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“[T]here is not a lot of 

evidence that other secession 

movements would succeed 

in following suit. To argue 

that the breakup of Sudan 

would be followed by other 

secessions, there must be 

other secession movements 

positioned to do so. But today 

there are no other movements 

in Africa with the history, local 

following and international 

support comparable to that 

of Southern Sudan.”

November 17, 2010 

Secession and Precedent in Sudan 

and Africa

Summary

•	 African leaders have recently expressed concern that the possible division of Sudan may lead 

to a domino effect of other secessions on the continent—but closer analysis questions how 

likely this may be.

•	 Africa’s borders are largely accepted; it is only a distinct few cases (including Sudan) in which 

they could be reconsidered.

•	 While there are many secession movements in Africa, most are weak and few stand a real 

chance of success, or have the international support they would need to advance their 

cause. This minimizes the likelihood of a wave of follow-on secessions if Southern Sudan 

chooses to secede. 

Introduction 

“A ‘yes” vote could...stimulate ethnic secessionist movements from Cairo to Cape Town...the impact of their 

new status may be catastrophic elsewhere on the continent, where secessionist tendencies have hitherto been 

held back by the international community’s refusal to recognize new nations”1

“...independence will encourage secessionists in other African countries. Angola, Cameroon, Senegal and 

South Africa all face potential splits.”2 

If these words were written today, one would assume they were about Sudan and the prospect 

that Southern Sudanese will vote to secede in the coming January referendum. But they were 

written in 1993, and the subject was the pending secession of Eritrea from Ethiopia. 

Back then, politicians and commentators feared that the internationally sanctioned creation of a 

new state in Africa would set a dangerous precedent and encourage other secession movements. 

Today, similar fears are heard concerning the possible division of Sudan. “What is happening in 

Sudan could become a contagious disease that affects the whole of Africa,”3 Libyan leader Col. 

Muammar Gaddafi recently warned. On another occasion, he predicted “the beginning of the crack 

in Africa’s map.”4 Algeria’s foreign minister added “this partitioning will have fatal repercussions on 

the African continent.”5 Chadian President Idriss Deby cautioned, “we all have a north and south. If 

we accept the breakup of Sudan, the domino effect will be inevitable and it would be a disaster for 

the continent.”6

But will it? Predictions of disaster following Eritrea’s secession were overstated—the EthiopiaEritrea war that followed was catastrophic, but there was no subsequent surge in secessionist 

efforts elsewhere in Africa. Is there likely to be such a surge if Southern Sudanese vote to secede?

Jon Temin

E-mail: jtemin@usip.org

Phone: 202.429.4726

peaceBrieF68
© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

Secession and Precedent in Sudan and Africa

page 2 • PB 68 • November 17, 2010

Norms and Borders

Any secession in Africa challenges the long-held norm of accepting borders drawn by colonial 

powers, illogical as some of them may be. This principle of uti possidetis (Latin for “as you possess”) 

was enshrined by participants in a meeting of the Organization of African Unity in 1964, whose 

final declaration “solemly declares that all Member States pledge themselves to respect the 

borders existing on their achievement of national independence.”7 In the 1960s this made sense: 

African states were brand new, weak and looking to ensure their very existence. When Biafra (in 

Nigeria) and Katanga (in the Democratic Republic of Congo) tried to break away from their mother 

states in the 1960s, it was prudent to discourage their secession given the weakness of those states 

and the confusion that could have resulted from their secession given that other African states 

were only then coming into existence. At the time, it was important to establish the principle that 

colonial borders would stand. 

But 50 years later, the context is different. Most African states are well-established and their 

borders are accepted. By and large, the map of Africa is settled. The borders governing just a few 

states, however, are persistently problematic, none more so than Sudan.

If Southern Sudanese vote to secede and gain their independence, it will be the most significant 

redrawing of African borders since decolonization. Eritrea, though strategically located given its 

access to the Red Sea, is small and somewhat peripheral to the rest of the continent. Sudan, on the 

contrary, is the largest physical country on the continent and borders nine other states. Dividing it 

in two would be a seismic cartographic shift. 

Even so, there is not a lot of evidence that other secession movements would succeed in 

following suit. To argue that the breakup of Sudan would be followed by other secessions, there 

must be other secession movements positioned to do so. But today there are no other movements in Africa with the history, local following and international support comparable to that of 

Southern Sudan. 

Standards for Secession

Secession movements elsewhere in Africa exist today in Casamance (Senegal), Cabinda (Angola), 

Zanzibar (Tanzania), Somaliland (Somalia) and Western Sahara (the disputed territory bordering 

Morocco). They are the same movements that were cited as potentially “next to secede” when 

Eritrea gained independence. With the exception of Somaliland, none of these movements are 

stronger now than they were in the 1990s. In fact, many are weaker; secession movements in 

Casamance, Cabinda and Zanzibar have been relatively inactive in recent years. 

