Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 240 / Wednesday, December 15, 2004 / Notices 75047

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration

[I.D. 110404C]

Endangered Species; File No. 1510

AGENCY: National Marine Fisheries 

Service (NMFS), National Oceanic and 

Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), 

Commerce.

ACTION: Receipt of application.

SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given that 

the Liberty Science Center (Richard 

Weddle, Principal Investigator), 251 

Phillip Street, Jersey City, New Jersey 

07305, has applied in due form for a 

permit to take shortnose sturgeon 

(Acipenser brevirostrum) for purposes of 

enhancement through educational 

display.

DATES: Written, telefaxed, or e-mail 

comments must be received on or before 

January 14, 2005.

ADDRESSES: The application and related 

documents are available for review 

upon written request or by appointment 

in the following office(s):

Permits, Conservation and Education 

Division, Office of Protected Resources, 

NMFS, 1315 East-West Highway, Room 

13705, Silver Spring, MD 20910; phone 

(301)713–2289; fax (301)713–0376; and

Northeast Region, NMFS, One 

Blackburn Drive, Gloucester, MA 

01930–2298; phone (978)281–9200; fax 

(978)281–9371.

Written comments or requests for a 

public hearing on this application 

should be mailed to the Chief, Permits, 

Conservation and Education Division, 

F/PR1, Office of Protected Resources, 

NMFS, 1315 East-West Highway, Room 

13705, Silver Spring, MD 20910. Those 

individuals requesting a hearing should 

set forth the specific reasons why a 

hearing on this particular request would 

be appropriate.

Comments may also be submitted by 

facsimile at (301)713–0376, provided 

the facsimile is confirmed by hard copy 

submitted by mail and postmarked no 

later than the closing date of the 

comment period.

Comments may also be submitted by 

e-mail. The mailbox address for 

providing email comments is 

NMFS.Pr1Comments@noaa.gov. Include 

in the subject line of the e-mail 

comment the following document 

identifier: File No. 1510.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Jennifer Jefferies or Amy Sloan, 

(301)713–2289.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The 

subject permit is requested under the 

authority of the Endangered Species Act 

of 1973, as amended (ESA; 16 U.S.C. 

1531 et seq.) and the regulations 

governing the taking, importing, and 

exporting of endangered and threatened 

species (50 CFR 222–226).

The Liberty Science Center proposes 

to receive and use five captive-bred, 

non-releaseable shortnose sturgeon for 

the purpose of educational display. The 

proposed project of displaying 

endangered cultured shortnose sturgeon 

responds directly to a recommendation 

from the NMFS recovery outline for this 

species. In addition, the facility would 

create a public education program and 

exhibit to increase awareness of the 

shortnose sturgeon and its status. The 

proposed project would educate the 

public on shortnose sturgeon life history 

and the reasons for its declining 

numbers.

Dated: December 9, 2004.

Jennifer Skidmore,

Acting Chief, Permits, Conservation and 

Education Division, Office of Protected 

Resources, National Marine Fisheries Service.

[FR Doc. 04–27430 Filed 12–14–04; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 3510–22–S

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration

[I.D. 120604A]

Marine Mammals; File No. 87–1593

AGENCY: National Marine Fisheries 

Service (NMFS), National Oceanic and 

Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), 

Commerce.

ACTION: Issuance of permit amendment.

SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given that 

Daniel Costa, Ph.D., University of 

California, Santa Cruz, Long Marine 

Lab, 100 Shaffer Road, Santa Cruz, CA 

95060, has been issued an amendment 

to Permit No. 87–1593 conduct 

scientific research on southern elephant 

seals (Mirounga leonina).

ADDRESSES: The permit and related 

documents are available for review 

upon written request or by appointment 

in the following office(s):

Permits, Conservation and Education 

Division, Office of Protected Resources, 

NMFS, 1315 East-West Highway, Room 

13705, Silver Spring, MD 20910; phone 

(301)713–2289; fax (301)713–0376; and

Southwest Region, NMFS, 501 West 

Ocean Blvd., Suite 4200, Long Beach, 

CA 90802–4213; phone (562)980–4001; 

fax (562)980–4018.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Amy Sloan or Ruth Johnson, (301)713–

2289.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On July 

15, 2004, notice was published in the 

Federal Register (69 FR 42424) that a 

request for a permit amendment to take 

the species identified above had been 

submitted by the above-named 

individual. The requested amendment 

has been issued under the authority of 

the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 

1972, as amended (16 U.S.C. 1361 et 

seq.), and the Regulations Governing the 

Taking and Importing of Marine 

Mammals (50 CFR part 216).

