US Air Force 

Counterproliferation Center

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

Norman Cigar

Considering a Nuclear Gulf:

Thinking About Nuclear Weapons 

in Saudi Arabia
CONSIDERING A NUCLEAR GULF:

Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

by 

Norman Cigar

USAF Counterproliferation Center

325 Chennault Circle

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6427

November 2013
Disclaimer

ii

The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or

implied in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily

reflect the views of the Air University, Air Force, or Department of

Defense.

ISBN 978-0-9914849-0-4
Contents

iii

Chapter Page

Disclaimer ...............................................................................................ii

Abstract .................................................................................................vii

About the Author....................................................................................ix

1 Introduction..............................................................................................1

Bounding the Problem......................................................................1

The Terms ofReference and Methodology.......................................2

Analytical Tools ...................................................................2

ConstructinganAssessment–TheAvailableData......................5

2 OfficialSaudiPolicyPerspectivesonNuclearWeapons..........................11

Saudi Arabia’s Traditional Stand....................................................11

EmergingOfficialSaudiDeclaratoryIndications............................12

3 The Dynamics of Saudi Strategic Culture ...............................................19

TheDecision-MakingProcessinSaudi Arabia................................20

TheCentrality of Regime Legitimacy.............................................22

Defense of the Realm...............................................................24

Defense of the Region..............................................................27

Defense of the Umma ..............................................................28

DefenseoftheEconomicPillarofLegitimacy...........................29

4 TheEvolution ofSaudiNuclearThreatAssessments ..............................35

The Long-Standing Israeli Threat...................................................36

Refocusing to Iran............................................................................. 39

Mobilizing the Saudi Public ...........................................................40

ShapingRegional Threat Perceptions.............................................42

5 Analyzing the Threat in Riyadh:

Why is a Nuclear Iran So Dangerous? ....................................................47

Iran’sNuclear Program:MilitaryorCivilian?.................................48

Creating a New Hegemony.............................................................48

ExportingtheRevolutionand“OffensiveDeterrence”..........................51
iv

Nuclear Weapons and Warfighting.................................................53

TheThreat to Saudi Arabia’s Economy ..........................................56

6 Thinking in Terms of Solutions: Stopping Iran ........................................ 65

Doing Nothing?..............................................................................65

AForeignNuclearUmbrella as anAlternative?...............................67

The Active Options – Striking Or Squeezing Iran’s Nuclear

Program? ...................................................................................72

The Strike Option ...............................................................72

Squeezing Iran –TheSoftPowerOption..............................76

Watching and Waiting ........................................................77

7 Thinking in Terms of Solutions:

Considering a Saudi Nuclear Option ......................................................89

Saudi Arabia’s Traditional View of a Nuclear Option and Its

Evolution...................................................................................89

NuclearProliferation and the Issue ofFairness................................91

Promoting Nuclear Weapons..........................................................92

TheGeneralDesirability ofNuclearWeapons.........................92

An “Arab” or “Gulf” Deterrent .........................................93

BeingCandid –ASaudi Deterrent ......................................95

Explaining Saudi Openness................................................97

8 Thinking about Nuclear Strategy..........................................................105

Conceptualizing Nuclear Deterrence ............................................105

NuclearDeterrenceandDealingwiththeGreatPowers........................109

Dealingwith theGreatPowers.........................................109

NorthKorea:ASuccessStoryinDeterrence? .........................111

DrawingLessonsfromNorthKorea...........................111

The2013CrisiswithNorthKorea..........................113

How to Implement Deterrence......................................................115

EstablishingCredibility....................................................115

AvoidingEscalationDominance.......................................116

Beefing Up the Strategic Rocket Force and the Space

Sector............................................................................117

SaudiArabia’sBallisticMissiles...........................117

TheNascentSpaceSector.....................................118
v

Integrating a Nuclear Capability into the Saudi Force

Structure .......................................................................119

ThePotentialMechanics ofAcquisition........................................120

9 WhereDoestheCivilianNuclearPowerSectorFitIn?............................ 133

Nuclear Energy Plans...................................................................133

NuclearEnergyand National Security..........................................134

10 TheReligiousSector:LegitimizationandAccountability ...........................139

The Theological Reasoning..........................................................139

MeshingReligion withRealpolitik ...............................................141

11 Reshaping Relations within an Evolving Gulf

Nuclear Environment .........................................................................147

TransformingtheGulfCooperationCouncil?................................147

Emphasizing the Nuclear Factor...................................................148

OfferingaSaudiNuclearUmbrella?.................................148

Increasing Saudi Leverage with the International

Community....................................................................149

Promoting the Idea of Union.........................................................150

Gulf Responses ............................................................................151

AcknowledgingtheGrowingThreat..................................151

DissonantViewsontheNuclearIssue ...............................152

Sensitivity to SaudiHegemony ..........................................153

12 TheRouhaniEra in Iran:ThePotentialImpact and Implications........................161

Assessing President Rouhani........................................................161

AdaptingtoNewDevelopmentsinIran’sPolicy............................162

13 Conclusions.........................................................................................165

ASaudiNuclearOptionWouldBeLikely...If...............................165

InternationalLeverageMaySometimesBeLimited............................167

ModifyingtheThreatEnvironmentCanHelp................................169

SaudiArabia:Commonalities andUniqueness..............................170
vi
vii

W

Abstract

hy countries seek to acquire nuclear weapons has posed a longstanding dilemma for scholars and policymakers. This study

analyzes Saudi thinking about nuclear weapons in light of the

pattern of recent suggestions by official circles that Riyadh could also seek

nuclear weapons if Iran does so. The approach of the study is “inside out,”

with a focus on the Saudis’ own perspective, and relies heavily on local

sources, grounded in the framework of Saudi strategic culture. The

regime’s need to retain its legitimacy, embodied in a requirement to

defend the country and the region from an Iranian threat, has provided a

key impulse to addressing the nuclear issue, and Riyadh has been building

a number of blocks with a view toward preparing the domestic and

regional publics if and when the time comes to exercise its nuclear option.

Riyadh’s nuclear threat perceptions have shifted from Israel to a focus on

a more imminent Iranian Shia threat. The principal concern in Riyadh has

been that a nuclear-armed Iran would use the new capability as a deterrent

screen behind which it could engage in aggressive behavior toward its

neighbors, secure from retaliation, and that the only effective counter is a

Saudi nuclear deterrent.

The domestic Saudi civilian and military media have been mobilized

to provide analysis and support for a nuclear option, and have expanded

on and clarified the often ambiguous official policy statements on the

nuclear issue. The small neighboring states have been encouraged to

support a potential nuclear-armed Saudi Arabia, the religious

establishment has been elicited to provide legitimacy for nuclear weapons,

and the strategic rocket force has seen a development of its infrastructure

in order to enhance credibility of a deterrent. Saudi Arabia is skeptical of

any “nuclear umbrella” extended by the United States. The study

concludes that there is a strong likelihood that Saudi Arabia will seek to

acquire nuclear weapons when and if Iran does so; that the case of Saudi

Arabia suggests that in some instances the international community’s

leverage to prevent nuclear proliferation may be limited; and that if Saudi

Arabia does acquire nuclear weapons this may be the prelude to an

additional spate of proliferation in the region. And, while at first glance,
Saudi Arabia would appear to constitute a classic example of the realist

security model – where state security interests determine a recourse to

nuclear proliferation – local characteristics necessitate an adaptation of

such a model to reflect the country’s social and political uniqueness and

reaffirm the multicausality approach in understanding the motivation for

countries to select a nuclear option.

viii
ix

N

About the Author

orman Cigar is Director of Regional Studies and the Minerva

Research Chair at the Marine Corps University, Quantico,

Virginia. Previously, he was on the staff of the Marine Corps

Command and Staff College and the Marine Corps School of Advanced

Warfighting. He was also a senior political-military analyst in the

Pentagon, where he was responsible for the Middle East in the Office of

the Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence. He has published

Saddam’s Nuclear Vision: An Atomic Shield and Sword for Conquest;

Libya’s Nuclear Disarmament: Lessons and Implications for Nuclear

Proliferation; and Thinking about Nuclear Power in Post-Saddam Iraq.

Dr. Cigar holds a DPhil from Oxford (St Antony’s College) in Middle East

History and Arabic; an M.I.A. from the School of International and Public

Affairs and a Certificate from the Middle East Institute, Columbia

University; and an M.S.S.I. from the National Intelligence University. He

has studied and traveled widely in the Middle East.
CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Bounding the Problem

The proliferation of nuclear weapons is likely to pose a continuing

challenge to U.S. interests and to regional and international security and

stability, and perhaps nowhere is this more evident than in the Middle

East. Efforts to halt or manage this process must address how regional

powers decide whether or not to acquire nuclear weapons and how they

might plan to use them, although this may not always be an easy process,

given the often closed nature of decision-making in that region. Saudi

Arabia is certainly interested in the issue of nuclear weapons and may be

one of those countries at least contemplating the possibility of joining the

nuclear club at some time in the future. The intent of this study is to

determine the dynamics of the nuclear issue specifically in Saudi Arabia

but, at the same time, more broadly, to also gauge to what extent Saudi

Arabia’s experience conforms to or differs from prevailing theories about

nuclear proliferation.

Over the past few years, Saudi Arabia has been developing the

various components of the policy, institutional, and military environment

that could lay the groundwork for the option to acquire nuclear weapons at

the appropriate moment in the future – if and when that decision is taken

in response, in particular, to any acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran,

whether in the near or more distant future. For example, one can identify a

focus on mobilizing support in both the civilian sector of the population

and in the military, as one can see from the media intended for each

audience. Moreover, in more tangible terms, there has been an effort

ranging from securing religious approval for nuclear weapons to visibly

developing the country’s Strategic Rocket Force and the nascent space

program. Even the promotion of nuclear power in the civilian sector can

Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

2

be seen, at least tangentially, as part of this process, if only by reinforcing

the legitimacy of nuclear power. In addition, this book will address other

parameters of Saudi thinking about nuclear threats and nuclear weapons,

including Saudi thinking on deterrence and the impact a nuclear threat

could have on reshaping relations within the Gulf.

At this juncture, with the on-going diplomatic developments in the

fall of 2013, there is a possibility of a negotiated agreement between

Tehran and the international community addressing the issue of Iran’s

nuclear program, and that could have a significant impact on Saudi policy.

Nevertheless, this book will remain relevant, as the focus here is on the

deliberations in Saudi Arabia about nuclear-related policy options that are

enduring and that illustrate what is perhaps representative of assessments

and discussions within most countries facing the prospect of a nucleararmed neighbor and the need to address the resulting change in the threat

environment. Moreover, in tangible terms, the development by Riyadh of

the basic institutional components and political conditions for a potential

nuclear capability, as analyzed in this book, will remain in place (and

probably be developed further), ready for activation if there should be a

reversal at any time in the future in what appears to be Iran’s present

evolving accommodating policy orientation.

The Terms of Reference and Methodology

Analytical Tools

Scholars have long sought to understand why some countries decide

to embark on a nuclear path while others do not, and elements of the

resulting approaches or models may be helpful in analyzing Saudi Arabia.

Conversely, conclusions drawn in this book may qualify or call into

question at least certain facets of such models. Moreover, this book will

seek to separate the commonalities which the Saudi case may share with

general concepts of proliferation applicable to other similar situations

from what may be specific to Saudi Arabia.

Efforts to develop a universal model to explain nuclear proliferation

have deepened our understanding of the phenomenon but have not

generated a consensus, despite a substantial scholarly literature on the

subject.1 Analytical approaches, however, have coalesced into overarching
Introduction

3

models relying, in very broad terms, on “realism” or on “idealism.” Both

models are in a sense deterministic, each in its way, and, while

contributing insights into the phenomenon of proliferation, have difficulty

in accounting for decision-making that does not conform to constraints

suggested by these models.

The realist perspective of nuclear proliferation, in its essence, has

focused on international security threats (especially nuclear ones), coupled

with the absence of adequate alternative options such as reliable alliances,

as the stimulus for states to pursue nuclear weapons.2 An alternative

idealist approach views the preceding model as weakened by the many

exceptions of countries that do not follow that path as the realist model

would posit they would, and focuses instead on a country’s national,

cultural, or individual-actor aspects as an analytical and explanatory tool.

The idealist model sees as key, in particular, the psychology of individual

decision-makers, who respond to national security threats based on a

psychological national identity, for “the decision to acquire nuclear

weapons is not only a means to the end of getting them; it is also an end in

itself, a matter of self-expression...The oppositional nationalist’s

emotional impulsions in this direction are so strong that the mere arrival in

power of such a leader is practically a sufficient condition to spark a

decision to build the bomb.”3

Peter Lavoy, in an insightful overview of such models, identifies

empirical shortcomings in the prevailing approaches –often arising in the

form of countries which do not conform to specific theories.4 He finds the

realist model too abstract, and unable to explain the timing or the specific

political, technical, or psychological variables which may determine

decision-making on proliferation.5Likewise, while seeing the idealist

model as better at accounting for cultural and national specificities,

motives, and decision-making styles of individual countries, he believes

that model, too, has limitations insofar as it cannot explain why

policymakers ignore constraints.6

The “why” of acquisition is often intertwined with sets of macroindicators that have been developed to help recognize decision points or

stages of a process leading toward or away from proliferation. In this

respect, Lavoy proposes a helpful analytical tool, what he calls “nuclear

mythmaking.” This perspective makes possible a more inclusive analytical

approach by allowing for due appreciation of genuine security threats
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

4

while offering a framework by which to recognize and assess the process

as a continuum toward or away from the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

Specifically, Lavoy draws attention to national elites engaging in what he

calls “nuclear mythmaking.” Nuclear mythmaking:

 Emphasizes a country’s insecurity or its poor international

standing.

 Portrays this strategy as the best corrective for these problems.

 Articulates the political, economic, and technical feasibility of

acquiring nuclear weapons.

 Successfully associates these beliefs and arguments (nuclear

myths) with existing cultural norms and political priorities.

