About the Report

This report examines the implementation of UNSCR 1325, what 

it has accomplished, and its potential in Egypt, Iraq, Israel, 

the Palestinian territories, and Tunisia fifteen years after being 

passed by the United Nations Security Council. To understand 

the successes and challenges of 1325 in each nation, 

one-on-one interviews were conducted as a key part of this 

research. Interviewees included female and male academics, 

activists, government officials, and nongovernmental leaders. 

The report distills lessons and recommendations that are 

applicable to the Middle East and North Africa region and 

those relevant to particular nations. The report’s findings aim 

to deepen the recognition and application of the essential 

linkages between advancing gender equality and creating 

sustainable national security and peace. 

About the Authors

Paula M. Rayman is the director of the Middle East Center 

for Peace, Development and Culture at the University of 

Massachusetts Lowell. Seth Izen is the assistant director of the 

Middle East Center for Peace, Development and Culture. Emily 

Parker is a research fellow and consultant on the Middle East.

2301 Constitution Ave., NW • Washington, DC 20037 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

Special Report 388 May 2016

© 2016 by the United States Institute of Peace. 

All rights reserved.

Contents

Introduction 2

Diverse Implementation 2

Benefits of UNSCR 1325 5

Challenges of UNSCR 1325 7 

Conclusion 15

Recommendations 16

Paula M. Rayman, Seth Izen, and Emily Parker

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE www.usip.org

SPECIAL REPORT

UNSCR 1325 in the Middle 

East and North Africa

Women and Security

Summary

• The United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1325 in October 2000. The resolution is not being utilized consistently across the studied nations in the Middle East and 

North Africa (MENA) region. This disparity exists not only among the five nations examined 

by this report but also within each nation.

• Internally, there are differences among women and men in their support for the resolution 

and a Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda due to factors such as rural/urban divides, 

religious/secular affiliations, and socioeconomic status. 

• Resolution 1325 offers a “common language” and approach for unifying efforts toward ending violence against women in the MENA region post-Arab Spring and promoting advancement toward gender equality. 

• Women’s organizations have benefitted from 1325 because of international funding for 

related projects which they have struggled to obtain from local governments.

• Passage and implementation of National Action Plans (NAPs) by governments in the 

studied nations have proven difficult, largely due to insufficient political will, a dearth 

of governmental leadership and buy-in, and a lack of necessary and targeted resources. 

General unawareness is a major obstacle to both launching viable campaigns for 1325 and 

recruiting actors necessary for its implementation. 

• For real change to occur, male and female leaders need to embrace values of gender justice 

that are recognized to be in the national interest of all. 

• As conflicts in the region persist and economic inequality deepens, governments are prioritizing responses to the economic, political, and security crises in ways that preserve the 

status quo. As a result, women are pushed to the periphery. 

• It is crucial that both men and women see the strong connection between implementation 

of the objectives of 1325 and long-term national security and economic development.
2 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 388

Introduction

In the post-Arab Spring period, the MENA region has faced major obstacles to creating 

conditions for sustainable peace and lasting economic and social security. The five case 

studies in this report—Egypt, Iraq, Israel, the Palestinian territories, and Tunisia—explore 

the struggles and divides in the region. The report focuses on women’s adaptations to a 

predicament exacerbated by rising expectations from the Arab Spring, while simultaneously 

being pushed to the periphery and bearing the burden of family responsibilities due to 

economic instability and continuing political, social, and cultural unrest. 

Security in the MENA region remains dire and inconsistent, especially for women. United 

Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 evolved as one approach to address these 

security concerns. It acknowledges the disproportionate impacts of conflict on women 

and girls and calls explicitly for the inclusion of women in conflict management, conflict 

resolution, and sustainable peace processes. As of January 2016, fifty-eight UN Member 

States have developed NAPs in order to implement 1325. At the same time, many countries 

and groups have pursued the 1325 commitments on a broader scale and without the use of 

formal NAPs. 

This report explores the effectiveness of 1325 in the MENA region, especially in its effort 

to recognize women’s unique situations in conflicted areas, to protect them from violence, 

and to expand their contribution to conflict prevention and resolution. The necessity for 

women and men to work together for these larger definitions of peace and security frame 

the interviews in this report and subsequent recommendations. Moreover, these interviews 

provide strong evidence from the field that viable peace will be achieved only by integrating 

gender equality with national security. 

One common finding from the thirty personal interviews is the significance of training 

both men and women to promote inclusion. A key question for all those reading this report 

is how they as individuals and through their organizations can best work together with the 

people in the MENA region, in the words of one interviewee, “to help us prepare for peace.”1

Diverse Implementation

There are significant differences in the development, implementation, and understanding of 

1325 among the various case studies as well as within each nation.

Egypt

Egypt does not yet have a 1325 NAP. When Egypt hosted the Arab League, however, the 

League presented a WPS regional action plan on October 12, 2015, as part of the United 

Nation’s review of 1325. The next day, at the UN “Discussions on 15 Years after 1325,” the 

Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs mentioned that the National Council for Women of Egypt 

“worked out a national plan for follow-up and implementation of resolution 1325.”2 However, 

the future of the NAP’s implementation remains uncertain. Interviewees suggested that Egypt 

has not passed a 1325 NAP largely due to lack of awareness of the resolution. For those aware 

of 1325, it is perceived as irrelevant in the Egyptian context, as the country is neither at war 

nor experiencing protracted violent conflict.

Simultaneously, there are local efforts in Egypt that reflect the “spirit” of 1325. Interviewees reported that holding trainings and summer schools for youth, as well as roundtables for local leaders and powerholders, resulted in small changes in local-level mentalities. 

Rasha Dewedar, former program manager at the Noon Center for Women and Family Issues, 

expressed her organization’s emphasis on “Islamic feminism,” utilizing religious texts and 

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily 

reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, 

which does not advocate specific policy positions.

For media inquiries, contact the office of Public Affairs 

and Communications, 202.429.4725.

To request permission to photocopy or reprint materials, 

email: permissions@usip.org.

About the Institute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, 

nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress. 

Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, 

promote postconflict peacebuilding, and increase conflict 

management tools, capacity, and intellectual capital 

worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others 

with knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct 

involvement in conflict zones around the globe.

Board of Directors

Stephen J. Hadley, (Chair), Principal, RiceHadleyGates, LLC, 

Washington, DC • George E. Moose (Vice Chair), Adjunct 

Professor of Practice, The George Washington University, Washington, DC • Judy Ansley, Former Assistant to the President and 

Deputy National Security Advisor under George W. Bush, Washington, DC • Eric Edelman, Hertog Distinguished Practitioner 

in Residence, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International 

Studies, Washington, DC • Joseph Eldridge, University Chaplain 

and Senior Adjunct Professorial Lecturer, School of International 

Service, American University, Washington, DC • Kerry Kennedy, 

President, Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and Human 

Rights, Washington, DC • Ikram U. Khan, President, Quality Care 

Consultants, LLC., Las Vegas, NV • Stephen D. Krasner, Graham 

H. Stuart Professor of International Relations at Stanford 

University, Palo Alto, CA • John A. Lancaster, Former Executive 

Director, International Council on Independent Living, Potsdam, 

NY • Jeremy A. Rabkin, Professor of Law, George Mason 

University, Fairfax, VA • J. Robinson West, Chairman, PFC 

Energy, Washington, DC • Nancy Zirkin, Executive Vice 

President, Leadership Conference on Civil and 

Human Rights, Washington, DC 

Members Ex Officio

John Kerry, Secretary of State • Ashton Carter, Secretary of 

Defense • Gregg F. Martin, Major General, U.S. Army; President, 

National Defense University • Nancy Lindborg, President, 

United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting)
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 388 3

tenets to advocate for women’s rights.3 Interviewees saw small but significant changes as a 

result of their programming—particularly roundtables involving imams, sheikhs, and Muslim 

and Christian community leaders. It was noted that post-training, discourse on women’s 

rights has improved. First-time participants are often more inclined to attend additional 

courses and follow-up trainings, and they influence their colleagues as well.4

It also appears that there is at least some interest in the WPS agenda among Egyptian 

government and civil society organization (CSO) actors. Interviewees reported that external actors, including the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the North Africa Regional 

Capability, have launched a few initiatives in collaboration with the Egyptian government 

to provide gender-sensitive training for security officers and prosecutors. Yet such training 

remains infrequent, small-scale, and does not reach the general populace.5 A prominent 

male leader in conflict resolution also reported new interest among the Egyptian Ministries 

of Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Interior in providing women peacekeepers in Egyptian 

operations, largely resulting from an understanding that the WPS agenda is now high on 

the international radar due to 1325’s fifteen-year anniversary. Additionally, he noted that 

more local CSOs have recently become interested in WPS efforts out of a desire to link their 

individual agendas to the international WPS agenda.6

Iraq

In early 2014, Iraq became the first country in the region to launch a 1325 NAP. Less than 

a year later, ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) surged out of eastern Syria to seize 

Mosul and other key cities and towns in Iraq. Gender equality advocates have continued to 

exert efforts, and in May 2015 an Emergency NAP to implement 1325 was passed by the 

government. Key actors express the importance of Iraq’s 1325 NAP and Emergency NAP, particularly that they provide a “common language” and approach for unification. At the same 

time, these actors are frustrated with the lack of implementation, largely due to insufficient 

political will and a dearth of resources. 

