F rench Negotiating Style

B r i e f l y. . .

• Fra nce has an of f ic ial position on virtually every important int e r na t io nal issue, but it

lacks the influence to effectively pro mote its positio ns outside of Euro p e.

• Fra nce fre q u e ntly challenges the United States, thus cont r i b u t i ng to the Fre nch re pu t a t ion as a spoiler in fo re ign affa i r s. Rather than simply accept Ame r ican positio ns,

F ra nce occasio nally allows ne go t ia t io ns to fail and prefers to portray itself as indep e nde nt from the United States.

• Fre nch gov e r n me ntal ins t i t u t io ns and the do me s t ic political enviro n me nt impact

F re nch fore ign polic y. Roles of primary go v e r n me nt actors, tra i n i ng of ne go t ia t o r s,

a nd deg ree of public int e rest in int e r na t io nal affairs are important factors influenci ng Fre nch ne go t ia t i ng behavio r.

• F ra nce’s int e r na t io nal policy positio ns and ne go t ia t i ng behavior are often chara c t e r i z e d

as being principled and as bearing both a highly developed sense of history and the burden of being rig ht. Ma n i f e s t a t ion of these chara c t e r i s t ics varies with issue and cont ex t .

• Two case stud ies help illustrate Fre nch ne go t ia t i ng behavio r. Analysis of Fre nch positio ns

on several North At l a nt ic Treaty Org a n i z a t ion (NATO) issues as well as on United Na t io ns

Security Council de c i s io ns re g a rd i ng Iraq offers useful ins ig ht into the Fre nch vision of

its role in int e r na t io nal affairs and how that view subsequently affects the Fre nc h

a p p roach to policy ne go t ia t io ns.

F rench-U.S. Relations

F re nch ne go t ia t i ng style is exa m i ned he re with emphasis on the bilateral re l a t io ns h i p

between the United States and Fra nc e. Although their histories differ, Fra nce and the

United States ma i ntain similar perc e p t io ns of int e r na t io nal re s p o ns i b i l i t ie s. Fra nce and the

United States have been allies for over 200 years, yet in the last 60 years differe nc e s

between the two have grown inc re a s i ngly visible, workshop partic i p a nts say. Despite the

l o ngevity of close re l a t io ns, the bilateral re l a t io nship lacks “de ns i t y.” As a result, int e ra ct io ns between Fra nce and the United States in the int e r na t io nal are na pro v ide exa m p l e s

of Fre nch behavior in an enviro n me nt whe re it believes it must work for everything it ge t s.

A l t hough Fra nce and the United States are allie s, most of the Cold War was ma r ke d

by Fre nch efforts to find an alternative to the duality of the bipolar int e r na t io nal system. Fric t ion re ma i ns a cons t a nt part of bilateral re l a t io ns, although history has pro v e n

F ra nce to be a good ally in times of crisis.

w w w. u s i p . o rg

S P E C I A L R E P O R T

1200 17th Street NW • Washington, DC 20036 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

April 26, 2001

AB O U T T H E RE P O R T

T he Research and Stud ies Pro g ram of the Un i t e d

States Institute of Peace convened a me e t i ng of 

A me r ican and Fre nch acade m ic experts and

p o l icy pra c t i t io ners to exa m i ne the Fre nc h

ne go t ia t i ng style. Focusing on the Fre nc h

a p p roach to bilateral and mu l t i l a t e ra l

rel a t io ns, the animated discussion yie l de d

useful ins ig ht into the Fre nch approach to

i nt e r na t io nal politic s.

This event was part of the Institute’s ongo i ng

C ro s s - C u l t u ral Ne go t ia t ion Project, which de v e lops a nd tra nsmits useful kno w l e dge for ne got ia t i ng with fo re ign counterparts on ma t t e r s

a f f e c t i ng the pre v e nt ion and ma na ge me nt of

i nt e r na t io nal conflic t s. Specific a l l y, the pro j e c t

is de s ig ned to help ne go t iators better

u nde r s t a nd the ne go t ia t i ng behavior of the i r

c o u nterparts and the reby reach mu t ua l l y

s a t i s factory political solutio ns to issues that

m ig ht otherwise escalate into confro nt a t io n .

