NO. 163 | July 2020

PEACEWORKS

Violent Extremist

Disengagement and Reconciliation

A PEACEBUILDING APPROACH

By Chris Bosley
NO. 163 | July 2020

The views expressed in this report are those of the author alone. They do not necessarily reflect the views of

the United States Institute of Peace. An online edition of this and related reports can be found on our website 

(www.usip.org), together with additional information on the subject.

© 2020 by the United States Institute of Peace

United States Institute of Peace

2301 Constitution Avenue NW

Washington, DC 20037

Phone: 202.457.1700

Fax: 202.429.6063

E-mail: usip_requests@usip.org

Web: www.usip.org

Peaceworks No. 163. First published 2020.

ISBN: 978-1-60127-812-8

VIOLENT 

EXTREMISM

ABOUT THE REPORT

This report presents a framework with which peacebuilders can foster disengagement 

from violent extremism and reconciliation between those disengaging and affected 

communities by examining the individual, social, and structural dynamics involved. One 

of a series, the report was supported by the Center for Applied Conflict Transformation 

at the United States Institute of Peace.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Chris Bosley is a senior program officer for the Program on Violent Extremism at 

USIP, where he leads the Institute’s initiative on Violent Extremist Disengagement and 

Reconciliation. Previously, he served for a decade as an intelligence officer in the US 

Navy and as a senior advisor for counterterrorism and countering violent extremism in 

the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

Cover photo: Frydenlund, a middle-class residential area on the outskirts of Aarhus, 

Denmark, is home to a number of men who fought for the Islamic State group in 

Syria, on December 8, 2014. (Photo by Jan Grarup/New York Times)
USIP.ORG 1

Contents

3 Introduction

6 Ideology, Social Ties, and Behavior

10 Disengagement and Reconciliation

17 Individual-Level Barriers

25 Communal and Social Barriers 

30 Structural Barriers

32 De-Exceptionalization
2 PEACEWORKS | NO. 163

Summary

Disengagement from violent extremism is inherently social and behavioral. 

Rather than changing beliefs, ideologies, and worldviews, it involves rejecting 

violence as a way to resolve conflict, express grievances, or pursue a goal. 

Peacebuilding tools offer opportunities to contribute to disengagement by fostering reconciliation and addressing complex dynamics across individual, social, 

and structural dimensions. The framework for disengagement that this report 

presents is a deliberately noncontextualized ethos to guide the development of 

locally tailored programs and policies from a constellation of principles.

Although violent extremism is only one of a host of social challenges that result 

from similar drivers and risk factors, the dominant approaches to it since 2001 have 

been largely defined by law enforcement and security imperatives that have exceptionalized it. Decades of public and behavioral health practice have developed 

successful strategies to reduce harm from high-risk behaviors and prevent violence. Decades of psychology, sociology, and criminology research shed light on 

why and how people voluntarily exit groups, including violent and ideological ones 

such as gangs and cults. These bodies of knowledge underscore that routinized 

prosocial interactions between those disengaging and community members and 

institutions are key to building relationships, generating social bonds, and promoting a sense of belonging. 

Disengagement and reconciliation is a two-way street that involves not only 

lowering barriers to prosocial behavior in the individual but also opening spaces 

for such engagement in affected communities. Although no clinical or diagnosable pathology definitively identifies a terrorist, healing trauma and addressing 

other mental and behavioral health challenges in people who are disengaging 

can encourage help-seeking behavior and a willingness to engage with others. 

Reconciliation and restorative justice principles can provide a sense of justice 

and reduce stigma against those disengaging, enabling routine and sincere 

prosocial engagement and offering a tangible alternative identity. People often 

disengage from violent extremism in the same environments in which they first 

engaged. Structural reforms to address legitimate grievances link prevention 

with disengagement, helping transform the dynamics that contribute to violent 

extremism and build more resilient communities.
USIP.ORG 3

If what you see in a mirror doesn’t correspond with how others see you, you’re not alone. 

Such dissonance is a common cognitive bias.1 The same is true for perceptions of social 

groups—each group forms a shared narrative to bind their imagined community. These 

narratives include histories, symbols, norms, and values as well as stereotypes. It is 

through these lenses that people perceive others—their behavior and their intentions—

and form a gulf amplifying differences between them and us regardless of the reality. That 

gulf can be frightening—violent extremism, although complex and multifaceted, is a result 

of perceived social identity threat whereby violence is deployed defensively in the name 

of one social group against another. Disengagement involves the rehumanization of the 

other; the gulf between social identities needs to be closed for people to sustainably disengage from violent extremism, and closing the gulf takes movement on both sides of it.

Peacebuilding provides a toolbox for doing just that. Peacebuilding approaches 

embrace complexity, humanity, and context.2 They “seek to change . . . attitudes and 

behaviors and to transform dynamics between individuals and groups toward a more 

stable, peaceful coexistence.”3 Peacebuilding “works over the long run and at all 

levels of society to establish and sustain relationships among people. . . . [It] connects 

people and groups [and] aims not only to resolve conflicts, but to build societies, 

Liaqat Ali Shah, an alleged former militant who returned from Pakistan-controlled Kashmir, talks with relatives from his window in a Lolab Valley village 

in India-controlled Kashmir on June 27, 2013. (Photo by Kuni Takahashi/New York Times)

 Disengagement 

involves the 

rehumanization of 

the other; the gulf 

between social 

identities needs 

to be closed for 

people to sustainably 

disengage from 

violent extremism, and 

closing the gulf takes 

movement on both 

sides of it.

Introduction
4 PEACEWORKS | NO. 163

Box 1.

A WORD ON THE WORDS WE USE

Behavioral health. Integrates mental health with social well-being, community resilience, and physical 

health to effect behavioral change of high-risk conduct such as aggression and violence; used to underscore the idea that though cognitive elements are involved, engagement in violent extremism is a behavioral challenge—not a psychological disorder. 

Community. “A psychological process by which one perceives a sense of membership and belonging in a 

group.”a

Disengagement. Rejection of violence to resolve conflict, express grievances, or pursue a goal.

Mobilization. A dynamic and often nonlinear process by which an individual, group, or mass of people 

undergo a transformation that results in engagement in violent extremism.

People-first language. Places the person before the label—such as people disengaging from violent 

extremism—to avoid stigmatizing and reinforcing identities steeped in past acts of violence while acknowledging the action to facilitate reconciliation.

Prosocial. Sustained, positive, inclusive interactions between individuals who are disengaging from violent 

extremism and local community members and institutions.

Reconciliation. A process by which communities and people disengaging from violent extremism rehumanize each other and foster healing to reduce stigma, open spaces for prosocial engagement, address 

needs for justice and accountability, restore relationships, and move from exclusion and fear to inclusion 

and productive participation in the community and society.

Violent extremism. A form of violent conflict in which people “espouse, encourage, and perpetrate violence as they seek to [replace] existing political [or social] institutions with a new political [or social] order 

governed by [an absolutist and totalitarian] doctrine that denies individual liberty and equal rights to citizens who identify differently.”b

Notes

a. B. Heidi Ellis and Saida Abdi, “Building Community Resilience to Violent Extremism Through Genuine Partnerships,” American Psychologist 72,

no. 3 (2017): 291.

b. Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States, Preventing Extremism in Fragile States (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2019), 19.
USIP.ORG 5

institutions, policies, and relationships that are better 

able to sustain peace and justice.”4 Peacebuilding tools 

can rehumanize not only society in the eyes of those 

disengaging, but also those disengaging in the eyes of 

society. Such reconciliation can transcend the tyranny 

of past actions and build relationships and bonds to 

chart new and sustainable futures, more inclusive societies, and more resilient communities. This report presents a foundation for the peacebuilding contribution 

to disengagement from violent extremism that focuses 

on individuals as well as social and structural dynamics. 

Existing efforts to disengage people from violent extremism are derived not from a peacebuilding ethos but 

instead from security imperatives. They target individuals and ideology but in several ways run counter to the 

available research on how people exit roles.5 First, the 

assumption that radical beliefs precede violence lacks 

a good evidence base—factors such as state predation 

and systemic discrimination are just as likely as radical ideology.6 Second, most people who leave violent 

extremist groups generally do not do so because of a 

sudden change of heart but instead for more mundane 

reasons.7 Finally, decades of psychology, sociology, 

criminology, and public health practice on violence 

prevention, behavioral health, and voluntary role exit 

underscore prosocial interactions as key to transforming 

relationships, building social bonds, and generating a 

sense of belonging.8

Accordingly, the peacebuilding approach identifies and 

lowers barriers to such sustained, positive, inclusive engagement. These include cognitive and individual barriers (by healing trauma and addressing mental health 

challenges to encourage help-seeking and prosocial 

behavior), social and communal barriers (by providing 

a sense of justice and accountability to reduce stigma), and structural barriers (by linking prevention with 

disengagement when people reintegrate into the same 

environments where they were initially mobilized).

Facilitating prosocial interactions between those 

disengaging and community members and institutions 

requires open spaces in society conducive to such 

engagement. Reciprocal rehumanization shifts focus 

away from the burden of forgiveness and toward building relationships and reconstituting identities together 

by addressing each level of social ecology—individual, 

social, and structural. When people interact, the other 

becomes far less scary—this is the peacebuilding contribution to disengagement from violent extremism.

The imperative to “do something” to disengage people from violent extremism remains high; but that 

something needs to be grounded in robust evidence to address the dynamics as they exist.
6 PEACEWORKS | NO. 163

Ideology, Social Ties, 

and Behavior

Conventional approaches to why and how people engage 

in violent extremism focus primarily on ideological radicalization into an extremist belief system. It follows from these 

conceptions that counternarratives and ideological reeducation programs to correct the misconceptions that foster 

these beliefs can “deradicalize” people away from violent 

extremism. However, ideology is only one component of 

a more complex system, and these conceptions fail to address the nature of both engagement and disengagement 

as at once behavioral and social.

RADICALIZATION

Radicalization is a problematic concept as applied to 

violent extremism. It is inherently subjective—it “indicates 

movement on [a] continuum [of thought],” and determining 

the line between acceptable and unacceptable thought 

is fraught with human rights challenges.9 In the absence 

of a tangible boundary of observable behavior to demarcate when radicalization or deradicalization has occurred, 

legally mandated programs risk abridging freedom of 

expression and of religion by criminalizing an arbitrarily 

selected set of beliefs. Repressive governments that seek 

to control dissent or use disproportionate force to target 

and oppress entire social groups suddenly have a counterterrorism rationalization to legitimize their actions. 

In China, for example, terrorism is defined as “any advocacy or activity that, by means of violence, sabotage, 

or threat aims to create social panic, undermine public 

safety, infringe on personal and property rights, or coerce 

a state organ or an international organization, in order 

to achieve political, ideological, or other objectives.”10 In 

Saudi Arabia, criticisms of the king and crown prince are 

considered terrorist offenses.11 In Indonesia, terrorism 

is defined to include “the threat of violence . . . [including any] speech, writing, picture, symbol or physical . . . 

which may incite fear in a person.”12 Such definitions put 

people at risk by effectively sanctioning arbitrary extradition, expulsion, or deportation; unjustified deprivation of 

liberty and detention; discrimination and ethnic or racial 

profiling of and in communities; denial of due process; 

loss of freedoms of expression and association; and 

disproportionate infringements on privacy.13 In China, up 

to a million Muslim Uighurs have been held in detention 

camps for “re-education” and subjected to forced labor 

based on an artificial intelligence–powered platform 

using algorithms for “predictive policing” that include indicators such as unusually high electricity use, spending 

too much time alone, and buying gasoline for an automobile registered to someone else.14 In Turkey and Egypt, 

journalists have been prosecuted on terrorist charges for 

exercising the freedom of expression; in Egypt, citizens 

can be denied due process for alleged links to terrorist 

organizations.15 Such definitions—which are derived 

from a flawed assumption that beliefs and behavior are 

causally linked, that radical ideas lead to violent behavior, 

and that if the radical ideas are abandoned violence will 

be renounced—ease authoritarian efforts to consolidate 

power and sanction repressive government behavior.