The Emergency NAP focuses primarily on including women in all peacebuilding efforts and 

providing legal, psychological, and health support for affected women and girls. It consists of 

three pillars—prevention, participation, and protection—and it focuses on the current conflict with ISIS. A common refrain among interviewees, however, was that 1325 and its NAPs 

remain “ink on paper” without the tools and support to ensure their implementation.

Israel 

In July 2005, Israel became the first UN member state to enshrine parts of 1325 into law. 

The Knesset passed an amendment to the 1951 Equality of Women’s Rights Law that committed the government to include “appropriate representation” of women in all national policymaking committees, including teams that focus on the peace process. The amendment is 

notable because it went beyond 1325 to require representation of diverse groups of women.7

To expand the role of 1325 in Israel, over thirty CSOs and feminist activists, under the 

leadership of Women Lawyers for Social Justice, the Center for the Advancement of Women 

in the Public Sphere at the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, and an NGO called Agenda, began 

a process in 2011 to develop a Comprehensive Action Plan for 1325. Funding came from 

international support, including the European Union, the Heinrich Böll Stiftung Foundation 

in Germany, and the U.S.-based National Council of Jewish Women. The two-year development process included a series of open meetings and consultations across the country. In 

2013, the organizations released A Comprehensive Action Plan for the Application of United 

Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (CAP).8 

A common refrain among 

interviewees, however, was 

that 1325 and its NAPs remain 

“ink on paper” without the 

tools and support to ensure 

their implementation.
4 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 388

In December 2014, an inter-ministerial committee was tasked with reviewing and implementing the CAP. The committee, which as of publication has only drafted a preliminary 

program, is far from gaining approval or implementing the action plan.9

Palestinian Territories

In the Palestinian territories, some activists questioned the value of 1325. Eileen Kuttab of 

the Institute of Women’s Studies at Birzeit University stated that “[UN] resolutions such as 

1325 are largely irrelevant. Palestine is not in conflict or postconflict but in the midst of a 

national liberation movement in which women’s rights are being overlooked...We can’t keep 

thinking that the state of Palestine is a normal state...what works here doesn’t work anywhere else, we are unique in that sense.”10 Furthermore, 1325 makes no mention of social 

or economic rights, such as the right to basic living conditions or right to housing, and thus 

does not fully cover women’s actual needs and priorities on the ground. 

In order to help 1325 appeal to a broad Palestinian audience, the NGO Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy (MIFTAH) framed the resolution as 

essential for both the national struggle against Israel and the social struggle against patriarchy. A 2009 MIFTAH report introduced 1325 by stating that the resolution is “particularly 

important for Palestinian women” because they “suffer from two forms of oppression: one 

is the oppression, violence and brutality of occupation, and the other is the male oppression that impedes their full equality as citizens in accordance with Palestinian references, 

namely the Charter of Independence and the Palestinian Basic Law.”11 Tying the resolution 

to the agenda of the Palestinian women’s movement, MIFTAH argued that 1325 “merges 

between the demands for national liberation and the need of women to achieve comprehensive and just peace as well as women’s need for social progress and rights to enshrine 

values of democracy and equality.”12 The necessity to tie the national and social movements 

was echoed by Jamilah Abu-Duhou, a gender studies expert with UN Women. She stated 

that “When we’re building a state, we know what kind of a state we want: democratic, 

liberal... within that ideology we build rights, and women’s rights should be at the forefront 

of the national rights movement...one shouldn’t take a precedence over the other.”13

In 2014, the National Coalition for the Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 held an international conference called “Women’s Freedom, Peace and Dignity in 

Palestine UNSCR 1325 for Accountability” sponsored by the World Young Women’s Christian 

Association. The conference was framed around how 1325 could provide accountability 

on the national and social level.14 The official Palestinian NAP was approved by cabinet 

ministers in May 2015. 

Tunisia

While there have been some grassroots efforts to incorporate a WPS agenda in Tunisia, the 

country does not yet have a NAP for 1325 implementation, nor does there appear to be one 

in the pipeline. Similar to findings from Egypt, interviewees suggested that Tunisia has not 

passed a 1325 NAP largely due to a general lack of awareness and understanding of the resolution. There are local efforts that reflect the spirit of 1325, however. For example, under the 

new transitional government following the revolution, women’s groups successfully pushed 

to drop Tunisia’s reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), which were officially lifted in April 2014. 

The International Institute of Human Development (IiDH) is also currently focusing on 

involving Tunisian women in efforts to prevent radicalization. Since July 2015, they have 

been working with the Tunisian Ministry of Interior to suggest a strategy for the National 

Tying the resolution to the 

agenda of the Palestinian 

women’s movement, MIFTAH 

argued that 1325 “merges 

between the demands for 

national liberation and the 

need of women to achieve 

comprehensive and just 

peace as well as women’s 

need for social progress and 

rights to enshrine values 

of democracy and equality.”
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 388 5

Center for Reintegration and Rehabilitation for Foreign Fighters to incorporate a WPS lens. 

IiDH also collaborated with the Ministry of Women’s Affairs to hold a conference in February 

2016 dealing with women, peace, and security in Tunisia. Conference objectives included 

both working toward a charter that would pressure the state to focus on a WPS agenda and 

building a network focusing on gender and security issues.15

Women have also risen to notable positions in civil society as a result of such efforts. One 

such example is Wided Bouchamaoui, president of the Employers’ Union (UTICA). In the wake 

of the 2013 anti-government protests catalyzed by the assassination of two opposition politicians, UTICA joined three other civil society forces to form the National Dialogue Quartet. As 

a leader of the Quartet, Bouchamaoui played a prominent role in the National Dialogue, which 

produced a political road map forward. In recognition of their struggle to mediate through 

crisis and instability, the four groups were awarded the 2015 Nobel Peace Prize. However, the 

cohesion of the Quartet—and Bouchamaoui’s role in it—remains uncertain, as UTICA is currently in dispute with its fellow Nobel winner the Tunisian General Labor Union over corporate 

pay increases while strikes and industrial protests continue nationwide.

Women’s Affairs Minister Samira Marai, as well as the broader Ministry of Women’s Affairs, 

have also recently ushered in positive change. On November 10, 2015, the Tunisian parliament approved a new law (143 to 1, with 4 abstentions) that will allow women to travel 

with their minor children without needing to obtain permission from the children’s father. 

Notably, the new law “recognizes that women are equal partners in making decisions about 

their children.”16

Benefits of UNSCR 1325

The most important benefits of 1325 are the provision of a “common language” and an 

approach capable of uniting diverse women’s groups. UNSCR 1325 is broad enough that it is 

relevant to the work of many NGOs. It has facilitated the formation of coalitions, established 

advocates, and improved interactions between women’s NGOs and government actors. Women’s 

organizations have also benefitted from 1325 because of international funding for related 

projects—projects for which they have struggled to obtain local government funding.

In Iraq, for example, the path to the NAP began in 2012 with directed efforts to build a 

common understanding and strengthen collaboration among various Iraqi women’s groups. 

A series of workshops and meetings held in cooperation with the European Feminist Initiative revealed that a major challenge for civil society groups in Iraq was a lack of networking 

and “insufficient will among CSOs to work together.” Addressing this gap was seen as a 

precondition for the success of the women’s rights movement and, consequently, for the 

development of a 1325 NAP.17 Active efforts were made early on to reach out to activists 

and representatives from major women’s rights organizations and networks and to ultimately 

form a civil society-led focus group that would work together to ensure an inclusive consultative process for developing a 1325 NAP.

