plan that realigns some funding for current effort, but 

maintains or even expands funding for the majority of programs. 

The Army also plans to do a significant amount of experiments 

and prototype efforts to explore new technologies. These efforts are 

intended to inform a new tactical network for the future. Furthermore, the Army intends to maintain competition in most of its 

radio programs, which is good to see. 

Finally, there is one major question mark and that regards the 

path forward for providing better on-the-move communications capability to armored brigade combat teams. These units were going 

to receive WIN–T [Warfighter Information Network-Tactical] Increment [Inc] 2 for this purpose. But that aspect of the WIN–T pro-
4 

gram has been terminated. It remains to be seen what the Army’s 

plans are for providing this capability. I hope to hear more today 

about the way forward. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back and I look forward to 

hearing from our witnesses. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

I understand General Murray will provide opening remarks for 

the Army followed by General Walsh who will provide opening remarks for the Marine Corps. Without objections, the witnesses’ prepared statements will be included in the record. 

General Murray, please begin. 

STATEMENT OF LTG JOHN M. MURRAY, USA, DEPUTY CHIEF 

OF STAFF, G–8, OFFICE OF THE U.S. ARMY DEPUTY CHIEF OF 

STAFF; AND LTG PAUL OSTROWSKI, USA, MILITARY DEPUTY 

TO THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY FOR ACQUISITION, LOGISTICS AND TECHNOLOGY 

General MURRAY. Thank you, sir. Chairman Turner—that is a 

nice short title, sir—Ranking Member Tsongas, distinguished members of the subcommittee, on behalf of our Army Secretary, the 

Honorable Mark Esper, and our Chief of Staff, General Mark 

Milley, General Ostrowski and I look forward to discussing Army 

modernization with you. 

Last year, I told you that we were approaching an inflection 

point; this year I would tell you that based upon everything you 

have just talked about, we are at an inflection point. We can no 

longer afford to choose between near-term readiness and modernization, and, specific to modernization, we can no longer afford 

to choose between improving existing systems and developing new 

ones. We must be able to do both, and I think you will see some 

of that in the 2019 budget and then specifically when we bring the 

2020 budget across in about a year, you will see that. 

The Army’s focus on the demands of ongoing campaigns combined with constrained resources and an industrial age organizational model have slowed, deferred, and in some cases halted the 

development of new capabilities. Meanwhile, our adversaries have, 

or are quickly attaining, a competitive advantage. 

Building on the fiscal year 2018 President’s budget, we believe 

the FY 2019 budget request aligns with the National Defense 

Strategy, continues to reverse the downward trend that has stifled 

Army modernization, and serves as an important step toward expanding and maintaining overmatch. 

However, we must stress that a major increase in modernization 

this year will not in itself reverse the trend. We must have sustained, predictable, and adequate funding over the long term to 

allow us to develop an effective plan to reduce future risk while 

making the most effective use of the valuable resources we are entrusted with. 

In fiscal year 2019, we plan to selectively upgrade the equipment 

that is critical to near-term readiness and focus our science and 

technology and our research, development, test, and evaluation 

[RDT&E] funding on the six Army modernization priorities, those 

areas crucial to combat which have eroded in the restricted budget 

environment. 
5 

This includes as you mentioned, Chairman, long-range precision 

fires, next-generation combat vehicle, future vertical lift, the network, air and missile defense, and soldier lethality. The American 

people expect their Army to win and meeting this expectation requires the Army to maintain overmatch against the near-peer 

threat. 

We urge Congress to provide fiscal stability so we can maintain 

our current warfighting readiness while simultaneously building a 

more modern, more capable, and more lethal force for the future. 

I would like to thank you and the entire committee for your unwavering support of the men and women of the United States 

Army, our Army civilians, and our Army families. Thank you and 

we look forward to your questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of General Murray and General 

Ostrowski can be found in the Appendix on page 32.] 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

General Walsh. 

STATEMENT OF LTGEN ROBERT S. WALSH, USMC, COMMANDING GENERAL, MARINE CORPS COMBAT DEVELOPMENT 

COMMAND, AND DEPUTY COMMANDANT, COMBAT DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION, HEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE 

CORPS; AND BGEN JOSEPH SHRADER, USMC, COMMANDING 

GENERAL, MARINE CORPS SYSTEMS COMMAND 

General WALSH. Thank you, Chairman Turner, Ranking Member 

Tsongas, distinguished members of the subcommittee, for the opportunity to testify before you today with my teammates, General 

Murray, General Ostrowski, and also my partner, General Shrader. 

The Marine Corps ability to serve as our Nation’s crisis response 

force is due largely in part to this subcommittee’s continuing strong 

support and we appreciate that on behalf of all the Marines. 

Additionally, the Bipartisan Budget Act is going to go a long way 

to give us the stability we really need to be able to continue to develop the capabilities we have. Across the Marine Corps Combat 

Development Command, we have got over 18,000 men and women 

sailors, Marines, civilians that are operating as the capability developers for the Marine Corps and integrating this across the Marine force. 

Over the past year, the Marine Corps has been focused on deterring conflict by providing combined arms teams to theaters either 

already in crisis or at the risk of crisis to meet the Congress’ mandate to be ‘‘ready to suppress or contain international disturbances 

short of large-scale war.’’ 

We operate—you talked about the National Defense Strategy— 

within three of the four areas described in the National Defense 

Strategy of the contact, blunt, and surge forces. Our forwarddeployed Marines and sailors operate daily as part of that contact 

layer. 

Today, they are vulnerable to—they are vulnerable to attacks in 

ways we haven’t seen in decades. To operate within the contact and 

blunt layers, Marines foster—need to foster the lethal combat 

forces to be a credible deterrence force. 

During the last several budget cycles, we have been focused 

heavily on improving readiness to improve the force and increase 
6 

our ability, but with the stability that you have given the budget, 

with a 7 percent increase in the total obligating authority with the 

Marine Corps, we have been able to push money into our modernization accounts at a rate of 32 percent. This increase in modernization spending is a signal, it is a sense of urgency that we will 

be prepared to address the threats in the National Defense Strategy. 

Like the Army, in the Marine Corps 2019 budget we aligned ourselves with five priorities: information warfare, long-range precision fires, air defense, command and control in a degraded environment, and protective mobility and enhanced maneuver along with 

the Secretary of Defense direction to increase lethality, resilience, 

agility, and build a flexible, dynamic force. 

Additionally, I would like to emphasize to this subcommittee our 

close coordination and in many cases full alignment with the 

United States Army and their programs. Our work with the Army 

provides more efficient use of taxpayer dollars and ensures the end 

product provides the best capability to our Marines, soldiers, and 

the operating forces. 

Thank you for allowing General Shrader and I to testify before 

you today. 

[The joint prepared statement of General Walsh and General 

Shrader can be found in the Appendix on page 43.] 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, gentlemen. I have a couple of questions 

before I pass it on to my ranking member. General Murray, thank 

you for accompanying me when we visited the Holston Army Ammunition Plant, that was very illuminating, got to get a firsthand 

view of both the state of the facilities, the demand issues, and production. Holston and Radford are both government-owned contractor-operated facilities and both are in the process of expanding 

their production capability of critical materials needed for ramping 

up production of high-demand munitions. 

I would like for you to update us on the facilities, where they are 

at expanding production, any additional information you would like 

to give us. You gave us an effective understanding of the issues 

when we were there together at Holston. And in your opinion, are 

there ways to accelerate these projects? I would like to also know 

what near-term actions are being considered, the things that we 

need to be considering as we put the NDAA together and, I know, 

are you considering stockpiling TNT [explosive]? 

General MURRAY. Yes, Mr. Chairman, thank you for that question. As you know at Holston, in 2018, it is really a multiyear effort, so it really goes even before fiscal year 2018. But in 2018, we 

put $105 million and then $100 million in 2019 to expand the capacity. That is about a 6 million pound increase in RDX [explosive] 

and about a 2 million pound increase in IMX [explosive]. 

And that work continues. It is probably not any different than 

the schedule we showed you when we were down there. We have 

looked for opportunities to accelerate and taken those opportunities 

where we could, but as you know it is—until it becomes an insensitive munition, it is in fact a sensitive munition. 

So chances for acceleration are probably not great, but we remain 

on track and we have looked at the issue of storing TNT and we 

continue to explore that option. The demand for the insensitive mu-
7 

nitions in theater right now is dropping slightly, so we have been 

able to catch up on some of the backlog, but we will continue to 

look for opportunities to expand the use of TNT, and then also add 

additional investments in those two critical facilities. 

Mr. TURNER. General Walsh, we are aware that the Marine 

ground units are almost wholly without an effective organic air defense system. We are also aware on the subcommittee that the Marine Corps has plans to develop a family of systems that can develop—excuse me—that can defend against airborne threats. 

Can you please update on the Marine Corps plans and how do 

these coordinate with other service branches? 

General WALSH. Thank you, Chairman. We have got really what 

I would say is a two-phased approach to this. In near term, we had 

been looking at the counter-UAS [unmanned aerial system] capabilities, but now with the National Defense Strategy to increase 

that, we have kind of looked at longer range capabilities. So within 

the—the near term, we have been developing on—as a light capability on our MRZRs which are our ATV [all-terrain vehicle] capability and also on the M–ATV [mine-resistant ambush protected 

ATV] that we have. 

And on that capability, we have got integrating Stinger missiles 

for rotary wing and fixed wing, a counter-UAS Coyote capability, 

an EW [electronic warfare] capability we call Modi, and also integrating a laser capability that we are working very closely with the 

Army on—with the counter-laser weapon system along with the 

sensors that go with that. 

That is the near-term capability and it is kind of a spiral ability 

that we are going to integrate into the JLTV that goes—as it goes 

forward. And as that goes forward we are working very closely with 

the Army on a longer range capability. 

In the interim we also have $4.5 million that we have got in 2018 

that we are working to develop and integrate a COTS [commercial 

off-the-shelf] system that we could demonstrate near term as we 

develop more money into the future that we have got for R&D [research and development] with the Army to integrate in with their 

IFPC [Indirect Fire Protection Capability] Block 2. And I will ask 

General Shrader if he would like to add anything from the acquisition side. 

General SHRADER. Sir, I would just echo really the work that we 

have done on the lightweight system that—that General Walsh 

talked about, we call it the—the Lightweight Marine Air Defense 

System that we would put on the RZR. We have—we have to date 

fielded 14 of those within a 12-month period from identifying the 

requirement to fielding. So we are happy with that. We want to 

continue on that effort. 

And that—on that vehicle, it is two vehicles where you have a 

command and control vehicle and then you have another vehicle 

that has the radar and the—the capability to compute the firing 

data and then engage with—we will just say EW Modi system. And 

we have done that in a 14-month period and we—we use that as 

the base and then spiral, what General Walsh said, spiral more capability into that. Not only that system, but also into the M–ATV 

and the JLTV as that comes onboard and also working with the 

laser, the 2-kilowatt laser. That is—that is all I would add, sir. 
8 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. Ms. Tsongas. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Since the start of the 

wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, DOD [Department of Defense] developed various systems for quickly addressing urgent needs for 

equipment. These efforts understandably started as urgent needs 

directly tied to ongoing combat operations. 

Recently, however, the use of the term ‘‘urgent’’ has migrated to 

other more routine requirements often tied to need statements 

from Army or Marine Corps units that in many cases are not deploying into a combat zone in the near future. Of course, the entire 

Army and Marine Corps exist to be prepared for possible combat 

in the future, so expansion of the label of urgent—urgent need to 

include anything plausibly related to a future combat operation 

could obviously include almost anything. 

While I support as many on this—we all in this committee do, 

support filling such urgent needs for units in combat or about to 

deploy to combat, I would like to explore what looks like an expanding definition of urgent need. 

So with that, General Murray and General Walsh, can you talk 

about and explain how the Army and Marine Corps currently categorize urgent needs? And can you also explain in detail where 

such urgent need statements come from and how are they reviewed? So I will start with you, General Murray. 

General MURRAY. Yes, ma’am, thank you. So it is—it is hard to 

know when you are going to deploy into combat, so we have had 

predictability over the last 16 years, I understand that with path 

charts and BCTs can prepare the year out. But it is hard to predict 

the world’s situation. So most of the urgent requirements that we 

are seeing are coming from division commanders, they are—they 

are funneled up through corps commanders, prioritized, and racked 

and stacked if you will. They go to the forces command commander 

if they are within FORSCOM [U.S. Army Forces Command]. If 

they are within the Pacific they go through the four-star in the Pacific. If they are in Europe, they go through the three-star Army 

commander in Europe. 

And then they come back to the building. The G3 [operations 

staff] racks and stacks them from an Army-wide priority look. We 

have lawyers look at them to make sure that there is a compelling 

reason why it is an urgent requirement and normally either the 

vice or the chief are briefed on them that this is an emerging requirement, this is the way we would like to do. 

Ms. TSONGAS. And what would the standard be for that, that the 

lawyer is—is employing to decide that? 

General MURRAY. It is just probably no—there is probably no 

piece of law I can point to and say. Now, there are Army regulations and there are DODIs, DOD instructions, that talk about urgent and compelling, but they don’t—they don’t point to a specific, 

it has to be A, B, C, D, and E to be qualified as urgent. 

So it is based up—it is really based upon the world situation. I 

mean what is going on in—in Korea at this particular point in time 

has—has led to most of the DRs, directed requirements, here recently, and then it is always for a limited quantity and it is not 

an acquisition strategy. It is just naming the requirements for the 
9 

piece of equipment that we are after if it doesn’t currently already 

exist in our inventory. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Is there any process in place to make sure that 

these decisions aren’t inappropriately influenced by non-government actors such as industry representatives? 

General MURRAY. For my perspective, yes, because the directed 

requirements that I have seen and I have personally signed do 

not—it is a requirements document, that this is the requirements 

for a capability that we would like—the acquisition community to 

either find, buy, or produce. And that is about the limit. Now, I do 

put into some of those, you know, the—the timeframes we are talking about because urgent implies fairly rapidly, but I have never 

seen or signed a directed requirement that specifies an acquisition 

strategy. 

And from my personal experience, from my perspective, there 

has been no contractor influence on the solution. 

Ms. TSONGAS. General Walsh. 

General WALSH. Congresswoman Tsongas, so I am just going 

to—I think our process is parallel very much with what General 

Murray said. What I will say is our urgent requests come in from 

our operating forces the same way, they come into our capability 

development directorate down there at Quantico. We assess them 

pretty much the same way. We also have deliberate operational 

needs that come in from the operating force commanders. So the 

ones that are urgent are coming in generally from the operating 

forces that are in combat areas that have urgent needs, maybe loss 

of life or capability in that sense. 

They come in, we rack and stack them, and then we send them 

up to our Marine Corps—Marine Requirements Oversight Council 

that is up with all the deputy commandants and the Assistant 

Commandant of the Marine Corps and eventually up to the Commandant. So that is the process we go through. 

We have been doing this a lot as you well know throughout Iraq 

and Afghanistan, so we have gotten fairly good at this. I think 

where—where the questions start to lie I think with Congress is 

the desire to go fast is starting to maybe sometimes look like it is 

getting outside the operational needs process in, for example, 

where we developed our rapid capabilities office that we have developed and all the services have developed those. 