Behavioral science, however, has known for decades 

that beliefs and violent behavior are not causally linked. 

Since the 1970s, sociologists have demonstrated that “a 

strong bond between an individual and a social environment [is] strongly influenced by . . . level of ‘attachment’ 

. . . , ‘commitment’ . . . , ‘involvement’ . . . , and ‘beliefs’”; 
USIP.ORG 7

and that beliefs is only one reason people engage with 

a given group—and rarely the most salient.16 Indeed, 

although some people who develop ideologies considered extreme resort to violence, most do not. 

The manpower estimates for the Taliban and other insurgent 

organizations in Afghanistan represented a minute fraction 

of the 29 percent of the population said to be sympathetic 

toward such groups in 2011. Similarly, those who support 

“suicide attacks” in the Palestinian Territories, reportedly 

reaching 66 percent of the population in 2005, far outnumber those actually involved in producing this violence.17

Likewise, this radicalization paradigm fails to make room 

for other—nonviolent and even positive—outcomes.18

Engagement both in nonviolent activism and in violent 

extremism stem from similar grievances—marginalization, state predation, corruption—and address many 

of the same kinds of needs—a sense of belonging, an 

expression of agency, and a feeling of significance.19

Indeed, beliefs perceived as radical can inspire social 

progress and selfless humanitarianism when people 

stay within social norms but take [their beliefs] to an extreme 

level of self-sacrifice. This may involve risking one’s life to 

benefit others in an objectively and consistently pro-social 

manner. . . . The paradox is, both cohorts stem from the 

same domestic sentiment pool and use the same sacred 

values to undergird their morally opposed behaviors.20

In fact, 

preceding its current use in the context of terrorism . . .

[the term radicalization] was mostly used to describe 

political mobilization in the black community, in women’s 

movements, and in social engagement to fight exclusion in 

Latin America. . . . Although these forms of social solidarities could sometimes be associated with violence, this 

highlights that radicalization of opinion not only does not 

linearly lead to violent extremism but also that violence 

may not be the most common outcome.21

Ideology, then, is not the problem. The problem is 

violent behavior.

The pathways people take into violence are complex, 

idiosyncratic, and nonlinear; people travel in and out 

of engagement in violent extremism frequently.22

Likewise, no parsimonious ideological or psychological 

profile applies to those who engage in violent extremism. Some radicals are not terrorists. Some terrorists 

are not radicals. Some former terrorists continue to 

adhere to a radical ideology.23 Indeed, legitimate grievances such as state predation; discrimination; exclusion from political structures, systems, and processes; 

historical or collective trauma; intergroup conflict; and 

oppression are at least as likely to contribute to a person’s engagement in violent extremism as ideology. 

It would be more accurate to describe highly individualized interactions among a host of contributing 

dynamics than discreet and separate drivers of violent 

extremism. “Fantasies of glory, coupled with moral 

outrage and grievance, and the adoption of snippets 

of a belief system that sanctions violence, become the 

internal template for the beginning of a pathway to 

violence.”24 In many cases, ideology is only a vehicle 

by which a host of idiosyncrasies, circumstances, and 

interactions are repackaged. In the absence of such 

an ideological channel, those dynamics may often be 

expressed through other forms of violence instead.

Radicalization provides a deceptively simplistic pinpoint 

that public discourse can appropriate as a bogeyman. In 

such a line of reasoning, if policies and practices were 

implemented to detect people vulnerable to radicalization, remove radical content, or counter radical messages, 

future terrorist threats could be mitigated. Unfortunately, 

such focus obfuscates what may be legitimate grievances 

by shifting the narrative away from structural and political 

challenges that may need to be addressed and toward 

predatory recruiters, vulnerable groups, and individuals 

with psychological deficiencies.25 This has been the focus 

of mainstream approaches to counter violent extremism 

since 2001, which have failed to adequately understand 

what mobilizes people to engage in violent extremism or 

what is likely to bring about disengagement from it.
8 PEACEWORKS | NO. 163

DERADICALIZATION

Terrorism remains a global challenge. Far-right terrorist 

incidents have increased by 320 percent since 2015. 

Likewise, although the territorial decline of the so-called 

Islamic State (ISIS) paralleled a decrease in terrorism-related deaths from a peak in 2014, terrorism continues to 

spread globally. The second-highest number of countries affected by terrorism since 2002 was in 2018.26

Further, the postconflict realities in Iraq and Syria include 

more than ten thousand people from dozens of countries who fought with ISIS and are being held in Syria, as 

well as more than seventy thousand who lived with ISIS 

and are consigned to displacement camps in Syria such 

as al-Hol and Roj. Of these seventy thousand, more than 

two-thirds are children and more than ten thousand are 

from one of up to a hundred countries other than Iraq or 

Syria.27 The imperative to “do something” to disengage 

people from violent extremism remains high; but that 

something needs to be grounded in robust evidence to 

address the dynamics as they exist.

Like radicalization, deradicalization derives from the 

seductive nature of ideology, centering belief and 

thought—rather than behavior and actions—as the 

fulcrum of change. Most who disengage from violent 

extremism, however, do so for a cocktail of reasons—

and ideological change is rarely cited as among the 

chief motivations. Across several studies, findings 

are remarkably consistent at identifying reasons why 

people disengage from violent extremism. Interviews 

with twenty-two disengaged violent extremists reveal 

that disillusionment with leadership was the primary 

reason for disengagement in the majority of cases; 

disillusionment with other group members, burnout, 

and excessive violence were also cited more often 

than disillusionment with radical ideas.28 Another study 

catalogues the reasons for disengagement among 

the autobiographies of eighty-seven disengaged 

violent extremists. The findings are strikingly similar: 

disillusionment with strategy was most often cited as 

a significant factor in disengagement, followed by 

disillusionment with leaders, disillusionment with other 

Figure 1. All of the Ds and All of the Rs

Defection

Deradicalization

Disengagement

Reintegration

Reconciliation

Resilience

Demobilized

Disaffiliated

Physical Separation

Behavioral

Identity

MHPSS

Individual

Beliefs

Ideology

Livelihood

Reinsertion

Public Safety

Structures

Cohesion

Prevention

Stigma

Justice

Inclusion
USIP.ORG 9

group members, disillusionment with day-to-day tasks, 

and burnout. In only 16 percent of the cases was loss of 

faith in the ideology a significant factor—and in only 29 

percent was it a factor at all.29

Not only is evidence scant that ideological change results in behavioral change, forcibly changing someone’s 

worldview is exceptionally difficult under any circumstance. In situations in which people are reminded of 

their mortality—such as violent extremist contexts—approaches couched in the legitimacy of ideology, beliefs, 

and values actually risk buttressing a person’s commitment; individuals tend to fortify their beliefs and react 

even more negatively toward outgroup members who 

have other values.30 In this way, deradicalization efforts 

are the coefficient of radicalization—multiplying the virulence of violent extremism rather than mitigating it.

Neuroimaging studies suggest that although sacred 

values and worldviews are resistant to social influence, 

the behaviors to defend those values can change based 

on perceptions of what a group considers acceptable 

and unacceptable. Thus, changing someone’s belief system entirely may be an ineffective strategy, but changing 

violent behavior may be a more practical solution.31

Source: Based on Mary Beth Altier et al., “Why They Leave: An Analysis of Terrorist Disengagement Events from Eighty-Seven Autobiographical 

Accounts,” Security Studies 26, no. 2 (2017): 319–21.

Figure 2. Factors in Disengagement

Disillusionment with strategy 55%

Disillusionment with leaders 45%

Disillusionment with members 43%

Disillusionment with tasks 43%

Loss of faith in ideology 29%

Burnout 25%

Fear of being caught 18%

Fear of becoming a victim 10%

Difficulty with lifestyle 10%
10 PEACEWORKS | NO. 163

Disengagement and 

Reconciliation

Fostering relationships, building social bonds, and 

expanding a social group to include people who 

renounce extremist violence as an acceptable way to 

pursue a goal or resolve a conflict may be effective at 

influencing behavior and facilitating disengagement 

from violence.32

MOBILIZING TO ENGAGE

Whereas radicalization is an ambiguous process by 

which a person comes to adopt beliefs considered 

diametrically opposed to a society’s core values, mobilization is an observable, behavioral process of engaging in violent extremism. The process of mobilization 

to engage in violent extremism is inherently social, the 

product of lived experience in a given social ecology. 

“Psychologically engaging with groups . . . is a part of 

every journey to violent extremism.” Group dynamics 

such as collective grievances and shared narratives are 

an essential component of mobilization because they 

emphasize an exclusionary identity. Social identification 

with a group thus widens the aperture of relevant context. Not only can perceptions of personal experiences 

contribute to the mobilization process, those of group 

status and treatment also can, regardless of whether 

the perceptions are supported by direct experience. 

The mobilizing “effect of ‘them’ and ‘us’ thinking is not 

predicated on individual-level vulnerabilities such as a 

lack of personal resilience to extremist narratives. Rather, 

it is predicated on group-making practices that define 

people as ‘other’ and so define relations in ‘them and us’ 

(intergroup) terms.” Violent extremism is a phenomenon 

that occurs either in solidarity with or in the name of a 

particular social group—it is a form of collective action.33

A neurological study conducted on a selection of people in Barcelona who were engaged in or supported 

jihadist violence finds that alienation and social exclusion increased the salience of sacred values, which are 

inviolable deontological principles not subject to compromise.34 As group values harden, they become intermingled with constructs of individual identity. “People’s 

collective identities become fused with their personal 

self-concept, [and] they subsequently display increased 

willingness to engage in extreme progroup behavior when the group is threatened.”35 Indeed, human 

neurobiology has evolved over eons in such a way that 

group belonging is vital for survival; thus, threats to a 

social group are perceived as existential. Accordingly, 

neuroscience studies find that threats to group identity 

and status activate the same neurobiological reactions 

as threats to physical safety, which dehumanize those 

perceived as threatening and remove cognitive inhibitions to violence.36

Mobilization to violence thus occurs as a result of complex interactions among cognitive, social, and structural 

dynamics—a “kaleidoscope of factors.”37 Individual 

perceptions of marginalization and isolation can harden 

sacred values and fuse individual and group identities. 

Such fusion increases affinity for the ingroup and consolidates social interaction among like-minded group 

members. The resulting network becomes a vector for 

the consensualization of stereotypes and perceived 

grievances and injustices, creating a common narrative that validates an imperative for collective action.38

Because this shared reality is internalized as an assault 

on identity, society is dehumanized as a threat, and 
USIP.ORG 11

D

ehumanization

Dehumanization

Dehumanizatio

n

Social/Political Grievances

Group Norms and Values

Figure 3. Mobilization Kaleidoscope

Identity Fusion

Identity Assault

Consensualization 

Perception of Alienation

Trauma/

Shame/

Humiliation

Frustrated

Agency

Need for

Respect /

Significance

Identity

Crisis

Hopelessness

Behavioral/

Mental Health

Idiosyncrasies

Illegitimate

or Poor

Governance

Injustice/

Inequity

Discrimination/

Oppression

Elite 

Predation

Relative

Depravation

Human

Insecurity

Circumscribed 

Mobility or

Opportunities

Culture of

Violence

Epigenetic/

Collective

Trauma

Social

Insulation

Ideology

Social

Identity

Sacred

Values

Note: In the context of violent extremism, the dynamics that contribute to mobilization may appear, in Magnus Ranstorp’s phrase, an overwhelming 

“kaleidoscope of factors.” Each element, though, interacts serendipitously when the cognitive, social, and structural dynamics interact in such a way 

to mobilize violence. Indeed, cognitive factors and dynamics—including trauma, victimization, hopelessness, frustrated agency, human needs for 

respect and significance, and certain behavioral and mental health characteristics—can result in perceptions of alienation and marginalization. Such 

perceptions often result in identity crises whereby sense of self becomes fused with social identity. In settings that enable violent extremism, group 

norms and values can interact with systems-level norms and grievances in such a way that personal values strain against those of society, and social 

group and identity appear under assault. In such circumstances, social selection can result in increased interactions with like-minded individuals and 

exposure to narratives that consensualize the dehumanization of others and provide a moral justification for the use of violence for people who are 

idiosyncratically susceptible to violent behavior and social influence.a

a. Noémie Bouhana, “The Moral Ecology of Extremism, A Systemic Perspective,” UK Commission for Counter Extremism, July 2019, 14–15.