The permit holder is authorized to 

capture, sedate, tag (flipper and 

instrument), sample, and release up to 

30 adult southern elephant seals; tag 

and weigh up to 50 immature elephant 

seals; conduct population censussing; 

and incidentally disturb up to 100 

elephant seals during research. The 

purpose of this project is to examine the 

foraging behavior and habitat utilization 

of the southern elephant seal in the 

Western Antarctic Peninsula.

In compliance with the National 

Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 

U.S.C. 4321 et seq.), a final 

determination has been made that the 

activity proposed is categorically 

excluded from the requirement to 

prepare an environmental assessment or 

environmental impact statement.

Dated: December 8, 2004. 

Stephen L. Leathery,

Chief, Permits, Conservation and Education 

Division, Office of Protected Resources, 

National Marine Fisheries Service.

[FR Doc. 04–27431 Filed 12–14–04; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 3510–22–S

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES 

SAFETY BOARD 

[Recommendation 2004–2] 

Active Confinement Systems

AGENCY: Defense Nuclear Facilities 

Safety Board.

ACTION: Notice, recommendation.

SUMMARY: The Defense Nuclear 

Facilities Safety Board has unanimously 

approved Recommendation 2004–2, for 

DOE to consider. Recommendation 

2004–2 deals with the confinement of 

hazardous materials at defense nuclear 

facilities in the Department of Energy 

complex.

DATES: Comments, data, views, or 

arguments concerning the 

recommendation are due on or before 

January 14, 2005.

ADDRESSES: Send comments, data, 

views, or arguments concerning this 

recommendation to: Defense Nuclear 

75048 Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 240 / Wednesday, December 15, 2004 / Notices 

Facilities Safety Board, 625 Indiana 

Avenue, NW., Suite 700, Washington, 

DC 20004–2001.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Kenneth M. Pusateri or Andrew L. 

Thibadeau at the address above or 

telephone (202) 694–7000.

Dated: December 10, 2004. 

A.J. Eggenberger, 

Vice Chairman.

Recommendation 2004–2 to the Secretary of 

Energy, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2286a(a)(5), 

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, As Amended 

Dated: December 7, 2004. 

There is a long-standing safety practice in 

the design, construction, and operation of 

nuclear facilities to build-in and maintain 

structures, systems, and components that 

contain or confine radioactive materials. The 

Department of Energy (DOE) establishes 

requirements to ensure such containment or 

confinement. In the hierarchy of safety 

controls, passive design features are preferred 

over active systems; however, controls must 

be capable of performing their intended 

function. Passive confinement systems are 

not necessarily capable of containing 

hazardous materials with confidence because 

they allow a quantity of unfiltered air 

contaminated with radioactive material to be 

released from an operating nuclear facility 

following certain accident scenarios. Safety 

related active confinement ventilation 

systems will continue to function during an 

accident, thereby ensuring that radioactive 

material is captured by filters before it can be 

released into the environment. 

The enclosed technical report, DNFSB/

TECH–34, Confinement of Radioactive 

Materials at Defense Nuclear Facilities,

compares the benefits of including a safetyrelated active confinement ventilation system 

to those of relying only on a passive 

confinement system. This technical report 

illustrates that using only a passive 

confinement system for an existing or new 

defense nuclear processing facility would not 

account for many safety considerations such 

as post-accident monitoring and response, 

and may result in the release of an 

undeterminable amount of radioactive 

materials, the consequences of which could 

approach that of the unmitigated scenarios. 