And so now we are spinning technology out fairly quickly at the 

lower end, not major acquisition development programs, but smaller. And I think the key part with that is trying to work with Congress and I think in this last year we have been very successful to 

work with Congress to show the areas that we have been working 

in that we would be wanting to demonstrate capabilities and experiment with that, and then continue to come back and engage with 

Congress on what actual programs that we are using to experiment 

with to be able to try to rapidly prototype those capabilities. 

So I think some of it looks like this rapid capability development 

is merging into the urgent operational needs process, but we keep 

these completely separate from a process standpoint. 

Ms. TSONGAS. And are you comfortable that these decisions 

aren’t being inappropriately influenced by, as I said, non-govern-
10 

ment actors such as industry representatives? And what do you 

have in place to be assured of that? 

General WALSH. Yes, Congresswoman, I think—to be honest with 

you, I don’t see us getting involved with the industry at that point 

when those capabilities come in. They come in, we look at what the 

best capability would be out there. We do do some demonstration 

capabilities when we try to bring in vendors to kind of see what 

opportunities are out there, but we kind of look at it from more of 

a capability standpoint than looking at a specific vendor’s capability. 

And let me ask if General Shrader wants to—because he works 

very closely with me on this process. 

General SHRADER. Ma’am, I would say that there is, on the acquisition side, the material development side, there is a process 

that we have in place where a vendor can introduce something and 

it is a non, unsolicited proposal type of process that we have. But 

as far as industry partners trying to come in and influence, try to 

generate an urgent need, no, ma’am, I don’t—I am not aware of 

anything like that going on, ma’am. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Cook. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our guests 

for being here today. And I am going to start with the Army and 

I want to talk about the Strykers. And I am big fan of the Strykers. 

I notice I guess the request is what, for three Stryker upgrades, is 

that correct right now? 

General MURRAY. As it stands right now, yes, sir. 

Mr. COOK. And we are pretty well straightened down on the— 

the V-hull even though it is heavy and everything else. The folks 

on the Strykers over in Europe, they—they seem to really like that 

a lot, at least that was what came back to me. Any—any problems 

with that other than the weight? 

General MURRAY. No, sir. So the Europe unit, the 2d Stryker 

Cavalry Regiment is in fact flat-bottom Stryker. What I think you 

are referring to is the 30-millimeter cannon. 

Mr. COOK. No, no, I am talking about the hull. 

General MURRAY. Yes, sir, those—those are all—— 

Mr. COOK. No, no, the 30-millimeter I am happy with, no problem at all. But—so I am more worried about, you know, mines and 

things of that nature. The other thing I—when I was over there 

and we were at Grafenwoehr, a place where—you know where I am 

talking about, and we are talking—they had four or five different 

variants. We had a CODEL [congressional delegation] there and 

they had the different systems. 

And I guess I didn’t realize that—are they going to change that 

with the mortar or some of the variants in the future or have they 

pretty well standardized what is going to be available to that? And 

I don’t have it all in front of me, but I was pretty impressed with 

the versatility of that weapon system. 

General MURRAY. Yes, sir. I think the actual number is nine different variants and I may be wrong, but it is—it is more than five. 

But in terms of the—the numbers of variants on the Stryker chassis, I think we stabilized it. As a matter of fact, we are adding to 
11 

it, so that will be the platform for our mobile SHORAD [shortrange air defense] solution. 

Mr. COOK. And we are going forward with the reactive armor, 

the variations of the Trophy systems? I think it is my understanding both services are—are committed to that talking. We are 

not going to—we are OK on that because I am a big supporter of 

that, by the way. 

General MURRAY. So, Trophy, yes. Between 2018 and 2019, it is 

about four brigades’ worth that will go on the Abrams tank. We 

have finished the characterization of Iron Curtain which we were 

trying on the Stryker. There was a decision to come on that this 

summer and then we’re in the process of characterizing Iron Fist 

on the Bradley right now down at Redstone Arsenal. 

Mr. COOK. Yes. Did—did you happen to look at the system that 

the Dutch are using for their armored personnel carriers? It is 

very—the big thing about it is it is very lightweight supposedly. I 

haven’t seen it. I did want to try and get over there and see what 

it looked like, but read a little bit on it, but not much. 

General MURRAY. I am not familiar with what the Dutch are 

using. We have looked at the German system, I believe it is called 

ADS [Active Defence System]. So we have had some folks in Germany to look at it. It is a very similar concept, different—different 

design, but a very similar concept to an intercept very close to the 

vehicle as the Artis system called Iron Curtain. 

Mr. COOK. Okay, I am going to get off script a little bit and I 

want to ask you about line charges. In fact, the last time I saw line 

charges about a year ago out at Fort Irwin and I got to tell you 

it is remarkably similar to the same line charge in terms of 51 

years ago in 1967 in Vietnam where it shoots out again, when we 

did it, it was from an AMTRAC [assault amphibious vehicle]. And 

everybody holds their breath and of course it didn’t work. 

And it just—I have always been sketchy about that. I think everybody is sketchy about it because of the dangers involved with 

it, particularly to the ground troops, you know, when it ruptures. 

Is there anything to improve that, because this is the enemy that 

we are probably going to encounter with minefields or mines or 

something like that. And to be able to do something expeditiously 

to blow up whatever it is, it just seemed almost archaic and that 

was—I don’t know, maybe anybody can answer that? 

General MURRAY. Yes, sir. It is, probably is; there are only so 

many ways you can pack C4 [explosive] into a tube. But I—what 

I can tell you is I know of no requirements being worked in the 

Army system to replace the MICLIC [Mine Clearing Line Charge], 

the mine charge. 

Mr. COOK. Yeah. I asked that question and he said no, and I was 

sarcastic and I said, we are going to use the same one that I used 

51 years ago. And they said, yeah, pretty much so. Anyway, I yield 

back. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our 

witnesses for your testimony today, most especially thank you for 

your service to the country. So I understand that, and we have 

touched this with the chairman’s question, but I understand that 

one of the Army’s ongoing priorities is to develop systems in order 
12 

to counter short-range air defense threats such as drones and in so 

doing has been experimenting with high energy lasers. As a proponent of directed energy technologies I am encouraged to hear 

that the Army is pursuing these advanced technology solutions 

such as the mobile experimental high energy laser, or MEHEL, to 

supplement its current ground force capabilities. 

And so can you discuss your—your progress on these efforts so 

far, as well as how you are training soldiers to actually operate the 

systems? 

General OSTROWSKI. Sir, I will just tell you that in addition to 

the one that you mentioned, we are also very much engaged in 

2018 with respect to a technology maturity initiative. This is taking a Stryker vehicle and putting a 50-kilowatt laser on that platform in order to get to a TR [technology readiness] level 7 by the 

first quarter of 2021. So it will be integral on both the—the IFPC 

program in terms of a Block 2 IFPC, as well as mobile SHORAD. 

So the intent is to bring that on as fast as we possibly can because 

as you know it is cheaper per round in terms of a shot in order to 

use that particular laser technology against both RAM [rocket, artillery, and mortar], as well as UAS threats. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. And progress on the—the one I mentioned, the 

MEHEL laser, is that—that is different than the one that is on the 

Stryker, right? 

General OSTROWSKI. Can you repeat the question, sir? 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Yes. I just want to know the mobile experimental 

high energy laser or the MEHEL, is that—that is not the same one 

you are putting on the Stryker, is it? 

General OSTROWSKI. Sir, I believe you are talking about the 100- 

Kw [kilowatt] one as opposed to the one that we are putting on the 

Stryker which is a 50-kilowatt. Again, we moved from 2 kilowatts 

to 5 kilowatts as we continue to improve the maturity of the technology. And so the next one for us right now in terms of the 

Stryker based is the 50-kilowatt laser. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay, thank you, gentlemen. So with further developments in artificial intelligence [AI], would you agree that 

using AI to help control swarms of drones during offensive operations or to provide logistics to forward units much like commercial 

companies that are experimenting within the United States has potential to be game changing? And how are you incorporating these 

ideas into your modernization strategy? 

General WALSH. I would say yes to all, sir, and I would say that 

it is probably fundamentally the technology that has the—the 

chance to be most—to changing the character of war as we move 

forward. So yes, we are very interested in artificial intelligence incorporation into weapon systems. Of course there are policy issues 

that go along with that that we will have to deal with as that— 

as that technology develops. 

We are very closely watching what is going on in industry and 

the other services. We are trying to capitalize off investments that 

OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] is making and the other 

services are making. We see this not necessarily as the—as the 

right place to invest a tremendous amount of money right now. We 

think this is a—this is a technology that industry will develop 

much faster than we will, and the opportunity to sprint will come 
13 

and we just need to be in a position to sprint to catch up with industry when it is mature. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. And—and how are both your services 

building cyber and electronic warfare resiliency into your modernization efforts to ensure our new platforms and systems will 

continue to function in a contested environment? 

General OSTROWSKI. Sir, I will just tell you that for every one of 

our programs and during our testing we go up against cyber 

threats, as well as EW, and that is across the board. Not only the 

systems that we are currently in the process of developing, but also 

systems that we already have in the field such as the Abrams tank 

for instance, or Apache helicopters, not only from an outsider 

threat, but also from an insider threat. 

We are spending a lot of money on a lot of initiatives. We have 

red teams that go at these particular systems whether they are out 

at NTC [National Training Center] or other places in order to ensure that whatever we are doing across the board, we are consistent with the EW threat and cyber threat on both—both our 

ground, as well as our air platforms, as well as our IT [information 

technology] efforts. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. General Walsh. 

General WALSH. If I could, Congressman. When we wrote our 

Marine Corps Operating Concept, the—one of the priorities we saw 

was being able to operate in the information warfare area. And 

from that we did our Marine Corps Force 2025, it was about a 

year-and-a-half-long force structure review. And what came out of 

that was developing our MEF [Marine expeditionary force] information groups. Within those information groups they are focused 

on cyber, EW, signals intelligence, information operations. 

Just now this summer we are standing up defensive counter operations cyber companies that are down inside the MIG [MEF information group], so we are now pushing that capability all the 

way down in small detachments, all the way down to the company 

level. So we are pushing the capability down in structure first with 

the capabilities and material solutions, some of which we have in 

a lot of ways in the electronic warfare, we have had that in our 

radio battalions and also in our electronic warfare Prowler squadrons, our EA–6Bs, but pushing that capability down to the lowest 

level, the first thing was get the structure in place and then the 

material solutions will follow. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you all. I would say this is important because as much as we are making progress on these technologies, 

our enemies and adversaries have invested heavily in being able to 

disrupt our activities in a contested environment, and what we can 

do to build resiliency, then the better off we are. So thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony and again, thank you for your service. 

And I yield back. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Wittman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thanks so 

much for joining us. Thanks again for your service. 

General Ostrowski, I wanted to touch base on where the modern 

operational systems for the soldier are going. We know that a soldier can carry about a third of their body weight and as it gets 

higher, it affects their mobility. 
14 

We know sometimes they can carry as much as 100 pounds of 

gear which does impact their ability to carry out the mission. I do 

understand though that there is some new technology out there, 

the squad multipurpose equipment transport, better known as 

SMET, that is able to carry equipment, munitions, help in that, 

even carry a wounded soldier. So an addition to that element at the 

squad level for tactical flexibility and additional capacity. 

We all know the benefits of that to me are pretty clear. The Chief 

of Staff of the Army placed some emphasis and said, listen, we are 

going to use more of these ground unmanned robotic systems to 

achieve mission. 

Give me a perspective, are there any plans in place to expedite 

the acquisition of a system like the SMET? Are there things that 

maybe you could do in the technology demonstration timelines to 

compress those to get more quickly to acquisition? Give us your 

perspective on how that’s coming together. 

General OSTROWSKI. Yes, sir. I will tell you this is basically a 

modern acquisition success story in terms of the way we are doing 

business today. Number one, the ability to go out with an other 

transactional authority [OTA] announcement to an industry that 

normally would never participate in Department of Defense type 

initiatives. 

So going out to an industry that typically has not had any kind 

of a contact with us and saying we need your help. The OTAs allow 

us to do this. That is what we did in July of last year. And we had 

numerous candidates bring in systems as well as proposals. 

We downselected to four of those systems. We are currently at 

that point right now. We are waiting on the money to come in from 

the 2018 budget, so thank you very much for getting that through. 

And so now, as a new start, we can begin that work. So, the bottom 

line is going forward, we will have another—the intent is to buy 

20 systems per vendor of the four vendors that we downselected to. 

We will then put those in the field with soldiers to gain soldier 

feedback. And by first quarter 2019, so at the end of this calendar 

year, the intent is to downselect to one. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Oh, good. 

General OSTROWSKI. From there, we are going to buy approximately 60 systems. And we are going to put those out either at either Fort—I would say—hang on, just half a second—yes, bottom 

line is we are going to put that out at Fort Drumm or Fort Campbell. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Yes, yes. 

General OSTROWSKI. And the intent there is to have those in the 

field for approximately one year during which time soldiers will be 

able to get feedback on them. We will get feedback on them and 

then have the opportunity to then make a downselect decision to 

whether or not it is good enough as it is or whether we want to 

improve it with intention of award right after that. 

So, again, the opportunity to go faster and get the capability that 

we know soldiers will want at the end of the day. And that is just 

the ground side. There is other opportunities as well through aerial 

vehicles and the rest that we are looking into because it is all 

about reducing soldier load. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Okay. 
15 

General MURRAY. Sir, if I could add. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Sure. Yes. 

General MURRAY. Just really under—all right, just really quickly 

and I think the time—I agree with him, I think the timing is really 

part of the good-news story. So and this was in the case of—for developmental activity, this is was a directed requirement, because 

we knew what we wanted. We knew what was available industrywise from technology standpoint. 

So instead of going through a 5-year requirements process, we 

just wrote the requirement, got it out to industry, and 16 months 

later, 6 months of that being the CR [continuing resolution] that 

we couldn’t get started. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Yes. 

General MURRAY. I mean we are ready to field capability to our 

soldiers right now. 

Mr. WITTMAN. That is great. That is great. 

Lieutenant General Walsh, I wanted to talk a little bit about the 

modernization efforts in the Marine Corps. About 29 percent of the 

resources for modernization are being utilized by the ground combat and tactical vehicle strategy. And the investment priority there 

is with the ACV. 

And we know that you are at Milestone C now looking for a 

downselect to be able to get that vehicle operationalized. So it looks 

like ACV is on the near horizon. As you know in the whole tactical 

back and forth about forceful entry, speed and surprise are important elements of that as you are looking at that. 

And we know that there are some technologies out there that 

allow for greater resolution in early detection of things that may 

be coming to shore. We know even groups, even non-state actors 

like Hezbollah now have pretty sophisticated radar-guided missiles 

out there. So that all creates a little more of a challenge in the contested environment there. There is always tradeoffs as you—the 

Marine Corps has been through in looking at speed and capability 

with those vehicles and mobility, obviously on land. So how do you 

have the right combination of both? 

Are you concerned as you look at this right mixture of ACV 

range and speed within that highly contested environment, do you 

think you have the mix right? And how have the ACV prototypes 

performed so far in this particular environment? Are you satisfied 

where things are when you get to the downselect? 

General WALSH. Thank you, Congressman. I will start with the 

last part of it is so far we have been very pleased with the two vendors in what we are getting out of those capabilities. The ACV 1.1 

capability was supposed to be just a ship-to-shore capability from 

a threshold requirement. And we see the vendors, both vendors 

meeting the objective capabilities. 