 Convinces senior decision-makers to accept and act on these

views.7

Scott Sagan also offers a useful critique to the conventional

understanding of why countries decide to go or not to go nuclear.8 He

identifies three alternative motivations or models – the “security model,”

that is recourse to nuclear weapons in order to increase security in

response to foreign threats; a “domestic politics model,” that is the use of

nuclear weapons as a tool to advance domestic and bureaucratic interests;

and a “norms model,” where nuclear weapons serve as a symbol of a

state’s modernity and identity – and demonstrates the applicability and

limitations of each of these. While some cases support one or another of

the models as an explanatory framework, he points out that others may

not. Instead, he makes a convincing case for a more complex analysis

requiring a range of variables. As he puts it, “multicausality...lies at the

heart of nuclear proliferation. Nuclear proliferation and nuclear restraint

have occurred in the past, and can occur in the future, for more than one

reason: different historical cases are best explained by different causal

methods.”9

Insights and limitations drawn from both general taxonomies can be

adapted to analyze the Saudi case and will be used here, even if at times

their tenets may be embedded only implicitly in directing the analysis.
Introduction

5

Constructing an Assessment –The Available Data

One cannot consider the issue of Saudi Arabia and nuclear weapons

in terms of assessing from the outside what the country ought to do or

what would be in its best interest. Rather, a more productive and realistic

approach is to turn the problem “inside-out,” that is, to evaluate the

situation from a country’s perspective, in this case proceeding based on

Saudi Arabia’s own security calculus. How accurate Saudi assessments are

is less important than the fact that Saudis view the situation as they do.

Key to appreciating Saudi Arabia’s thinking is an analysis of what Saudis

at various levels say and an assessment of Saudi discussions within a

framework of that country’s strategic, or security, culture. At the same

time, in parallel to verbal evidence, one should also take into consideration

tangible actions related to the issue of nuclear weapons, such as

developments in Saudi Arabia’s Strategic Rocket Force, the civilian

nuclear sector, and the mobilization of legitimacy in the religious

establishment, which complement policy statements and discussions in the

civilian and military media. In a way, all these components can be viewed

as building blocks of a cohesive, if imperfectly visible and incomplete,

policy initiative.

Access to information on Saudi Arabia is not easy, given the

country’s closed political system, and this study relies on information in

the public domain and, in particular, on official declarations and on the

Saudi media. Saudi sources vary in their significance and function.

Declaratory statements by officials in the government, and especially by

senior members of the royal family, of course, carry the greatest weight.

Political and strategic decisions are the purview of a narrow leadership

elite consisting of the senior levels of the royal family and opinions the

royals express in public seldom stray from the consensus developed within

the royal family.

However, the resulting official positions expressed are often scanty,

opaque, and undeveloped, and information is routinely held tightly and

stove-piped for security reasons or for internal political leverage, so that

one must look elsewhere for more complete expositions of Saudi thinking.

Even well-placed Saudis may find official thinking unclear, as was the

case with one frustrated senior Air Defense Forces officer who criticized,

even if obliquely, the lack of clear guidance for defense planning, noting
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

6

that, “What is needed is transparency and clarity by other parts of the

government with respect to any information needed to draft strategy; there

is a need to overcome the resistance by some authorities about stating

clearly what the assumed security threats are.”10

Although the Saudi decision-making process is obscure, important

decisions normally cannot be formulated and implemented in a vacuum,

but must be integrated into a broader context of national consensus, or at

least of acquiescence, and major policy decisions normally are

accompanied by extensive efforts to prepare, explain, and convince not

only the domestic public but often also regional and international opinion.

In some instances, the media can be used to lay the groundwork for policy

as appears to have been the case here, where support for such issues as the

concept of nuclear deterrence and nuclear weapons acquisition was visible

in the media even before Saudi officials began to speak on the subject.

In that respect, discussions, editorials, and opinion pieces in the Saudi

media can facilitate an understanding of official policy, especially given

the tight functional control which the government exercises over the

mainstream media on significant issues. It is in such public, though

controlled, fora that major decisions and their rationale frequently are

elaborated subsequently by civilian and military analysts and the

government’s unofficial spokesmen. Even then, the supporting analytical

structure can still be incomplete and emerge piecemeal through such

discussions over time, but such writing is normally consistent and

supportive of policy decisions, reflecting a general media consensus which

it is assumed official circles can accept.

The Saudi media is notable for its avoidance of what the regime

would consider embarrassing or sensitive issues, especially if they relate

directly to the royal family, and editors, conscious of the potential

consequences, routinely operate on the basis of self-censorship.11 The

mainstream electronic media is state-owned and the state exercises firm

control over the rest of media using multiple mechanisms. For example,

the government may communicate official policy directly to editors. The

previous monarch, King Fahd, would contact journalists directly to follow

up on news items and was even known to request to see individual media

items in order to act as arbiter on their suitability.12 More generally, the

government appoints or at least must approve all editors of the print and

electronic media. While some media outlets are more liberal or more
Introduction

7

conservative than others, the range remains within accepted limits.

Boundaries of expression can be tested on such issues as poor housing,

unemployment, high prices, or women’s rights, but major national security

or foreign policy issues remain a sensitive topic where public discussions

are likely only with official permission.

Censorship is practiced on a daily basis on individual articles.

Although cartoons are often allowed to express opinions considerably

more openly than is the written text, and visual images carry a powerful

message, they, too, are subject to limits. While one may find an occasional

item in the media that is an outlier from the norm, patterns of such an

orientation are highly unlikely. A persistent pattern of testing those limits

can result in a corrective, with an editor dismissed or a newspaper or

electronic outlet shut down temporarily or permanently, or offending

journalists blacklisted. The media and the pundits it features at times must

intuit official policy based on limited guidance, although in some cases

those in positions of responsibility in the media may already share the

same views on an issue as the policymakers. The thousands of electronic

blogs, tribal websites and satellite channels, and the social media in Saudi

Arabia, while monitored, seem to be controlled considerably less tightly

than is the mainstream media. However, any dissident group’s media is

invariably based abroad. Most Saudis also have access to Arab-language

satellite television programs from other countries, at least those based in

neighboring countries, such as Al-Jazira (Qatar) and Al-Arabiya (United

Arab Emirates), but these are usually also careful to avoid direct criticism

of the Saudi ruling family.

The Saudi media, in many ways, can be likened to a lopsided

transmission belt, serving as an informal, though semi-official, vehicle

presenting and promoting government policy to the public. Also, to a

lesser degree, it can serve as a rudimentary barometer of public opinion

through reader comments on the internet versions of the media (though not

all such feedback is necessarily published). At the same time, in the

absence of political parties, labor unions, or an independent media to

reflect public views, the government uses the media not only as a vehicle

to communicate policy, but also as a way to foster some controlled

discussions by permitting the airing of different views if there has been no

decision taken, if the government seeks to generate ideas or, rarely, if

different stands reflect divided views within government circles. Of
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

8

course, such discussions are kept within accepted parameters and are not

allowed to stray into criticism of the royal family or of its decisions.

Likewise, the media provides information and guidance for the informal

discussions among family and friends – the majlis – that take place in the

homes of the informed public.

Sustained coverage in the Saudi media of a topic is a good indicator

of official interest in an issue. In recent years, the amount of attention in

the media devoted to nuclear weapons would spike whenever there was an

increase in threat perceptions, such as in the tense 2002-2003 period

preceding the Iraq invasion, in 2006 when Iran announced a breakthrough

in enriching uranium, and, again, since 2010, when the assumption that

Iran was moving inexorably towards success with its nuclear program

gained currency in Saudi circles.

Saudi Arabia’s military media, like its civilian counterpart, is also

controlled from above and is used to inform military personnel of official

policy. However, the military media also serves as an important

professional forum to discuss and develop ideas from an expert vantage

point, especially concepts of a theoretical or technical nature, including the

general outline of military doctrine, and to provide military assessments of

other countries’ capabilities. As such, the military media complements the

civilian media and provides insights on military and security issues from

an additional perspective.

The Saudi media can be used to send messages on sensitive issues to

the informed public or to governments in friendly or hostile countries that

might otherwise be embarrassing if done officially, while benefiting from

a degree of plausible denial. The media can also serve as a test-bed for

trial balloons, introducing ideas to gauge the reaction they might generate

at home or abroad. In this case, the possibility of a Saudi nuclear option

was floated in the local media before it was broached openly by officials.

The Saudi-owned international media, at times more adventurous than that

at home, most often also reflects official thinking on sensitive issues and

can also be used to inform and send indirect messages to, in particular,

other Arab audiences.13 When foreigners write in the Saudi press, they are

subject to the same restrictions as domestic writers, although their foreign

status may lend a veneer of plausible denial to their views. The reprinting

of items from other countries in the Saudi media can lend yet additional

layer of plausible denial.
Introduction

9

While the details or focus of individual media items in Saudi Arabia

may differ, the principal thrust of the approach to any topic is likely to be

consistent. Although one may find an occasional article that is an outlier

from the norm, patterns of such an orientation are highly unlikely. As

such, an analysis of the controlled civilian and professional military media

can provide insights into official thinking on any given issue.

Notes

1. Tanya Ogilvie-White carried out a particularly comprehensive analysis of the

strengths and weaknesses of various theoretical approaches in “Is There a Theory of

Nuclear Proliferation? An Analysis of the Contemporary Debate,” The Nonproliferation

Review, iv, 1, Fall 1996, 43-60.

2. For an elaborated version of this model by its originator see, Kenneth N. Waltz,

“Toward Nuclear Peace,” in Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz, eds., 4th edition , The

Use of Force. (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1993), 527-55.

3. Jacques E.C. Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity,

Emotions, and Foreign Policy. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 35-36.

4. Peter R. Lavoy, “Nuclear Proliferation over the Next Decade: Causes, Warning

Signs, and Policy Responses,” The Nonproliferation Review, xiii, 3, November 2006,

434-54.

5. Ibid., 434.

6. Ibid., 435.

7. Ibid.

8. Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in

Search of a Bomb,” International Security, xxi, Winter 1996-97, 54-86.

9. Ibid. 85.

10. Staff Brigadier General Muhammad bin Yahya Al-Jadii, “Idad al-istiratijiya alaskariya: al-tahaddiyat wa’l-suubat” [Preparing Military Strategy: The Challenges and

the Difficulties], Quwwat Al-Difa Al-Jawwi Al-Malaki Al-Saudi (Riyadh), On-line,

Internet, 13 December 2011, available from www.rsadf.gov.sa/Pub_mq1T.asp?ID=6.

Quwwat Al-Difa Al-Jawwi Al-Malaki Al-Saudi is the Saudi Air Defense Forces’ official

journal.
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

10

11. On censorship in the Saudi media, see John R. Bradley, Saudi Arabia Exposed;

Inside a Kingdom in Crisis. (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005), 181-204.

12. Interview with journalist Badr Ahmad Karim, “Dardasha an al-idhaa wa-wikalat

al-anba’” [Chatting About Radio Broadcasting and the News Agency], Al-Bilad (Jeddah),

On-line, Internet, 23 December 2010, available from www.albiladdaily.com/

print.php?action=print&m=newsm&id=67550, and Mishal Al-Anazi, “Thana’ al-malik

Fahd bin Abd al-Aziz ala dawrih al-idhai bi-musalsal Sawalif Al-Nas” [Praise for King

Fahd bin Abd Al-Aziz for His Media Role in the Sawalif Al-Nas TV Serial], Al-Riyadh

(Riyadh), On-line, Internet, 3 December 2010, available from www.al-riyadh.com/2010/

12/03/article581797.html.

13. In the case of the two most influential Arabic-language international

newspapers, the late Defense Minister, Prince Sultan, owned Al-Hayat (which

presumably remains in his family), while other well-placed royals, Prince Al-Walid bin

Talal and Prince Faysal bin Salman (son of the current Minister of Defense) own AlSharq Al-Awsat.
CHAPTER 2

Official Saudi Policy Perspectives on Nuclear

Weapons

Overall, the trend emanating from Saudi Arabia has been that of an

integrated message at all levels indicating a perception of an increasing

threat and, in particular, of a nuclear threat. Furthermore, the threat that

has often been projected is one that Saudis deem as unacceptable, as it

would imperil vital national interests, and one that one could not be

ignored.

Saudi Arabia’s Traditional Stand

Traditionally, Saudi spokesmen were always eager to disavow any

interest in nuclear weapons. As far back as at least 1990, the then-Minister

of Defense and eventually Crown Prince, Prince Sultan (d. 2011), himself

insisted that “the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has the capability of acquiring

and developing nuclear weapons but, as is well known, the Kingdom is at

the forefront of the states that are calling to make the Middle East a

nuclear-free zone.”1Even in the more recent past, Saudi Arabia routinely

would deny any intention to acquire nuclear weapons. For example, the

Saudi Foreign Minister, Prince Saud Al-Faysal, when asked in 2006

whether his country would consider seeking nuclear weapons if Iran did

so, replied categorically “No, we will not. We do not believe that it gives

any country security to build nuclear weapons.”2In fact, in 2006, Prince

Sultan dismissed nuclear weapons as of no importance, contending that

“We in the Kingdom do not need them.”3To be sure, even then, some

Saudi messages at times were somewhat cryptic. In December 2005,

Prince Turki Al-Faysal – former Director General of Saudi Arabia’s

Intelligence Agency and former ambassador to Great Britain and, at the
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

12

time, Saudi ambassador to the United States – rejected speculation that

Saudi Arabia would follow suit if Iran acquired nuclear weapons, stating

that the Saudis “will not follow the nuclear path under any circumstance

because that would contribute to an arms race in the region.” However, at

the same time, he had also alerted the Saudi public that if Iran developed

nuclear weapons “many neighboring states will also follow its example.”4

Elsewhere, Prince Sultan sought to dispel persistent reports of

Pakistani-Saudi cooperation in the nuclear field. As he put it, “Saudi

Arabia categorically does not believe in nuclear means and nuclear

weapons because they would annihilate human life and what was said

about there being Pakistani-Saudi cooperation is completely unfounded.”5

With an Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons then not foreseen in the

immediate future, such denials would have made sense if they were

intended not to arouse international concern.

More Recent Official Saudi Declaratory Indications

However, a shift in statements by members of the royal family about

the possibility of Saudi Arabia’s reacting to Iran’s acquisition of nuclear

weapons by also following that route began to be noticeable over the past

few years. In general, normally reticent Saudi government officials and

other public figures became increasingly willing to address that issue,

albeit sometimes indirectly. To be sure, nuclear weapons are a delicate

topic in the international community and official references to Saudi

Arabia’s nuclear option remained largely in the realm of hints and

allusions, often in terms of references to “the Gulf countries” or “the

Arabs” as those likely to adopt a nuclear response to an Iranian nuclear

threat.