The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety 

Board (Board) has advised DOE in various 

ways during the past decade regarding the 

need to pay increased attention to the design 

and operational reliability of the confinement 

ventilation systems at defense nuclear 

facilities. These Board efforts include 

transmittal of a technical report on May 31, 

1995, Overview of Ventilation Systems at 

Selected DOE Plutonium Processing and 

Handling Facilities, a letter to the Deputy 

Secretary of Energy dated July 8, 1999, and 

Recommendation 2000–2, Configuration 

Management, Vital Safety Systems, on March 

8, 2000. This advice has helped DOE improve 

the reliability of its confinement ventilation 

systems. However, DOE requirements have 

become less prescriptive during the last 

decade as DOE Order 6430.1A, General 

Design Criteria Manual, was replaced with 

DOE Order 420.1, Facility Safety, and its 

subsequent revisions. Furthermore, it has 

become apparent that the Board’s advice on 

confinement systems is not being rigorously 

pursued as evidenced by the following: 

• On December 27, 2002, the Board sent a 

letter to the National Nuclear Security 

Administration (NNSA) regarding the 

confinement concept used for the Highly 

Enriched Uranium Materials Facility at the 

Y–12 National Security Complex. The 

proposed confinement concept was based on 

isolating the radioactive material in the 

building using a passive confinement system 

under certain abnormal events. The Board 

communicated safety concerns associated 

with this concept in the letter; subsequently, 

the confinement concept for HEUMF was 

modified to adopt a safety-related active 

ventilation system.

• On April 12, 2004, the Board sent a letter 

to the Administrator of NNSA regarding 

similar safety issues related to the 

confinement systems for the plutonium 

facility at the Lawrence Livermore National 

Laboratory. The proposed approach utilized 

passive confinement of radioactive material 

from the facility during certain accident 

scenarios. Further, because the offsite dose 

consequences of such an unfiltered release 

were calculated to be below DOE’s evaluation 

guideline (25 rem), the proposal included 

downgrading the existing safety-class active 

confinement ventilation system to a safetysignificant system. The Board believed that 

the new approach was inconsistent with a 

defense-in-depth philosophy. Subsequently, 

the Livermore Site Office commissioned an 

independent calculation of the amount of the 

unfiltered release. These calculations yielded 

results that were an order of magnitude 

greater than the original building leakage 

estimates—clearly indicating that significant 

uncertainties existed in the analytical 

techniques. As a result, NNSA decided to 

maintain the existing safety-class active 

confinement ventilation system. 

• On August 27, 2004, the Board sent a 

letter to the Under Secretary of Energy 

regarding the confinement approach 

proposed for the Salt Waste Processing 

Facility at the Savannah River Site. The 

confinement concept for this new facility is 

based on isolation of the process building 

using passive confinement during accident 

scenarios. The Board suggested that the salt 

waste facility should be designed with a 

safety-related active ventilation system. 

A number of existing facilities (including 

the TA–55 Plutonium Facility, the Device 

Assembly Facility, and the Hanford 

Evaporator) rely on passive or non-safety 

related confinement systems. More 

importantly, designs for proposed facilities 

(including Chemistry and Metallurgy 

Research Replacement Facility and the Salt 

Waste Processing Facility) are based on the 

same passive confinement concept and use 

an assumed quantitative value for the 

building leak path factor as a design 

criterion. 

These examples illustrate two primary 

concerns. First, a reliance on calculations 

that do not appropriately account for large 

uncertainties is not defensible. These 

analytically determined building leak path 

factors are based on a combination of several 

computer programs that were not specifically 

designed for this purpose. Furthermore, it is 

generally impossible for these programs to 

model the true conditions of a real accident 

because of the uncertain behavior of the 

workers and emergency crews responding to 

the event. 

Second, these examples represent a 

fundamental change in DOE’s approach to 

protection of the public near defense nuclear 

facilities. DOE appears to be using the 

evaluation guideline of 25 rem exposure at 

the site boundary as a design criterion and 

an allowable dose to the public. This is 

contrary to the Board’s July 8, 1999 letter to 

the Deputy Secretary of Energy that states 

‘‘the 25 rem evaluation guideline is not to be 

treated as a design acceptance criterion nor 

as a justification for nullifying the general 

design criteria relative to defense-in-depth 

safety measures.’’ It is also contrary to DOE–

STD–3009 that states that the 25 rem 

evaluation guideline ‘‘is not to be treated as 

a design acceptance criterion.’’ However, the 

Board continues to see 25 rem at the site 

boundary used as an acceptance criterion for 

the performance of confinement systems. The 

Board is concerned that in these examples 

DOE and its contractors are underestimating 

the significance of the performance 

requirements for a confinement ventilation 

system and are relying on questionable 

calculations of offsite doses to evaluate 

performance. The Board reiterates that the 25 

rem evaluation guideline is solely to be used 

for guidance for the classification of safety 

controls, and not as an acceptable dose to the 

public for the purpose of designing or 

operating defense nuclear facilities. 

