UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

2100 RENAISSANCE BLVD., SUITE 100

KING OF PRUSSIA, PA 19406-2713

 February 12, 2016

Mr. Dean Curtland

Site Vice President

Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant 

NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC 

c/o Mr. Michael Ossing 

P.O. Box 300 

Seabrook, NH 03874 

SUBJECT: SEABROOK STATION, UNIT NO. 1 – INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 

05000443/2015004 AND INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE 

INSTALLATION REPORT NO. 07200063/2015001

Dear Mr. Curtland: 

On December 31, 2015, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an 

inspection at Seabrook Station, Unit No. 1. The enclosed report documents the inspection 

results, which were discussed on January 21, 2016, with you and other members of your staff.

NRC Inspectors examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and 

compliance with the Commission’s rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. 

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed 

personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified. However, a 

licensee-identified violation, which was determined to be of very low safety significance, is listed 

in Section 4OA7 of this report. If you contest the non-cited violations (NCVs) in this report, you 

should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for 

your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, 

Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, 

Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-

0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Seabrook Station. 
D. Curtland -2-

In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 2.390 of the NRC’s 

“Rules of Practice,” a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be 

available electronically for public inspection in the NRC’s Public Document Room or from 

the Publicly Available Records component of the NRC’s Agencywide Documents Access 

and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC website at 

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

 /RA/

Fred L. Bower, III, Chief

Reactor Projects Branch 3

Division of Reactor Projects

Docket No. 50-443

License No. NPF-86

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000443/2015004

 and ISFSI Report 07200063/2015001

 w/Attachment: Supplementary Information

cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ
D. Curtland -2-

In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 2.390 of the NRC’s 

“Rules of Practice,” a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be 

available electronically for public inspection in the NRC’s Public Document Room or from 

the Publicly Available Records component of the NRC’s Agencywide Documents Access 

and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC website at 

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

 /RA/

Fred L. Bower, III, Chief

Reactor Projects Branch 3

Division of Reactor Projects

Docket No. 50-443

License No. NPF-86

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000443/2015004

 and ISFSI Report 07200063/2015001

 w/Attachment: Supplementary Information

cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ

DISTRIBUTION: (via email)

DDorman, RA

DLew, DRA 

MScott, DRP

JColaccino, DRP 

RLorson, DRS

BSmith, DRS

FBower, DRP 

RBarkley, DRP

MDraxton, DRP

PCataldo, DRP, SRI

CNewport, DRP, RI 

ACass, DRP, Resident AA

RIyengar, RI, OEDO 

RidsNrrPMSeabrook Res

RidsNrrDorlLpl1-2 Res

ROPreports Res

DOCUMENT NAME: G:\DRP\BRANCH3\Inspection Reports\Seabrook\15Q4\SB IR2015004_Final.docx

ADAMS Accession No. ML16043A391 

 SUNSI Review

 Non-Sensitive

 Sensitive

 Publicly Available

 Non-Publicly Available

OFFICE RI/DRP RI/DRP RI/DRP

NAME PCataldo/ RSB for RBarkley/ RSB FBower/ FLB 

DATE 02/11 /16 02/ 11 /16 02/ 11 /16

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
1

Enclosure

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Docket No: 50-443

License No: NPF-86

Report No: 05000443/2015004

Licensee: NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC 

Facility: Seabrook Station, Unit No.1

Location: Seabrook, New Hampshire 03874

Dates: October 1, 2015 through December 31, 2015

Inspectors: P. Cataldo, Senior Resident Inspector

C. Newport, Resident Inspector

J. Vasquez, Project Engineer

D. Silk, Senior Operations Engineer

B. Dionne, Health Physicist

J. Nicholson, Senior Health Physicist 

T. O’Hara, Reactor Inspector

B. Cook, Senior Reactor Analyst

Approved by: Fred L. Bower, Chief

Reactor Projects Branch 3

Division of Reactor Projects
2

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUMMARY ................................................................................................................................ 3

1. REACTOR SAFETY ........................................................................................................... 4

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection..................................................................................... 4

1R04 Equipment Alignment ............................................................................................... 4

1R05 Fire Protection.......................................................................................................... 6

1R07 Heat Sink Performance ............................................................................................ 6

1R08 Inservice Inspection.................................................................................................. 6

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance ..10

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness......................................................................................12

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control .................................13

1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments.....................................14

1R18 Plant Modifications ..................................................................................................14

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing.......................................................................................15

1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities.....................................................................15

1R22 Surveillance Testing ................................................................................................17

1EP2 Alert and Notification System Evaluation .................................................................17

1EP3 Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation System.................17

1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes .........................................18

1EP5 Maintaining Emergency Preparedness ....................................................................18

2. RADIATION SAFETY.........................................................................................................19

2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls .......................................19

2RS2 Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls ...........................................................20

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES..........................................................................................................21

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification...........................................................................21

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution .....................................................................22

4OA5 Other Activities ........................................................................................................28

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit...........................................................................................29

4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violation....................................................................................29

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION.......................................................................................A-1

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT ..................................................................................................A-1

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, DISCUSSED, AND UPDATED ....................................A-1

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED.......................................................................................A-2

LIST OF ACRONYMS...........................................................................................................A-17
3

SUMMARY

Inspection Report 05000443/2015004 and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) 

Report 07200063/2015001; 10/01/2015 – 12/31/2015; Seabrook Station, Unit No. 1; Routine 

Integrated Inspection Report.

This report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced 

inspections performed by regional inspectors. The NRC’s program for overseeing the safe 

operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, “Reactor 

Oversight Process,” Revision 5.

Other Findings

A violation of very low safety significance was identified by NextEra and reviewed by the 

inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by NextEra have been entered into the 

corrective action program (CAP). This violation and corrective action tracking number are listed 

in Section 4OA7 of this report.
4

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

Seabrook began the assessment period at less than 20 percent reactor power, continuing the 

coastdown for shutdown and entry into Refueling Outage No. 17 (OR17). Seabrook remained 

shutdown during performance of OR17, until reactor criticality was achieved on November 12, 

2015. Subsequently, Seabrook synchronized to the grid on November 13, 2015, and achieved 

full power (100 percent) on November 17, 2015. Seabrook operated at full power for the 

remainder of the assessment period. 

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01 – 1 sample)

Readiness for Seasonal Extreme Weather Conditions

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed NextEra’s readiness for the onset of seasonal cold 

temperatures. The review focused on the service water (SW) cooling tower (CT) and the 

supplemental emergency power system generators, as well as other areas of cold 

weather protection for various areas of interest onsite, such as weather enclosures for 

the condensate storage tank. The inspectors reviewed the updated final safety analysis 

report (UFSAR), technical specifications (TSs), control room logs, and the CAP to 

determine what temperatures or other seasonal weather could challenge these systems, 

and to ensure NextEra personnel had adequately prepared for these challenges. The

inspectors reviewed station procedures, including NextEra’s seasonal weather 

preparation procedure and applicable operating procedures. The inspectors performed 

walkdowns of the selected systems to ensure station personnel identified issues that 

could challenge the operability of the systems during cold weather conditions. 

Documents reviewed for each section of this report are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment

.1 Partial System Walkdowns (71111.04 – 3 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following systems:

 'A' SW return to service on October 29

 'B' residual heat removal (RHR) return to service on November 17

 'B' charging system during 'A' train maintenance on December 17
5

The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk-significance relative to the 

reactor safety cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors reviewed 

applicable operating procedures, system diagrams, the UFSAR, TSs, work orders 

(WOs), condition reports (CRs), and the impact of ongoing work activities on redundant 

trains of equipment to identify conditions that could have impacted the system’s 

performance of its intended safety functions. The inspectors also performed field 

walkdowns of accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and 

support equipment were aligned correctly and were operable. The inspectors examined 

the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of 

equipment to verify that there were no deficiencies. The inspectors also reviewed 

whether NextEra staff had properly identified equipment issues and entered them into 

the CAP for resolution with the appropriate significance characterization.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Full System Walkdown (71111.04S – 1 sample)

a. Inspection Scope

During October and November 2015, the inspectors performed a complete system 

walkdown of accessible portions of the primary component cooling water system to 

verify the existing equipment lineup was correct. The inspectors reviewed operating 

procedures, surveillance tests, system diagrams, equipment line-up check-off lists, WOs, 

work requests, CRs, TSs, and the UFSAR to verify the system was aligned to perform its 

required safety functions. The inspectors also reviewed electrical power availability, 

component lubrication and equipment cooling, hanger and support functionality, and 

operability of support systems. The inspectors performed field walkdowns of accessible 

portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment were 

aligned correctly and operable. The inspectors examined the material condition of the 

components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were 

no deficiencies. The inspectors also reviewed whether NextEra staff had appropriately 

evaluated and resolved any equipment issues and other performance deficiencies and 

entered them into their CAP for resolution with the appropriate significance 

characterization.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.
6

1R05 Fire Protection

Resident Inspector Quarterly Walkdowns (71111.05Q – 5 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted tours of the areas listed below to assess the material 

condition and operational status of fire protection features. The inspectors verified that 

NextEra controlled combustible materials and ignition sources in accordance with 

administrative procedures. The inspectors verified that fire protection and suppression 

equipment was available for use as specified in the area pre-fire plan, and passive fire 

barriers were maintained in good material condition. The inspectors also verified that 

station personnel implemented compensatory measures for out of service, degraded, or 

inoperable fire protection equipment, as applicable, in accordance with procedures. 

 Containment 0' (C-F-2-Z) on October 14

 Containment -26' (C-F-1-Z) on October 20

 Containment 25' (C-F-3-Z) on October 24

 Supplement emergency power system (SEPS-F-1-0) on December 3

 Essential switchgear 'A' (CB-F-1A-A) on December 17

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R07 Heat Sink Performance (711111.07A – 1 sample)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the ‘B’ emergency diesel generator (EDG) heat exchanger to 

determine its readiness and availability to perform its safety functions. The inspectors 

reviewed the design basis for the component and verified NextEra’s commitments to 

NRC Generic Letter 89-13. The inspectors reviewed results of previous inspections of 

the ‘B’ EDG heat exchanger, reviewed performance data obtained during recent 

operation of the ‘B’ EDG heat exchanger, observed the most recent inspection results of 

the ‘B’ EDG heat exchanger, and discussed the results with NextEra staff. The 

inspectors also verified that NextEra initiated appropriate corrective actions for identified 

deficiencies.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R08 Inservice Inspection (711111.08 – 1 sample)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted a review of NextEra’s implementation of inservice inspection 

(ISI) program activities for monitoring degradation of the reactor coolant system (RCS)

boundary, risk significant piping and components, and containment systems during the 
7

Seabrook Unit 1, OR17. Inspection sample selection was based on the inspection 

procedure objectives and risk priority of those pressure retaining components in systems 

where degradation would result in a significant increase in risk. The inspectors observed 

in-process non-destructive examinations (NDE), reviewed documentation, and 

interviewed NextEra personnel to verify that the NDE examination activities performed 

as part of the Seabrook Unit 1 ISI program were being conducted during the Seabrook 

Interval 3, Period 2, 2

nd Outage, ISI in accordance with the requirements of American 

Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section XI, 

2004 Edition, no Addenda.

Non-destructive Examination and Welding Activities (Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC)

Section 02.01)

The inspectors performed direct observations of select NDE activities, and reviewed 

records of the NDEs listed below. The inspectors reviewed certifications of the NDE 

technicians performing the examinations. The inspectors verified that the examinations 

were performed in accordance with approved procedures and that the results were 

reviewed and evaluated by certified Level III NDE personnel.

ASME Code Required Examinations

• The inspectors observed the remote, bare-metal visual (VT-2) examination of the 

reactor vessel upper closure head and control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) nozzle 

penetrations. 

• The inspectors reviewed the VT-3 direct visual examination data from NextEra’s

examination of the CRDM structural supports to determine whether all results were 

satisfactory. 

• The inspectors reviewed the examination data sheets for the post mechanical stress 

improvement process phased array, outside diameter ultrasonic test inspections and 

the eddy current (EC), inside weld surface inspections of seven reactor vessel hot 

leg and cold leg nozzle dissimilar metal safe-end welds. The inspectors verified the 

examinations were completed in accordance with the applicable Seabrook TSs, 

ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI, 2004 Edition, Title 10 of the 

Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.55a(b)(2)(xiv, xv and xiv), Code Case N770-1 and the Examination Program Plan (Scan Plan) WDI-PJF-1312142-EPP-001, 

Revision 0, as submitted to, and reviewed by, the NextEra staff. The inspectors 

determined whether the examination results were dispositioned in accordance with 

the applicable requirements for the weld records identified in the list of documents 

reviewed section of this report. 