The Civil Society Strategic Meeting in Beirut on July 28–29, 2012, brought together 

major Iraqi women’s rights organizations. The meeting developed an outline of a NAP 

framework and formed a national reference group, the Iraq NAP 1325 Initiative (I-NAP 

1325), as well as a cross-sector taskforce consisting of both local NGOs and state actors 

from various ministries in Iraq, including the Kurdistan region. Following a number of 

consultations and working meetings, I-NAP 1325 developed a six-pillar NAP focused on 

political participation, prevention, protection, economic empowerment, legislation, and 

monitoring. Former prime minister Nouri al-Maliki signed the plan into action in February 

2014, making Iraq the first country in the region to pass a NAP. However, he omitted the 

UNSCR 1325 has facilitated 

the formation of coalitions, 

established advocates, 

and improved interactions 

between women’s NGOs and 

government actors.
6 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 388

pillars on economic empowerment and legislation and failed to allocate a budget for the 

NAP, largely obstructing its implementation.

The emergence of ISIS in Iraq in June 2014 undermined much of I-NAP 1325’s work and 

led to further challenges. Leaders of the initiative realized that they needed to expand the 

reach of collaboration. As Suzan Aref, director of the Women Empowerment Organization 

(WEO) in the Kurdistan region, expressed, “We needed more organizations to be stronger and 

to have unified voices to put more pressure on the government.”18 I-NAP 1325 merged with 

related groups to form the 1325 Alliance in 2014. After talks and workshops supported by the 

U.S. Institute of Peace, the thirty-group Alliance produced a one-year 1325 Emergency NAP 

with support from the Iraqi Ministry of Women’s Affairs and the High Council in the Kurdistan 

region. On May 26, 2015, Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi signed the 1325 Emergency NAP into 

action. Once again, it was passed without a budget.

Despite varying circumstances and continued tensions between Iraq and its Kurdistan 

region, 1325 brought together different women’s groups from both areas and enabled them 

to reach common ground beyond what was accomplished by the Iraqi Women’s Network, 

established in 2003. Liza Hido, president of the Baghdad Women Association, reported that 

Iraq’s 1325 NAP required extensive negotiation, but various actors—religious, secular, conservative, and liberal—eventually reached consensus. The consultative process also led to 

widespread ownership of the NAP among the diverse groups involved in both the Kurdistan 

region and the rest of Iraq.19

Moreover, 1325 and the process of developing Iraq’s NAP helped build relations between 

Iraqi women’s groups and state actors. As Hido explained, the years spent developing the NAP 

led to strong support from the cross-sector taskforce—as well as from the Independent High 

Commission for Human Rights of Iraq.20 The NAP also generated an increase in international 

attention, and women’s organizations received more international funding for 1325-related 

projects, which would have struggled to obtain sufficient local government funding. The 

resolution, and the international funding and attention it generated, was therefore helpful to 

“move from a government adaptation to a civil society movement”21 through its impetus to 

unite diverse women’s groups, establish advocates, and offer new resources.

In the West Bank and Gaza, 1325 is seen as a unifying force among women’s groups. 

Soraida Hussein, director of the Women’s Affairs Technical Committee, referred to the 

resolution as “a language” and “a common tool throughout the world.” She called the 

resolution “a gateway for all to communicate and learn using common language and 

terminology.”22 Khaleda Abusoboh of the Palestinian Authority (PA) Ministry of Interior 

stated that 1325 is “like a code for individuals who believe in peacebuilding” and that 

activists can “take advantage of the plan to bridge the cooperation and ties between the 

Palestinian factions.”23 Even though movement limitations and governmental differences 

have frustrated efforts to build a unified movement between the West Bank and Gaza, 

Abusoboh noted: “We believe we can overcome this because a woman is the same whether 

she is a mother of Hamas or Fatah.”24

In Israel, however, where approximately 20 percent of the country’s citizens are Palestinian Arab,25 1325 has only served as a unifying force among the Israeli Jewish women’s organizations who joined together to develop a CAP. While Israel’s Arab women’s organizations 

were invited to participate in the development process for the CAP, they were told that there 

would be no guarantee that the process would acknowledge Israeli responsibility to end the 

occupation. As a result, they refused to participate. The Arab women’s organizations in the 

country, and broader-based left-wing Israeli women’s groups, issued a position paper criticizing the CAP and its development process. They argued that their positions were “silenced 

and marginalized.”26 According to feminist scholar Sarai Aharoni, one could read through 

In the West Bank and Gaza, 

1325 is seen as a unifying force 

among women’s groups.
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 388 7

the fifty pages of the Israeli Action Plan (excluding the introduction) and not be aware that 

Israel is involved in an armed conflict.27 The words “occupation” or “occupied territory” are 

only mentioned once each in the introduction and not at all in the CAP.”28

Challenges of UNSCR 1325

Political Will

Beyond passing an international resolution such as 1325, tangible change in the MENA region 

requires buy-in from key actors, political will to allocate resources, and awareness and understanding of the resolution. Activists and organizations not directly working on 1325 either 

remain predominantly unaware of the resolution or do not regard it as an important or relevant 

goal. This lack of awareness is also prevalent among those actors needed to implement it.

According to the 2015 Global Gender Gap report, Egypt ranks 136th out of 145 countries 

in the world on gender equality. Despite a number of new articles related to women’s rights 

in Egypt’s 2014 constitution—including a 25 percent quota for women in local councils—

the 2015 ranking highlights a large decline, as Egypt ranked 125th in 2013.29 The decline 

suggests that while new legislation and legal reforms may have symbolic value, they have 

achieved little ground-level change due to a lack of implementation and enforcement 

mechanisms, as well as entrenched societal norms. Interviewees noted that the lack of 

political will to actually implement change remains a key issue, for both existing legislation 

and potential new initiatives such as a 1325 NAP. 

Moreover, while state actors and political parties have expressed surface-level support 

for women in politics, this commitment has not played out on the ground level, and women 

remain relegated to lower-level positions.30 Upon taking power, Egypt’s Supreme Council 

of the Armed Forces issued a decree abolishing the previous sixty-four seat quota in the 

People’s Assembly (the lower house of Egypt’s parliament). On the first day of Egypt’s October 2015 parliamentary elections, Omar Marwan of the High Elections Committee expressed 

that the number of female voters so far was “four times greater” than that of men. Yet as 

candidates, women were greatly outnumbered.31 Out of 568 members of parliament (MPs), 

73 female MPs were elected, representing 12.8 percent of all elected MPs, in addition to 14 

women appointed by the president, according to legal requirements.32 The 2014 Egyptian 

Constitution does, however, assign a quota of one quarter of the seats for women in elected 

local councils.33 Yet activists highlighted the tendency to nominate largely unqualified and 

noncompetitive women, as well as place them lower on electoral lists.

Interviewees stated that the greatest challenges toward furthering a WPS agenda in 

Egypt are the continued societal acceptance—on the part of both men and women—of 

gender inequality and prevailing “negative attitudes” toward women’s empowerment. This 

is particularly true in rural areas, in Upper Egypt, and with the older generation. Although 

more women and girls participated in volunteering and grassroots activities after the 2011 

Egyptian revolution, this change is largely limited to youth, and their ability to be politically 

active is mostly at the grassroots level, not the governmental level. 

As Yanar Mohammed, cofounder and president of the Organization of Women’s Freedom in 

Iraq (OWFI), stated during her remarks at the UN Security Council Open Debate on Women, 

Peace and Security on October 13, 2015, implementation of 1325 and international human 

rights standards “...provide a roadmap for the prevention of armed conflict and the integration of gender equality across all peace and security actions. What is primarily lacking is 

the political will.”34 The responses of both former prime minister Maliki and Prime Minister 

Abadi to the original 1325 NAP and the subsequent Emergency NAP reflect this statement. 

Activists and organizations 

not directly working on 1325 

either remain predominantly 

unaware of the resolution or do 

not regard it as an important 

or relevant goal. This lack of 

awareness is also prevalent 

among those actors needed 

to implement it.
8 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 388

WEO director Suzan Aref claimed that the exclusion of two major pillars—the economic 

and social participation of women and the representation and status of women in legislation 

and law enforcement—proved the “fragile political will” behind the resolution and NAP.35 

Haider al-Ibrahimi, executive director of Sanad for Peacebuilding in Iraq, further argued that 

Maliki’s refusal to allocate a budget to implement the NAP confirmed that it was little more 

than a “marketing plan” on Maliki’s part to garner votes in Iraq’s 2014 elections and to gain 

international accolade.36

For Dlawer Ala’Aldeen, a former government minister and current president of the Middle 

East Research Institute (MERI) in the Kurdistan region of Iraq, the lack of effort to create 

and promote opportunities for women and girls to develop their skills and leadership qualities reveals that the Iraqi government and society “have symbolically acknowledged women’s 

rights, but they haven’t invested in them enough.”37 Such a training deficit disadvantages 

women in terms of political participation, negotiations, and other 1325-related activities 

because they lack exposure to the appropriate technical language and processes. 