Mobilization

to Violence
12 PEACEWORKS | NO. 163

violence emerges as a viable way to address those 

grievances and defend the ingroup. 

EXCEPTIONALIZATION

The dynamics involved in mobilization are complex 

and challenging. Many other social issues that arise 

from similar underlying conditions and dynamics also 

are—fragility, violent conflict, poverty, and poor population health—yet violent extremism has been exceptionalized. In the years immediately following 2001, the 

global center of gravity for countering terrorism was 

segregated from other areas of practice that address 

social challenges. It was racialized as largely Islamic, 

securitized as a global war on terror, and driven primarily by intelligence, military, and law enforcement 

expertise.39 As a result, networks and collaboration 

between counterterrorism and other fields were slow to 

form, insulating counterterrorism practice from relevant 

good practices. For example, despite a slew of well-established programs, especially in Europe, that drew 

from a body of psychology, criminology, and sociology 

research to disengage people from gangs and far-right 

violent extremist groups, disengagement from Islamic 

terrorism consisted too often of military operations to 

neutralize terrorist organizations and targeted strikes to 

kill high-value targets. By 2005, a handful of countries in 

the Middle East, North Africa, and South and Southeast 

Asia began to develop the first generation of so-called 

deradicalization programs for violent Islamic extremists. 

These programs were generally centralized and run by 

the state, prison-based and mandatory, and oriented to 

religious reeducation. They were also often designed to 

funnel information to intelligence and law enforcement 

services, which at times undermined their legitimacy. In 

addition, their focus on theological counternarratives to 

convince people engaged in violent extremism that their 

interpretation of dogma and religious texts was incorrect 

assumed a causal link between ideology and violence.40

Even when programs in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Indonesia, 

Egypt, Malaysia, Singapore, and Morocco began to 

expand beyond ideological deradicalization by including 

psychologists and social workers as core staff, they typically remained focused on individual-level dynamics.41

These programs were for the most part structured on 

learning and psychosocial activities that in turn focused 

on critical thinking skills and assessing risk of recidivism 

without systematically engaging the social and structural 

factors that keep people engaged in violent extremism.42 Programs that focus on skills deficits by providing 

micro-grants, vocational training, and education were a 

step forward but failed to directly address cognitive dimensions or the influence of social networks. Individuallevel risk and resiliency factors certainly have their place 

in disengagement programs, and a person’s agency in 

their decision to engage in violent extremism should 

not be minimized, but dynamic group processes and 

relationships need to be addressed as well.43

Approaches such as behavioral health and harm reduction have addressed this entire social ecology in an 

integrated way. Indeed, behavioral change is an integral 

feature of public health practice, and harm reduction 

approaches minimize risk and build community capacity 

by shifting “the focus of change from individuals alone 

to the social situations and structures in which they 

find themselves. . . . They draw attention to [behavioral 

challenges] as the manifestation of system rather than 

aggregated individual-level effects.”44 Harm reduction 

was borne out of European drug policies that recognized abstinence as an ideal but unrealistic outcome 

and instead focused on building community resilience 

to drug use and mitigating the adverse effects of drug 

use on individuals and communities. The approach 

has since been expanded from addiction to include 

other behavioral challenges to public health and social 

well-being such as gambling, sun safety, sex work, 

Individual-level risk and resiliency factors certainly have their place in disengagement programs, and a 

person’s agency in their decision to engage in violent extremism should not be minimized, but dynamic 

group processes and relationships need to be addressed as well.
USIP.ORG 13

injury prevention, gun violence, and youth violence.45 Its 

practices are designed to minimize the negative effects 

of high-risk behaviors by addressing complex challenges with low-threshold access to services and bottom-up 

alternatives to moral, criminal, or disease models.46 Harm 

reduction approaches offer pragmatic and compassionate strategies that begin by validating the lived experience of individuals and meeting people where they are.

By focusing on system, these practices avoid the 

temptation of parsimony and eschew the need to argue worldview. In violence prevention, harm reduction 

approaches embrace decades of sociology, psychology, and criminology research on how people voluntarily 

exit roles, including violent and ideological ones, which 

confirms that social and structural dynamics are just as 

important as individual ones.47 This robust and longitudinal body of research frames commitment to a role as 

a function not only of satisfaction, or degree of ideological belief, but also of available alternatives and sunk 

costs already invested in the role.48 Yet because violent 

extremism has been securitized and exceptionalized, 

approaches to prevent and counter violent extremism 

to date generally have failed to apply this principle. 

For example, criminology research has reached consensus that prosocial bonds to facilitate the adoption of nonviolent social norms have a significant role in criminal and 

gang desistance.49 Accordingly, the research also stresses 

that “the absence of a ‘receiving group’ [is] a significant 

barrier to establishing a new identity, achieving a sense 

of belonging outside the group, and obtaining protection 

from potential reprisals.”50 In many ways, the mechanisms 

gangs use to trap members in the group are similar to 

those of violent extremist organizations. Because both 

gangs and terrorist groups are perceived as “irrationally 

violent”—their members are ostracized and excluded from 

local communities and society, and regarded with fear and 

often anger.51 The resulting isolation not only increases 

ingroup cohesion, but also reinforces the consensualized 

narrative of injustices and the feelings of alienation that 

harden sacred values and foster identity fusion.

Similar mechanisms are involved in disaffiliation from 

ideological movements such as cults. Like members 

of violent extremist organizations, cult members often 

experience a form of identity fusion: because they 

interact almost exclusively with the group, the social 

influence of other social circles is reduced. The social 

dependency on the cult reinforces collective narratives 

and norms. Absent competing influences, consensualization of values, behaviors, norms, and narratives 

occurs, and the identity of the individual merges with 

that of the cult. Whereas stigma and fear present a 

significant tangible barrier to gang desistance, the 

salience of a shared reality is a significant barrier to cult 

disaffiliation. Often “the disaffiliation process is initiated 

by the ‘discovery’ or ‘induction’ of some kind of [cognitive] ‘dissonance’, which is powerful enough to result in 

one’s adoption of an alternative reference group . . .

to resolve the dissonance.”52 Not surprisingly, then, just 

as prosocial bonds with people outside a gang are 

associated with gang desistance, so are prosocial interactions with people outside the cult associated with 

cult disaffiliation—the very act of engaging with others 

can create a cognitive dissonance by challenging the 

stereotypes that cult narratives propagate.53

Indeed, prosocial engagement with other groups is a 

key feature of voluntary exit. Exiting violent roles and 

exiting ideological ones, although certainly not mutually exclusive, presents unique barriers and challenges. Desistance from violent roles such as gangs and 

criminality is met with community-level and stigma-related barriers. Communities that are afraid and angry 

present a closed front for those who might otherwise 

be motivated to leave a gang by blocking opportunities, leaving the individual with no choice but to remain 

engaged or recidivate. Providing those communities 

with a sense of justice can begin to reconcile the 

anger just as sincere prosocial engagement with those 

disengaging can build relationships and reduce fear. 

Disaffiliation from ideological roles such as cults often 

is met with perceptions among cult members that the 

cult is the only identity available. Similarly, prosocial 
14 PEACEWORKS | NO. 163

engagement with community members can challenge 

that perception and offer a viable alternative. 

SOCIAL CHALLENGES, SOCIAL SOLUTIONS

Social and political systems and structures that encourage regularized and systematized interaction by 

individuals among several identity groups via inclusive 

representation and equitable distribution of goods and 

services can moderate intergroup conflict and promote 

cooperation.54 Moreover, such routinized prosocial interactions can transform identities, expanding the boundaries of group and inviting others into the franchise.55

On an individual level, prosocial interactions and the 

affective bonds formed between people as a result can 

bridge otherwise intractable differences. Studies show 

that even in contexts of protracted conflict, expressions 

of compassion from a single member of an outgroup 

can trigger reciprocal empathy toward that entire group, 

despite the well-documented ingroup bias for empathy.56 Empathy is key to sustaining prosocial behavior, 

building social bonds, rejecting intergroup or interpersonal violence, and transforming social identities.57 This 

phenomenon is reflected by a striking number of people 

who highlight unexpected compassion from an outgroup 

member as a key moment that created a cognitive 

dissonance, opened their minds to other options, and 

catalyzed their disengagement processes.58

Sarah (a pseudonym) became involved in the skinhead 

neo-Nazi movement in her high school, for example. As 

is common among people who engage in violent extremism, she credits her mobilization to a host of dynamics 

and traumas in her childhood and adolescence that manifested in anger and feelings of alienation. The anger and 

violence of local neo-Nazi groups resonated with her by 

offering an alternative, countercultural lifestyle. During 

Gulpari Farziyeva (left) holds her daughter at a rehabilitation center for women repatriated from the Islamic State, in Aktau, Kazakhstan, on July 22, 

2019. (Photo by Tara Todras-Whitehill/New York Times)
USIP.ORG 15

her period of engagement, Sarah began brandishing 

tattoos and other symbols, not only to demonstrate her 

commitment to other group members and to society but 

also to reinforce the identity by reminding herself of the 

acceptance she found in the group. 

From early on in her engagement, Sarah had doubts 

about the ideology of the movement. She felt hypocritical for dating people of color and feeling attracted to 

other women. She struggled to reconcile the movement when the Oklahoma City bombing killed nineteen 

children, which caused an introspection that resulted in 

deep disillusionment. But without any tangible alternatives available to her, Sarah remained engaged and 

even became more tenacious in her recruitment activity and violent behavior to hide her disillusionment and 

demonstrate commitment to other group members.

Like many people engaged in violent extremism, Sarah 

vacillated between periods of committing to exit and 

getting pulled back in by the self-worth, validation, 

protection, empowerment, and social bonds the movement provided. This continued until she was forced to 

disaffiliate when she was arrested, prosecuted, and 

sentenced to federal prison for aiding in an armed 

robbery. But it wasn’t just the physical separation prison 

placed between her and the movement that resulted 

in her eventual disengagement—it was even more so 

interactions she had with people of color inside prison, 

the empathy demonstrated by them, and the new social bonds and relationships she built with them. These 

new bonds and experiences opened Sarah’s mind, and 

the opportunity provided to receive higher education 

while in prison made her realize that she could find 

self-worth outside of the movement through her “responsibility to go out and try to undo damage, try to put 

a stop to it [violence, racism] and . . . its infantile stages 

if [I] can help someone.”59

Mobilization to violence is not simply a ball of yarn 

that can be unwound: disengagement is similarly not 

necessarily linear; it is often organic, presenting and 

revoking opportunities for cognitive openings in turn. 

Disengagement programs must reflect this complexity 

by both being responsive to the needs of each individual and addressing the cognitive, social, and structural dynamics that facilitated a person’s mobilization 

to violent extremism, as well as the changes a person 

experienced during their engagement. Indeed, disengagement from violent extremism is a two-way street. 