• The inspectors reviewed the data records from the visual examinations of the 

containment liner concrete pad and floor plugs. The inspectors determined whether 

NextEra personnel documented the conditions for investigation, repair, and 

monitoring in accordance with their program requirements.

• The inspectors observed the ultrasonic test examination of two ASME Class 2 

feedwater nozzle-to-pipe welds (FW 4607-04-19 and FW 4607-04-20) to determine

whether the examinations were performed to check for indications of thermal fatigue 
8

in the welds and whether the results were properly dispositioned. No new indications 

were detected, and previously detected indications were confirmed to show that no 

changes had occurred.

• The inspectors reviewed the documentation for a containment liner anomaly on 

the inside surface of the containment dome. NextEra staff completed a VT-1 remote, 

visual examination on October 2, 2015. This indication, identified as

IWE-15-159-176, was first documented in October 2009, and re-examined in 

October 2012 and April 2014. NextEra engineering staff evaluated the results and 

did not identify measureable changes in the length, width, contour or color of the 

anomaly from 2009 thru 2015. The inspectors noted that NextEra engineers were 

not able to accurately measure the height of the anomaly due to limitations of their 

imaging equipment. NextEra staff initiated plans to perform an examination during 

the next refueling outage. The inspectors determined NextEra staff tracked and 

dispositioned this indication in accordance with their program requirements.

Review of Originally Rejectable Indications Accepted by Evaluation

The inspectors determined there were no samples available for review during this 

inspection that involved examinations with recordable indications that had been 

accepted for continued service after evaluation.

Repair/Replacement Consisting of Welding Activities

The inspectors reviewed WO 4036801501, which provided direction to fabricate a diesel 

fuel system connection to implement design change EC282581. The inspectors 

reviewed the WO to determine whether welding was completed in accordance with 

ASME Code welding requirements. Specifically, the inspectors determined whether 

approved plant welding procedures and parameters were specified and that post-weld 

quality control examinations were identified. The inspectors verified that the WO

contained completed weld traveler information, documentation of completed 

examinations, and appropriate documentation of the work steps completed by NextEra 

personnel. 

Pressurized Water Reactor Vessel Lower Head Penetration Inspection Activities (IMC 

Section 02.02) 

The inspectors reviewed visual inspection records of the bare-metal visual examination 

(VT-2) of the exterior surface of the Unit 1 lower reactor vessel head surface and 

instrument penetrations for indications of boric acid leakage in order to confirm 

appropriate inspection coverage was achieved and to verify that no boric acid leakage or 

wastage had been observed. The inspectors further verified that NextEra staff took 

actions, tracked in their CAP, to ensure the lower head surface was sufficiently clean to 

accurately observe the annulus between the penetrations and the openings in the lower 

head. The inspectors reviewed the examination records to verify that there was no 

evidence of boric acid. 
9

Steam Generator (SG) Tube Inspection Activities (IMC Section 02.04)

The inspectors reviewed the NextEra degradation assessment report for OR17, and 

reviewed records associated with a sample of SG tube examinations completed from all 

four SGs. The inspectors determined the following activities were planned: 

1. Base scope of 100 percent full length bobbin coil examinations in all SGs to inspect 

general tube conditions;

2. Hot and cold leg tube support plate to tube intersections examinations in high stress 

tubes using a “+ Point probe” to interrogate the regions with the potential for outside 

diameter stress corrosion cracking due to tube bulges and tube expansion transitions 

near the top of the tube sheet;

3. Examinations of all SGs utilizing a “+ Point probe”, which cannot be inspected with 

bobbin probes, such as small radius U-bends and local profile anomalies;

4. Inspection of the tube sheet region with “+Point probe” in each SG to detect tube 

cracking near the top of the tube sheet; and

5. Examination of large residual noise tube support plate locations on high-stress tubes 

(hot leg tube support plates only) using a “+ Point probe” in regions with the potential 

for outside diameter stress corrosion cracking and primary water stress corrosion 

cracking, as well as regions not inspectable with bobbin probes, such as small radius 

U-bends and local profile anomalies.

The inspectors reviewed the scope of the EC examinations to verify that known and 

potential areas of tube degradation were inspected. The inspectors also verified that 

examination scope expansion criteria were implemented based upon inspection results, 

as directed by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) “Pressurized Water Reactor 

Steam Generator Examination Guidelines.” The inspectors verified compliance of these 

examinations with the Seabrook TSs, the ASME Code, Section XI, and Nuclear Energy 

Institute (NEI) 97-06, “Steam Generator Program Guidelines.” The inspectors verified 

tubes with identified wall wear of 40 percent or greater were plugged.

The inspectors reviewed EC examination records and determined NextEra staff 

identified a single axial indication in SG ‘A’, row 20, column 80 that was subsequently 

plugged in accordance with program requirements. NextEra staff review of EC 

examination results also identified a defect, due to anti-vibration bar wear in SG ‘A’, row 

50, column 79, which was plugged during the refueling outage to remove it from service. 

EC examination results further showed a single axial indication in SG ‘C’, row 39, 

column 46, below the top of the tube sheet in the hot leg, which was plugged in 

accordance with program requirements. The inspectors determined NextEra staff 

developed and completed an expansion plan for all four SGs without discovery of further 

indications. The inspectors verified that NextEra staff completed condition monitoring 

evaluations for these indications to properly determine, in accordance with program 

requirements, that in-situ pressure testing was not required in these tubes.
10

Boric Acid Corrosion Control Inspection Activities (IMC Section 02.03)

The inspectors reviewed the boric acid corrosion control program to determine whether 

activities were completed in accordance with NextEra procedures. The inspectors 

discussed the program with the boric acid program owner, and sampled photographic 

examination records of boric acid found on safety significant piping and components 

inside the containment structure during Mode 3 walkdowns conducted by NextEra 

personnel and directly observed by the NRC Resident Inspectors on October 2, 2015. 

The inspectors reviewed records related to the identification and documentation of nonconforming conditions of boric acid leaks in the CAP with a focus on areas that could 

cause degradation of safety significant components.

The inspectors verified the adequacy of VT-2 visual examination results of the baremetal examination of the Unit 1 reactor pressure vessel lower head penetration nozzle 

welds that was performed by NextEra personnel during OR17. The inspectors reviewed 

a sample of photographs and visual inspection documentation records to verify whether 

indications of boric acid leakage were identified.

The inspectors verified that potential deficiencies identified were entered into the CAP

and reviewed evaluations of selected deficiencies documented in CRs to verify that the 

corrective actions were consistent with the requirements of the ASME Code and 10 CFR 

50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI. The inspectors also reviewed a sample of engineering 

evaluations for the above CRs to verify that equipment or components that were wetted 

or impinged upon by boric acid solutions were properly analyzed for degradation that 

might impact their function.

Identification and Resolution of Problems (IMC Section 02.05)

The inspectors reviewed a sample of CRs since the previous refueling outage, and 

verified that non-conforming conditions associated with ISI and SG inspections were 

properly identified, evaluated, dispositioned, and appropriately entered into the CAP.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

(71111.11Q – 2 samples; 71111.11B – 1 sample)

.1 Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Requalification Testing and Training

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the implementation of “just-in-time” training for licensed 

operators on September 30 through October 1, 2015. This training included the 

verification of plant shutdown activities consistent with the training plan and associated 

objectives for the shutdown and entry into OR17. 

b. Findings

No findings were identified.
11

.2 Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Performance in the Main Control Room

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed infrequently performed test or evolution briefings, pre-shift 

briefings, and reactivity control briefings to verify that the briefings met the criteria 

specified in NextEra’s Administrative Procedure OP-AA-100-1000, “Conduct of 

Operations,” Revision 16. In particular, the inspectors observed turbine overspeed 

testing, power reduction, reactivity management, and reactor shutdown and entry into 

OR17 on October 1, 2015. In addition, inspectors observed transition to shutdown 

cooling and implementation of alarm response procedures on October 1, 2015, and RCS 

drain-down to mid-loop activities on November 1, 2015. The inspectors observed test 

performance to verify that procedure use, crew communications, and coordination of 

activities between work groups similarly met established expectations and standards.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.3 Licensed Operator Requalification Biennial Review

a. Inspection Scope

The following inspection activities were performed using NUREG-1021, "Operator 

Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors," Revision 10, and Inspection 

Procedure Attachment 71111.11B, “Licensed Operator Requalification Program.”

Examination Results

On December 29, 2015, the results of the annual operating tests were reviewed in-office 

to determine if pass/fail rates were consistent with the guidance of NUREG-1021, 

"Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors," Revision 10, and NRC 

Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix I, “Operator Requalification Human Performance 

Significance Determination Process (SDP).” The review verified that the failure rates 

(individual or crew) did not exceed 20 percent.

 Five out of 52 operators failed at least one section of the annual exam. The overall 

individual failure rate was 9.6 percent.

 One out of 11 crews failed the simulator test. The crew failure rate was 9.1 percent.

Written Examination Quality

The inspectors reviewed two written examinations administered during the 2015 

examination cycle for qualitative and quantitative attributes as specified in Appendix B of 

Attachment 71111.11B, “Licensed Operator Requalification Program.”

Operating Test Quality

Ten job performance measures (JPMs) and four dynamic scenarios were reviewed for 

qualitative and quantitative attributes as specified in Appendix C of 71111.11B, 

“Licensed Operator Requalification Program.”
12

Licensee Administration of Operating Tests

The dynamic simulator exams and JPMs administered during the week of November 30, 

2015, were observed. These observations included facility evaluations of Shift Crew B 

and Staff Crew Four during two dynamic simulator exams and individual performance of 

five JPMs.

Examination Security

The inspectors assessed the facility staff’s handling of exam material. The inspectors 

also checked JPMs, scenarios, and written examinations for excessive overlap of test 

items from week to week.

Remedial Training and Re-Examinations

The remediation plans for two individual JPM failures from the 2014 segment 14F annual 

requalification exam, and one biennial comprehensive written exam failure from 

November 2013, were reviewed to assess the effectiveness of the remedial training. 

Conformance with Operator License Conditions

Medical records for ten license holders were reviewed to assess conformance with 

license conditions. Proficiency watch standing records were reviewed for the second 

and third quarters of 2015. The reactivation plans for license holders in 2015 were 

reviewed to assess the effectiveness of the reactivation process. 

Simulator Performance

Simulator performance and fidelity was reviewed for conformance to the reference plant 

control room. A sample of simulator deficiency reports was also reviewed to ensure 

facility staff addressed identified modeling problems. Simulator test documentation was 

also reviewed.

Problem Identification and Resolution

A review was conducted of recent operating history documentation found in inspection 

reports, NextEra’s CAP, and the most recent NRC plant issues matrix. The inspectors 

also reviewed specific events from NextEra’s CAP which, indicated possible training 

deficiencies, to verify that they had been appropriately addressed. The NRC resident 

inspectors were also consulted for insights regarding licensed operators’ performance.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12Q – 3 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the samples listed below to assess the effectiveness of 

maintenance activities on structure, system, and component (SSC) performance and 
13

reliability. The inspectors reviewed system health reports, CAP documents, 

maintenance WOs, and maintenance rule (MR) basis documents to ensure that NextEra 

was identifying and properly evaluating performance problems within the scope of the 

MR. For each sample selected, the inspectors verified that the SSC was properly 

scoped into the MR in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65 and verified that the (a)(2) 

performance criteria established by NextEra staff were reasonable. As applicable, for 

SSCs classified as (a)(1), the inspectors assessed the adequacy of goals and corrective 

actions to return these SSCs to (a)(2). Additionally, the inspectors ensured that NextEra 

staff was identifying and addressing common cause failures that occurred within and 

across MR system boundaries. 

 Radiation monitors

 Various safety-related snubber maintenance and leak resolutions

 SW CT fan electrical and mechanical maintenance activities

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13 – 3 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed station evaluation and management of plant risk for the 

maintenance and emergent work activities listed below to verify that NextEra performed 

the appropriate risk assessments prior to removing equipment for work. The inspectors 

selected these activities based on potential risk significance relative to the reactor safety 

cornerstones. As applicable for each activity, the inspectors verified that NextEra 

personnel performed risk assessments as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and that the 

assessments were accurate and complete. When NextEra performed emergent work, 

the inspectors verified that operations personnel promptly assessed and managed plant 

risk. The inspectors reviewed the scope of maintenance work and discussed the results 

of the assessment with the station’s probabilistic risk analyst to verify plant conditions 

were consistent with the risk assessment. The inspectors also reviewed the TS

requirements and inspected portions of redundant safety systems, when applicable, to 

verify risk analysis assumptions were valid and applicable requirements were met.

