89–006 

116TH CONGRESS REPORT " ! HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 1st Session 116–168 

VENEZUELA TPS ACT OF 2019 

JULY 23, 2019.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of 

the Union and ordered to be printed 

Mr. NADLER, from the Committee on the Judiciary, 

submitted the following 

R E P O R T 

together with 

ADDITIONAL VIEWS 

[To accompany H.R. 549] 

[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office] 

The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred the bill 

(H.R. 549) to designate Venezuela under section 244 of the Immigration and Nationality Act to permit nationals of Venezuela to be 

eligible for temporary protected status under such section, and for 

other purposes, having considered the same, report favorably thereon with an amendment and recommend that the bill as amended 

do pass. 

CONTENTS 

Page 

Purpose and Summary ............................................................................................ 2 

Background and Need for the Legislation ............................................................. 2 

Hearings ................................................................................................................... 6 

Committee Consideration ........................................................................................ 6 

Committee Votes ...................................................................................................... 7 

Committee Oversight Findings ............................................................................... 9 

Committee Estimate of Budgetary Effects ............................................................ 9 

New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures ...................................................... 9 

Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate .......................................................... 9 

Duplication of Federal Programs ............................................................................ 15 

Performance Goals and Objectives ......................................................................... 15 

Advisory on Earmarks ............................................................................................. 15 

Section-by-Section Analysis .................................................................................... 15 

Additional Views ...................................................................................................... 16 

The amendment is as follows: 


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Strike all that follows after the enacting clause and insert the 

following: 

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Venezuela TPS Act of 2019’’. 

SEC. 2. DESIGNATION FOR PURPOSES OF GRANTING TEMPORARY PROTECTED STATUS. 

(a) DESIGNATION.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—For purposes of section 244 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1254a), Venezuela shall be treated as if it had been designated under subsection (b)(1)(C) of that section, subject to the provisions of 

this section. 

(2) PERIOD OF DESIGNATION.—The initial period of the designation referred to 

in paragraph (1) shall be for the 18-month period beginning on the date of the 

enactment of this Act. 

(b) ALIENS ELIGIBLE.—As a result of the designation made under subsection (a), 

an alien who is a national of Venezuela is deemed to satisfy the requirements under 

paragraph (1) of section 244(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 

1254a(c)), subject to paragraph (3) of such section, if the alien— 

(1) has been continuously physically present in the United States since the 

date of the enactment of this Act; 

(2) is admissible as an immigrant, except as otherwise provided in paragraph 

(2)(A) of such section, and is not ineligible for temporary protected status under 

paragraph (2)(B) of such section; and 

(3) registers for temporary protected status in a manner established by the 

Secretary of Homeland Security. 

(c) CONSENT TO TRAVEL ABROAD.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Homeland Security shall give prior consent 

to travel abroad, in accordance with section 244(f)(3) of the Immigration and 

Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1254a(f)(3)), to an alien who is granted temporary protected status pursuant to the designation made under subsection (a) if the alien 

establishes to the satisfaction of the Secretary of Homeland Security that emergency and extenuating circumstances beyond the control of the alien require the 

alien to depart for a brief, temporary trip abroad. 

(2) TREATMENT UPON RETURN.—An alien returning to the United States in accordance with an authorization described in paragraph (1) shall be treated as 

any other returning alien provided temporary protected status under section 

244 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1254a). 

Purpose and Summary 

H.R. 549, the ‘‘Venezuela TPS Act of 2019,’’ designates Venezuela 

for Temporary Protected Status (TPS) under section 244(b) of the 

Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)) for a period 

of 18 months beginning on the date of the enactment of the Act. 

Nationals of Venezuela are deemed eligible for TPS under H.R. 549 

if they: (1) have been continuously physically present in the United 

States since the date of enactment; (2); are admissible to the 

United States and not ineligible for TPS as provided in section 

244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 

§ 1254a(c)(2)); and (3) register for TPS in a manner established by 

the Secretary of Homeland Security. H.R. 549 also requires the 

Secretary to give prior consent to travel abroad to individuals 

granted TPS under the Act if emergency and extenuating circumstances require a brief, temporary trip abroad. 

Background and Need for the Legislation 

I. TEMPORARY PROTECTED STATUS

The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) authorizes the Secretary of Homeland Security to designate a country for TPS if 

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1See generally INA 244; 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (2019). 2See U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Temporary Protected Status (identifying 

countries currently designated for TPS), https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protected-status. 3 Nicole Prchal Svajlenka, Angie Bautista-Chavez, & Laura Mun ̃ oz Lopez, TPS Holders Are 

Integral Members of the U.S. Economy and Society, Center for American Progress (Oct. 20, 

