96-687

 No. 96-687

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

 

1997

IN RE THE MATTER OF THE

DRIVER'S LICENSE OF

CHRISTOPHER T. ANDERSON,

 Petitioner and Appellant,

 v.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

 Respondent and Respondent.

 

APPEAL FROM:District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,

 In and for the County of Yellowstone,

 The Honorable G. Todd Baugh, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

 For Appellant:

 Terry L. Seiffert, Attorney at Law, Billings, Montana

 For Respondent:

 Hon. Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General

 Pamela P. Collins, Ass't Attorney General, Helena, Montana

 

 Dennis Paxinos, Yellowstone County Attorney

 Brent Brooks, Deputy County Attorney, Billings, Montana

 Submitted on Briefs: May 8, 1997

 Decided: August 1, 1997

Filed:

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 __________________________________________

 Clerk

Justice Karla M. Gray delivered the Opinion of the Court.

 Christopher T. Anderson (Anderson) appeals from the order of the Thirteenth

Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, which denied his petition challenging 

the

declaration by the Montana Department of Justice (Department) that he is a habitual

traffic offender and the Department's revocation of his driver's license. We 

reverse and

remand.

 The sole issue before us is whether the District Court erred in denying Anderson's

petition. 

 On or about May 7, 1996, the Department notified Anderson that, according to its

records, he had accumulated 30 or more conviction points related to the use or 

operation

of a motor vehicle within a 3-year period. The records reflected convictions for 

driving

under the influence of alcohol (DUI) on September 20, 1995, November 27, 1995, and

April 11, 1996. Each DUI conviction was assigned 10 conviction points. 

 Under such a circumstance, the Department is required to declare the driver a

habitual traffic offender and to revoke the person's driver's license for 3 years. 

The

notification so advised Anderson, and also advised that he could challenge the 

declaration

and revocation by petitioning the district court in the county of his residence 

within 30

days.

 Anderson timely filed a petition in the District Court challenging the Department's

actions. He contended that the purported DUI conviction on April 11, 1996, was

erroneous because his conviction date for that DUI was November 14, 1991. As a 

result,

Anderson argued that he had not accumulated 30 or more conviction points within a 3-

year period under 61-11-203(2), MCA, and the Department's habitual traffic offender

declaration and driver's license revocation were invalid.

 The District Court ordered the parties to submit an agreed statement of facts and

memoranda of law. After the parties complied, the District Court entered its order

denying Anderson's petition. Anderson appeals.

 Did the District Court err in denying Anderson's petition challenging the

 Department's declaration that he is a habitual traffic offender and its

 revocation of his driver's license?

 In Montana, a habitual traffic offender is a person who, within a 3-year period,

accumulates 30 or more "conviction" points relating to the use or operation of a 

motor

vehicle. Section 61-11-203(2), MCA. " 'Conviction' means a finding of guilt by duly

constituted judicial authority. . . ." Section 61-11-203(1), MCA. In the case 

presently

before us, it is clear that if Anderson was convicted of DUI on November 14, 1991,

rather than on April 11, 1996, he did not accumulate sufficient conviction points 

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within

a 3-year period to support the Department's declaration that he is a habitual traffic

offender and revocation of his driver's license. Thus, it is necessary to carefully

scrutinize the record before us to determine the correct conviction date.

 According to the record, Anderson was arrested on the DUI charge at issue on

October 26, 1991, found guilty by the Billings City Court (City Court) on November 

14,

1991, and sentenced on the same date. He appealed to the district court where, for

unknown reasons, the case languished. On April 11, 1996, the district court signed 

an

order, based on a stipulation by the parties, dismissing the appeal and remanding to 

the

City Court for final imposition of sentence. The abstract of record relating to

proceedings on remand in the City Court, signed by the Clerk of the City Court and 

dated

April 30, 1996, is the only document before us relating to those proceedings. The 

Clerk

wrote in "4-11-96" after "date of conviction" and checked boxes captioned "found

guilty" and "judge."