 RCS drain-down to the reactor vessel flange on October 5

 ‘A’ SW system outage during core offload period (i.e., out-of-service) on October 8

 RCS decreased inventory and mid-loop operations on October 30

b. Findings

No findings were identified.
14

1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments (71111.15 – 4 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed operability determinations for the following degraded or nonconforming conditions based on the risk significance of the associated components and 

systems:

 Feed regulating valve localized flow erosion on October 14

 Foreign material (i.e., ball bearings) identified in the reactor vessel and system piping 

from an ultrasonic inspection tool on October 23

 Containment liner leakage rate floor plugs and channel inspections on October 28

 Through wall leak on pipe threads of MS-V-413 drain line on December 21

The inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of the operability determinations to 

assess whether TS operability was properly justified and the subject component or 

system remained available such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred. The 

inspectors compared the operability and design criteria in the appropriate sections of the 

TSs and UFSAR to NextEra’s evaluations to determine whether the components or 

systems were operable. The inspectors confirmed, where appropriate, compliance with 

bounding limitations associated with the evaluations.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R18 Plant Modifications (71111.18 – 3 samples)

.1 Permanent Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the permanent modifications listed below. This included two

modifications associated with NextEra’s response to a Japan Lessons Learned Order. 

The inspection did not address whether the modification satisfactorily addressed the 

objectives of Order EA-12-049. The inspection scope for the modification was restricted 

to those elements necessary to satisfy the stated objectives of Inspection Procedure

71111.18, specifically: 1) to verify that the modifications have not affected the safety 

functions of important safety systems; 2) to verify that the design bases, licensing bases, 

and performance capability of risk significant SSCs have not been degraded through 

modifications; and, 3) to verify that modifications performed during increased risksignificant configurations did not place the plant in an unsafe condition. The inspectors 

reviewed modification documents that included applicable 10 CFR 50.59 documentation, 

post-modification testing, and design interface activities, such as procedure changes and 

applicable training activities.

 EC282453, replacement of MS-V-393

 EC282474, installation of reactor coolant pump low leakage shutdown seals 

 EC282580, Fukushima FLEX strategy RCS makeup
15

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19 – 5 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the post-maintenance tests for the maintenance activities listed 

below to verify that procedures and test activities adequately tested the safety functions 

that may have been affected by the maintenance activity, that the acceptance criteria in 

the procedure were consistent with the information in the applicable licensing basis 

and/or design basis documents, and that the test results were properly reviewed and 

accepted and problems were appropriately documented. The inspectors also walked 

down the affected job site, observed the pre-job brief and post-job critique where 

possible, confirmed work site cleanliness was maintained, and witnessed the test or 

reviewed test data to verify quality control hold points were performed and checked, and 

that results adequately demonstrated restoration of the affected safety functions.

 Reactor trip breaker inspection and testing on October 1 and November 4

 ‘B’ RHR pump retest following outage maintenance activities on October 26

 Emergency feedwater pump P-37A retest following outage maintenance activities on 

November 12

 10 CFR Part 21, primary/secondary trip latch replacement on ABB Model 7 K-Line 

breaker for CT fan, 2-SW-FN-51B, on December 1

 'D' vital battery cell #18 replacement on December 30 

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities (71111.20 – 1 sample)

a. Inspection Scope 

The inspectors reviewed the station’s work schedule and outage risk plan for the 

maintenance and refueling outage (OR17), conducted October 1 through November 13. 

The inspectors reviewed NextEra’s development and implementation of outage plans 

and schedules to verify that risk, industry experience, previous site-specific problems, 

and defense-in-depth were considered. During the outage, the inspectors observed 

operator performance and other attributes associated with portions of the shutdown and 

cooldown processes, and compliance with cooldown rates associated with TS. Further, 

the inspectors reviewed multiple surveillance and other critical evolutions in the control 

room, and monitored controls associated with the following outage activities:

 Configuration, risk, and outage management, including monitoring of key shutdown 

safety functions, and compliance with the applicable TSs when taking equipment out 

of service;
16

 Implementation of clearance activities and confirmation that tags were properly hung 

and that equipment was appropriately configured to safely support the associated 

work or testing;

 Configuration and appropriate monitoring of reactor coolant level and temperature 

instruments, particularly during activities associated with the highest level of 

shutdown risk, which occurred during the RCS drain-down and reactor vessel head 

de-tensioning activities, as well as the drain-down to support RCS evacuation and fill;

 Status and configuration of electrical systems and switchyard activities to ensure that 

TSs were met; activities associated with the installation and testing of the new 

generator step-up transformers, including monitoring systems for combustible gas 

generation and induced currents from solar magnetic disturbances;

 Monitoring of decay heat removal operations, during initial onset into shutdown 

cooling, as well as activities associated with spent fuel pool cooling following full core 

offload;

 Observed various stages of NextEra’s management and design implementation of 

post-Fukushima beyond design basis mitigating strategies and to verify no impacts 

on systems important to safety for both operating and shutdown conditions;

 Reactor water makeup and inventory controls, including appropriate flow paths, 

configurations, alternative means for inventory additions, and controls to prevent 

inventory loss;

 Activities that could affect reactivity;

 Industrial safety activities, including equipment heavy lifts consistent with the 

Memorandum of Understanding with the Occupational Safety and Health 

Administration;

 Refueling activities, including fuel handling during core offload and reload inside 

containment, fuel handling in the spent fuel pool, as well as pre-outage fuel receipt 

inspections;

 Fatigue management that involved covered workers, and review of work hour 

controls and waivers;

 Prioritization and completion of mode hold condition reports and work orders, and 

review of operating mode transition checklists;

 Performed a final containment closeout/walk-down to verify that debris or equipment 

had not been left inside, particularly in areas that could impact operability of the 

containment recirculation sumps; additionally, performed condition assessment of 

debris interceptor screens, scuppers and doorways that contribute to overall 

operability of the containment sumps and emergency core cooling systems and 

component;

 Reactor start-up, plant heat-up, and power ascension activities; and

 Problem identification and resolution actions related to OR17 refueling outage 

activities.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.
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1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22 – 2 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed performance of surveillance tests and/or reviewed test data of 

selected risk-significant SSCs to assess whether test results satisfied TSs, the UFSAR, 

and NextEra procedure requirements. The inspectors verified that test acceptance

criteria were clear, tests demonstrated operational readiness and were consistent with 

design documentation, test instrumentation had current calibrations and the range and 

accuracy for the application, tests were performed as written, and applicable test

prerequisites were satisfied. Upon test completion, the inspectors considered whether 

the test results supported that equipment was capable of performing the required safety 

functions. The inspectors reviewed the following surveillance tests:

 Refueling water storage tank to charging pump suction isolation valve, 1-CS-LCV112E, inservice test surveillance on October 8 (inservice test)

 CBS-V-8 containment isolation valve equipment qualification and operability testing 

on October 11 (containment isolation valve test)

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

1EP2 Alert and Notification System Evaluation (71114.02 – 1 sample)

a. Inspection Scope

An onsite review was conducted to assess the maintenance and testing of the Seabrook 

Station Alert and Notification System (ANS). During this inspection, the inspectors 

conducted a review of the ANS testing and maintenance programs. The inspectors 

reviewed the associated ANS procedures and the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency approved ANS Design Report to ensure compliance with design report 

commitments for system maintenance and testing. The inspectors toured the facility 

used by, and interviewed, the dedicated Seabrook staff responsible for the maintenance 

and testing of the Seabrook ANS. Title 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5) and the related 

requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, were used as reference criteria.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1EP3 Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation System

(71114.03 – 1 sample)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted a review of the Seabrook Station Emergency Response 

Organization (ERO) augmentation staffing requirements and the process for notifying 

and augmenting the ERO. The review was performed to verify the readiness of key 
18

licensee staff to respond to an emergency event and to verify NextEra’s ability to 

activate their emergency response facilities (ERFs) in a timely manner. The inspectors 

reviewed the Seabrook Station Emergency Plan for ERF activation and ERO staffing 

requirements, the ERO duty roster, applicable station procedures, augmentation test 

reports, the most recent drive-in drill report, and corrective action reports related to this 

inspection area. The inspectors also reviewed a sample of ERO responder training 

records to verify training and qualifications were up to date. Title 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2) 

and related requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, were used as reference 

criteria.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes (71114.04 – 1 sample)

a. Inspection Scope

NextEra implemented various changes to the Seabrook Emergency Action Levels 

(EALs), Emergency Plan, and Implementing Procedures. NextEra had determined that, 

in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q)(3), any change made to the EALs, emergency plan, 

and its lower-tier implementing procedures had not resulted in any reduction in 

effectiveness of the Plan, and that the revised Plan continued to meet the standards in 

50.47(b) and the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix E. 

The inspectors performed an in-office review of all EAL and emergency plan changes 

submitted by NextEra as required by 10 CFR 50.54(q)(5), including the changes to 

lower-tier emergency plan implementing procedures, to evaluate for any potential 

reductions in effectiveness of the emergency plan. This review by the inspectors was 

not documented in an NRC Safety Evaluation Report and does not constitute formal 

NRC approval of the changes. Therefore, these changes remain subject to future NRC 

inspection in their entirety. The requirements in 10 CFR 50.54(q) were used as 

reference criteria. 

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1EP5 Maintaining Emergency Preparedness (71114.05 – 1 sample)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed a number of activities to evaluate the efficacy of NextEra’s 

efforts to maintain the Seabrook emergency preparedness (EP) program. The 

inspectors reviewed: Memorandums of Understanding with offsite agencies; the 10 CFR 

50.54(q) emergency plan change process and practices; NextEra maintenance of 

equipment important to EP; records of evacuation time estimate population evaluation; 

and provisions for, and implementation of, primary, backup, and alternate emergency 

response facility maintenance. The inspectors also verified NextEra’s compliance at 

Seabrook with new NRC EP regulations regarding: EALs for hostile action events; 

protective actions for on-site personnel during events; emergency declaration timeliness; 
19

ERO augmentation and alternate facility capability; evacuation time estimate updates; 

on-shift ERO staffing analysis; and, ANS back-up means.

The inspectors further evaluated NextEra’s ability to maintain their EP program through 

their identification and correction of EP weaknesses, by reviewing a sample of drill 

reports, actual event reports, self-assessments, 10 CFR 50.54(t) review reports, and 

EP-related CRs. The inspectors reviewed a sample of EP-related CRs initiated at 

Seabrook from July 2013 through December 2015. The inspection was conducted in 

accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71114.05. Title 10 CFR 50.47(b) and the 

related requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, were used as reference criteria.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

2. RADIATION SAFETY

Cornerstone: Public Radiation Safety

2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls (71124.01 – 1 sample)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed NextEra’s performance in assessing and controlling radiological 

hazards in the workplace. The inspectors used the requirements contained in 10 CFR 

20, TSs, applicable Regulatory Guides (RGs), and the procedures required by TSs as 

criteria for determining compliance.

Inspection Planning 

The inspectors reviewed the performance indicators (PIs) for the occupational exposure 

cornerstone, radiation protection (RP) program audits, and reports of operational 

occurrences in occupational radiation safety since the last inspection.

Radiological Hazard Assessment 

The inspectors reviewed recent plant radiation surveys and any changes to plant 

operations since the last inspection to identify any new radiological hazards for onsite 

workers or members of the public. 

Instructions to Workers

The inspectors observed several containers of radioactive materials and assessed 

whether the containers were labeled and controlled in accordance with requirements. 

The inspectors reviewed several occurrences where a worker’s electronic personal 

dosimeter alarmed. The inspectors reviewed NextEra’s evaluation of the incidents, 

documentation in the CAP, and whether compensatory dose evaluations were 

conducted when appropriate.
20

Contamination and Radioactive Material Control

The inspectors observed the monitoring of potentially contaminated material leaving the 

radiological control area and inspected the methods and radiation monitoring 

instrumentation used for control, survey, and release of that material. The inspectors 

selected several sealed sources from inventory records and assessed whether the 

sources were accounted for and were tested for loose surface contamination. The 

inspectors evaluated whether any recent transactions involving nationally tracked 

sources were reported in accordance with requirements.

Radiological Hazards Control and Work Coverage

The inspectors assessed whether posted surveys, radiation work permits, worker 

radiological briefings, the use of continuous air monitoring, and dosimetry monitoring 

were consistent with the present plant conditions. The inspectors examined the control 

of highly activated or contaminated materials stored within the spent fuel pool and the 

posting and physical controls for selected high radiation areas, locked high radiation 

areas, and very high radiation areas to verify conformance with the occupational PI.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

2RS2 Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls (71124.02)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors assessed performance with respect to maintaining occupational 

individual and collective radiation exposures as low as is reasonably achievable 

(ALARA). The inspectors used the requirements in 10 CFR Part 20, RG 8.8, RG 8.10, 

TSs, and NextEra’s procedures required by TSs as criteria for determining compliance.

