After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is *

unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record. See FED. R. APP. P.

34(a)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted July 15, 2009*

 Decided July 16, 2009 

Before

RICHARD D. CUDAHY, Circuit Judge

 DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge

 JOHN DANIEL TINDER, Circuit Judge

No. 08-2910

BARRY L. BALL,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

GREG GRAMS,

Respondent-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Western District of

Wisconsin.

No. 07-cv-670-bbc

Barbara B. Crabb,

Chief Judge.

O R D E R

Wisconsin prisoner Barry Ball petitioned the district court for a writ of habeas

corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, alleging that he was deprived of good-time credits in

violation of his due-process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court

found that the prison authorities acted properly and denied Ball’s petition. We affirm.

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 08-2910 Page 2

Prison officials at Oshkosh Correctional Institution issued Ball a conduct report that

charged him with sexual conduct and battery in violation of the Wisconsin prison code. See

WIS. ADMIN. CODE §§ DOC 303.12, 303.15. The report concluded, based on the sworn

statements of five confidential informants (only three were notarized), that Ball engaged in

repeated sexual contact with one inmate (Ball’s former cellmate) and attempted sexual

contact with two others (who were not named). The report also charged Ball with striking

his former cellmate on the face hard enough to leave a red mark. The report summarized

each informant’s sworn statement, but did not disclose the identities of the informants,

who feared for their personal safety, or the times and locations of the events. 

At the disciplinary hearing, Ball objected to withholding the times and locations of

the incidents and filed a written statement denying all the charges. The disciplinary

committee, though, found Ball guilty of misconduct with his former cellmate. It explained

that it reviewed the sworn statements of the five informants and found the statements to be

credible, detailed, and consistent with one another. The committee also noted that Ball had

provided no evidence to corroborate his denial of wrongdoing. It sentenced Ball to eight

days of adjustment segregation, 360 days of program segregation (resulting in a loss of

good-time credits), and a transfer to another institution. 

After exhausting his remedies in the prison, Ball filed a petition for review in the

Wisconsin state courts, as he was required to do before turning to the federal courts. 

McAtee v. Cowan, 250 F.3d 506, 508 (7th Cir. 2001). The Wisconsin Court of Appeals, the last

state court to hear his case, affirmed the denial of Ball’s petition. See State of Wisconsin ex

rel. Ball v. Frank, 712 N.W.2d 87, 2006 WL 407689 (Wisc. App. 2006) (unpublished order). 

That court concluded that the notice Ball received was sufficient for him to mount a

defense against the charges of a sexual relationship with his former cellmate and a battery

against him. It expressed concern about withholding details regarding the two other

alleged instances of attempted sexual conduct, but concluded that its concern was

mitigated because Ball was not punished for those acts, only for those against his cellmate. 

As to the charges concerning Ball’s cellmate, because the two men were housed together for

only about 60 days, the court concluded that Ball had notice of the general time of the

offense. Finally, the court refused to discredit the two statements that were not notarized

because they were made under oath as required by the Wisconsin Administrative Code

§ DOC 303.81(5).

Because the prison’s disciplinary proceeding deprived Ball of good-time credits, he

properly brought his petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to claim that the proceeding denied

him due process. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 529, 557, 572 (1974). Furthermore,
No. 08-2910 Page 3

because the Wisconsin Court of Appeals decided the merits of Ball’s challenge to his prison

discipline, the limited-review provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) apply. White v. Ind. Parole

Bd., 266 F.3d 759, 766 (7th Cir. 2001). As relevant here, federal collateral relief is not

available unless the state-court adjudication was contrary to or an unreasonable application

of federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). We review

de novo the district court’s application of these principles in considering a petition for a

writ of habeas corpus. Julian v. Bartley, 495 F.3d 487, 491 (7th Cir. 2007). 