So, in many ways they are exceeding what we already have in 

our AAV [amphibious assault vehicle] capabilities. Now, with the 

tradeoffs of the capabilities you talked about as you are well familiar with is trying to go fast. We weren’t willing to trade off a lot 

of those capabilities to be able to be protected, maneuver, and have 

lethal firepower when we get ashore. 

So we have developed through a non-developmental program 

with the two vendors. We are looking forward to the Milestone C 
16 

decision in June. But the larger part of your earlier question is 

what we have really been working on in this contested environment is we are going to have to operate differently. 

It is not all about AMTRACs on line coming ashore. It is much 

more into what you were just talking about, sensing the battle 

space, deception, jammers in that area. And we have been doing a 

lot of work in that area. 

Last year, we had our advanced naval technology experiment 

that was focused completely on ship-to-shore maneuver. And in 

that ship-to-shore maneuver, the majority of the first parts of the 

landing operations were all unmanned systems, whether they were 

in the air, on the surface, and under the surface. 

Many of the capabilities that we saw we learned from, as you are 

very familiar with the Naval Undersea Warfare Center up in 

Rhode Island. We got capabilities from them that now a lot of our 

reconnaissance forces that we have rapidly prototyped that we are 

now using for swarming hydrographic capabilities to be able to 

sense as we come ashore. 

So I think this unmanned area is going to take us into many different areas to be able to do deception, but the key part is not conducting operations the way we have in the past. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Gallego. 

Mr. GALLEGO. Thank you, Mr. Chair. The budget request is going 

to be an increase of over 82 percent for long-range precision fires 

capable of up to 400-kilometer shots. The development of such technology is critical as we build the next-generation conventional deterrence, especially when looking at Korea and Europe. 

What is the expected timeline for R&D and fielding of this technology to the best of your ability? 

General OSTROWSKI. Yes, sir. The bottom line is the precision 

strike missile which it is now being called as opposed to the longrange precision fires, is in OTA as well. So we have two competitors, both Lockheed Martin as well as Raytheon, that are competing for this. 

The first time we will have an opportunity to see where we are 

at is the fourth quarter of 2019 when each of the vendors will provide four missiles to us of which we will fire three. Depending on 

the results of that, again, where the intent is to fire those at max 

range, so the 499. 

Depending on the results of that we intend to expedite the delivery of the system much faster. Originally, it was 2025. We are 

thinking more like 2022. But it will all depend on the fourth quarter 2019, when we get the results of the test. 

Mr. GALLEGO. Anything to add, gentlemen? 

General WALSH. The only thing I would add on that, working 

very closely with the Army on how to increase longer range capabilities coming out of our HIMARS [High Mobility Artillery Rocket 

System] capability. But the other piece too is we have got about 

$20 million of RDT&E in 2019 to be able to look at how we can 

integrate a much quicker capability, commercial off-the-shelf capability for an anti-ship missile capability that in the long term working very closely with the Army in 2020 and beyond in the long- 
17 

range fires capability for anti-ship that is also capable of on-land 

capabilities. 

Mr. GALLEGO. Excellent. So to kind of latch on to that theme. I 

understand some of the testing for these systems will go on in Arizona, good choice, at the Yuma Proving Grounds. Is there adequate 

space to test the long-range shots both at Yuma and at White 

Sands Missile considering we are dealing with some rather long 

distances? 

General MURRAY. Yes, sir. There is more than sufficient range at 

both those locations to test this. 

Mr. GALLEGO. Okay. Let me move on into the tactical network 

modernization. The Army is requesting nearly $500 million in 

new—again, tactical network technology modification line. What is 

the intent of this line? And in other words what does it buy? What 

is it bringing us? 

General MURRAY. So you—thank you, sir. I believe you were 

briefed last fall on the network modernization. You were very familiar with the halt, the fix, and the pivot. So the network modernization modification line really does two things for us. 

Number one is that it is primarily focused on fix. So we have 

halted three specific programs, which you are very aware of and 

then the fix piece is to fix the current baseline. Our current baseline is WIN–T Inc 1b in some of the force fielded with WIN–T Inc 

2 on-the-move capability. 

So it is to finish the fielding of the Inc 2 stuff that we have already purchased that will go on through 2018, so it is fielding the 

light gear to the light infantry units primarily. Cascade of heavier 

equipment to some Strykers and not all of them into the ABCTs 

is to accelerate the common platform we are going to use across all 

formations to include the ABCTs, the Joint Battle Command-P, the 

JBC–P. 

And then it is also to do some experimentation with the CFT 

[cross-functional team] looking at what we are calling the integrated tactical network. And I think the thing that is exciting 

about this is when we developed networks in the past, we start at 

the top and make it fit, small units, companies, platoons, battalions. 

And we are starting at the bottom and scaling up in this case. 

We are making sure it works at the platoon, company, battalion 

level. And right now, in 2018, if the money is made available, we 

intend to look at an IBCT [infantry brigade combat team] and 

ABCT and SBCT [Stryker brigade combat team] and do the scalability up. 

And this is mostly—it is almost solely modified commercial offthe-shelf gear or SOCOM [Special Operations Command] gear that 

has already been purchased and proven. 

Mr. GALLEGO. Let us go a little deeper. What are the plans in 

terms of when it comes to Stryker, are we talking—you said some 

Stryker, are we talking full brigades or what is the plan in terms 

of—— 

General MURRAY. There is not enough of the light gear to go to 

every SBCT and—a Stryker brigade, we are peer fleeted and some 

of them will have all have a lighter gear, a few of them and that 
18 

is one or two I believe, but I have to get back to you on that, will 

have the older, heavier gear just like the ABCTs do. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 61.] 

Mr. GALLEGO. Okay. I yield back. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. Gentlemen, I am going to have to apologize, both my ranking member and I had conflicts to the end of 

this. I didn’t want you to think that it was you. My ranking member had a memorial service for Member Slaughter. And I have a 

meeting with the chairman of the committee. So I am going to pass 

the gavel over to Mr. Banks and call on Mr. Brown. But I appreciate your testimony and your service. 

Mr. Brown. 

Mr. BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to ask the 

Army and probably General Ostrowski about the future of vertical 

lift. And future vertical lift, I know that it is I think number three 

on the priority list, the six priorities for Army modernization according to General Milley. Recently General Tate described the development in a way that the Army is going to spend more time 

kind of working through issues, identifying requirements during 

the prototype phase more so than in past fieldings and—or development, and so that this way when you get to the program of record, 

we are able to deliver an aircraft that is much more adaptable to 

the changing environment, future requirements, upgrades in technology, et cetera. 

If I have mischaracterized, please correct me, but the question is 

can you give us an update and what is the plan for rapid prototype 

development? And are there ways to accelerate the ongoing analysis of the alternatives that you are currently considering? 

General OSTROWSKI. Yes, sir. I would say that the tech demonstration I believe is what you are talking about right now. It’s 

called the Joint Multi-Role. And, again, this is the way that we 

should be doing acquisition in terms of being able to inform our requirements. 

And we are having industry buy-in. So industries bought in both 

with respect to Boeing, as well as Sikorsky, and then Bell is a different partner. Each of these particular companies have come forward with their platforms to the tune of about $450 million worth 

of spend in terms of industry to the Army’s $90 million per vendor 

in order to get at a demonstration of these technologies, whether 

it would be tiltrotor or whether it would be compound coaxial 

which each of these vendors are providing. 

The intent is to have those fly. We have had the Bell flying already. And it continues to fly with respect to its prototype or its 

experimental version. And then now, we are looking very forward 

to the summer as we get the Sikorsky-Boeing’s compound coaxial 

up in the air. 

From there, sir, the intent is to finish off our analysis of alternatives by the second quarter of 2019, which helps us further refine our requirements and determine what else is out there. 

And that allows us to then move into a TMRR, a tech maturity 

risk reduction, phase of the program in 2021. Depending on what 

we get and what we see from these two demonstrators, it allows 

us to make better decisions, better choices with respect to how far 
19 

the technology really is. Are these experimental or are they more 

prototypes? We hope for the latter, but we are concerned that we 

might not get there in terms of that. 

So, again, they might be just experimental as opposed to prototypes. In conjunction with that we have to work with the Marines. 

We want to work with the Marines in terms of getting our capabilities sets. We need their money as they need ours in order to pull 

this together. Again, that is going to be requirements tradeoffs between the two services. So exciting program, the way we should be 

doing business. 

Mr. BROWN. [inaudible] that you’re experiencing with regard to 

your rotor-wing fleet. I didn’t have the mic [microphone] on. Did 

you hear me? 

General WALSH. Yes, I did. On the rotary-wing side, I think the 

most challenging ones, we have actually been bringing in new programs with our Yankee Zulu on our H–1s. Obviously, we are still 

in the last of multiyear for our MV–22s. 

Probably the big challenge that we have got, exciting challenge 

is bringing in our CH–53 Kilo which is the largest, most capability 

to lift the most of any helicopter that is made. So that right now 

is in the systems development stage, transitioning those helos up 

to Pax River for further testing. 

But I think that is probably the most—the leading thing that we 

have got going, we continue to buy out the last 25 AH–1 Zulus this 

year and 2019. Continue with the MV–22 as the Navy takes on the 

carrier onboard delivery. We are shifting some of that procurement 

over to them and then really the CH–53 Kilo is our large aircraft, 

bringing that in and trying to make sure that that program moves 

forward. 

Mr. BROWN. Thank you. We like more work at Pax River in 

Maryland. Back to the Army, you may not be able to answer this 

in the time I have remaining. Futures Command, and I understand 

that there is currently no budget item specifically requested or allocated for Futures Command, which expects to be stood up by this 

summer or at least the initial phase. Are you going to reprogram 

money from other accounts to fund this command? 

General MURRAY. We are going to try, sir. And so it’s the same 

thing with the CFTs, when you look at cross-functional teams, 

when you look at the funding for the CFTs and timing was very 

much against us on this. If you remember it was last October that 

the Army announced number one, Futures Command and number 

two, the eight cross-functional teams in support of the six Army 

modernization priorities. 

And it was December before the cross-functional teams’ charters 

were approved and what it was they were going to work on. So this 

was last December. We turned in our budget on the second week 

of January. 

So we got into the 2019 budget what we possibly could. And we 

are really focused on the 2020 budget for both Futures Command, 

which will go FOC [full operational capability] in that budget, just 

an IOC [initial operational] capability in 2019 and the cross-functional teams to get after it. And we were very much constrained 

by time with the 2019 budget. 

Mr. BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 
20 

Mr. BANKS [presiding]. The gentleman’s time has expired. I yield 

the next 5 minutes to myself. 

General Ostrowski and General Murray, I wonder if you can give 

us a quick status update on the Army’s plan to replace the transmissions in the Bradley family vehicles and armored multipurpose 

vehicle programs. 

General OSTROWSKI. Yes, sir. The intent there with respect to 

your—you are talking about the Bradley A4. 

Mr. BANKS. Yes. 

General OSTROWSKI. And again, as we make continual upgrades 

to the Bradley fleet of vehicles, the A3 being the last, which is to 

currently field the capability, those were suspension upgrades. 

And so, we are moving forward now. We have done the research 

and development and we are now in the process of negotiating the 

production contract for the upgraded A4 version of the Bradley. 

A4 Bradley has an upgraded transmission as well as engine, as 

well as additional electric power in order to run the systems that 

we continue to load on to the Bradley in terms of the overall electrical power piece. 

So, we are in the process of finishing off those negotiations with 

BAE [BAE Systems]. And the intent there is to award that contract 

in the very near future. 

Mr. BANKS. Okay. Anything you would like to add? 

General MURRAY. No, sir. But I think you said, I mean, there is 

some confusion about a replacement transmission. Right now, I 

mean there has been no decisions on anything other than General 

Ostrowski just mentioned. The upgraded transmission we are 

working under the A4 contract. 

Mr. BANKS. Okay. My next question is for both of you as well. 

I noticed that in the fiscal year 2019 budget there is a request for 

Humvee ambulance modernization funding for the second year in 

a row. 

However, there aren’t any funds also requested for non-armored 

Humvee modernization. So I wonder if you can comment on both 

of those and in your professional military opinion if that is the best 

way forward. 

General MURRAY. So, yes, sir. And thanks to Congress we have 

been very successful at upgrading this very specific version of our 

Humvee, the up-armored ambulance and thanks to the graciousness of Congress, the National Guard and the United States Army 

Reserve are complete with that modernization. 

We began a program last year. Congress added some money to 

it, do the Active Component, the Regular Army ambulance fleet 

that we’re about 10 percent through and then we have asked more 

money in 2019. About 6 months ago, we had the decision meeting 

on the upgrading the Humvee fleet. 

In my mind, that is not a question of will we upgrade the 

Humvee fleet, it is just a question when because as you know the 

JLTV fleet only replaces about 50 percent of our light tactical vehicle needs. So Humvees will be with us for a long time into the future. 

We talked about upgrading, starting with the unarmored Humvee fleet first because that is the oldest fleet, that is about 9 years 
21 

of fleet age. We like to keep it below about 12 years, so we are approaching that. 

That decision will go to the chief sometime within the next 2 to 

3 months and then we expect to quickly follow that on with what 

we want to do with the up-armored, the armored fleet Humvees. 

And then, again, in my opinion it is going to be just a question of 

when, not necessarily if. 

General OSTROWSKI. Sir, I will just add that we are poised from 

an industrial base perspective, with our public/private partnership 

with AM General as well as Red River in Rock Island in order to 

press forward should the decision be made to get after the recap 

[recapitalization] of the Humvees. 

Mr. BANKS. Okay. Thank you. My last question for all four of 

you, could you maybe address or talk for a moment about how you 

are addressing the systematic challenges of the redistribution of 

equipment overcoming the growing capability gap between the Active Component and Reserve Component? 

You talked a moment ago about the Reserve Component in my 

previous question, but as the Reserve Component becomes—units 

become more of a pit stop for divestiture, what are we doing to address those types of issues if that make sense? 

General MURRAY. Yes, I think there is really two pieces of that, 

sir, if I could. So equipment on hand is the amount of equipment, 

actually there are three. The equipment on hand is the equipment 

they have. We call it the UH rating. 

We have made great strides during the course of the war to 

where the National Guard and United States Army Reserve are almost at parity with the Regular Army in terms of the equipment 

that they need on hand. 

The piece as you refer it, and there is also the dual-use equipment. So in their State mission and their Federal mission, we are 

in very good shape on that. Where the U.S. Army Reserve and the 

Army National Guard are lagging somewhat, although we have 

started—we have closed this gap over the last 10 years—is in the 

most modern equipment available. And that is primarily because 

we have focused our most modern equipment on the next deploying 

units. 

So regardless of component, whether it was a Reserve unit, a 

Guard unit or an Active Component unit, we put the equipment in 

the hands of that deploying unit, which often got left in theater for 

follow-on forces and become theater-provided equipment which has 

set us back a bit. But we are very focused on closing that gap to 

modernize equipment and there are three components. 

Mr. BANKS. I have 7 seconds left. Would anybody from the Marines like to comment on that? 

General WALSH. Very quick. Congressman, I would say we look 

at it from a total force perspective. We deploy our Reserve units all 

the time to fill for Active units, so we try to maintain the same capabilities across both the Active and Reserve force. 

Mr. BANKS. Okay. My time has expired. I yield to Mr. Carbajal. 

Mr. CARBAJAL. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you all for 

being here today. 