Radiological Work Planning

The inspectors compared the results achieved (dose rate reductions, actual dose) with 

the intended dose established in NextEra’s ALARA planning for selected high-dose work 

activities. The inspectors compared the person-hour estimates provided by maintenance 

planning and other groups to the RP group actual person-hours for the work activity, and 

evaluated the accuracy of these time estimates. The inspectors assessed the reasons 

for any inconsistencies between intended and actual work activity doses.

The inspectors determined whether post-job reviews were conducted to identify lessons 

learned. If problems were identified, the inspectors verified that worker suggestions for 

improving dose and contamination reduction techniques were entered into NextEra’s 

CAP.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.
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4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)

.1 Mitigating Systems Performance Index (3 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed NextEra’s submittal of the Mitigating Systems Performance 

Index for the following systems for the period of October 1, 2014, through September 30, 

2015:

 Safety System Functional Failures (MS05)

 RHR System (MS09)

 Cooling Water System (MS10)

To determine the accuracy of the PI data reported during those periods, the inspectors 

used definitions and guidance contained in NEI Document 99-02, “Regulatory 

Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline,” Revision 7. The inspectors also 

reviewed NextEra’s operator narrative logs, mitigating systems performance index 

derivation reports and basis documents, event reports, and NRC integrated inspection 

reports to validate the accuracy of the submittals. 

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness (1 sample)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed NextEra submittals for the occupational radiological 

occurrences PI for the fourth quarter 2014 through the third quarter 2015. The 

inspectors used PI definitions and guidance contained in NEI Document 99-02, Revision 

7, to determine the accuracy of the PI data reported. The inspectors reviewed NextEra’s 

electronic personal dosimetry accumulated dose alarms, dose reports, and dose 

assignments for any intakes that occurred during the time period reviewed, to determine 

if there were potentially unrecognized PI occurrences. The inspectors conducted 

walkdowns of various locked high radiation area entrances to determine the adequacy of 

the controls in place for these areas. 

b. Findings

No findings were identified.
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.3 Radiological Effluent TS/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Radiological Effluent 

Occurrences (1 sample)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed licensee submittals for the radiological effluent TS/Offsite Dose 

Calculation Manual radiological effluent occurrences PI for the fourth quarter 2014 

through the third quarter 2015. The inspectors used PI definitions and guidance 

contained in NEI Document 99-02, Revision 7, to determine if the PI data was reported 

properly. The inspectors reviewed NextEra’s public dose assessments for the PI for 

public radiation safety to determine if related data was accurately calculated and 

reported.

The inspectors reviewed the CAP database to identify any potential occurrences such as 

unmonitored, uncontrolled, or improperly calculated effluent releases that may have 

impacted offsite dose. The inspectors reviewed gaseous and liquid effluent summary 

data and the results of associated offsite dose calculations to determine if indicator 

results were accurately reported.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.4 Emergency Preparedness Performance Indicators (3 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed data for the following three EP PIs: (1) Drill and Exercise 

Performance; (2) ERO Drill Participation; and, (3) ANS Reliability. The last NRC EP 

inspection at Seabrook was conducted in the second calendar quarter of 2012. 

Therefore, the inspectors reviewed supporting documentation from EP drills and 

equipment tests from the fourth calendar quarter of 2014 through the third calendar 

quarter of 2015 to verify the accuracy of the reported PI data. The review of the PIs was 

conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71151. The acceptance 

criteria documented in NEI 99-02, “Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator 

Guidelines,” Revision 7, was used as reference criteria.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution (71152 – 4 samples)

.1 Routine Review of Problem Identification and Resolution Activities

a. Inspection Scope

As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, “Problem Identification and Resolution,” the 

inspectors routinely reviewed issues during baseline inspection activities and plant 

status reviews to verify NextEra entered issues into the CAP at an appropriate threshold, 

gave adequate attention to timely corrective actions, and identified and addressed 
23

adverse trends. In order to assist with the identification of repetitive equipment failures 

and specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily 

screening of items entered into the CAP and periodically attended CR screening 

meetings. The inspectors also confirmed, on a sampling basis, that, as applicable, for 

identified defects and non-conformances, NextEra performed an evaluation in 

accordance with 10 CFR Part 21.

b. Findings 

No findings were identified.

.2 Semi-Annual Trend Review

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a semi-annual review of site issues, as required by Inspection 

Procedure 71152, “Problem Identification and Resolution,” to identify trends that might 

indicate the existence of more significant safety issues. In this review, the inspectors 

included repetitive or closely-related issues that may have been documented by NextEra 

outside of the CAP, such as trend reports, PIs, major equipment problem lists, system 

health reports, MR assessments, and maintenance or CAP backlogs. The inspectors 

also reviewed NextEra’s CAP database for the third and fourth quarters of 2015, to 

assess CRs written in various subject areas (equipment problems, human performance 

issues, etc.), as well as individual issues identified during the NRC’s daily CR review 

(Section 4OA2.1). The inspectors reviewed Seabrook Station’s Self–Evaluation and 

Trending Analysis report for the second quarter of 2015, conducted under PI-AA-207-

1000, “Station Self-Evaluation and Trending Analysis,” Revision 5, to verify that NextEra 

personnel were appropriately evaluating and trending adverse conditions in accordance 

with applicable procedures.

The inspectors evaluated a sample of departments that are required to provide input into 

the quarterly trend reports, which included the operations and maintenance 

departments. This review included a sample of issues and events that occurred over the 

course of the past two quarters to objectively determine whether issues were 

appropriately considered or determined to be emerging or adverse trends, and in some 

cases, verified the appropriate disposition of resolved trends. The inspectors verified 

that these issues were addressed within the scope of the CAP, or through department 

review and documentation in the quarterly trend report for overall assessment.

b. Findings and Observations

No findings were identified.

The inspectors noted that on occasion, potential adverse trends were identified through: 

(1) the use of statistical tools available to staff and utilized throughout the quarter to

identify statistically significant issues that reach a predetermined threshold, or (2) 

cognitive trends by staff or collectively during review by the Management Review 

Committee (MRC) while screening action requests (ARs). In general, the inspectors 

noted that new and existing adverse trends, as well as management awareness areas,

were consistent with those identified by the NRC through daily CR reviews, including 

those trends identified as cognitive trends during MRC reviews. For example, the 
24

inspectors had identified several issues associated with Maintenance Department 

rework, and noted that two “quick hit” self-assessments were independently initiated by 

maintenance personnel to evaluate potential causes of the rework. 

.3 Annual Sample: Transmitter Failures

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed an in-depth review of NextEra’s evaluations and corrective 

actions associated with multiple transmitter spurious indications and failures occurring on 

site. The inspectors assessed NextEra’s problem identification threshold, problem 

analysis, extent of condition reviews, compensatory actions, and the prioritization and 

timeliness of corrective actions to determine whether NextEra was appropriately 

identifying, characterizing, and correcting problems associated with these transmitter 

issues and whether the planned or completed corrective actions were appropriate. The 

inspectors compared the actions taken to the requirements of NextEra’s CAP, licensing 

basis, and other requirements. The inspectors interviewed engineering and operations 

personnel to assess the effectiveness of the implemented corrective actions, 

reasonableness of the planned corrective actions, and to evaluate the extent of any ongoing problems.

The inspectors evaluated seven ARs (see below) documenting various transmitter 

malfunctions and failures. The transmitter issues spanned multiple systems and 

occurred over a timeframe of approximately 18 months. The review focused on various 

aspects of the corrective actions and operability process to assess the effectiveness and 

scope of corrective actions, including trending, and the bases and supporting information 

for immediate operability evaluations, as applicable. Associated documentation and 

bases, as well as the MRCs review of operability statements and actions to address 

weaknesses were assessed as well. The ARs that were reviewed included:

 Volume control tank level transmitter spurious indication (AR 01972065)

 Containment building sump level transmitter spiking (AR 01999679)

 ‘B’ EDG SW jacket water cooling flow transmitter out of tolerance low (AR 01995588)

 Thermal barrier heat exchanger head pipe level transmitter erratic (AR 02002668)

 ‘A’ EDG SW jacket water cooling flow transmitter discolored water during calibration 

(AR 02013241)

 Volume control tank level deviations (AR 01991967)

 ‘B’ reactor coolant pump hi-range leakage flow transmitter noisy condition

(AR 02011136)

b. Findings and Observations

No findings were identified. 

Based on the documents reviewed and discussions with NextEra personnel, the 

inspectors determined that NextEra’s responses to the identified transmitter issues were 

commensurate with their safety significance, and that the actions completed and 

planned were reasonable to address the issues identified.
25

.4 Annual Sample: Motor Control Center Breaker Failure to Trip

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed an in-depth review of NextEra’s corrective actions associated 

with CR 1998220, “Breaker at 1-EDE-MCC-512 for 1-AS-V-175 Would Not Close.” 

Specifically, a breaker failed to reset several times following manual trip actions during 

the performance of breaker preventive maintenance. 

The inspectors assessed NextEra’s problem identification threshold, and applicable 

cause analyses, extent of condition reviews, and compensatory actions, as well as the 

prioritization and timeliness of corrective actions to determine whether NextEra was 

appropriately identifying, characterizing, and correcting problems associated with this 

issue and whether the planned or completed corrective actions were appropriate. The 

inspectors compared the actions taken to the requirements of NextEra’s CAP and 10 

CFR 50, Appendix B. In addition, the inspectors performed field walkdowns and 

interviewed appropriate personnel to assess the effectiveness of the implemented 

corrective actions. 

b. Findings and Observations

No findings were identified.

NextEra originally suspected a well-known industry phenomenon of hardened grease as 

the cause of the breaker to not operate as expected during implementation of breaker 

preventive maintenance in October 2014, under WO 40274287. The inspectors noted 

that the preventive maintenance included an activity to assess the quality of the grease 

consistent with the grade characteristics of the National Lubricating Grease Institute, and 

LS 0569.20, “Lubrication PM and Starter Inspection for Motor Operated Valve 

Actuators,” Revision 10. The as-found grease condition of Grade 2 was consistent with 

grease that is new, and therefore, was not the probable cause of the breaker failure to 

operate. Subsequent inspections resulted in the replacement of a unitized starter 

associated with the breaker circuitry. Following successful replacement of the starter, 

the post-maintenance testing was performed and the breaker operated as designed.

.5 Annual Sample: Review of Corrective Actions for Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) Affected 

Structures

a. Inspection Scope

During this inspection period, a region-based inspector accompanied Office of Nuclear 

Reactor Regulation, Division of Engineering and Division of License Renewal staff 

members on an audit of NextEra’s large scale test activities at the University of Texas –

Austin, Ferguson Structural Engineering Laboratory (FSEL). The audit was conducted 

to support the NRC staff’s ongoing review of the Seabrook license renewal application. 

The audit team observed the progress and implementation of NextEra’s large specimen 

testing program. 

The inspectors also conducted an in-office review of NextEra’s root cause evaluation 

(RCE) and corrective actions related to the identification of differential movement, or 

deformation, of the containment enclosure building (CEB). This condition is described in 
26

an NRC inspection report, dated August 25, 2015 (Agencywide Documents Access and 

Management System (ADAMS) Ascension No. ML15217A256). In addition, inspectors 

reviewed evaluations related to discrete cracks identified in below grade, internal walls in 

the RHR and containment spray (CS) equipment vault structure. This condition was 

previously described in an NRC inspection report dated August 5, 2014 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML14212A458). 

The inspectors assessed the problem identification threshold, operability and 

functionality assessments, extent of condition reviews, and the prioritization and 

timeliness of corrective actions to determine whether NextEra personnel were 

appropriately identifying, characterizing, and correcting problems associated with the 

ASR-affected CEB and RHR vault. The inspectors evaluated NextEra’s actions to verify 

compliance with the CAP procedure and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B requirements.

The resident inspectors continued to conduct routine walk downs of Seabrook Station 

ASR-affected structures, focusing on the identification of any changes that have the 

potential for further degrading the functional performance of these structures or 

associated systems and components. 

b. Findings and Observations

During the week of October 26, 2015, the NRC audit team observed the last planned 

large-scale specimen testing at FSEL, reviewed test program results and analyses 

completed, to date, and interviewed NextEra staff and their consultants. Audit team 

activities and conclusions are documented in an NRC audit report (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML15307A019) dated December 17, 2015. No significant observations or concerns 

were identified related to the conduct of testing to appropriate quality assurance criteria. 