T hus fa r, the Institute has published stud ie s

on China, North Ko rea, and Russia, with add it io nal stud ies on Japan and Germa ny under way.

T he fo l l o w i ng report is a synt hesis of the

p ro c e e d i ngs of the workshop on Fre nch ne got ia t i ng behavio r. While this report summa r i z e s

v iews ex p ressed thro u g hout the workshop, it

s hould not be cons ide red re p re s e ntative of

a t t e ndees’ positio ns on all ma t t e r s.

This report was written by pro g ram of f icer Emily

Me t z g a r. The Institute wishes to re c o g n i z e

S t e p h a n ie Cohn for her initial summary of the

F re nch ne go t ia t i ng behavior event held at the

I nstitute in summer 2000. Special thanks to

Charles Cogan of Ha r v a rd University and Ins t itute fellow Je a n - Ma rc Coic a ud for their he l pf u l

c o m me nts on an earlier draft of this re p o r t .

The views ex p ressed in this report do not

necessarily reflect views of the United

States Institute of Pe a c e, which does not

a d vocate specific policies.

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEAC E

CO N T E N T S

F re nch-U.S. Relatio ns 1

I ns t i t u t io nal Impera t i v e s 2

F re nch Behavior in Pra c t ic e 3

Two Case Stud ie s 4

C o nc l u s io n 6
T he ent re nc h me nt of the U.S.-do m i nated int e r na t io nal system in the post–Cold Wa r

e ra has led to mo re fre q u e nt tens ion between the two count r ie s. Divisio ns over Midd l e

East polic ies and competition over the dire c t ion of European security are re p re s e nt a t i v e

of disagre e me nts between Fra nce and the United States.

T he Fre nch rankle under Ame r ican leadership in the int e r na t io nal are na. Belie v i ng

that the United States too often fails to ge nu i nely consult with its European allie s,

F ra nce fre q u e ntly challenges the United States, cont r i b u t i ng to the Fre nch re p u t a t ion as

a spoiler in int e r na t io nal affa i r s. Fra nce seeks int e r na t io nal legitimacy by ado p t i ng posit io ns in opposition to the United States. It prefers not to passively accept Ame r ic a n

p o s i t io ns or Ame r ican unilateralism, but ra t her to achieve its ends by occasio nally allowi ng ne go t ia t io ns to fail or by ma k i ng what it perceives as an inde p e nde nt de c i s ion ra t he r

than acting out of loyalty to the United States. 

T he stre ngth of Fra nce’s econo my, the Fre nch nuclear de t e r re nt, Fra nce’s role in peacekee p i ng and military int e r v e nt io ns, its re s idual int e rests in Africa and elsewhe re, and the

c o nt i nu i ng attra c t ion that Fra nce has to the Third World as a land of political asylum all

c o ntribute to its high int e r na t io nal prof i l e. These factors also justify Fre nch partic i p a t io n

in major int e r na t io nal ins t i t u t io ns such as the G-8 (the Group of Eig ht leading indu s t r ialized na t io ns) and the United Na t io ns, whe re it is a perma ne nt member of the Security

C o u ncil. Such membership ens u res int e ra c t ion with the United States and a place at the

global de c i s io n - ma k i ng table.

L i ke the United States, Fra nce has an of f ic ial position on virtually every int e r na t io nal issue. Yet Fra nce lacks the influence and re s o u rces to effectively pro mote its positio ns

in the int e r na t io nal are na outside of Euro p e. It is within this cont ext that Fra nce ma ne uvers to retain its inde p e nde nce in int e r na t io nal affa i r s. The rest of this report pro v ide s

examples of Fre nch ne go t ia t i ng behavior in differe nt cont exts and attempts to draw ge ne ral conc l u s io ns about the Fre nch approach to cro s s - c u l t u ral ne go t ia t io ns.

Institutional Impera t i ve s

F re nch go v e r n me ntal ins t i t u t io ns and the country’s political enviro n me nt have a large

impact on Fre nch fo re ign polic y. The role of the pre s ide nt and the na t u re of the Fre nc h

p a r l ia me nt are important ins t i t u t io nal factors influenc i ng Fre nch ne go t ia t i ng behavio r,

a c c o rd i ng to workshop partic i p a nt s.

