E u rope in the 21st Century

A Strategy for Ac h i eving 

Stable Pe a c e

B r i e f l y. . .

In the future, a peaceful, und i v ide d, and de mo c ra t ic Europe could take differe nt fo r ms

but would inc l ude the fo l l o w i ng eleme nt s :

• di f f e re nt ia t ion amo ng states accord i ng to membership in Europe’s ins t i t u t io ns — i f

based on na t io nal cho ic e, differe nt ia t ion is the pre f e r red mo del for Europe’s future

• a stable peace amo ng European states

• t he int e g ra t ion of Russia into Euro p e

• a mo re equal re l a t io nship between the European Un ion and the United States in European affairs and globally

• active involveme nt by the United States in Europe—even though that involveme nt

is likely to be mo re cons t ra i ned due to do me s t ic conc e r ns re g a rd i ng fo re ign polic y

o v e r re a c h

G l o b a l i z a t ion offers opportunities for Europe’s further int e g ra t ion. Governme nt s, ho we v e r, must not impede this pro c e s s, but better unde r s t a nd and harness it.

T he outlines of a peaceful, und i v ide d, and de mo c ra t ic Europe are eme rg i ng, but cons ide rable obstacles re ma i n :

• The future of de mo c racy in Russia re ma i ns unc e r t a i n .

• A coord i nated European-U.S. strategy for eng a g i ng Russia is lacking .

• Po l i t ical will in western capitals for int e g ra t i ng Eastern Europe may flag.

• En l a rg i ng and re fo r m i ng the European Un ion may weaken re l a t io ns amo ng the alli m p o r t a nt core West European states.

• The tra ns i t ion to a peaceful, und i v ide d, and de mo c ra t ic Europe will re q u i re a shift in

s o me leadership re s p o ns i b i l i t ies from the United States to Euro p e. Is this acceptable to

t he United States? Are the Euro p e a ns re a dy to assume this add i t io nal re s p o ns i b i l i t y ?

S o l id tra ns a t l a nt ic re l a t io ns are the fo u nda t ion for fo r m i ng a peaceful, und i v ide d, and

demo c ra t ic Euro p e. The United States and Europe need to ens u re that tra ns a t l a nt ic re l at io ns endu re the European Un ion’s attempts to re form and enlarge, the de v e l o p me nt of

a common European de f e nse polic y, and a shift in leadership re s p o ns i b i l i t ies from the

United States to Euro p e.

w w w. u s i p . o rg

S P E C I A L R E P O R T

1200 17th Street NW • Washington, DC 20036 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

The views ex p ressed in this report do not

necessarily reflect those of the United States

Institute of Pe a c e, which does not 

a d vocate specific policies.

N ovember 7, 2000

AB O U T T H E RE P O R T

T he United States Institute of Pe a c e

o rganized a Wo r k i ng Group on the Future of

E u rope in 1998 ma de up of 15 Ame r ic a n

experts on Europe and Russia, and co-chaire d

by Stephen Hadley and Ant ho ny Lake. The

task of the group has been to develop a

l o ng-term vision for Europe that is in the

best int e rest of the United States, while layi ng out the appro p r iate polic ies and

p ro g ra ms for its achie v e me nt .

T he fo l l o w i ng report is based on a series of

mee t i ngs held by the working group in late

1999 and early 2000, inc l ud i ng a confere nc e

with Euro p e a ns at the Aspen Institute in

Berlin in Ja nua r y. (For a summary of the re co m me nda t io ns of the Berlin me e t i ng, see

Defining the Path to a Peaceful, Undivided,

and Democratic Europe, S p e c ial Report 60, by

S t e p hen Ha d l e y.) This report was written by

I nstitute pro g ram of f icer Lauren Van Me t re

a nd is based on comme nts by partic i p a nts in

t he Future of Europe Project, but does no t

imply unanimity of opinion on every point .

T he Future of Europe Project is a major effo r t

of the Institute's Research and Stud ies Prog ram, which is directed by Pa t r ick M. Cro n i n .

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEAC E

CO N T E N T S

I nt ro duc t io n 2

What Mig ht a Peaceful and

D e mo c ra t ic Europe Look Like ? 2

O p p o r t u n i t ies for Ac h ie v i ng a

Stable Peace in Euro p e 4

Obstacles to Ac h ie v i ng a 

Stable Peace in Euro p e 5

I m p ro v i ng U.S.-Russian Relatio ns 6

T he Challenges of an Enlarg i ng Euro p e 7

C o nc l u s io ns 1 0

R e c o m me nda t io ns 1 1
I n t ro d u c t i o n

In November 1999, members of the Future of Europe Wo r k i ng Group met to discuss the

p rospects for a “peaceful, und i v ide d, and de mo c ra t ic” Europe (syno ny mous with a Euro p e

“ w hole and free”). Pa r t ic i p a nts agreed that the concept, although the ma nt ra of suc c e ssive U.S. pre s ide nt ial adm i n i s t ra t io ns, had never been clearly de f i ne d, nor had an acceptable tra ns a t l a nt ic strategy for its achie v e me nt ever been pre p a re d. The task of the study

g roup was thre e - fold: to assess whe t her a peaceful, und i v ide d, and de mo c ra t ic Europe is

feasible and de s i rable; to ide ntify the likely scena r ios for achie v i ng a stable peace in a

E u rope inclusive of Russia, as well as the eleme nts necessary for achie v i ng it; and to

a r t iculate policy optio ns for its attainme nt. The Institute also spons o red three separa t e

mee t i ngs on Russia, since Russia’s role in Europe is critical to achie v i ng a Europe at stable peace.

In January 2000, the U.S. Institute of Pe a c e, with the Aspen Institute/Berlin, org anized a me e t i ng with experts from Europe to pre s e nt to them ma ny of the same issues.

Despite differe nt na t io nal, political, and historical perspectives, partic i p a nts at the

mee t i ng in Berlin recognized the de s i rability of a peaceful, und i v ide d, and de mo c ra t ic

E u ro p e, but held widely differe nt views as to its shape and the like l i hood of the Un i t e d

States and Europe achie v i ng such a visio n .

What Might a Peaceful, Undivided, and Democratic Europe Look Like? 

Possible Scenarios 

Par t ic i p a nts agreed that the future shape of a peaceful, und i v ide d, and de mo c ra t ic

E u rope was not easily de f i ne d, nor was it necessarily useful to reach cons e nsus on this

i s s u e. Several differe nt associa t io ns of states mig ht form the basis of a stable peace in

E u ro p e. Some partic i p a nts envisio ned a “fuzzy tripolarity” corre s p o nd i ng to North Ame rica, the European Un ion, and a revived Russia, with other states fre e l y, or not at all,

a s s o c iated with one or all of these three cent e r s. Alternative scena r ios inc l uded: (1) re lative autono my of the three major power centers with each ma i nt a i n i ng their own cult u ral he r i t a ge and satisfying their particular int e rests; (2) skillfully imposed coopera t io n

in a system whe re the United States is do m i na nt and the re is little or no opposition to

this arra nge me nt; (3) North Ame r ica and Western Europe working as partners on econom ic and security ma t t e r s, while Russia, fa i l i ng in econo m ic and de mo c ra t ic re fo r ms,

b e c o mes inc re a s i ngly hostile towards the West; and (4) coopera t ion challenged at time s

by coalitio ns opposing U.S. polic ie s.