NextEra staff planned to have the test data analyses completed by the end of 2015, in 

support of submitting to the NRC a license amendment request in 2016, to address an 

ASR-related non-conforming condition with the current licensing basis.

NRC inspectors conducted in-office reviews of the root cause evaluation for the 

“Containment Enclosure Building Local Deformation, Event Dated December 19, 2014,” 

completed per AR 02014325, and the “Condition Assessment of Cracking in RHR and 

CS Equipment Vault,” documented in Foreign Print (FP) 100903, dated March 17, 2015. 

NextEra’s CEB RCE described two root causes. First, regarding the physical causes of 

CEB deformation, NextEra staff concluded that internal expansion (strain) produced by 

ASR in the CEB concrete (in-plane direction of the CEB shell) and ASR expansion in the 

backfill concrete, coincident with a unique building configuration, resulted in CEB 

deformation. Second, regarding NRC identification of this issue, NextEra concluded this 

was not identified by plant staff due to an organizational mindset that viewed conditions 

such as concrete cracks, water infiltration, and misalignment issues as acceptable and 

inconsequential. Additionally, the RCE identified that NextEra staff did not perform and 

document comprehensive evaluations of building conditions that could have potentially 

revealed more significant underlying conditions, such as localized deformation of the 

CEB. These NRC-identified performance deficiencies were previously dispositioned as 

non-cited violation (NCV) 2015002-01 and NCV 2015002-02 in NRC inspection report 

05000443/2015002 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15217A256).
27

The inspectors determined NextEra corrective actions to address these problems 

included: 1) a revision to their design control procedures to require pozzolanic materials 

like fly ash or slag cement to be added to concrete mixes to prevent ASR in any new 

concrete structures; and, 2) the implementation of multiple training and program 

changes to correct the organizational mindset issues and strengthen individual 

responsibilities and accountability for implementation of the Seabrook Structures 

Monitoring Program. The inspectors concluded the RCE was reasonably thorough and 

utilized a cause and effect methodology that was appropriate to the problem statement. 

However, NextEra’s RCE, dated December 19, 2014, concluded that the reason that 

NRC inspectors, and not plant staff, identified the presence of localized ASR-induced 

deformation in Seabrook’s concrete structures was due to an organizational mindset that 

viewed conditions such as concrete cracks, water infiltration, and misalignment issues 

as acceptable and inconsequential. The inspectors concluded the RCE was reasonably 

thorough and utilized a cause and effect methodology that was appropriate to the 

problem statement. The planned and in-process organizational and program related 

corrective actions appeared appropriately focused on the identified causes of the 

problem. However, the inspectors concluded that the corrective actions, taken to date, 

to implement multiple training, program and oversight changes to correct the 

organizational mindset issues and strengthen individual responsibilities and 

accountability for implementation of the Seabrook Structures Monitoring Program have 

either not been implemented or are not yet effective and thus require additional 

management attention near-term.

The inspectors noted that the CEB RCE referenced the results of a Finite Element 

Analysis (FEA) model of the CEB. The FEA and results were documented in FP 

100985. The inspectors’ review of FP 100985 identified that the FEA model simulated 

ASR expansion to assess the impact of expansion induced deformation on the structural 

performance of the CEB. The FEA evaluated CEB design capacity against assumed 

loading, based on ACI 318-71 criteria, including simulated loads associated with the asdeformed condition. As documented in FP 100985, the FEA model also simulated the 

impact of the external structural loading due to ASR expansion of the backfill concrete. 

Based upon the review of the CEB structural assessment described in FP 100985 and 

the limited structural analysis of the RHR/CS vault documented in FP100903, the 

inspectors had multiple follow-up questions regarding the CEB and RHR/CS vault 

structural assessments and the potential impact of these evaluation results on NextEra’s 

open Immediate Operability Determinations and Prompt Operability Determinations 

(PODs) for these ASR-affected structures (reference AR 01664399, AR 01929460, AR 

01977456, AR 02004749, and AR 02044627). The follow-up questions were developed 

via a collegial review by the Region 1 Senior Reactor Analyst and structural engineers 

from NRC Offices of Nuclear Reactor Regulation and Region 2, under the auspices of 

the Seabrook ASR Technical Team (ADAMS Accession No. ML14014A378). The 

questions were documented and shared with the NextEra staff on December 23, 2015 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML15357A326). NextEra’s responses and the inspector’s 

review are planned for the first quarter of 2016 and will be documented in an NRC 

inspection report. 

Following the guidance of IMC 0612, “Power Reactor Inspection Reports,” the inspectors 

identified an issue of concern regarding NextEra’s implementation of their Seabrook 

Structures Monitoring Program. Specifically, the structural evaluations, performed by 

contractors and accepted by NextEra staff via the FP process, included discussions that 
28

identified the potential to exceed limits in the applicable design code (ACI 318-71) for 

specific locations in the CEB and RHR/CS vault walls. The evaluations further 

recommended actions to determine whether this was the case. The inspectors noted 

that the Seabrook staff screened or reviewed these evaluations without documenting a 

justification in a revision or update to the open PODs for these structures. The additional 

information requested on December 23, 2015 is required for the inspectors to determine 

whether this issue involves a performance deficiency. As a result, the NRC opened an 

unresolved item (URI).

Introduction. The inspectors identified an issue of concern regarding NextEra’s 

implementation of the Seabrook structures monitoring program and acceptance of 

evaluations via the FP and CAP.

Description. Additional inspection is warranted to determine whether a performance 

deficiency exists related to NextEra’s disposition of FP 100985 for the CEB condition and 

FP 100903 for the RHR/CS vault condition. Specifically, further inspection is warranted 

to determine whether NextEra staff properly implemented the Seabrook structures 

monitoring program for the acceptance and review of structural evaluations potentially 

impacting the functionality of the CEB and RHR/CS vault, as currently documented in 

open PODs. (URI 05000443/2015-01, Issue of Concern Regarding Implementation 

of the Seabrook Structures Monitoring Program and Structural Evaluations of the 

CEB and RHR/CS Vault)

4OA5 Other Activities

Operation of an ISFSI at Operating Plants (60855 & 60855.01)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated Seabrook’s activities related to long-term operation and 

monitoring of their ISFSI, and verified that activities were being performed in accordance 

with the Certificate of Compliance (CoC), TSs, regulations, and site procedures. 

The inspectors reviewed any changes to the10 CFR Part 72.212 evaluation as well as 

associated Part 72.48 and 50.59 screenings related to dry cask storage. 

The inspectors performed tours of the ISFSI pad to assess the material condition of 

the pad. The inspectors also verified that transient combustibles were not being stored 

on the ISFSI pad or in the vicinity of the HI-STORMS. The inspectors verified that 

Seabrook was performing daily HI-STORM surveillances in accordance with TS 

requirements, in addition to the periodic monitoring of the condition of the pad HISTORM exterior surfaces. 

The inspectors interviewed spent fuel group personnel and reviewed Seabrook’s 

program associated with fuel characterization and selection for storage from the last 

ISFSI loading campaign in 2013. The inspectors verified that the criteria meets the 

conditions for cask and canister use as specified in the CoC. The inspectors also 

confirmed that physical inventories were conducted annually and were maintained as 

required by the regulations. 
29

The inspectors reviewed radiological records from the last ISFSI loading campaign to 

confirm that radiation and contamination levels measured on the casks were within limits 

specified by the TS and consistent with values specified in the final safety analysis 

report. The inspectors reviewed RP procedures associated with ISFSI operations. The 

inspectors also reviewed annual environmental reports to verify that areas around the 

ISFSI pad and the ISFSI site boundary were within limits specified in 10 CFR Part 20 

and 10 CFR Part 72.104. The inspectors verified that radiation surveys of the ISFSI pad 

were performed in accordance with site procedures. 

The inspectors reviewed CAP ARs, and the associated follow-up actions associated with 

ISFSI operations to ensure that issues were entered into the CAP, prioritized, and 

evaluated commensurate with their safety significance.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

On January 21, 2016, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Dean 

Curtland, Site Vice President, and other members of the Seabrook Station staff. The 

inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained by the inspectors or 

documented in this report.

4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violation

The following violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by NextEra 

and is a violation of NRC requirements. The violation meets the requirements of the 

NRC Enforcement Policy for being dispositioned as an NCV.

 Title 10 CFR 50.55a (g)(4), “Inservice Inspection Requirements,” requires, in part, 

that throughout the service life of a boiling or pressurized water-cooled nuclear 

power facility, components (including supports) that are classified as ASME Code 

Class 1, must meet the requirements set forth in Section XI of editions and addenda 

of the ASME Boiler Pressure and Vessel Code. Section XI of the ASME Boiler 

Pressure and Vessel Code, 2001 Edition with 2003 Addenda, Table IWF-2500-1, 

Examination Category F-A Supports, requires VT-3 examination of 100 percent of 

the ASME Class 1 supports, other than piping supports, every ISI Interval 

(examination item F1.40). Contrary to this requirement, from initial commercial 

operation until October 14, 2015, (when NextEra staff completed the initial required 

VT-3 examinations) NextEra did not perform the required ASME Section XI VT-3 

examination of ASME Class 1 supports (i.e. seismic support plates and associated 

load path components) on the CRDM assemblies of Seabrook Unit 1. NextEra staff 

entered the issue into their CAP as AR 01991880 and completed the VT-3 
30

examinations during the October 2015 refueling outage. The finding is more than 

minor because it was associated with the protection against external factors attribute 

of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the objective to ensure 

reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent 

undesirable consequences. The inspectors determined that this finding is of very low 

safety significance (Green) in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 2, 

“Mitigating Systems,” because the finding did not involve the loss or degradation of 

equipment or function specifically designed to mitigate a seismic initiating event. 

NextEra completed the required examinations on October 14, 2015.

ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
A-1

Attachment

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

D. Curtland, Site Vice President

R. Dodds, Plant General Manager 

C. Adams, Operations Training Manager (Acting) 

K. Boehl, Senior Rad Protection Analyst

V. Brown, Senior Licensing Engineer

D. Currier, Emergency Planning Manager

K. Douglas, Maintenance Director

D. Flahardy, Radiation Protection Manager

A. Giotas, Chemistry Analyst

S. Hamel, NDE Level III

D. Hickey, Radiation Protection Supervisor

J. Kennish, Instructor

D. Loch, Reactor Vessel Upper Head Inspection Lead

R. Mauer, SG Data Analyst

G. Mikos, Project Manager

D. Merrill, Simulator Support Supervisor

M. Nadeau, RP Analyst

W. Neal, ANII

M. Ossing, Licensing Manager

J. Packer, MSIP Project Manager

K. Randall, Reactor Engineering

D. Ritter, Site Operations Director

D. Robinson, Chemistry Manager

D. Slavon, ISI Program Manager

T. Smith, Radiation Protection Supervisor

D. Strand, RP Manager

C. Thomas, Licensing Engineer

K. Thompson, SG Engineer

T. Vassalo, MPR staff

S. Wellhoffer, Nurse Manager RN

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, DISCUSSED, AND UPDATED

Opened

05000443/2015004-01 URI Issue of Concern Regarding Implementation of 

the Seabrook Structures Monitoring Program 

and structural evaluations of the CEB and 

RHR/CS Vault (Section 4OA2.5)
A-2

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Section 1R01: Adverse Weather Protection

Procedures

OP-AA-102-1002, Seasonal Readiness, Revision 9

OP-AA-102-1002-F01, Cold Weather Data Sheets, Revision 0

OS1023.75, Operation of Feedwater Isolation Valves’ Temporary Heating, Revision 04

Condition Reports

02071737 02075786 02093279 02096190 02098538 02099933

Maintenance Orders/Work Orders

40266470 40334413 40334716 40353490 40410503

Miscellaneous

BM-Winter-Ready, Cold Weather Preventive Maintenance Activity

Memo to Chief Operating Officer, Seasonal Readiness – Winter 2015, September 24, 2015