Notwithstanding the concerns discussed 

above, DOE continues to pursue a passive 

confinement approach in the design of some 

new nuclear facilities that have the potential 

for a radiological release. The Board 

recognizes that DOE’s defense nuclear 

complex is comprised of a wide variety of 

nuclear facilities with an equally diverse 

range of materials, forms, activities, and 

proximities to the public. For this reason, it 

is difficult to prescribe a single, broadlyapplicable design requirement. However, in 

light of the examples discussed above, the 

Board believes a more prescriptive design 

requirement is needed. 

The Board further recognizes that certain 

Hazard Category 2 and 3 defense nuclear 

facilities may not benefit significantly from 

an active confinement ventilation system. An 

example would be a facility that stores 

radioactive material in protected, safety-class 

containers. Other examples may be certain 

tritium facilities, outside storage locations, 

burial grounds, or facilities with planned 

declining nuclear material inventories and 

scheduled for decommissioning in the near 

future. This recommendation is not meant to 

require an active confinement ventilation 

system in all such cases. 

Therefore, the Board recommends that 

DOE:

1. Disallow reliance on passive 

confinement systems and require an active 

confinement ventilation system for all new 

and existing Hazard Category 2 defense 

nuclear facilities with the potential for a 

Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 240 / Wednesday, December 15, 2004 / Notices 75049

radiological release. These systems are 

expected to be classified as safety-class or 

safety-significant as required by a 

conservative application of DOE-approved 

methodology, and should be designed and 

maintained to function during abnormal and 

accident conditions. Exceptions to such 

classifications should be approved at a level 

in DOE that ensures a consistent, 

conservative approach throughout the 

complex. 

2. Disallow reliance on passive 

confinement systems and require an active 

confinement ventilation system for all new 

and existing Hazard Category 3 defense 

nuclear facilities with the potential for a 

radiological release. These systems would 

not ordinarily be classified as safety-class or 

safety-significant unless such designation is 

required by the DOE-approved methodology. 

3. Revise all applicable DOE directives 

pertaining to operation of existing facilities, 

design and construction of new facilities, and 

major modifications to existing facilities, in 

accordance with Items 1 and 2 above. These 

revisions should include guidance for 

determining when a facility would not 

benefit from an active confinement 

ventilation system. 

4. Assess existing facilities, ongoing major 

modifications, and new design/construction 

projects, to ensure that: 

(a) The confinement strategy described 

above is implemented, and 

(b) The 25 rem evaluation guideline is used 

solely for classification of safety controls. 

Section 42 U.S.C. 2286d(e) provides 

authority to the Secretary of Energy to 

‘‘implement any such Recommendation (or 

part of any such Recommendation) before, 

on, or after the date on which the Secretary 

of Energy transmits the implementation plan 

to the Board under this subsection.’’ The 

Board suggests that the Secretary of Energy 

consider taking action on Item 4 above in 

parallel with the development of an 

Implementation Plan for this 

Recommendation. 

In addition, the Board’s Recommendation 

2004–1, Oversight of Complex, High-Hazard 

Nuclear Operations, addresses the need for 

complex-wide consistency in the application 

of DOE requirements and expectations. The 

Board expects the mechanisms established in 

response to Recommendation 2004–1 would 

likewise ensure consistent, conservative 

implementation of the confinement 

requirement provided here.

John T. Conway, 

Chairman.

[FR Doc. 04–27426 Filed 12–14–04; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 3670–01–P

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

[Docket No. EA–274–A] 

Application To Export Electric Energy; 

Wisconsin Public Service Corporation

AGENCY: Office of Fossil Energy, DOE.

ACTION: Notice of application.

SUMMARY: Wisconsin Public Service 

Corporation (WPSC) has applied to 

renew its authority to transmit electric 

energy from the United States to Canada 

pursuant to section 202(e) of the Federal 

Power Act.

DATES: Comments, protests or requests 

to intervene must be submitted on or 

before January 14, 2005.