 

 The Department's declaration that Anderson is a habitual traffic offender is based

on its contention that Anderson had an "April 11, 1996, conviction." That 

contention is

premised entirely on the district court's April 11, 1996, order dismissing Anderson's

appeal and remanding for final imposition of sentence, and the abstract of record 

from

the City Court containing an identical conviction date. The problem is that, on this

record, no "duly constituted judicial authority" found Anderson guilty of DUI on 

that

date and, as a result, no conviction occurred at that time. See 61-11-203(1), 

MCA. 

 First, it is important to recall that the City Court convicted Anderson of--and

sentenced him on--the DUI at issue on November 14, 1991. Anderson appealed for a

trial de novo, but the district court ultimately dismissed his appeal from that 

conviction

pursuant to the parties' stipulation and remanded for final imposition of sentence. 

The

district court did not find Anderson guilty of DUI and, thus, did not "convict" him 

as

defined in 61-11-203(1), MCA, on April 11, 1996. 

 With regard to the abstract of record concerning the remand to the City Court, it

is clear that the abstract reflects a conviction date of April 11, 1996, and 

indicates

"found guilty" and "judge." It is equally clear, however, that the City Court had no

statutory authority to find Anderson guilty again, at that time, of the offense for 

which

it had already convicted and sentenced him in November of 1991. Nor does the

Department cite to any case law under which such authority would exist.

 Moreover, the district court's dismissal of Anderson's appeal remanded to the City

Court only for imposition of sentence already pronounced. While we prohibited such a

remand in Rickett v. City of Billings (1993), 262 Mont. 339, 864 P.2d 793, that case 

is

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inapplicable here. In Rickett, the pro se defendant appealed a city court 

conviction to the

district court and then failed to appear for a scheduled omnibus hearing. Based on 

her

failure to appear, the district court determined that the defendant had waived her 

appeal

and remanded to the city court for imposition and/or execution of that court's 

sentence. 

Rickett, 864 P.2d at 794. We determined that the district court's options in 

response to

a failure to appear were limited to those set forth in 46-16-122(2), MCA, and, as a

result, we held that the district court exceeded its authority in remanding to the 

city court

for imposition or execution of sentence. Rickett, 864 P.2d at 794-95. Here, the 

parties

stipulated to the dismissal of Anderson's appeal to the district court and its 

remand to the

City Court for final imposition of sentence. Nothing in Rickett precludes a remand 

under

this factual scenario.We conclude that the records on which the Department relied

in declaring Anderson a habitual traffic offender and revoking his driver's license

incorrectly reflected an April 11, 1996, DUI conviction and, as a result, Anderson 

did

not accumulate 30 conviction points within a 3-year period. On that basis, we 

further

conclude that the Department improperly declared Anderson a habitual traffic offender

and revoked his driver's license.

 The Department contends that Anderson is attempting to collaterally attack his

April 11, 1996, conviction in this proceeding challenging a habitual traffic offender

declaration and correctly cites to State ex rel. Majerus v. Carter (1984), 214 Mont. 

272,

278-80, 693 P.2d 501, 504-505, as authority for the proposition that he cannot

collaterally attack a conviction at this time. The Department's position, however, 

is

premised on its theory that a conviction occurred on April 11, 1996. As we concluded

above, that theory is incorrect. 

 Moreover, while Majerus prohibits efforts to refute underlying charges or dispute

the propriety of underlying convictions in a habitual traffic offender proceeding by

collaterally attacking those convictions (Majerus, 693 P.2d at 504-505), Anderson is 

not

attempting to do so here. Rather, Anderson is disputing the accuracy of the records

regarding the alleged April 11, 1996, conviction on which the Department's 

declaration

and revocation were based; that is, Anderson questions only whether the records on

which the Department relied correctly reflected a DUI conviction on April 11, 1996. 

Section 61-11-210(3), MCA, and Majerus, 693 P.2d at 504-505, expressly authorize him

to do so. 

 We hold that the District Court erred in denying Anderson's petition 

challenging

the Department's declaration that he is a habitual traffic offender and its 

revocation of his

driver's license.

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 Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

 /S/ KARLA M. GRAY

We concur:

/S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.

/S/ JIM REGNIER 

/S/ JAMES C. NELSON

/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART

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