Section 1R04: Equipment Alignment

Procedures

OS1002.02, Operation of Letdown, Charging, and Seal Injection, Revision 48

OS1012.03, Primary Component Cooling Water Loop A Operation, Revision 23

OS1012.04, Primary Component Cooling Water Loop B Operation, Revision 26

OS1013.04, Residual Heat Removal Train B Startup and Operation, Revision 28

OS1016.01, Service Water System Fill and Vent, Revision 18

OS1212.01, PCCW System Malfunction, Revision 13

Condition Reports

01943964 01955559 01961777 02038084 02038084 02043141

02055074 02079841 02083248 02083834 02088009 02092165

02092171

Maintenance Orders/Work Orders

40311084 40418154 40419867

Maintenance Requests/Work Requests

94096827 94117626 94117629 94127549

Miscellaneous

Seabrook Component Cooling System Detailed Systems Text, Revision 9

Section 1R05: Fire Protection

Procedures

FP2.2, Control of Combustible Materials, Revision 20
A-3

Miscellaneous

Seabrook Station Fire Protection Pre-Fire Strategies, Volume I, C-F-1-Z

Seabrook Station Fire Protection Pre-Fire Strategies, Volume I, C-F-2-Z

Seabrook Station Fire Protection Pre-Fire Strategies, Volume I, C-F-3-Z

Seabrook Station Fire Protection Pre-Fire Strategies, Volume I, CB-F-1A-A

Seabrook Station Fire Protection Pre-Fire Strategies, Volume I, CB-F-1G-A

Seabrook Station Fire Protection Pre-Fire Strategies, Volume II, SEPS-F-1-0

Section 1R07: Heat Sink Performance

Procedures

PEG-268, Heat Exchanger and NRC GL 89-13 Program, Revision 0

Condition Reports

01957744 02037230 02050993 02075755 02080499 02081299

02083447 02094198

Miscellaneous

Evaluation of DG-E-42B Tube Plugging

Section 1R08: Inservice Inspection

Procedures

ES15-01-03, Seabrook Unit 1 Reactor Vessel Nozzle MSIP Dissimilar Metal Weld Centerline 

Locating and Marking Field Services Procedure, Revision 0, 7/31/2017

Seabrook Station Engineering Procedure ES15-01-04, Revision 0, 7/24/2017; Title: 

Seabrook Unit 1 Reactor Vessel Nozzle Mechanical Stress Improvement Process Field 

Service Procedure, July 24, 2017

Seabrook Station Engineering Procedure ES10-01-32, Revision 2, 7/24/2017; Title: Remote 

Inservice Examination of Reactor Vessel Nozzle to Safe End, Nozzle to Pipe and Safety 

End to Pipe Welds Using the Nozzle Scanner, June 30, 2017

Seabrook Unit 1 Reactor Vessel Nozzle Mechanical Stress Improvement Process Field Service 

Procedure, July 24, 2017

Seabrook Station Engineering Procedure ES1807.050, Revision 1, Visual Examination (VE) For 

CRDM Inspections, ASME Code Case N-729-1

Seabrook Station Engineering Procedure ES10-01-32, Revision 2, Remote Inservice

Examination of Reactor Vessel Nozzle to Safe End, Nozzle to Pipe and Safe End to Pipe 

Welds Using the Nozzle Scanner, June 30, 2017

Seabrook Station Engineering Procedure ES10-01-31, Revision 3, ET Examination of Reactor 

Vessel Pipe Welds Inside Surface, August 31, 2017

Seabrook Station Engineering Procedure ES1807.050, Revision 1A; Visual Examination (VE) 

Procedure for Reactor Vessel Upper Head (RVUH) Penetration Inspections (N-729-1)

Seabrook Station Administrative Procedure MA 10.3, Revision 15, Boric Acid Corrosion Control 

Program

Seabrook Engineering Department Instructions (EDI) BORIC ACID EVALUATIONS, EDI No. 

30560, Revision 0

Seabrook Chemistry Procedure CS0905.08, Revision 8; Response To A Primary-to-Secondary 

Leak

Seabrook Station Engineering Department Procedure ES1807.050, Revision 1; 

Visual Examination (VE) Procedure for CRDM Inspections (N-729-1)
A-4

Seabrook Station Engineering Department Procedure ES1807.037, Revision 4; 

Visual Examination (VE) Procedure for BMI Inspection (N-722-1)

Seabrook Station Engineering Department Instruction CDI-018, Revision 4; Primary-ToSecondary Leak Rate Monitoring Below 1 GPD

Seabrook Station Engineering Procedure ES10-01-31, Revision 3; ET Examination of Reactor 

Vessel Pipe Welds Inside Surface, August 31, 2017

Condition Reports

00207921 01934094 01954739 01956858 01956974 01958294

01958658 01959231 01960060 01960192 01960662 01962130

01967763 01968281 01977393 01979332 01980333 01981302

01981663 01985049 01985507 01995292 02005943 02010624

02013631 02017775 02020023 02023008 02025166 02030144

02032984 02038340 02038887 02039668 02042461 02044332

02044452 02044899 02045365 02049171 02051868 02058610

02059112 02065121 02065815 02069165 02070738 02072120

02073698 02073706 02073711 02073712 02073714 02073720

02073720 02073740 02079633 02079633 02079633 02079633

02079690 02081530 02081530 20133359

Documented Boric Acid Leaks and Evaluations

01751940 01751948 01954739 01954894 01956887 01958294

01958658 01960060 01960192 01967763 01968281 01969662

01979332 01981302 01981663 01985507 02005943 02013359

02013631 02017775 02020023 02023008 02025166 02039668

02043261 02043789 02044332 02044452 02044772 02044772

02044899 02045365 02073706 02073711 02073712 02073714

02073720 02073720 02078055 02078097 02078112 02078117

02078120 02078121 02078124 02078128 02078130 02078133

02078134 02078135 02078139 02078140 02078143 02078145

02078146 02078268 02078274 02078472 02078700 02078839

02079208 02079236 02079241 02079247 02079278 02079287

02079290 02079294 02079297 02079303 02079318 02079325

02079330 02079333 02079336 02079341 02079342 02079343

02079349 02079353 02079360 02079361 02079363 02079366

02079367 02079372 02079375 02079377 02079380 02079381

02079385 02079389 02079393 02079394 02079398

20278063

Self-Assessments

Quick Hit Assessment Report, AR 02004668, Seabrook: Engineering Programs

Quick Hit / Department Assessment Report, AR 2024069, Fleet Steam Generator Program SelfAssessment; 7/30/15

Focused Self-Assessment AR 1773622; Chemistry Sampling and Analysis Program, 8/15/12

Focused Self-Assessment AR 02050220; Maintenance Implementation of Welding Program, 

9/15/15

Quick Hit Assessment Report, AR 01950056, Seabrook/Engineering Programs – Materials, 

OR16 Inservice Inspection (ISI) NRC Inspection, 3/24/14

Quick Hit Assessment Report, AR 01725016, Seabrook Engineering Programs – Materials, 

Title: Integration of the Alloy 600 Program Into Inservice Inspection
A-5

Engineering Evaluations Design Changes and SG Procedures:

Engineering Evaluation EE-09-016 Revision 0; Engineering Evaluation Flaw Indications In 

Reactor Vessel Safe End Welds. By H.W. Mentel-Seabrook Station, October 22, 2009

Engineering Change (EC) – 281842, Revision 0 Design Change Package Form MSIP, 

15 Pages Document/PCR/EC#281724, Revision 0, 10 CFR Applicability Determination 

Form, 5 Pages

Steam Generator Degradation Assessment for Seabrook OR17 Refueling Outage, Revision 1, 

SG-SGMP-15-10, October 2015

Steam Generator Degradation Assessment for Seabrook OR17 Refueling Outage, Revision 2, 

SG-SGMP-15-10, October 2015

Seabrook OR16 Condition Monitoring Assessment and Final Operational Assessment, April 

2014, SG-SGMP-15-10

Seabrook Appendix H & I Techniques, Fall 2015 Inspection; MRS-TRC-2286, October 2015 

EC-284861, Revision 0; Evaluation #EE-14-013, Revision 1; Seabrook Unit 1, Title: 

Reactor Vessel Head Effective Degradation Years (EDY) & Re-Inspection Years (RIY) 

for Cycle 17

ACR # 96-1258; Adverse Condition Report, 69034975, Cause Determination and corrective 

actions for 1996 leaks from SG B and SG C, 11/25/96

Seabrook OR17 Condition Monitoring Assessment and Final Operational Assessment, 

November 2015, SG-SGMP-15-20, Revision 0

NDE Data Reports:

Examination data sheets related to seven reactor vessel nozzle dissimilar metal welds as 

follows: RC-RPV-SE-301-121-338-deg-D; RC-RPV-SE-302-121-293 deg-C; 

RC-RPV-SE 302-121-247-deg-B; RC-RPV-SE-301-121-202-deg-A; 

RC-RPV-SE-302-121-113 deg-G; RC-RPV-SE-301-121-67-deg-F; RC-RPV-SE-301-

121-22 deg-E

Data Sheet 15-VT-041, CRDM structural support, VT3 examination10-15-15

ES1807.037 Form A: Visual Examination of BMI Penetrations and RPV Bottom Head –

UNSAT due to Residue/Deposits or Wastage Detected (CR written to sample residue, 

clean residue and reinspect penetrations); VT Inspector Notes for each penetration (16 

pages) and pictures of each penetration (105 pages)(11/3/15)

ES1807.037 Form A: Visual Examination of BMI Penetrations and RPV Bottom Head after 

cleaning and re-inspection- SAT; (16 pages) and pictures of each penetration (11/6/15)

Data Sheet 15-UT-001(5 pages), FW Elbow to pipe, Class 2, Thermal Fatigue Exam

Data Sheet 15-UT-002(5 pages), FW Elbow to pipe, Class 2, Thermal Fatigue Exam

Data Sheet 15-VT3-041(6 pages), CRDM STRUCTURAL SUPPORT Inspection, Class 1

IWE VT-1 Re-Examination of a previously identified Containment Dome Anomaly/Indication

Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant Unit 1

Refueling Outage OR17, Post MSIP Reactor Vessel Nozzle DM Weld Examination Summary, 

October 12 through October 22, 2015

Repair Replacement Activity

WO 4036801501; Fabricate “B” Diesel Fuel Connection for “B” Train, EC282581

Miscellaneous

NUREG-0313, Revision 2, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor 

Regulation, W.S. Hazelton; W.H. Koo, Title: Technical Report on Material Selection and 

Processing Guidelines for BWR Coolant Pressure Boundary Piping

NRC Bulletin 2003-02: Leakage from Reactor Pressure Vessel Lower Head Penetrations and 

Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Integrity, August 21, 2003
A-6

Westinghouse NSAL-14-6, 9/24/2014, Subject: Reactor Coolant Pump Turning Vane Bolt 

Cracking and Failures

Code Case N-722-1, Additional Examinations for PWR Pressure Retaining Welds In Class 1 

Components Fabricated with Alloy 600/82/182 Materials Section XI, Division 1 Code 

Case N-729-1, Alternative Examination Requirements for PWR Reactor Vessel Upper 

Heads With Nozzles Having Pressure-Retaining Partial-Penetration Welds Section XI, 

Division 1 Code Case N-770-1, Alternative Examination Requirements and Acceptance 

Standards for Class 1 PWR Piping and Vessel Nozzle Butt Welds Fabricated With UNS 

N06082 or UNS W86182 Weld Filler Material With or Without Application of Listed 

Mitigation Activities Section XI, Division 1

EPRI Technical Report 2011, Steam Generator Management Program: Primary-to-Secondary 

Leak Guidelines, Revision 4

Seabrook Station Reference Manual; Steam Generator Maintenance Reference, SGRE 

Revision 20, 3/10/14

Seabrook Station, Steam Generator Eddy Current Data Analysis Guideline Manual, Revision 7, 

4/4/2014

NextEra Energy Program Description, ER-AP-121, Revision 2; Steam Generator Integrity, 

9/2/15

Apparent Cause Evaluation for AR 00207921

Section 1R11: Licensed Operator Requalification Program

Procedures

TR-AA-104, NEXTERA Energy Fleet Licensed Operator Continuing Training Program, 

Revision 7

TR-AA-220-1004, Licensed Operator Continuing Training Annual Operating and Biennial 

Written Exams, Revision 1

TR-AA-230-1004, SAT Implementation, Revision 5

TR-AA-230-1005, SAT Evaluation, Revision 2

TR-AA-230-1007, Crew-Specific Simulator Plan, Revision 3

Condition Reports

01917736 01923551 01954983 01966222 01987175 01988101

01994628 02012298 02014014 02015273 02022491 02022755

02024157 02027235 02038184 02040722 02042410 02046889

02050058 02054056

Miscellaneous

ACAD 10-001, February 2010, Revision 0

ANS 3.4-1983

Focused Area Self-Assessment Report 2058898

LORT Training Program Description, December 2012

NT 3744, Simulator Transient Tests, Revision 17

NRC Information Notice IN 2004-20

NRC Information Notice IN 94-14

NRC Information Notice IN 91-08

NRC Regulatory Guide 1.134

NRC Regulatory Guide 1.8

Requalification Training Program Annual Examination Sample Plan 2015

Seabrook Transient Tests 1 through 11
A-7

Section 1R12: Maintenance Effectiveness

Procedures

ES1807.025, Inservice Inspection (ISI) Visual Examination Procedure, Revision 6

EX1805.03, Snubber Functional Test, Revision 12

LS0557.19, 480 Vac K600 Electrically Operated Breaker Refurbishment, Revision 15

MS0515.08, Paul-Munroe 2300, 2400 and 2500 Hydraulic Snubber Maintenance, Revision 4