If mobilization is the result of complex group dynamics 

that involve perceptions of social exclusion and consensualizing outgroup stereotypes, then the existence of 

an available, viable, and tangible alternative identity into 

which disengaging persons are welcome is not optional. 

Presenting such an opportunity is not straightforward—

not only must the shames, fears, and behavioral health 

challenges of those who are disengaging be addressed 

to encourage help-seeking behavior and a willingness 

to interact prosocially among a broader community, but 

the broader community must also reduce its stigmas, 

fear, anger, and prejudice so that community members 

are willing to interact with those who are disengaging. Enabling such interaction is not enough, however. 

Unless those interactions are routinized, social learning 

will not occur, relationships and bonds will not be built, 

and a sense of belonging will not be generated.

Removing barriers to open spaces for prosocial interactions requires addressing the legitimate grievances 

or reforming political systems and social structures that 

contribute to divisions and violent extremism within a 

given social ecology. In this way, disengagement from 

violent extremism and prevention of violent extremism 

(PVE) are integrally linked, and efforts to build more 

inclusive communities and improve social cohesion 

are vital not only for preventing violent extremism but 

also for sustainable disengagement from it. For example, political institutions that fail to inclusively aggregate, articulate, and channel—or actively repress—the 

preferences and interests of certain segments of the 

population exclude those social groups from a stake in 

the social compact and forestall meaningful engagement between members of those groups and other 
16 PEACEWORKS | NO. 163

community members.60 Likewise, patrimonial political 

networks that mobilize political participation along rigid 

identity cleavages or corrupt elites who hoard scarce 

resources for a favored social group contribute to fractures within communities that prevent the cross-cutting 

of identities and cross-group interactions that break 

down barriers to routine prosocial engagement. 

Moreover, PVE efforts that target vulnerable communities or geographic hotspots are unlikely to encounter 

communities in which people are not already engaged 

in violent extremism. The success of such programs 

depends on also targeting networks that catalyze the 

mobilization of others. Likewise, people disengaging 

from violent extremism while interacting with the same 

social networks; engaging with the same political and 

social systems, structures, and norms; and accessing 

the same sources of information will experience a very 

similar lived experience and shared reality as those 

that contributed to their initial engagement. Without 

efforts to address those dynamics, disengagement is 

not sustainable.61

Tailored Interventions

Programs designed to facilitate personal and social 

development often engage directly with communities 

to reduce stigma and promote interactions between 

program beneficiaries and the community. 

In Indonesia, the Stabilisation Network’s Hearts, Hands 

and Heads approach to social disengagement, developed with local partner Kreasi Prasasti Perdamaian, wins 

trust with people at risk of mobilization to violent extremism by highlighting commonalities, identifying alternate 

versions of self-worth, and establishing social networks; 

encouraging education, entrepreneurship, and creativity; 

and fostering acceptance by local communities. The 

program trains mentors—many of whom have themselves disengaged from violent extremism—to engage 

with communities to identify potential beneficiaries; 

involving community leaders helps educate and reduce 

stigma and gives them a stake in it. One mentee, recently released from prison on terror-related charges, feared 

for his safety, the possibility of recidivism, and rejection 

by his community. The successive meetings demonstrated to the community the individual’s desire to return 

home, eventually leading him to be welcomed back and 

to become more active in educating local people about 

the dangers of radicalism and terrorism.

In Melbourne, Australia, STREAT focuses on trauma-informed, strength-based prosocial integration to foster 

belonging and sense of self and purpose for youth who 

are at risk of not only violent extremism but also other adverse outcomes such as crime, homelessness, social isolation, early school leaving, and chronic unemployment. 

The program provides training and employment pathways in several businesses, providing a sense of connection, safety, and belonging. By providing vocational 

training and employment, tailored personal support, and 

work-life skills, the program provides a renewed sense 

of empowerment and self-respect. The experience of 

being part of a real work team combined with the public 

setting of a café encourages prosocial interactions with a 

wide range of other community members. Paid jobs with 

carefully chosen employment partners are available to all 

graduates, and intensive postplacement support follows 

for another six months. STREAT’s operating principle is 

that if a person keeps their first job for twelve months, 

lifetime employment increases by 85 percent. As one 

trainee remarked, “It’s easy to feel you belong if someone cares. Not many people care in my world.”

People disengaging from violent extremism while . . . engaging with the same political and social 

systems . . . will experience a very similar lived experience and shared reality as those that contributed to 

their initial engagement. Without efforts to address those dynamics, disengagement is not sustainable.
USIP.ORG 17

Individual-Level Barriers

No psychopathology of a terrorist has been established, 

and violent extremism is not caused by a diagnosable 

psychological or mental health disorder. Indeed “any 

effort to uncover ‘the terrorist mind’ will more likely 

result in uncovering a spectrum of terrorist minds.”62

This does not mean, however, that mental health and 

cognition have no role in mobilization. Similarly, although 

existing disengagement programs overemphasize 

individual-level dynamics, those dynamics should not be 

overlooked. Even when social ecologies and political 

systems conspire in such a way that people feel excluded, and collective grievances draw marginalized people 

together in a shared reality that may be sympathetic 

toward violence, only a handful of people will actually 

engage in violent extremism. Such variance can often be 

explained by how individual-level dynamics interact with 

the context in which people find themselves.63 Indeed, 

biological and psychological influences on cognition 

help explain why some people in a given environment 

engage in violence and others refrain from it.64

On neurobiological, neuroprocessing, and genetic levels, 

several mechanisms may correlate with a predilection 

toward violence. Many are genetic and epigenetic, but the 

interactions and their behavioral and mental health effects 

differ for each individual. For example, the interaction of 

certain chemical levels in the brain, which can be affected 

by trauma and stress, and gene expressions can influence 

cognitive function.65 Adverse experiences thus sometimes 

cause structural changes to brain processing that can 

alter memory formation and retrieval, threat detection and 

vigilance, and emotion regulation processes, which may 

make some people more aggressive or more inclined to 

violence.66 A clinical discussion of the interactions among 

neurological processes and the specific neurobiological 

mechanisms involved and treatment methods are beyond 

the scope of this report, but neurological functions are 

important to consider when exploring the individual-level 

dynamics in violent extremism. Disengagement programs 

must examine how local contexts may interact with these 

processes to ensure that they are effectively calibrated to 

mitigate them, to encourage help-seeking behavior, and 

to forestall social avoidance and antisocial responses.

TRAUMA AND SHAME

Neurobiological processes and functioning, however, do 

not determine violent behavior in a vacuum. Only in conjunction with other psychological and social dynamics can 

they influence a person to engage, or remain engaged, in 

violent activity. Traumatic stress is, in fact, associated with 

a host of mental health challenges and antisocial behaviors, including anxiety, depression, substance-related 

disorders, poor self-regulation and information-processing capacities, criminality, and aggression.67 Also, trauma 

is often associated with adversity during resettlement into 

local communities. Discrimination and stigma, socioeconomic uncertainty, and status loss are stressors often 

associated with reintegration that can aggravate trauma 

and undermine disengagement.68

Trauma-informed care needs to become a hallmark of 

disengagement programs. As the Centers for Disease 

Control and Prevention explains, six principles guide 

such an approach to treatment: safety; trustworthiness 

and transparency; peer support; collaboration and 

mutuality; empowerment voice and choice; and cultural, 

historical, and gender respect.69 Trauma-informed care 

is not a technique or method but instead an awareness 

and sensitivity that behavioral health providers must 

maintain throughout any treatment plan to avoid subjecting a person to more trauma. It conceives of trauma 

through a social-ecology framework that identifies risk 
18 PEACEWORKS | NO. 163

and protective factors across the multiple levels that 

trauma may exert bidirectional influence on—including 

individuals, interpersonal relationships, and communities.70 It draws attention to how trauma might affect a 

person’s behavior and life by emphasizing “adaptation 

over symptoms and resilience over pathology.”71 Traumainformed care that incorporates social-ecological 

interventions cannot be confined to clinical settings and 

applied solely by mental health professionals but instead 

needs to be integrated across the entire community, including law enforcement and policing authorities, social 

workers, educators, and other social service practitioners who should build trust and contribute to the overall 

health and resilience of individuals and communities.

Women, girls, and sexual and gender minorities often 

face gender-specific challenges during reintegration after 

exiting violent extremist conflicts. Although women play 

diverse roles in violent extremist groups and are often just 

as committed and violent as men, they and girls are often 

enslaved, raped, and subjected to physical and emotional 

abuse; sexual and gender minorities may be threatened 

with death.72 Studies have indicated a strong correlation 

between women who experience violence and the development of mental health challenges such as substance 

abuse, “feelings of powerlessness and low self esteem 

. . . , [low] ability to advocate for themselves . . . , problems with self-soothing and emotional modulation, anger, 

shame, flashbacks, depression, suicide attempts, self-inflicted violence, terror, disassociation, and disconnection 

from others.”73 Amplifying these dynamics, women who 

participated in violent extremism often are ostracized 

from local communities because of perceptions that they 

have transgressed gender norms, whether as victims 

of sexual violence or by participating in violent conflict. 

The same women often have been widowed, or have 

escaped from, been abandoned by, or separated from 

husbands and fathers, and may become the sole income 

provider after reintegration.74 Unable to earn a living, 

disillusioned by the stigma against them, and frustrated 

by their inability to conceive of a future, women and girls 

returning from conflict in Sierra Leone and the Democratic 

Republic of Congo often were recruited again into armed 

groups; it is reasonable to expect recidivism to be a similar outcome among women and girls under analogous 

circumstances returning to communities with the same 

stigmas.75 Moreover, the widespread practice of sexual 

violence among violent extremist groups may serve to 

ingrain hypermasculine identities—as well as associated 

behaviors and attitudes such as entitlement to callous 

sex, glorification of violence, and attraction to danger—in 

men who lived with those groups. The result is multifold 

because men returning are likely to continue committing 

gender-based violence against women and girls and may 

be more vulnerable to recidivism in societies where such 

hypermasculine behavior is unacceptable.76

Trauma-informed care is also gender informed, reflecting 

the unique experience of women, girls, and sexual and 

gender minorities. Programs to address misogynistic 

behaviors, attitudes, and values associated with masculinity can marginalize militant conceptions of masculinity 

and encourage help-seeking behavior among men, 

which can help prevent the revictimization of those who 

were subjected to gender-based violence while in conflict.77 Especially in communities that have experienced 

historical abuses by law enforcement and security-sector authorities, such programs can help women feel 

empowered with the agency to overcome the “injustice 

and deficit in dignity that women experience in their 

own societies.”78 But women should be viewed not just 

as victims and perpetrators; they are also rescuers.79

“Developing and promoting women’s networks to allow 

women to support women and expanding the role and 

support of women-led organizations and civil society 

actors have proven to be effective ways to increase 

the agency of local women in highlighting idiosyncratic 

dynamics, identifying solutions, and empowering other 

women influencers.”80 As mothers, grandmothers, community gatekeepers, teachers, friends, and peacemakers, women have a stake in the reintegration of people 

disengaging from violent extremism. Mainstreaming 

gender and gender dynamics into disengagement programs by involving female community and faith leaders, 
USIP.ORG 19

as well as women who have disengaged from violent 

extremism, can demonstrate sensitivity, empathy, and 

openness, reducing the burden of stigma and trauma.81

Although post-traumatic stress most commonly refers to 

persistent activation of cognitive fear responses, it can 

also activate responses of shame and guilt, which can in 

turn have significant implications for the disengagement 

of people who have contributed to violence or harm to 

others. Traumatic reintegration stressors may activate 

those shame responses, for which social avoidance is a 

common coping mechanism that can deter help-seeking 

behavior and amplify perceptions of alienation and exclusion. Alternatively, perceptions of being shamed unfairly 