There are few state actors that profess to support efforts toward 1325 implementation 

and gender equity, and most of these politicians’ commitments to women’s issues are widely 

perceived as mere rhetoric or “propaganda” used for electoral campaigns.38 Women remain 

in lower-level positions within political parties and are not offered decision-making roles. 

As Liza Hido expressed, “You will see no women in the steering committee of the [political] parties.” Moreover, she added that the present focus remains on gender-based violence 

response—treating women as “victims” rather than as “participants” and empowering them 

to work to improve situations for themselves and others.39

According to al-Ibrahimi and Ala’Aldeen, the situation is somewhat different in the Kurdistan region.40 Ala’Aldeen believes the political will exists to implement a 1325 NAP, despite a 

lack in resources, because of the strength of numerous women’s rights groups in the Kurdistan 

region “who pushed it [1325] down the system” in collaboration with the UN. He largely 

attributed the success of women’s organizations to investments made over time in women 

and girls’ trainings and education, both in the Kurdistan region and abroad. Such investments 

led to a “critical mass” of well-qualified women who gradually took on more and more leadership positions in the government, NGOs, and the Kurdish Peshmerga forces. Since the ISIS 

escalation, young female fighters have become even more prominent. This image of women 

as protectors of their communities, according to Ala’Aldeen, has provided a powerful argument 

for women’s rights and inclusion, an argument that is largely lacking in the rest of Iraq.41

A common refrain among interviewees was that 1325 and its NAPs lack the tools and 

support to ensure their implementation. While the UN passing 1325 was significant, the 

UN does not lobby for the resolution locally, spread awareness, convince leaders to buy 

into the resolution, or designate time and resources for implementation—nor do local 

organizations receive support for most of these activities. As Ala’Aldeen explained, passing any NAP or WPS agenda is not a one-off job.42 It takes an active process to get the 

whole system to comply, and a lack of follow-up prevents larger structural change. A 

number of interviewees agreed that the UN and international NGOs need to be more active 

with local groups to lobby for the resolution. Such efforts must engage rural women to 

make them aware of their rights and expose rural men to the benefits of a WPS agenda. 

In Israel, there remains significant skepticism about the future of the implementation 

of 1325 given that the inter-ministerial committee established in December 2014 to consolidate and implement the NAP missed its summer 2015 deadline. Furthermore, Dr. Tamir 

Magal, a research fellow at Hebrew University, pointed out that the minister in charge of 

the committee, Gila Gamliel, is the head of a newly created ministry of Social Equality and 

therefore has limited resources to advance any plan.43

The lack of effort to create 

and promote opportunities for 

women and girls to develop 

their skills and leadership 

qualities reveals that the Iraqi 

government and society “have 

symbolically acknowledged 

women’s rights, but they haven’t 

invested in them enough.”
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 388 9

Knesset member Merav Michaeli of the Zionist Union, reflecting on the lack of women 

in the ministry positions in the government formed in April 2015, said, “No one should 

be surprised that the third Netanyahu government authorized Resolution 1325 just so the 

fourth Netanyahu government can immediately ignore it.”44 The appointment of only one 

woman to the current fourteen-member security cabinet in Israel exemplifies the limited 

role women continue to possess in affairs of national security. 

In the Palestinian territories, the lack of awareness about 1325 is a serious issue. 

International funders often earmark contributions for projects with deliverables. Therefore, 

awareness-raising, which is not easy to measure with metrics, is not a funder priority. For 

activists, however, raising awareness is of paramount importance. “The most important 

thing,” according to Khaleda Abusoboh, “is to start discussing and raising awareness about 

this resolution in our own communities [because] women may be oppressed and treated 

unfairly, but that doesn’t mean [they] shouldn’t be informed of her rights.”45 One gender 

rights activist from Bethlehem, Rami Khader, stated that he was familiar with numerous UN 

resolutions but had never heard of 1325.46 Indeed, international resolutions such as 1325 

are not widely known or seen as relevant to the lives of ordinary women whose primary focus 

is on daily survival.47

Activists in the West Bank are also skeptical about the implementation of 1325. Sama 

Aweidah, director of the Women’s Studies Center, pointed to how the PA had decided to do a 

gender mainstreamed budget three years ago but no work had been done toward its completion. The government was not willing to put financial or human resources to the task.48 This is 

compounded by the lack of binding mechanisms for enforcement or implementation. 

In Gaza, the Wissal Coalition has focused its implementation efforts on combatting 

gender-based violence and working on bringing moderate Hamas and Fatah women together 

for national unity. Activism in Gaza with the Hamas government is difficult, and members 

call their current situation “a depressing one in which we see no real avenues for women’s 

participation and limited space for us to work.”49

Tunisian interviewees indicated that new legislation and legal reforms may have symbolic 

value but have achieved little ground-level change. There was consensus that most legislation relevant to women’s rights and gender equality remains weakly implemented, contains 

vaguely worded language, or allows for loopholes that have impeded large-scale change. In 

particular, interviewees cited Article 46 of the country’s 2014 constitution which says that 

“The state commits to protect women’s established rights and works to strengthen and 

develop those rights.” Yet as Emna Jeblaoui, the president of Tunisia’s International Institute 

for Human Development, expressed, “It’s not enough to have a law. It’s important to have 

it respected and adopted and for people to take ownership.”50

Along the same lines, the 2014 Tunisian Constitution declares that “the State is obliged 

to take measures to eliminate all forms of violence against women,”51 and rape is illegal 

under the Tunisian penal code. Very few cases, however, are prosecuted and Article 227 

states that in the case of a statutory rape involving a minor female, legal proceedings 

against the perpetrator may be dropped if the victim agrees to marry the perpetrator. 

Similarly, although domestic violence has been ruled a criminal offense punishable by 

imprisonment for up to two years, societal acceptance of domestic violence remains 

prevalent. In the results of the first national survey on violence against women in Tunisia, 

conducted in 2010 by the Office National de la Famille et de la Protection, 73 percent 

of violence survivors reported not seeking help from anyone due to shame and fear of 

aggravating the situation.52 Thus, despite promising new legislation, activist and human 

rights defender Lina Ben Mhenni remarked, “When it comes to real life, it’s different. We 

aren’t really enjoying these laws.”53

The appointment of only one 

woman to the current fourteenmember security cabinet in 

Israel exemplifies the limited 

role women continue to possess 

in affairs of national security. 
10 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 388

Understanding That Women’s Rights Are for Everyone

In the MENA region, there is a lack of involvement, collaboration, and trust between male 

and female powerholders and activists toward 1325, while immediate political and personal interests are prioritized. In order for a real difference to be made on women’s equality, men and powerholders must see that it is in their best interests to expand access to 

shared power and increased capacity for women now rather than later. Advancing women 

into positions of power is not enough, as many of the women who have recently gained 

power tend to belong to majority groups resistant to large changes to the status quo. 

They follow their party leadership and oppose agendas that might threaten their positions 

of power. What matters is for women and men in leadership roles to recognize that social 

and legal equality benefits everyone.

All Egyptian interviewees agreed that advances in women’s rights are still largely 

viewed as only beneficial for women. Ghada Hammam, country program manager of Diakonia Egypt, explained that there is “confusion that gender just means women’s rights and 

supports just women” rather than the greater society.54 These interviews also revealed 

that difficulties have arisen in advancing a WPS agenda, reaching “the right people,” and 

keeping them involved. A young, local female CSO worker explained that there are many 

organizations with resources working for women’s rights in Egypt. However, they tend to 

focus on training women alone and teaching them about their rights, rather than raising awareness within the broader communities. There is currently no organized national 

platform for peacebuilding and dialogue work, nor is there a prominent political party or 

unified movement advocating for women’s rights. In addition to their difficulties in reaching and collaborating with other local women’s rights and peace groups, interviewees also 

expressed their limitations in accessing rural communities. At the same time, interest 

in the subject does not necessarily indicate long-term commitment to advancing a WPS 

agenda. As a prominent male CSO representative explained, “It’s hard to find people who 

will actually commit to doing the work of the women, peace, and security agenda.”55

The instability following the events of 2011 has also obstructed government officials 

and powerholders from advancing a WPS agenda in Egypt. Inactive parliaments and inconsistent regulations have led not only to decreased confidence in state institutions but also 

to a lack of mechanisms by which to debate escalating tensions and implement reforms. 