2017), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/news/2017/10/20/440400/tps-holders-are-integral-members-of-the-u-s-economy-and-society/. 4 Jonathan Watts, Nicolas Maduro Narrowly Wins Venezuelan Presidential Election, Associated Press (Apr. 15, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/apr/15/nicolas-maduro-winsvenezuelan-election. 5Zeeshan Aleen, How Venezuela Went from a Rich Democracy to a Dictatorship on the Brink 

of Collapse, Vox (Sep. 19, 2017), https://www.vox.com/world/2017/9/19/16189742/venezuelamaduro-dictator-chavez-collapse. 6 Brian Walker & Tiffany Ap, Venezuela’s Opposition Party Wins Parliament in a Blow to 

Maduro, CNN (Dec. 7, 2015), https://www.cnn.com/2015/12/07/americas/venezuela-oelections/. 7Diego Ore ́, Venezuela Arrests Anti-Maduro Politicians in Sweep, Reuters (Jan. 12, 2017), 

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-politics-idUSKBN14W2QP. 8Zeeshan Aleen, Venezuela just had a Rigged Election. It’s One Step Closer to Becoming a 

Failed State, Vox (May 22, 2018), https://www.vox.com/world/2018/5/22/17379674/venezuela-election-results-maduro-won-sanctions. 

cumstances prevent the safe return of its nationals.1 Once designated, nationals of the country may register for permission to live 

and work lawfully in the United States and are protected from removal during the designated period. A country may be designated 

for TPS for an initial period of six to 18 months, and the designation may be extended if the country continues to experience conditions warranting the designation. TPS applicants are subject to 

most grounds of inadmissibility and may not be granted TPS if 

they have been convicted of an inadmissible offense, or any felony 

or two misdemeanors in the United States. Applicants are also ineligible if they are deemed a threat to national security or have engaged in the persecution of others. 

Since 1990, when the TPS provisions were enacted, a total of 21 

countries (or parts of countries) have been designated for TPS. At 

present, ten countries hold TPS designations: El Salvador, Haiti, 

Honduras, Nepal, Nicaragua, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, 

and Yemen.2 An estimated 320,000 individuals from these ten countries are currently in the United States in TPS status.3

II. CONDITIONS IN VENEZUELA WARRANTING A TPS DESIGNATION

A. Economic and political situation 

Much of the political and economic turmoil that is unfolding in 

Venezuela today can be traced back to April 2013, when Nicola ́s 

Maduro was elected President by a narrow margin after the death 

of Hugo Cha ́vez.4 Oil prices crashed shortly after the election and 

Venezuela’s economy went into freefall, which critics blamed on 

Maduro and his government.5 In the years since, hundreds of thousands of anti-government protesters have poured into the streets 

demanding new leadership. Support for opposition parties have 

grown alongside the protests, with the opposition gaining a super 

majority of parliamentary seats in the 2015 National Assembly 

election, the first major shift in power since Hugo Cha ́vez took office in 1999.6 Nevertheless, the Maduro regime, supported by the 

military establishment, arrested many opposition leaders in March 

2017.7

In May 2018, opposition parties boycotted the presidential election, deeming it fraudulent and corrupt, and Maduro ostensibly 

won the majority of votes.8 Most Venezuelans and much of the 


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9 Clare Ribando Seelke, Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy, Cong. Res. Serv. (May 24, 

2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF10230.pdf. 10 Id. 11 Id. 12 Human Rights Watch, Venezuela: Arrests, Killings in Anti-Government Protests (Jan. 25, 

2019), https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/01/25/venezuela-arrests-killings-anti-government-protests. 13 UN: Nearly 700 Venezuela Arrests in a Day Mark 20-Year High, Associated Press (Jan. 29, 

2019), https://www.apnews.com/c904a5b3c1984866a356e55a3993b9e1. 14 Amnesty Int’l, Venezuela: Authorities Must Stop Criminalizing and Killing Young People 

Living in Poverty (Sep. 20, 2018), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/09/venezuela-authorities-must-stop-criminalizing-and-killing-young-people-living-in-poverty/. 15 Ribando Seelke, supra, note 9, at 1. 16More than 50 Countries Support Venezuela’s Juan Guaido, Share America (Feb. 15, 2019), 

https://share.america.gov/support-for-venezuelas-juan-guaido-grows-infographic/. 17 Ribando Seelke, supra, note 9, at 1. 18 Emma Graham-Harrison and Joe Parkin Daniels, Venezuela: At Least Four Dead and Hundreds Injured in Border Standoff, The Guardian (Feb. 23, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/ 

world/2019/feb/23/venezuela-border-latest-maduro-guaido. 19 Venezuela: Violent Response to Demonstrators, Human Rights Watch (May 3, 2019), https:// 

www.hrw.org/news/2019/05/03/venezuela-violent-response-demonstrators. 20 Ribando Seelke, supra, note 9. 21 Id. 

international community considered Maduro’s reelection illegitimate.9 On January 5, 2019, the National Assembly elected Juan 

Guaido ́ of the Political Will party as its parliamentary president.10

A few days later, Maduro was sworn in to a new six-year presidential term.11 Violent protests and demonstrations escalated, and 

the government responded in force, arresting, teargassing, and 

beating protestors.12 Over the course of seven days in January, for 

example, approximately 40 Venezuelans were killed and 850 were 

detained, including 77 children.13 Human rights groups have documented hundreds of extrajudicial killings under Maduro’s rule.14