The budget request for fiscal year 2019 includes an Army request for $47 million to procure 133 ground mobility vehicles [GMVs], 
22 

which are fairly small, unarmored Jeep-like trucks, for a unit cost 

of $271,000 each. Twice what a typical Humvee costs. Fiscal year 

2018 budget included a request for 100 vehicles of the same type 

for $260,000 each. For these procurements the Army has proposed 

doing a sole source contract award to procure a modified version of 

the Special Operations Command vehicle. 

The Army, based on an urgent needs statement, plans to procure 

5 brigade sets totaling about 300 vehicles via the sole source contract with the plan for a competition in the future to buy more. 

General Murray, do you think the cost per vehicle for more than $270,000 each is warranted? I ask because there appear to be several commercially available vehicles on the market for much less. 

And the Army already has large numbers of unarmed Humvees 

that meet most of the requirements for this vehicle. Simply put, 

are we going to spend more than we should? 

General MURRAY. Sir, on the GMV and if you don’t mind, I will 

start with the sole source contract. So, in our opinion that is not 

true. We bought off an existing SOCOM contract, so the SOCOM 

was buying this vehicle. 

They had headspace in their contract. This contract was competed prior to us buying off this contract. So we leveraged the 

SOCOM specifications. We leveraged the SOCOM open competition 

that this vehicle went through before we bought off the headspace 

in their contract. 

So in our opinion it is not a sole source contract, that we are buying off the SOCOM contract. The primary consideration for this vehicle when the decision was made to go with the SOCOM contract 

was speed for, as you stated, five airborne IBCTs. 

The full and open competition which has funding in 2019 to complete is for 30 IBCTs. Is the 270 high? It is higher than some of 

the options on the market. But this was the fastest way to get this 

requirement to the field because the competition was done, the 

EMD [engineering & manufacturing development] phase was done. 

The downselect was done, so a lot of the things that takes up those 

years to get to a—what it is you are going to buy was done by 

SOCOM before we opted to buy off that contract. 

Mr. CARBAJAL. Thank you very much. 

General Ostrowski, is there detailed records about the decisionmaking process that led to what was articulated by General Murray? 

General OSTROWSKI. Yes, sir. We certainly documented that. I do 

have the SOCOM contract. I do have the modifications to the 

SOCOM contract that we can certainly make available to you. 

How it was competitively awarded. How we modified that contract in order to reduce the cost of vehicle because we didn’t need 

all of the components that SOCOM had on that vehicle. All the 

bells and whistles we didn’t need because again, what we needed 

was a capability to move in a period of darkness from a drop zone 

to a landing strip at the speed that is faster than the boot. And 

so hence, the five airborne brigades to start with. 

The key thing here, sir, is that the competitive piece of this is 

going to be where industry is going to have the opportunity to really get after. Right now, we are going to have vehicles in the field 

in 2018 going off the SOCOM contract. Otherwise, we would not 
23 

have had vehicles in the field until 2020. The intent is with the 

award of the competitive contract, as General Murray alluded to, 

the intent is to bring that forward and have the ability for the 

other 30 brigades to have a capability, again, competitively awarded, but we hope at a much cheaper price. 

Mr. CARBAJAL. Thank you very much. I look forward to getting 

that from you in writing if possible. 

Mr. Chair, I yield back. 

Mr. BANKS. The gentleman yields. And being in the chair has its 

privileges, so I am going to yield another 5 minutes to myself. And 

back to you, General Murray and General Ostrowski. I wonder if 

you could talk—there has been some confusion about the objective 

of the next-generation combat vehicle program. 

And I wonder if you can talk about that for a moment. How the 

Army is balancing its investments in incremental upgrades for current vehicle systems versus next-generation capabilities. 

So, General Murray. 

General MURRAY. So that is the fundamental dilemma, sir. I 

mean you just hit it right on the head right there. And it is beyond 

next-generation combat vehicle. I mean that is the inflection point 

that I talked about or the decision point where the Army is. 

It is not so much stress in 2019 because of the newness of the 

CFTs at that point, but in 2020 as we build it, it is how you balance that investment between current, the incremental upgrades 

for the near term and where you start investing heavily in future 

capability because the period in between when you can start fielding new and when you stop upgrading old is risk, that you are really saying that the current fleet is good for X numbers of years, 

whenever you can cut into that new system. 

Next-generation combat vehicle has been described in a variety 

of ways and I go back to the original construct that I have heard 

briefed by General Les Brown to both the Chief and the Secretary 

and it is really along two paths. 

And we really won’t know where we are going until we do some 

of the experimentation, prototyping, the early evaluation by soldiers, which is one of the most important aspects of the CFTs is 

get equipment into the hands of soldiers early and often throughout the process, we can get their deliberate feedback before we 

write a requirements document. There is no requirements document written for next-generation combat vehicle. 

But the path we are on right now basically is two fundamental 

paths. A manned variant of some size, shape that would carry 

probably a couple crewmen and up to five or six soldiers in the 

back, that it has to be manned or unmanned at the commander’s 

call at the point of decision whether you send a vehicle forward unmanned for instance into a breach. You probably want to send an 

unmanned vehicle or you actually crew that vehicle. And then the 

second path is remote combat vehicles that could be tele-operated 

from the manned version. 

And so, one manned vehicle, tele-operated to robotic combat vehicles. That is fundamentally the two paths that the NGCV crossfunctional team is working down. 

General OSTROWSKI. I will just add, sir, there is really three 

sprints as General Murray talked about with respect to the two dif-
24 

ferent variants. The first sprint is going to take place between now 

and the fourth quarter 2019. 

And the opportunity there is to gain knowledge from some of 

these experimental demonstrators that we have, then to conduct 

another sprint. Add in additional technologies between now and 

2021, so the second quarter of 2021 will end the second sprint. 

Again, with soldiers. Getting feedback. Making use of existing 

technologies as well as future technologies. And then a final sprint, 

which gets us to the fourth quarter of 2023. Again, incorporating 

lessons learned, incorporating the technologies that come to bear 

and the rest of it in order to get to a decision point in 2023 of 

where we go from there. 

General MURRAY. And if I could just add real quick. So, I mean 

one of the key things of this is we won’t get everything we want 

by whenever it is we field this. So building in the ability to add 

more capability as we go to upgrade the vehicle like we have done 

with the tank and the Bradley. So building in the size, the electrical capacity, the ability to add new technologies to it as we grow 

this vehicle. 

Mr. BANKS. Can you elaborate on the cost? 

General MURRAY. In NGCV, I have got it right here. So right now there is $165 million in 2019 RDT&E. 

Mr. BANKS. What about through 2023? 

General MURRAY. That—I am sorry, sir. Pushed the wrong button. It is all pre-decisional. So that is what we are working right 

now on the POM [program objective memorandum] build. 

Mr. BANKS. Okay. Thank you very much. 

Thanks to each of you. This has been very informative just in the 

brief time that I have been here today as we near the NDAA period. So we appreciate your testimony and your participation. 

The hearing has adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:09 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

APRIL 18, 2018 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

APRIL 18, 2018 

(29) 

Statement of the Honorable Michael Turner 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces 

Hearing: Ground Force Modernization Budget Request for Fiscal Year 2019 

April18, 2018 

The hearing will come to order. 

The Subcommittee meets today to review the Army and Marine Corps 

ground force modernization programs and the fiscal year 2019 budget request. 

I'd like to welcome our witnesses: 

• Lieutenant General John Murray, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8 and 

principal military financial advisor for Army program development and 

justification; 

• Lieutenant General Paul Ostrowski, Military Deputy to the Assistant 

Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology; 

• Lieutenant General Robert Walsh, Deputy Commandant of the Marine 

Corps for Combat Development and Integration; and 

• Brigadier General Joseph Shrader, Commanding General, Marine Corps 

Systems Command. 

Thank you each for your service to our Nation. 

Today the subcommittee will review a broad portfolio of ground force 

equipment modernization programs and their associated acquisition strategies 

covering over $40.0 billion in budget authority. 

Our focus today is to conduct oversight on how the budget requests for these 

modernization programs and acquisition strategies are aligned with the new 

National Defense Strategy and how they will begin to restore full-spectrum 

operational readiness. 

Last year during a similar subcommittee hearing, General Murray testified 

that "the Army has nearly half of the funding for modernization and equipment that 

it had just 8 years ago," and the Marine Corps stated that "between fiscal year 2012 

and fiscal year 2016, Marine Corps spending on ground procurement decreased by 

48 percent in its base budget." 

Essentially the Army was "outranged, outgunned and outdated," and the 

Marine Corps was out of balance and required accelerated modernization to 

maintain overmatch capabilities. 

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 and the 

bipartisan budget agreement for fiscal years 2018 and 2019 sets the necessary 

conditions to start the long process of repairing the damage resulting from years of 

combat operations compounded with deferred modernization. 

We all acknowledge this damage did not occur in a single year and it will 

take consistent levels oflong-term increased investment to rebuild. 

The Army's modernization budget request for this year represents a 22 

percent increase over last year's modernization budget request. I'm pleased to see 
30 

the Army is requesting enough funding to modernize one and a half arn1ored 

brigade combat teams as opposed to last year's plan that modernized only half of 

the requirements for one complete ABCT. 

The Marine Corps procurement request for ground equipment this year is 

$2.9 billion, which if enacted, would be an 80 percent increase over last year's 

budget request of $1.6 bill on. 

So it does appear that the Army and Marine Corps are taking the necessary 

steps to accelerate modernization and mitigate existing capacity shortfalls and 

capability gaps. 

For example, the Army has identified six modernization priorities that 

include Long-Range Precision Fires, Next-Generation Combat Vehicles, Future 

Vertical Lift, Army Network, Air and Missile Defense, and Soldier Lethality. 

To help streamline procurement of these capabilities, I understand the Army 

has also established eight cross-functional team pilot programs to expedite the 

requirements process and accelerate these priorities. 

The subcommittee expects to hear how the fiscal year 2019 request is 

addressing these modernization priorities and better understand program schedules 

and fielding timelines that will enable acceleration of these capabilities to the 

soldier. 

As a follow-up to the Subcommittee's hearing from last September on Army 

tactical network modernization, we expect our witnesses to provide additional 

details and justification underpinning this new strategy and how the fiscal year 

2019 request enables it. 

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 also directed 

the Army to develop a long term modernization strategy. Today is a good 

opportunity for the witnesses to provide us with an update on where the Army is at 

with developing this strategy. 

From a Marine Corps perspective, this year and next will represent critical 

milestones for the Amphibious Combat Vehicle program, the CH-53K heavy lift 

helicopter program, as well as accelerating ground based air-defense initiatives. 

We expect to receive updates on all three of these issues today. 

In summary, we cannot dig ourselves out of this readiness and 

modernization hole in just a couple of fiscal years or NOAA cycles. 

I want to again place emphasis on what I said during last week's 

subcommittee hearing. We are experiencing a crisis in military readiness. 

Over the last three and a half weeks we have witnessed a series of aviation 

accidents where 16 service-members have tragically lost their lives. 

Many of these tragic events are a result oflack of training hours due to 

constrained resources and/or the current state of aging equipment; all of which 

resulted from years ofunderfunding our military, and clearly shows the magnitude 

of the problem we are dealing with. 

This increase in modernization funding is absolutely required to maintain 

our comparative advantage against strategic competitors and improve overall 

readiness. However, with this increased funding comes added responsibility. If we 
31 

are to sustain higher top line defense budgets we need to be assured that the 

military services and industrial base can execute the funds Congress authorizes and 

appropriates. 

The bottom line is we have to get this right and we have to do it now. 

I understand General Murray will provide opening remarks for the Army, 

followed by General Walsh who will provide opening remarks for the Marine 

Corps. 

Without objection, each of the witnesses prepared statements will be 

included in the hearing record. 
32 

RECORD VERSION 

STATEMENT BY 

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOHN M. MURRAY 

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY, G-8 

AND 

LIEUTENANT GENERAL PAUL A. OSTROWSKI 

MILITARY DEPUTY TO THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY 

FOR ACQUISITION, LOGISTICS AND TECHNOLOGY 

BEFORE THE 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ON 

ARMY MODERNIZATION 

SECOND SESSION, 115TH CONGRESS 

APRIL 18, 2018 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED BY THE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 
33 

INTRODUCTION 

Chairman Turner, Ranking Member Tsongas, distinguished Members of the House 

Armed Services Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces, thank you for your continued 

support and demonstrated commitment to our Soldiers, Army Civilians, Families, and 

Veterans. On behalf of our Army Secretary, the Honorable Mark Esper, and our Chief 

of Staff, General Mark Milley, we thank you for the opportunity to appear before you 

today. We look forward to discussing the Fiscal Year 2019 Army Modernization Budget 

Request with you. 

Modernization is critical to the future of our Army. For the last several decades, the 

U.S. Army possessed overmatch based on its qualitative edge in capabilities. It 

enabled our Army to defeat enemy formations, underpinned credible deterrence, and 

served as a critical pillar of Joint Force capabilities in all domains- air, land, maritime, 

space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum. Now, a combination of 

strategic, technological, institutional, and budgetary trends places at risk the Army's 

competitive edge over near-peer adversaries in the next fight. 

The Army has reached an inflection point: we can no longer afford to choose between 

near term readiness and modernization and, specific to modernization, we can no 

longer afford to choose between improving our existing systems and developing new 

ones -we must be able to do both. The American people expect their Army to win, and 

meeting this expectation requires the Army to maintain overmatch against emerging 

threats and adversaries. While we continue to work hard to improve our readiness, we 

are now expanding our focus on a dedicated and robust modernization effort. As you 

know one of the most critical elements in achieving this objective is sufficient resources. 

We believe that the Fiscal Year (FY) 2019 Budget Request reflects the President's 

commitment to restoring the military, especially in the case of Army modernization. 

Building on the FY18 President's Budget, we believe this budget will continue to reverse 

the downward trend that has stifled Army modernization and serve as an important step 

towards expanding and maintaining overmatch. We will seek to employ these funds in 

the most efficient and effective manner by turning ideas into actions through continuous 

2 
34 

experimentation and prototyping, reforming our acquisition processes, leveraging 

technology, and improving training. Our purpose is simple: ensure that future 

generations of American Soldiers remain the most lethal fighting force in the world. 

THE URGENCY OF MODERNIZATION 

The Army's focus on the demands of ongoing campaigns combined with constrained 

resources and an industrial age organizational model has slowed, deferred, and in 

some cases, halted the development of new capabilities. Meanwhile, our adversaries 

have, or are quickly attaining, a competitive advantage. Moreover, the character of war 

has changed, and the Army must adapt and innovate faster. The Army is engaged in a 

protracted struggle to out-innovate future competitors, and right now, we are not 

postured for success. If the Army does not modernize its force to expand and maintain 

overmatch, we face the potential of being out-matched in high-end conventional 

combat. 

MODERNIZING THE FORCE 

The Army Modernization Strategy has one focus: make Soldiers and units more lethal 

so they can fight and win our Nation's war. It is established upon a vision for the Future 

Army and the challenges of balancing near-, mid-, and far-term investments. To provide 

a comprehensive plan for modernization, the Army establishes and aligns 

modernization objectives and organizations to orient on potential military peers for the 

current, next, and future fights that span across and beyond the Future Years Defense 

Program. All of this must be done within a 21st Century system that provides for unity of 

effort and unity of command in support of the modernization process and allied 

interoperability from the outset. 