I m p o r tant Qualities

T hese and other scena r ios mig ht accurately describe a Europe of the future that was stab l e, at peace, and committed to de mo c ra t ic go v e r na nc e. A careful comparison could yie l d

a strategy for achie v i ng the mo re plausible and de s i rable scena r io s, while sugge s t i ng

p o l ic ies to avoid the mo re unde s i rable outcome s. 

Par t ic i p a nts agreed that the pre f e r red mo dels for Europe shared several common eleme nt s, which are discussed below. One common eleme nt was a Europe in which the

c o u nt r ies would be differe nt iated accord i ng to their membership in Europe’s mu l t i l a t e ral ins t i t u t io ns. Ho w e v e r, as count r ies developed stable de mo c ra c ies and pra c t iced go o d

re l a t io ns with ne ig h b o r s, such differe nt ia t ion would be de t e r m i ned by na t io nal cho ic e

a nd not ins t i t u t io nal inc l u s ion or exc l u s ion. Pa r t ic i p a nts felt stro ngly that differe nt ia t io n

off e red the most sophisticated and stable mo del for Europe’s future de v e l o p me nt. In the

i nterim perio d, it allows: (1) Europe’s ins t i t u t io ns and core count r ies time to adapt to

new cond i t io ns and me m b e r s, and (2) flexibility in the event of political reversals in

newly de mo c ra t ic states. And, at the end of the da y, differe nt ia t ion allows count r ies to

2

AB O U T T H E IN S T I T U T E

T he United States Institute of Peace is an

i nde p e nde nt, nonpartisan fede ral ins t i t u t io n

c reated by Cong ress to pro mote re s e a rc h ,

e duc a t ion, and tra i n i ng on the pre v e nt io n ,

ma na ge me nt, and re s o l u t ion of int e r na t io na l

c o n f l ic t s. Established in 1984, the Ins t i t u t e

meets its cong re s s io nal ma ndate through an

a r ray of pro g ra ms, inc l ud i ng re s e a rch gra nt s,

f e l l o w s h i p s, prof e s s io nal tra i n i ng pro g ra ms,

c o n f e re nces and worksho p s, library servic e s,

p u b l ic a t io ns, and other educ a t io nal activitie s.

T he Institute's Board of Directors is appoint e d

by the Pre s ide nt of the United States and

c o n f i r med by the Sena t e.

BOA R D O F DI R E C TO R S

Chester A. Cro c ke r ( C h a i r man), Ja mes R. Schlesinge r

P rofessor of Stra t e g ic Stud ie s, School of Fore ign Servic e,

G e o rgetown University • Max M. Ka m p e l m a n , E s q .

( V ice Chairman), Frie d, Frank, Ha r r i s, Shriver and Ja c o bson, Wa s h i ngton, D.C. • Dennis L. Bark, S e n ior Fellow,

Hoover Ins t i t u t ion on Wa r, Revolution and Pe a c e, Stanfo rd University • Stephen J. Hadley, Esq., Shea & 

G a rd ne r, Wa s h i ngton, D.C. • T h e o d o re M. Hesbu rg h ,

P re s ide nt Eme r i t u s, University of No t re Dame • Za l m a y

K h a l i l z a d , RAND Corpora t ion, Wa s h i ngton, D.C. • 

S eymour Martin Lipset, Hazel Professor of Public Po l ic y,

G e o rge Mason University • W. Scott Thompson, P rof e ssor of Int e r na t io nal Po l i t ic s, Fletcher School of Law and

D i p l o ma c y, Tufts University • Allen Weinstein, P re s ide nt, Center for Demo c ra c y, Wa s h i ngton, D.C. • H a r r i e t

Z i m m e r m a n , V ice Pre s ide nt, Ame r ican Is rael Public

A f fairs Committee, Wa s h i ngton, D.C.

ME M B E R S E XO F F I C I O

Paul G. Gaffney II, P re s ide nt, Na t io nal Defense Un i v e rsity • J. Stapleton Roy, Ass i s t a nt Secretary of State fo r

I nt e l l ige nce and Research • Walter B. Slocombe, Unde r

S e c retary of Defense for Po l icy • R i c h a rd H. Solomon,

P res ide nt, United States Institute of Peace (no n v o t i ng )
mai ntain important na t io nal prio r i t ies and pre c e de nts in order to retain do me s t ic support for the ins t i t u t io nal affilia t io ns they select. 

Of course, tra ns i t io n i ng to a system of differe nt ia t ion based on na t io nal self-select ion re q u i res a major commitme nt by European count r ies to: (1) help the count r ies of

C e nt ral Europe and the fo r mer Soviet Un ion achieve the curre nt membership criteria, and

(2) ens u re that European ins t i t u t io ns have the capacity to inc l ude new me m b e r s. And,

it me a ns political leaders must be able to accept ambig u i t y — t he event ual shape of a

E u rope in stable peace cannot be pre d icted toda y. Pa r t ic i p a nts cautio ne d, ho w e v e r, that

this ambiguity must be a tho u g htful stra t e g ic de c i s ion. It cannot be employed as a

crutch for fa i l i ng to ide ntify long-term goals and polic ies cons i s t e nt with those go a l s.

A second important quality of a peaceful, und i v ide d, and de mo c ra t ic Europe would

be a stable peace amo ng European states. That is, the resort to armed fo rce would no t

be amo ng the policy optio ns any European go v e r n me nt would seriously cons ider as a

met hod of re s o l v i ng differe nces with other states within the system. Pa r t ic i p a nt s

a c k no w l e dge d, ho w e v e r, that int e r nal conflicts would be difficult to era d icate even in a

E u rope in which state-on-state aggre s s ion was obsolete. The re fo re, conflict mig ht ex i s t

even within a system at stable peace. Statecraft in such a system would rely pre do m inantly on diplomacy to create a pre d ic t a b l e, orderly re l a t io nship amo ng states—a coope rative security order or a security commu n i t y. Military calculatio ns would be less

dom i na nt in the re l a t io ns amo ng states, which would be influenced primarily by econom ic and political fa c t o r s. In this cont ext, partic i p a nts emphasized that the process of

“ de - na t io na l i z i ng” for mer communist states was just as important as de mo c ra t i z a t io n .

S o c ie t ies must be dra i ned of ide o l o g ical and na t io nal passion, and go v e r n me nts mu s t

exist primarily to satisfy the well-being of their citizens and not to vene rate the state. 