could result in humiliation, rage directed at others, and 

a desire to seek revenge.82 Shame ensures that people 

conform to social norms and activities when transgression 

of those norms could result in social exclusion—violent 

responses to regulate shame may be an evolutionary 

maladaptation to defend against that threat.83 Indeed, 

shame’s biological function may be linked to ensuring 

one remains included as part of a social group; shame is 

therefore threatening to one’s identity and sense of self.84

Trauma-informed care minimizes the risk of replicating 

prior trauma dynamics, which has implications on treatment methods when shame is dominant. To treat trauma in which shame is circumscribed and fear is dominant, traditional methods that emphasize fear exposure 

and cognitive restructuring such as cognitive-behavioral therapy may be effective. However, exposure 

treatments for shame-dominant trauma that require the 

reliving of an event may result in anger at local communities perceived to be the cause of the shame and 

spark a desire for revenge.85 In these cases, alternative 

treatments such as mind-body skills groups that incorporate meditation, guided imagery, breathing techniques, biofeedback, and self-expression exercises 

may be effective at reducing anxiety and healing 

trauma in conflict-affected individuals.86

Antecedent trauma and adverse childhood events frequently contribute to a person’s path into violent extremism; these too may need to be addressed to foster disengagement.87 Although people who have experienced 

such trauma cannot be considered, wholesale, at risk of 

becoming engaged in violent extremism, engaging for 

some may be a way to ascribe meaning to the events.88

For others, trauma and adversity destroys one’s sense of 

self and worldview, facilitating feelings of alienation and 

victimization. Violent extremist groups instrumentalize 

trauma—as well as therapeutic elements of group cohesion and belonging such as spirituality, empowerment, 

and social support—not only to manipulate people into 

engaging, but also to trap those who already are engaged 

into remaining; long-term adverse mental health outcomes 

are often a result.89 For example, white supremacists often 

include violence and dysfunction in their systematized 

family dynamics to “raise their children as tomorrow’s warriors who will defend the white race against genocide.”90

Likewise, people who lived with the so-called Islamic State 

experienced grotesque physical violence as a routine part 

of daily life, including public executions, torture, rape, and 

armed conflict.91 Moreover, post-traumatic stress has for 

decades been associated with postwar antisocial behavior among combatants, and the correlation between combat exposure and PTSD symptomology, including social 

avoidance and aggression, is well established.92

The negative effects of exposure to such toxic stress . . . 

often become “deeply embedded in . . . neurobiology, with 

an astonishing range of long-term effects on cognition, 

emotion, and behavior.” . . . Visible effects, such as for example, increased substance abuse, aggression, impaired 

cognition, emotion and behavior, lack of coping skills, poor 

stress management and mental illness may manifest [even] 

after a significant lag period.93

Although post-traumatic stress most commonly refers to persistent activation of cognitive fear 

responses, it can also activate responses of shame and guilt, which can in turn have significant 

implications for the disengagement of people who have contributed to violence or harm to others.
20 PEACEWORKS | NO. 163

The implications are clear—trauma can lead to significant barriers to building social bonds, empathy, and a 

sense of belonging due to the erosion of trust and the 

neurobiological changes in brain function and processing that occur as a result.94 And people who have 

engaged in violent extremism likely have been traumatized across several dimensions. Efforts to disengage 

people from violent extremism need to address this 

trauma to encourage help-seeking behavior and erode 

individual-level barriers to prosocial interactions.

Healing Trauma

Sitting in Shigeo, a Gaza suburb decimated by the 2014 

war between Israel and Hamas, James Gordon of the 

Center for Mind-Body Medicine is surrounded by eight 

children, each of whom has lost a father to the war. In 

the first of nine mind-body skills groups, they begin 

with slow, deep, soft belly breathing, after which the 

children are asked to create a drawing of themselves 

along with their biggest problem. One of them—a 

nine-year-old girl named Azhar—draws a scene of her 

home and family. On one side of her drawing are Israeli 

fighter planes dropping bombs on her home. At the 

foot of the building, drenched in blood, is her father. 

Not far away are two other bodies, also soaked with 

blood—“These are my uncles,” she says. Nearby is another—Azhar’s aunt. On the other side of the drawing is 

a small, frowning stick figure. “That’s me,” Azhar says. 

In the next exercise, children are asked to draw the 

solution to their biggest problem. In many cases, these 

drawings are rather cheerful, depicting for instance, a 

road back home for a refugee family. In Azhar’s drawing is a deep and dark-colored grave, and within it, a 

body. She explains: “I’m lying in my grave in my shroud. 

The Israelis have killed me. There is nothing for me in 

this life. I want to be with my father.”

Over the next eight weeks, Azhar and her group 

learn a series of psychotherapy-informed self-help 

techniques from the Center for Mind-Body Medicine 

counselors. She practices soft belly breathing to sleep 

and concentrate better. Using guided imagery, she 

imagines a safe and comfortable place for herself in 

Gaza. She engages in active physical techniques such 

as shaking, dancing, and fast deep breathing to break 

up patterns of tension in the body, which is in constant 

anticipation of further catastrophe.

Weeks later, in the last of these group meetings, Azhar 

creates another set of drawings. The first is a self-portrait. This time, Azhar situates herself in the middle of 

the page, no longer as a stick figure off to the side, but 

instead as a grown woman with a bright skirt. Coming 

from her heart is an arrow, which passes through 

another, larger heart on the page, across which “I love 

nature” is written. The arrow then passes through 

a flower with well-defined petals, and continues on 

toward a brightly colored tree. In the second picture, 

having been asked to draw what she would like to be, 

Azhar portrays herself in a white coat—“I am a heart 

doctor,” she says. Around her neck is a stethoscope 

with its resonator sitting on the heart of a person lying 

on the table below her. “That is my patient,” Azhar says. 

Beside her is a line of people. “Those are my other 

patients; they are waiting for me.” Over the course of 

so many weeks working with the Center for Mind-Body 

Medicine, Azhar has transformed from a despairing 

child seeking only death after trauma to being able to 

open her heart to others and to herself. 

Gordon describes how he has found, in his fifty-plus 

years of working in mind-body medicine, that trauma 

can be a doorway to discovering who people really 

are—that by reaching out, out of one’s pain and suffering, the wounded can become the healer; that the 

traumas people experience can show them who they 

are, what is important to them, and may give them the 

gravity and compassion to help other people. “What I 

hope,” Gordon explains,

is that Azhar will be able to continue this like so many 

others I have seen . . . [how] our traumas have opened us 

to our fundamental humanness and to the humanness of 
USIP.ORG 21

everyone around us. And they have encouraged us, urged 

us, and called us to reach out to others with the compassion that we have learned through our own suffering.

Giving people an opportunity to talk about their vulnerability helps them to recognize that each one of us has 

the capacity for self-healing, and that we need other 

people to maximize that capacity.95

BEHAVIORAL HEALTH AND PEACEBUILDING

Shame, embarrassment, hopelessness, loss, grief, 

anxiety, hypermasculine social norms, resentment, poor 

self-awareness, preferences for self-reliance, and low 

confidence in health-care systems, treatment methods, or 

service providers can all be barriers to help-seeking behavior, even when trauma-informed care and behavioral 

health and psychosocial support (BHPSS) are available. 

These barriers present significant challenges for people 

disengaging from violent extremism because such 

support is crucial to addressing cognitive or behavioral 

conditions that prevent people from engaging prosocially 

with community members and institutions. Indeed, where 

prosocial engagement is key to rehumanizing others, 

building bonds, and generating a sense of belonging, a 

willingness to engage prosocially is essential. Addressing 

traumas and shame that incite avoidance behavior can 

generate openings for such a willingness, but enabling 

help-seeking behavior and providing that care to individuals who may not want it can be challenging. 

In communities with the technological capacity, implementing remote-access support systems may 

expand care to those who are embarrassed to seek 

help in public and to women in communities with 

highly structured gender norms, as well as to people 

who live in communities with little capacity to access 

Eamonn Baker of the Towards Understanding and Healing Team organized a September 17, 2019 reconciliation event with Lee Lavis (second from right), 

a former British soldier, and Fiona Gallagher (right), whose brother was killed by a British soldier in 1976. (Photo by Andrew Testa/New York Times).
22 PEACEWORKS | NO. 163

BHPSS services otherwise.96 Another approach may 

be to embed psychosocial support, trauma healing, 

and mental health literacy functions in other activities such as rituals or ceremonies, formal education 

systems, and recreational, cultural, art, and creative 

activities. Perhaps the most effective way to encourage 

help-seeking behavior is vicariously through gatekeepers. Gatekeepers are people who regularly interact 

with and are trusted by those disengaging from violent 

extremism—family members, friends, educators, or primary health-care providers—who can shepherd those 

in need toward BHPSS services. Although potential 

gatekeepers are not always likely to intervene because 

of fear of relational loss or cognitive biases that cloak 

warning signs, they can be cultivated through engagement and training. When gatekeepers are trained on 

behavioral challenges to expect, and how to directly 

provide basic interventions and trauma first aid, they 

are more likely to do so and will have a better understanding of when to refer individuals to professional 

BHPSS service providers.97

Of course, access to BHPSS often is not available or is 

limited, especially in non-Western countries. In some 

communities, access can be limited by stigmas against 

seeking mental health support or Western conceptions 

of care. Indeed, “much of the theory and practice of 

mental [and behavioral] health . . . have emerged from 

Western cultural traditions and Western understandings of the human condition” that focus primarily on 

individual symptoms and pathology rather than more 

communal or relational processes. The application 

of BHPSS to non-Western contexts requires careful 

analysis and calibration to local conceptions regarding 

etiology that integrates body, mind, and spiritual and 

religious dimensions; and cultural norms governing 

treatment-seeking processes.98 In these contexts, even 

where capacity may be available, it is important to 

consider function over form; social norms may require 

delivery of BHPSS to conform with cultural standards 

and local customs that have often evolved over centuries into tradition-based healing practices to address 

mental and behavioral health challenges in function if 

not in the language of Western clinical psychology.

Such practices can take many forms and be delivered a variety of ways—including community elders, 

religious leaders, and traditional healers—but often 

incorporate familiar treatment practices such as rituals, 

counseling, listening sessions, and communal dialogue 

that frequently mirror clinically tested or empirically 

validated principles of intervention.99 Indeed, indigenous rituals in a number of contexts incorporate psycho-education and spiritual guidance, goal setting and 

expectation management, relationship building and 

person-centered interactions guided by empathy and 

congruence, symbolic exposure to the traumatic event, 

externalization of symptoms, and other therapeutic 

factors shown to decrease traumatic stress symptoms.100 These are “positive community resources” that 

can provide at least some essential functions of trauma-informed BHPSS in acceptable and locally familiar 

ways.101 Additionally, evidence-based treatments can be 

adapted to be responsive to language and meanings, 

cultural patterns, and social values and norms in such 

a way that incorporates both top-down and bottom-up 

approaches by beginning with theory and procedures 

based on clinical trials that are subjected to scrutiny 

and input by local stakeholders.102

Access to care is also often limited by a scarcity of 

human capacity, especially in rural or conflict-affected 

communities. In these cases, community-based care 

administered by community members trained in BHPSS 

techniques and principles have shown promise. These 

programs are designed to address the needs of traditionally underserved populations by addressing “needs 

in ways that are accessible and acceptable,” focusing 

Evidence-based treatments can be adapted to be responsive to language and meanings, cultural patterns, 

and social values and norms in such a way that incorporates both top-down and bottom-up approaches.
USIP.ORG 23

on strengths and resilience factors in addition to risk 

factors and deficits, and melding evidence-based 

treatments with recovery-oriented ethos and practical 

ethics.103 BHPSS training is often provided to nonspecialist health workers to integrate BHPSS services into 

primary care systems to scale up and extend the reach 

of behavioral health capacity and provide focused 

and specialized treatments for serious and chronic 

behavioral health diagnoses.104 In other contexts, even 

primary health-care facilities may be inadequate or 

inaccessible, and community-based programs can fill 

the gap where neither behavioral nor mental health 

services exist. Community-based BHPSS programs can 

build capacity for basic BHPSS services and empower 

community and family support by providing training 

and psycho-education to family members, community 

elders and leaders, religious actors, social workers, and 

educators. Platforms for delivery can include schools, 

churches, NGO offices, prisons, community centers, 

public spaces, and remote technologies.