Prince Turki Al-Faysal became perhaps the most visible Saudi

spokesman on the regional and international scene for such an option,

although he has had to be especially careful in his choice of words when

dealing with the nuclear issue, given its sensitivity. In March 2011, at a

conference that a high-profile research center in the United Arab Emirates

(UAE) organized, Prince Turki Al-Faysal asked openly: “What would be

wrong with acquiring a nuclear force to confront the Iranian [nuclear]

force if international efforts to prevent Iran’s acquisition of nuclear

weapons fail?”6 A short time later, Prince Turki Al-Faysal, speaking to
Official Saudi Policy Perspectives on Nuclear Weapons

13

senior NATO military officials, hinted cryptically that if Iran developed

nuclear weapons then that “would compel Saudi Arabia...to pursue

policies which could lead to untold and possibly dramatic consequences.”7

Shortly thereafter, in an interview with the BBC, Prince Turki AlFaysal specifically sought to clarify his speech in the UAE – in which he

had perhaps been too open – and now insisted that Saudi Arabia “is not

seeking to acquire nuclear weapons,” but he also warned pointedly that if

Iran did acquire nuclear weapons Saudi Arabia’s response would be

“severe and resolute in order that this situation does not become a threat to

its interests.”8 When pressed about his earlier speech by the interviewer, a

discomfited Prince Turki Al-Faysal, perhaps sensing that earlier he had

been too transparent in making the point, cut him off, cautioning “Don’t

attribute words to me that I didn’t say.”9 Yet at a Gulf Cooperation

Council (GCC) meeting in December 2011, when speaking of Iran’s

expected acquisition of nuclear weapons, Prince Turki again noted that “It

is necessary and indeed it is our duty on behalf of our [GCC] nations and

peoples for us to examine all possible options, including our own

acquisition of the same weapons.”10 More recently, Prince Turki Al-Faysal

appeared to soften his message when speaking publicly to Western

audiences, placing greater emphasis on the desirability of a regional

weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-free zone and a United Nations

nuclear umbrella, although his precondition that both Iran and Israel

forego their nuclear programs indicated he did not see this to be a realistic

option in the foreseeable future.11 In fact, in the same speech, he suggested

that if Iran did acquire nuclear weapons this “would compel other nations

to pursue policies that could lead to untold and possibly dramatic

consequences.”

While the articulate and cosmopolitan Prince Turki Al-Faysal may

have garnered the most headlines in the West, he was no black swan.

Rather, his statements could be seen as part of a larger pattern. In fact,

other members of the royal family had also expressed at least implicit

support for a nuclear option even years earlier. For example, Prince Naef

bin Ahmed Al Saud, who eventually was to become Defense Minister

Prince Sultan’s adviser on national strategy, as early as 2002 had hinted

that “turmoil in the Middle East could engender the sort of instability that

may result in attempts to acquire WMD,” citing efforts by Israel, India,

Pakistan, Iran, and Iraq in that arena, and adding that “despite the lack of
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

14

evidence that Riyadh may be pursuing a nuclear option, some speculate on

the possibility.”12 To be sure, statements by high-ranking officials and

influential members of the royal family were often vague, veiled, or

ambiguous. For example, Prince Muqrin, Saudi Arabia’s then-Director

General of Saudi Arabia’s Intelligence Agency, already in 2006 had

assessed at a conference in Bahrain that the proliferation of nuclear

weapons in the Middle East, would “also spur moderate states in the

region to establish nuclear programs, whether covertly or openly, aimed at

creating a military balance in the region.”13 (Emphasis added.)

Likewise, in April 2010, Prince Muqrin, speaking at the Nuclear

Security Summit, in Washington, D.C., presented his prognosis of a

nuclear arms race in the Middle East, alluding that the quest by an

unnamed country for nuclear weapons “may lead once again to a return to

the environment of the Cold War.”14 In December 2010, Prince Turki Bin

Muhammad, Saudi Arabia’s Deputy Foreign Minister for Multilateral

Relations, for his part, was also circumspect when he repeated his

country’s calls for a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East, but hinting at

the same time that Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons “will lead to a slide

toward a nuclear arms race in the region.”15 Again, at a Gulf conference in

December 2011, Prince Muqrin told his audience that he feared that Iran’s

nuclear polices would lead to a “return to the doctrine of balance of

terror,” a term commonly used in Arab discourse to refer to the nuclear

deterrence characteristic of the superpower relationship during the Cold

War, and cautioned enigmatically that “the Gulf states cannot only stand

by as observers” to Iran’s nuclear program.

16 For his part, Prince Khalid,

the then-Deputy Minister of Defense (and son of the then-Defense

Minister Prince Sultan), during a visit to Kuwait in 2010, when asked what

the position of the Gulf countries would be if the nuclear issue with Iran

was not resolved, answered ambiguously that “every state will then do

what is in its interest.”17 Elsewhere, Prince Khalid cautioned that “a

change in the balance of power” in the region “requires us to acquire

power in all its forms.”18

Such hints from official quarters have continued to the present. Saudi

Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al-Faysal warned, as another round of talks

between Iran and the international community was set to start in February

2013, that, although Saudi Arabia favored the elimination of all WMD in

the region, “If the [Iranians] continue on the path they are now on, many
Official Saudi Policy Perspectives on Nuclear Weapons

15

other countries which will also follow the same path. This is not

speculation. The fact is that proliferation of nuclear weapons to any one

country means the proliferation of nuclear weapons also to other

countries.”19

Admittedly, most official statements have been ambiguous and

suggestive more than concrete. Nevertheless, they were unmistakable in

their intent. In case any local or international audience did not understand

the meaning of such veiled statements, accompanying Saudi press

commentary or back-channel communications often spelled out the intent

of such statements in no uncertain terms. For example, a Saudi editorialist

noted that Prince Turki Al-Faysal’s comments “at present do not go

beyond oblique messages; however, these are messages that must be taken

seriously, since they express the Gulf’s concerns about falling behind in

the nuclear arms race in the region in case the international community

fails to deal with the issue.”20

Significantly, after one such statement by Prince Turki Al-Faysal, a

Saudi pundit who often writes on defense matters penned an article in the

mainstream press entitled A Reading of [Prince Turki] Al-Faysal’s

Statements, in which he highlighted the “extreme importance” of the

prince’s “official or semi-official” statement because this affirmed

“absolutely clearly and plainly” Saudi Arabia’s “intent to acquire nuclear

weapons as a corrective to the upsetting of the uneven strategic nuclear

deterrence equation in the region.”21 He added that “personally, I

understand His Highness Prince Turki’s statements as the firm Saudi

decision to have nuclear weapons.”22 And, the same writer stressed that

Prince Turki Al-Faysal’s statements were “a ray of hope” and “longawaited” and that they had met with “broad approval within the popular

strata and among the intellectual elite.”23

Again, reacting to Prince Turki Al-Faysal’s speech noted above, at

the conference on Gulf security in December 2011, another Saudi

commentator reinforced the point by explaining that what was meant was

that “the Kingdom [of Saudi Arabia] may be compelled to follow the same

path” as Iran and Israel.”24 Likewise, after Prince Turki Al-Faysal’s

cryptic speech to NATO officials in June 2011, according to British press

reports, “a senior official in Riyadh who is close to the prince” interpreted

his message as “We cannot live in a situation where Iran has nuclear

weapons and we don’t. It’s as simple as that...If Iran develops a nuclear
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

16

weapon, that will be unacceptable to us and we will have to follow suit.”25

Notes

1. Interview with Prince Sultan, “Al-Alam al-arabi yamurr bi-marhala harija” [The

Arab World Is Passing through a Delicate Phase], Al-Hawadith (Beirut), 18-27 April

1990, 19.

2. Interview with Prince Saud Al-Faysal, “Changes in the Kingdom – on ‘Our

Timetable’” Washington Post, 27 February 2005, B5.

3. Prince Sultan quoted in “Al-Amir Sultan: Al-Saudiya laysat bi-haja li-asliha

nawawiya” [Prince Sultan: Saudi Arabia Does Not Need Nuclear Weapons], Al-Sharq AlAwsat (London), On-line, Internet, 19 April 2006, available from www.aawsat.com/

print.asp?did=359013&issueno=10004.

4. “Al-Safir al-saudi lada Amirika: Al-Qaida la tazal qadira ala shann hajamat” [The

Saudi Ambassador in America: Al-Qaida Is Still Capable of Launching Attacks], AlSharq Al-Awsat, On-line, Internet, 9 December 2005, available from www.aawsat.com/

print.asp?did=337373&issueno=9873.

5. Reported in Muhammad Al-Ghunayyim, “Al-Amir Sultan: Al-Mansha’at alnaftiya al-saudiya amina” [Prince Sultan: The Saudi Oil Facilities Are Secure], AlRiyadh, On-line, Internet, 4 April 2006, available from www.alriyadh.com/2006/04/04/

article143736.html.

6. Ali Al-Qahis, “Al-Amir Turki Al-Faysal yutalib bi-tahwil majlis al-taawun ila

ittihad ashbah bi’l-urubbi wa-insha’ jaysh khaliji muwahhad” [Prince Turki Al-Faysal

Calls for a Transformation of the [Gulf] Cooperation Council into a Union Resembling

the European Union and for the Establishment of a Unified Gulf Army], Al-Riyadh, Online, Internet, 22 March 2011, available from www.alriyadh.com/2011/03/22/

article615880.html.

7. Jason Burke, “Riyadh Will Build Nuclear Weapons if Iran Gets Them, Saudi

Prince Warns,” The Guardian (London), On-line, Internet, 29 June 2011, available from

www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jun/29/saudi-build-nuclear-weapons-iran/print.

8. Interview with Prince Turki Al-Faysal, BBC Arabic News (London), On-line,

Internet, 8 July 2011, available from www.youtube.com/watch?=Kfw.R7j4-HwZO.

9. Ibid.

10. Salim Al-Sharif, “Turki Al-Faysal: Al-Alam fashal fi iqna Isra’il wa-Iran min
Official Saudi Policy Perspectives on Nuclear Weapons

17

‘al-nawawi’ wa-khiyaratna maftuha” [Turki Al-Faysal: The World Failed to Convince

Israel and Iran on the Nuclear [Issue] and Our Options Are Open], Al-Madina (Jeddah),

On-line, Internet, 6 December 2011, available from www.al-madina.com/print/343006.

11. Prince Turki Al-Faysal, “Saudi Arabia’s New Foreign Policy Doctrine in the

Aftermath of the Arab Awakening,” lecture at the Belfer Center for Science &

International Affairs, Harvard University, On-line, Internet, 25 April 2013, available

from http://live.belfercenter.org/publication/23013/prince_turki_on_saudi_arabias_role_

after_arab_awakening.html?breadcrumb=%2F.

12. Prince Naef bin Ahmed Al Saud, “Underpinning Saudi National Security

Strategy,” Joint Forces Quarterly (Washington, D.C.), autumn 2002, 130.

13. “Ra’is al-mukhabarat al-saudiya akkad ann al-nawawi al-isra’ili yuthir sibaq

tasalluh” [The Head of Saudi Intelligence Asserted that Israel’s Nuclear Weapons Would

Spur an Arms Race], Al-Arabiya TV (Abu Dhabi, UAE), On-line, Internet, 9 December

2006, transcript available from www.alarabiya.net/articles/2006/12/09/29744.html.

14. “Ra’is al-istikhbarat al-saudiya: Imtilak Isra’il li’l-asliha al-nawawiya yushakkil

aqaba asasiya amam al-istiqrar fi al-mintaqa” [The Head of Saudi Intelligence: Israel’s

Possession of Nuclear Weapons Presents a Fundamental Obstacle to Stability in the

Region], Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, On-line, Internet, 15 April 2010, available from

www.aawsat.com/print.asp?did=565347&issueno=11461.

15. Turki Al-Suhayl, “Al-Saudiya: Lan nadkhul sibaq tasalluh nawawi wa-ala

Tihran taqdim damanat” [Saudi Arabia: We Will Not Enter a Nuclear Arms Race But

Tehran Must Provide Assurances], Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, On-line, Internet, 12 December

2010, available fromwww.aawsat.com/print.asp?did=599111&issueno=11702.

16. Umar Al-Zubaydi and Mashari Al-Wahbi, “Muqrin bin Abd Al-Aziz yuhdhir

min sibaq tasalluh fi’l-mintaqa wa-awdat ‘tawazun al-rub’“ [Muqrin bin Abd Al-Aziz

Warns of an Arms Race in the Region and of a Return to a “Balance of Terror”], AlWatan (Abha), On-line, Internet, 4 December 2011, available from www.alwatan.com.sa/

Politics/News_Detail.aspx?ArticleID=78218&CategoryID=1.

17. “Khalid bin Sultan: Amn Al-Kuwait min amn Al-Saudiya” [Khalid bin Sultan:

Kuwait’s Security Is Part of Saudi Arabia’s Security], Al-Ra’y (Kuwait), On-line,

Internet, 5 May 2010, available from www.alraimedia.com/Alrai/ArticlePrint.aspx?id=

201410.

18. “Khalid bin Sultan: Taghayyur mawazin al-quwwa yaduna ila tatwir qudratna

al-qitaliya wa-tahsinha” [The Change in the Balance of Power Requires Us to Develop

and Improve Our Combat Capabilities], Al-Madina, On-line, Internet, 18 April 2011,

available from www.al-madina.com/print/299303.
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

18

19. Fahd Al-Dhiyabi, “Saud Al-Faysal: Yajib tamkin al-shab al-suri min al-difa an

nafsih, wa-Iran ghayr sadiqa hawl barnamijha al-nawawi” [Saud Al-Faysal: The Syrian

People Must Be Empowered to Defend Themselves, and Iran Is Not Sincere about Its

Nuclear Program], Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, On-line, Internet, 13 February 2013, available

from www.aawsat.com/print.asp?did=717110&issueno=12496.

20. Saud Kabili, “Al-Mintaqa ala washk sibaq al-tasalluh al-nawawi” [The Region

Is on the Brink of a Nuclear Arms Race], Al-Watan, On-line, Internet, 22 April 2012,

availablefromwww.alwatan.com.sa/Articles/Detail.aspx?ArticleId=10530.