Par t ic i p a nts also agreed that a Russia distinct from Europe inhibits the vision of a

peaceful, und i v ide d, and de mo c ra t ic Euro p e, and that it is was also in the int e rest of

R u s s ia to be a part of the new Euro p e. The price Moscow would pay for competition with

E u ro a t l a nt ic struc t u res would be a tre me ndous draw on its re s o u rc e s — re s o u rces that are

c u r re ntly ne e ded for Russia’s econo m ic, de mo c ra t ic, and cultural de v e l o p me nt. Me a nw h i l e, Russia’s close associa t ion with a Euro a t l a nt ic security community would enhanc e

its role in the world and ease the hardships associated with its curre nt tra ns i t ion. 

A mo re equal re l a t io nship in Europe and globally between the European Un ion and

t he United States is inevitable and a de s i rable eleme nt of a Europe “whole and fre e. ” T he

rec e nt int ro duc t ion of the European joint curre nc y — t he euro—will re q u i re greater and

more balanced coopera t ion between the European Un ion and the United States in int e rna t io nal fina nc ial affa i r s. Some partic i p a nts also felt that the European Un ion was ideally positio ned to take the lead in cre a t i ng the possibilities for a stable peace and a

security community inclusive of Russia. Europe has a smaller stra t e g ic vision that is

more palatable to Russia than that of the United States, which has ex t e nsive int e re s t s

ra ng i ng from ge o g ra p h ic (the Caspian Sea Basin) to func t io nal (nuclear and arms cont rol issues). And, through fo r m i ng the European Un ion, European leaders have re f i ne d

c o nc i l ia t ion and cons e ns u s - b u i l d i ng skills that are useful for eng a g i ng Russia. 

Many tho u g ht that the best cont r i b u t ion Europe could ma ke today for its future

peace is to develop a cohe re nt political struc t u re. This struc t u re would no longer be

based on a common de s i re to share power in order to avoid war, as was the goal of

E u rope's ins t i t u t io ns. Ins t e a d, European states and ins t i t u t io ns must focus on building

a strong community that can ma na ge Europe’s int e ra c t ion with the global econo my. One

s p e a ker at the Berlin me e t i ng noted that do m i na nt powers embrace globalization in

o rder to have a say in the ways of the world and to spread their values. For lesser powe r s, ex p o s u re to global culture and econo my feels like a loss of cont rol—an attack on

state ins t i t u t io ns. The European Un ion is a way for the states of Europe to pool the i r

res o u rces to ma na ge, and not simply react to, globalization. It offers a sense of empowe r me nt and self-confide nce that will help the European Un ion become an actor, and no t

merely a pre s e nc e, in global affa i r s. And, if the United States and Europe ma na ge well

3

Participants felt strongly that

d i f f e rentiation of f e red the most

sophisticated and stable model

for Europe's future development. 

A more equal relationship in

E u rope and globally betwe e n

the European Union and the

United States is inev i table and

a desirable element of a Euro p e

“whole and fre e. ”
E u rope’s inc reased power and influenc e, Europe will be a stro ng partner not only in European affa i r s, but in other global ma t t e r s. 

It is important that the United States also be eng a ged with the new Euro p e. The re are

s e v e ral fa c t o r s, ho w e v e r, that will cond i t ion future U.S.-European re l a t io ns. On the do me st ic fro nt, ne o - i s o l a t ionism has been and may cont i nue to be a limiting fa c t o r. Most part ic i p a nts agre e d, ho w e v e r, that despite the occasio nal questio n i ng of U.S. global

e ng a ge me nt s, the United States is a na t ion whose population is overwhe l m i ngly in fa v o r

of mul t i l a t e ral org a n i z a t io ns and collective appro a c hes to int e r na t io nal pro b l e ms. Dome st ic conc e r ns re g a rd i ng U.S. overreach will, ho w e v e r, begin to cons t rain its int e r na t io na l

a c t io ns. Po l icy leaders on both sides of the At l a nt ic must begin to accept that U.S. prio r i t ies and res t ra i nts will limit its leadership and partic i p a t ion on some issues. In the s e

c a s e s, the Euro p e a ns may have to fill the void and the United States will have to accept

that, in these cases, the outcome may not be ent i rely fa v o rable to its int e re s t s. 

Opportunities for Ac h i eving a Stable Peace in Euro p e

Par t ic i p a nts agreed that a good starting point for de t e r m i n i ng a strategy for achie v i ng

a peaceful, und i v ide d, and de mo c ra t ic Europe was an accurate assessme nt of whe re

E u rope is toda y. In this re g a rd, it was noted that, since the fall of communism (and with

t he exc e p t ion of the Balkan wars) no ne of Europe’s worst case scena r ios had occurred: 

• Ru s s ia has not ex p e r ie nced a vio l e nt social and political bre a kdown. 

• The count r ies of east-cent ral Europe (such as Hu ngary and Roma n ia) have not go ne

to war with each othe r.

• NATO and the EU have adapted to the new political and security enviro n me nt and

re main core ins t i t u t io ns. 

• The Balka ns conflicts were cont a i ned and did not escalate to inc l ude the Great Po wers (as they did in World War I). 

O t hers saw the outlines of a peaceful, und i v ide d, and de mo c ra t ic Europe alre a dy

e me rg i ng. The Org a n i z a t ion for Security and Coopera t ion in Europe (OSCE) Paris agre ement with Russia and the United States, the EU enlarge me nt pro c e s s, a robust NATO, and

t he EU’s attempts to improve int e r nal cohe s ion, were cons ide red eleme nts of a Euro p e

“ w hole and fre e.” Pa r t ic i p a nts agre e d, ho w e v e r, that the struc t u re in place—the fo u ndat ion for a peaceful, und i v ide d, and de mo c ra t ic Europe—is not yet secure: 

• Not all states have access to all ins t i t u t io ns.

• Op p o r t u n i t ies for coopera t ion with the East, especially with Russia, have not been

fully ex p l o i t e d. 

• While the European Un ion is cont e m p l a t i ng ins t i t u t io nal re form, it may not have the

w he rewithal to impleme nt its difficult aspects. 

G o v e r n me nts can take steps to further this pro c e s s, but are often distracted by perio d ic crises and the public’s adverse re a c t ion to the effects of globalization. And, leade r s

may not be up to the task. The curre nt group may lack the de t e r m i na t ion of the leade r s

of the Cold War era, and tend not to be savvy or int e rested fo re ign policy actors. Pa r t ici p a nts tho u g ht that no n - go v e r n me ntal fa c t o r s — e c o no m ic tre nd s, the attra c t ion of fre e

mar ke t s, inc reased cultural diffusion, and the still-vaguely-de f i ned process of globalizat io n — a re more likely to deliver a Europe in stable peace than fo r mal go v e r n me nt polic ie s. This is not to say that go v e r n me nts have no role in cons t r uc t i ng a peaceful,

u nd i v ide d, and de mo c ra t ic Euro p e — t hey do. The obstacles to a Europe at stable peace,

how e v e r, are mo re likely to be the sho r t - s ig hted polic ies of na t io nal actors, as discussed

b e l o w. If the barriers to a Europe “whole and free” are to be overc o me, if they are overc o me at all, it will most likely be the result of the effects of globalization, ra t her than

t he polic ies of na t io nal go v e r n me nt s. 