Tradition-Based Rituals and Trauma Healing

In 1992, when Patrick was six years old, his father was 

abducted and killed by the Lord’s Resistance Army 

when it began to infiltrate northern Uganda. Afterward, 

Patrick displayed chronic depression symptoms and 

withdrew socially. Seven years later, he too was abducted. Within weeks, he was forced to kill four men 

who attempted to escape captivity; within a month, he 

began training as a child soldier; within two months, 

he participated in an attack on a convoy where he 

witnessed soldiers kill twenty people with axes. During 

the three years of his captivity, Patrick was tortured 

and in constant fear of being killed, forced to torture 

prisoners, and participated in combat. In 2003, he was 

wounded by government forces, captured, and eventually released into a child soldier rehabilitation program.

After release, Patrick experienced severe nightmares 

several times a week, daily flashbacks and manifestations of people he had killed, and other somatic 

symptoms of trauma. To relieve the symptoms, Patrick 

sought out a healer to perform a cleansing ritual to rid 

himself of the spirits of those he had killed. Over the 

course of several days, Patrick and his family participated in a series of symbolic activities—including leaving 

the village and returning; stepping on an egg, which 

symbolizes purity; being fed; pronouncements by 

elders of cleansing; community participation; hypnotic 

and intense dancing; and ritualized slaughter—that ultimately resulted in the spirits agreeing to leave Patrick 

and instead inhabit a goat, which was then killed.

Notably, this ritual consisted of several clinically validated therapeutic elements. Before it was conducted, the 

traditional healer and community elders engaged with 

Patrick on psycho-education and spiritual guidance to 

provide him with clear expectations and build trust. The 

ritual itself provided symbolic exposure to the traumatic 

event, externalization of symptoms, decoupling past 

from future, and social connectedness. After the ritual, 

Patrick’s symptoms decreased significantly—his nightmares immediately went from weekly to monthly, then 

disappeared almost entirely; manifestations of those 

he had killed ceased; his desire for social activities 

began to increase; and he became future oriented. 

After fifteen months, Patrick was no longer clinically 

depressed, and over the course of follow-up interviews 

that spanned the following two years, he no longer met 

the criteria for a Western-style PTSD diagnosis.105

Improving Access to Care

Given the more than ten million people displaced by 

the ongoing Syrian war and nearly sixty million others 

displaced elsewhere around the world, millions are in 

need of treatment for psychological traumas associated 

with forced displacement or violence. Yet few who need 

it ever receive treatment, either out of fear of stigmatization or the inaccessibility of mental health resources.

Beyond Conflict, a nonprofit that combines behavioral science and humanitarian work, created the 

Field Guide for Barefoot Psychology to address 

the challenge. Currently being piloted in the Za’atri 
24 PEACEWORKS | NO. 163

refugee camp in Jordan, the Guide follows the story 

of two Syrian siblings enduring conflict and migration. 

Through storytelling and vignettes of the siblings’ lives, 

it illustrates otherwise complex scientific concepts. It 

unpacks the biological and psychological processes 

associated with life in conflict and forced migration—

fear, anxiety, stress, trauma, guilt, shame, hopelessness—and normalizes many of these experiences 

through storytelling that frames these issues as “common responses of the brain and the body to abnormal 

life events.” It takes an asset-based approach, attempting to cultivate resilience through “the science of neuroplasticity, belonging, and post-traumatic growth.”106

In low-capacity environments, civil society often fills 

the gaps that government services cannot reach. In 

northern Nigeria, the NEEM Foundation addresses the 

mental health, rehabilitation, and reintegration needs of 

victims of Boko Haram, as well as people who have disengaged from the group. To address a critical resource 

limitation that prevents adequate access to care—for 

example Maiduguri, the capital of Borno State, had 

only one psychologist for every 375,000 residents in 

2017—the NEEM Foundation trains “lay counselors (including gender-based violence and expressive therapy 

specialists), peace coaches, and religious leaders who 

can assist in rehabilitation, reintegration, and general 

psychosocial support.”107

Socio-Recreational Activities and Well-Being

Socio-recreational and cultural activities such as interest 

groups, activity groups, problem-based groups, and structured groups can be effective at providing psychosocial 

support that encourages prosocial engagement by providing peer support, listening sessions, referral services, and 

encouraging inclusive, equal, and respectful relationships.

Creative and art-based activities can have profound effects on mental and behavioral well-being through their 

ability to transform suffering, connect individuals, and 

enable participants to voice the unspeakable. 

Furthermore, recent neuroscientific and psychological, 

neuroendocrine and immunological studies have claimed 

that participation in cultural and artistic activities can have 

a positive impact at the organic level, containing the negative outcomes of protracted distress and empowering the 

immune response. According to the most recent studies 

of neuroaesthetics, the vision and creation of artistic forms 

solicit the mirror neurons and stimulate empathy.

Rituals and celebrations can be particularly potent 

in promoting psychosocial well-being by helping 

overcome isolation using metaphors and symbols to 

indirectly express painful experiences, contextualize 

trauma in a shared history and heritage, and validate 

and demarcate transformations.108
USIP.ORG 25

Communal and Social Barriers 

Removing individual barriers to help-seeking and 

prosocial behavior, however, is like building a bridge 

to nowhere if open spaces in which interactions with 

those disengaging are welcome do not exist. Indeed, 

the absence of a tangible and viable alternative social 

group is a significant barrier to exiting a host of roles, 

and communities may be hesitant to welcome back 

people who have engaged in violent extremism.

Communities affected by violent extremism and people 

returning from violent extremist conflicts may be understandably angry and fearful, and thus may stigmatize 

those returning. After all, violent extremist groups are 

guilty of committing heinous crimes, cleansing entire ethnicities, perpetrating mass violence targeting 

civilians, and inflicting untold trauma on communities. 

It is therefore not surprising that stigmatizing people 

perceived as being involved could be the first reaction. 

Such a response, however, is not helpful in the long 

term for either the community or the people returning.

THE POWER OF LANGUAGE

For decades, terrorists have been portrayed in the 

media and by politicians as a singular threat and as 

pariahs to be feared and imprisoned for life, exiled, or 

killed. Terrorism and violent extremism were framed as 

a global and existential threat. Even in liberal democracies, government programs established new rules 

for handling people accused of aiding or abetting 

terrorism, at times brushing aside civil rights and longheld legal norms. The policies and laws that followed 

tested the balance between constitutional rights and 

liberal values with security needs, placing primacy on 

“winning the war” and retribution against those who 

participated in violent extremist groups. A host of countries adopted similar measures. In Malaysia, people 

suspected of terrorist-related crimes can be held 

more or less indefinitely without charge or trial. In the 

United Kingdom, authorities can refuse entry to citizens 

suspected of terrorist-related activities. In Germany, 

authorities can replace passports with identity cards 

that are not valid for travel abroad. In Tajikistan, citizens 

younger than thirty-five are barred from traveling to 

Mecca or Medina. Further, governments and law enforcement agencies worldwide created terrorist watch 

lists from which removal procedures were nontransparent at best and nonexistent at worst. As a result, 

terrorist and violent extremist became designations for 

which redemption was not possible. As far as society is 

concerned, once a terrorist, forever a terrorist.

This fear dehumanizes those who have engaged in 

violent extremism, and the resulting stigma closes off 

avenues of acceptance into communities even after 

disengagement, foreclosing the availability of an alternative identity and reinforcing the otherness that keep 

people from successfully disengaging. But people disengaging from violent extremism are not the only ones 

for whom stigma is a challenge. For people living with 

HIV/AIDS, people who use drugs, and people affected 

by the criminal justice system, language has been used 

to reduce stigma and aid in their recovery. Indeed, 

words matter when it comes to encouraging inclusive 

social engagements, and language is a powerful tool to 

shape perceptions and behavior. The cognitive linguist 

George Lakoff famously wrote, “If I tell you ‘Don’t think 

of an elephant!’, you’ll think of an elephant.”109 Lakoff 

was illustrating a cognitive effect of language whereby 

words trigger the brain to use shortcuts, or “frames,” 

to jump to a given conclusion or learned reaction. The 

same holds true for terrorist. No one wants to engage 

with a terrorist.
26 PEACEWORKS | NO. 163

In some circumstances, of course, it is important to acknowledge a person’s past—situations such as criminal 

justice proceedings, redemption rituals, or disengagement programs in which such history is directly relevant 

as an essential element.110 But though a spade should be 

called a spade, and acts of terrorism should of course be 

labeled as just that, “terrorist” language is often deployed 

not because it is relevant but because it is politically 

expedient. Such language often reflects a political impulse to appear staunch on national security or criminal 

justice. In some more nefarious platforms, it can also be 

a xenophobic dog whistle that preys on fear and anger, 

activates jingoist emotional responses, and mobilizes 

the segments of society most unwilling to engage with 

people disengaging from violent extremism. Rhetoric 

that reinforces perceptions of exclusion and buttresses 

the social divisions that fuel violence weakens the ability 

of communities to effectively protect themselves by focusing on a nonnegotiable identity clash rather than the 

substantive and underlying issues at stake. 

Rather than backward-looking language that emphasizes conflict and responsibility, reconciliation requires 

forward-looking language that imagines a future, 

acknowledges mutual responsibility, and encourages 

introspection about a group’s identity—then broadens 

it.111 In criminal justice, social work, and public health, 

people-first language has been used to rehumanize 

marginalized groups, reducing the burden of stigma, presenting opportunities for social learning, and 

challenging the alienating narratives that generate 

resentment. Emphasizing a person’s personhood can 

harness the cognitive and neurobiological power of 

language to ease open spaces for engagement by 

influencing social attitudes and self-identity. Instead, 

used casually as part of a daily vernacular, terms such 

as terrorist, Jihadi, violent extremist, and fighter, even 

when preceded by ex- or former, activate the frames 

associated with the war on terror that have been 

socialized in many communities since 2001 and reinforce—both for society and for the individual—the very 

identities that they are attempting to shed. 

In 1974, for example, subjects were randomly divided 

into groups and shown the same seven films of automobile accidents, after which they answered questions 

about the films. Those who were asked how fast the 

cars were going when they smashed into each other 

provided significantly higher speed estimates than 

those asked an almost identical question that replaced 

the verb smashed with collided, bumped, contacted, 

or hit. A week later, on reexamination, the participants 

whose question used the verb smashed were more 

likely to report having seen broken glass in the films, 

even though broken glass was not in fact present.112

Fast forward to 2011. 

Crime is a beast / virus ravaging the city of Addison. Five 

years ago Addison was in good shape, with no obvious 

vulnerabilities. Unfortunately, in the past five years the 

city’s defense systems have weakened, and the city has 

succumbed to crime. Today, there are more than 55,000 

criminal incidents a year—up by more than 10,000 per year. 

There is a worry that if the city does not regain its strength 

soon, even more serious problems may start to develop.