MS0515.12, Cooling Tower Primary Fan and Gear Reducer Maintenance, Revision 5

MS0517.05, Installation of Pipe Supports, Revision 3

PEG-24, Maintenance Rule Goal Setting and Monitoring, Revision 8

PEG-45, Maintenance Rule Program Monitoring Activities, Revision 17

Condition Reports

02065121 02071704 02081775 02083296 02093663 02094577

02099774

Maintenance Orders/Work Orders

40289589 40353703 40379186 40410443 40418627

Miscellaneous

EE-10-010, Maintenance Rule PRA Basis Document PRA Risk Ranking and Performance

Criteria Based on SSPSS-2009, dated March 2011

Maintenance Rule Functional Failure Evaluation, ‘A’ main Steam Line (RM-6481-1) in High 

Alarm – Not Valid

NUMARC 93-01, Industry Guidelines for monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at 

Nuclear Power Plants, Revision 2

Radiation Monitoring System Health Report

SBK-L-15183, Seabrook Station Technical Specification Special Report – Radiation Monitor 

Inoperable Greater Than 7 Days

Section 1R13: Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Procedures

ODI101, Guarded Equipment Recommendations for Refueling Outages, Revision 16

OP-AA-102-1003, Guarded Equipment, Revision 9

Condition Reports

02079027 02087297 02087302

Miscellaneous

LCOTR Log on October 8, 2015

Seabrook Station Shutdown Condition Status Report for 10/8/15 OCC Turnover at 0500

Section 1R15: Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Procedures

PI-AA-104-1000, Corrective Action, Revision 3
A-8

Condition Reports

02044332 02080495 02080584 02081530 02082377 02082510

02083255 02083422 02084748 02084825 02085161 02085433

02098607

Maintenance Orders/Work Orders

94131854

Miscellaneous

2004 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XVI

Engineering Evaluation Documenting Integrity of the Containment Liner Plate dated 

October 28, 2015

NRC Information Notice 2014-07: Degradation of Leak-Chase Channel Systems for Floor Welds 

of Metal Containment Shell and Concrete Containment Metallic Liner

Seabrook Station UFSAR

Westinghouse Letter LTR-RC-15-47, Operability Assessment for Ball Bearings Primary Side 

Loose Parts at Seabrook Unit 1

Drawings

1-MS-B20582, Main Steam System Emergency Feedwater Pump Supply Detail, Revision 21

9763-F-805139, Containment Liner Floor Leak Chase System Piping Arrangement, Revision 10

Section 1R18: Plant Modifications

Procedures

EN-AA-205-1100, Design Change Package, Revision 13

EN-AA-203-1201, 10 CFR Applicability of 10 CFR 50.59 Screening Reviews, Revision 4

ES1807.025, Form B, VT-2 Visual Examination Form, Revision 6

ES1850.012, Air Operated Valve Program Procedure, Revision 4

ES1810.206, Charging System – Charging Pump Discharge Pipe ISI System Leakage Test, 

Revision 2

OX1408.06, Controlled Leakage Monthly Surveillance, Revision 7

OX1456.01, Charging Pump A & B Quarterly Flow and Valve Stroke Test And 18 Month 

Remote Position Indication Verification, Revision 21

SM7.20, Control of Time Critical Actions and operator Response Times, Revision 8

Condition Reports

01973578 02041778 02041838 02042131 02079830 02087598 

02090399

Maintenance Orders/Work Orders

40339187 40367789

Miscellaneous

50.59 Evaluation No. 15‐069, Revision 0 

Calculation #C‐S‐1‐45705, Revision 2

DBD‐EFW‐01, Emergency Feedwater System Design Basis Document, Revision 6

EC282453, Revision 0 

EC282474, Revision 1

ES15-01-18, Radiographic Examination in Accordance with ASME Section V, Article 2, Rev. 0
A-9

Instruction Book 205, Reactor Coolant Pump Model W-11012-A1 (93-A1), Revision 5

MISTRAS Radiographic Inspection Report, 3INCH-SCH160-10132015, dated 10/14/15

PWROG-14006-P, Implementation Guide for the generation III Westinghouse Shutdown Seal, 

Revision 0-B

Seabrook Emergency Feedwater System Detailed Systems Text, Revision 10

Westinghouse LTR-RES-14-104, Shutdown Seal Purge Volume, Coastdown Time and Material 

Properties for Seabrook Station, dated October 13, 2014

Westinghouse LTR-RES-14-126, Impact on the Seismic Evaluation by Installing the SHIELD at 

Seabrook Station, dated November 13, 2014

Westinghouse LTR-SEE-I-14-61, Downstream Effects Evaluation of an Inadvertent Actuation of 

the RCP Shutdown Seal at Seabrook Unit 1, dated December 4, 2014

Drawings

1‐NHY‐250000, Rev. 81, Data Sheets for Motor and Air Operated Valves and Dampers

Section 1R19: Post-Maintenance Testing

Procedures

LS0557.19, 480 VAC K-600 Electrically Operated Breaker Refurbishment, Revision 15

LX0556.113, 1-EDE-B-1-D 18-Month Technical Specification Battery Surveillance, Revision 3

OX1410.04, Post Refueling Pre-Startup Rx Trip Breaker Surveillance, Revision 10

OX1413.03, B Train RHR Quarterly Flow and Valve Stroke Test, and 18 Month Valve Stroke 

Observation, Revision 13

OX1413.05, RHR Cold Shutdown Valve Testing, Revision 7

OX1413.08, RH-P-8B Comprehensive Pump Test, Revision 10A

OX1416.03, Monthly Cooling Tower Fan Operability Test, Revision 10

OX1436.13, Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump Post Cold Shutdown or Post 

Maintenance Surveillance and Comprehensive Pump Test, Revision 29

Condition Reports

01647943 01837698 02069435 02071668 02083213 02083832

02085868 02085922 02090725 02091049

Maintenance Orders/Work Orders

40103650 40289589 40310982 40310991 40310993 40311461

40311466 40315437 40369086 40421948 40436813 40436853

Miscellaneous

1-NHY-31017, Sheet EG2a, 125VDC Bus 1-SWG-11D Distr Pnl 1-PP-111D Schedule, 

Revision 8

1-NHY-310042, Sheet 2, 125VDC Vital Distribution System One Line Diagram, Revision 4

1-NHY-310942, Sheet E04/10, Process Protection Cabinet Power Supply MM-CP-4 Cable 

Schematic, Revision 0

1-NHY-310949, Sheet E01/2a, Solid State Protection System Cabinet MM-CP-12 Schematic 

Diagram, Revision 5

1-NHY-310949, Sheet E02/4a, Solid State Protection System Cabinet MM-CP-13 Schematic 

Diagram, Revision 5
A-10

Section 1R20: Refueling and Other Outage Activities

Procedures

AD-AA-101-1004, Work Hour Controls, Revision 16

EX1808.014, Containment Enclosure Building Integrity 18 Month Surveillance, Revision 10

IS1682.222, Spent Fuel Pool Level Calibration, Revision 7

ODI-101, Attachment D, Outage Status Sheet, Revision 16

ON1090.04, Containment Entry, Revision 30

OP-AA-102-1003, Guarded Equipment, Revision 9

OS1000.02, Plant Startup From Hot Standby to Minimum Load, Revision 31

OS1000.04, Plant Cooldown From Hot Standby to Cold Shutdown, Revision 51

OS1000.07, Approach to Criticality, Revision 13

OS1000.09, Refueling Operation, Revision 30

OS1000.10, Operation at Power, Revision 31

OS1000.14, Reactor Coolant System Evacuation and Fill, Revision 22

OS1000.14, Reactor Coolant System Evacuation and Fill, Revision 23

OS1001.02, Draining the Reactor Coolant System for Vessel Head Removal, Revision 19

OS1013.03, Residual Heat Removal Train A Startup and Operation, Revision 31

OS1013.04, Residual Heat Removal Train B Startup and Operation, Revision 28

OS1015.18, Setting Containment Integrity for Mode IV Entry, Revision 10

OX1406.12, 18 Month Containment and Containment Spray Recirculation Sump Surveillance, 

Revision 11

OS1436.19, 18 Month ATWS Mitigation System Auto Actuation Surveillance, Revision 9

OX1426.34, Diesel Generator 1A 36 Month Operability Surveillance, Revision 17

RS1737, Post Refueling Low Power Physics Testing, Revision 7

Condition Reports

02005438 02074905 02080584 02080921 02080921 02082510

02084164 02088138 02097832

Maintenance Orders/Work Orders

40273392 40312116 40339169 40339170 40367789 40416945

Miscellaneous

Cycle 18 Core Map, dated 10/17/15

Drawing 9763-F-805139, Containment Liner Floor Leak Chase System Piping Arrangement, 

Revision 10

Engineering Change 281724, Revision 0

Engineering Change 284624, Revision 0

LTR-PAFM-15-104, Seabrook SG & RCP Support Shim Gap Measurement Process Flowchart

LTR-PAFM-15-017, Seabrook SG & RCP Support Shim Gap Re-Shim Guidance

PRA Evaluation PRAE-15-011, AR 2057299, OR17 Outage Schedule Shutdown Risk Review

AT-01.13 Mode Hold / Milestone Reports

Report SBK 15-013, Seabrook Nuclear Oversight Report, dated 11/19/15

Westinghouse Letter, LTR-RVHP-15-56, Seabrook SG & RCP Support Option 2 Shim 

Adjustments Post MSIP, dated October 20, 2015

Westinghouse Letter, LTR-ISE-15-039, Power Ascension Shim Gap Monitoring Plan for 

Seabrook Station Unit 1 During OR17, dated October 22, 2015
A-11

Section 1R22: Surveillance Testing

Procedures

ES1850.003, Motor Operated Valve Performance Monitoring, Revision 10

LS0569.16, Diagnostic Testing of Rising Stem MOVs, Revision 23

LS0569.17, Diagnostic Testing of Rising Stem MOVs Using the Torque Thrust Cell, Revision 17

OX1402, CVCS Cold Shutdown and Refueling Interval Valve Test, Revision 13

OX1456.81, Operability Testing of IST Valves, Revision 23

Condition Reports

02004690 02083866

Maintenance Orders/Work Orders

40312073 40312078 40321086 40414003 40414014

Section 1EP2: Alert and Notification System Evaluation

Procedures

EP-AA-101-1000, Nuclear Division Drill and Exercise Procedure, Revision 13

EP-AA-102, NextEra Energy Alert and Notification System, Revision 0

SIR10, WPS-3000 and WPS-4008 Siren Bi-Weekly Functional Test, Revision 4

SIR11, WPS-3000 and WPS-4008 Siren Annual Maintenance, Revision 2

SIR45, State Siren Activation Control System Annual Maintenance and Testing, Revision 4

SIR76, Local Town Siren Activation Control System Annual Maintenance and Testing, 

Revision 4

Miscellaneous

Seabrook Station ANS Maintenance and Testing records, August 2013 – December 2015

Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant Alert and Notification System Design Report, 

Addendum 7, June 2013

Seabrook Station Radiological Emergency Plan, Revision 69

Section 1EP3: Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation System

Procedures

NM11700, Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities of Primary, Subject-to-call, and

Secondary, Emergency Response Organization members, Revision 35

Miscellaneous

2014 3rd Quarter Emergency Response Organization Notification Test Results

2014 4th Quarter Emergency Response Organization Notification Test Results

2015 3rd Quarter Emergency Response Organization Notification Test Results

2015 4th Quarter Emergency Response Organization Notification Test Results

E-Plan Personnel Expiration Report – 14 day look ahead dated December 4, 2015

ERO Staffing Succession Planning dated December 8, 2015

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Drill and Exercise Manual, Revision 41

Seabrook Station Emergency Response Manual, Revision 122

Seabrook Station On-Shift Staffing Analysis Report, Revision 1

Seabrook Station Radiological Emergency Plan, Revision 69

Weekly ERO Pager Test, and Quarterly ERO Call-In Drill, results, January 2012 – June 2013
A-12

Section 1EP4: Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes

Procedures

ER1.1, Classification of Emergencies, Revision 55

ER1.2, Emergency Plan Activation, Revision 64

ER5.3, Operation of the Raddose-V, Revision 33

ER5.4, Protective Action Recommendations, Revision 34

Miscellaneous

Radiological Emergency Plan (SSREP), Revision 69

Section 1EP5: Maintaining Emergency Preparedness

Procedures

EN-AA-203-1201, 10 CFR Applicability of 10 CFR 50.59 Screening Reviews, Revision 4