As our draft strategy lays out, first and foremost, we must return to mastering the 

fundamentals of shoot, move, communicate, protect, and sustain better than any 

potential adversary. In the near-term, the Army will invest in capabilities that address 

critical gaps and improve lethality to expand and maintain overmatch against China and 

Russia. In the mid-term, the Army will develop, procure, and field next generation 

capabilities to fight and win in Multi-Domain Battle. In the far-term, we will build an 

3 
35 

Army for a fundamentally different conflict environment - one that will require us to 

exercise mission command across dispersed and decentralized formations, leverage 

disruptive technologies at the small unit level, and operate with and against autonomous 

and artificial intelligence systems, all at an accelerated speed of war. 

To accomplish these objectives, this year we plan to selectively upgrade the equipment 

we have and focus our Science and Technology and Research, Development, Test and 

Evaluation funding on the six Army Modernization Priorities. The six prioritized 

capability areas naturally align with the Army fundamentals of shoot, move, 

communicate, protect, and sustain. 

Our first modernization priority is to restore the Army's Long Range Precision Fires 

(LRPF) capabilities in order to regain our dominance in range, lethality, and target 

acquisition. 

• Within the FY19 budget the Army will expedite development of a long range 

precision missile, which will have a range of up to 499 kilometers, through 

competitive prototyping and flight demonstrations which will allow for fielding of 

an urgent material release variant three years prior to full material release. 

The Army will also: 

• Increase capacity to produce improved Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) 

missiles to extend service life until the new LRPF missile can be developed and 

fielded. 

• Develop an Extended Range Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System that extends 

range and improves guidance systems to increase the lethality for specific targets 

at increased ranges. 

• Focus LRPF Science and Technology critical technology efforts on such areas as 

propulsion for extended range missiles; extended range cannon artillery; 

enhanced guidance/navigation for weapons; advanced energetics; and advanced 

warheads for area effects munitions. 

4 
36 

Our second modernization priority is Next Generation Combat Vehicles (NGCV). A next 

generation vehicle is needed to enhance Soldier protection, increase mobility, and make 

our forces more lethal. 

• Army Combat Vehicle Prototyping focuses on the development of the next 

generation combat vehicles. The FY19 funding supports concept development, 

prototyping and demonstration of combat vehicles (both manned and unmanned) 

to assess future concepts and designs. 

Separate from the NGCV effort the Army is making significant investments to improve 

the platforms and increase the production of Ground Systems. We will: 

• Significantly increase production of M1 Abrams and M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles 

over the Future Years Defense Program, which will enable the procurement of 

five ABCTs' worth of combat vehicles in the next five years; previously, the Army 

planned to fund the modernization of one BCT every 2.5 years 

• Incrementally upgrade the Abrams, Bradley and Stryker platforms resulting in 

more lethal, survivable and mobile combat vehicles; by upgrading our individual 

vehicle capabilities, the Army ensures that our brigade combat teams will be 

equipped with the technology necessary to maintain near-term overmatch. 

• Prototype Mobile Protected Firepower to provide protected, long-range, direct fire 

capabilities to the Infantry BCT to ensure freedom of maneuver and action in 

close contact with the enemy. 

• Increase quantities of next generation ground vehicle capabilities -Armored 

Multipurpose Vehicles and the Joint Light Tactical Wheeled Vehicles. 

Our third modernization priority is Future Vertical Lift (FVL) platforms - reconnaissance, 

attack, assault- that are survivable on the modern and future battlefield. 

• The Joint Multi-Role demonstrator, the initial FVL effort, is focused on restoring 

vertical lift dominance with next generation agility, reach, protection, lethality, and 

5 
37 

mission flexibility. Future systems should also benefit from improved power 

generation, autonomy, artificial intelligence, and manned-unmanned teaming. 

The Army will also: 

• Continue development ofthe Improved Turbine Engine in order to increase 

payload, range, fuel efficiency in our existing AH-64 and UH-60 fleets. 

• Develop and field lightweight precision munitions (LPM) for light targets requiring 

precision as an alternative to Hellfire missiles, as well as begin to field the Joint 

Air-Ground Missile (JAGM). 

• Sustain production of AH-64 Apache and UH-60 Blackhawks through multi-year 

contract execution, while developing the next generation of CH-47 Chinook 

helicopters. 

• Develop and field the Advanced Threat Detection/Common Infrared Counter 

Measure (ATDS/CIRCM) and modernized radar warning receiver (MRWR) to 

improve our 'detect and defeat' capability. 

Our fourth modernization priority is to modernize the Army Network. We must have a 

communications system that is intuitive, mobile, expeditionary, reliable and can be used 

to fight cohesively in contested cyber and electromagnetic environments. 

The Army will: 

• Accelerate and pure fleet the Joint Battle Command-Post (JBC-P) capability. 

• Realign WIN-T lncr 2 funding to support Army's "Halt, Fix and Pivot" network 

strategy. 

• Procure Handheld Manpack Small Form Fit (HMS) Manpack, 2-Channel leader 

Radio and Nett Warrior capability for four BCTs. 

• Procure and Field COTS like unique line of sight and beyond line of sight rapid 

deployable communications capability to 3 Security Forces Assistance Brigades 

(SFABs). 

• Equip Cyber protection teams with deployable kits and deployable tools to defend 

the network and operate in Cyberspace. 

6 
38 

Our fifth priority is to modernize and restore our Air and Missile Defense (AMD) systems 

to ensure our future combat formations are protected from modern and advanced air 

and missile delivered fires- including drones. 

• Within this category, the Army's number one priority is to procure four battalions of 

the Interim Maneuver-SHORAD (IM-SHORAD) capability by FY22. IM-SHORAD 

adds a mounted capability but we also need to improve the dismounted capability 

and will start doing so in FY21. 

We will also: 

• Field Block 1 Stinger missiles that deliver improved performance against 

unmanned aerial systems and fill the SHORAD capability gap until the IMSHORAD is fielded. 

• Produce Patriot Missile Enhancement Segment missiles with improved 

performance against advanced threats and continue to pursue a significant 

upgrade effort for the Lower Tier AMD Sensor. 

• Focus AMD Science and Technology on critical technology to include 

opportunities for technology insertions. Areas of Science and Technology focus 

include smaller and cheaper missiles; high energy lasers; advanced seekers; and 

advanced energetics and propulsion. 

Finally, we must aggressively enhance Soldier lethality, a holistic series of capabilities 

that span all fundamentals including shooting, moving, communicating, protecting, and 

sustaining. Two areas to highlight include: 

• Accelerating the Squad Designated Marksman Rifle to increase squad lethality at 

ranges from 300-600 meters and serve as a bridge to the Next Generation Squad 

Weapon (NGSW). 

• Procuring an initial quantity Enhanced Night Vision Goggles-Binocular to provide 

dismounted Soldiers the immediate capability to operate in 0 percent illumination, 

such as in underground facilities. 

7 
39 

The Army will also: 

• Develop the NGSW to improve probability of hit and incapacitation as well as 

reduce weapon and ammo weight. 

• Demonstrate the Squad Multipurpose Equipment Transport (SMET), which will aid 

a nine-man squad by carrying up to 1 ,000 pounds of equipment and supplies and 

generating 1 KW-3KW of power for a 72-hour mission. 

• Focus Soldier Lethality Science and Technology concept development and 

exploration into areas such as Fused Integrated Mobility Device/Heads Up; 

Hostile Fire Locator System; Integrated Head-borne System; Advanced Fire 

Control Technologies; and human-system interfaces that increase small unit 

standoff distances, enhance situational awareness to deny and surprise 

adversaries. 

To implement this strategy, the Army is currently undertaking a series of acquisition 

reform efforts designed to promote unity of effort, unity of command, efficiency, cost 

effectiveness, and leader accountability. Part of this effort is the work of a three-starlevel task force responsible for mapping out options to consolidate the modernization 

process under one command. To develop and deliver better solutions faster, the early 

integration of concept and testing will allow the Army to fail early and cheaply as we 

experiment, prototype and test, thus increasing the probability of success by learning 

from early failures. Critical to this effort is the establishment of Cross-Functional Teams 

(CFTs) for each of the identified modernization priorities. Each CFT will incorporate 

elements from acquisition, testing, resourcing, and capability development communities 

and directly report to Army senior leaders. 

THE DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE 

The past trends of constrained resources in the Army's modernization account have led 

to significant challenges for the Defense Industrial Base (DIB). When developing our 

equipment modernization strategy, we have carefully assessed risk across all portfolios 

to ensure balanced development of new capabilities, incremental upgrades to existing 

systems, and protection of critical capabilities in the commercial and organic elements 

of the DIB. 

8 
40 

The Army remains concerned about the preservation of key skills and capabilities in the 

engineering and manufacturing bases for our original equipment manufacturers and 

their key supplier bases. To assist our industry partners to address manufacturing and 

producibility risks, the Army supports efforts such as the Army Manufacturing 

Technology Program, Foreign Military Sales, and Direct Commercial Sales. 

The Army continually assesses risk in the Industrial Base across all Army portfolios to 

identify fragile and critical sectors within the DIB, and facilitate risk mitigation strategies. 

The Army also continually assesses the health of the organic industrial base (OIB), 

including our depots, arsenals, ammunition plants, munitions centers, and Governmentowned Contractor-operated plants. The Army maintains critical skill sets in our OIB and 

continues to modernize our OIB infrastructure, as needed, to support readiness. 

IN CONCLUSION 

We sincerely appreciate the opportunity to address the challenges the Army faces in 

modernizing its force. Building on the FY18 President's Budget Request, the FY19 

request continues to reverse the downward trend in modernization funding. However, 

we must stress that a major increase in modernization this year will not, by itself, 

reverse the trend. We must have timely, predictable, sustained, and adequate 

funding across the Future Years Defense Program and beyond. 

The budget request provides us the opportunity to build our force through key 

modernization efforts. As importantly, Army's senior leaders are committed to being 

good stewards of our Nation's resources while meeting the equipping and 

modernization needs of our Soldiers. 

Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of this Subcommittee, we sincerely 

appreciate your steadfast and strong support of the outstanding men and women in 

uniform, our Army Civilians, and their Families. 

9 
41 

Lieutenant General John M. Murray 

Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8 

Lieutenant General Murray was commissioned as an Infantry ot1icer in the U.S. Army upon graduation 

from the Ohio State University in 1982. Throughout his career, Lieutenant General Murray has served in 

leadership positions and commanded from Company through Division, with various staff assignments at 

the highest levels of the Army. 

Lieutenant General Murray has held numerous command positions. His command assignments include: 

Commanding General Joint Task Force-3; Deputy Commanding General-Support for U.S. Forces 

Afghanistan; Commander Bagram Airfield; Commanding General 3rd Infantry Division at Fort Stewart, 

Georgia; Commander, 3rd Brigade, 1" Cavalry Division, at Fort Hood, Texas while serving in Operation 

IRAQI FREEDOM; Commander, 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry, 1st Infantry Division, United States Army 

Europe and Seventh Army. Germany; Commander, C Company, !-12th Infantry Battalion, 4th Infantry 

Division (Mechanized), Fort Carson, Colorado. 

Previously, he was the Director, Force Management, the Pentagon; Assistant Deputy Director for Joint 

Training, J-7, Joint Staff, Suffolk, Virginia; Director, Joint Center for Operational Analysis, United 

States Joint Forces Command, Suffolk, Virginia; Deputy Commanding General (Maneuver), lst Cavalry 

Division, Fort Hood, Texas; Deputy Commanding General (Maneuver), Multi-National DivisionBaghdad OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, Iraq; G-3 (Operations), Ill Corps, Fort Hood, Texas; Chief 

of Staff, III Corps and Fort Hood, Fort Hood, Texas; C-3, Multi-National Corps-Iraq, OPERATION 

IRAQI FREEDOM, Iraq; G-3 (Operations), 1st lnfimtry Division, United States Army Europe and 

Seventh Army, Germany; Chief. Space Control Protection Section, J-33, United States Space Command, 

Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado; S-3 (Operations), later Executive Officer, 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry, 

1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas; Chief; Plans, G-1, III Corps and Fort Hood, Fort Hood, Texas. 

Lieutenant General Murray's awards and decorations include: the Distinguished Service Medal w/ Oak 

Leaf Cluster, the Defense Superior Service Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster, the Legion of Merit with two 

Oak Leaf Clusters, the Bronze Star Medal with three Oak Leaf Clusters, the Defense Meritorious 

Service Medal, the Meritorious Service Medal with two Oak Leaf Clusters, the Army Commendation 

Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster, the Joint Service Achievement Medal, the Army Achievement Medal with 

Oak Leaf Cluster, the Ranger Tab, the Combat Infantryman Badge, the Expert Infantryman Badge, the 

Parachutist Badge, the Air Assault Badge, the Joint Chiefs ofStaffldentilication Badge and the Army 

Staffldentification Badge. 

Lieutenant General Murray hails from Kenton, Ohio. He and his wite, Jane, have three lovely daughters 

and seven grandchildren. 
42 

Lieutenant General Paul A. Ostrowski 

Principal Military Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army 

(Acquisition, Logistics and Technology) and Director of the Army Acquisition Corps 

Lieutenant General Paul A. Ostrowski graduated from the United States Military Academy in 

1985. He earned a Master of Science degree in National Resource Strategy from the National 

Defense University's Industrial College of the Armed Forces in 2006. He graduated from Joint 

and Combined Warfighting School at the Joint Forces Staff College in 2000. Additionally, he 

earned a Master of Science degree in Systems Acquisition Management at the Naval 

Postgraduate School in 1996. 

Lieutenant General Ostrowski has more than twenty-five years of experience in acquisition, 

operational, and Joint assignments. He currently serves as the Principal Military Deputy to the 

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology (ASA (ALT)) and 

Director of the Army Acquisition Corps. Prior to this assignment, Lieutenant General Ostrowski 

served as the Deputy Commanding General for Support, Combined Security Transition 

Command-Afghanistan. He also served as the Deputy for Acquisition and Systems Management, 

Office ofthe ASA (ALT) in Washington, D.C., from September 2014 to March 2016. Lieutenant 

General Ostrowski was assigned as the Program Executive Of1icer, Program Executive Office 

(PEO) Soldier at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, from April2012 to September 2014. 

Previous assignments include the Assistant Deputy for Acquisition and Systems Management, 

Office of the ASA (ALT); Executive Officer to the Commander, United States Special 

Operations Command (USSOCOM), MacDill Air Force Base, Florida; Director, Operational 

Test and Evaluation, as well as PEO for Special Programs, USSOCOM; and Program Manager 

for Counterproliferation, US SOC OM. He served as a Legislative Fellow, as well as Project 

Leader for the Rapid Equipping Force in both Washington, D.C., and in Iraq during Operation 

Iraqi Freedom from June 200 I to July 2003. He also served as a Company Grade Officer in 

several command and staff positions in Joint Special Operations, Special Forces, and Infantry 

assignments. 