ADDRESSES: Comments, protests or 

requests to intervene should be 

addressed as follows: Office of Coal & 

Power Import/Export (FE–27), Office of 

Fossil Energy, U.S. Department of 

Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, 

SW., Washington, DC 20585–0350 (FAX 

202–287–5736).

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Xavier Puslowski (Program Office) 202–

586–4708 or Michael Skinker (Program 

Attorney) 202–586–2793.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Exports of 

electricity from the United States to a 

foreign country are regulated and 

require authorization under section 

202(e) of the Federal Power Act (FPA) 

(16 U.S.C. 824a(e)). 

On February 6, 2003, the Office of 

Fossil Energy (FE) of the Department of 

Energy (DOE) issued Order No. EA–274 

authorizing WPSC to transmit electric 

energy from the United States to Canada 

as a power marketer. That two year 

authorization will expire on February 6, 

2005. 

On November 30, 2004, FE received 

an application from WPSC to renew its 

authorization to transmit electric energy 

from the United States to Canada for a 

five-year term. WPSC proposes to 

arrange for the delivery of those exports 

over the international transmission 

facilities owned by Basin Electric Power 

Cooperative, Bonneville Power 

Administration, Eastern Maine Electric 

Cooperative, International Transmission 

Company, Joint Owners of the Highgate 

Project, Long Sault, Inc., Maine Electric 

Power Company, Maine Public Service 

Company, Minnesota Power, Inc., 

Minnkota Power Cooperative, New York 

Power Authority, Niagara Mohawk 

Power Corporation, Northern States 

Power, Vermont Electric Company and 

Vermont Electric Transmission 

Company. 

The construction of each of the 

international transmission facilities to 

be utilized by WPSC, as more fully 

described in the application, has 

previously been authorized by a 

Presidential permit issued pursuant to 

Executive Order 10485, as amended. 

Procedural Matters: Any person 

desiring to become a party to these 

proceedings or to be heard by filing 

comments or protests to this application 

should file a petition to intervene, 

comment or protest at the address 

provided above in accordance with 

§§ 385.211 or 385.214 of the FERC’s 

Rules of Practice and Procedures (18 

CFR 385.211, 385.214). Fifteen copies of 

each petition and protest should be filed 

with the DOE on or before the dates 

listed above. 

Comments on the WPSC application 

to export electric energy to Canada 

should be clearly marked with Docket 

EA–274–A. Additional copies are to be 

filed directly with Dennis M. Derricks, 

Director, Regulatory Policy & Analysis, 

Wisconsin Public Service Corporation, 

700 North Adams Street, P.O. Box 

19001, Green Bay, WI 54307–9001, and

David Martin Connelly, Esquire, Bruder, 

Gentile & Marcoux, L.L.P, 1701 

Pennsylvania Avenue, NW., Suite 900, 

Washington, DC 20006–15807. 

Copies of this application will be 

made available, upon request, for public 

inspection and copying at the address 

provided above or by accessing the 

Fossil Energy Home Page at http://

www.fe.doe.gov. Upon reaching the 

Fossil Energy Home page, select 

‘‘Electricity Regulation,’’ and then 

‘‘Pending Proceedings’’ from the options 

menus.

Issued in Washington, DC, on December 8, 

2004. 

Anthony J. Como, 

Deputy Director, Electric Power Regulation, 

Office of Fossil Energy.

[FR Doc. 04–27416 Filed 12–14–04; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6450–01–P

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory 

Commission 

Notice of Application for Amendment 

of License and Soliciting Comments, 

Motions To Intervene, and Protests 

December 9, 2004. 

Take notice that the following 

application has been filed with the 

Commission and is available for public 

inspection: 

a. Application Type: Amendment of 

License to Reflect Terms and Conditions 

of Settlement Agreement. 

b. Project No: 2360–144. 

c. Date Filed: November 12, 2004. 

d. Applicant: ALLETE, Inc. 

e. Name of Project: St. Louis Project. 

f. Location: The project is located on 

the St. Louis, Beaver, and Cloquet 

Rivers in Carlton and St. Louis 

Counties, Minnesota. 

g. Filed Pursuant to: Federal Power 

Act, 16 U.S.C. 791(a) 825(r) and sections 

799 and 801. 

h. Applicant Contact: Ingrid K. 

Johnson, Assistant General Council,