In mid-January, Guaido ́ announced that he was willing to serve 

as the interim president until free and fair elections could take 

place, and he took the oath of office on January 23, 2019.15 Almost 

immediately, more than 50 countries, including the United States 

and most of the European Union, recognized Guaido ́ as the legitimate interim president of Venezuela and called for speedy new 

elections.16

Since then, the National Assembly has enacted resolutions declaring Maduro’s mandate illegitimate, establishing a framework 

for a transition government, and creating a strategy for accepting 

cross-border humanitarian assistance.17 As of this time, however, 

no agreement for a peaceful transition of power exists between 

Maduro and Guaido ́. On February 23, 2019, Venezuelan security 

forces killed four Guaido ́ supporters and injured hundreds more 

when they attempted to bring convoys with emergency supplies 

across the border.18 When Guaido ́ and Leopoldo Lo ́pez, a former 

political prisoner and head of the VP [what is this?] opposition 

party, called for a civil-military rebellion against the Maduro regime on April 30, 2019, military forces violently dismantled the 

demonstrations, attacking journalists in the process and removing 

several media outlets from the air.19 In the aftermath, Maduro ordered the arrest and torture of individuals perceived to be a threat 

to the government, including military officers and opposition politicians.20

Venezuela’s political stalemate is expected to continue, with both 

Guaido ́ and Maduro claiming to be the rightful leader of the nation. 

Many observers regard the military’s defection from Maduro as key 

to the transfer of power.21 For now, however, aside from the former 


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22 Clare Ribando Seelke, Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy, Cong. Res. Serv. (May 3, 

2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF10230.pdf. 23 Id. 24 10 Things You Need to Know About Venezuela’s Human Rights Crisis, Amnesty International (Feb. 18, 2019), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/02/10-things-you-need-toknow-about-venezuelas-human-rights-crisis/. 25World Economic Outlook 2019: Inflation Rate, Average Consumer Prices, International Monetary Fund (Apr. 2019), https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/PCPIPCH@WEO/ 

WEOWORLD/VEN. 26 Clare Ribando Seelke, Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy, Cong. Res. Serv. (May 3, 

2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF10230.pdf. 27Laura Silver, Courtney Johnson, & Kyle Taylor, Venezuelans Have Little Trust in National 

Government, say Economy is in Poor Shape, Pew Research Center (Jan. 25, 2019), https:// 

www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/01/25/venezuelans-have-little-trust-in-national-governmentsay-economy-is-in-poor-shape/. 28 Id. 29Majority Fleeing Venezuela in Need of Refugee Protection—UNHCR, UNHCR (May 21, 

2019), https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/briefing/2019/5/5ce3bb734/majority-fleeing-venezuelaneed-refugee-protection-unhcr.html. 30Displaced Colombians Open Their Doors to Venezuelan Refugees and Migrants, UNHCR 

(Dec. 14, 2019), https://www.unhcr.org/news/stories/2018/12/5c12bbae4/displaced-colombiansopen-doors-venezuelan-refugees-migrants.html/. 31 Asylum Applications by Venezuelans Soar to Over 400,000, UNHCR (Mar. 8, 2019), https:// 

www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/press/2019/3/5c826efe2e9/asylum-applications-venezuelans-soar400000.html. 32 Venezuela Situation Update—March 2019, UNHCR (Mar. 12, 2019), https://reliefweb.int/report/venezuela-bolivarian-republic/unhcr-venezuela-situation-update-march-2019. 33Dany Bahar and Douglas Barrios, How Many More Migrants and Refugees Can We Expect 

out of Venezuela?, Brookings Institute (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/ 

2018/12/10/how-many-more-migrants-and-refugees-can-we-expect-out-of-venezuela/. 

head of the national intelligence agency, the military high command appears to remain loyal to Maduro.22

Meanwhile, Venezuela’s economy continues to plummet, due to 

mismanagement of the country’s oil sector, and a dramatic drop in 

oil prices emptying the coffers of the government and families 

alike.23 In 2018, inflation in Venezuela stood at 1.7 million percent.24 The International Monetary Fund estimates that in 2019, 

the annual inflation rate will reach 10 million percent—making basics like milk and bread far too expensive for most Venezuelans to 

afford.25

B. Humanitarian crisis 

Millions of Venezuelans are malnourished and lack access to safe 

water and basic medicine.26 In 2017, an estimated 87 percent of 

Venezuelans were living in poverty, with seven million in need of 

humanitarian assistance.27 Infant and maternal mortality rates are 

increasing, and previously eradicated diseases like diphtheria and 

measles have returned.28 These challenges go beyond the border 

and pose a threat to the entire region. 