Lieutenant General Ostrowski's awards and decorations include the Defense Superior Service 

Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster), Legion of Merit, Bronze Star Medal, Defense Meritorious 

Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster), Meritorious Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster), 

Army Commendation Medal (with two Oak Leaf Clusters), Joint Service Achievement Medal 

(with Oak Leaf Cluster), Anny Achievement Medal, Afghanistan Campaign Medal with 

Campaign Star, and NATO Medal. Additionally, he earned the Expert Infantryman Badge, 

Pathfinder Badge, Parachutist Badge, Air Assault Badge, Scuba Diver Badge, Ranger Tab, 

Special Forces Tab, and Am1y Staffidentification Badge. 
43 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED 

BY THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES 

COMMITTEE SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

SEAPOWER 

STATEMENT 

OF 

LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERTS. WALSH 

DEPUTY COMMANDANT 

COMBAT DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION & 

COMMANDING GENERAL, MARINE CORPS COMBAT DEVELOPMENT COMMAND 

AND 

BRIGADIER GENERAL JOSEPH SHRADER 

COMMANDER, MARINE CORPS SYSTEMS COMMAND 

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS 

BEFORE THE 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES 

OF THE 

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 

ON 

FISCAL YEAR 2019 GROUND FORCES MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS 

APRIL I8, 2018 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED BY THE 

SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER 
44 

Marines- Contribution to National Defense 

Introduction 

As set forth by the 82nd Congress and reaffirmed by the !14th, the purpose of our Corps 

is to provide maritime expeditionary combined arms air-ground task forces that are "most ready, 

when the Nation is least ready." We are a naval force whose mission requires us to be ready- a 

fight-tonight, forward deployed, Next Generation force- able to respond immediately to 

emergent crises around the globe either from the sea, forward bases, or home station. The new 

National Defense Strategy (NDS) has further prioritized major power competition, in particular 

reversing the erosion ofthe U.S. military advantage in relation to China and Russia. 

Amphibious forces, in competition against the full range of potential adversaries, have 

significant roles in three of the four layers of the global operating model (contact, blunt and 

surge layers). While our organization, training, and equipment must continually adapt to meet 

changes in the operational environment, our fundamental purpose remains unchanged. 

Globally Engaged, Force in Readiness 

Combatant Commander (CCDR) demand for Marines and tailored Marine Air-Ground 

Task Forces (MAGTFs) continues to drive an aggressive operational tempo. We consistently 

maintain about 35,000 Marines, or one-third, of our operating forces forward deployed across the 

globe. Our current posture encompasses several global tasks: Marines supporting multiple 

CCDRs with offensive air support and strikes from our Amphibious Ready Groups I Marine 

Expeditionary Units (ARG/MEU) afloat; building partner capacity in both Iraqi and Afghan 

Annies confronting Islamic State and Tali ban fighters; providing critical fixed-wing and artillery 

fire support to coalition-enabled Syrian Democratic Forces as they fought to clear the Islamic 

State from Raqqa, Syria; providing tailored military combat-skills training and advisor support to 

foreign forces as part of Marine Corps Forces Special Operation Command (MARSOC); 

deterring provocations in the East and South China Seas through the forward posturing of 5th 

Generation aircraft within the Pacific; providing immediate disaster response from our 

ARG/MEU and Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) to Americans in 

the wake of four hurricanes; supporting continued efforts to ensure freedom of navigation 

through the Bab al-Mandab strait; and enabling full spectmm cyberspace operations while 

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45 

supporting Joint and Coalition Forces as part of Marine Forces Cyber Command 

(MARFORCYBER). Marines are continuing to evolve as an inside force by fostering and 

strengthening relationships with our allies and partners, demonstrated by executing 62 joint, 

bilateral, and multinational exercises last year. 

A Strategy Driven Budget 

The National Defense Strategy (NDS) prioritizes major power competition, and in 

particular, reversing the erosion of the U.S. military advantage in relation to China and Russia. 

The Marine Corps' FY 2019 budget aligns budget priorities with strategy and guidance enabling 

the Corps to compete, deter, and win in the fhture operating environment. The request fulfills 

DoD and DON objectives by addressing Secretary of Defense direction to increase lethality; 

resilience; agility; and the building of a flexible and dynamic force. Guided by the NSS and 

NDS, the Marine Corps made specific decisions about the FY 2019 budget that support a more 

capable, ready, and efficient force. 

The surest way to prevent war is to be prepared to win one under the most difficult of 

circumstances. Doing so requires new operational concepts, an aggressive approach to force 

development and a consistent, multiyear investment to restore warfighting readiness. The goal is 

to field a more lethal, resilient, and agile force. We have focused on preventing and deterring 

conflict by providing combined-arms task forces to theaters either already in crisis or at the risk 

of crisis to meet the Congress' mandate to be" ... ready to suppress or contain international 

disturbances short of large-scale war." 

As stated, your Marine Corps already provides key elements within three of the four 

layers of the global operating model described in the NDS- contact, blunt, and surge. Our 

forward deployed forces are part of the Nation's contact and blunt Layers- that competitive 

space where the military element of national power preserves the alignment of shared interests 

with our partners and allies-while the balance of Marine Corps forces arc prepared to rapidly 

deploy as part of the Surge Layer, as one would expect given our role as an expeditionary-forcein-readiness. Our competitors, however, are continuously seeking to challenge us in new ways 

within the littorals, advancing their ability to locate, track, and attack the naval fleet and 

associated amphibious forces. Thus, future amphibious contact, blunt and surge layer operations 

will require many capabilities to allow us to be effective within the most likely future operating 

3 
46 

environment. Our wargames and experiments indicate that the current gap in requirements 

between today's force and the future force is a critical vulnerability. 

This statement aims to do two things: I) Broadly describe how your Marine Corps is 

adapting to increase its competitive advantage and reduce the vulnerability against pacing threats 

; 2) Explain how our ground programs budget priorities for the President's Budget Fiscal Year 

2019 (PB 19) submission will result in a more lethal force that is better postured to deter conflict, 

while remaining ready to prevail if one ensues. 

Adapting to Increase our Competitive Advantage 

Unlike experiences following past major U.S. military campaigns, where the world was 

generally stable enough that our Corps' overseas commitments decreased in quantity, today's 

Marines are employed more frequently, more widely, in more complex missions, and in smaller 

units than ever before. In recent years ARG/MEUs have been forced to operate in an increasingly 

disaggregated fashion, often times spread out over thousands of nautical miles in order to 

prosecute varied missions in littoral regions. This disag~o,rregation strains the traditional 

capabilities of these units as currently organized and forces us to consider a wide variety of 

future ship mix and type options. Additionally, the proliferation of advanced weapons 

technologies, mass urbanization and migration, regional conflict and the challenges of the 

information age all combine to further drive the need for a properly manned, trained and 

equipped next generation Marine Corps. 

Your Marines continue to innovate and build this next generation Marine Corps a 

lethal, adaptive, and resilient Corps that implements combined arms and conducts maneuver 

warfare across all domains,. This transformation began in 2016 with the implementation ofthe 

Marine Corps Operating Concept (MOC). The MOC represents our institutional vision for how 

the Marine Corps will operate, fight, and win despite the challenges described above. While the 

Corps' fundamental purpose docs not change, our concepts - and the organization, training, and 

equipment changes they drive- must adapt to effectively accomplish it. The MOC provides the 

foundation and context f()r subordinate operating and functional concepts like Littoral 

Operations in a Contested Environment (LOCE) and Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations 

(EABO)- and it guides our analysis, wargaming, and experimentation. Further, the MOC drives 

the evolution of our Service doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, 

4 
47 

personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPf') through a detailed and thorough Concepts Based 

Requirements System. 

The development and acquisition of long-range precision weapons by our Nation's chief 

rivals- China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, and Violent Extremist Organizations (YEO)- have 

placed many of our forward deployed forces within the effective range of their weapons systems, 

or "threat rings." Forward deployed and stationed Marines are now vulnerable to attacks in ways 

we have not considered for decades. Forward positioned forces require a resilient, dispersed 

basing posture with sufficient forward stockpiles of logistics and a reliable command and control 

(C2) networks. Conversely, most of our forward bases and stations lack sufficient resilience 

against long-range kinetic and non-kinetic attacks; thus, jeopardizing our ability to prepare, 

project, and sustain combat power. Efficiencies in the construction and configuration of these 

bases, made possible by a previously existing security environment have now created risks to 

forward deployed forces. The PB 19 begins to remedy these problems. Remediation efforts 

include increased dispersion of our forward elements, additional hardening of our existing 

facilities, to include aircraft hangars and command posts, the capability to rapidly repair damage 

to our air stations, effective counters to precision guided munitions and advanced integrated 

mobile air-defense capabilities. Many of these remedies will also prove effective to sea-based 

forces and to forces positions on expeditionary advanced bases. 

Increasing the Lethality of Our Corps 

ln addition to increasing the survivability and resilience of our forward forces, we must 

also strive to make all forces more lethal. Building a more lethal force is not defined solely by 

hardware; it requires change in the ways the Marine Corps readies, postures, employs, and 

develops the Jorce. The rapid changes in the character of warfare and the problems presented by 

current and future pacing competitors create fundamental challenges to ground programs, the 

associated concepts of employment, and the personnel that will operate the systems. We have 

discovered that key enablers such as unmanned systems, Manned/Unmanned Tean1ing, 

networked sensors/weapons and C2, and Al-enabled systems will all shape the next generation 

force's lethality. Some or all of these elements will appear in all future ground systems. We must 

prioritize modernization of ground programs to support our new operating concepts, regain lost 

5 
48 

competitive space and fully leverage capabilities that other elements of the MAGTf and the Joint 

force are fielding. 

Ground Programs Budget Priorities 

Modernizing - The Foundation of Our Future Readiness 

What we desire to achieve is a Corps capable of exploiting, penetrating, and destroying 

advanced adversary defenses in all domains in support of naval or Joint Force operations. To do 

that, we must be afforded the flexibility to experiment with new technologies available on the 

market, determining what will work best in the future operating environment, and then delivering 

those capabilities to the force quickly to mitigate the rapid rate of technological change. Our 

newly chartered Marine Corps Rapid Capabilities Office (MCRCO) accomplishes that end, 

seeking emergent and disruptive technologies to increase our lethality and resiliency. The 

MCRCO leverages FY16 and FY17 NOAA provisions and partnerships to accelerate the 

acquisition process- with the consistent and steadfast support of Congress we will continue to 

fund this office. Accelerated modernization is the most effective remedy to our long-term 

readiness problems and we must abstain from burying our modernization efforts under 

cumbersome acquisition processes- we have to get this right. 

The PB 19 investment approach is synched with the implementation of Marine Corps 

Force 2025, specifically investing in ground systems that enhance our capabilities in areas such 

as: Information Warfare (IW), Long Range/Precision Fires, Air Defense, Command and Control 

in a Degraded Environment, and Protected Mobility/Enhanced Maneuver. These capability areas 

support building a Next Generation Marine Corps across the Active and Reserve components of 

the force. Additionally we have foundational efforts which are critical to modernization efforts 

(such as infrastructure, training sustainment, and manpower) that enable that enable our 

warfighting capabilities. This approach includes changes to the structure of our into equipment 

sets that balance affordability with the need for a networked, mobile, and expeditionary force. 

Information Warfare (!W) 

We continue to prioritize the integration of infmmation capabilities throughout the 

MAGTF. Within the Command Element, investments in the Marine Intelligence Program 

6 
49 

allowed the formation of the MEF Information Group (MIG). The MIG establishes IW 

coordination centers for MAGTF Commanders, filling the IW gap at the operational level. 

Additionally, we have increased ti.mding to MARFORCYBER to man, train, and equip cyber 

forces and conduct full-spectrum cyberspace operations. The coordination, integration, and 

employment of information and cyber capabilities will enable the MAGTF Commander to 

facilitate friendly force maneuver and deny the enemy freedom of action in the information 

environment. 

The Marine Corps is making rapid progress in the use Small Unmanned Aerial Systems 

(SUAS). We are currently fielding to every infantry battalion in the Marine Corps SUAS 

platforms for conducting Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance 

(ISR), enhancing the reach of current communications equipment, and for use in training for 

countering enemy UAS platforms. The Marine Corps is using some commercial oft~the-shelf 

systems as well as systems produced through the use of additive manufacturing. Simultaneously, 

the Marine Corps is advancing the digital interoperability between these systems and digital 

communications systems in order to synchronize as well as control SUAS platforms. 

Long Range/Precision Fires 

The Marine Corps must advance its long range and precision fires capabilities. In 

support ofthis requirement, we have prioritized the reactivating 5th Battalion, lOth Marines as a 

High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) unit. Due to reach !OC in FY21, this 

battalion will expand long range fires capability to II Marine Expeditionary Force based in Camp 

Lejeune, North Carolina. In addition, we are exploring with the Army the ability to modify 

Guided MLRS rockets from aboard ships and modifications to the rockets to enable engagement 

of moving targets. 

Technological advancements have also made it possible to operate precision guided 

munitions at lower echelon units. In this area, the Marine Corps has fielded Loitering Miniature 

Aerial Munitions (LMAM) as part of an urgent requirement to operating forces for use on the 

battlefield. Also, in conjunction with ONR is working on the Advanced Capability Extended 

Range Mortar (ACERM) Future Naval Capabilities (FNC) program. This partnership looks to 

utilize the existing 81mm mortar tubes to increase range of the system through the development 

of a precision guided gliding munition. Considering the changes in the complexity of the battle 

7 
50 

space and increased congestion due to the increase prevalence of SUAS and LMAMS, the 

Warfighting Laboratory is experimenting with various air space planning tools and procedures to 

assist operators in planning and executing of tire missions. They are also exploring the use of 

SUAS and Radio Frequency geolocation to cue and target threats at increased ranges. 

Air Defense 

To modernize our air defense systems and capitalize on our current investments in the 

Ground Air Task Oriented Radar (G/ATOR) and Common Aviation Command and Control 

System (CAC2S), the Marine Corps is pursuing a Ground Based Air Defense (GBAD) kinetic 

means to defeat the latest threat. The rapid rise in threat air platforms requires the Marine Corps 

to rapidly modernize its GBAD capabilities in both Short Range Air Defense (SHORAD) and 

Beyond Visual Range (BVR). These modernization etiorts began in 2017, and will protect our 

forces from an array of emerging air threats including: unmanned aerial systems (UAS); aircraft; 

and cruise missiles. 

The first of these initiatives is the Marine Air Defense Integrated System (MADIS). 

MAD IS is a maneuverable JLTV mounted short range air defense capability that is being 

designed to detect, track, identity and defeat emerging threat UAS, as well as Fixed Wing 

(FW)/Rotary Wing (RW) capabilities. The MADTS program is directly leveraging the Anny's 

Program Director Counter Rockets, Artillery, Mortar (PD CRAM) developmental efforts. 

MAD IS is designed to protect both ground maneuver forces and fixed sites. Future 

modernization efforts will include integration with G/ATOR and CAC2S as well as beyond 

visual range systems. 

Command and Control (C2) in a Degraded Environment 

PB 19 invests in our C2 capabilities needed to build the Next Generation Marine Corps 

that will dominate the intCHmation domain. 

Critical to the success of the MAGTF ashore is our ability to coordinate and synchronize 

our distributed C2 sensors and systems. Our modernization priorities in this area are the 

Ground/ Air Task Oriented Radar (G/ ATOR) and the Common Aviation Command and Control 

System (CAC2S). These systems will provide modern, interoperable technologies to support 

real-time surveillance, detection and targeting and common C2 suite to enable the effective 

8 
51 

employment of that and other sensors and C2 suites across the MAGTF. 

G/ATOR ensures no other service is more capahle than the Marine Corps for controlling 

MAGTF airspace. It serves as the foundation for Commander, Joint Force Air Component 

delegation of airspace control to the future MAGTF, and provides MAGTF commanders the 

freedom of action to employ organic surface and air tires. 