21. Sami Said Habib, “Qira’a fi tasrihat Al-Faysal” [A Reading of [Turki] AlFaysal’s Statements], Al-Madina, On-line, Internet, 10 December 2011, available from

www.al-madina.com/print/343867.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid. Another Saudi press analysis of Prince Turki’s statements likewise

clarified that what he meant was that if the international community failed to stop Iran,

other options, including a nuclear one, would be “inevitable” for Saudi Arabia. “Khabira:

Imtilak al-mamlaka li-silah nawawi yajurr al-mintaqa ila sibaq li’l-tasalluh” [An Expert:

The Kingdom’s Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons Will Propel the Region into an Arms

Race], Al-Ikhbariya (Saudi Arabia), On-line, Internet, 5 January 2012, available from

www.k1b1.com/print.php?action+print&m=newsm&id=18289.

24. Prince Turki al-Faysal’s speech was reported in “Al-Faysal: Al-Saudiya qad

tudtarr li-hiyazat al-silah al-nawawi” [Al-Faysal: Saudi Arabia May Be Forced to

Acquire Nuclear Weapons], Al-Yawm (Dammam), On-line, Internet, 6 December 2011,

available from www.alyaum.com/News/art/37488.html. The commentary is found in Abd

Al-Aziz Husayn Al-Suwaygh, “Al-Khalij wa’l-khatar al-nawawi?” [The Gulf and the

Nuclear Threat], Al-Madina, part 2, On-line, Internet, 23 May 2012, available from

www.al-madina.com/printhtml/379718.

25. Jason Burke, “Riyadh Will Build Nuclear Weapons if Iran Gets Them, Saudi

Prince Warns,” The Guardian (London), On-line, Internet, 29 June 2011, available from

www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jun/29/saudi-build-nuclear-weapons-iran/print.
CHAPTER 3

The Dynamics of Saudi Strategic Culture

Saudi assessments integrate the issue of nuclear weapons into a

broader threat framework, and the credibility and import of policy

statements can best be appreciated by placing them within the broader

context of Saudi Arabia’s strategic culture and of the latter’s relationship

to decision-making. Some analysts have highlighted, correctly, the

importance of not ignoring the impact of a country’s strategic culture as a

factor shaping security assessments and choices, arguing that “different

states have different predominant strategic preferences that are rooted in

the early or formative experiences of the state and are influenced to some

degree by the philosophy, politics, culture, and cognitive characteristics of

the state and its elites.”

1

One could add, as well, such enduring and less malleable givens as

history and geography. Evaluating national leaders or ruling elites against

the background of such factors yields a more comprehensive and accurate

understanding of threat perceptions and of leaders’ motivations, thinking,

and decision-making process with respect to nuclear weapons than do

assumptions based on paradigms drawn largely from pure theory or from

the experience of the superpowers. By the same token, focusing on a

country’s strategic culture need not replace the threat/interest-based realist

approach but enrich it and add flexibility to its application in concrete

cases.

2

Realpolitik and ideology intertwine to generate Saudi Arabia’s

strategic culture and, as an influential Saudi observer noted, combine to

serve as the basis for the country’s decision-making.3 As Prince Abd AlRahman, then Deputy Minister of Defense, told Strategic Rocket Force

graduates, the King would guarantee the country’s security and stability

through a combination of “faith supported by power; nothing else works.”4
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

20

The Decision-making Process in Saudi Arabia

Decision-makers, of necessity, formulate paradigms or models,

whether consciously or unconsciously, in order to make sense of problems

and to organize and interpret relevant information to enable them to make

decisions.5To a significant extent, a country’s strategic culture may shape

decision-makers’ paradigms, but it is an interactive process and, once

established, paradigms may be very difficult to change, what Robert Jervis

terms “premature cognitive closure.”6In Saudi Arabia, such paradigms

have evolved in conjunction with perceived threats and a sense of identity

and, to a significant degree, dove-tail with the prevailing parameters of

legitimacy.

In essence, it is the top stratum of the royal family which makes the

ultimate decisions. Within the context of the country’s patrimonial sociopolitical system, characterized by patron-client relationships, most of these

power networks ultimately lead to a member of the royal family, and

personalities count more than do institutions. Some individuals in the

royal family may have access to information and wield influence not

based on holding any official title or position but, perhaps, because of their

reputation within the family or their membership in specific blood-related

family coteries. Many of the country’s perhaps 10,000 princes are outside

the immediate circles of national decision-making, but some of them may

nevertheless hold important positions in the military, bureaucracy,

business, or the sports sector (as do some princesses in the parallel female

arenas). This allows them influence on specific issues, although ordinarily

they will seek to attach themselves to a patron in the top ranks of royal

decision-makers in order to exert that influence. Many key agencies

connected with national security (Ministry of Defense, Ministry of the

Interior, Intelligence Agency, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Saudi Arabian

National Guard (SANG)) as well as local governorships are headed by a

prince, while princes are deputies in several other key ministries and

agencies (for example in the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral

Resources), but tight royal control is exerted even over those sectors of the

system which may have a non-royal at the top.

Almost assuredly, there must have been discussions within the top

strata of the royal family about nuclear issues over the years, no doubt

with the participation of political advisers and technical and military
The Dynamics of Saudi Strategic Culture

21

experts. If so, such discussions must have been held within narrow circles

and tightly-held. Given the blurring between personal and institutional

interests, one cannot be certain at which level of influence Saudi

policymakers may be operating. For example, hypothetically, one would

not expect the SANG, whose main mission is domestic security and which

operates largely as a land force, to have a strong interest in and be a

supporter of nuclear weapons, yet its official journal has indicated such

interest and support repeatedly. However, personal issues may matter

more than institutional ones, as the Commander of the SANG until 2010

was King Abd Allah, who would have had a broader national perspective

than as simply a military service commander. He was then succeeded in

the same post by his son, Prince Mitib, who can be assumed to aspire to

accede to the throne himself some day, and would therefore be looking

ahead at a higher than single-service institutional level.

What is more, consensus within the royal family is a fundamental

principle of Saudi decision-making. While individuals at the top of the

royal family clearly exert the greatest influence, they do so within a wider

family framework, so that changes in policy perspectives are usually

gradual rather than abrupt. Perhaps inspired by senior princes as a

reminder to the rest of princes, an account in a Saudi daily close to the

palace described the assembly of princes waiting to welcome the remains

of Prince Sultan, who had died in New York, and emphasized the royal

family’s internal cohesion. As the article noted, “this family knows that its

unity and cohesion...is the yardstick for preparing for crises, emergencies,

and sudden shocks.” Pointing to the regimes that were then falling in the

region, the writer identified as the reason for their demise “personal

objectives and individual desires.” The article stressed that, instead, “the

secret of success for nations...is in the ruling family’s internal cohesion,”

and – perhaps prescriptively – praised how the young princes respected

their elders in the Saudi royal family.7

While there may be individual positions within the royal family on a

particular issue, if individual differences of views on the nuclear issue

exist, they are hard to detect. Similarly, if there has been any diversity in

opinion on this issue in the broader political body – with factional, tribal,

professional, or bureaucratic interests at play as in any society – it has not

been evident, and there have not been any structured public debates. What

one sees in public is a consensus, which may be genuine to a significant
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

22

degree, the result of effective shaping by a system which controls the

principal mechanisms of persuasion. However, despite the concentration

of power within the royal family, the political process is an interactive one

to some extent and one cannot ignore the impact of wider circles of

society on policymaking even if this impact may be indirect or if it acts as

an implicit limiting factor which policymakers have to factor into their

assumptions.

The Centrality of Regime Legitimacy

Perhaps the key element in understanding Saudi Arabia’s strategic

culture, from the perspective of the country’s rulers, is that of the essential

need to maintain legitimacy both within the wider royal family – where

competition and positioning for the future among cliques and individuals

can be intense – and of the royal family in society as a whole. In Saudi

Arabia’s case, legitimacy consists of an aggregate collection of security,

economic, religious, and symbolic legitimacy in relation to the existing

system, which is embodied in the monarchy.

In a way, given the absence of mechanisms such as elections or a free

media to define and determine the degree of legitimacy, it is a case of

assumed legitimacy, a factor steeped in uncertainty that is perhaps more

evident in its absence or disappearance than in its presence, and a factor

which requires constant precautionary measures. Legitimacy in the context

of Saudi Arabia means, in particular, providing for the defense of the

Kingdom from foreign threats and is, at the same time, also connected to

other central elements of legitimacy, which all depend on a safe and

secure environment. These related elements include religious legitimacy –

protecting the Two Holy Shrines (Mecca and Medina) and the Sunni

branch of Islam, an element which the Saudi military recognizes as one of

its basic missions.8 Moreover, there is also the element of providing the

expected level of economic well-being for the population.

Characteristically, one newspaper underlined the basic parameters of King

Abd Allah’s legitimacy, as it called him “the defender of the nation and

the leader of development.”9In order to safeguard legitimacy, policy

decisions and initiatives must take into account or at least anticipate and

manipulate the latent or active demands and expectations of key sectors in

society, including of the bureaucracy, the military, the business
The Dynamics of Saudi Strategic Culture

23

community, tribal leaders, and the religious establishment, as well as of

the general public.10,11

State and family interests tend to blur in Saudi Arabia, and

responsibility for such basic requirements as listed above, to a great

extent, lies squarely with the ruling family, the Al Saud. This

responsibility is highly concentrated and, indeed, the Al Saud have

traditionally fostered an identification and equation of the state with their

own family or even with an individual ruler, and have governed their

subjects by means of a paternalistic relationship. Characteristically, in his

speech introducing the new budget in December 2012, King Abd Allah

addressed the Saudis as “my sons and daughters” and represented their

well-being as “my personal obligation and trusteeship toward you.”12 Not

coincidentally, after King Abd Allah’s recovery from surgery, a Saudi

newspaper headline read “The King’s Recovery Is the Nation’s

Recovery.”13 As one provincial newspaper put it on the country’s National

Day, “this wonderful entity – nation, abilities, blessings, [and] strength of

religion – all of that in totality is the Al Saud.”14 And, the ad which the

Bin Ladin conglomerate sponsored in the SANG’s official journal, AlHaras Al-Watani, on the occasion of the country’s National Day in 2012,

congratulated the King, the Crown Prince, the Saudi people, and “the

noble ruling family” as a separate category representing the nation.

In a sense, the Al Saud “own” the country. That appears to be a

common view in the country, and probably not only among those who are

disaffected. As one source critical of the Al Saud put it, “The Al Saud

harbor no doubt whatsoever that the country – all that is beneath the

ground and all that moves above it – is their private property, with no need

to justify that.”15 It is the Al Saud who created the country – a first version

in the 18th century and, in 1903, the current entity in the person of their

ancestor King Abd Al-Aziz Al Saud – and who named it after themselves.

Reminders of this national narrative are encouraged and promoted

constantly.

According to the official discourse, between the early days of Islam

under Muhammad and the creation of the Saudi state there had been only

primordial chaos. Prince Salman, the country’s Minister of Defense and

now also Crown Prince, has compared the current Saudi state to “the first

Islamic state,” i.e. the one that Muhammad had established, and was proud

that the Saudis had “returned to the Arabian Peninsula the security and
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

24

stability that it had lacked for many centuries.” He emphasized that prior

to the Saudi state every region and tribe had been a state unto itself and at

war with all the others.16 A military writer, typically, focused on the

country’s “heroic leaders,” and stressed that before the creation of the

Saudi state “there was no identity or political unity;” instead, there was

only “a complete absence of security...while the terrible triad of hunger,

fear, and disease ran roughshod over the Peninsula.”17 This identification

of the royal family with the nation was underlined, for example, during a

Ramadan reception, when a member of the country’s Consultative Council

(Shura) addressed King Abd Allah on behalf of the visiting delegation of

the country’s senior officials and notables by acknowledging that the

King’s father had returned to the Peninsula its dignity in the form of “an

Arab Saudi state, the first independent state in the Arabian Peninsula.”18

The royal family portrays itself as having created not only the country

but also a civilized society and a national identity. As Prince Khalid AlFaysal noted, thanks to King Abd Al-Aziz, the latter’s creation of a unified

country “succeeded in transforming the Arabian Peninsula from a society

of wars and strife to a civilized society representing a unique model of

success in the modern era.”19 In the process, the same dignitary asserted

that King Abd Al-Aziz (the father or grandfather of the current king and of

many of the most senior princes) had created a unity of identity, so that

now there was “a Saudi person, a Saudi way of thinking, a Saudi language,

and a Saudi national dress.”20 Indeed, in the Saudi ideology, which

reinforces the sense of uniqueness, is the belief that the creation of the

Saudi state had been “a miracle” wrought by the Al Saud family.21

Defense of the Realm

The royal family no doubt feels it has to be perceived by the domestic

public as defending effectively the country for which the Al Saud feel

proprietary responsibility. As an editorial in the Saudi Land Force’s

journal noted, “the top priority for the Servant of the Two Holy Shrines

(Khadim Al-Haramayn) [i.e. King Abd Allah] and for his faithful Crown

Prince is to ensure that the nation remains secure.”22

Domestic dissidents, such as the apparently foreign-based Hijaz

regional independence movement, in fact, have used the potential for an

Iranian atom bomb as a lever to criticize the Saudi government for an
The Dynamics of Saudi Strategic Culture

25

alleged lack of an adequate response to threats to the country. As an

anonymous writer on the Al-Hijaz website was to complain:

Oh Saudis, did you feel as I did bitterness and as being

duped when I heard [Iran’s president Mahmoud]

Ahmadinejad announce to the world that Iran had become

the world’s eighth nuclear power? ...I read the pride in

every Iranian’s eyes. I saw Ahmadinejad hold his head up

high. On the contrary I, as a Saudi, was tormented by

feelings of bitterness, anguish, and disappointment. I felt a

lump in my throat raising the question: “What do we lack

as Saudis in order to become a nuclear power and to be

proud of that in front of the world?” Why, why? ...Here, as

a Saudi citizen, I ask King Abd Allah “Why do we place

our security, our holy places, and our very existence in the

hands of others?”...We only want to be able to hold our

heads up high before the world and to hear you, Servant of

the Two Holy Shrines, announce to the entire world that we

have become the ninth nuclear power in the world.23

Questions and reproaches stemming from the nuclear threat to Saudi

Arabia could even come from the country’s liberal quarters, as in the case

of Abd Al-Aziz Al-Khamis, Director of the Saudi Human Rights Center

and a frequent critic of the regime. Seeing in Iran’s quest for nuclear

weapons a factor which would change the regional balance of power, AlKhamis noted on a Yemen-based website that this factor “has become a

duty entrusted and thrust on the shoulders of the Saudi state to move

expeditiously to also acquire nuclear weapons, in order to warn off any

enemy, whether in the East or in the West.”24 Throughout the article there

is a sense of implicit blame directed at the Saudi rulers for what the author

interpreted as an inadequate response, as he remarked on “the indifference

and slowness which impair Saudi actions to strengthen the country’s

military agencies,” contrasting the lethargy on his side of the Gulf with the

military activity on the Iranian side. Saudis were now allegedly afraid, “and

are even losing their patience with the suspicious sluggishness with which

the organs of the GCC, and above all Saudi Arabia, confront the destruction

planned for it and its people.” His recommendation was that “it is high time

to acquire nuclear weapons and that task falls on the shoulders of Saudi
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

26

Arabia, and in the shortest time possible; otherwise, one day we will lament

the time when there existed an Arab Gulf and an Arabian Peninsula.”25

What is more, the Saudi leadership must be seen to provide

protection, insofar as possible, with local capabilities, rather than

depending on non-Muslims. Visible reliance on a non-Muslim country for

protection of the Holy Land could be used as a club by domestic and

regional critics of the regime and at least raise questions about the

regime’s legitimacy and about its ineffectiveness in light of its massive

spending on defense. Significantly, one of the stated objectives, or

benefits, of Saudi Arabia’s acquisition of the CSS-2 surface-to-surface

missiles (SSMs) in 1988, according to then-Minister of Defense Prince

Sultan, had been that that proved that Riyadh was not a hostage to the

United States in acquiring weaponry.26 Indeed, Saudi Arabia’s acceptance

of a large U.S. military presence in the wake of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait

in 1990 appears to have been the catalyst for Usama Bin Ladin’s shift to

open dissidence, and the presence of foreign forces on Saudi soil long

remained a staple Al-Qaida propaganda theme. Accusing King Fahd (d.