Since 2015, more than 3.7 million people have fled Venezuela, 

constituting the largest exodus in recent Latin American history.29

During 2018, an average of 5,500 people left the country every day, 

with the vast majority seeking refuge in Colombia, Brazil, Ecuador, 

and Peru.30 Venezuelans have filed more than 414,000 asylum 

claims in the region, with 248,000 filed in 2018 alone.31 Neighboring countries have provided 1.3 million Venezuelans with residency permits or other forms of lawful status that give access to 

health and education, and, in most countries, the right to work.32

A recent report found that if oil prices and oil production in Venezuela continue to collapse—which is expected following new U.S. 

sanctions—the crisis could cause the total number of refugees and 

migrants to spike to more than eight million.33 That would far outVerDate Sep 11 2014 04:30 Jul 27, 2019 Jkt 089006 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\HR168.XXX HR168

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34Tim Henderson, Venezuelan Immigrants Get Trump Sympathy but Not Status, Pew Charitable Trusts (Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/ 

2018/10/02/venezuelan-immigrants-get-trump-sympathy-but-not-status. 35 Jie Zong and Jeanne Batalova, South American Immigrants in the United States, Migration 

Policy Institute (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/south-american-immigrants-united-states. 36 Id. 37Manuel Madrid, Trump Is Tough on Venezuela—but Won’t Let Fleeing Venezuelans Into the 

U.S., The American Prospect (Feb. 12, 2019), https://prospect.org/article/trump-tough-on-venezuela-wont-let-fleeing-venezuelans-us. 38 U.S. Department of State, FY 2018 Annual Report of the Visa Office: Nonimmigrant Visas 

Issued by Nationality, https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/Statistics/AnnualReports/ 

FY2018AnnualReport/FY18AnnualReport%20-%20TableXVIII.pdf. 39Madrid, supra, note 36. 

number the estimated five million refugees who left Syria during 

its civil war and would likely overwhelm the region. 

C. The Venezuelan-born community in the United States 

In 2017, about 350,000 Venezuelan immigrants lived in the 

United States, with the largest population residing in south Florida.34 Approximately 50 percent of Venezuelan immigrants are 

English proficient, and 80 percent are of working age.35 More than 

half of Venezuelan immigrants are college graduates, and the median income of Venezuelan households is $51,900.36

For the past three years, Venezuelans have requested asylum in 

higher numbers than any other population in the United States, including almost 28,000 new applications in 2018.37 At the same 

time, the number of visas issued to Venezuelans is plummeting, 

from almost 240,000 visas granted in fiscal year 2015 to less than 

30,000 granted in fiscal year 2018.38 Despite the catastrophe unfolding in Venezuela, the United States deported more Venezuelans 

in late 2018 than were resettled as refugees over the previous five 

years.39

Hearings 

For the purposes of section 103(i) of H. Res. 6 of the 116th Congress, the following hearing was used to develop H.R. 549: ‘‘Protecting Dreamers and TPS Recipients,’’ held before the Judiciary 

Committee on March 6, 2019. Among others, the witnesses who 

testified at the hearing included: Jose Palma, a Salvadoran national TPS recipient who is married to another TPS recipient, has 

4 U.S. citizen children, and serves as the National Coordinator of 

the National TPS Alliance; Donald Graham, former owner of The 

Washington Post and co-founder of TheDream.US, which provides 

scholarships to thousands of highly motivated Dreamers and TPS 

recipients; Catholic Bishop Mario Dorsonville, Auxiliary Bishop of 

the Archdiocese of Washington, a naturalized immigrant from Colombia, and the incoming Migration Chairman of the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops; and Andrew R. Arthur, Resident Fellow at the Center for Immigration Studies. 

Committee Consideration 

On May 22, 2019, the Committee met in open session and ordered the bill, H.R. 549, favorably reported with an amendment in 

the nature of a substitute, by a rollcall vote of 20 to 9, a quorum 

being present. 


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Committee Votes 

In compliance with clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, the Committee advises that the following 

rollcall vote occurred during the Committee’s consideration of H.R. 

549. 

1. The motion to report H.R. 549, as amended, favorably was 

agreed to by a rollcall vote of 20 to 9. 


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Committee Oversight Findings 

In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, the Committee advises that the findings 

and recommendations of the Committee, based on oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in the descriptive portions of this report. 

Committee Estimate of Budgetary Effects 

In compliance with clause 3(d) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, the following statement is made concerning the effects on the budget of the bill, H.R. 549, as reported. 

The Committee agrees with the estimate prepared by the Congressional Budget Office, which is included below. 

New Budget Authority, Entitlement Authority, and Tax 

Expenditures 

Pursuant to clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House 

of Representatives, the Committee adopts as its own the estimate 

of new budget authority, entitlement authority, or tax expenditures 

or revenues contained in the cost estimate prepared by the Director 

of the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section 402 of the 

Congressional Budget Act of 1974. 

Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate 

In compliance with clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, the Committee sets forth, with respect to 

the bill, H.R. 549, the following estimate and comparison prepared 

by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office under section 

402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974: 

The bill would 

• Allow Venezuelans in the United States to apply for temporary protected status (TPS) for 18 months 

Estimated budgetary effects would primarily stem from 


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• Changes in revenues and outlays for refundable tax credits 

when individuals who receive TPS become eligible to work legally and receive Social Security numbers • Subsidies for health insurance purchased through the marketplaces established under the Affordable Care Act by individuals receiving TPS 

Areas of significant uncertainty include • Estimating the number of Venezuelans who are in the 

United States in nonimmigrant status or without legal status • Estimating the number of those Venezuelans who would 

apply for TPS • Projecting the employment and tax-paying behavior of 

those Venezuelans if they did not receive TPS 

Bill summary: H.R. 549 would allow Venezuelans in the United 

States to apply for and receive temporary protected status for 18 

months. Aliens with TPS may work legally, receive Social Security 

numbers (SSNs), and claim the earned income and child tax credits. Additionally, they are eligible for subsidies for health insurance 

purchased through the marketplaces established under the Affordable Care Act (ACA), provided that they meet the other eligibility 

requirements for those subsidies. 

Estimated Federal cost: The estimated budgetary effect of H.R. 

549 is shown in Table 1. The costs of the legislation fall within 

budget functions 550 (health), 600 (income security), and 750 (administration of justice). 


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TABLE 1.—ESTIMATED BUDGETARY EFFECTS OF H.R. 549 

By fiscal year, millions of dollars— 

2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2019–2024 2019–2029 

Increases in Direct Spending 

Estimated Budget Authority ...................................................................................... 0 239 204 63 73 70 69 66 53 51 52 649 940 Estimated Outlays ..................................................................................................... 0 239 204 63 73 70 69 66 53 51 52 649 940 

Increases or Decreases (¥) in Revenues 

Estimated Revenues .................................................................................................. 0 35 60 59 54 51 44 35 34 33 32 259 437 On-Budget .................................................................................................................. 0 ¥71 ¥94 ¥72 ¥67 ¥63 ¥54 ¥54 ¥50 ¥50 ¥49 ¥367 ¥624 

Off-Budget ................................................................................................................. 0 106 154 131 121 114 98 89 84 83 81 626 1,061 

Net Increases or decreases (¥) in the Deficit From Changes in Direct Spending and Revenues 

Effect on the Deficit .................................................................................................. 0 204 144 4 19 19 25 31 19 18 20 390 503 

On-Budget ......................................................................................................... 0 310 298 135 140 133 123 120 103 101 101 1,016 1,564 Off-Budget ........................................................................................................ 0 ¥106 ¥154 ¥131 ¥121 ¥114 ¥98 ¥89 ¥84 ¥83 ¥81 ¥626 ¥1,061 

Sources Congressional Budget Office, staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation. All off-budget effects would come from changes in Social Security revenues. 


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1 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15) defines many classes of nonimmigrant aliens who are permitted to reside in the United States temporarily and for specified purposes. Examples of nonimmigrant 

classifications include F–1 students and H–1B temporary workers, named for their authorizing 

provisions, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(F)(i) and 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b), respectively. 

Basis of estimate: For this estimate, CBO assumes that H.R. 549 

will be enacted near the start of fiscal year 2020. CBO expects that 

the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) would receive and 

process TPS applications during the first half of fiscal year 2020. 

CBO assumes that under current law, most of the Venezuelan 

nationals who would be affected by the bill will remain in the 

United States, either in legal nonimmigrant status or without legal 

status.1 Spending in CBO’s baseline reflects the expectation that 

resources available to DHS to remove aliens without legal status 

are constant in inflation-adjusted terms over the 2019–2029 period 

and that DHS’s policie—notably it enforcement priorities—remain 

the same over that period. 

CBO anticipates that under H.R. 549, most of the Venezuelan 

nationals who would be affected by the bill would remain in the 

United States after the expiration of the 18-month period of temporary protected status. The staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) expects that some of the individuals who would receive 

TPS would continue to work, pay taxes, and receive tax credits 

after that status expires. Thus, some budgetary effects of the bill 

would continue after that 18-month period. 

The President could extend the TPS designation for Venezuela at 

the end of that 18-month period. The budgetary effects of any such 

decision are not attributable to this legislation. 

People affected by the legislation: H.R. 549 would allow Venezuelans to receive TPS if they were physically present in the 

United States continuously between enactment of the bill and adjudication of their application, if they apply for such status, and if 

they are not inadmissible on certain grounds (related to crime and 

national security). Venezuelans who receive TPS would retain it 

during the 18-month period following enactment. 

The actual number of aliens present in the United States at any 

time is not known. The Department of State tracks the visas it has 

issued that allow aliens to travel to a U.S. port of entry to seek admission into the country. DHS records aliens’ admissions into the 

United States, as well as their departures from most air and sea 

ports of entry. However, DHS generally does not collect information 

about aliens’ departures to Mexico via land ports of entry. DHS and 

a variety of immigration researchers estimate the number of aliens 

without legal status in the United States using census data and 

comparing that survey information with administrative data. 