CAC2S provides the tactical situational display, infonnation management, sensor and 

data link interface, and operational facilities for planning and execution of Marine Aviation 

missions within the MAGTF. CAC2S will eliminate the current stove-piped, dissimilar legacy 

systems and will add capability for aviation combat direction and air defense functions by 

providing a single networked system. CAC2S will be the primary C2 system that integrates 

MAGTF aviation operations with Joint, combined, and coalition aviation C2 agencies. 

The MAGTF of2025 must also improve the networking capability of ground systems. 

Networking on the Move (NOTM) is being procured to enhance networking among both ground 

vehicles and aviation platfonns. NOTM provides the MAGTF with robust beyond-line-ot:sight 

command, control and communication capabilities while on the move or stationary. Using 

existing commercial or military broadband SATCOM, this system extends the digital network to 

Marines at the furthest reaches of the battlefield. This system will enable the distributed Marine 

forces of2025. 

Protected Mobility/Enhanced Maneuver 

Our Ground Combat and Tactical Vehicle Strategy (GCTVS) provides a framework for 

portfolio management and enterprise decision support. The Marine Corps is investing 

approximately 29 percent of its modernization resources into GCTV systems within the FYDP. 

The overarching combat and tactical vehicle investment priority is the modernization of Assault 

Amphibian capability through the Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) program as the means to 

incrementally replace the legacy AA V. 

The first phase and increment of the ACV program (ACV 1.1) is on schedule for 

Milestone C decision and down-select to a single contractor in June of2018. It is successfully 

perfonning at or above the required perfonnance parameters with both vendors demonstrating 

the capacity to meet objective requirements for ship-to-shore water mobility. Both 

manufacturers have delivered their required number of vehicles and are currently undergoing 

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52 

rigorous developmental testing including water mobility and under-vehicle blast protection tests 

as well as operational testing with the user community. ACV 1.1 is on track to meet an FY20 

initial operation capability target and has set the conditions for a seamless transition in the 

production of second increment (ACV 1.2) personnel carriers and supporting mission role 

variants for command & control and maintenance & recovery. Finally, ACV 1.2 is resourced to 

also deliver an initial active protection system capability and a lethality upgrade to improve 

support by tire to the infantry. 

The second highest priority for combat and tactical vehicle investment remains the 

replacement of the legacy high mobility, multi-purpose, wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) fleet 

beginning with that portion which is most at risk; those trucks that perform a combat function 

and are typically exposed to enemy fires. In partnership with the Army, the Marine Corps has 

sequenced the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) program to ensure affordability in 

conjunction with the execution of the ACV program. This approach enables an affordable, 

incremental, and simultaneous modernization of the two most stressing gaps within the GCTV 

portfolio. 

In this budget year, we are also beginning to look at a replacement for our legacy Light 

Armored Vehicles (LAY), the Marine Corps' current light armored reconnaissance platform. 

The Office of Naval Research (ONR) is leading the effort develop revolutionary technologies 

that will inform requirements development for what we are calling the Armored 

Reconnaissance Vehicle (ARV). This effort will identify the "realm of the possible" for the 

LA V replacement and will help accelerate movement to the acquisition phase within the next 

four to five years. The research will explore advanced technologies within size, weight, time 

and price point limitations, as well as generation-after-next-technologies using size and weight 

constraints only. 

A subset inherent to our Protected Mobility/Enhanced Maneuver efforts is the 

requirement to increase Close Combat Lethality. We have made great strides in several areas 

such as; enhancing small anns and ammunition; virtual training tactical decision kits; sensing 

Unmanned Air Systems (UAS) and Unmanned Ground Systems (UGS); small situational 

awareness devices for Distributed Operations and decentralized decision making; loitering 

munitions; lightening the individual Marine's load and addressing power needs; Electronic 

Spectrum and Signature Management; and Active Protection Systems. 

10 
53 

The Marine Corps rifle squad currently possesses a tactical advantage with its small 

arms overmatch capabilities for ranges up to 500 meters. To maintain relevance against recent 

small arms capability advancements made by potential adversaries, significant modernization 

efforts are planned within the next decade. 

The Marine Corps is pursuing capability improvements to small arms with the goals of 

increased lethality and improved mobility. For lethality, the Marine Rifle Squad requires the 

ability to accurately engage and neutralize threats out to 600 meters. For mobility, Marines 

require the ability to move efficiently and effectively while carrying a standard combat load 

and weapon in order to accomplish combat related tasks. 

The Marine Corps has also been supporting DARPA's Squad X program by providing 

personnel for testing. Squad X is maturing key technologies, developing system prototypes, 

and refining the prototypes to maximize the squad's performance against emerging threats. 

Squad X looks to develop a multi-domain combined arms squad through the integration of 

shared situational understanding, optimized resource management, synchronized action and 

increased lethality. 

Further, the Marine Corps is working with the Army in regards to ground robotics with 

the future CRS-I program. It is also expects to participate more significantly in the Army's 

Leader Follower, Robotic wingman and Squad Multi-purpose Equipment Transpott efforts to 

develop CONOPS, interface standards, open software architectures, and better define capability 

requirements. We are looking at its applicability with our EOD and engineer functions. 

Modernization Foundational Effort- Training 

As our capabilities continue to expand and the threat continues to adapt, our ability to 

train the MAGTF is challenged. As we implement the Marine Corps Operating Concept, we 

must modemize our synthetic training environment, making it more integrated and adaptable. 

Our units must be able to conduct collective training and mission rehearsals wherever they are; 

not only in training areas and simulation centers, but in barracks, in headquarters, at service-level 

training centers and while forward deployed on ships or in country. Our Live, Virtual and 

Constructive Training Environment Program will improve our ability to exercise multiple 

elements of the MAGTF from disparate locations as if they were collocated on the same 

battlefield. Neither live training nor synthetic training alone is sufficient. The strategy that will 

11 
54 

offset our readiness beyond that of our opponents involves multiple synthetic repetitions leading 

to highly effective live training exercises and evaluations, followed by continual live, virtual, and 

constructive sustainment events. 

Weapons proficiency, weapons employment, and the integration of combined arms and 

maneuver through live-tire training remain core components of our combat readiness. To meet 

these demands, our operating forces must rely on access to safe, modemized, and well 

maintained training ranges. The Marine Corps' range modernization efforts are designed to 

provide realistic training environments that simulate contemporary and future operating 

environments. Ongoing modernization efforts include a new generation of interactive targets that 

move autonomously, expanded military operations in urban terrain capabilities, improved 

instrumentation technologies, realistic threat representations, and scoring systems. 

The Marine Corps' current and future immersive training environments are designed to 

enhance our Marines' abilities to make sound tactical and ethical decisions in chaotic, stressful 

and complex environments. These venues are equipped with contracted role players, the Tactical 

Video Capture System, battlefield effects simulators, special effects, and range instrumentation 

equipment that facilitates detailed after-action reviews. These training capabilities enable unit 

commanders to assess tactics, techniques and procedures in real time and to provide learning 

points for follow-on training. The expanded procurement and utilization of advanced force-onforce training will further allow Marines to improve their decision making abilities through 

engagement against a thinking, adaptive enemy. 

Summary/Conclusion 

The Marine Corps' Ground programs Modernization strategy will ensure the individual 

Marine enjoys a qualitative military edge over any adversary. Our goal is not to man the gear, 

but to adequately equip the Marine to ensure we can provide combat formations capable of 

closing with and destroying the enemy. In the near-term, our first priority is to increase 

capability and competency within the infmmation environment, while concurrently actualizing 

structure design, leader development and training with corresponding updates to doctrine and 

policy. Equipment enhancement in the near-tenn will consist of balanced investment in existing 

capabilities while exploiting technological advances. In the mid-term, Marine Corps 

modernization targets increasing naval integration, expeditionary power projection, lethality, and 

12 
55 

protection; the results of which will address restoration of multi-domain combined arms 

overmatch against peer and near-peer adversaries. In the long-term, the Marine Corps seeks new 

capability development and investment to enhance the next generation MAGTF, exploiting 

Science and Technology and applied research to attain significant improvements in capabilities, 

addressing identified warfighting challenges, capability gaps, and requirements to achieve 

asymmetrical advantages. 

In future competition for international stability and security, the Marine Corps will 

provide a globally responsive expeditionary force that includes forward deployed, rapid 

response, and surge force elements. This expeditionary force is designed to maintain contact, 

blunt emergent aggression, and surge to prosecute a major campaign, thereby providing a wide 

range of options to command authorities to message, deter, combat, or defeat those that would 

attack the global order or threaten the global commons. As Marines have always done, when our 

Nation calls upon us, we will fight and win regardless of the dimension or domain. 

13 
56 

Lieutenant General RobertS. Walsh 

Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, and Deputy 

Commandant, Combat Development and Integration 

Lieutenant General Walsh was commissioned a Second Lieutenant from the United States Naval 

Academy in May 1979. After completing The Basic School he was assigned as an infantry 

platoon commander in I st Battalion, 7th Marines. He reported to Pensacola, FL for flight 

training and was designated a Naval Aviator in October 1981. Upon completion of an 

assignment to VT-26 as a Selectively Retained Graduate and the F-4 training syllabus he was 

ordered to VMFA-115 at Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort, SC in November 1983. 

While in VMFA-115 he transitioned to the F/A-18 Hornet, attended the U.S. Navy Fighter 

Weapons School, and made two deployments before assuming duties as a flight instructor at 

TOPGUN in 1987. He returned to MCAS Beaufort in January 1990 and was assigned to 

VMFA-251, making two WESTPAC deployments, and was selected as the 1st Marine Aircraft 

Wing Aviator of the Year. 

In July 1993, he reported to the 9th Marine Regiment as the Air Officer. He attended the Air 

Command and Staff College at Maxwell AFB before reporting to Headquarters, U.S. European 

Command, Stuttgart, Germany in 1995 where he served in the Plans and Policy Directorate. 

In 1998, he returned to MCAS Beaufort for a third tour in Marine Aircraft Group 31 where he 

served as the Commanding Officer ofVMFA-115 and deployed to both the European and 

Western Pacific Theaters. 

He graduated from the National War College in Washington D.C. in June 2002 with a Masters of 

Science in National Security Strategy. From there he reported to Headquarters, U.S. Marine 

Corps, where he served in the Aviation Department. After his Branch head tour, Lieutenant 

General Walsh returned to MCAS Beaufort as the Commanding Onicer of Marine Aircraft 

Group 31 from June 2004 to May 2006. 

Following command, he returned to Headqumters, U.S. Marine Corps, as the Assistant Deputy 

Commandant for Aviation. In May 2008, Lieutenant General Walsh became the Commanding 

General of the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing and deployed to Operation Iraqi Freedom 09 as the 

Commanding General of the 2d Marine Aircrall Wing (Forward). In August 20 I 0 he assumed 

the duties as the Director of Operations, United States Northern Command. In June 2012 he 

became the Deputy Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command. 

In July 2013, Lieutenant General Walsh assumed duties as Director, Expeditionary Warfare 

Division for the Chief of Naval Operations. In August 2015, Lieutenant General Walsh became 

the Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command; Commander, Marine 

Corps Forces Strategic Command, and the Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and 

Integration. 
57 

Brigadier General Joseph Shrader 

Commander, Marine Corps Systems Command 

Brigadier General Joseph Shrader, a native of Princeton, West Virginia, enlisted in the Marine Corps in 

January 1981. He served for three years with 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines as an infantryman and was 

promoted to corporal. After his enlistment, he returned to West Virginia where he earned an associate 

degree in Mechanical Engineering Technology and a Bachelor of Science degree in Electrical 

Engineering Technology from Bluefield State College. He was commissioned a second lieutenant 

through the Platoon Leaders Course commissioning program in 1989. 

Upon graduation from The Basic School, Brigadier General Shrader attended the Artillery Officer Basic 

Course in Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and then reported to 5th Battalion, lOth Marines (5/10). While assigned 

to 5110, Brigadier General Shrader served as a Guns Platoon Commander, Battery Executive Otlicer and 

Battery Commander, and deployed to Southwest Asia during operations Desert Shield, Desert Storm and 

Provide Comfort. 

Brigadier General Shrader reported in June 1993 to Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Parris Island, South 

Carolina, where he served as a recruit training company Series Commander, Company Executive 

Officer and Company Commander. He then attended the Field Artillery Advanced Officer Course in 

Fort Sill, and in August 1996, repotied to the III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF), Okinawa, 

Japan. While there, he was promoted to Major and served as Assistant Operations Officer, 4th Marine 

Regiment, and Battalion Operations Officer and Battalion Executive Officer with 3rd Battalion, 12th 

Marines. 

He then attended the Marine Corps Command and Staff College on Marine Corps Base Quantico, 

Virginia, where he earned a Master of Military Studies degree. In June 2001, he was transferred to 

Marine Corps Systems Command where he served as the Armor and Fire Support Targeting Team Lead. 

Upon promotion to Lieutenant Colonel, he was reassigned to serve as the Deputy Program Manager for 

the Expeditionary Fire Support System. 

In July 2004, Brigadier General Shrader returned to Ill MEF where he served as 12th Marines 

Operations Officer and later that same year deployed to Sumatra, Indonesia, in support of Operation 

Unified Assistance. In May 2005, Brigadier General Shrader received orders to stand up 5th ANGLICO, 

Ill MEF. In early 2007, he deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. In October 2007, he 

relinquished command of 5th ANGLICO and was reassigned as the Ill MEF Force Fires Coordinator. 

In August 2009, he was promoted to Colonel after graduating from the Industrial College of the Armed 

Forces at National Defense University in Washington, D.C. lie was then designated primary military 

occupational specialty (8061) Acquisition Professional Officer and assigned to Marine Corps Systems 

Command. Over the next tour years he served as Product Group Director for Combat Equipment and 

Support Systems, and Product Group Director and Program Manager for Armor and Fire Support 

Systems. 

In May 2013, he transferred to the Of1ice of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy tor 

Expeditionary Programs and Logistics Management to serve as Chief of Staff. In July 2014, Brigadier 

General Shrader took the helm as Commander of Marine Corps Systems Command. In August 2014, he 

was frocked to Brigadier General. 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

APRIL 18, 2018 

(61) 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. GALLEGO 

General MURRAY. During the Army’s holistic network strategy review, it was clear 

that Warfighter Information Network–Terrestrial (WIN–T) Increment (INC) 2 was 

not adequate to meet the total Army’s long-term network requirements. As such, the 

Army as part of its Halt, Fix, Pivot network modernization strategy, made the decision to: 

a. Baseline the Active Component Armored Brigade Combat Teams (ABCT), Fires, 

Combat Aviation Brigades and all Army National Guard units, which includes 

SBCTs, on WIN–T INC 1B (Joint Network Node (JNN), Satellite Tactical Terminal 

(STT), Command Post Node (CPN)) 

b. Complete fielding and modernization of WIN–T INC 2 in the Active Component 

Infantry BCTs (IBCT) and Light Divisions: 

(1) Replace Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles based Tactical Communication 

Node (TCN)/Network Operations Security Center (NOSC) heavy with the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle-based Transportation Control Number (TCN)/ 

Network Operations and Security Center (NOSC) Lite 

(2) Maintain Point of Presence (PoP) and Soldier Network Extension 

c. Complete fielding of WIN–T INC 2 to Active Component Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCT): 

(1) Three of seven SBCTS will be fielded as of Fiscal Year 2019 (FY19) (TCN/ 

NOSC Heavy, Point of Presence (PoP), Soldier Network Extensions (SNEs) 

(2) The remaining four Active Component SBCTs will be fielded with PoPs, SNES 

and displaced TCN/NOSC Heavy systems from the Active component IBCTs no later 

than FY21. 

d. Close out the WIN–T INC 2 effort in FY21 Leveraging the Army’s network 

modernization strategy in this manner allows us to synchronize capability within 

the formations across the force, and maintain interoperability, while providing the 

time and ability to identify and implement more appropriate solutions for the future. [See page 18.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

APRIL 18, 2018 

(65) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER 

Mr. TURNER. As we work to modernize both small arms and all our key assets 

in the battle space one of the key elements is increasing connectivity—while improving both efficiency and lethality. I understand that you are in the process of developing the next generation of squad weapons and that in the near future we will see 

technological advances that dramatically upgrade both energy efficiency and secure 

communications through inductive rail technology. Could you please provide me 

with a status report re: acquisition of these new ‘‘smart’’ small arms platforms? 