Funding is also an issue—particularly given Egypt’s ongoing economic crisis—and many 

foreign organizations have been reluctant to fund in Egypt. Even when CSOs are allocated 

funding, a lack of transparency makes it difficult to ascertain whether it reaches its 

intended recipients and therefore to build trust. As a local NGO representative explained, 

there is a general belief that NGOs who receive foreign funds have “special agendas.” NGOs 

also cannot receive any funding without government approval and must be a registered 

association to do so. “Some organizations have refused this step...they don’t want to be 

registered because they believe that NGOs should work freely without restrictions,” the 

representative stated.56

Moreover, despite the large number of registered CSOs in Egypt, Hammam estimated 

that only a small percent work in the realm of advocacy, peacebuilding, and human 

rights, while the rest work in service provision.57 Oscar Fernandez-Taranco, UN assistant 

secretary-general for Peacebuilding Support, explained that approximately 2 percent of 

global funds allocated to peace and security efforts go to gender empowerment activities 

or projects.58

Within the Iraqi political system, a climate of fear dominated by sectarian politics has 

prevailed. Although grassroots women’s organizations have been able to create networks 

that bridge party and religious-secular divides through their collaboration on the NAP and 

A young, local female CSO 

worker explained that there 

are many organizations with 

resources working for women’s 

rights in Egypt. However, 

they tend to focus on training 

women alone and teaching them 

about their rights, rather than 

raising awareness within the 

broader communities.
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 388 11

Emergency NAP, this has not been the case within the actual political system necessary for 

implementation. Many of the women in government were elected for symbolic purposes, and 

rather than wielding real power they tend to defer to male higher-ups. Moreover, government institutions and structures themselves continue to change.59 For example, the Iraqi 

Ministry of Women’s Affairs was instrumental in advocating for and passing the NAP and the 

Emergency NAP. However, in Prime Minister Abadi’s reforms in August 2015, the Ministry of 

Women’s Affairs was dissolved, making relationships difficult to maintain. 

Mistrust between NGOs and the Iraqi government, as well as internal politics and red 

tape, make the process more convoluted as well. Because both the 1325 NAP and the 

Emergency NAP went unfunded, it became the responsibility of each individual ministry 

to allocate resources for implementation. However, ministries have easily justified their 

lack of implementation by arguing that they do not possess the funds to do so. Even 

when ministries demonstrate the will to implement 1325, as Liza Hido explained, the issue 

becomes further politicized because the ministries must obtain parliamentary approval 

for each budget.60

Furthermore, the capacity of local CSOs to provide much-needed services is not protected, 

let alone promoted. In fact, in most situations, CSOs are blocked. As OWFI president and 

cofounder Yanar Mohammad explained at this year’s UN Security Council’s Open Debate on 

Women, Peace and Security, “In the absence of government-sponsored services, local women’s groups meet the needs of those most vulnerable to the conflict. We are at the forefront 

of providing aid and services in places unreachable by international aid organizations. Yet 

we remain vastly underrepresented in our efforts to prevent and address conflict and violent 

extremism.” She cited several examples of civil society efforts that have been stifled by the 

government: “Iraqi authorities do not allow women’s organizations to provide shelter to the 

thousands of women fleeing conflict-related violence, and independent radio stations that 

promote peace across sectarian divides, dispel misogyny and combat homophobia have been 

shut down.”61 Mohammad herself has established a secret network of safe houses for honorkilling runaways and survivors of rape and abuse. The lack of collaboration and trust between 

relevant state and civil society actors, as well as the prioritization of more immediate political and personal interests, have hindered 1325 NAP implementation in Iraq.

In Israel, the power and representation of women who are members of the majority Ashkenazi62 Jewish population tends to increase when the Women’s Equal Rights Law is implemented. Sometimes the women who advance professionally possess sharply different political 

views than the organizations that helped support their advancement. Aida Touma Suleiman, 

one of the two Arab women who are members of Knesset, summarized the dilemma by stating: 

“Though I’m a feminist and support female representation everywhere, some of the women 

[ministers] do not really represent what I want to see: Feminist values, democratic values, 

support for the rights of the marginalized and oppressed. I very much hope that there will be 

more feminist voices in the Knesset and not just a higher number of women.”63

Many other groups of women who are not part of the majority have been left behind; 

Arab women and Ethiopian and Mizrahi64 Jewish women have not shared in the increasing 

representation intended by the 2005 amendment. In the push to advance women, the reality that women are not a “‘monolithic’ group and that they suffer from double exclusion 

as a result of the intersection of their femininity with religious, ethnic or economic affiliations”65 was overlooked. This realization contributed to the new focus on using gender 

mainstreaming tools to achieve gender equality. 

A central goal of 1325 is increased participation of women in national and international 

decision making. Including women’s voices in government is more difficult than simply 

appointing female ministers. An activist from Gaza stated that female members of the 

Although grassroots women’s 

organizations have been 

able to create networks that 

bridge party and religioussecular divides through their 

collaboration on the NAP and 

Emergency NAP, this has not 

been the case within the actual 

political system necessary 

for implementation.
12 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 388

legislative council are unable to make their own decisions since they are bound by the 

agenda of their party: “Although we have seven sisters from Hamas in the Legislative Council, 

I consider them all as one woman or as one man in terms of political perception or position, 

they all represent one line.” She finds the same phenomenon in Fatah and concludes that 

since “men do not listen to women and they have no trust in their views so when men give 

them high positions it is usually more symbolic than substantive.”66

Ultimately, substantive implementation of 1325 in the Palestinian territories may rely as 

much upon the involvement of men as of women, according to activist Rami Khader. Based 

on his experience, Khader stated that solely empowering women in a patriarchal society 

doesn’t lead to change. Rather, men need to be educated to help them understand why it is 

important for women to participate in politics and the legal system. The status quo can only 

change with men’s support.67

In Tunisia, struggles and nuances of local power politics have also proven challenging 

for advancing a WPS agenda. University professor and writer Olfa Youssef explained that 

many commitments to gender equality, such as the decision to drop Tunisia’s reservations to 

CEDAW, are perceived as mere “political propaganda” by politicians seeking to gain approval 

from progressive Tunisians and the international community. “Interests supersede the desire 

to achieve rights and equality,” she stated.68 Insufficient training and awareness of recent 

women’s rights legislation have also led to a lack of trust in such legislation and agendas, let 

alone in a broader WPS agenda. Both Youssef and Emna Jeblaoui explained that the French 

term for HIV is SIDA, which sounds like CEDAW. “So CEDAW has been linked with HIV, as the 

pronunciation is similar to the French word for AIDS—that gives you an idea of the level of 

ignorance we are dealing with,” Jeblaoui expressed.69

A gap has also emerged between elite women activists and more marginalized women, 

with the different groups having divergent interests rather than a unified vision. According to several interviewees, a majority of public-facing feminist activists in Tunisia have 

developed into an elitist movement, adopting a western model of feminist activism that is 

less applicable and relatable to marginalized women, largely located in the country’s interior 

region. This “feminist elite” receives a large proportion of international funding and attention, thus widening the gap. There are also fissures in the women’s political movement over 

a number of other factors, including women’s religious practices. The difficulty in bridging 

various geographic, religious, class-based, and political identities to build trust and advocate 

for common concerns has proven difficult in Tunisia’s dynamic environment post-revolution.

Promoting Women as Part of the Security Agenda

There is an inadequate understanding of the critical connection between gender and national 

security, as well as between gender and economic benefits. As conflict and economic inequality 

continue in the MENA region, societies are prioritizing responses to the economic, political, and 

security crises in ways that preserve the status quo. In the process, women are pushed to the 

periphery. It is crucial that both men and women see the link between the implementation of 

1325 and increased sustainable national security and economic growth. 