2005) of having transformed the country into “an American protectorate,”

Bin Ladin (d. 2011) in 1995 asked himself who could be trusted to provide

security: “Is it the regime which reduced the country to a state of permanent

military weakness in order to permit the importation of Crusader and Jewish

forces to defile the holy places?”27 When he declared a jihad against U.S.

forces in Saudi Arabia the following year, this again was a major theme, as

Bin Ladin accused the Saudi rulers of having permitted “Crusader American

forces” to stay in the country for years and maintained that, as a result,

“people ask themselves: ‘Why even have this regime?’”28

Admittedly, criticism by such extremist dissidents probably has

limited real impact at present. However, the Al Saud may fear that such

criticism potentially could come to give voice to broader feelings of

dissatisfaction if they are validated by a perceived failure by the royal

family to provide adequately for the country’s defense. And, even if

representing only a marginal slice of Saudi society, such criticism could be

embarrassing to the Saudi ruling system and add pressure on decisionmakers as they deal with the nuclear issue.
The Dynamics of Saudi Strategic Culture

27

Defense of the Region

In addition, Saudi Arabia has a self-view as the principal Arab state in

the Gulf and beyond, and as having a unique mission as a regional leader.

For example, King Abd Allah’s son, Prince Mitib, writing in a military

journal while he was still Deputy Commander of the SANG, argued that

based on its “Arab and Islamic principles,” Saudi Arabia has “historical

responsibilities as a state that has political, economic, geographic, and

moral prominence such as few other countries have.”29 Likewise, an

editorial in a special issue of Al-Haras Al-Watani in honor of King Abd

Allah highlighted that the monarch is seen as having broad defense

responsibilities extending well beyond Saudi Arabia. According to this

journal, “history had a rendezvous with a great leader...someone whose

destiny it is to defend the Kingdom, Islam, and the Arabs.”30

Saudi Arabia’s legitimacy as the local leader also implies an

obligation to provide for its neighbors’ protection, and an inability to do so

would reflect negatively on the royal family’s credibility and legitimacy.

With the great diminution of the influence of Egypt, Iraq, and Syria on the

Arab political horizon due to their internal turmoil, Saudi Arabia has also

highlighted its own increased leadership role. A key element of this

aspirational regional leadership role is the ability to provide security. As

one military officer saw it, Saudi Arabia “plays a pivotal and leading role

in guaranteeing the security and stability of the region.”31 A Saudi military

journal provided a typical overview of the official self-perception in this

domain, linking the country’s “leadership role in the Islamic world...[and]

its leading role in the Arab world, which stems from its being one of the

largest Arab countries and having the greatest capabilities and prestige.”32

In particular, in the Gulf region, thanks to its relative greater size,

wealth, and human and technical resources in comparison to the other

GCC states, Saudi Arabia is the natural leader of that key regional

organization, albeit not without some discomfort for its smaller neighbors.

Predictably, one journal emphasized Saudi Arabia’s “political role in Gulf

politics as a leading state which bears most of [the Gulf’s] burden.”33

Characteristically, Saudis sometimes refer to their country as “the Gulf

states’ elder sister.”34 A senior military officer and member of the royal

family echoed this view a few years later: “Our country has become...a

pivotal axis for the states of the region...the sad recent events in Bahrain
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

28

confirm our country’s leading role and its ability to assume an important

role in guaranteeing the region’s security and stability.”35

Defense of the Umma

More broadly, Saudis view their country as having a special place and

responsibility in the Islamic world, with one local academic characterizing

Saudi Arabia as “the Muslims’ qibla [i.e. the direction for prayer], the

cradle of Islam, the bearer of the banner of Islam, and the defender of the

causes of Arabness and of the Muslims in both material and moral terms

in all quarters and all lands.”36 According to King Abd Allah – in a speech

delivered on behalf of the ailing monarch by the Governor of Mecca,

Prince Khalid Al-Faysal – “The Kingdom is faithful to its religious and

historical duty...to serve Islam...and to proclaim and defend it in all

corners of the world.”37 In effect, the Saudi King is the self-proclaimed

defender of Islam, with the preceding monarch, King Fahd, having

adopted the title of Servant of the Two Holy Shrines, while the Saudi

regime has long relied on the support of the domestic religious

establishment as part of the political system. At the heart of this mutually

beneficial symbiotic relationship, the Saudi religious establishment is

quick to highlight the Al Saud family’s personal religious legitimacy and

responsibilities. Typically, a member of the country’s Council of Senior

Ulama’ noted, “This blessed state, the state of the Al Saud, is a state of

orthodoxy (tawhid), religious outreach (dawa), and rule by the undefiled

Sharia...and was established by a religious covenant (baya shariya).”38

As such, the royal family must also be seen as an effective protector

against all threats to Islam, and specifically to the Holy Shrines, whether

from Israel or Shia Iran – which many in the Saudi religious establishment

view as existential threats to Sunni Islam, doubly dangerous in the case of

the latter because of its rival claim to religious legitimacy. Not

coincidentally, an article in the Saudi press that dealt with the Iranian

threat pointedly referred to King Abd Allah as “the Umma’s shepherd”

(rai).39 Indeed, as Minister of Defense, Prince Sultan, had long justified

Saudi Arabia’s arming not only as a response to a need to address his own

country’s defense, but also that of the Arab world and of the Umma, or

broader Islamic community.40
The Dynamics of Saudi Strategic Culture

29

Defense of the Economic Pillar of Legitimacy

In many ways, the economic pillar of the Al Saud’s legitimacy is also

tied to the defense of the realm from foreign threats and, in particular,

from Iran. To a significant extent, the royal family has identified economic

development with itself and the line between private royal wealth and that

of the state is often blurred. The legitimacy of the existing system, one can

argue, relies on an implicit social contract with the population to share the

oil and gas wealth which the royal family controls, while the royal family

claims the credit, and therefore also the responsibility, for the people’s

economic well-being. The media constantly reminds Saudi audiences that

it is “the heroic leaders” who have created “abundance,” as did the

military media on the country’s National Day.41 Another typical article in

the military media, likewise, concluded that “Saudi citizens are very much

aware of the achievements which are being attained day after day in every

aspect of their lives; the enlightened leadership has devoted all its efforts

and time and has mobilized all of the country’s potential and wealth in

order to raise the standard of living of Saudi citizens.”42 As a leading

Saudi businessman also waxed eloquently of the relationship between the

country’s rulers and society, “there is no doubt that our dear Kingdom’s

path of development is witness to the natural result of one of the

wonderful illustrations of the cohesion between ruler and ruled...the

leadership...has never wavered in its zeal to stand by its sons, the citizens,

and to fulfill their desires and needs to ensure a life of plenty and of

dignity.”43

Although significant socio-economic problems – such as unemployment, corruption, and high prices for food, housing, medical care,

and weddings – have at times frayed this unspoken, but nevertheless real,

social compact, enough of the population still share in the benefits to

ensure stability for now. However, sufficient national income is vital for

the system to remain viable, especially given rising expectations and a

rapidly growing population. The Saudi rulers have been particularly

sensitive to this facet of their legitimacy in the atmosphere of the popular

unrest throughout the region in connection with the Arab Spring, as they

succeeded in staving off discontent at home – in part at least – by being

able to open the country’s ample coffers for large-scale salary raises,

bonuses, an economic stimulus to business, and various other generous
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

30

material incentives. Over the longer term, such legitimacy will also hinge

on the success of the country’s ambitious economic development plans for

the post-oil era, which will also depend on a secure regional environment.

Notes

1. Alastair Iain Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture,” International

Security, xix, 4, spring 1995, 34.

2. Michael C. Desch, “Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security

Studies,” International Security, xxiii, 1, summer 1998, 141-70.

3. Muhammad bin Abd Al-Latif Al Al-Shaykh, “Kayf yusna al-qarar al-siyasi fi AlSaudiya?” [How Are Political Decisions Made in Saudi Arabia?], Al-Sharq Al-Awsat,

On-line, Internet, 18 April 2005, available from www.aawsat.com/print.asp?did=

294244&issueno=9638. His term for Realpolitik was “interest.”

4. Mubarak Al-Fadil and Qablan Al-Hazimi, “Al-Amir Abd Al-Rahman bin Abd

Al-Aziz raa takhrij add min dawrat quwwat al-sawarikh al-istratijiya bi-Wadi AlDawasir” [Prince Abd Al-Rahman bin Abd Al-Aziz Presided over the Graduation from

Several Courses of the Strategic Rocket Force in Wadi Al-Dawasir], Al-Jazira (Riyadh),

On-line, Internet, 2 July 2004, available from http://search.al-jazirah.com.sa/2004jaz/jul/

2/In1.htm.

5. “Preconceptions cannot be abolished; it is in one sense just another word for

‘model’ or ‘paradigm’ – a construct used to simplify reality, which any thinker needs in

order to cope with complexity.” Richard K. Betts, “Analysis, War, and Decisions: Why

Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable,” World Politics, xxxi, October 1978, 83-84.

6. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics. (Princeton,

NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 412. Drawing from psychology, in his seminal

work on decision-making frameworks, he notes insightfully that “once a person has

conceived of a problem in a given way, it is very hard to break out of his pattern of

thought. New information, rather than calling the established sub-goal into question, will

be interpreted within the old framework.” Ibid.

7. Ahmad Al-Jamia, “Bayt Al Saud min al-dakhil takwin istithna’i hubb wa-wafa’

wa-taqdir” [The Al Saud from the Inside: A Unique Structure, Love, Loyalty, and

Respect], Al-Riyadh, On-line, Internet, 26 October 2011, available from

www.alriyadh.com/2011/10/26/article678858.html.
The Dynamics of Saudi Strategic Culture

31

8. See, for example, Al-Jadii, “Idad al-istiratijiya.”

9. “Khadim al-haramayn haris al-watan wa-qa’id al-tanmiya wa-qimma fi tawadu

al-kibar” [The Servant of the Two Holy Shrines Is the Defender of the Nation, the Leader

of Development, and the Acme in Modesty for Great Men], Al-Madina, On-line, Internet,

22 September 2012, available from www.al-madina.com/printhtml/402773.

10. For perceptive overviews of the Saudi political system, see Tim Niblock, Saudi

Arabia: Power, Legitimacy and Survival. (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 1-

18, and Bertelsmann Stiftung BTI 2012 Saudi Arabia Country Report. (Gütersloh,

Germany: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2012), On-line, Internet, available from www.btiproject.org/fileadmin/Inhalte/reports/2012/pdf/BTI%202012%20Saudi%20Arabia.pdf.

12. “Khadim al-haramayn yar’as jalsat majlis al-wuzara’ wa-yuqirr akbar mizaniya

fi tarikh Al-Mamlaka” [The Servant of the Two Holy Shrines Chairs a Meeting of the

Council of Ministers and Unveils the Largest Budget in the Kingdom’s History], AlRiyadh, On-line, Internet, 30 December 2012, available from www.al-riyadh.com/

2012/12/30/article797098.html.

13. “Shifa’ al-malik shifa’ al-watan,” Al-Madina, On-line, Internet, 29 November

2012, available from www.al-madina.com/node/416893.

14. Khalaf Al-Hashar, “Yawm al-watan al-80 am wa-Al Saud” [The National Day,

Year 80, and the Al Saud], Ha’il, (Ha’il), On-line, Internet, 21 January 2013, available

from www.hailnews.net/hail/article-action-show-id-2284.htm.

15. “Kayf yufakkir Al Saud” [How the Al Saud Think], n.d., Najran Land website,

On-line, Internet, available from http://najranland.8m.com/book.htm. In practical terms,

individual members of the royal family do own enormous swathes of the country’s land

area.

16. Prince Salman’s speech reported in “Al-Amir Salman: La tujad usra aw qabila fi

hadhihi al-bilad illa wa-li-aba’iha aw ajdadha musharaka faila fi tawhid al-watan” [Prince

Salman: There Is Not a Single Family Or Tribe in This Country Whose Fathers or

Grandfathers Did Not Make a Direct Contribution to the Nation’s Unification], AlMarsad (Riyadh), On-line, Internet, 31 March 2011, available from www.al-marsd.com.

17. Brigadier General Salih bin Ibrahim Al-Tasan, “Fi dhikra yawmna al-watani”

[Celebrating Our National Day], Al-Difa (Riyadh), September 2011, 55. Al-Difa is the

official journal of the Ministry of Defense.