T he Fre nch cons t i t u t ion is ambig uous in assig n i ng re s p o nsibility for fo re ign affairs to

e i t her the pre s ide nt or the prime minister. In spite of this, pre s ide nts of the Fifth Republ ic have successfully reserved for the mselves primary re s p o nsibility for de f e nse and fo re ign policy issues. Ne v e r t he l e s s, the prime minister ma i nt a i ns a role in fo re ign affa i r s,

a t t e nd i ng European Un ion and G-8 summits with the pre s ide nt. To avoid da ma ge re s u l ti ng from any public disagre e me nt on fo re ign policy issues, the prime minister typic a l l y

plays a less fo r w a rd role in such fo r u ms. Ho w e v e r, when the pre s ide nt and the prime minister are from differe nt parties (a situa t ion known as “c o h a b i t a t ion”), differe nces on fo re ign policy issues can be a source of tens ion within the go v e r n me nt .

Unl i ke the U.S. Cong re s s, which has authority to ratify or reject int e r na t io nal tre a t ie s,

t he Fre nch parlia me nt lacks the authority to veto pre s ide nt ial fo re ign policy prio r i t ie s.

T he Fre nch pre s ide nt thus has great leeway in int e r na t io nal affa i r s, without fear of parl ia me ntary mic ro - ma na ge me nt. In difficult ne go t ia t io ns it is not unc o m mon for the

F re nch pre s ide nt to pro v ide direct guida nce to the ne go t ia t i ng team, behavior which is

h ighly unlikely from a U.S. pre s ide nt except on the most sensitive of issues.

F re nch public opinion is an important variable influenc i ng that country’s ne go t ia t i ng

b e h a v io r. This can be particularly enlig ht e n i ng with respect to the United Na t io ns. The

UN is not a matter of much public concern in Fra nce and the re is no polarization on UN

issues like the re is in the United States. This has given Fra nce flexibility on Un i t e d

Nat io ns issues that the United States has not had, especially in fo r u ms like the UN 

2

AB O U T T H E IN S T I T U T E

T he United States Institute of Peace is an

i nde p e nde nt, nonpartisan fede ral ins t i t u t io n

c reated by Cong ress to pro mote re s e a rc h ,

e duc a t ion, and tra i n i ng on the pre v e nt io n ,

ma na ge me nt, and re s o l u t ion of int e r na t io na l

c o n f l ic t s. Established in 1984, the Ins t i t u t e

meets its cong re s s io nal ma ndate through an

a r ray of pro g ra ms, inc l ud i ng re s e a rch gra nt s,

f e l l o w s h i p s, prof e s s io nal tra i n i ng pro g ra ms,

c o n f e re nces and worksho p s, library servic e s,

p u b l ic a t io ns, and other educ a t io nal activitie s.

T he Institute’s Board of Directors is appoint e d

by the Pre s ide nt of the United States and

c o n f i r med by the Sena t e.

BOA R D O F DI R E C TO R S

Chester A. Cro c ker ( C h a i r man), Ja mes R. Schlesinge r

P rofessor of Stra t e g ic Stud ie s, School of Fore ign Servic e,

G e o rgetown University • S eymour Martin Lipset ( V ic e

C h a i r man), Hazel Professor of Public Po l ic y, George

Mason University • Betty F. Bumpers, P re s ide nt, Pe a c e

L i n k s, Wa s h i ngton, D.C. • Holly J. Burkhalter, Ad v o -

cacy Dire c t o r, Phy s ic ia ns for Hu man Rig ht s, Wa s h i ng t o n ,

D.C. • Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Corpora t ion, Wa s h i ngton, D.C. • M a rc E. Leland, Esq., Pre s ide nt, Ma rc E.

L e l a nd & As s o c ia t e s, Arlington, Va. • M o ra L. McLean,

Esq., Pre s ide nt, Afric a - A me r ica Ins t i t u t e, New York, N.Y.

• María Otero , P re s ide nt, AC C ION Int e r na t io na l ,

S o me r v i l l e, Ma s s. • B a r b a ra W. Snelling, State Sena t o r

a nd fo r mer Lie u t e na nt Governo r, She l b u r ne, Vt.

• S h i b l ey Te l h a m i , A nwar Sadat Chair for Peace and

D e v e l o p me nt, University of Ma r y l a nd

• Harriet Zimmerman, V ice Pre s ide nt, Ame r ican Is ra e l

P u b l ic Affairs Committee, Wa s h i ngton, D.C.