EP-AA-100-1002, Emergency Preparedness Change Review Committee Guideline, Revision 2

EP-AA-100-1007, Evaluation of the Change to the Emergency Plan, Supporting Documents and 

Equipment (10CFR 50.59(a)), Revision 3

SM7.28, Seabrook Equipment Important to Emergency Response, Revision 2

Condition Reports

01890396 01937133 02005383 02005487 02023560 02025317

02030373 02031036 02032420 02052946 02052947 02052947

02068065

Miscellaneous

Benchmark Report on Use of Teams in the ERO, AR 02062157

EP Readiness Assessment for INPO Evaluation, AR 02014862

Formal Benchmark Report on VC Summer Emergency Preparedness, AR 01928502

Quick Hit Assessment Report on EP NRC Inspection Readiness, AR 02004700

Quick Hit Assessment Report on EAL Classification Timing, AR 01898102

Quick Hit Assessment Report on ERO Self-Assessment, AR 02004700

Quick Hit Assessment Report on PAR’s for Large Bodies of Water in EPZ, AR 02022403

SEP 2014016, Seabrook Station CFE 14-05 Report

SEP 2015003, Seabrook Station CFD 15-01 Report

SEP 2015016, Seabrook Station CFD 15-02 Report

Seabrook Nuclear Oversight Report, SBK 13-012

Seabrook Nuclear Oversight Report, SBK 14-008

Seabrook Nuclear Oversight Report, SBK 15-007

Seabrook Station Development of Evacuation Time Estimates 2014, Final Report, Revision 0

Seabrook Station Development of Evacuation Time Estimates 2015, Final Report, Revision 0

Seabrook Station Radiological Emergency Plan, Appendix D, letters of Agreement with 

Emergency Response Organization, Revision 60

Section 2RS1: Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

Procedures

HD095817, Performance of Routine Radiological Surveys, Revision 13

HD0955.50, Far West REM-500 Operation, Revision 6

HN0960.10, Radiological Requirements for Entry Beneath Reactor Vessel, Revision 31
A-13

HN0960.17, Radiological Controls for Transfer of Spent Fuel between the Containment and the 

Spent Fuel Pool, Revision 4

OA 13-007 Pre-Planned Posting and Survey Instructions, Revision 0

RP-AA-102-1001, Area Radiological Surveys, Revision 1

RP-AA-103-1001, Posting Requirements for Radiological Hazards, Revision 2

RP-AA-103-1002, High Radiation Area Controls, Revision 3

RP-AA-107-1001, Radioactive Material Receipt, Revision 2

RP-AA-107-1003, Unconditional and Conditional Release of Material, Revision 1

Condition Reports

02075677 02075678 02078744 02078869 02081011 02092044

Miscellaneous

Air Sample Results 15-491 Transfer Canal FSB, October 4, 2015

Air Sample Results 15-515 CTMT Reactor Cavity, October 7, 2015

Air Sample Results 15-683 CTMT Reactor Cavity, October 20, 2015

Air Sample Results 15-708 CTMT 25’ Reactor Head O Ring, October 22, 2015

Air Sample Results 15-778 CTMT Reactor Cavity during Decontamination, October 30, 2015

HD0958.19 Form A Dosimetry Abnormality Occurrence Report, ED Dose Alarm Badge Number

6494, November 2, 2015

HD0958.19 Form A Dosimetry Abnormality Occurrence Report, ED Dose Alarm Badge Number 

6478, November 5, 2015

HD0958.19 Form A Dosimetry Abnormality Occurrence Report, ED Dose Alarm Badge Number 

6564, November 3, 2015

HD0958.19 Form A Dosimetry Abnormality Occurrence Report, ED Dose Alarm Badge Number 

6045, November 5, 2015

HD0958.19 Form A Dosimetry Abnormality Occurrence Report, Lost TLD Badge Number 6584, 

October 20, 2015

HD0958.03 Form A Personnel Contamination Report, Facial Contamination Badge Number 

5937, October 19, 2015

HSYM-085 YRD-20-YD100, Radioactive Material Storage Building Rad Survey M-20151203-1, 

December 3, 2015 

HSYQ-001C Radiac Calibration Facility Survey M-20151021-34, October 21, 2015

HSYQ-001D C Vans & RM Trucks Survey M-20151102-8, November 2, 2015

HSYQ066A FSB-21-FB202 Fuel Storage Building Survey M-20151101-9, November 1, 2015

HX0958.23 Figure 1, Non Exempt Source Index by Location, September 10, 2015

SB Radioactive Source Leak Test Survey M-20150910-3, September 10, 2015

Section 2RS2: Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls 

Procedures

RP15.4, Use and Control Temporary Shielding, Revision 12

RP-AA-104, ALARA Program, Revision 2

RP-AA-104-1000, ALARA Implementing Procedure, Revision 5

Condition Reports

02079857 02089191 02061478 02082603 02082386 02085254

Miscellaneous

Next Era, OR 17 ALARA and Station Dose Performance, December 8, 2015

Next-Era, ALARA Review Board Meeting ARB 15-06 Presentation, December 4, 2015
A-14

RP-AA-104-1000-F2 Pre Job ALARA Review ALARA Package No. 15-16 RCP Tie Rod and 

Shim, October 25, 2015

Section 4OA1: Performance Indicator Verification

Procedures

CS0917.02, Gaseous Effluent Releases, Revision 14

CX0917.01, Liquid Effluent Releases, Revision 20

EPDP-03, Emergency Preparedness Performance Indicators, Revision 25

HD0958.33, Performance of Radiation Protection Supervisory Plant Walkdowns, Revision 6

JD0999.910, Reporting Key Performance Indicators per NEI 99-02, Revision 7

Condition Reports

02092877 02079246 02079779 02082355

Miscellaneous

SBK-PRAE-15-001, Seabrook MSPI Basis Document Update 2014, Revision 0

LIC-15004, Performance Indicator Data, 4th Quarter 2014

LIC-15015, Performance Indicator Data, 1st Quarter 2015

LIC-15026, Performance Indicator Data, 2nd Quarter 2015

LIC-15-032, Performance Indicator Data, 3rd Quarter 2015

Alert Notification System PI data, December 2014 – December 2015

DEP PI data, December 2014 – December 2015

ERO Drill Participation PI data, December 2014 – December 2015

NextEra - Seabrook Station 2014 Annual Radioactive Release Report, April 24, 2015

CP4.1B GEW Sample Collection Data, Permit Number 15-321 Steam Generator Blowdown,

August 13, 2015

CP4.1B GEW Sample Collection Data, Permit Number 15-316, Plant Vent, August 15, 2015

CS0908.01 Form F – Radioactive Effluent Dose Assessment Report 2015, December 9, 2015

CS0917.02 Form C GEW Containment Purge Release Permit 15-409 Containment Purge, 

September 28, 2015

CX0917.01, Form C LEW Release Data, Permit Number 15-433, Waste Test Tank, 

October 7, 2015

CX0917.01, Form C LEW Release Data, Permit Number 15-438, Turbine Building Sump, 

October 6, 2015

CX0917.01, Form C LEW Release Data, Permit Number 15-319, Groundwater, July 31, 2015

JD0999.910 Figure 1 Occupational Exposure Occurrence, October, November and December 

2014, January 12, 2015

JD0999.910 Figure 1 Occupational Exposure Occurrence, January, February and March 2015, 

April 2, 2015

JD0999.910 Figure 1 Occupational Exposure Occurrence, April, May and June 2015, 

December 2, 2015

JD0999.910 Figure 1 Occupational Exposure Occurrence, July, August and September, 2015, 

October 15, 2015

Section 4OA2: Problem Identification and Resolution

Procedures

EN-AA-203-1001, Operability Determinations/Functionality Assessments, Revision 21

PI-AA-104-1000, Corrective Actions, Revision 6

PI-AA-207-1000, Station Self-Evaluation and Trending Analysis, Revision 5
A-15

Condition Reports

01664399 01929460 01936340 01972065 01977373 01977456

01990185 01991967 01995588 01999679 02000523 02002668

02002750 02004749 02007975 02011136 02013241 02014325

02014325 02018118 02031149 02034198 02039025 02044627

02063563 02070871 02078215 02078215 02085144 02085147

Maintenance Orders/Work Orders

01191454 40274351 40279910 40314207 40320492 40325682

40345801

Work Requests

94098872 94106748

Miscellaneous

Foreign Print 100903, “Condition Assessment of Cracking in RHR and CS Equipment Vault,” 

dated March 17, 2015

Foreign Print 100985, “Investigate Apparent Movement of Containment Enclosure Building at 

NextEra Seabrook Facility, Seabrook, NH,” dated November 2015

Maintenance Department Rework Assessment dated January 9, 2015

Maintenance Department Rework Assessment dated May 29, 2015

Operations Department Station Self-Evaluation and Trending Analysis Report, 2nd quarter 2015

Operations Department Station Self-Evaluation and Trending Analysis Report, 3rd quarter 2015

Section 4OA5: Other Activities

Procedures

Seabrook Station Instrumentation & Controls Procedure, Dry Fuel Storage HSM Temperature 

Monitoring System Calibration Check, IS3600.401, Revision 3

Seabrook Station Radiation Protection Procedure, Performance of Routine Radiological 

Surveys, HD0958.17, Revision 13

Seabrook Station Radiation Protection Procedure, DFS Radiological Controls, HX3950.85, 

Revision 7

Seabrook Station Security Procedure, Protected Area, DFS, and Vehicle Barrier System 

Inspections, GN1322.00, Revision 39

Condition Reports

01898310 01949316 01970650 02036364 02040234 02042227

02059136 02060075 02096511

Calculations

Calc No: SBK-1FJF-13-014, Rev. 2, Seabrook Station- Irradiated Fuel Assembly Selection for

Second Dry Cask Loading Campaign

Miscellaneous

Action Request Report, AR Number 02050994, Concrete Inspection at DFS Area, 05/29/2015

Activity Documentation Sheet, HEN-Q6, Evaluate Quarterly Environmental and Protected Area 

TLD Results Second Quarter 2015

DFS Lessons Learned 2013

Evaluation for Blind Spike TLD Test BS-13-08-28 Neutron Test Outside of Tolerance for 

AR01949316
A-16

Health Physics Study/Technical Information Document 13-007, Determination of Dry Fuel 

Storage Neutron Correction Factor for Global TLDs 09/2013

HSYQ-001M Dry Fuel Storage Surveys, 10/17/2013 through 11/03/2015

Nuclear Engineering Department Discipline Standard, STD-F-040, Revision 6, Nuclear Fuel, Dry 

Cask Storage Fuel Assembly Assignments, August 2013

Personnel Contamination Report for AR01898310, 08/21/2013

Pre and Post-Job ALARA Review 13-01, Rev. 0, Dry Fuel Transfer Pool to Pad and Associated 

Tasks for 8 Casks

Radiation Work Permit, 15-0023, Dry Fuel Storage Area Maintenance/Inspection Activities, 

03/02/2015, Revision 01

Seabrook 2013 ISFSI Demonstration Exercise Plan, 06/2013

Tech Spec and Commitment Logs, DFS Daily Temperature or Visual Inspection July 14, 2015 

through October 25, 2015
A-17

LIST OF ACRONYMS

ADAMS Agencywide Documents Access and Management System

ALARA as low as reasonably achievable 

ANS Alert and Notification System

AR action request

ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers

ASR alkali-silica reaction

CAP corrective action program

CEB containment enclosure building

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

CoC Certificate of Compliance

CR condition report

CRDM control rod drive mechanism

CS containment spray

CT cooling tower

EAL emergency action level

EC eddy current

EDG emergency diesel generator

EP emergency preparedness

ERF Emergency Response Facility 

ERO Emergency Response Organization

FEA finite element analysis

FP Foreign Print

FSEL Ferguson Structural Engineering Laboratory

IMC Inspection Manual Chapter

ISFSI independent spent fuel storage installation

ISI inservice inspection

JPM job performance measure

MR maintenance rule

MRC Management Review Committee 

NCV non-cited violation

NDE non-destructive examination

NEI Nuclear Energy Institute

NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission

OR refueling outage

PI performance indicator

POD Prompt Operability Determination

RCE root cause evaluation

RCS reactor coolant system

RG Regulatory Guide

RHR residual heat removal

RP radiation protection

SG steam generator

SSC structure, system, and component

SW service water

TS technical specification

URI unresolved item

VCT volume control tank

WO work order