4
Obstacles to Ac h i eving a Stable Peace in Europe 

T he future of de mo c racy in Russia re ma i ns uncertain. Russia has failed to inc o r p o ra t e

c o ns t i t u t io nal liberalism within its political struc t u re and pra c t ic e, and the pra c t ice of

demo c racy re ma i ns superfic ial. Some working group members arg u e d, ho w e v e r, that Russ ia has traveled far from its rig id autho r i t a r ianism. The re has been a sig n i f ic a nt (and no t

always cons t r uctive) de v o l u t ion of power to re g io ns and localitie s. While de mo c ra t ic

p rocesses have not necessarily accompanied this de v e l o p me nt, at least de c i s io n - ma k i ng

is spread amo ng mo re actors. The executive and legislative bra nc hes of go v e r n me nt do

s h a re power. Even though the cons t i t u t ion gives eno r mous power to the pre s ide nt of the

R u s s ian Fede ra t ion, the legislature has been able to re dress the imbalance to a de g re e.

F u r t he r mo re, in every political crisis since the disaster of October 1993, the funda me ntal rules of the pre s e nt cons t i t u t ion have been observed. 

O t hers argued that Russia’s successful de mo c ra t i z a t ion is not assure d. For ma ny worki ng group me m b e r s, the election of Vladimir Putin as pre s ide nt of Russia is a disturbing

dev e l o p me nt. Putin seems to stand for a stro ng, autho r i t a r ian Russian state; his popularity with the Russian people calls into question their support for pluralism, due pro c e s s,

a nd the rule of law. In the curre nt enviro n me nt, whe re crime is pre v a l e nt and Russia ’ s

w e a l t hy work and live beyond the law, order and a firm hand are quite appealing to the

a v e ra ge citizen. Support for autho r i t a r ian rule is also tied to the public perc e p t ion of

demo c ra c y, which is ge ne rally understood in Russia as a power grab by the wealthy and

powerful. 

Putin’s election, the re fo re, may result in the eme rge nce of an autho r i t a r ian re g i me

with sig n i f ic a nt social and political support. Western go v e r n me nts will cons ider this a

cause for concern; Russia ns may welcome the ina u g u ra t ion of a “stro ng” cent ral go ve r n me nt. How can Russian perc e p t ion of “good” go v e r n me nt differ so sig n i f ic a ntly fro m

t he West? At issue, partic i p a nts tho u g ht, is Russia’s conc e p t ion of state cons o l ida t io n .

After the fall of communism, East Euro p e a ns looked to limit their political leade r s

t h rough a system of checks and balanc e s, which would also create space for the de v e lo p me nt of an active civil socie t y. Russia ns, on the other hand, wanted a stro ng cent ra l

gov e r n me nt to dictate re form from above. Civil society in Russia re ma i ns weak and citiz e ns are ge ne rally passive re g a rd i ng political and econo m ic re form. Russia’s political system, the re fo re, has both de mo c ra t ic and autho r i t a r ian eleme nt s. Un fo r t u na t e l y, the

demo c ra t ic aspects of the system have been inc re a s i ngly discre d i t e d, leading to a cre e pi ng autho r i t a r ianism at the re g io nal and na t io nal levels of go v e r n me nt. 

P u b l ic disappoint me nt in the re c e nt ex p e r i me nt in de mo c racy has affected

R u s s ia ns’ perc e p t io ns of their na t io nal ide nt i t y. Frustra t ion with its econo m ic

a nd political backward ness is causing a backlash not unfa m i l iar to Russia

exp e r t s. In the past, a Russian opening to the West has often int ro duced a sens e

of inferiority and event ually a sense of futility. Realizing that parity with the

West would take de c a des to achie v e, Russia ns, in the past, have rejected We s tern political and econo m ic mo dels in favor of a unique “Russian” path to na t io nal well-being. The curre nt flirtation with the idea of Russia as a bridge fro m

E u rope to As ia re p re s e nts a similar re j e c t ion by Moscow of int e g ra t ion with

E u rope and the West. First, it suggests that Russia does not share European values—a necessary criteria for membership in Europe’s ins t i t u t io ns. And, as the

do m i na nt power in Eura s ia, Russia will de ma nd special cons ide ra t ion by the

West—a process that would weaken de c i s io n - ma k i ng within Europe’s ins t i t u t io ns

a nd ma ke smaller states ins e c u re. Fina l l y, Russia's Eura s ian ide ntity sig nals an

i nt e nt to count e r b a l a nce the United States in Euro p e. Russia’s support for European int e g ra t ion, accord i ng to some partic i p a nt s, is a way to further contain or

c o u nt e r b a l a nce pre p o nde ra nt U.S. power. In this way, the U.S. proclivity for unil a t e ralism will be limited by Europe’s mu l t i l a t e ral ins t i t u t io ns and approach to

fore ign polic y. Some partic i p a nts in the working group, the re fo re, questio ned the

5
utility of Russian int e g ra t ion with Europe given curre nt attitudes in Mo s c o w. As

a member state of Euro p e, would Russia be a de t r i me nt to or a de f e nder of its

i ns t i t u t io ns? 

A peaceful, und i v ide d, and de mo c ra t ic Europe inclusive of Russia, the re fo re, re q u i re s

R u s s ia’s successful tra ns i t ion to de mo c ra c y. Will Putin pro mote de mo c racy in Russia ?

Does public support exist for de mo c ra t ic concepts and ins t i t u t io ns? Wo r k i ng group me mbers were not able to reach cons e nsus on these issues. 

Most partic i p a nts agreed on the impedime nts fa c i ng Russia and its int e g ra t ion with

E u ro p e, such as setbacks in de mo c ra t i z a t ion, too much “uncivil” socie t y, na t io na l i s t

t re nd s, disillusio n me nt with the West, the popularity of an arc h a ic fo re ign policy me nt a l i t y, the war in Che c h nya, and especially cont i nu i ng econo m ic crisis. But discussio n

y ie l ded no cons e nsus as to whe t her Russia could overc o me these obstacles. Those who

t ho u g ht Russia was on the rig ht path believed it was important to judge Russia not by

what it had achie v e d, but by the catastro p hes that it has avoide d — v io l e nc e, social and

p o l i t ical bre a kdown, autho r i t a r ian rule, and so forth. The correct me a s u re of Russia, the y

t ho u g ht, is not the West, but the Russia of yesterda y. Others fear Russia is not prog re s s i ng politically or econo m ic a l l y, and mig ht, in fact, be backslid i ng .