General MURRAY. The smart rail capability that you have identified is included 

as a requirement in the approved Next Generation Squad Weapon (NGSW) Initial 

Capabilities Development Documents (ICD). The requirement specifies the need for 

a Data Transfer Rail (power and data). This rail will be capable of transferring both 

data and power and will integrate with various fire control components and other 

enablers mounted on the weapon system. The Army will begin soliciting industry 

to provide prototype weapon systems that incorporate smart rail technologies. The 

test and evaluation effort for this capability is scheduled to begin in early FY 2020. 

Mr. TURNER. I’d like to know your opinion on the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program. Do you think that the program is useful for ensuring the 

innovation and diversification of our industrial base? In what ways can we develop 

the program to be more advantages for both the DOD and industry. The health of 

our industrial base is essential for our future national defense, I look forward to 

continuing to encourage innovation through these programs with you. 

General MURRAY and General OSTROWSKI. The Small Business Innovative Research (SBIR) Program is useful in ensuring the innovation and diversification of 

our industrial base. Some ways that we can develop the program are to reinstate 

3% administrative funds; waiving the requirement for Phase II awardees to have 

a DCAA-approved cost accounting system; permit consecutive Phase II awards; and 

fund/provide additional transition assistance. Administrative funds help provide additional outreach, especially to underrepresented states in DOD’s SBIR investment, 

and it provides funds to establish dedicated contracting personnel who are experienced, knowledgeable and efficient in awarding SBIR contracts. Dedicated contracting personnel can shorten the time between the Phase I and Phase II awards, 

which is often a time of cash flow challenge for small businesses. The time from 

completion of the Phase II work—development of the working prototype—to commercialization is called ‘‘the valley of death’’ because it can take up to 10–12 years 

for a small business to realize commercialization of their innovative technology. 

Funding and providing additional transition assistance may be able to shorten that 

time to realize commercialization. Army will continue to expand opportunities for 

these small businesses to engage with Army labs to foster transition from Phase I 

to Phase II. 

Mr. TURNER. In what ways has NATO standardization proven advantageous for 

your service? Do you believe that we should continue to seek NATO standardization 

in our procurement/research/development programs? 

General MURRAY and General OSTROWSKI. NATO standardization has been extraordinarily beneficial. It is the foundation of interoperability in materiel, doctrine, 

and operations. We need to continue to improve our investments in procurement/ 

research/development and continue to promote the sales of U.S. interoperable capabilities to our NATO partners. 

The Army is optimizing for interoperability with our allies and partners to 

strengthen alliances and deliver more effective coalition operations. 

Standardization, testing, and compatibility certification of ammunition to NATO 

standard Soldier weapons provides a wide range of small arms ammunition choices 

that can be confidently used. Collaborative agreements, such as the Ground-Based 

Air Defense (GBAD) Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) facilitate information 

sharing, exercises, and coordination of these essential command, control, and deterrent capabilities in peace time. This agreement allows the warfighter to access information which enables networking of surface-based air defense capabilities. Another 

example of how NATO standardization has supported interoperability is through Artillery Systems Cooperative Activities (ASCA). ASCA developed a software interface 
66 

that allows nations to digitally link and translate between different field artillery 

and fire support systems in a faster, more effective way. This digital link improves 

the effectiveness and interoperability of allied artillery systems. The Land Battle 

Decisive Munitions Precision Guided Munition MOU provides for common sharing, 

storage, and ammunition surveillance for signatory nations. Standardization is an 

interoperability force multiplier, which enables U.S. and allied forces to operate side 

by side or in support of each other. 

Mr. TURNER. As we work to modernize both small arms and all our key assets 

in the battle space one of the key elements is increasing connectivity—while improving both efficiency and lethality. I understand that you are in the process of developing the next generation of squad weapons and that in the near future we will see 

technological advances that dramatically upgrade both energy efficiency and secure 

communications through inductive rail technology. Could you please provide me 

with a status report re: acquisition of these new ‘‘smart’’ small arms platforms? 

General OSTROWSKI. The smart rail capability that you have identified is included 

as a requirement in the draft Next Generation Squad Weapon (NGSW) Capabilities 

Development Documents (CDD). The requirement specifies the need for a Data 

Transfer Rail (power and data). This rail will be capable of transferring both data 

and power and will integrate with various fire control components and other 

enablers mounted on the weapon system. The draft NGSW CDDs are currently in 

staffing at the Headquarters, Department of the Army, and are expected to be validated by the Army Requirements Oversight Council this Fiscal Year (FY) 2018. 

Once the requirements have been validated, the Army will begin soliciting industry 

to provide prototype weapon systems that incorporate smart rail technologies. The 

test and evaluation effort for this capability is scheduled to begin in early FY 2020. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOK 

Mr. COOK. The Army and Marine Corps have a varied history of working together 

on developing and fielding platforms. While both are essentially ground forces with 

their own vehicle and aircraft fleets, they have sometimes pursued modernization 

in a truly joint nature (like the JLTV) or in a common nature (like the Abrams 

tank). On other occasions they have chosen to go down completely different roads 

while pursuing similar capabilities (like the USMC’s Huey and Cobra vs the Army’s 

Black Hawk and Apache). One of the next big opportunities for collaboration is on 

the evolving Future Vertical Lift program that is structured to replace Hueys and 

Black Hawks. Do you see this playing out more like the JLTV where both Services 

make concessions to achieve commonality or do you see it being more like the Huey 

and Black Hawk where service-unique needs outweigh the benefits of jointness? 

General MURRAY and General OSTROWSKI. The Future Vertical Lift Long Range 

Assault Aircraft (FLRAA or Capability Set 3) is an Army led multi-service initiative 

with joint participation from the USMC. A Joint Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) is 

currently being conducted to assess both the service unique requirements and opportunities for commonality. A critical component of the AoA is the Joint Trades Analysis to be conducted after the service unique requirements have been identified. The 

Joint Trades Analysis is a three pronged effort focusing efforts to determine if benefits of service concessions can lead to an identical aircraft, a common dynamics system, or if benefits are not realized then components (seats, cockpits, special tools, 

etc) with high probability of commonality between the Army and USMC aircraft. 

Mr. COOK. I saw that the FY19 request was only for three Stryker upgrades at 

a price of $21 million. Is that enough to keep the upgrade production line open? 

What is the Army’s plan to upgrade Strykers to the most modern A1 configuration? 

General OSTROWSKI. The minimum efficient production rate is approximately one 

third of a Stryker brigade per year (120 vehicles) which has been met through a 

combination of vehicles going through an upgrade process and vehicles going 

through a modification process utilizing different funding lines. 

In March 2018, the Army approved replacing the flat bottom Stryker brigades 

with Stryker Double V-Hull (DVHA1s). The Army submitted an FY18 Above 

Threshold Reprogramming request and a request to shift FY19 funding within 

Stryker funding lines that when combined with the current FY19 budget request 

will procure approximately one-half of a Stryker brigade (168 vehicles). The Army 

would like to continue the DVHA1 production rate at approximately one-half 

Stryker brigade per year until all flat bottom Strykers have been replaced with 

DVHA1s. 
67 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CARBAJAL 

Mr. CARBAJAL. General Ostrowski and General Murray, we understand the urgent 

need for Counter Unmanned Aerial Systems (C–UAS) and Maneuver Short Range 

Air Defense (M–SHORAD) capabilities, and we appreciate the Army working quickly to provide soldiers this necessary equipment. Do you believe there are synergies 

between the two missions that the Army can leverage and field a common capability 

that meets both missions requirements? Would you consider this approach if it was 

proven to reduce costs and accelerate fielding? 

General MURRAY and General OSTROWSKI. Yes, we have identified some synergies 

already, including fire control and command and control. Those synergies led us to 

use a common turret and common command and control system, which reduced cost 

and accelerated fielding. We will continue to assess the opportunity to integrate the 

two systems into a common capability. 

Yes, we will continue to assess the opportunity to field common capability in the 

future, especially if it reduces costs and accelerates fielding. 

Mr. CARBAJAL. General Walsh and General Shrader, we understand that the Marine Corps may be looking to utilize common requirements for developing the weapon system that will be integrated onto ground vehicles against unmanned aerial systems and for mobile short-range air defense. Can you please tell the committee 

today what the benefits are with taking on this approach? For example, would you 

plan to see considerable cost savings and quicker fielding of systems if you had one 

weapon system to meet both missions? 

General WALSH and General SHRADER. The Marine Corps is applying lessons 

learned from Joint Urgent Operational Need (JUON) CC–0558 and Joint Emergent 

Operational Need (JEON) ST–008 Counter UAS (CUAS) efforts into the Ground 

Based Air Defense (GBAD) Program of Record, Marine Air Defense Integrated System (MADIS). MADIS is the integration of enhanced anti-air warfare capabilities 

onto JLTVs to provide our Low Altitude Air Defense Battalions contemporary proficiency against current & future air threats from near-peer to non-state actors. The 

MADIS enhancements incorporate state-of-the-art radar, optics and C2 with kinetic/ 

non-kinetic surface to air weapons which will provide the MAGTF a truly mobile 

& adaptable short range air defense capability to detect, track, ID and defeat threat 

UASs as well as fixed wing/rotary wing threats. There are significant benefits to 

this approach including: • Rapid fielding Expeditionary MADIS (E–MADIS) & Light MADIS (L–MADIS) 

activities began in 3QFY17 with fielding of systems starting in 2QFY18 in response to JUON–0558. These initial efforts are now informing the MADIS Program of Record, which meets its Initial Operating Capability in FY21. • Cost and time savings through integrating new capabilities, as well as 

repurposing existing capabilities onto the JLTV. The MADIS is being designed 

with the idea that future air defense upgrades and advancements will occur, 

and this system can be rapidly upgraded with little to no modification to the 

JLTV. This will be accomplished with the use of slide-on & slide-off air defense 

components to MADIS’ ‘‘Picatinny Rail’’ configured turret. • UNITY OF EFFORT. Employing many of the same short range air-defense 

(SHORAD) capabilities the Army intends to employ on their Maneuver 

SHORAD Stryker. • ECONOMY OF FORCE. 

• In short order, MADIS can be mission configured based on the threat (UAS, 

FW, RW or all of the above). • Multiple mission capability provides not only force protection for the forward 

deployed MAGTF, but can also be easily employed at critical fixed sites including both OCONUS & CONUS bases & stations. • All R&D efforts are in close coordination/cooperation with the Army’s PEO 

Missile & Space—the two services testing & selecting ‘‘best of breed’’ M– 

SHORAD capabilities for both the USMC’s JLTV (MADIS) & the Army’s 

Stryker. 

• SIMPLICITY. Standardized M–SHORAD operation, maintenance & training for 

both the Marine Corps & Army. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BISHOP 

Mr. BISHOP. We understand the urgent need for Counter Unmanned Aerial Systems (C–UAS) and Maneuver Short Range Air Defense (M–SHORAD) capabilities, 

and we appreciate the Army working quickly to provide soldiers this necessary 

equipment. Do you believe there are synergies between the two missions that the 

Army can leverage and field a common capability that meets both missions require-
68 

ments? Would you consider this approach if it was proven to reduce costs and accelerate fielding? 

General MURRAY and General OSTROWSKI. Yes, we have identified some synergies 

already, including fire control and command and control. Those synergies led us to 

use a common turret and common command and control system, which reduced cost 

and accelerated fielding. We will continue to assess the opportunity to integrate the 

two systems into a common capability. 

Yes, we will continue to assess the opportunity to field common capability in the 

future, especially if it reduces costs and accelerates fielding. 

Mr. BISHOP. We understand the Marine Corps may be looking to utilize common 

requirements for developing the weapon system that will be integrated onto ground 

vehicles against unmanned aerial systems and for mobile short-range air defense. 

Can you please tell the Committee today what the benefits are with taking on this 

approach? For example, would you plan to see considerable cost savings and quicker 

fielding of systems if you had one weapon system to meet both missions? 

General WALSH and General SHRADER. The Marine Corps is applying lessons 

learned from Joint Urgent Operational Need (JUON) CC–0558 and Joint Emergent 

Operational Need (JEON) ST–008 Counter UAS (CUAS) efforts into the Ground 

Based Air Defense (GBAD) Program of Record, Marine Air Defense Integrated System (MADIS). MADIS is the integration of enhanced anti-air warfare capabilities 

onto JLTVs to provide our Low Altitude Air Defense Battalions contemporary proficiency against current & future air threats from near-peer to non-state actors. The 

MADIS enhancements incorporate state-of-the-art radar, optics and C2 with kinetic/ 

non-kinetic surface to air weapons which will provide the MAGTF a truly mobile 

& adaptable short range air defense capability to detect, track, ID and defeat threat 

UASs as well as fixed wing/rotary wing threats. There are significant benefits to 

this approach including: 

• Rapid fielding Expeditionary MADIS (E–MADIS) & Light MADIS (L–MADIS) 

activities began in 3QFY17 with fielding of systems starting in 2QFY18 in response to JUON–0558. These initial efforts are now informing the MADIS Program of Record, which meets its Initial Operating Capability in FY21. 

• Cost and time savings through integrating new capabilities, as well as 

repurposing existing capabilities onto the JLTV. The MADIS is being designed 

with the idea that future air defense upgrades and advancements will occur, 

and this system can be rapidly upgraded with little to no modification to the 

JLTV. This will be accomplished with the use of slide-on & slide-off air defense 

components to MADIS’ ‘‘Picatinny Rail’’ configured turret. 

• UNITY OF EFFORT. Employing many of the same short range air-defense 

(SHORAD) capabilities the Army intends to employ on their Maneuver 

SHORAD Stryker. 

• ECONOMY OF FORCE. 

• In short order, MADIS can be mission configured based on the threat (UAS, 

FW, RW or all of the above). 

• Multiple mission capability provides not only force protection for the forward 

deployed MAGTF, but can also be easily employed at critical fixed sites including both OCONUS & CONUS bases & stations. 

• All R&D efforts are in close coordination/cooperation with the Army’s PEO Missile & Space—the two services testing & selecting ‘‘best of breed’’ M–SHORAD 

capabilities for both the USMC’s JLTV (MADIS) & the Army’s Stryker. 

• SIMPLICITY. Standardized M–SHORAD operation, maintenance & training for 

both the Marine Corps & Army. 

Æ