On the basis of that research and data, CBO estimates that 

around 300,000 Venezuelans will be in the United States either in 

legal nonimmigrant status or without legal status upon enactment. 

(Venezuelans with lawful permanent resident status would have no 

need to apply for TPS.) CBO estimates that 10,000 to 20,000 of 

those Venezuelans would remain in their current nonimmigrant 

status (such as H–1B temporary workers) or would acquire another 

status (such as asylee) during the 18 months after enactment and 

thus also would have no need to apply for TPS. Finally, CBO anticipates that about 75 percent of the remaining Venezuelans 


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would apply for and be granted TPS. In total, about 200,000 people 

would receive TPS under the bill, CBO estimates. 

Direct spending: CBO and JCT estimate that H.R. 549 would increase net direct spending for refundable tax credits, for health 

benefits, and for DHS processing costs and collections of application 

fees by $940 million over the 2020–2029 period. 

Refundable tax credits: JCT estimates that H.R. 549 would increase outlays for the earned income and child tax credits, which 

are refundable, by about $640 million over the 2020–2029 period. 

Refundable tax credits reduce a taxpayer’s overall income tax liability; if those credits exceed other tax liabilities, the taxpayer 

may receive the excess in a refund. Such refunds are classified as 

outlays in the federal budget. 

JCT estimates that the increase in outlays for refundable credits 

projected for the 2020–2029 period would be mostly attributable to 

earned income tax credits. H.R. 549 would increase the number of 

people with valid SSNs, which taxpayers and their dependents 

must have to qualify for those credits. (That effect is also discussed 

below under the heading ‘‘Revenues.’’) 

Health benefits: People who are lawfully present in the United 

States, including aliens with TPS, generally can receive subsidies 

for health insurance purchased through the marketplaces established under the ACA provided that they meet other criteria: they 

cannot have access to affordable health insurance coverage through 

certain other sources and their household income must be between 

100 percent and 400 percent of the federal poverty guidelines. If 

their income is below 100 percent of the guidelines, they also must 

be ineligible for Medicaid because of their immigration status. 

CBO and JCT estimate that about 20,000 people who receive 

TPS under H.R. 549 would purchase health insurance through the 

marketplaces in 2020 and would have income that was low enough 

to qualify for the subsidies. That coverage would end when their 

TPS expired during 2021. The agencies estimate that the average 

cost of those subsidies would be about $10,600 per person in 2020 

and about $11,300 in 2021. In total, those subsidies would increase 

direct spending by $300 million. 

DHS application fees and processing costs: DHS collects fees of 

between $50 and $545 to process an initial application for TPS. The 

fees are classified as offsetting receipts (that is, as reductions in direct spending) and are available for spending by DHS upon collection under current law. Enacting the bill would increase the number of applicants for temporary protected status and employment 

authorization. CBO estimates that fee collections also would increase and that additional collections and spending would total 

about $85 million each over the 2020–2022 period. Because the collections and spending offset, the net effect on direct spending would 

be insignificant. 

Revenues: H.R. 549 would both increase and decrease revenues. 

CBO and JCT estimate that H.R. 549 would increase net revenues 

by about $440 million over the 2020–2029 period. On-budget revenues would decline by about $620 million, and off-budget revenues 

(Social Security payroll taxes) would increase by about $1,060 million. 

Higher revenues, according to JCT’s estimates, would largely 

stem from increased reporting of employment income by people 


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14 

who would gain work authorization and SSNs under the bill. Those 

workers would continue to possess SSNs in their own name after 

TPS expires. Thus, JCT estimates that some of those individuals 

would continue to earn and report income after the 18-month period of temporary protected status. That increase in reported wages 

would increase revenues, mostly in the form of Social Security 

taxes. 

Slightly more than half of the increase in revenues from workers 

would be offset for two reasons. First, increased reporting of employment income would increase tax deductions by businesses for 

labor compensation, including those businesses’ contributions to 

payroll taxes. As a result, corporations would report lower taxable 

profits and pay less in income taxes. Noncorporate businesses, such 

as partnerships and sole proprietorships, also would report lower 

taxable income, which would decrease individual income taxes paid 

by their partners and owners. (Some of those effects also would 

persist after the 18-month period of temporary protected status.) 

Second, CBO and JCT estimate revenues would decrease by $22 

million over the 2020–2022 period because tax credits for health insurance purchased through the marketplaces established under the 

ACA would reduce individuals’ tax liability. 

Uncertainty: A significant source of uncertainty is the number of 

Venezuelans who are in the United States in nonimmigrant status 

or without legal status. Uncertainty about the number of Venezuelans who enter without inspection (that is, who cross the border without legal permission), the number of Venezuelans who 

leave the United States to enter Mexico via a land port of entry, 

and the number of Venezuelans who are not counted by census surveys could affect CBO’s estimate. 

Another source of uncertainty is the number of those Venezuelans who would apply for TPS. Some could become eligible for 

other legal immigration statuses—removing the need to apply for 

TPS—at higher or lower rates than CBO estimates. Additionally, 

they could return to Venezuela or depart for another country, or 

otherwise decline to apply for TPS while within the United States, 

at different rates than reflected in this estimate. 