Judgment: In your opinion, what does Addison need to do 

to reduce crime?113

In this study, subjects were randomly divided and 

given this scenario, one group receiving a version that 

described crime in Addison as a beast and the other as 

a virus. This change in adjectives, and the connotations 

that went along with it, influenced the solutions each 

group recommended. Those who heard crime framed 

as a beast were significantly more likely to recommend 

enforcement responses than those for whom crime 

was framed as a virus, who were more likely to recommend social-reform responses.114

These two studies demonstrate the neurological power 

of language to influence peoples’ perceptions and preferred policy approaches to respond to social challenges.
USIP.ORG 27

ALTERNATIVE IDENTITIES

Society functions as a looking glass whereby people 

tend to conform to the labels they are given because 

those labels identify opportunities and funnel people into 

certain roles: when mainstream society alienates, subcultures such as violent extremist groups welcome. Society 

is eager to label people who could pose a security risk as 

deviant but is loath to label them as reformed or rehabilitated: it takes only one deviant action to stigmatize a person, but rehabilitated is a status earned by demonstrating 

social conformity over a sustained period.115 It is a status 

whereby the criteria for eligibility is inherently subjective—

because how long a person needs to “cease and desist” 

before they are labeled rehabilitated and what behaviors 

or attitudes are considered acceptable or unacceptable 

are undefined and negotiated on a case-by-case basis.116

Although fear and skepticism about the sincerity of 

people disengaging from violent extremism are understandable, an unwillingness to give them a chance and 

welcome interactions in good faith could become a 

self-fulfilling prophecy that results in recidivism.117

Long-term disengagement involves transforming a person’s identity and sense of self, and “drawing on the symbolic interactionist notion of the ‘looking-glass self-concept’, [labeling theory] suggests that [an] . . . individual 

will come to view himself based upon what he believes 

other people think he is.”118 When people disengage from 

violent extremism—particularly when they return from 

having participated in conflict—they face a crisis of identity that catalyzes finding new meaning in life, reassigning 

new meaning to past experiences, and searching for a 

new social identity.119 This crisis presents opportunities 

for rehabilitation. Labeling a person disengaging from 

violent extremism as rehabilitated may itself contribute 

to the disengagement process.120 This has been validated by several well-known studies stretching back to the 

1970s. In one, researchers informed patients that they had 

devised a mechanism to determine who would be likely 

to recover from alcohol dependency and who would not. 

In reality, no such mechanism existed. A random selection 

of participants in the study were told that, based on the 

mechanism, they were likely to succeed; the study results 

showed that these participants were significantly more 

likely to give up alcohol than the control group.121

More recent and perhaps more relevant experience 

demonstrates that social rituals and ceremonies that publicly acknowledge and reflect an identity transformation 

may be especially effective at sustainable desistence or 

disengagement.122 In Rwanda, for example, thousands of 

people who participated in the 1994 genocide are beginning to be released from prison and reintegrate into their 

communities, to live among victims of the violence. Such 

a reintegration is an intense crisis of identity, and many 

brace themselves, expecting to be stigmatized and ostracized. Often they find instead that they are embraced into 

the community with simple rituals, such as being greeted 

with a Fanta or alcohol—including by the victims.123

JUSTICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Rituals, ceremonies, and rites of passage that symbolically mark a person’s transition back into society 

serve a much broader social function than encouraging 

help-seeking and prosocial behavior among individuals. 

They also are involved in the healing and reconciliation 

process at the community level. Indeed, tradition-based 

rituals have deep roots in social ethos and community 

identities, and cleansing or purification rituals performed 

on soldiers and other people who have participated in 

armed conflict or violence can “re-establish harmony 

between ex-soldiers and community members.”124

Especially in communities that have experienced violent 

extremism, trauma will compound the stigma, anger, and 

Society functions as a looking glass whereby people tend to conform to the labels they are given 

because those labels identify opportunities and funnel people into certain roles: when mainstream 

society alienates, subcultures such as violent extremist groups welcome.
28 PEACEWORKS | NO. 163

fear against those who are returning or disengaging. 

Even in communities not directly affected by violent 

extremism, intense feelings of betrayal and experiences 

of losing children and other community members to a 

conflict zone may themselves be sources of communal 

trauma. Trauma-informed peacebuilding aproaches such 

as transformative mediation and narrative mediation 

may also be effective for reducing stigma and healing 

collective trauma.125 Rituals can begin to heal psychosocial traumas and provide a pathway for moving forward 

together. Symbolic ceremonies can provide a tangible 

break from past actions and identities experienced 

not only by the individual but also by the community; 

they can transform identities, create new shared identities, and heal wounds from conflict and crime. One 

researcher described the power of one such ceremony 

from Sierra Leone that “created an emotionally charged 

atmosphere that succeeded in moving many of the participants and spectators . . . and which arguably opened 

an avenue for reconciliation and lasting peace.”126 Rituals 

involving the community have the ability to give expression and meaning to human experiences, and to nurture 

human relationships by enabling both individuals and 

communities to envision each other as we.

127

Often it can be challenging to collect evidence from 

a foreign battlefield in a way that upholds judicial and 

evidentiary standards, making prosecution difficult. 

In other cases, lack of evidence or perceptions that 

an individual played a minor role could result in little 

or no prison time. And, of course, children who were 

trafficked or born into a conflict must be considered 

victims by the law.128 But bureaucratic and practical 

reasons for not pursuing criminal justice often will fail 

to provide a sense of justice to communities that feel 

aggrieved. In many cases, tradition-based rites of 

redemption or community-based dispute settlement 

mechanisms can begin the healing process.

Although justice mechanisms not based in rule of law 

may not provide retributional forms of justice, tradition-based redemption systems have a greater ability 

to orient attention to the experiences of victims to heal 

“breaches, [redress] imbalances, [and restore] broken relationships. This kind of justice seeks to rehabilitate both 

the victim and the perpetrator, who should be given the 

opportunity to be reintegrated into the community he or 

she has injured by his or her offense.”129

Whereas other crimes involve perpetrators and direct 

victims, violent extremism targets entire societies. Even 

community members who were not the direct targets of 

a terrorist attack may feel as though they have a stake 

in the response to a person who has been engaged 

in violent extremism.130 Restoration in such cases is 

not individual but instead collective. Restorative justice, which is “primarily oriented toward repairing the 

individual, relational, and social harm caused by [an] 

offence,” can leverage tradition-based and communal 

redemption systems and empower communities to 

participate in healing and restoration.131

Community-based systems that involve respectful 

dialogue can drive credible narratives of redemption 

and blame in a way that more rigid, rational-legalistic 

state institutions cannot.132 Dialogues that emphasize 

respect, solidarity, and active responsibility can derive meaning from tragedy or transgression, which is 

associated with positive outcomes among victims and 

perpetrators alike. Indeed, “people often demonstrate 

resilience, growth, and prosocial behaviors in response 

to extremely negative life events,” to which they often 

search to ascribe meaning. Credible, compassionate, 

meaningful, and respectful narratives that acknowledge 

responsibility and offer reparations are essential to 

reconciliation, but developing them without minimizing 

the harm caused or triggering defensive reactions from 

perpetrators is difficult. Dialogues can engage in building redemption narratives, which “can reflect events 

from the . . . past [and] imbue meaning for the present.” 

“If perpetrators perceive their past wrongdoing or the 

aftermath as catalyzing some positive change in their 

own lives, this may reduce the wrongdoing’s threat 

to their identities, allowing perpetrators to respond 
USIP.ORG 29

prosocially, rather than defensively.” Studies show 

that “engaging in redemption narratives can promote 

reconciliatory intentions among perpetrators (e.g., 

collective guilt, willingness to make reparations), with 

seemingly little defensive responses from victims.”133

Compassionate and empathetic language encourages 

complex thinking, which has been shown to promote 

“mutual understanding and can predict more peaceful outcomes to conflict.”134 Narratives that emphasize 

complexity can contextualize actions within a social 

ecology, acknowledging legitimate grievances without 

deflecting agency or accountability.

Box 2.

HEALING PROPERTIES OF RITUALS

When traditional forms of justice are difficult to execute, whether because of challenges collecting evidence or gaps in terrorism legislation, community rituals can provide an expedient and sometimes more 

constructive alternative:a

• Rituals help people interact in new ways. Communicating mainly though symbols, senses, and emotions rather than words, people are empowered to perform symbolic actions and interact in new ways. 

The ritual space enables people to “perform their humanity,” calming their emotions, channeling them, 

and expressing them in a safe way.

• Rituals help create “safe spaces” in the midst of conflict. Because rituals take place in a space separate 

from the troubles of everyday life, the safe space they create gives participants the opportunity “to 

listen and speak more thoughtfully and carefully about the problems at hand.”

• Rituals help form and transform worldviews. As participants collectively cultivate values and reshape 

memories, the ritual process serves as a prism through which participants view the world. In this way, 

rituals can provide a new lens that emphasizes relationships and the big picture.

• Rituals help form and transform identities. Rituals can build, affirm, and heal identities, improving the 

self-esteem of individual participants, and increasing awareness of their ability to act in the world and 

in what ways. Ritualized rites of passage transform identities by encouraging the creation of an inclusive, shared identity for people in conflict. By focusing on the common ground that exists between 

them, people in conflict can “use ritual to legitimize or reinvent their identity in ways that express their 

interdependence.”

• Rituals help form and transform relationships. In doing so, they create opportunities for people to become aware of their shared humanity and interdependence. Rituals thus build bridges between individuals and provide a structured platform for them to interact with one another and begin to view each 

other as fellow problem-solvers.

Source: Quotes from Ali Gohar and Lisa Schrich, “Ritual and Symbol in Justice and Peacebuilding,” in Creating the Third Force: Indigenous

Processes of Peacemaking, ed. Hamdesa Tuso and Maureen P. Flaherty (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), 457–58.
30 PEACEWORKS | NO. 163

Structural Barriers

Violent extremism is a form of violent conflict. It does 

not spring out of nowhere. It is instead the result of 

frustrated agency, of social exclusion, marginalization, 

and fragmentation, and of broken governance that has 

failed a segment of the population. These challenges cannot be ignored. Individual choices and social 

dynamics are circumscribed by structural realities. As a 

form of collective action, violent extremism may be the 

spark that ignites the prairie fire. People often falsify 

their private preferences to conform with the apparent 

preferences of the mainstream until a spark exposes 

the existence of a “latent bandwagon,” or a critical 

mass of people who are also discontent with the status 

quo. Such a critical mass can grow into a “prairie fire” 

as that discontent manifests mass movements, both 

violent and nonviolent.135

Violent extremism often signifies the existence of such 

discontent; it can be the leading edge in the mobilization of collective action with the potential to galvanize 

a tipping point by which others affected could join in 

widespread political violence. Pursuing a broader effort 

to promote social cohesion that goes beyond a return 

to the status quo where relationships were frayed and 

instead strengthens the social fabric through collaborative relationships can build more resilient communities. 

Resilient communities not only prevent violent extremism but also create an environment in which disengagement from violent extremism can be sustained: 

that is, they produce peaceful societies more broadly. 

Three types of social connections are critical to a resilient 

community in relation to violent extremism. . . . Social 

connection within and between communities specifically 

mitigate risk factors associated with violent extremism; 

within communities refers to individuals that share similar 

social identities (termed social bonding), and between

communities refers to groups composed of individuals with 

diverse social identities but who share a common sense 

of community in some other way (termed social bridging). 

. . . The role of social connection between communities 

and institutions or governing bodies (termed social linking) 

provides an opportunity for addressing social injustice.136

Addressing individual and cognitive as well as social 

and communal barriers to prosocial engagement can 

facilitate reconciliation within and among social groups, 

fostering social bonding and social bridging. But social 

linking cannot occur in communities where fragmentations along religious, ethnic, or other socioeconomic 

lines prevail. In such conditions, the ability to inclusively 

engage, reintegrate, or reconcile with people disengaging from violent extremism for whom the alternative 

identity offered is itself marginalized will remain stunted. 