18. “Talaqqi tahani al-umara’ wa’l-ulama’ wa-kibar al-mas’ulin wa-jam min almuwatinin” [Receiving Congratulations from the Governors, Ulama’, Senior Officials,

and a Group of Citizens], Al-Nadwa, On-line, Internet, 16 August 2012, available from

www.alnadwah.com.sa.
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

32

19. Abd Allah Al-Dawsi reporting the latter’s speech, “Khalid al-Faysal: Amalt waasart mulukan mundh ahd al-malik Abd Al-Aziz hatta al-malik Abd Allah” [Khalid alFaysal: I Worked with and Was a Contemporary of Kings from the Time of King Abd

Al-Aziz to That of King Abd Allah], Al-Nadwa, On-line, Internet, 28 February 2012,

available from www.alnadwah.com.sa.

20. “Talaqqi tahani al-umara’ wa’l-ulama’ wa-kibar al-mas’ulin wa-jam min almuwatinin” [Receiving Congratulations from the Governors, Ulama’, Senior Officials,

and a Group of Citizens], Al-Nadwa, On-line, Internet, 16 August 2012, available from

www.alnadwah.com.sa.

21. Turki Abd Allah Al-Sudayri, “Ma al-amir Salman fi haqa’iq tarikh” [With

Prince Salman on Historical Facts], Al-Riyadh, On-line, Internet, 6 February 2012,

available fromwww.alriyadh.com/2012/02/06/article707389.html.

22. “Al-Ru’ya al-istratijiya li’l-qiyada al-saudiya nahw watan amin wa-Khalij

mustaqirr” [The Saudi Leadership’s Strategic View of a Secure Country and a Stable

Gulf], Al-Barriya (Riyadh), On-line, Internet, 27 October 2010, available from

http://RSLF.GOV.SA/English/AlBarriyaMagazine/ArticleSharingDocs/368110ef-abc2-

a309-338e212fc9ff.doc. Al-Barriya is the official journal of the Saudi Land Forces.

23. Nawawiyun saudiyun [Saudi Nuclear Guys], “Marra ukhra ma al-qunbula alnawawiya al-saudiya wa-lakin bi-shakl mukhtalif” [Once Again on the Saudi Atom

Bomb but This Time in a Different Way], Al-Hijaz (London?), n.d., On-line, Internet,

available fromwww.alhejazi.net/seyasah/014206.htm.

24. Abd Al-Aziz Al-Khamis, “Han waqt al-silah al-nawawi al-saudi” [The Time has

come for a Saudi Nuclear Weapon], Ibda (Sanaa), On-line, Internet, 23 February 2012,

available fromhttp://ebdaa.com/?act=artc&id=5577&print=1.

25. Ibid.

26. Interview with Prince Sultan by Muhammad Abd Al-Mawla and Muhammad

Ghabris, “Hadith wazir al-difa al-saudi ila Al-Sayyad” [Interview with the Saudi Minister

of Defense to Al-Sayyad], Al-Sayyad (Beirut), 29 April 1988, 35.

27. Usama Bin Ladin, “Khitab ila Abi Raghal, Fahd bin Abd Al-Aziz Al Saud”

[Letter to Abu Raghal, Fahd bin Abd Al-Aziz Al Saud], 5 Rabi I 1416/3 August 1995,

Minbar Al-Tawhid Wa’l-Jihad website, On-line, Internet, available from

www.tawhed.ws/r?i=oxyobqbh. Abu Raghal served the invading the Ethiopians as a

guide on their way to attack Mecca in the pre-Islamic period, and is viewed in Arab

culture as the archetypical traitor.

28. Usama Bin Ladin, “Ilan al-jihad ala al-amrikan al-muhtallin li-Bilad AlHaramayn” [Declaration of the Jihad Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the
The Dynamics of Saudi Strategic Culture

33

Two Holy Shrines], [1 Rabi II 1416/15 August 1996], Minbar Al-Tawhid Wa’l-Jihad

website, On-line, Internet, available from www.tawhed.ws/r?i=1502092b.

29. Prince Mitib bin Abd Allah, “Al-Dawr al-saudi wa-thabat muntalaqatih” [The

Saudi Role and the Firmness of Its Principles], Majallat Kulliyat Al-Malik Khalid AlAskariya (Riyadh), On-line, Internet, 1 November 2010, available from

www.kkmaq.gov.sa/detail.asp?InNewsItemID=371633&InTemplateKey=print. Majallat

Kulliyat Al-Malik Khalid Al-Askariya is the official journal of the Saudi National Guard’s

military academy.

30. The Editor, “Mawid ma al-tarikh: 7 sanawat hafila bi’l-injaz wa’l-ijaz”

[Rendezvous with History: Seven Years Jam-packed with Success and with What Is

Unrivalled], Al-Haras Al-Watani (Riyadh), Rajab 1433/June 2012, 22. Al-Haras AlWatani is the Saudi National Guard’s official journal.

31. Staff Brigadier General Zhafir bin Ali Al-Shihri, “Istratijiyat Al-Mamlaka limuwajahat al-mutaghayyirat al-duwaliya wa’l-iqlimiya li-tahqiq al-amn al-watani” [The

Kingdom’s Strategy to Deal with International and Regional Changes in Order to

Achieve National Security], Al-Difa, January 2007, 65.

32. Abd Al-Azhim Mahmud Hanafi, “Al-Dawr al-qiyadi li’l-Mamlaka taht qiyadat

khadim al-haramayn al-sharifayn” [The Kingdom’s Leading Role under the Leadership

of the Servant of the Two Holy Shrines], Majallat Kulliyat Al-Malik Khalid Al-Askariya,

On-line, Internet, 21 June 2011, available from www.kkmaq.gov.sa/detail.ap?

InNewsItemID=393304&InTemplateKey=print.

33. Ibid.

34. Badr Al-Balawi, “Al-Qunbula al-nawawiya al-saudiya” [The Saudi Atom

Bomb], Al-Sharq (Dammam), On-line, Internet, 14 December 2011, available from

www.alsharq.net.sa/2011/12/14/46046.

35. Staff Major General Bandar bin Abd Allah bin Turki Al Saud, “Hadha al-yawm

al-khalid fi tarikhna al-majid” [This Memorable Day in Our Glorious History], Al-Difa,

September 2011, 81.

36. Hamad bin Abd Allah Al-Luhaydan, “Majlis al-taawun al-khaliji yathbut

faaliyathu” [The Gulf Cooperation Council Confirms Its Effectiveness], Al-Riyadh, Online, Internet, 13 May 2011, available from www.alriyadh.com/2011/05/13/

article632204.html.

37. Reported by Wa’il Al-Lahibi and Khalid Abd Allah, “Fi kalima alqaha

niyabatan anhu amir Makka Al-Mukarrama khilal mu’tamar al-dawa al-islamiya ‘AlHadir wa’l-mustaqbal’” [In A Speech Delivered for Him by the Governor of Mecca the

Venerable During the Conference on Islamic Outreach “Present and Future”], Al-Riyadh,
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

34

On-line, Internet, 1 November 2011, available from www.alriyadh.com/2011/11/01/

article680041.html.

38. Shaykh Salih bin Fawzan Al-Fawzan, “Hadhihi al-bilad wa-hadhihi al-dawla alsaudiya” [This Country and This Saudi State], Al-Riyadh, On-line, Internet, 27 March

2013, available fromwww.alriyadh.com/2013/03/27/article820830.html.

39. Salih bin Hammud Al-Qaran, “Iran wa-qad takashshafat nawayaha al-adaniya”

[Iran’s Aggressive Intentions Finally Revealed], Al-Jazira, On-line, Internet, 9 September

2011, available from www.al-jazirah.com.sa/20111109/rj4.htm.

40. Interview with Prince Sultan, “Al-Alam al-arabi yamurr bi-marhala harija” [The

Arab World Is Passing through a Delicate Phase], Al-Hawadith (Beirut), 18-27 April

1990, 18.

41. Brigadier General Salih bin Ibrahim Al-Tasan, “Fi dhikra yawmna al-watani”

[Celebrating Our National Day], Al-Difa (Riyadh), September 2011, 55.

42. Staff Lieutenant General Husayn bin Abd Allah Al-Qabil, “Ajmal ibarat althana’ li-qiyadatna al-hakima” [The Highest Praise for Our Wise Leaders], Al-Difa, May

2011, 12.

43. Fahd Al-Dalani, “Al-Rajul al-mukhlis al-ladhi nadhar nafsah li-khidmat dinih

wa-watanih” [The Righteous Man Who Has Devoted Himself to His Religion and

Nation], Al-Riyadh, On-line, Internet, 15 January 2007, available from

www.alriyadh.com/2007/01/15/article216480.html.
CHAPTER 4

Evolving Saudi Nuclear Threat Assessments

In many ways, defense policy in Saudi Arabia is threat-based, in that

it responds to perceived threats, and considerations surrounding nuclear

weapons are no exception to that mechanism. That is, to a great extent, the

Kingdom’s defense policy must address such manifest challenges or

potentially face the consequences of a loss or at least a diminution of the

ruling system’s legitimacy if it fails to do so. Traditionally, Saudi

policymakers have operated on the basis of their perception of being

surrounded by active or potential threats, which have varied over the

years. In more recent times, defining the nuclear threat has been one of the

central elements of that threat and has represented the principal stimulus

for thinking about nuclear power in Saudi Arabia.

It appears that Riyadh has had to rely for the political and technical

intelligence on the capability and progress of Iran’s nuclear program –

which Saudi Arabia needs in order to develop its own assessments and

plans – predominantly on foreign capabilities, whether from the

International Atomic Energy Agency, the United Nations, probably

foreign governments, and the foreign media, many of whose reports are

cited in the Saudi media. Other information or perspectives on Iran’s

policy may also come from sources within the Iranian system or from

those who have broken with the Tehran government.1 However the Saudi

intelligence process may work, Saudi discourse is suffused with the

implicit given that Iran would be fully capable of eventually implementing

its nuclear project successfully, although the assessment of Iran’s technical

and political timetable for achieving its goal has contained considerable

uncertainty, as has been true of the foreign estimates on which such Saudi

judgments must rely.
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

36

The Long-Standing Israeli Threat

The understanding of the nuclear threat has shifted over time in

reaction to regional developments. Not surprisingly, Israel has figured

prominently in this respect, given its imposing nuclear capabilities and the

presence of unresolved Arab-Israeli issues. Calls for a counterweight to

Israel’s nuclear weapons have long been a staple in public Saudi

discourse, if not expressed openly by policymakers, at least in the views of

a portion of the country’s “informed public,” those who are at least

interested in current affairs, insofar as one can judge based on the

positions articulated by opinionmakers that are allowed to appear in

public, and thus presumably do not contradict official thinking. Tellingly,

in a telephone conversation between Saudi Arabia’s King Fahd and

Egypt’s President Husni Mubarak in July 1990 – which was intercepted by

Iraqi Intelligence – King Fahd noted that “Israel...is now our main

concern; they possess 200 nuclear warheads and 47 atom bombs and are

committed to using them against us and against our Palestinian brothers.”2

In the past, Saudi policymakers could rely, especially in terms of

public perceptions, on the fact that there was or would be an “Arab”

balance with Israel, as with Saddam Husayn’s efforts in the nuclear field,

which at certain phases reportedly had benefited from Saudi

encouragement. In fact, there had long been reports of Saudi financial

support for Iraq’s nuclear effort in the past. For example, Sad Al-Bazzaz, a

senior figure in the Iraqi media world and a Saddam regime insider, noted

that after Israel had destroyed the Osirak nuclear reactor in Iraq, Saudi

Arabia’s King Khalid had been prepared to finance the reactor’s

reconstruction, allegedly to the tune of $300 million, although the offer

was never implemented, since France refused to rebuild the reactor.3

According to information provided by a defecting Saudi diplomat,

Muhammad Al-Khilaywi, Saudi Arabia reportedly did actually help

finance Saddam Husayn’s nuclear program at one time.4That option, of

course, ended with the Gulf War.

In that vein, a Saudi op-ed in 1992 had continued to call for “an

assured Islamic nuclear deterrent to neutralize Israeli nuclear power,”

noting that without such a deterrent a country would be “at the mercy of

an adversary.”5Speaking of nuclear weapons, the same Saudi

commentator fifteen years later still believed that “anyone who does not
Evolving Saudi Nuclear Threat Assessments

37

possess such weapons while his adversary does will be, most often, at the

mercy of his enemy and vulnerable to blackmail.”6

In fact, when Libya’s leader Muammar Qaddafi relinquished his

nuclear weapons program in December 2003, a Saudi military journal

carried a lengthy analytical article which took the Libyan leader to task for

doing so. The article concluded that “despite the expected positive effects

of this decision for Libya, the international and regional effects will not be

of the same type, as the negative effects will be dominant, especially those

with respect to the unity of Arab action and the future of the Arab-Zionist

conflict.”7 Blaming Libya’s “eagerness to please [the United States] at

whatever cost,” the author cited as negative consequences of Libya’s deal

the validation for the United States of the principle of preventive war, a

situation not supportive of stability but favoring the establishment of U.S.

hegemony, the marginalization and subversion of international agencies,

the embarrassment of Pakistan for its support to Libya’s nuclear program,

and ensuing pressure on other Middle East states to sign the NonProliferation Treaty (NPT). Most importantly, there would now be a

further erosion of the balance of power in the Middle East in Israel’s

favor, as a potential deterrent in the Arab camp was removed, which

would “confirm and solidify Israel’s regional position” and facilitate the

United States’ wider plan of enabling Israel to play the role of a regional

great power.

8

Speaking in terms of being able to pressure Israel to accept a

nuclear-free zone, another article in the same military journal rued the

failure of Iraq, Libya, and even Iran to pursue a nuclear program, as this

“helped to weaken the three Arab (sic) countries’ power...and lost cards to

use to pressure and negotiate.”9

Understandably, in the first decade of this century, the prevailing

Saudi view still evaluated Israel as the dominant nuclear threat. Prince

Muqrin, then Head of Saudi Intelligence, for example, in 2006 asserted

that “Israel’s possession of a nuclear arsenal is considered the biggest

permanent strategic threat to Gulf security in the short and mid-term.”10

And, added Prince Muqrin, it was Israel’s nuclear arsenal that had spurred

Iran to also embark on its quest for nuclear weapons.