Interviewees in Egypt revealed that many Egyptians are uncertain how to define conflict

and peacebuilding. Ghada Hammam explained that the general societal belief in Egypt is that 

conflict requires arms and that peacebuilding only takes place in situations of armed conflict, 

such as the current crises in Syria and Yemen.70 Yet she highlighted that there is still much 

internal conflict in Egypt—particularly between supporters of the “old” versus the “new 

regime.” Such internal strife often leads to violence, yet it is not seen as conflict related 

to peacebuilding. Interviewees also expressed that CSOs in Egypt remain largely unaware 

of 1325. Hammam noted that conflicts affecting Egyptians today are not viewed as “high 

Men need to be educated to 

help them understand why 

it is important for women to 

participate in politics and the 

legal system. The status quo can 

only change with men’s support.
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 388 13

level” conflicts that necessitate peacebuilding efforts, therefore, 1325 is largely considered 

irrelevant to those familiar with the resolution.71 A prominent male CSO representative also 

explained that this lack of awareness of 1325 includes the general public, governmental 

institutions, and officials.72

Decades of war and violence, economic sanctions, and corruption and misrule in Iraq 

have left many women widowed, displaced, or unemployed, and the security situation continues to interrupt many girls’ schooling, adding to the gender gap.73 Moreover, the ongoing 

conflict in Iraq has led to a large increase in male adult mortality, which has meant that 

many women are now bringing up children alone, often in situations of considerable financial hardship and vulnerability.74 The context of structural violence has greatly impinged on 

their financial independence and security. 

Amid Iraq’s more volatile security situation, violence against women remains widespread. 

Survivors of violence lack mechanisms for protection. Liza Hido noted that security problems, bureaucratic hurdles, and funding deficits have forced many NGOs to close down.75 As 

such, women survivors of violence often have nowhere to seek sanctuary and ensure that 

their rights are protected. Currently, formal women’s shelters exist only in the Kurdistan 

region of Iraq. Multiple sources also report that the number of honor killings in Iraq has 

increased dramatically since the 2003 invasion.

Particularly in the context of the ISIS escalation, security has taken the front seat in 

government and media rhetoric. Women’s rights are perceived as a humanitarian burden and 

beneficial for women alone, and the link between women’s rights and security is largely misunderstood. Therefore, as interviewees explained, the prevailing excuse is that now is not 

an appropriate time, and women’s rights “will come later.” Suzan Aref explained that before 

the approval of the Emergency NAP, the 1325 Alliance attempted to hold its last conference 

within the Parliament in Baghdad, but the MPs said, “No, it’s not a good time because we 

are busy with ISIS...We don’t have money—this is a war and not a good time.” To which 

the Alliance responded, “Okay, but women are part of this, and they are the biggest victims 

of this war. This is why we have to talk about it.”76

During her remarks at the UN Security Council Open Debate on Women, Peace and Security, Yanar Mohammad stated, “Building a state on a corrupt foundation subjected millions 

to poverty and hunger in a climate of sectarian hatred. These are the politics that paved 

the way for the creation of ISIS.”77 Women’s positions in the current crisis and conflict 

with ISIS therefore cannot be understood without consideration of the broader context 

since 2003 and the widespread marginalization that arose on the basis of gender, sect, 

and ethnicity. This marginalization is inextricably linked to the security and well-being of 

the country, therefore focusing on 1325’s emphasis on equality would benefit security and 

society as a whole.

The situation in the Kurdistan region of Iraq—where women have been engaged in armed 

resistance for decades and are currently contributing to the fight against ISIS78—shows 

how efforts to strengthen women’s training over time have largely contributed to security 

benefits and enhanced women’s participation rather than their victimization. As MERI 

president Dlawer Ala’Aldeen explained, more and more women, in Sulaymaniyah in particular, have taken on key positions in the police and Peshmerga military forces—positions 

not traditionally available to women. As a result, women “have now gradually advanced 

their cause, removed boundaries, and are seriously considered, on merit, for sharing 

government leadership positions.” Further, Ala’Aldeen juxtaposed two main images that 

have recently affected perceptions of Iraqi women and women’s rights since the 2014 ISIS 

escalation: “On the one hand, we have the female fighters of Kobane [in Rojava in North 

Syria], the Shingal [with Peshmarga of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq], who actually did 

The link between women’s 

rights and security is largely 

misunderstood. Therefore, as 

interviewees explained, the 

prevailing excuse is that now is 

not an appropriate time, and 

women’s rights “will come later.” 
14 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 388

a lot more to free women and make people respect their rights. More girls were inspired 

to follow such role models and express their individual rights and political independence.” 

The other image is of “weak and helpless” women and girls who have fallen victim to 

ISIS. According to Ala’Aldeen, “People felt they needed to do more to protect women, 

enhance their capacity, and enable them to protect themselves. The Kurdish authorities 

had previously failed to invest sufficiently in training and educating women, particularly 

in the rural areas, and in making them more independent individuals in charge of their 

own destiny.” MERI, a policy-research institute based in Erbil in the Kurdistan region of 

Iraq, focuses on promoting women’s rights as part of nationbuilding, peace, and stability 

“...because we believe you can’t have peace and stability with one half of society not 

being free.”79 In monitoring rule of law as key to peacebuilding and stability, Ala’Aldeen 

explained that MERI’s “...best indication of progress is women’s rights and the data that 

we get for violence against women and the measures taken by the authorities to combat 

them.”80 While women’s rights in Iraq are still widely regarded as a humanitarian burden 

and beneficial for women alone, the link between women’s rights and security has begun 

to take root in organizations such as MERI.

In 2013, thirty women’s organizations in Israel released A Comprehensive Action Plan for the 

Application of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325.

81 Given the prominence of the 

word “security” to Israeli discourse, the authors of the NAP decided to frame it around a redefinition of the concept of “security.” According to this redefinition, “security for the people of 

Israel is a broad concept which includes: protection from violence in public and private spaces; 

termination of the ongoing state of warfare; protection and advancement of political, civil, and 

economic rights; freedom from religious coercion; freedom from oppression born of denial of 

personal and collective rights; freedom from violence, and equal opportunities for women from 

all parts of society in the economy, education, employment, health, and housing.”82

The Israeli NAP has five main objectives, including promoting gender equality, implementing gender mainstreaming, preventing violence against women, preventing violence 

against all groups, and establishing a government committee to enact the NAP into law.

In discussing some of their hopes for 1325, Palestinian women spoke of security and 

dignity. Khaleda Abusoboh stated, “Security for Palestinians is not about jet fighters and 

martyrs and tanks. Security has been identified by Mahmoud Darwish, [regarded as the 

Palestinian national poet, as the following:] Security means we have a safe place for our 

children to go to school to return home and to drink coffee with their mothers.”83 Yet she 

bemoaned that “even this kind of security is unreachable today.” Lara Nassar of the Young 

Women’s Christian Association Palestine said, “Dignity is the most important aspect; you 

can’t get anything from UNSCR 1325 without dignity. Society doesn’t see women as human 

beings. Women are viewed as mothers, daughters, wives, and lovers and not as human beings 

of their own. Therefore we should focus on ensuring and respecting women’s dignity.”84

As with other countries in this study, the greatest obstacle in the Tunisian context 

appears to be a lack of political will for advancing and implementing women’s rights guarantees given Tunisia’s current focus on security and economic recovery. Particularly in the wake 

of the Bardo (March 2015) and Sousse (June 2015) tourist attacks, as well as a November 

2015 suicide bombing, Tunisian politicians have placed immense importance on scaling up 

Tunisia’s security. This emphasis, however, has come largely without attention to women’s 

capacities in augmenting security and addressing root causes of violence. As Monia Zgarni, 

visiting fellow at Women in International Security, expressed, “I do not see any serious work 

done from the government and parliament to advance the goals of UNSCR 1325 in Tunisia. 

This fact results from the unstable situation in Tunisia. There is a big fear from the situation 

in Libya, plus the critical economic and security situation.”85

While women’s rights in 

Iraq are still widely regarded 

as a humanitarian burden and 

beneficial for women alone, the 

link between women’s rights 

and security has begun to 

take root in organizations 

such as MERI.
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 388 15

Moreover, even among the few Tunisians aware of 1325, it is largely seen as relevant 

during times of national war and armed conflict alone. Tunisian activist Moutaa Amin 

stated that 1325“...has never been an issue in Tunisia...Maybe because this resolution 

is supposed to be functional in the times of wars and armed conflicts, which is not the 

situation in Tunisia till now hopefully.”86 Once again, this reflects a lack of understanding 

of 1325 and its benefits for the larger society. Sana Ghenima, president of the Femmes 

& Leadership association and a top Tunisian CEO and entrepreneur, expressed that there 

is no national plan in Tunisia to establish durable solutions and examine the impact that 

women can have at addressing root causes of instability, as well as women’s role in security and peacebuilding.

Another significant challenge identified by interviewees involves Tunisia’s current 

economic woes. Ghenima cited the statistic that 70 percent of Tunisia’s jobless graduates 

are female—more than double the percentage of jobless male graduates.87 The issue is 

more acute in Tunisia’s marginalized interior and southern regions, where the gender gap 

increases. In short, within the government and broader society, security and economic 

focuses have taken priority, yet the link has not been made between advancing a WPS 

agenda and potential security and economic benefits for the society as a whole. 