I m p roving U.S.-Russian Relations

W hen asked the key to impro v i ng U.S. re l a t io ns with Russia, partic i p a nts agreed that the

s i ngle most important de t e r m i na nt was Russia’s int e r nal de v e l o p me nt. Ho w e v e r, while

hea l t hy dev e l o p me nts in Russia are necessary to improve re l a t io ns with the Un i t e d

S t a t e s, they are not suffic ie nt. For a number of re a s o ns, the United States could diseng a ge and lose int e rest in Russia, re g a rdless of events unfo l d i ng the re: 

• The pre s e nt trajectory in U.S.-Russian re l a t io ns is toward greater diseng a ge me nt, or

selective eng a ge me nt .

• Yeltsin kept U.S.-Russia re l a t io ns on an even keel. It is likely that Putin will not be

as attuned to the ex t e r nal enviro n me nt, or able to balance int e r na l - ex t e r nal affa i r s.

• The re is need for long-term stra t e g ic patie nce with Russia. Yet for the next U.S.

a dm i n i s t ra t ion, Russia fa t igue will be a fa c t o r.

• The United States has come to expect that Russia’s pro b l e ms will re main pre s s i ng, but

never urge nt. With Russia stuck in its tra ns i t ion and the United States suffering fro m

fa t ig u e, cont i nued diseng a ge me nt is like l y.

• The United States and Russia may share ma ny of the same int e re s t s, but

t he re is a discre p a ncy in prio r i t ie s. Econo m ic issues are of hig her prio r i t y

for Mo s c o w, while the United States is int e rested primarily in Coopera t i v e

T h reat Reduc t ion (CTR). 

T he re was cons e nsus amo ng partic i p a nts that the United States and Russia are curre ntly stuck in a no n - p ro ductive re l a t io nship, but that the West needs to find a role fo r

R u s s ia now that it is no longer a superpower. Pa r t ic i p a nts agreed that it was important

for the United States to ens u re that Russia completes its tra ns i t ion and does not end up

as a poor, weak state on the periphery of Euro p e. Although Russia may be hostile to

ex t e r nal support, the United States must re main actively eng a ge d. 

Par t ic i p a nts agre e d, ho w e v e r, that the United States must change sig n i f ic a ntly its

a p p roach by seeking coopera t ion on issues of mu t ual int e rest, but it must also take a

s t ro ng stand in de f e nse of int e rests conflic t i ng with Mo s c o w. This me a ns ma k i ng it clear

to Russia that it is not a partner to the United States on certain issues. In fact, on issues

w he re their int e rests conflict, such as the Caspian Sea Basin, the United States will no t

seek accommo da t ion with Russia. On some issues, such as European int e g ra t ion and

e n l a rge me nt, coopera t ion with Russia is he l pful, but not ne c e s s a r y. Both the Un i t e d

6

Will Putin promote democra cy in

Russia? Does public support

exist for democratic concepts

and institutions? Working gro u p

members we re not able to re a c h

consensus on these issues.

T h e re was consensus among

participants that the United

S tates and Russia are curre n t l y

stuck in a non-pro d u c t i ve 

re l a t i o n s h i p .
States and European count r ies should work towards Russia’s int e g ra t ion as they build a

peaceful, und i v ide d, and de mo c ra t ic Euro p e, but the ultimate future shape of Euro p e

s hould be left unde f i ned as Russia works on its int e r nal re fo r ms. Other issues, such as

a r ms cont rol and “loose” nuclear weapons, re q u i re coopera t ion between the Un i t e d

States and Russia. Pa r t ic i p a nts agreed that the United States must prioritize its int e rests; a weak Russia does not have the re s o u rces to cooperate on all issues. 

Ado p t i ng the afo re me nt io ned approach would shatter the curre nt ima ge of a U.S.-

R u s s ian stra t e g ic partnership, but would reflect the reality that Russia is not a partne r

to the United States on certain issues. To perpetuate such a myth da ma ges future re l at io ns; it unde rcuts Russian re fo r mers and creates cynicism in the Russian populace. To

i m p rove re l a t io ns, the United States should de c ide how much it will accommo date Russ ia and how much it should stick to its int e rests and be clear about them. The Un i t e d

States should not sacrifice vital na t io nal int e rests for a shaky partnership with Mo s c o w. 

Par t ic i p a nts agreed that the United States must exa m i ne its long-term int e rests in

E u rope in order to guide its curre nt re l a t io nship with Russia. The United States must no t

try to resolve quickly the role of Russia in Europe and NATO. It must be ma de clear to

Moscow that NATO will evolve as Russia evolves. Until Russia de f i nes itself as a de mo crat ic state, NATO re ma i ns a military allia nce and does not lay down its Article 5 comm i t me nt s. Yet it must also be ma de clear to Russia that Europe wants a working

re l a t io nship and a cons t r uctive dia l o g u e. And it must be ma de clear that Europe and the

United States de s i re Russia’s membership in Europe’s ins t i t u t io ns, inc l ud i ng NATO, based

not on ge o p o l i t ical cons ide ra t io ns but on me e t i ng membership criteria. 

A cent ral part of the Ja nuary me e t i ng at the Aspen Institute was a discussion on the

d i v i s ion of labor between the United States and Europe on int e g ra t i ng Russia. It was

s u g gested by some Ame r ic a ns that Europe ought to take the lead in working with Russ ia fo l l o w i ng a strategy developed in coord i na t ion with the United States. Euro p e a ns, fo r

t he most part, felt that they had enough on their plate with European Un ion re form and

e n l a rge me nt. They pre f e r red that the United States ma i ntain a leadership role in re l at io ns with Russia. For Ame r ican partic i p a nts this was cause for concern. If this me a nt

that the United States should do all the heavy lifting and bear all the burde ns associa ted with de a l i ng with Russia on difficult issues (nuclear weapons, Iran, Iraq), while

E u rope gets to deal only with the affirmative aspects of the age nda with Russia, the n

this is not particularly attractive to the United States. 

L e a dership issues aside, both European and Ame r ican partic i p a nts agreed that any

a p p roach to Russia must inc l ude the fo l l o w i ng eleme nts: 

• a vision of a peaceful, und i v ide d, and de mo c ra t ic Europe of which Russia's int e g rat ion is an int e g ral part; 

• rules of the road for orde r i ng re l a t io ns with Russia in the aftermath of NATO’s military

c a m p a ign in Kosovo; 

• ex p a nded cons u l t a t io ns with Russia on its new na t io nal security do c u me nt s, in orde r

to stem the inc re a s i ngly anti-western character of those do c u me nts and pre v e nt the m

f rom becoming of f ic ial Russian policy; 

• an age nda for active eng a ge me nt amo ng the United States, the European Un ion, and

R u s s ia, so that re l a t io ns with Russia don’t revolve ent i rely aro u nd NATO. A trilatera l

a ge nda could inc l ude, for exa m p l e, sharing info r ma t ion on social issues such as he a l t h

a nd the enviro n me nt. 