11 During the same

period, a special dossier in the official journal of the Shura devoted to the

nuclear threat focused solely on Israel.12

As Saudi Arabia’s powerful Minister of the Interior and Crown

Prince, the late Prince Nayif (d. 2012), also noted in 2006, Israel’s
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

38

possession of nuclear weapons “is justification for every country to think

about acquiring nuclear weapons.”13 Elaborating on such perceptions, a

typical editorial from this time-frame in a Saudi-owned daily warned that

Israel put the Middle East at the mercy of its nuclear weapons, and that it

was prepared to launch a nuclear first strike “even if it was not threatened

by an Arab or Iranian attack using nuclear, chemical, or biological

weapons.”14 The editorial then wondered skeptically “are the chemical and

biological weapons which the Arabs do possess really a deterrent against

Israel or Iran?” In that writer’s view, “the Arabs” clearly needed to acquire

a nuclear deterrent, and he suggested in a round-about way that Arab

leaders must consider that option. He provided an answer to his own

rhetorical question: “the people in the cave are asleep, assuming that a

philosophy of living in caves, deserted places, and caverns suffices for

defense and protection and that there is no need to incommode the

negotiators simply by raising the question of legitimate Arab security,

which is being threatened.”15 The Saudi press, for its part, focused in

particular on the combination of Israel as an “expansionist state” and its

nuclear arsenal, which “place the Middle East countries under the urgent

threat of [Israel’s] nuclear weapons.”16

A key lesson learned that emerged was that thanks to its nuclear

deterrent Israel could enforce the status quo on its own terms.17 In the

context of the concept of nuclear-supported hegemony, Saudi observers

have often referred to the negative model to avoid seeing repeated, that of

Israel’s use of its undeclared nuclear arsenal to establish and maintain a

political situation to its favor, but one highly detrimental to Arab interests.

As one editorialist saw it, Israel in fact saw no need at all to negotiate with

the Arabs thanks to its nuclear weapons.18 In particular, the Israeli

experience has convinced the Saudis that a country can use its nuclear

deterrent to keep territory it may have seized. As the editor of the AlJazira daily saw it, “Israel, with the West’s help, acquired the nuclear

weapons which it now uses to hold on to what it plundered from the Arabs

and [this weapon] will serve as their ‘deterrent’ if [the Arabs] attempt to

regain their rights.”19

A Saudi observer praised Israel sarcastically for its nuclear

development: “Of course, one cannot blame Israel for seeking to hurt us

with 400 atom bombs; rather, the rebuke should be to the Arab states

which have ignored for so long the deterrent role of long-range
Evolving Saudi Nuclear Threat Assessments

39

missiles.”20 Citing Israel’s large nuclear arsenal, another Saudi writer

noted that “The Arabs’ situation today in terms of power is enough to

make friends cry and enemies rejoice!”21 As one Saudi observer noted, “to

embark on a confrontation with America or Israel without possessing a

deterrent is a type of political suicide.”22 An editorialist, for his part,

concluded that “no one who is fair can be forced to accept the principle of

the unilateral possession by that criminal entity Israel of the advantage of a

nuclear deterrent poised against the entire Umma.” His corollary was that

“it is therefore vital for Arab national security and to guarantee the success

of peaceful Arab development policies that there be an Arab (or an

Islamic) nuclear deterrent to confront Israel in order to neutralize the

latter’s frightening nuclear deterrent.”23

Refocusing to Iran

By 2006, however, the impending nuclear threat from Iran

increasingly was joining that from Israel. Discussions began to appear in

the Saudi media during the latter half of the first decade as to which

country – Israel or Iran – posed the greater threat as a nuclear power and

where the Saudi defense focus should be. In the view of one Saudi

editorialist, for example, the uncontrolled Israeli nuclear arsenal posed

“without any doubt a greater degree of concern” than did the Iranian

nuclear program.

24

As Saudi Arabia increasingly came to believe that Iran was

approaching nuclear status, attention began to shift to the latter as a more

immediate and in key ways a more pernicious threat. To be sure, Saudi

Arabia had viewed Iran as a threat ever since the Islamic Revolution in

1979. However, Iran’s possible acquisition of nuclear weapons would

raise that threat to a new level. As one retired Saudi military officer put it,

“Iran’s desperate and constant attempts to acquire nuclear weapons” had

merely mutated “the Iranian threat to a new garb.” Chief among the

consequences of becoming a nuclear power in his view is the ability to

“apply one’s pressure and one’s demands on an adversary.”25 To make his

point, the author also quoted Arabic poetry to that effect: “the strong rule

in every land; so that the weak are not allowed their rights,” which is

reminiscent of Thucydides’ classic Melian Dialogue: “The strong do as

they can and the weak suffer what they must.” Reflecting the same
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

40

viewpoint, an opinion piece by a liberal Saudi academic likewise argued:

“it is vital to have a nuclear deterrent, whatever the cost. For us, it is not

just one of a number of options but rather an inevitable necessity in a

world that only understands the logic of power.”26 And, as the article

concluded, “All of that makes our possession of a nuclear deterrent a

necessity for our national security and for the defense of our political

independence in the face of any regional or international pressure.”27

Another commentator, who writes often on defense issues, even posited

that Turkey could easily develop nuclear weapons, further complicating

the Arabs’ position in the “survival of the strongest” struggle, since “one

of the elements of that survival...is acquiring a nuclear weapons deterrent

either by purchase from others...or by developing [it].”28

Prince Saud Al-Faysal put the nuclear threat in perspective in 2009,

noting that Israel’s nuclear arsenal had been a threat for decades already,

but if Iran now also acquired nuclear weapons that would “upset the

traditional balance between the countries of the Gulf to Iran’s favor.” As

he saw it, “we have every legitimate right to express our legitimate

concern and our justified fears of any developments that lead to the

proliferation of WMD in the Gulf region...and we also have the right to

confirm our categorical refusal of any unilateral hegemony and influence

at the expense of our states, peoples, and interests, or of any plans which

transform our countries and peoples into chess pawns.”29

Mobilizing the Saudi Public

Saudi policymakers, in their efforts to rank-order the threat to Saudi

Arabia have had to be careful so as not to blatantly contradict deeply-held

public views of a continuing Israeli nuclear threat. Such perceptions are

still deeply ingrained in Saudi opinion at all levels and, moreover,

dismissals of the Israeli threat could prove embarrassing in domestic

opinion and among wider Arab circles. As one military observer noted,

Israel’s monopoly of nuclear weapons represents “a permanent element of

threat to the Arab world.”30 Even as much of the Saudi media was shifting

its focus to Iran, one Saudi commentator – a member of the Shura –

reminded his readers that Israel was still an active nuclear threat, using its

nuclear monopoly to blackmail not only the Arabs but Europe and Asia as

well, and that any Israeli use of nuclear weapons in war would cause
Evolving Saudi Nuclear Threat Assessments

41

“great destruction” in the region.31 Israel’s assumed possession of nuclear

weapons for decades has led to ingrained Saudi perceptions, at least in

public opinion, of a continuing active Israeli nuclear threat, and any future

Iranian threat would only join, rather than displace, the existing Israeli

one. Thus, one Saudi observer in 2006 typically characterized “the Arabs

[as] between the pincers of the Israeli and of the Iranian nuclear

deterrents.”32 Such perceptions have persisted and, in 2010, another

editorialist spoke of the Arabs as living “between the two halves of a

pincer, one of which is Iran...in connection with its nuclear program, and

the other of which is Israel.”33

Significantly, when the editor of one loyalist Saudi daily sought to

mobilize support against Iran, he may have gone too far for public opinion

by essentially dismissing any Israeli threat, nuclear or otherwise.34 The

resulting readers’ comments were scathing, reminding him that Israel still

posed just as much of a threat as before and taking him to task for

practically ignoring that threat. In the wake of the popular furor, he was

forced to pen another editorial two days later, admitting that he had

received many critical messages, but suggesting that he may have been

reflecting official views in his original editorial when he noted that “what I

wrote was not my personal airing of the replacement of Israeli hostility by

Iranian hostility.”35 He reassured readers that his earlier editorial did not

mean that he was ignoring the Israeli threat, but he emphasized that Israel

had also never attacked the Gulf states, and he thought it necessary to

reemphasize the immediacy of the Iranian threat.

Ultimately, although the Saudis continue to see a dual nuclear threat

from both Israel and Iran, the balance in emphasis clearly shifted toward

Iran in recent years, as the Israeli threat was downgraded to more of a

residual threat. In some ways, it is true, placing Iran in greater prominence

may have been more acceptable and less controversial in the international

arena as the proximate potential catalyst for Saudi Arabia’s considering its

own nuclear weapons rather than would have been true of a focus on

Israel. Likewise, Saudi policymakers might have assumed that a focus on

Iran in this context might minimize Israeli opposition to a Saudi nuclear

option. Nevertheless, illustrating the continued official dual threat focus –

even if more recently an uneven one – Prince Turki Al-Faysal asked:

“What would be wrong with acquiring a nuclear force” to confront Iran

“or [to confront] the Israeli nuclear force?”36
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

42

Shaping Regional Threat Perceptions

The Saudi-owned media has also sought to convince regional publics

that a nuclear-armed Iran indeed had become a greater threat than Israel,

which is important to Riyadh in terms of being seen as fulfilling its role of

regional defender. As one editorial complained, some Arabs outside the

Gulf still saw a nuclear Iran in positive terms as a balance to Israel, but the

article insisted that Iran would only target the Gulf – rather than targeting

Israel – and “transform the region into a political hostage,” and therefore,

constituted the greater threat.37 Other Saudis labeled such views which

believed that Iranian nuclear weapons were a balance to Israel as only a

“hypothesis” and as “just an impossible hope.”38

However, convincing Arab audiences that the Iranian nuclear

program represented the greater threat has not always been easy.

According to one Saudi editorial, “some Arab observers” continued to

view Iran’s nuclear program in terms of a balance to Israel’s arsenal and

as a means to regain Palestinian rights. However, the writer argued that

Iran was not genuinely interested in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Rather,

Iran’s “feverish effort to complete its nuclear program makes its intention

plain that it will continue its confrontational and destructive policy against

its peaceful Arab neighbors.”39 And, he concluded, “no Arab denies...that

the Zionists are our top enemy; that is true, but the mistake I want to

address is that of glossing over another rogue state [i.e. Iran] on the brink

of adding to its criminal record with WMD so that it can carry out its

destructive plan in the region.”40 A military study also took to task “some

who hope” that Iran would balance Israel: “the truth, instead, is that it is

not Israel which will feel directly the danger of [Iran’s] nuclear weapons,

but rather it is the Arab states of the Gulf who will fall within the danger

zone of Iran’s blackmail.”41

Notes

1. For example, the former spokesman for Iran’s nuclear negotiating team, Seyed

Hossein Mousavian, was featured in the Saudi press, interview with Seyed Hossein

Mousavian by Ayman Al-Hammad, “Iran qadira ala intaj silah nawawi wa-mahamm

wikalat al-taqa al-dharriya tajassusiya” [Iran Is Capable of Building Nuclear Weapons
Evolving Saudi Nuclear Threat Assessments

43

and the Atomic Energy Agency’s Mission Is Espionage], Al-Riyadh, On-line, Internet, 28

December 2012, available from www.alriyadh.com/2012/09/28/article771824.html.

2. The intercepted conversation is one of the Iraqi documents captured in 2003,

transcript in SH-MICN-D-000-839_TF, 28 July 1990, Conflict Records Research Center,

Washington, DC.

3. Sad Al-Bazzaz, Harb talid ukhra [One War Engenders Another]. (Amman: Alahliya li’l-nashr wa’l-tawzi, 1992), 2nd ed., 202.

4. Paul Lewis, “Defector Says Saudis Sought Nuclear Arms,” New York Times, 7

August 1994, A20.

5. Sadaqa Yahya Fadil, “Al-Qunbula al-nawawiya al-islamiya bayn al-hulm wa’lkabus” [The Islamic Atom Bomb Either Dream or Nightmare], Ukaz (Jeddah), 1 May

1992, 8.

6. Sadaqa Yahya Fadil, “Istikhdam al-silah al-nawawi...al-maful al-khafiy” [Using

Nuclear Weapons...the Hidden Impact], Ukaz, On-line, Internet, 25 March 2007,

availablefromwww.okaz.com.sa/okaz/osf/20070325/PrinCon2007032597841.htm.

7. Yusuf Kamil Khattab, “Qarar Libiya al-takhalli an aslihat al-damar al-shamil:

abaduh wa-natai’jhu” [Libya’s Decision to Relinquish WMD: Its Dimensions and

Results], Majallat Kulliyat Al-Malik Khalid Al-Askariya, March 2004, 38.

8. Ibid., 35-38.

9. Hay’at Al-Tahrir [Editorial Board], “Hal yusbih Al-Sharq Al-Awsat mintaqa

khaliya min aslihat al-damar al-shamil?” [Will the Middle East Become a Region Free of

Weapons of Mass Destruction?], Majallat Kulliyat Al-Malik Khalid Al-Askariya, March

2004, 45. Iran had just signed the Additional Protocol to its NPT safeguards agreement,

granting expanded international inspection rights, and the Saudis at the time apparently

believed this marked an end to Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons.

10. “Al-Amir Muqrin: Al-Nizaat al-madhhabiya wa’l-tasalluh al-nawawi

yuhaddidan amn Al-Khalij” [Prince Muqrin: Ideological Conflicts and Nuclear Arms

Acquisitions Threaten Security in the Gulf], Ukaz, On-line, Internet, 9 December 2006,

available from www.okaz.com.sa.

11. Ibid.

12. Ahmad Muharram Najib, “Al-Silah al-nawawi yaqud” [Nuclear Weapons Rule],

Majallat Al-Shura, Dhu al-hijja 1427/December 2006-January 2007, 32-41.

13. Prince Nayif quoted in a press conference in Tunisia, “Imtilak ‘Isra’il’ silahan
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

44

nawawiyan yuti mubarriran li-ayy dawla li-an tufakkir bi’l-husul alayh” [Israel’s

Possession of Nuclear Weapons Gives Any Country the Justification to Also Think about

Acquiring Them], Al-Riyadh, On-line, Internet, 2 February 2006, available from

www.alriyadh.com/2006/02/02/article127533.html.