ME M B E R SE X O F F I C I O

Paul G. Gaffney II, V ice Adm i ral, U.S. Navy; Pre s ide nt ,

Na t io nal Defense Un i v e r s i t y • Colin L. Powell, S e c re t a r y

of State • Donald H. Rumsfeld, S e c retary of Defense 

• R i c h a rd H. Solomon, P re s ide nt, United States 

I nstitute of Peace (no n v o t i ng)
Security Council. Fra nce can be mo re flexible than the United States because it lacks

many of the do me s t ic re s t ra i nts that fo rce U.S. positio ns. Fre nch behavior on Iraq prov ides a good example of this (see below).

F ra nce fo r ms tactical allia nces in the United Na t io ns and elsewhe re on various issues

because it realizes it cannot always carry issues alone. This is common on econo m ic

issues and within the UN. Fra nce focuses on issues and re g io ns whe re it has a history

a nd can ma ke a differe nc e, as in the Middle East and Africa. As a result, it some t i me s

bumps up against the United States, causing tens ion. Fra nce takes a leading role whe re

o t hers have abdicated it, such as on Rwanda .

C o m p a red to tra i n i ng for Ame r ican fo re ign service of f icers and other go v e r n me nt of f ic ia l s, the Fre nch pro g ram of tra i n i ng and educ a t ion is far mo re ho mo ge no u s. This tra i ni ng of fore ign policy pra c t i t io ners affects Fre nch ne go t ia t i ng behavio r. The Fre nc h

e duc a t io nal system re ma i ns int r i ns ically elitist, and ma ny na t io nal advisers have gra duated from either the Na t io nal Adm i n i s t ra t ion School, L’ I nstitut d’Etudes Po l i t i q u e s, or

L’Ecole Po l y t e c h n i q u e. It is common for Fre nch diploma t s, particularly ambassado r s, to

des c e nd from the aristocra c y. These are ge ne ra l i z a t io ns, and the truths on which they are

based are evolving. The direct impact of these factors is difficult to me a s u re, but the

t ra i n i ng and personal chara c t e r i s t ics of Fre nch ne go t iators cannot be discounted as

p o t e nt ially important variables when ex p l a i n i ng Fra nce’s ne go t ia t i ng behavio r.

F rench Behavior in Pra c t i c e

F re nch int e r na t io nal policy positio ns and ne go t ia t i ng behavior are often seen to have

t h ree primary chara c t e r i s t ic s. The first chara c t e r i s t ic is princ i p l e. Last year, for exa m p l e,

t he Fre nch de c ided that on principle they would not sign the Warsaw Demo c racy Summit’s final de c l a ra t ion, “To w a rds a Common Demo c ra c y,” because it was not an accura t e

p o r t rayal of the Fre nch de f i n i t ion of de mo c racy and because Fra nce believed it pro v ided too great a forum for Ame r ican-led globalization. Although Fre nch int e rests would

not have been da ma ged by sig n i ng, principle was para mo u nt .

T he second chara c t e r i s t ic is Fra nce’s highly developed sense of history. The idea that

t he re has been a change in Fra nce’s int e r na t io nal position since World War II re ma i ns

u nd igested and the re is cons t a nt re f e re nce to history—a fact that fre q u e ntly of f e nd s

F ra nce’s European ne ig h b o r s. While the United States is seen as unilateralist and he gemon ic in its diploma c y, Fre nch barg a i n i ng positio ns often result from fa i l u re to adjust

to the postwar reality that Fre nch influence in the world has been greatly diminishe d.

F ra nce has a long tra d i t ion of being involved in int e r na t io nal affairs and this is a ro l e

it is unw i l l i ng to re l i n q u i s h .

F i na l l y, the re is the “burden of being rig ht.” Although the Fre nch go v e r n me nt’s posit io ns fre q u e ntly have merit, Fra nce lacks the influence to impleme nt them. Despite

often public disagre e me nts on policy issues, U.S. of f ic ials ackno w l e dge that the Fre nc h

p o s i t ion in some cases is the rig ht one, especially when it pertains to re g io ns in whic h

F ra nce has a great deal of ex p e r ie nc e, such as sub-Saharan Africa or the Middle East. In

t hese cases, the United States adopts the Fre nch position because it is tho u g ht to be

t he rig ht one, not because Fra nce has the power to fo rce acceptance of its vie w s.