Ensuring “access to decision-making mechanisms of 

community, institutional, and political structures” that can 

fully acknowledge, aggregate, articulate, and appropriately channel legitimate grievances can validate lived 

and shared experiences and provide people who are 

disengaging with stake in the social and political milieu 

through nonviolent avenues to pursue their goals.137

Generalized social trust—in those institutions as well as 

in other community members—is vital to ensure that societies and institutions remain inclusive and capable of 

responding to the needs of people disengaging from 

violent extremism, as well as those of the community at 

large. Indeed, “fear reduces tolerance for outgroups, 

increases support for hawkish . . . policies and decreases political participation,” all of which undermine social 

cohesion and community resilience. Longitudinal and 

experimental studies have found that people “with 

higher levels of generalized [social] trust . . . had lower 
USIP.ORG 31

Wedding ceremonies for former Tamil Tiger rebel fighters—such as this in September 2013—have been part of the government’s rehabilitation program in the aftermath of Sri Lanka’s quarter-century-long civil war. (Photo by Eranga Jayawardena/AP)

levels of fear” after being confronted with a terrorist 

threat or attack.138 Building trust, then, is an important 

component of building cohesion and resilience.

Here too, peacebuilding contributions to disengagement and reconciliation can pay dividends. Dialogues 

can “bridge the gulf of mistrust between the civilian 

police and local communities” by outlining human 

security needs and promoting cooperation and understanding.139 When institutional capacity is low and grievances against authorities run high, civil society is often 

the bridge to affected individuals and communities, 

offering the trust and networks that governments 

lack.140 Sincerely engaging and building capacity of 

women, educators, religious actors, health systems, 

and other civil society organizations can simultaneously 

provide direct support and services to people disengaging from violent extremism and foster resilience by 

empowering communities to address components of 

the social environment that may contribute to violent 

radicalization.141 Conceived in this way, preventing violent extremism and disengaging from violent extremism 

are not at opposite ends of a continuum; instead, they 

close the circle and disrupt the cycle of violence. 
32 PEACEWORKS | NO. 163

De-Exceptionalization

Violent extremism is both an expression of violent conflict and a form of violence. Instead of applying peacebuilding and violence prevention practices, however, 

approaches to disengaging people from violent extremism have been primarily linear, derived from security and 

law enforcement imperatives and flawed assumptions. 

Like other forms of violence, extremist violence is a 

behavioral challenge. It is only one of a host of adverse 

outcomes from similar sets of risk factors and social 

ecologies. The literature on criminality, gang involvement, illicit drug use, addiction, self-harm, intimate 

violence, poor population health, and other forms of 

political violence highlight strikingly similar themes 

regarding community resilience, stigma, marginalization, relative depravation, access to services, trauma 

and adverse childhood events, and social and political 

grievances. Public health is an inherently multidisciplinary practice that incorporates complexity and social 

ecologies as a matter of course. This is what approaches such as behavioral health, violence prevention, 

and harm reduction are based on and what advanced 

public health methods such as causal inference in 

epidemiology and complex systems modeling excel 

at untangling. “A public health framework offers the 

interdisciplinary approach that is needed to disentangle the context-specific individual and societal [dynamics involved], as well as to identify clusters of services 

and multiple levels of action” from which to engage.142

Despite the securitization of violent extremism, it is 

not unique among behavioral challenges. Responses 

should mirror existing approaches to similar challenges 

that use social-ecological frameworks to leverage risk 

and protective factors existing in local communities, 

minimize risks and adverse effects of high-risk activities 

by increasing access to support services and building 

capacity and resilience in affected communities, and 

offer nonviolent alternatives by applying the principles 

presented in this report.

Center behavioral change. “There can be a physical 

disengagement from terrorist activity, but not concomitant change or reduction in ideological support.”143

Moreover, focusing on why someone’s beliefs and values are wrong can fortify their sense of righteousness, 

making it even more difficult to change their mind. 

Instead, behavioral science “suggests building and 

maintaining relationships with individuals who support 

and reinforce non-deviant behavior is vital to constructing a non-criminal identity.”144

Facilitate prosocial engagement. Sustained positive 

and inclusive engagement between those disengaging 

and community members and institutions provides a 

guide star to generate empathy, build social bonds, 

promote a sense of belonging, and offer an alternative 

identity that rejects violence as a way to resolve conflict, express agency, or pursue a goal. 

Consider the entire social ecology. People mobilize 

to engagement as the result of complex interactions 

among dynamics from across a host of social and cognitive dimensions. Likewise, disengagement opportunities 

may exist in each of those dimensions. For example,

Mental health and education professionals have increasingly turned towards building programs based in community assets, rather than focusing on deficits/problems, and 

recognizing the need to leverage strengths across the 

different levels of the social ecology. Strengths-based programming effectively engages families, leverages existing 

resources, and diminishes problems of stigma associated 

with more problem-focused approaches. Assuming a 
USIP.ORG 33

social-ecological approach allows for strengths from different levels of the social ecology like individual, community, 

and cultural, to be both acknowledged and leveraged.145

Disengagement efforts that consider not only individuals but also relationships, peer networks, communities, 

institutions, and political structures can expand the 

constellation of resilience factors likely to bring behavioral change.146

Apply trauma-informed care. Trauma may often present a significant barrier to disengagement, and several 

layers need to be addressed. These include antecedent 

trauma that may have contributed to a person’s initial 

mobilization to engage in violent extremism, trauma experienced while engaged in violent extremism, and trauma associated with reintegration into local communities. 

All of these can result in social avoidance responses that 

amplify feelings of isolation and exclusion and forestall 

help-seeking behavior. Collective trauma within communities affected by violent extremism may also need to be 

addressed, even healed, to facilitate sincere engagement with people who are disengaging.

Ensure access to care. Cognitive and emotional states 

that people may often experience during the disengagement process—such as hopelessness, loss, fear, grief, 

shame and humiliation, frustrated agency, anxiety, and 

trauma—can intensify feelings of isolation and alienation 

that can in turn contribute to recidivism.147 Behavioral 

health and psychosocial support mechanisms can 

address these challenges, but access to care is often 

limited due to stigma, capacity, or know-how. Leveraging 

technology, functions of tradition-based healing practices, community-based delivery platforms, and training 

and education can expand access. 

People from Mayange village, in Rwanda, sit and watch during a trial of a gacaca court on August 9, 2007. Rwanda relies on a traditional justice

system known as gacaca, which means “court on the grass,” to try those accused of genocide and other crimes. (Photo by Riccardo Gangale/AP)
34 PEACEWORKS | NO. 163

Watch your language. Given the importance of reducing stigma to facilitate prosocial engagement, it is critical to avoid stigmatizing language. Language has the 

neurological power to shape perceptions. Deliberately 

placing the person before the label—such as people 

disengaging from violent extremism—can avoid reinforcing the very identities people are disengaging from. 

Label the transformation. Symbols are key to identity 

formation, and people tend to conform to the behavioral 

expectations of the labels society gives them. Symbolically 

demarcating the transition to rehabilitated can in itself be a 

powerful tool contributing to the disengagement process.

Facilitate justice and accountability. Justice has two 

faces, one criminal and retributive, the other social and 

restorative. When criminal justice is not possible or prudent, restorative justice is crucial to redemption, healing, and reconciliation. Restorative justice involves “the 

notion that because crime hurts, justice should heal. . . . 

[And] no progressive social movement is likely to be effective without . . . promoting the just acknowledgement 

of [harm]” and responsibility for it.148 Community-based 

rituals, rights, and ceremonies can acknowledge the 

harm and ensure the acceptance of responsibility to restore dignity to victims.149 Compassionate and respectful 

dialogue that facilitates a narrative that gives meaning, 

acknowledges harm, promotes redemption, and opens 

spaces in which a new identity is offered is a powerful 

tool for disengagement from violent extremism. 

Link with prevention efforts. People disengaging 

from violent extremism often are doing so in the same 

environment in which they were initially mobilized to 

engage. Preventing a return to violence is paramount. 

This requires acknowledging and beginning to address 

the legitimate grievances and structural, political, and 

economic dynamics and risk factors that may have contributed to violent extremism to begin with. Although 

communities are critical stakeholders, the burden of 

these reforms cannot be placed entirely on civil society. Governments at all levels, from national to municipal, 

must approach communities with transparency and 

sincerity to build trust, diagnose challenges, and work 

together to devise and implement solutions.

Communal, political, and interpersonal violence and 

conflict often predate a person’s engagement in violent 

extremism. Conflicts and legitimate grievances also 

often persist after their period of engagement, as 

do behavioral health challenges and other adverse 

outcomes. Peacebuilding and public health provide 

approaches to address these issues in an integrated 

way because they span individual, relational, communal, and institutional dimensions. Indeed, peacebuilding 

and public health already address these challenges in 

other contexts—armed conflict, fragile states, gang and 

interpersonal violence, population health, social cohesion, community resilience. De-exceptionalizing violent 

extremism applies these same practices for people disengaging from violent extremism. Rather than marvel 

at how intractable the complexity of violent extremism 

is, the area of practice needs to engage with the other 

social disciplines that have had proven success at 

addressing similar social challenges.
USIP.ORG 35

Notes

The author thanks Setareh Motamedi and Mike Darden for their exhaustive support with research, examples, and so much more. 

Thanks also to Dr. John Horgan for providing research advice and expert guidance, four anonymous reviewers for thoughtful and 

constructive comments, and the United States Institute of Peace editorial team for making this report tangibly stronger. Finally, thanks 

to Leanne Erdberg Steadman for her steadfast belief in and support of this initiative.

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141. Nemr et al., “It Takes a Village.”

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144. Altier, Thoroughgood, and Horgan, “Turning Away from Terrorism,” 653.

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146. Michael Ungar, ed., The Social Ecology of Resilience: A Handbook of Theory and Practice (New York: Springer, 2012).

147. Niconchuk, “A Dangerous Displacement Crisis.”

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149. Huyse, introduction, 12–13.
ABOUT THE INSTITUTE

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Making Peace Possible

NO. 163 | July 2020

Violent extremism is an inherently social and behavioral form of conflict. Efforts to disengage 

people from violent extremism must therefore internalize knowledge from peacebuilding, 

violence prevention, and behavioral science. They must be equally social, lowering barriers 

to disengagement and opening community spaces for routine and prosocial interaction. 

Peacebuilding provides a toolbox aligned to just that—to rehumanize society in the eyes 

of those disengaging, and to rehumanize those disengaging in the eyes of society. Such 

reconciliation can transcend the tyranny of past actions and build relationships that can 

chart a pathway toward new nonviolent identities, more inclusive societies, and more 

resilient communities. This report presents a scaffolding for the peacebuilding contribution 

to disengagement from violent extremism that focuses on social and structural dynamics as 

well as on the individual.

• Myanmar’s Casino Cities: The Role of China and Transnational Criminal 

Networks by Jason Tower and Priscilla Clapp (Special Report, July 2020)

• Legislature and Legislative Elections in Afghanistan: An Analysis by A. Farid 

Tookhy (Special Report, July 2020)

• Understanding Russia’s Interest in Conflict Zones by Paul M. Carter, Jr. (Special 

Report, July 2020)

• The Challenges Facing the Philippines’ Bangsamoro Autonomous Region at 

One Year by Zachary Abuza and Luke Lischin (Special Report, June 2020)

• Bourgeois Jihad: Why Young, Middle-Class Afghans Join the Islamic State by 

Borhan Osman (Peaceworks, June 2020)

OTHER USIP PUBLICATIONS