Par t ic i p a nts agreed that mo re eng a ge me nt with Russia is ne c e s s a r y, but the na t u re of

t he West’s re l a t io nship with Russia must change. Members of the working group also

t ho u g ht that re l a t io ns with Russia must be ex p a nded beyond state-to-state to inc l ude

no n - go v e r n me ntal, societal, and business associa t io ns. Much needs to be do ne to

s t re ng t hen civil society in Russia and to create ins t i t u t io ns that would curtail a stro ng

c e nt ral go v e r n me nt. Jud ic ial re form is one such area that the United States mig ht supThe United States must change

significantly its approach by

seeking cooperation on issues of

mutual interest, but it must

also take a strong stand in

defense of interests conflicting

with Moscow.

7
port; others would inc l ude educ a t io nal exc h a nges and bolstering Russia’s no n - go v e r nme ntal org a n i z a t io ns. 

The Challenges of an Enlarging Euro p e

T he vision of a peaceful, und i v ide d, and de mo c ra t ic Europe does not mean that every

E u ropean state needs to be a member of every European ins t i t u t ion. Rathe r, the re can

be cons ide rable flexibility of form in the way this single community arra nges itself. The

E u ropean Un ion is inc re a s i ngly talking about differe nt iated struc t u res and varia b l e

speeds of int e g ra t ion. A peaceful, und i v ide d, and de mo c ra t ic Europe would be no diff e re nt. At the same time, greater attent ion and focus needs to be given to the shape of

E u rope and the differe nt iated struc t u res that will support it. The goal is to avoid a ne w

d i v i s ion of Europe between the haves and the have no t s, whe t her in terms of security,

p o l i t ical de v e l o p me nt, or econo m ic pro s p e r i t y. A differe nt iated struc t u re of re l a t io ns simply reflects the reality that the various na t io ns of Europe are in differe nt states of de v e lo p me nt of a de mo c ra t ic civic culture and that for the tra ns i t ion period differe nt patterns

of ins t i t u t io nal re l a t io nships will characterize the European land s c a p e. Pa r t ic i p a nt s

a g reed that the ultimate arc h i t e c t u re of what a Europe at stable peace would be simply

c a n not be de c ided at this time. 

What are the obstacles to Europe achie v i ng a peaceful, und i v ide d, and de mo c ra t ic

E u rope? Int e g ra t i ng fo r mer communist count r ies will re q u i re the de d ic a t ion of tre me ndous re s o u rces and attent ion over an ex t e nsive period of time. Pa r t ic i p a nts worried that

western capitals mig ht not have the political will to oversee this project through successive ge ne ra t io ns and political adm i n i s t ra t io ns. Challeng i ng the West’s endu ra nce is

t he fact that the first ro u nd of int e g ra t ion is likely the easiest. Successive int e g ra t io ns

will undoubtedly be mo re difficult. These subsequent ent r ie s — B u l g a r ia, Roma n ia, and

t he Yugoslav successor states—are in most cases de s c e nda nts of differe nt political and

rel ig ious culture s — t he Ottoman millet system and the Ortho dox chu rch. Can the Un i t e d

States keep the lid on by working on the Balka ns and the int e g ra t ion of Russia while the

E u ropean Un ion enlarges to cent ral Europe? Pro g ress on int e g ra t ion is curre ntly he l p e d

by the stre ngth of the global econo my. What would be the effect of an econo m ic do w nturn on European policy and the pace of int e g ra t ion? 

A second challenge fa c i ng the establishme nt of a peaceful, und i v ide d, and de mo c rat ic Europe is a successful re form of the European Un ion itself. It was the cons e nsus of

U.S. partic i p a nts that the adm i n i s t ra t ion in Wa s h i ngton often unde re s t i mates the role of

t he European Un ion in building the fo u nda t ion for Europe’s future. NATO has kept the

p e a c e, but the European Un ion has re moved the cond i t io ns for war through a quie t

p rocess of socia l i z a t ion. Enlarg i ng the European Un ion may weaken re l a t io ns amo ng the

a l l - i m p o r t a nt core states. If enlarge me nt or int e r nal re form fa l t e r s, leaders may become

i nc re a s i ngly ins e c u re about their ability to cont i nue the EU’s political and econo m ic evol u t ion and to sustain public support for re fo r ms that re q u i re giving up important aspects

a nd symbols of na t io nal sovere ig nt y. 

T he tra ns i t ion to a peaceful, und i v ide d, and de mo c ra t ic Europe will also re q u i re a shift

in leadership re s p o ns i b i l i t ies from the United States to Euro p e. Are European leade r s

rea dy for this added re s p o nsibility? Will the United States accept its new and ra t he r

u ncertain role in Euro p e, which would re q u i re it to lead on some issues but not on others? Since a stable and peaceful Europe is a funda me ntal security int e rest of the Un i t e d

S t a t e s, Ame r ic a ns have ex p ressed concern re g a rd i ng the enlarge me nt pro c e s s. It is no t

yet clear that the Euro p e a ns have a vision or a re a l i s t ic pro g ram for enlarge me nt that

goes beyond econo m ic coopera t ion to inc l ude political partic i p a t ion in the Euro p e a n

Union. If Europe is unw i l l i ng or unable to change its go v e r na nce struc t u re s, enlarge me nt

will not happen. Ame r ic a ns also worry that Europe may do too little in critical areas suc h

as the Balka ns. If the Balkan Stability Pact establishes a re g io nal free tra de zone, fo r

I n t e g rating former communist

countries will re q u i re the 

dedication of tre m e n d o u s

re s o u rces and attention over an

ext e n s i ve period of time.

8

The transition to a peaceful,

undivided, and democra t i c

E u rope will also re q u i re a shift

in leadership re s p o n s i b i l i t i e s

f rom the United States 

to Euro p e.
exa m p l e, but fails to int e g rate the re g io ns with Euro p e, the Balka ns will cont i nue to be

t he poor relative of Europe and suffer cont i nued instability and econo m ic de p r i v a t io n .

Par t ic i p a nts also ex p ressed concern that Euro p e a ns will not de f i ne Europe bro a d l y

e nough—that they will not inc l ude count r ies such as Albania and Tu r ke y. Pa r t ic i p a nt s

b e l ieved that the United States must become mo re eng a ged in the European Un io n

dev e l o p me nt pro c e s s. Deepening and wide n i ng the European Un ion are legitimate elements of the tra ns a t l a nt ic dialogue and must be given priority by Wa s h i ngton. 

E u ro p e a ns re m i nded the working group that, while issues of enlarge me nt are critic a l ,

EU leadership must not lose sig ht of its core issues and cons t i t u e nt s, or it will risk the

p ro g ress it has ma de to da t e. While Europe’s leaders have accepted the pooling of na t io nal sovere ig nt ie s, public support is uncertain. At issue is not only how well the component ins t i t u t io ns of the European Un ion govern, but how well they re p re s e nt the i r

p u b l ic s. It was suggested that the European Un ion could be mo re re s p o nsive to its

p u b l ics by ado p t i ng common electoral districts and cro s s - na t io nal voting districts in

o rder to build political coalitio ns across na t io nal borde r s, and by inc re a s i ng EU tra nsp a re ncy and account a b i l i t y. 