S o me also argue that Fre nch fo re ign policy is accepting of ambiguity in partic u l a r

s i t ua t io ns. Fra nce’s re a c t ion to the crisis in Yu go s l a v ia illustrates this point. Until 1995,

F ra nc e, like most other European count r ie s, believed it should not take side s. Whe n

i nt e r na t io nal opinion harde ned in one dire c t ion, Fra nce then followed suit. Formu l a t io n

of policy toward Iraq is ano t her exa m p l e. The Fre nch are opposed to most, if not all,

s a nc t io ns against Iraq. As was once articulated by a Fre nch ambassado r, “Fra nce do e s

not believe in the concept of rogue states, but would ra t her speak of rogue re g i me s. ”

F ra nce seeks political solutio ns ra t her than military ones and prefers ind i v idual re l a t io ns

to the “bloc” approach of the Cold War era .

3

F rance focuses on issues and

regions where it has a histo r y

and can make a differe n c e, as

in the Middle East and Africa.

As a result, it sometimes bumps

up against the United Sta t e s,

causing tension.

While the United States is seen

as unilateralist and hegemonic

in its diplomacy, French barg a i ning positions often result fro m

fa i l u re to adjust to the postwa r

reality that French influence in

the world has been gre a t l y

d i m i n i s h e d .
In Fra nc e, a small group of of f ic ials arrives at barg a i n i ng positio ns. The United States,

on the other hand, ne go t iates with itself first—through int e ra ge ncy and int ra go v e r n me nt a l

deb a t e s — s o me t i mes for weeks. This results in inflexible U.S. positio ns. Despite their flex ib i l i t y, the Fre nch take lang ua ge mo re seriously than most Ame r ic a ns. They do so perhaps as

t he result of what one scholar has ide nt i f ied as the conflict between Fre nch abstra c t io n i s m

a nd Ame r ican pra g matism. As a global power, the United States can ultimately de c ide to

rel e nt on lang ua ge without feeling it has lost any t h i ng of importanc e. The Fre nch are mo re

l i kely to take a hard line and not conc e de until they have no option but to back off. Whe n

m i s u s e d, such tactics can da ma ge Fra nce’s ability to attain its stra t e g ic go a l s.

W he t her its positio ns are principled or pra g ma t ic, stubborn or flex i b l e, Fra nce ado p t s

nego t ia t i ng positio ns that seek to protect its int e re s t s, both hard and soft. In this,

F ra nce is not unlike other na t io ns as they enter into int e r na t io nal ne go t ia t io ns.

Two Case Studies

Two case stud ies illustrate the na t u re of Fre nch ne go t ia t i ng behavior with the United States

a nd within mu l t i l a t e ral ins t i t u t io ns. These cases relate to NATO and the United Na t io ns.

F rance and NATO

D i s c u s s ion ind icated that ana l y z i ng Fre nch positio ns on NATO can yield bro a der ins ig ht s

i nto that country’s ne go t ia t i ng behavio r. Cons ide ra t ion of a new Stra t e g ic Concept fo r

N ATO, leadership of its Southern Comma nd, and allia nce ex p a ns ion hig h l ig hts chara c t e ri s t ics of Fre nch ne go t ia t i ng behavior on a subject of importance not only to Fra nce and

t he United States, but to all members of the tra ns a t l a nt ic commu n i t y. The debates of the

1990s are most ins t r uctive for those ne go t ia t i ng with the Fre nch over the re l a t io ns h i p

between NATO and the European Un ion’s proposed Rapid Reaction Forc e.

T he Fre nch are often mo re aggressive and confro nt a t io nal than other European ne got ia t o r s, say workshop partic i p a nt s. Fra nce attaches importance to lang ua ge and politic a l

i s s u e s, and will fig ht long and hard to attain its objectives. In ge ne ral, the Fre nch will

t a ke a slig htly ex t re me position and stick to it until the last mo me nt, befo re re l e nt i ng

at the end to de mo ns t rate flex i b i l i t y. Other count r ies get nervous if issues are not settled in advance of a summit. In the words of one observer, “They take issues ho s t a ge

a nd do this until late in the game and turn it into a game of chic ken.” The Fre nch seem

to reg a rd the potent ial da ngers of being isolated as worth it. They fig ht hard for perceived int e rests and do not apologize for it.