Conclusion

Events in the MENA region in recent years have shaken the stability of communities and 

families and made the task of building support for 1325 more difficult to obtain. Calls to 

increase women’s participation in conflict resolution mechanisms and implementation of 

effective NAPs in the region have been met with stiff resistance. However, as this report 

uncovers, the benefits of the resolution have been to provide a common language and 

an approach capable of both uniting diverse women’s groups and procuring international 

funding for related projects. 

On a larger level, Sanam Anderlini, a leader on women, peace, and security issues, has 

noted that “attention to the gender dimensions of recovery and rehabilitation benefit[s] 

not just women but society at large.”88 Female and male interviewees from the five 

case studies all agreed that in order to promote sustainable peace and security, values 

of inclusivity would need to replace business-as-usual conflict resolution methods. The 

social and economic costs of continuing cycles of violence in the region have undermined 

security for everyone. 

As this report explores, the challenges of successfully implementing the vision and 

values of 1325 in the MENA region are substantial. For example, Israel demonstrates the 

challenge of overcoming a series of complex internal divides to forge a unified movement. 

In Egypt, a strong divide exists between women and men in rural versus urban settings 

and the tension between customary laws and laws of central state governance. As all 

politics are “local,” how these internal divides are used and addressed will make a major 

difference in the likelihood of future success in advancing women, peace, and security. 

Yet the interviewees raised important examples of both resiliency and hope. Efforts 

are underway in the MENA region to establish networks of CSOs to deepen analysis and 

awareness of women, peace, and security challenges and opportunities. Women requested 

that donors help create internal, safe spaces to further discussions. There is an emerging 

recognition that linking the development of NAPs to binding legislation can ensure that 

commitments do not disappear when there is a regime change. Both women and men 

shared how donors and international parties can link their aid to outcome measures that 

address the ending of violence against women and increased representation of women 

The social and economic costs 

of continuing cycles of violence 

in the region have undermined 

security for everyone.
16 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 388

in peace processes. Though there is a continued need to raise understanding and awareness of 1325, there is widespread support for systemic approaches and related training 

programs for women and men of the region. 

Recommendations

• Rather than elevating security and economic crises above (and often at the 

expense of) a WPS agenda, the case should be made that a WPS agenda enhances 

and complements current and future security and economic objectives. During 

this fluid transitional phase, efforts to balance the need for passing new genderfocused legislation and supporting its implementation amidst economic and security 

crises presents a challenging task. Yet local governments should be encouraged to 

fully implement the intentions of newer, more progressive laws related to gender 

equality with an eye to their broader societal benefits. Findings from the 2015 UN 

High Level Review and the empirical studies that it draws upon indicate that a WPS 

agenda can greatly enhance and complement other security and economic efforts. 

The potential economic and security-related leverage that a WPS agenda and a 1325 

NAP could offer presents a starting point in advocating for implementation.

• Focus should be on training and awareness-raising with local powerholders—

especially men, politicians, and religious leaders—stressing that women’s 

rights are beneficial to society as a whole. Funding should target these critical 

awareness-raising activities. Common findings across this report’s five case studies 

reveal the crucial need for political and societal will for implementation, as well as 

the significant role that can be played by local powerholders when they understand 

and buy into the contributions that a WPS agenda and 1325 can offer. Activists across 

the board reported that funding for awareness-raising is extremely difficult to acquire, 

however. Providing funding for trainings and awareness-raising efforts that reach wider 

communities would allow for a broader understanding of WPS and 1325. Outreach 

toward men and boys would also help to cultivate new advocates, expand support 

bases, and challenge violent notions of masculinity.

• The international community should be encouraged to look beyond the wellrecognized NGO actors in order to focus on capacity building for local NGOs and 

CSOs working to empower rural women. Such efforts must reach beyond the capital 

and national level engagement, as changes at the national level mean little if rural 

women do not know their rights and local governance continues to be dominated by 

male elites who do not see the benefits of a WPS agenda. In order to take advantage 

of opportunities offered in new legislation, local women leaders should receive 

training. In particular, economic empowerment programs and small business projects 

for women could provide them the resources and social capital to participate in other 

aspects of society, including conflict prevention and resolution as well as political 

participation. This effort also includes removing the barriers in both law and practice 

that inhibit NGOs’ ability to provide vital services, as well as increasing protection for 

women’s organizations.

• There should be efforts to foster and fund safe spaces for internal conversations 

between diverse groups. These conversations should bring together men and women 

across boundaries so that they can deepen trust, develop a greater voice, and begin 

to create a greater sense of inclusivity. Providing a forum through which civil society 

organizations can seriously engage with religious groups and thought leaders is also 

Though there is a continued 

need to raise understanding 

and awareness of 1325, there is 

widespread support for systemic 

approaches and related training 

programs for women and 

men of the region. 
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 388 17

key. Shahira Shalaby, a Palestinian activist in Israel, spoke of the increasing difficulty 

for Israeli Jews and Palestinian citizens of Israel to find safe spaces for dialogue. She 

urged international funders to create the opportunities for activists to come together, 

across divides, to “prepare for peace.”89 

• The international community should continue to support the development and 

implementation of 1325 NAPs by governments that reflect the wide collaborative 

efforts of CSOs. In order to be successful, NAPs must be enacted by governments 

and supported by respected and informed CSOs. International funding, training, and 

capacity building can temper the challenges of cooperation by establishing lead 

groups and setting a common vision. Without international funding, as has been 

the case in Egypt and Tunisia, it is more difficult for groups to coalesce around 1325 

and NAP development by their governments. At the same time, it is important that 

NAP development is seen as an “internal” country initiative and not an imposed 

“external” initiative. 

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to express appreciation and thanks to the interviewees from the 

MENA region who contributed their valuable time and thoughts to this report. They would 

also like to express their appreciation to Victoria Denoon for all of her efforts on behalf of 

this report. 

Notes

1. Personal interview, Shahira Shalaby, September 1, 2015.

2. Personal interview, Name redacted for privacy, November 17, 2015. 

3. Personal interview, Rasha Dewedar, August 18, 2015.

4. Ibid.

5. Personal interview, Ghada Hammam, September 4, 2015.

6. Personal interview, Name redacted for privacy, November 17, 2015.

7. Anat Saragusti, “Israel and UNSCR 1325,” Israel-Palestine Journal 17, no. 3–4 (2011): 55–58. 

8. A Comprehensive Action Plan for the Application of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (CAP), 

October 31, 2013, www.vanleer.org.il/sites/files/atttachment_field/Israeli%20Action%20Plan%201325%20

31%2010%202013.pdf.

9. Personal correspondence, Naomi Chazan, February 24, 2016.

10. Catherine Anderson “Palestinian Women’s Rights Overlooked in Favour of National Liberation,” Middle East 

Eye, November 3, 2015, www.middleeasteye.net/news/palestinian-women-oppressed-rights-overlooked-favournational-liberation-1771812742.

11. Rima Kittaneh Nazzal, Palestinian Women and Resolution 1325, Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global 

Dialogue and Democracy, October 7, 2009.

12. Ibid.

13. Anderson, “Palestinian Women’s Rights.”

14. Marcia Banasko, Mira Rizeq, Rev. Loren McGrail’, and Suhair Ramadan, “Women’s Freedom, Peace and Dignity in 

Palestine: UNSCR 1325 for Accountability,” Conference Report, Young Women’s Christian Association of Palestine 

International Conference, February 13, 2015, http://ywca-palestine.org/manual-reports/index.php.

15. Personal interview, Emna Jeblaoui, October 15, 2015.

16. Human Rights Watch, “Tunisia: A Step Forward for Women’s Rights,” November 12, 2015.

17. “Developing National Action Plan for Implementation of UNSCR 1325 in Iraq: Strategic Meeting-Civil Society 

Group,” European Feminist Initiative, July 28-29, 2012, www.efi-ife.org/sites/default/files/6%20report_

strategic_meeting_for_developing_of_nap_1325_in_iraq_28-29_july_2012_beirut.pdf.

18. Suzan Aref, Statement given at Implementing UNSCR 1325 amidst Conflict & Chaos in Iraq: An Emergency Plan 

in Response to the ISIS Crisis (USIP), October 27, 2015. 