The State of Transatlantic Relations 

U.S. involveme nt in Europe has been justified in the past by a he ge mo n ic threat to the

c o nt i ne nt. While Europe re ma i ns a stra t e g ic concern (especially issues such as Balka n

i ns t a b i l i t y, Ukra i ne’s position between Europe and Russia, and competition with Russia

in the North Caucasus), U.S. involveme nt is not as compelling as in the past. The Un i ted States may ex p e r ie nce the pull of stra t e g ic challenges other than those ema na t i ng

f rom Euro p e. China, instability in no r t heast As ia, corruption, and drugs are issues that

m ig ht vie with Europe for U.S. re s o u rces and attent ion. The lack of a he ge mo n ic thre a t

to focus U.S. attent ion will likely result in a less cohe re nt Ame r ican position on European security issues. Without a stra t e g ic threat from Europe to unite fa c t io ns in Wa s hi ngton, tra ns a t l a nt ic polic ies will inc re a s i ngly be the target of partisan struggle;

C o ng ress will feel less cons t ra i ned to int e rc e de. A weake n i ng of tra ns a t l a nt ic re l a t io ns

will have an obvious impact on Europe and its shared stra t e g ic objectives with the Un i ted States. It will also have an impact beyond Europe on Russia. While the West canno t

compel Russian int e g ra t ion with Euro p e, a he a l t hy, cons t r uctive tra ns a t l a nt ic re l a t io nship could act as a ma g net for dra w i ng Russia into Euro p e. 

Both Ame r ic a ns and Euro p e a ns agreed that the pre p o nde ra nce of U.S. power in the

world has fre q u e ntly led to an arro g a nt assumption that wisdom accompanies power. The

U.S. must be less overbearing in its approach to Euro p e, and fo re go so ma ny unilatera l

a c t io ns and polic ie s. While partic i p a nts agreed that tra ns a t l a nt ic re l a t io ns re main stro ng ,

t hey could be improved even mo re with inc reased cons u l t a t io ns and a willing ness on the

part of the United States to change its position based on such cons u l t a t io ns. 

That said, Euro p e a ns must accept that unipolarity in security will exist for a long

t i me. The United States spends mo re on de f e nse than the next five major powers comb i ne d. If U.S. unipolarity ceases, it will most likely be self-imposed, as the United States

b e c o mes mo re selective in its eng a ge me nts abro a d. Pa r t ic i p a nts noted that this curre nt

phase of U.S. int e r na t io nalism coinc ides with an econo m ic boom; an econo m ic slowdo w n

would likely result in a re v iew of U.S. eng a ge me nts and commitme nts abro a d. As de mo ns t rated re c e ntly by the ge ne ral lack of public support for the U.S. eng a ge me nt in Ko s ovo, new ge ne ra t io ns of Ame r ic a ns are not as int e rested in European affa i r s. Given the

U.S. proclivity for re s t r ic t i ng its eng a ge me nt abro a d, partic i p a nts felt it unlikely that

o t hers will feel the need to count e ract U.S. power. In ge ne ral, states that exe rc i s e

res t ra i nt find that others don’t “bandw a gon” against them. The United States’s ge og ra p h ic location and its relative disint e rest in do m i na t i ng other states politically has

forestalled the fo r ma t ion of allia nces against it. 

9
E u ro p e a ns and Ame r ic a ns also worried that inde p e nde nt thinking by Europe on security issues, if not handled well on both sides of the At l a nt ic, may also weaken tra ns a tl a nt ic re l a t io ns. Pa r t ic i p a nts raised a number of conc e r ns: 

• the diverge nce of U.S. and European polic ies toward the Middle East; 

• that the lesson learned by Euro p e a ns from Kosovo was not the ind i s p e nsability of the

United States, but the need for European inde p e nde nce; 

• Ame r ican perc e p t io ns that Europe will be mo re inc l i ned to adopt the Fre nc h - G e r ma n

e c o no m ic mo del, which is not as “frie ndly” to the United States; 

• that pre o c c u p a t ion with do me s t ic issues, such as immig ra t ion and re fo r m i ng the

s o c ial welfa re state, will result in an insular ra t her than an enlarg i ng Euro p e ;

• that European support for the European Security and Defense Po l icy (ESDP) will no t

be backed by ade q uate de f e nse spend i ng, leading to a de c o u p l i ng with the Un i t e d

S t a t e s, or that European ESDP pro g ra ms will du p l icate NATO ’ s. 

Par t ic i p a nts agreed that European leaders have a lot on their plate—EU re form and

e n l a rge me nt, NATO enlarge me nt, Balkan stabilization, and the fo r ma t ion of an ESDP—

that may re q u i re a balanc i ng of or a tra de off in prio r i t ie s. The United States must be cons c ious of the tra de of f s. For exa m p l e, if Europe wide ns faster than it de e p e ns, it may no t

be the kind of partner in crises that the United States want s. The re may be a competit ion for re s o u rces between paying for ESDP and paying for wide n i ng. 

T he United States should support Europe in its effort to develop real military capability and give the Euro p e a ns some bre a t h i ng space to do what is necessary to build

p o l i t ical support for this effort in Euro p e. The United States should recognize that Euro p e

is trying to do what the United States has asked Europe to do for de c a de s — na me l y, to

accept mo re of the common de f e nse burden. European allies have given the Un i t e d

States gro u nds for optimism that they will develop the ESDP in a way that pro v ides the

a p p ro p r iate re l a t io nship to NATO and a cont i nu i ng U.S. role in Euro p e. 

For its part, Europe should pursue the ESDP by fo c u s i ng on de v e l o p i ng real military capability, while avoid i ng an abstract fig ht with the United States over the U.S.

role in Europe and the ESDP’s re l a t io nship with NATO. Such an abstract fig ht can only

a l ie nate the United States from Europe and ultimately re duce European security—

e s p e c ially if Europe in fact does not enhance its real military capability as part of the

E S D P.

Conclusions 

C re a t i ng a peaceful, und i v ide d, and de mo c ra t ic Europe inclusive of Russia and the Un i ted States is feasible, but ex t re mely challeng i ng. One of the first challenges for the Un i ted States is to accept that, while Europe may share its vision, it may have differe nt

s t ra t e g ies for achie v i ng this vision, differe nces of opinion on whe t her Europe or the

United State takes the lead on certain issues, and differe nt prio r i t ie s. This is why an int eg rated and shared U.S.-European concept of the future shape of Europe is absolutely

i m p e ra t i v e. It is also necessary to ide ntify fall-back optio ns if pro g ress toward a peaceful, und i v ide d, and de mo c ra t ic Europe is uncertain. This will re q u i re setting prio r i t ie s. It

will re q u i re re c o g n i z i ng whe re the obstacles lie, and how best to overc o me them. 