W hen debate over NATO’s Southern Comma nd arose in the mid-1990s the Fre nch pushe d

for a European to hold the leadership position. Ne go t ia t io ns on this subject were overseen

at the hig hest levels of Fre nch go v e r n me nt. Pre s ide nt Jacques Chirac wrote two letters to

P re s ide nt Bill Clinton, one inc l ud i ng a personal plea for help in appoint i ng a European comma nde r. Pre s ide nt Clinton opposed it, elimina t i ng the possibility of future discussion. With

t he de c i s ion alre a dy ma de at the hig hest level, the Fre nch were out of optio ns. With a diff e re nt approach, Fra nce mig ht have been able to retain some barg a i n i ng power.

In opening Stra t e g ic Concept discussio ns, the United States wanted to clarify the ro l e

of NATO for the next 50 years. The funda me ntal question was NATO’s stra t e g ic and political purpose. This was a debate about the United Na t io ns and whe t her NATO ne e ded a

UN ma ndate in order to act. The Fre nch wanted to be specific that NATO ne e ded the UN

mandate in order to act. The Ame r ican stand p o i nt was that NATO is the ins t i t u t io n - of -

c ho ice for joint U.S.-European efforts on collective de f e nse and crisis ma na ge me nt. The

United States sought fewer re s t r ic t io ns on potent ial roles for NATO, and the Euro p e a ns,

F ra nce in partic u l a r, worked to pre v e nt the ma ndate from being too open-ende d. This

was cons i s t e nt with pre v ious Fre nch positio ns on NATO that opposed ex p a ns ion of the

a l l ia nce’s role for fear of inc reased Ame r ican influence via the comma nd struc t u re. In this

4

Whether its positions are

principled or pra g m a t i c,

stubborn or flex i b l e, Fra n c e

adopts negotiating positions

that seek to protect its intere s t s, both hard and soft. In

t h i s, France is not unlike other

nations as they enter into 

international negotiations.

The French seem to re g a rd 

the potential dangers of 

being isolated as worth it. 

T h ey fight hard for perc e i ve d

i n t e rests and do not 

apologize for it.
c a s e, the lang ua ge met all U.S. re q u i re me nts but had been ma s s a ged to such an ex t e nt

by the Fre nch that the only truly accurate re a d i ng was one that read between the line s

a nd recognized the importance of what was said as much as what was no t .

R e g a rd i ng NATO enlarge me nt, Fra nce was not initially ent hu s ia s t ic about ex p a ns io n .

W hen it became clear that enlarge me nt would happen, ho w e v e r, Fra nce did not try to

block it but, ra t he r, worked to influence which count r ies would be adm i t t e d. Fra nce took

a ma x i malist position. When it was de c ided that just three count r ies (Po l a nd, the Czech

R e p u b l ic, and Hu ngary) would be adm i t t e d, Fra nce was willing to conc e de, but ma de sure

it got some t h i ng for the tro u b l e. Fra nce insisted on stro ng fo r w a rd - l e a d i ng lang ua ge on

R o ma n ia, a harbinge r, perhaps, to the next ro u nd of debates over NATO enlarge me nt with

t he Bush adm i n i s t ra t io n .

A ny summary of Fre nch ne go t ia t i ng behavior with respect to NATO must stress the

i m p o r t a nce placed on clarity of position, the emphasis on pushing for that position unt i l

it is either accepted or is no longer via b l e, and the effort ma de to ens u re that Fra nc e

does not leave the barg a i n i ng table without gaining some t h i ng for its tro u b l e.

The United Nations and Ira q

F re nch behavior with respect to the United Na t io ns and Iraq is ins t r uctive especially fo r

u nde r s t a nd i ng differe nt compone nts of the Fre nch approach to int e r na t io nal diploma c y.