The estimated change in revenues and refundable tax credits 

also includes uncertainty about whether affected Venezuelans 

would work without authorization and whether and how they 

would pay taxes—both under current law and after the expiration 

of TPS authorized in the bill. Aliens without work authorization 

might choose to work outside of the tax system, to pay taxes under 

their own previously received SSN, or to pay taxes under a false 

or stolen SSN. 

Pay-As-You-Go considerations: The Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act 

of 2010 establishes budget-reporting and enforcement procedures 

for legislation affecting direct spending or revenues. The net 

changes in outlays and revenues that are subject to those pay-asyou-go procedures are shown in Table 2. Only on-budget changes 

to outlays or revenues are subject to pay-as-you-go procedures. 


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TABLE 2.—CBO’S ESTIMATE OF PAY-AS-YOU-GO EFFECTS OF H.R. 549 

By fiscal year, millions of dollars— 

2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2019– 

2024 

2019– 

2029 

Net Increase in the On-Budget Deficit 

Statutory Pay-AsYou-Go Effect ..... 0 310 298 135 140 133 123 120 103 101 101 1,016 1,564 

Memorandum: 

Changes in 

Outlays ...... 0 239 204 63 73 70 69 66 53 51 52 649 940 

Changes in 

Revenues ... 0 ¥71 ¥94 ¥72 ¥67 ¥63 ¥54 ¥54 ¥50 ¥50 ¥49 ¥367 ¥624 

Increase in long-term deficits: None. 

Mandates: None. 

Estimate prepared by: Population: David Rafferty; Federal Costs: 

Kate Fritzsche, Mark Grabowicz, Lisa Ramirez-Branum, and the 

staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation; Federal Revenues: Kate 

Fritzsche and the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation; Mandates: Rachel Austin. 

Estimate reviewed by: David Newman, Chief, Defense, International Affairs, and Veterans’ Affairs Cost Estimates Unit; H. 

Samuel Papenfuss, Deputy Assistant Director for Budget Analysis; 

Theresa Gullo, Assistant Director for Budget Analysis. 

Duplication of Federal Programs 

No provision of H.R. 549 establishes or reauthorizes a program 

of the federal government known to be duplicative of another federal program, a program that was included in any report from the 

Government Accountability Office to Congress pursuant to section 

21 of Public Law 111–139, or a program related to a program identified in the most recent Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance. 

Performance Goals and Objectives 

The Committee states that pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII 

of the Rules of the House of Representatives, H.R. 549 designates 

Venezuela for Temporary Protected Status under section 244 of the 

Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1254a) and permits 

qualified individuals to apply for such status. 

Advisory on Earmarks 

In accordance with clause 9 of rule XXI of the Rules of the House 

of Representatives, H.R. 549 does not contain any congressional 

earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits as defined 

in clause 9(d), 9(e), or 9(f) of rule XXI. 

Section-by-Section Analysis 

The following discussion describes the bill as reported by the 

Committee. 

Sec. 1. Short title. Section 1 sets forth the short title of the bill 

as the ‘‘Venezuela TPS Act of 2019’’. 

Sec. 2. Designation for purposes of granting temporary protected 

status. Section 2(a) designates Venezuela for TPS for an initial peVerDate Sep 11 2014 04:30 Jul 27, 2019 Jkt 089006 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\HR168.XXX HR168

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1 Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to H.R. 549, 116th Cong. (Venezuela TPS Act of 

2019). 2 8 U.S.C. § 1254(b)(1). 

3 INA § 244(b)(1) 

4 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(3)(A), (C). 

5 8 U.S.C. § 1254(b)(3)(B). 

riod of 18 months, beginning on the date of enactment of the Act. 

Section 2(b) states that TPS will be available to individuals who: 

(1) are nationals of Venezuela who have been continuously physically present in the United States since the date of enactment of 

the Act; 

(2) are admissible and not ineligible for TPS in accordance with 

the TPS eligibility standards (including waivers of certain grounds 

of inadmissibility) described in section 244(c)(2) of the Immigration 

and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1254a(c)(2)); and 

(3) register for TPS in the manner established by the Secretary 

of Homeland Security. 

Section 2(c)(1) requires the Secretary to provide advance consent 

to travel abroad to individuals granted TPS under the Act if there 

are emergency and extenuating circumstances beyond the individual’s control that require a brief, temporary trip abroad. 

Section 2(c)(2) states that an individual with consent to travel 

abroad shall be treated the same as any other individual with TPS 

upon return. 

Additional Views 

H.R. 549 1 statutorily designates Venezuela for Temporary Protected Status (‘‘TPS’’) under section 244 of the Immigration and 

Nationality Act. Venezuelans present in the United States on the 

date of enactment—regardless of legal status—would be eligible to 

apply for TPS and allowed to stay in the United States with employment authorization. The Department of Homeland Security 

‘‘DHS’’) estimates around 270,000 Venezuelans currently in the 

United States would benefit from TPS, 123,000 of whom are here 

illegally. Republicans are concerned without reforms to the TPS 

statute, this designation of TPS will not truly be ‘‘temporary.’’ 