19. Personal interview, Liza Hido, September 20, 2015.

20. Personal interview, Haider al-Ibrahimi, October 18, 2015.

21. Ibid.

22. Banasko, Rizeq, McGrail’, and Ramadan, “Women’s Freedom, Peace and Dignity.” 
18 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 388

23. Personal interview, Khaleda Abusoboh, September 8, 2015.

24. Ibid.

25. This community regularly self-identifies as Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel.

26. “Critical Assessment and Recommendations for the National Action Plan for the Implementation of the UN 

Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security in Israel,” Position Paper by Jewish & 

Palestinian Women’s Rights Organizations in Israel, Altufula Center – Nazareth, No date given. 

27. Personal interview, Sarai Aharoni, August 13, 2015.

28. CAP, 6.

29. “The 2015 Global Gender Gap Report: How Did MENA Countries Rank?” Al-Bawaba, November, 23 2015, www.

albawaba.com/business/2015-global-gender-gap-report-how-did-mena-countries-rank-772076?mkt_tok=3RkMM

JWWfF9wsRonvajPe%2B%2FhmjTEU5z17e4pX6Cg38431UFwdcjKPmjr1YIJScJgI%2BSLDwEYGJlv6SgFSLHMMa12z

7gLXxI%3D.

30. Hammam, interview.

31. Mariam Mecky, “Egyptian Women in Parliament Polls: Hopes and Hurdles,” Ahram Online, November 18, 

2015, http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/164/166619/Egypt/Egypt-Elections-/Egyptian-women-inparliament-polls-Hopes-and-obsta.aspx?mkt_tok=3RkMMJWWfF9wsRonvajPe%2B%2FhmjTEU5z17e4pX6Cg3843

1UFwdcjKPmjr1YIJScJgI%2BSLDwEYGJlv6SgFSLHMMa12z7gLXxI%3D.

32. Angele Reda, “87 Women in Egypt’s 2015 Parliament: Not Good Enough,” Watani (Cairo), January 4, 2016, http://

en.wataninet.com/politics/parliament/87-women-in-egypts-2015-parliament-not-good-enough/15471/.

33. Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt 2014, 48.

34. Yanar Mohammad, “Statement by Ms. Yanar Mohammad, UN Security Council Open Debate on Women, Peace 

and Security,” October13, 2015, http://womenpeacesecurity.org/media/pdf-NGOWG_Statement_OpenDebate_

Mohammad_Oct2015_EN.pdf.

35. Aref, Statement at Implementing UNSCR 1325.

36. Al-Ibrahimi, interview.

37. Personal interview, Dlawer Ala’Aldeen, October 17, 2015.

38. Hido, interview.

39. Ibid.

40. Al-Ibrahimi, interview.

41. Ala’Aldeen, interview.

42. Ibid.

43. Personal interview, Tamir Magal, November 23, 2015.

44. Lahav Harkov, “Women Likely to Be Left Out of Security Cabinet,” Jerusalem Post, May 3, 2015, www.jpost.com/

Israel-News/Politics-And-Diplomacy/Women-likely-to-be-left-out-of-Security-Cabinet-400952.

45. Abusoboh, interview.

46. Personal interview, Rami Khader, November 10, 2015.

47. Vanessa Farr, “UNSCR 1325 and Women’s Peace Activism in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,” International 

Feminist Journal of Politics, 13, no. 4 (2011): 539–56.

48. Personal interview, Sama Aweidah, September 30, 2015.

49. Farr, “UNSCR 1325 and Women’s Peace Activism.”

50. Jeblaoui, interview.

51. UN Women, “Tunisia’s New Constitution: A Breakthrough for Women’s Rights,” February 11, 2014, www.

unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2014/2/tunisias-new-constitution.

52. Drude Dahlerup, Elin Danielsson, and Emil Johansson, “Gender Equality Policy in Tunisia,” European Parliament 

Policy Department C, 2012, 11, www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/note/join/2012/462502/IPOLFEMM_NT(2012)462502_EN.pdf.

53. Personal interview, Lina Ben Mhenni, September 7, 2015.

54. Hammam, interview.

55. Personal interview, Name redacted for privacy, November 17, 2015

56. Personal interview, Name redacted for privacy, September 20, 2015.

57. Ibid.

58. Oscar Fernandez-Taranco, “Collaborative Approaches to Global Security,” (speech, Institute for Inclusive Security, 

October 15, 2015). 

59. Hido, interview.

60. Ibid.

61. Mohammad, “Statement by Ms. Yanar Mohammad, UN Security Council Open Debate.”

62. Jews who emigrated to Israel from Western Europe.

63. Lahav Harkov, “Meet the New MK: Joint List’s Touma-Sliman Wants to Enact Feminist Laws, Improve Lives of 

Arabs,” Jerusalem Post, April 20, 2015, www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Politics-And-Diplomacy/Meet-the-New-MKJoint-Lists-Touma-Sliman-wants-to-enact-feminist-laws-improve-lives-of-Arabs-398674.

64. Jews who emigrated to Israel from Arab nations.

65. Naomi Chazan, “Israel’s Gender Revolution,” The Times of Israel, December 22, 2014, http://blogs.timesofisrael.

com/israels-gender-revolution/.

66. Nadera Shalhoub Kevorkian, The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325: Implementation in Palestine 

and Israel 2000-2009, Norwegian Christian Aid, 2010.
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 388 19

67. Khader, interview.

68. Personal interview, Olfa Youssef, September 28, 2015.

69. Jeblaoui, interview. 

70. Hammam, interview.

71. Ibid.

72. Personal interview, Name redacted for privacy, November 17, 2015.

73. Freedom House, “Women’s Rights in the Middle East and North Africa 2010-Iraq,” 2010.

74. World Bank, “World Development Report 2012: Gender Equality and Development,” (Washington, DC: World 

Bank, 2012), 119.

75. Hido, interview.

76. Aref, Statement at Implementing UNSCR 1325. 

77. Mohammad, “Statement by Ms. Yanar Mohammad, UN Security Council Open Debate.”

78. Dilar Dirik, “Western Fascination with ‘Badass’ Kurdish Women,” Al Jazeera, October 29, 2014, www.aljazeera.

com/indepth/opinion/2014/10/western-fascination-with-badas-2014102112410527736.html.

79. Ala’Aldeen, interview.

80. Ala’Aldeen, interview. 

81. CAP. 

82. Ibid., 6.

83. Abusoboh, interview.

84. Banasko, Rizeq, McGrail’, and Ramadan, “Women’s Freedom, Peace and Dignity.”

85. Email correspondence Monia Zgarni, September 27, 2015.

86. Email correspondence, Moutaa Amin, November 9, 2015.

87. Personal interview, Sana Ghenima, September 8, 2015.

88. Sanam Anderlini, “Translating Global Agreement into National and Local Commitments,” in Women and War, 

ed. Kathleen Kuehnast, Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, and Helga Hernes, (Washington DC: USIP Press, 2011) 35. 

89. Shalaby, interview.
Of Related Interest

• Women, Religion, and Peacebuilding: Illuminating the Unseen edited by Susan Hayward and 

Katherine Marshall (USIP Press, 2015)

• Women and War: Power and Protection in the 21st Century edited by Kathleen Kuehnast, 

Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, and Helga Hernes (USIP Press, 2011) 

• Women’s Leadership Roles in Afghanistan by Aarya Nijat and Jennifer Murtazashvili (Special 

Report, September 2015)

• The Other Side of Gender: Men as Critical Agents of Change by Joseph Vess, Gary Barker, 

Sanam Naraghi-Anderlini, and Alexa Hassink (Special Report, December 2013)

• Engaging Men in Women’s Rights and Empowerment in South Asia and the Middle East by 

Anne Angarola, Steven E. Steiner, and Shannon Zimmerman (Peace Brief, April 2013) 

• Peacebuilding Efforts of Women from Afghanistan and Iraq: Lessons in Transition by Kathleen 

Kuehnast, Manal Omar, Steven E. Steiner, and Hodei Sultan (Special Report, December 2012)

• Lessons from Women’s Programs in Afghanistan and Iraq by Kathleen Kuehnast, Manal Omar, 

Steven E. Steiner, and Hodei Sultan (Special Report, March 2012) 

• The Other Side of Gender: Including Masculinity Concerns in Conflict and Peacebuilding by 

Kathleen Kuehnast and Nina Sudhakar (Peace Brief, January 2011) 

• The Role of Women in Global Security by Valerie Norville (Special Report, January 2011)

ISBN: 978-1-60127-570-7

An online edition of this and related 

reports can be found on our website 

(www.usip.org), together with additional 

information on the subject.

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Institute of Peace

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