With the exception of Western Sahara, the people and rebels of these other secessionist regions 

have not been through what those in Southern Sudan and Eritrea have endured. Sudan’s NorthSouth civil wars lasted roughly 40 years—almost their entire post-colonial history—and resulted 

in approximately two million deaths. Eritrean rebels fought for 30 years. While people in other 

secessionist regions have no doubt suffered immensely and have legitimate grievances, they have 

not put in the time or paid a price that puts them on par with Southern Sudan (again with the 

exception of Western Sahara). This history matters, because it demonstrates the intractability of the 

conflict, and suggests that partition may be a necessary option. The determination and sacrifice 

of secession movements elsewhere should not be casually questioned, but there should be a 

threshold at which secession movements are considered to be credible, and the support and commitment demonstrated by the movement should be key factors in meeting that threshold. Beyond 

Sudan, few if any movements in Africa can show that requisite level of support and commitment.
© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

Secession and Precedent in Sudan and Africa

page 3 • PB 68 • November 17, 2010

Furthermore, for any secession movement to stand a chance of success it requires significant 

international support. One reason Southern Sudan may succeed in gaining internationally 

recognized independence is that a pillar of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that 

ended Sudan’s second civil war is the South’s right to self-determination, and the CPA was the 

product of vigorous international engagement, mediation and cajoling (by the U.S. and other key 

international actors and regional bodies). In some ways the international community owns the CPA 

as much as the Sudanese do, which ties the international community to the referendum and its 

result. But no other secession movements in Africa (with the possible exception of the Polisario in 

Western Sahara) have anything equivalent to the CPA that may compel influential members of the 

international community to recognize their right to self-determination. International recognition is 

crucial to successful secession—Somaliland’s lack of recognition provides a case in point. Without 

that international backing, other African secession movements are unlikely to get very far. 

What of the prospect that the secession of Southern Sudan could precipitate the breakup of 

some of Africa’s other large, conflict-ridden states, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, 

Ethiopia (whose constitution says “every Nation, Nationality and People in Ethiopia has an unconditional right to self-determination, including the right to secession”8

) or Nigeria? (Col. Gaddafi 

suggested in March that Nigeria should split into two). While those states have plenty of opposition 

movements and rebels, none of the major opposition forces are currently advocating for secession. 

Without a powerful champion pushing for secession, any precedent set elsewhere, such as in 

Sudan, is unlikely to gain much traction at home.

The combination of factors giving Southern Sudanese the option to secede is unlikely to be 

repeated elsewhere in Africa any time soon. If Southern Sudanese choose to secede, perhaps more 

concerning than follow-on secessions is the prospect that the threat of follow-on secessions—real 

or exaggerated—will be used by leaders in other states to clamp down on internal dissent in the 

name of unity. A wave of imitation secession movements across the continent is unlikely, or at 

least unlikely to get very far. For the same reasons that it’s been 17 years since Eritrea’s secession, 

it may be just as long until there is another prospect for internationally recognized secession in 

Africa. Just as warnings of a domino effect following Eritrea’s creation were overstated, so are 

similar warnings concerning Southern Sudan. 

Endnotes

1. Sam Kiley. “Eritrean Vote Will Fuel Breakaway Scramble in Africa.” The Times, April 23, 1993. 

2. Richard Dowden. “Eritrea Emerges as World’s Newest Nation.” The Independent, May 25, 1993. 

3. “Sudan’s Partition to be a ‘Contagious Disease.” AFP, October 10, 2010.

4. “Kenya Looking Forward to a ‘Free South Sudan’ – Envoy.” Sudan Tribune, October 15, 2010.

5. “Algeria: South Sudan Secession Could Have Serious Impact on African Continent.” Kuwait 

News Agency, October 25, 2010.

6. Philippe Perdix. “Sud-Sudan: Les Frontiers Africaines Sont-Elles Menacees?” Jeune Afrique, 

October 22, 2010.

7. Organization of African Unity, Resolutions Adopted by the First Ordinary Session of the 

Assembly of Heads of State and Government Held in Cairo, UAR, dated July 17-21, 1964.

8. Article 39 of the 1994 Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.

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About This Brief

This Peace Brief was written by 

Jon Temin, a senior program 

officer in USIP’s Center for 

Mediation and Conflict Resolution, 

where he focuses on Sudan and 

leads the Institute’s Sudan team. 

He travels to Sudan frequently and 

has significant experience in other 

regions of Africa.