F ra nce recognizes the value of working in a mu l t i l a t e ral cont ext to cons t rain the behavior of mo re powerful na t io ns. The Fre nch are also skilled at de v e l o p i ng a mu l t i fa c e t e d

a p p roach to complex pro b l e ms. The results can be an irritant to re l a t io ns with othe r

c o u nt r ie s, particularly the United States, but the re is a de g ree of begrudg i ng respect fo r

F re nch willing ness to ide ntify its true int e rests and to pursue them without he s i t a t io n .

In the post–Cold War era, being a perma ne nt member of the UN Security Council and

h a v i ng veto power is one of the last real me a s u res of int e r na t io nal influenc e. The mu lt i l a t e ral na t u re of the United Na t io ns creates an opportunity for me m b e r s. For ma ny

na t io ns, the challenge is ge t t i ng the United States to be subject to the rules of that

b o dy. The Fre nch have a strategy to maximize their int e r na t io nal levera ge in this cont ext. Fra nce believes that its levera ge is maximized if the superpower is fo rced to abide

by Security Council re s o l u t io ns and the rules of the ins t i t u t ion, ra t her than being free to

pursue its own int e rests unilatera l l y. On Iraq, Fra nce ma ne u v e red to keep the issue within the confines of the Security Council. Fra nce fo u g ht efforts that thre a t e ned to mo v e

t he field of discussion into differe nt re a l ms, particularly ones in which the United States

would have a leading ro l e.

T he Fre nch approach to certain issues, inc l ud i ng some within the purview of the Security Council, is “mirved,” with multiple positio ns aimed at cre a t i ng diploma t ic flex i b i l it y. This has been true with respect to Iraq and UN sanc t io ns. On one hand, the Fre nc h

w a nt to be close to the Iraqis to unde r s t a nd and re p re s e nt Iraqi vie w s. At the same time,

how e v e r, the Fre nch are also int e rested in unde r s t a nd i ng the Ame r ican, British, and

R u s s ian perspectives so they can re p re s e nt those to the Ira q i s, thus enhanc i ng levera ge.

Ma ny characterize this as a “shrewd and effective approach” that has put the Fre nc h

in the position of competing with the Russia ns for influence in Baghda d. Recognizing

t h i s, the Iraqis have occasio nally played the Fre nch against the Russia ns to see who

could deliver the most. This example illustrates the complexity of the Fre nch positio n .

Mo re often than not, Ame r ic a ns see things in black-and - w h i t e, bilateral terms, while the

F re nch view is variable and ultimately mo re flex i b l e.

With respect to UNSCOM (United Na t io ns Special Commission) in partic u l a r, Fra nce was

i nt e rested in supporting UNSCOM from the beginning. The Fre nch go v e r n me nt pro v ide d

experts and ma t e r ial support and participated fully. Fra nce wanted to be involved in the

p ro g ram both mu l t i l a t e rally and bilaterally with the major capitals in the re g ion, inc l udi ng Baghda d. In the early 1990s, Fra nce also participated in the no-fly zones on re c o nnai s s a nce missio ns and even in some of the re t a l iatory strikes on Iraq until the spring of

5

A ny summary of French negotiating behavior with respect to

N ATO must stress the importa n c e

placed on clarity of position, the

emphasis on pushing for that

position until it is either accepted or is no longer viable, and the

e f fort made to ensure that

F rance does not leave the

b a rgaining table without gaining

something for its tro u b l e.

The French approach to certa i n

issues . . . is “mirved,” with

multiple positions aimed at 

c reating diplomatic flex i b i l i t y.

This has been true with re s p e c t

to Iraq and UN sanctions.
1993. As a result of this ex t e nsive partic i p a t ion, Fra nce was in a good position to evaluate the dire c t ion of the UN Security Council’s Iraq polic ies and was willing to revise the

ext e nt of its involveme nt de p e nd i ng on its judg me nt of the situa t ion’s evolutio n .

T he Fre nch position on the issue of Iraq was pra g ma t ic. Fre nch go v e r n me nt of f ic ia l s

at the time suggested that Fra nce dealt with states and not re g i me s, thus side s t e p p i ng

debate about int e ra c t ion with Saddam Hussein. Questio ned about matters of princ i p l e

c o nc e r n i ng Hussein, the Fre nch took cover under the ma ntle of pra g matism, arg u i ng that

d i f f icult situa t io ns ne e ded to be handled pra g ma t ic a l l y. U.S.-Fre nch disagre e me nt on

I raq is not typical of the two count r ies’ re l a t io ns in the United Na t io ns. In the Un i t e d

Nat io ns, the United States and Fra nce vote toge t her 90 perc e nt of the time. The exc e pt ion to this conc e r ns the Middle East, whe re voting coinc ide nce on those issues is only

o ne - t h i rd. For the United States and Fra nce the re are funda me ntal differe nces on de f i ni t ion of int e rests and issue perc e p t ion, and those spilled over into Iraq polic y.

