United States Institute of Peace • www.usip.org • Tel. 202.457.1700 • Fax. 202.429.6063

UNITED STates institute of peace

© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

“For all the dire warnings 

about a return to civil war in 

Sudan and the gloomy scenarios envisioned by our organizations’ reports, it is worth 

recognizing that the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 

remains intact and in effect. ”

July 28, 2010 

Scenarios for Sudan’s Future, 

Revisited

Summary

•	 Many of the post-referendum scenarios in Sudan envisioned by the U.S. Institute of Peace and 

Clingendael Institute one year ago remain plausible today, less than six months prior to the 

referendum.

•	 While recent progress on post-referendum arrangements is encouraging, a return to a NorthSouth civil war is possible, and there is reason to be concerned about the stability of both 

states if the outcome of the referendum is secession.

•	 As the referendum approaches, it will be important for the South to develop a stronger sense 

of cohesion and common purpose given the uncertain and unprecedented environment 

following the vote.

•	 Productively engaging the opposition (armed and unarmed), incorporating marginalized 

ethnic and tribal groups into power structures, decentralizing authority, more equitably sharing resources, and refraining from supporting armed opposition against rivals are important 

principles for both parties to adhere to in any recipe for peace and stability. 

Sudan is less than six months away from a seminal event: the referendum on whether Southern 

Sudan remains part of a united Sudan or secedes. In an effort to stimulate discussion of and 

planning for the referendum and its aftermath, last year our two institutions—the United States 

Institute of Peace and the Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael—each 

conducted scenario development exercises designed to describe a few (by no means all) of the 

potential scenarios in Sudan surrounding the referendum. One year later, we are revisiting those 

scenarios to evaluate how they have held up and which ones appear most likely given recent 

developments in Sudan. 

Summarizing the Scenarios

USIP summarized three scenarios in the USIP Special Report, “Scenarios for Sudan: Avoiding Political Violence Through 2011”1

:

•	 “Muddling Through”—With concerted effort, robust international engagement, and some 

progress on key issues, the parties avoid large-scale violence. This requires collaboration 

and compromise between the parties on several key issues, such as oil management and 

revenue sharing.

Jon Temin

E-mail: jtemin@usip.org

Phone: 202.429.4726

JaÏr van der Lijn

E-mail: jlijn@clingendael.nl

Phone: +31 70 374 66 06

peaceBrieF42
© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

Scenarios for Sudan’s Future, Revisited

page 2 • PB 42 • July 28, 2010

•	 “Civil War, from Tinderbox to Conflagration”—The failure to build trust and address key 

issues between the North and South prior to the referendum results in violence after the 

referendum. A single incident, especially around Abyei or the oil fields, can trigger a return 

to war.

•	 “Costly Secession”—Without a change in its current capacity to govern, the South devolves 

into a downward spiral of violence, even in the absence of aggression from the North or a 

loss of existing donor support. The lack of a “peace dividend” at the grassroots is especially 

disruptive.

On the basis of two key questions—“Will Sudan remain united or will the South secede?” and 

“Will there be a renewed war between the North and South or can it be avoided?”—the Clingendael Institute described four scenarios in its report, “Sudan 2012: Scenarios for the Future”2

:

•	 “The Last War Revisited?” (war & united)—Southern Sudan declares itself unilaterally independent. Khartoum uses tribal discord to manage the rebellion and is able to control an 

unstable, conflict-ridden Southern Sudan. The Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) and 

the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) splinter as a result of Khartoum’s divide and rule 

strategy.

•	 “Border Wars” (war & secession)—The South chooses independence in the referendum. This 

choice is not acceptable to Khartoum, which decides to start a military offensive. The South 

unites in the face of a common enemy and keeps the northern forces at bay. Subsequently, 

the war continues, mainly in the border region. 

•	 “Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) Hurray!” (no war & united)—As a result of a renewed mediation effort by the international community, the peace process is rejuvenated. 

The elections are won by the Sudan People Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the northern 

opposition, who subsequently form a coalition with the National Congress Party (NCP). This 

new government starts a process of further democratization and redistribution of power 

and income, so that most marginalized groups no longer need to take up arms against 

Khartoum. Moreover, the atmosphere in Southern Sudan changes and the population 

regains confidence in the unity of the country.

•	 “Be Careful What You Wish For: Somalia?” (no war & secession)—Even before the South 

declares independence, various groups anticipate the coming redistribution of power. 

