In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 00-3177

Matt Lindland,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

United States of America Wrestling

Association, Inc., and United States

Olympic Committee,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 00 C 5151--Suzanne B. Conlon, Judge.

Submitted August 24, 2000--Decided August 24, 2000

 Before Easterbrook, Manion, and Diane P. Wood, Circuit

Judges.

 Easterbrook, Circuit Judge. During the Olympic

trials for Greco-Roman Wrestling, conducted by

United States of America Wrestling Association

(USA Wrestling) as the governing body of that

sport, Keith Sieracki was declared the winner,

over Matt Lindland, in the 76 kilogram

championship bout (known as "Bout #244" on the

program). As the winner, Sieracki was entitled

under the rules of the contest to be nominated by

USA Wrestling to the United States Olympic

Committee (USOC) as a member of the U.S. team in

that sport. Sieracki has been duly nominated.

 Lindland protested the officials’ decision, and

after internal proceedings unnecessary to recount

USA Wrestling rejected his protest. Lindland then

initiated arbitration, which was his right under

sec.9 of the Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur

Sports Act, 36 U.S.C. sec.sec. 220521-29. "A

party aggrieved by a determination of the

corporation under section 220527 or 220528 of

this title [here, USA Wrestling’s final decision]

may obtain review by any regional office of the

American Arbitration Association." 36 U.S.C.

sec.220529(a). On August 9 arbitrator Daniel T.

Burns directed USA Wrestling to rerun the final

bout. The award’s critical language provides:
"Bout #244 of the June 24, 2000 Olympic Trials

will be re-wrestled in accord with the USA

Wrestling rules and officiating in effect at that

time. The re-wrestle shall take place prior to

Noon on Monday, August 14, 2000." Sieracki and

Lindland accordingly wrestled again. This time

Lindland was the victor by a unanimous decision.

But USA Wrestling did not replace Sieracki with

Lindland as its nominee for the Olympic team;

instead it left Sieracki as the nominee and put

Lindland on an eligibility list, from which he

might replace Sieracki in the event of injury.

Lindland then filed this action to enforce the

award. Federal jurisdiction is proper. The

parties debate whether federal-question

jurisdiction is appropriate, a debate we bypass

because complete diversity of citizenship exists,

and the value of a position on the Olympic team

cannot be said (to a legal certainty, see St.

Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303

U.S. 283, 289 (1938)) to be less than $75,000.

The Northern District of Illinois is a proper

venue, because the arbitration took place in

Chicago. 9 U.S.C. sec.9. The same section of the

Federal Arbitration Act provides a private right

of action, authorizing (and requiring) judges to

confirm awards on the demand of the prevailing

party unless the award is infirm.

 The district court dismissed the suit without

rendering a written opinion. Its judgment says

only that the petition to confirm the award is

"dismissed"; a minute order adds that the

petition "is dismissed as moot for reasons stated

in open court. Court finds there is no federal

jurisdiction at this time." Even as supplemented

by the district court’s orally stated view that

all Lindland received from the arbitrator was a

right to a rematch rather than a right to be

named to the squad if he won, this decision is

off the mark. Lindland thinks that the award

entitles him to the spot on the Olympic team.

That may be right or wrong, but either way the

claim is not "moot" as long as it is possible for

USA Wrestling to designate him as its nominee for

the team (a possibility that is open until

midnight Eastern time today). Moreover, federal

jurisdiction plainly is present, as we have

recounted.

 So does the award entitle Lindland to USA

Wrestling’s nomination for the Olympic spot? Here

is its critical language a second time: "Bout

#244 of the June 24, 2000 Olympic Trials will be

re-wrestled in accord with the USA Wrestling

rules and officiating in effect at that time."

The new bout occurred, and Lindland was declared

its winner. The award plus the victory entitle

Lindland to the Olympic spot. The arbitrator did

not order an exhibition match between Sieracki
and Lindland; he ordered that "Bout #244 . . . be

re-wrestled". Bout #244 is the championship

match, and USA Wrestling’s rules say that its

winner receives its support in going to the

Olympic Games in Sydney as the U.S

representative. Lindland, as the winner of Bout

#244, is entitled to nomination under the

association’s own rules--to which Arbitrator

Burns pointedly referred. Rule 3.2.1 of USA

Wrestling’s "2000 Olympic Trial Procedures"

doesn’t say that USA Wrestling will nominate the

winner of the championship bout if it is in the

mood to do so; the rule says that the "winner

will be the USAW designate for the 2000 Olympic

Team" (with an exception not pertinent here)

(emphasis added). Reading the award together with

the rules to which it refers, then, we do not

have an ambiguous award, one that might be sent

back to the arbitrator for clarification (if

there were time, which there is not). In context,

the Burns Award unambiguously makes the rematch

dispositive; it replaces the outcome of the match

held on June 24, with whatever consequence of

victory "the USA Wrestling rules and officiating

in effect at that time" provide. That

consequence, under Rule 3.2.1, is USA Wrestling’s

nomination for membership on the Olympic squad.