On appeal Ball raises two procedural challenges to the district court’s decision. First

he complains that the district court incorrectly placed the burden on him to show that the

decision of the Wisconsin court was contrary to the precedent of the Supreme Court. But it

is Ball, not the prison, who bears that burden. See Badelle v. Correll, 452 F.3d 648, 659 (7th

Cir. 2006); Henry v. Page, 223 F.3d 477, 480 (7th Cir. 2000). Ball next contends that he was

not given a chance to argue fully his petition to the district court. But the court followed

the procedures in the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. Ball submitted a petition setting

forth his proposed grounds for relief, see Rule 2(c), he replied to the state’s answer to his

petition, see Rule 5(e), and he even filed a 21-page objection to the magistrate judge’s report

and recommendation—all of which the district court considered. And, finally, Ball does

not identify any issue that he was prevented from raising.

Ball’s most serious attack surrounds the absence of any dates or locations in the

prison’s charging document. He asserts that he was unable to put on an effective defense

without this information. He also contests the Wisconsin court’s conclusion that the

relationship took place during the 60-day period in which the two men were double-celled

because the time of the offense was never stated in the charging document or anywhere

else in the administrative record. He insists, also, that the district court should have held

an evidentiary hearing to identify the prison’s reasons for not revealing the locations and

times, which Ball believes would not withstand scrutiny.

The Supreme Court has held the notice of prison disciplinary charges is sufficient if

it “inform[s] [Ball] of the charges and . . . enable[s] him to marshal the facts and prepare a

defense.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564. The notice should alert the inmate to the rule that he

allegedly violated and summarize the facts underlying the charge. Whitford v. Boglino, 63

F.3d 527, 534 (7th Cir. 1995). In this case, the prison told Ball whom he was accused of

acting against (his former cellmate) and what offenses he was accused of committing

(sexual acts and a battery). Even without knowing the precise dates and locations of the

misconduct, Ball could still gather evidence to mount a defense against the charges. For

example, in addition to his own sworn statement, he could have sought the testimony of

his former cellmate to support his denial of any sexual misconduct or battery. 
No. 08-2910 Page 4

Although the dates and locations might have helped Ball, our task is limited to

deciding whether the Wisconsin court’s conclusion that the notice was sufficient is an

unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The

decision is reasonable if it is “minimally consistent with the facts and circumstances of the

case.” Schultz v. Page, 313 F.3d 1010, 1015 (7th Cir. 2002). Ball cites to district-court and

circuit-court decisions that he believes suggest that the Wisconsin court was wrong. See

McCollum v. Miller, 695 F.2d 1044, 1048-89 (7th Cir. 1982); Washington v. Chrans, 769 F. Supp.

1045, 1054 (C.D. Ill. 1991); Franklin v. Israel, 537 F. Supp. 1112, 1117-18 (W.D. Wisc. 1982);

Rinehart v. Brewer, 483 F. Supp. 165, 169 (S.D. Iowa 1980). But these cases show, at most,

that another court may have viewed the sufficiency of notice differently than the Wisconsin

court, not that the Wisconsin court’s decision was unreasonable. See Schriro v. Landrigan,

550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007) (“The question under AEDPA is not whether a federal court

believes the state court’s determination was incorrect but whether that determination was

unreasonable—a substantially higher threshold.”). And even McCollum recognizes that

prison officials may withhold the time and place of an alleged offense if other procedural

safeguards are present to guard against errors, such as requiring that statements be under

oath, as was done here. 695 F.2d at 1048-49. Without any Supreme Court case requiring

dates and locations, it was not unreasonable for the Wisconsin court to conclude that the

notice was sufficient. Therefore the federal district court did not need to inquire further

into the prison’s reasons for not divulging that information.

Finally, Ball objects that two of the confidential statements were not notarized, and

therefore the disciplinary committee should have disregarded them. The Wisconsin Court

of Appeals rejected this contention because the statements were made under oath. Ball has

pointed to no Supreme Court case that compels, as a matter of due process, the opposite

conclusion. The case he does cite, Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114-15 (1964), discusses the

use of informants in finding probable cause in a criminal context—inapplicable to prison

disciplinary proceedings. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556 (“Prison disciplinary proceedings are

not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such

proceedings does not apply.”). Accordingly, the Wisconsin court did not unreasonably

decide that the disciplinary committee could rely on the sworn but unnotarized statements.

We AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Ball’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.