In the North, the conflicts in Darfur and other regions intensify, while the South faces an 

increasing number of tribal conflicts. After the referendum, in which the South chooses independence, the balance of power is lost. The South splinters into smaller parts controlled 

by various factions, while the North also loses its coherence.

The two scenario development exercises were conducted independently, using different 

methodologies and participants3, but the similarities between some of the outcomes were striking. 

Each included a scenario in which secession resulted in a new state in the South that is weak and 

racked by internal violence (“Costly Secession” and “Be Careful What You Wish For: Somalia?”). Each 

described a possible return to a North-South civil war, with fighting concentrated around the 

North-South border (“Civil War, from Tinderbox to Conflagration” and “Border Wars”). 

Both exercises also left little room for optimism. The best case USIP scenario is “Muddling 

Through.” The most optimistic Clingendael scenario is “CPA Hurray!,” which was assessed as 

plausible but unlikely. The USIP and Clingendael exercises both emphasized that Sudan’s future is 

unlikely to be free of violence and conflict, and both highlighted the need to negotiate key postreferendum arrangements in advance of the referendum.
© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

Scenarios for Sudan’s Future, Revisited

page 3 • PB 42 • July 28, 2010

The main difference between the exercises is that none of the USIP scenarios envisioned a vote 

for unity, whereas two of the Clingendael scenarios (“CPA Hurray!” and “The Last War Revisited?”) 

involve unity, both voluntary and forced. The prospect of southerners voting for unity seems even 

less likely now than it did one year ago; the time remaining to make unity attractive is minimal, and 

the unity campaign promised by the North after the April elections is just getting off the ground. 

Two of the Clingendael scenarios and all of the USIP scenarios envisioned the referendum 

occurring on time. For all the dire warnings about a return to civil war in Sudan and the gloomy 

scenarios envisioned by our organizations’ reports, it is worth recognizing that the CPA remains 

intact and in effect. Over the past year, several issues and events could have led to the unraveling 

of the CPA, including the disputed census, contentious legislation (including the Southern Sudan 

Referendum Act, the Abyei Referendum Act and the National Security Act), and the recent nationwide elections. None of these challenges were handled by the NCP and SPLM with particular grace 

or subtlety (elite bargaining between the parties remains the norm), but all were managed and 

widespread violence avoided. Of course, the referendum will be the ultimate test of the parties’ 

ability to collaborate and avoid disaster, in part because the SPLM has compromised in other areas 

while clearly signaling that they will not compromise on the referendum.

Revisiting the USIP Scenarios

All three USIP scenarios seem plausible one year later. The “Civil War” scenario may be less likely 

now that some of the possible seeds of political violence identified in that scenario—the census, 

elections and referendum legislation—are in the past. But other possible triggers—such as oil 

revenue sharing, border demarcation and citizenship—remain to be negotiated, with disagreement over oil and revenue sharing possessing the greatest potential for instigating North-South 

violence.

The “Costly Secession” scenario remains worryingly possible. The USIP report identified six 

factors that could trigger large-scale political violence in the South: 

•	 failure to distribute food, water and power and build basic infrastructure (still a concern, as 

there is little tangible “peace dividend” to speak of); 

•	 intertribal conflict (which has generally increased over the past year, though may have 

decreased in recent months); 

•	 violence in Southern Kordofan or Blue Nile states (encouragingly, there has been relatively 

little in the past year); 

•	 the GoSS’s inability to disarm militias (minimal progress made and some tensions exacerbated by disarmament efforts); 

•	 lack of decentralization of power (only limited decentralization has occurred); and

•	 the North’s failure to lend assistance to avoid violence in the South (there is no reason to 

believe the North has worked to deter violence in the South). 

All six factors still have the potential to destabilize the South.

Encouragingly, the “Muddling Through” scenario may be more likely now than one year ago. The 

report identified five ingredients to building the confidence and stability essential to this scenario: 

•	 compromise on the census (which has occurred); 

•	 acceptance of election and referendum results (election results were not wholly accepted 

but contestations have been muted; acceptance of the referendum results remains a massive factor); 
© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

Scenarios for Sudan’s Future, Revisited

page 4 • PB 42 • July 28, 2010

•	 developing a shared vision of the future (little progress, though negotiations on postreferendum arrangements may help); 

•	 reaching a negotiated settlement or other resolution concerning the status of the three areas (the Permanent Court of Arbitration verdict on Abyei was largely accepted and legislation governing the Abyei referendum and Popular Consultation processes passed, but how 

those processes play out remains hugely influential); and

•	 Darfur does not become a source of escalating violence (sadly violence has increased 

significantly in recent months). 