 An award may be set aside on grounds specified

in 9 U.S.C. sec.10(a), but the district judge did

not conclude that any of these defects (such as

"corruption" or "fraud" or "evident partiality")

spoils the Burns Award. Nor does anyone contend

that the dispute was not arbitrable, or that the

arbitrator exceeded the authority conferred by

sec.220529. USA Wrestling proclaims in the

memorandum filed in this court "that there are

numerous grounds for vacating the Award" but does

not identify even one of these "numerous grounds"

under sec.10; the memorandum devotes almost all

of its space to arguing that federal-question

jurisdiction is lacking. It would be surprising

if disputes about application of the Ted Stevens

Olympic and Amateur Sports Act were confined to

state court, see Michaels v. United States

Olympic Committee, 741 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1984)

(discussing jurisdictional issues before the 1998

amendment that gave sec.220529 its current

contents) but, as we have said, diversity of

citizenship enables us to bypass that subject.

 Both USA Wrestling and the USOC view the award

as problematic because Sieracki was not a party

to the arbitration. Section 10 of the Arbitration

Act does not provide that the absence of an

interested person privileges a person who did

participate to disregard an adverse decision.

What is more, sec.220529 calls for arbitration

between the aggrieved athlete and the governing

body; it does not require arbitration among
athletes. Likewise under the USOC Constitution,

Art. IX sec.2, the demand for arbitration must

name "such USOC member" as the adverse party.

Lindland named the right party in his demand to

arbitrate. He sought relief from USA Wrestling,

which is the USOC member and the governing body

of his sport, not from Sieracki. USA Wrestling is

the only entity in a position to give him what he

wants--nomination to the Olympic team. Similarly,

an employee who has been discharged from his

position may arbitrate a grievance with his

employer, without naming as an additional party

his replacement, who might have to be discharged

or demoted to reinstate a grievant who prevails

in the arbitration. The notion, advanced by both

USA Wrestling and the USOC, that an arbitration

must include all persons who could be affected by

the outcome is novel and would work a revolution

in arbitral proceedings. Neither USA Wrestling

nor the USOC has cited any authority for the

proposition that a person potentially affected by

an arbitration is a necessary party to it.

Perhaps Sieracki could have intervened, or

perhaps USA Wrestling could have brought him in,

but these possibilities are neither here nor

there. Sieracki, as a non-party to the

arbitration, is not "bound" by the result, but

USA Wrestling is, and it must implement the

award. This means, in particular, treating the

winner of the second bout as "the winner" for

Olympic purposes.

 Sieracki has initiated his own arbitration,

protesting the result of the rematch (and perhaps

protesting USA Wrestling’s willingness to

implement at least this part of the Burns Award).

This arbitration includes both wrestlers, plus

the USOC, and thus is more comprehensive than the

proceeding conducted before Arbitrator Burns. It

also creates a possibility that USA Wrestling

will be subject to inconsistent awards, or that

it will have to go back to the arbitrator hearing

the second proceeding with Lindland rather than

Sieracki as its nominee. Arbitrators need not

follow judicial notions of issue and claim

preclusion, Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way

Employees v. Burlington Northern R.R., 24 F.3d

937 (7th Cir. 1994), which increases the chance

of inconsistent awards. These are risks that USA

Wrestling took when it decided not to bring

Sieracki into the original proceeding, and this

risk does not justify USA Wrestling’s incomplete

implementation of the Burns Award. A party to

arbitration cannot refuse to implement an

existing award just because it dreads the

prospect of a later incompatible award; indeed,

even when incompatible awards are rendered the

party may be required to implement both. See W.R.

Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757

(1983); Consolidation Coal Co. v. United Mine
Workers, 213 F.3d 404 (7th Cir. 2000). The only

questions at hand now are (a) what does the Burns

Award require?, and (b) are there legal grounds

for not enforcing it? We hold that (a) the award

requires USA Wrestling to certify to the USOC

that the winner of the rematch (which is to say,

Lindland) is the category champion and thus its

nominee for the Olympic Games, and (b) none of

the grounds in the Arbitration Act justifies

failing to enforce that award.

 The USOC’s argument that Lindland has failed to

"exhaust his remedies" because he is

participating in the arbitration initiated by

Sieracki is frivolous. It amounts to saying that

nonparties to an arbitration may nullify an award

by demanding sequential arbitration. Section 9 of

the Arbitration Act expressly gives Lindland the

right to judicial enforcement of an award. With

respect to the Burns Award, there are no more

procedures to exhaust. Moreover, the suggestion

of the USOC (at page 17 of its memorandum in this

court) that Lindland has demonstrated unfitness

for the team by initiating litigation, rather

than by accepting the results of USA Wrestling’s

internal processes, demeans that august

organization. Congress gave athletes not only a

right to arbitration but also a right to judicial

enforcement of ensuing awards. To propose that

competitors forfeit their rights as athletes when

they use legal entitlements under the Ted Stevens

Olympic and Amateur Sports Act and the Federal

Arbitration Act is to confess antipathy to one’s

legal obligations--a step that makes judicial

enforcement of the award all the more vital.

 Lindland has named the USOC as an additional

defendant. But the USOC was not a party to the

Chicago arbitration. The only appropriate

disposition "enforcing" the award is a judgment

requiring USA Wrestling to send Lindland’s name

to the USOC as its champion and nominee. Lindland

is entitled to that relief immediately. The

mandate will issue now. We trust that the USOC

will act responsibly once it receives USA

Wrestling’s nomination of Lindland.