A shared strategy would expose the funda me ntal differe nces and pro v ide an opportunity for their re s o l u t ion. It would also do much to allay Ame r ican conc e r ns that it carr ies too much of the burden in Euro p e. A compre he nsive strategy would ma ke clear that

t he United States will carry the burden in some are a s, but that Europe will also do its

s h a re. For exa m p l e, the United States mig ht take the lead on int e g ra t i ng Russia with

E u ro p e, but with the unde r s t a nd i ng that Euro p e a ns are indeed pre p a r i ng for a Euro p e

capable of inc l ud i ng Russia. Euro p e a ns, on the other hand, would publicly commit to

E u rope should pursue the ESDP

by focusing on developing re a l

m i l i tary capability, while avo i ding an abstract fight with the

United States over the U.S. ro l e

in Europe and the ESDP’s

relationship with NATO.

1 0
U.S. leadership on a number of specific issues, while ex p l icitly stating their own ro l e,

t hus re duc i ng fears of Ame r ican unilatera l i s m .

F i na l l y, mo re attent ion needs to be given to the role of globalization in building a

peaceful, und i v ide d, and de mo c ra t ic Euro p e. Globalization may overc o me obstacles pres e nted by na t io nal polic ies and int e re s t s. In the end, go v e r n me nts may best further the

p rocess of a Europe whole and free by not stand i ng in its way. 

Recommendations 

• Develop and ma i ntain a vision of a peaceful, und i v ide d, and de mo c ra t ic Europe as the

c o m mon objective of U.S. and European policy in Euro p e. When de a l i ng with “second

o rder” issues, keep in mind the overall goals that unde r l ie common U.S. and European effo r t s.

• The impact of globalization must be better unde r s t o o d, and go v e r n me nts must be

more open to the prospects globalization offers for greater int e g ra t ion in Euro p e. 

• G reater attent ion needs to be given to the form of a peaceful, und i v ide d, and de mo crat ic Europe and the differe nt iated struc t u res that are go i ng to characterize this eme rgi ng re a l i t y. The goal is to avoid a new division of Europe between the haves and the

have no t s. A differe nt iated struc t u re of re l a t io ns reflects the reality that the vario u s

nat io ns of Europe are in differe nt stages of de mo c ra t ic de v e l o p me nt. The ultimate struct u re of a peaceful, und i v ide d, and de mo c ra t ic Europe cannot be de c ided at this time. 

• The re are a number of things that the United States and the European Un ion can do

to enc o u ra ge a Europe whole and free: 

— The United States must be less overbearing in its approach to Euro p e. 

— For its part, Europe should pursue an ESDP, but fo c u s i ng on de v e l o p i ng real military capability while avoid i ng an abstract fig ht with the United States over its ro l e

in Europe and the ESDP’s re l a t io nship to NATO. 

— Eu rope needs to cont i nue its effort to ex p a nd the European Un ion to embrace ne w

mem b e r s. The prospect of EU membership is a key eleme nt in enc o u ra g i ng the econom ic and political evolutio ns in the rest of Europe that will pro v ide the critic a l

fou nda t ion for achie v i ng a Europe whole and fre e. 

— Ac c o m p a ny i ng the process of NATO enlarge me nt must be a parallel process of

t ra ns fo r m i ng NATO and re de f i n i ng its role to fit the new security enviro n me nt in

E u rope (and to re a s s u re Russia ) .

— The United States, the European Un ion, and Russia need to work toge t her to exa mi ne the roles of other European political, econo m ic, and security ins t i t u t io ns and

to re f i ne the roles they now play, accepting that a certain ins t i t u t io nal unt id i ne s s

is inevitable in this tra ns i t ion phase. 

— It is important that the United States and the European Un ion not take for gra nted the commitme nt of their publics to de mo c ra c y, much less a commitme nt to a

v i s ion of a peaceful, und i v ide d, and de mo c ra t ic Euro p e. Future ge ne ra t io ns ne e d

to be convinced of the virtues of de mo c ra c y, and the importance of a Europe who l e

a nd fre e. 

— At t e nt ion needs to be given to de v e l o p i ng polic ies on how to enc o u ra ge the civic

c u l t u re that will support de mo c racy and a Europe whole and fre e. 

• Be clear to the Russian people and go v e r n me nt that they have a place in Euro p e.

T he re is a long way to go befo re the vision of Russia as an int e g ral part of Euro p e

b e c o mes a re a l i t y, and the United States and the European Un ion must develop a

c o m mon strategy to impleme nt this vision. But the ultimate vision ought to be articulated clearly and often to Russia, particularly in this difficult period of tra ns i t ion. 

M o re attention needs to be

g i ven to the role of

globalization in building a

peaceful, undivided, and 

d e m o c ratic Euro p e.

1 1
• Any approach to Russia must inc l ude the fo l l o w i ng eleme nts: 

— a vision of a peaceful, und i v ide d, and de mo c ra t ic Europe of which Russia is a part; 

—“rules of the road” for orde r i ng re l a t io ns with Russia in the post-Kosovo world; 

— ex p a nded cons u l t a t io ns with Russia on its new na t io nal security do c u me nt s, in

o rder to seek to pre c l ude the eme rg i ng anti-western character of those do c u me nt s

f rom becoming the reality of Russian policy; and

—an age nda for active eng a ge me nt amo ng the United States, the European Un io n ,

a nd Russia; on certain issues (such as nuclear safety, the enviro n me nt, and publ ic hea l t h ) , w o r k i ng on a trilateral basis may be mo re effective.

• U.S. bilateral re l a t io ns with Russia need impro v i ng. The United States must ens u re

that Russia completes its tra ns i t ion and does not end up weak and isolated on the

p e r i p hery of Euro p e.

• Despite “Russia fa t ig u e,” the United States must re main eng a ged on a bilateral basis

with Russia, although it needs to change its approach: 

— The United States must be clear with Moscow on which issues it seeks cooperat ion. On those issues whe re U.S. and Russian int e rests conflict, the United States

must stro ngly de f e nd its position. 

— The United States must abandon the myth of a U.S.-Russian partnership, whic h

c reates false re a l i t ies and confuses discussio ns and ne go t ia t io ns on critical fo re ig n

p o l icy issues. 

For mo re info r ma t ion on this topic,

see our web site (www. u s i p . o rg), whic h

has an online edition of this re p o r t

c o nt a i n i ng links to related web sites, as

well as add i t io nal info r ma t ion on European issues and tra ns a t l a nt ic re l a t io ns. 

For info r ma t ion about the Ins t i t u t e ’ s

F u t u re of Europe Project as well as its

R u s s ia Wor k i ng Group, contact pro g ra m

off icer Emily Metzgar at 202-429-3887

or eme t z g a r @ u s i p . o rg .

SP E C I A L RE P O R T 6 3

United States 

Institute of Pe a c e

1200 17th Street NW

Was h i ngton, DC 20036