Ordinarily, the Secretary of DHS designates a country for TPS 

if there are circumstances that would prevent the safe return of 

aliens to that country, or if a country is temporarily unable to adequately handle the return of its nationals.2 These conditions include ongoing armed conflict, an earthquake, flood, drought, epidemic, or other environmental disaster.3 The effect of a TPS designation is nationals of the designated country who are inside the 

United States on the date of such designation, whether legally or 

illegally, are allowed to apply to stay here and receive employment 

authorization. 

At least 60 days before the expiration of the TPS designation, or 

any extension thereof, the Secretary, after consultations with appropriate agencies of the Government, must review the conditions 

in a foreign state designated for TPS to determine whether the conditions for the TPS designation continue to be met and, if so, the 

length of an extension.4 If the Secretary determines that the foreign state no longer meets the conditions for the TPS designation, 

the Secretary is required under law to terminate the designation.5

Such termination may not take effect ‘‘earlier than 60 days after 


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6 8 U.S.C. § l254a(b)(3)(B) 

7 USCIS Website, at https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protected-status 

8 Ramos, et al v. Nielsen, et al., No. 18–cv–01554 (N.D. Cal. Oct 3, 2018) (enjoining government from terminating TPS for Sudan, Nicaragua, Haiti, and El Salvador); see also CASA de 

Maryland v. Trump, No. 18–cv–00845 (D. Md. Nov. 29, 2018) (Enjoining the government from 

terminating TPS for Salvadorans).; Bhattarai v. Nielsen, No. 19–cv–731 (N.D. Cal) (Stipulation 

for Honduras and Nepal to extend TPS while appeal is pending in Ramos); Saget v. Trump, No. 

18–cv–01599 (E.D.N.Y.) (Haiti). 

the date the Notice [of termination] is published [in the Federal 

Register] or, if later, the expiration of the most recent previous extension . . . .’’ 6

Unfortunately, what was intended by Congress to be a temporary 

protection has, over time, become a permanent, automatically renewed status, with some countries being rubber-stamped for re-designation for decades. For instance, Nicaragua was initially designated for TPS in 1999 due to Hurricane Mitch which struck the 

country in October 1998. And El Salvador was initially designated 

in March 2001 based on a series of earthquakes. 

Upon review of TPS status for certain countries, DHS has indicated it will not renew TPS status for nationals of Sudan, Nicaragua, Haiti, El Salvador, and Nepal while extending TPS for nationals of Yemen and Somalia.7 However, despite findings by DHS 

that the temporary conditions existing at the time of the initial 

designation are no longer in effect, multiple nationwide federal 

court injunctions and stipulations have prohibited the DHS from 

ending TPS for nationals of these countries.8

Chart 1: 


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9Statement of Chairman Jerrold Nadler, Markup of H.R. 2821, the American Promise Act of 

2019, House Judiciary Comm., 116th Cong. May 22, 2019. 

Republicans would prefer to ensure designations are temporary, 

and the statute is not abused to provide a quasi-permanent status. 

Republicans offered an amendment at the markup to require congressional approval of future re-designations of TPS designated 

countries but withdrew the amendment after indications from 

Democrats it would be found not to be germane. 

It should be noted H.R. 549 was considered immediately after, 

and in the same markup as H.R. 2821, in which the Democrats 

voted to give green cards to all current TPS recipients and those 

eligible for TPS under prior designations. It would seem the Democrats do not intend this temporary status to be temporary. 

In fact, Chairman Nadler stated at the markup for H.R. 2821, 

the ‘‘American Promise Act of 2019,’’ that ‘‘I should say that TPS 

is a temporary program and when the catastrophe abates, if it’s 

after a year or two or three, then it is proper to end the TPS and 

people can go home. But once people, have been here for fifteen or 

twenty years they’ve laid down roots here they’ve raised families 

here then to suddenly say they have to go home after fifteen or 

twenty years to go home to some place they haven’t seen in 15 

years . . . that becomes cruel.’’ 9 Without reforms to the TPS statue 

to ensure the temporary nature, the American people cannot be assured any TPS designation is in fact ‘‘temporary.’’ 

Ranking Member Collins predicted in his opening remarks that 

without reforms, if H.R. 549 becomes law, future administrations 

will continue rubber stamping TPS re-designations for Venezuela 

and a bill will be brought in 20 years to give green cards for Venezuelans here on TPS. That prediction is based on how TPS has 

been used by administrations in the past and on Democrats’ own 

vision of what TPS is—merely a path to a green card. Republicans 

remain concerned without such reforms to the TPS statute, H.R. 

549 would offer a status ‘‘temporary’’ in name only. 

Sincerely, 

DOUG COLLINS, 

Ranking Member, House Judiciary Committee. 

Æ 


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