Related examples illustrate these differe nces on Middle East policy equally well. Whe n

UNSCOM evacuated Iraq in December 1998 for the last time, the United States and

Britain initiated a limited bombing campaign. The Security Council wanted to avoid fa i lu re and sought a way out, belie v i ng that if UNSCOM could not change Iraq’s behavio r,

t hen the ins t i t u t ion itself should be disma nt l e d. Both the Russia ns and the British dra f ted re s o l u t io ns that would supplant UNSCOM with a new org a n i z a t ion that could change

t he Security Council’s re l a t io ns with Iraq. The Fre nch wanted a position distinct fro m

each proposal. At the same time they were ne go t ia t i ng with the British on their proposal, they were also supporting the Russian proposal. The Fre nch had their own posit ion but also had a foot in both of the other camps. This maximized their ability to affect

t he outcome in a ra t her shrewd way. The Fre nch saw that the U.S. position was so fixe d

that the re was room for this kind of ma ne u v e r i ng .

At that time, the re was no unified point of view in Pa r i s, and this fact may have contributed to changes in the Fre nch position. Pre s ide nt Chirac and his of f ice kept close cont rol of de c i s io ns, but the re were other stro ng voices with varying points of vie w,

i nc l ud i ng comme rc ial int e re s t s, military conc e r ns, the prime minister’s of f ic e, and the

fore ign ministry. Fre nch policy was not always arrived at neatly or quic k l y. When the

United States sought support from Fra nc e, the re could be ent hu s iasm in the compone nt

parts but this would not be reflected ultimately in of f ic ial positio ns. This approx i ma t e d

A me r ican dy na m ics in arriving at ne go t ia t i ng positio ns and de mo ns t rated a differe nt

c h a ra c t e r i s t ic of Fre nch ne go t ia t i ng behavio r. These examples showcase the pra g ma t ic

na t u re of Fre nch ne go t ia t i ng behavio r.

C o n c l u s i o n

P r i nciples and pra g matism both have a place in Fre nch ne go t ia t i ng behavio r. How and

w hen these chara c t e r i s t ics pre s e nt the mselves is the result of complex int e r na t io na l

dyna m ic s, the do m i na nt role of the United States in the int e r na t io nal are na within whic h

F ra nce opera t e s, and a seeming sense of no s t a l g ia for the days of great Fre nch power.

T he rea l i t ies of Fra nce’s int e r na t io nal position lead the Fre nch to adopt barg a i n i ng tact ics that seek to maximize their influenc e, often frustra t i ng their interlocutors and somet i mes re s u l t i ng in uns uccessful ne go t ia t io ns even with frie nds and allie s.

T he difficulty with which the United States ne go t iates with Fra nce has become almo s t

a cliché in int e r na t io nal politic s. In the U.S. vie w, the Fre nch have developed a re p u t at ion for being difficult partners in times of peace, yet re l iable allies in times of crisis.

With better unde r s t a nd i ng of Fre nch mo t i v a t io ns in the conduct of int e r na t io nal affa i r s,

t he United States and other interlocutors can work mo re cons t r uctively with Fra nc e,

e ns u r i ng coopera t i v e, mu l t id i me ns io nal re l a t io ns in both bad times and go o d.

6

In the United Nations, the

United States and France vo t e

together 90 percent of the

t i m e. The exception to this 

concerns the Middle East, where

voting coincidence on those

issues is only one-third .

United States 

Institute of Pe a c e

1200 17th Street NW

Was h i ngton, DC 20036

For mo re info r ma t ion, see our

web site (www. u s i p . o rg), which has

an online edition of this report cont a i n i ng links to related web sites, as

well as add i t io nal info r ma t ion 

on the topic.

SP E C I A L RE P O R T 7 0