That the “Muddling Through” scenario may be slightly more likely to occur than the other 

scenarios is cause for cautious optimism.

Revisiting the Clingendael Scenarios

The two key questions in the Clingendael scenarios—whether the country remains one or the 

South secedes, and whether there will be a return to war—remain relevant. Looking at the four 

scenarios, all but one remain plausible.

If war cannot be avoided, the relative strength of the South and North, to a large extent, 

determines whether “Border Wars” or “The Last War Revisited?” is more likely. If both parties remain 

coherent and find themselves in a relative power balance, the former scenario becomes more 

likely. If the North has the upper hand and the South is unable to remain united, the latter scenario 

becomes more likely.

The precondition for the “CPA Hurray!” scenario was free, fair and uncontested elections. This 

condition was not met, making this the one scenario which is no longer plausible. In the original 

report, however, an alternative scenario involving unity and no return to war was suggested: “Stagnation.” In this scenario, elites in Khartoum and Juba have little to gain from a change in the status 

quo and cooperate with each other. Sudanese and international actors carry on, continuing to 

hold Sudan together and address problems in an ad hoc manner. Although the country is formally 

still united, in the North, certain areas, such as Darfur, continue to rebel against Khartoum, while in 

the South, marginalized areas increasingly resist and push back against Juba. Essentially, “Stagnation” is not very different from “Be Careful What You Wish For: Somalia?” Paradoxically, because 

progress has been made over the past year towards a peaceful referendum and possible secession, 

this latter scenario becomes more likely. This underlines the need to confront the formidable task 

of managing internal conflicts in both the North and South.

Going Forward

It is late in coming, but there has been some encouraging recent progress in addressing a main 

concern raised in the USIP and Clingendael reports regarding post-referendum arrangements. For 

example, the NCP and SPLM signed a memorandum of understanding in late June that outlines 

the structure of negotiations over post-referendum arrangements that began in July. They will 

need to progress quickly, however, as the window for negotiations will be open for probably only 

three or four months until the hype surrounding the referendum takes hold. The top of the list of 

issues to be negotiated should be post-referendum oil sector management and revenue sharing.

Both reports emphasized the potential for increased South-South and North-North violence. 

In addition to negotiating post-referendum arrangements, both the North and South need to 

develop strategies to productively engage the opposition (armed and unarmed) and incorporate 

marginalized ethnic and tribal groups into power structures, while decentralizing authority and 
© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

USIP provides the analysis, training and 

tools that prevent and end conflicts, 

promotes stability and professionalizes 

the field of peacebuilding.

For media inquiries, contact the office 

of Public Affairs and Communications, 

202.429.4725

About This Brief

This Peace Brief was written by 

Jon Temin, a senior program 

officer at USIP, and Jaïr van der 

Lijn, a senior research fellow at 

the Clingendael Institute, both 

of whom focus much of their 

work on Sudan. The Netherlands 

Institute of International Relations 

Clingendael works to identify 

and analyze emerging political 

and social developments for the 

benefit of government and the 

general public.

more equitably sharing resources. Both parties also need to refrain from supporting armed opposition against each other. Strategies that pursue a union of the marginalized against Khartoum or a 

divide and rule approach in the South have a good chance of backfiring and creating an uncontrollable chaos. 

Finally, the Southern leadership needs to develop a strategy for generating a stronger, broader 

sense of cohesion and common purpose across the South. Much of what unifies the South today 

is the perceived common enemy in the North and the promise held by the referendum. Whether 

the referendum results in secession or continuation of the CPA-style of governance featuring a 

semi-autonomous GoSS, now is the time for an inclusive dialogue on the bonds that can be the 

basis for stronger Southern cohesion.

Endnotes

1. http://www.usip.org/resources/scenarios-sudan-avoiding-political-violence-through-2011 

2. http://www.clingendael.nl/cscp/publications/?id=7626

3. The USIP exercise involved Sudan experts outside of Sudan, while the Clingendael workshops 

were conducted in Sudan with Sudanese.

Scenarios for Sudan’s Future, Revisited

page 5 • PB 42 • July 28, 2010