14. Ghassan Al-Imam, “Al-amn al-qawmi al-arabi wa’l-qunbula al-iraniya” [Arab

National Security and the Iranian Bomb], Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, On-line, Internet, 10 May

2005, available fromwww.aawsat.com/print.asp?did=298477&issueno=9660.

15. Ibid.

16. Ali Abbud Madi, “Nam annaha al-khatar al-akbar” [Yes, It Is the Greater

Threat], Al-Riyadh, On-line, Internet, 16 November 2003, available from

www.alriyadh.com/2003/11/16/article18406.html.

17. Jasir Abd Al-Aziz Al-Jasir, “Naam li-silah nawawi khaliji” [Yes to a Gulf

Nuclear Weapon], Al-Jazira, On-line, Internet, 7 December 2011, available from

www.al-jazirah.com.sa/20111207/du8.htm.

18. Yusuf Al-Kuwaylit, “La-yakun amn Isra’il waraqat al-musawama al-arabiya”

[Let Israel’s Security Be the Arab Negotiating Card], Al-Riyadh, On-line, Internet, 4

December 2001, available from www.alriyadh.com/2001/12/04/article30286.html.

19. Jasir Abd Al-Aziz Al-Jasir, “Naam li-silah nawawi khaliji” [Yes to a Gulf

Nuclear Weapon], Al-Jazira, On-line, Internet, 7 December 2011, available from

www.al-jazirah.com.sa/20111207/du8.htm.

20. Fahd Amir Al-Ahmadi, “Sahh al-nawm ya arab wasalat al-arbami’a!” [Hope

You Have Slept Enough, Oh Arabs; the Fourteen Hundreds Have Arrived], Al-Riyadh,

On-line, Internet, 13 July 2002, available from www.alriyadh.com/2002/07/13/

article26773.html. The 1400s refers to the current century in the Islamic calendar.

21. Id bin Masud Al-Juhani, “Hal yufiq al-arab ala hadir al-quwwa al-isra’iliya?”

[Will the Arabs Awake from the Noise of Israeli Power?], Al-Hayat (London), On-line,

Internet, 12 April 2008, available from http://international.daralhayat.com/print/200023/

archive. The author is Director of the Arab Gulf Center for Energy and Strategic Studies.

22. Salih Al-Namla, “Kuriya, Taywan, Iran wa-tanaqud al-siyasa al-nawawiya alamrikiya” [Korea, Taiwan, Iran, and the Contradictions of American Nuclear Policy], AlRiyadh, On-line, Internet, 8 October 2003, available from www.alriyadh.com/2003/10/

08/article19079.html.

23. Sadaqa Yahya Fadil, “Istikhdam al-silah al-nawawi...al-maful al-khafiy” [Using

Nuclear Weapons...the Hidden Impact], Ukaz, On-line, Internet, 25 March 2007,

availablefromwww.okaz.com.sa/okaz/osf/20070325/PrinCon2007032597841.htm.
Evolving Saudi Nuclear Threat Assessments

45

24. “Li-madha istithna’ Isra’il?’” [Why the Exception for Israel?], Al-Madina, Online, Internet, 22 September 2010, available from www.al-madina.com/print/265335.

25. Staff Major General Salama bin Hadhdhal Bin Saydan (Ret), “Al-Tahdid alirani fi thawbih al-jadid” [The Iranian Threat in Its New Garb], Al-Jazira, On-line,

Internet, 16 August 2008, available from www.al-jazirah.com.sa/2008jaz/aug/16/ar8.htm.

26. Muhammad bin Abd Al-Latif Al Al-Shaykh, “Al-Radi al-nawawi darura la

khiyar” [A Nuclear Deterrent Is a Necessity Not Just an Option], Al-Jazira, On-line,

Internet, 13 December 2011, available from www.al-jazirah.com.sa/2011jaz/dec/13/

1p4.htm.

27. Staff Brigadier Zayid bin Muhammad Al-Umari, “Dawafi imtilak al-qudrat alistratijiya al-sarukhiya al-fada’iya wa’l-nawawiya” [The Incentives for Acquiring

Strategic Rocket, Space, and Nuclear Capabilities], Quwwat Al-Difa Al-Jawwi Al-Malaki

Al-Saudi, December 2010, 15.

28. Sami Said Habib, “Ardughan wa-sibaq al-tasalluh al-nawawi al-qadim”

[Erdogan and the Coming Nuclear Arms Race], Al-Madina, On-line, Internet, 17

September 2011, available from www.al-madina.com/printhtml/327185.

29. “Nass kalimat al-amir Saud Al-Faysal wazir al-kharijiya al-saudiya” [The Text

of the Speech by Prince Saud Al-Faysal, Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Minister], Al-Sharq AlAwsat, 7 January 2009, www.aawsat.com/print.asp?did=501885&issueno=10998. Saudi

concerns had already sharpened due to Iran’s development of SSMs some years earlier,

which were also viewed within the context Iran’s intent “to become a regional great

power and to be able to impose its hegemony in the region.” “Wast mazid min altawatturat wa’l-daght al-sarukh al-irani shihab 3 yadkhul al-khidma” [Amid Increasing

Tensions and Pressure the Iranian Shihab-3 Missile Enters Service], Majallat Kulliyat AlMalik Khalid Al-Askariya, 1 December 2003, www.kkmaq.gov.sa/detail.asp?

InNewsItemID=129818&InTemplateKey=print.

30. Major General Muhammad Jamal Mazhlum, “Al-Amn al-qawmi al-tahaddiyat

al-askariya wa-subul al-tasaddi laha” [National Security: Military Challenges and the

Means to Counter Them], Majallat Kulliyat Al-Malik Khalid Al-Askariya, 1 June 2008,

www.kkmaq.gov.sa/detail.asp?InNewsItemID=273652&InTemplateKey=print.

31. Sadaqa Yahya Fadil, “Istikhdam Isra’il li-tarsanatha al-nawawiya” [Israel’s Use

of Its Nuclear Arsenal], Majallat Al-Shura, Jumada II 1430/May-June 2009, 28.

32. Talal Salih Bannan, “Al-Arab bayn kammashat al-rub al-nawawi!” [The Arabs

between the Pincers of Nuclear Terror!], Ukaz, On-line, Internet, 2 April 2006, available

from www.okaz.com.sa/okaz/osf/20060402/PrinCon200604026920.htm.

33. Adnan Kamil Salah, “Al-Qadiya al-iraniya bi-ru’ya arabiya muwahhada” [The
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

46

Iranian Case from a United Arab Perspective], Al-Madina, On-line, Internet, 7 January

2010, available from www.al-madina.com/print/213010.

34. Turki Abd Allah Al-Sudayri, “La-nafham shawahid al-makhatir al-qa’ima” [Let

Us Understand the Evidence for the Existing Threat], Al-Riyadh, On-line, Internet, 15

October 2011, available from www.alriyadh/com/2011/10/15/article675765.print.

35. Turki Abd Allah Al-Sudayri, “Iran awwalan wa-Isra’il thaniyan” [Iran First and

Israel Second], Al-Riyadh, On-line, Internet, 13 October 2011, available from

www.alriyadh/com/2011/10/13/article675147.html.

36. Ali Al-Qahis, “Al-Amir Turki Al-Faysal yutalib bi-tahwil majlis al-taawun ila

ittihad ashbah bi’l-urubbi wa-insha’ jaysh khaliji muwahhad” [Prince Turki Al-Faysal

Calls for a Transformation of the [Gulf] Cooperation Council into a Union Resembling

the European Union and for the Establishment of a Unified Gulf Army], Al-Riyadh, Online, Internet, 22 March 2011, available from www.alriyadh.com/2011/03/22/

article615880.html.

37. Abd Al-Rahman Al-Rashid, “Li-hadhihi al-asbab nakhsha Iran” [These Are the

Reasons Why We Fear Iran], Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, On-line, Internet, 18 April 2006,

available from www.aawsat.com/leader.asp?section=3&article=358858&issueno=10003.

38. Abd Al-Munim Mustafa, “Kull shay’ lam yaud kafiyan” [All of That Is Not

Enough], Al-Madina, On-line, Internet, 14 February 2010, available from www.almadina.com/print/224041.

39. Sulayman Al-Asad, “Al-Silah al-nawawi al-irani didd man?” [The Iranian

Nuclear Weapon – Against Whom?], Al-Jazira, On-line, Internet, 26 December 2011,

available fromwww.al-jazirah.com.sa/20111226/du13.htm.

40. Ibid.

41. Major General Husam Suwaylim (Ret), “Ahdaf Iran al-siyasiya wa’l-istratijiya

wa-asalib tahqiqha,” [Iran’s Political and Strategic Objectives and the Methods to

Achieve Them], Al-Haras Al-Watani, part 1, August 2011, 39.
CHAPTER 5

Analyzing the Threat in Riyadh: Why Would a

Nuclear Iran Be So Dangerous?

Not surprisingly, the Saudis devoted an increasing amount of

attention to analyzing the changing Iranian threat and its implications as

Iran was seen coming closer to acquiring nuclear weapons. How Iran

might use nuclear weapons and how Saudi nuclear weapons might be used

to counter that threat have elicited a considerable amount of discussion

and speculation in both civilian and military circles. Saudi policymakers

and analysts have focused exclusively on Iran’s nuclear program from a

Saudi threat perspective, with Iran seen as an aggressive state pursuing

nuclear weapons as a means to increase its capability to threaten its

neighbors and to impose its hegemonic control on the region. There has

been no attempt by Saudi Arabia to analyze the Iranian nuclear program

from Tehran’s standpoint, with a regime which feels threatened by a U.S.

military presence in the region and by the prospect of regime change

promoted or abetted from outside, a concern very likely intensified by the

events in Libya and Syria and the role played by outside support to the

dissidents in those two countries.

In part, deep and abiding religious undercurrents exacerbate the

bilateral relationship. That is, Saudis in general, and the country’s

religious establishment in particular, view the Shia (whether in Iran or the

other regional communities) with distaste and suspicion born of longstanding theological differences. The intense competition for regional

influence, based on state interests, complements both countries’ readiness

to react viscerally to each other’s policies. And, to lend concrete validity

to such mutual mistrust, Saudi Arabia and Iran have been engaged in a

covert war in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Lebanon, while Riyadh has blamed

the protests by the Shia majority in Bahrain on Iranian influence rather

than on local grievances. Not surprisingly, Saudi assessments of a
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

48

prospective Iranian nuclear capability are considered within that existing

overarching threat framework. As one editorial in 2013 summed up the

Saudi view, Iran was pursuing nuclear weapons to compensate for its

“religious and ideological inferiority complex,” and its ultimate objective

was to “oblige the world to accept it on the list of great nuclear powers.”1

Iran’s Nuclear Program: Military or Civilian?

Saudi Arabia had long been convinced that Iran’s nuclear program,

whatever Tehran’s claims, was meant for military purposes and not for

civilian use. One observer in a Saudi-owned newspaper claimed in 2005

that Iran was merely pursuing a policy of deception similar to those that

Israel, India, and Pakistan had followed until they had developed nuclear

weapons.

2 As a more recent editorial, among many articulating the Saudi

consensus, noted, “Iran’s repeated assurances...that its nuclear program is

not intended for the production of nuclear weapons...is hard to believe.”3

Saudi doubts about the civilian nature of the Iranian nuclear program,

despite Tehran’s assurances, have continued unabated until the present.4

Arguments by Iran that it needed nuclear power to generate electricity

were dismissed out of hand, even though Saudi Arabia has made similar

arguments about impending energy shortages in advocating its own

civilian nuclear program. As the editor of one Saudi daily put it, Iran is “a

state with enormous reserves of oil and gas, but has used [this argument]

in order to achieve other objectives.”5In fact, the whole thrust of Saudi

analysis and policy planning has been based on the conviction that Iran

has pursued a nuclear option specifically for military purposes.

Creating a New Hegemony

As some in Saudi Arabia saw it, Iran would be able to translate

nuclear weapons into considerable, and perhaps decisive, clout in the

region. A consensus emerged in Saudi Arabia that Iran was not likely to

use a new nuclear capability against Israel because of the latter’s

overwhelming overmatch and U.S. support. Significantly, a retired Saudi

general, asked: “What will the Iranian regime now be able to do if it

acquires nuclear weapons?” According to that officer, what was of
Analyzing the Threat in Riyadh: Why Would a Nuclear Iran Be So Dangerous?

49

particular concern about Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons was that,

unlike some other nuclear powers, “the difference is that in the case of

Iran it has become clear that the latter has a geo-political plan for

expansion.”6 As another retired Saudi military officer saw it, acquiring

nuclear weapons would enable Iran to “consolidate its security, extend its

influence, and break the international isolation which has beset it since the

Revolution.”7

According to another observer, “the Iranian nuclear bomb has only

one objective, namely that of dominance by a new Persian Empire over

Asia and the Arab and Islamic worlds,” which he saw as replacing in a

way the earlier Ottoman Empire, and, as he put it, the intent was to

“spread this new Persian Empire’s political and religious culture.”8 One

editorial claimed that a nuclear Iran was merely following in the steps of

the Shah, who had hoped the nuclear program he had initiated would

enable Iran to become the “policeman of the Gulf.”9 A report in a Saudiowned newspaper commenting on a meeting between the defense

ministers of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait noted that, according to unnamed

sources, the GCC viewed Iran’s recent refusal to allow international

inspection of its nuclear program with “extreme concern” and that all

“understood very clearly” that if Iran reached the stage of manufacturing

an atom bomb that “will lead to a redrawing of the map of the Middle East

region and, as a result, to a change in the balance of military power in the

region, opening the way for Tehran to extend and expand its political and

military influence [and] for the ‘Persianization’ of the Gulf as a first

phase.”10

Similarly, a Saudi military study posited that Iran was seeking nuclear

weapons “in order to safeguard its regional role, and to expand that role so

that the Islamic Republic’s presence is at a level no less prominent than

that of India, Israel, or Pakistan.”11 Another Saudi study specifically

linked Iran’s potential acquisition of nuclear weapons to a new ability to

establish its hegemony in the region by changing borders, partitioning

existing states into mini-states, and turning the Arab states into satellites.12

As that observer saw it, “we can confirm that when the production of

Iranian nuclear weapons is complete they will not be directed against

Israel at all...Rather, they will be used to threaten and blackmail the Arab

states, starting with those in the Gulf.”13

An editorial, likewise, characterized the Gulf countries – with their
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

50

key assets along the coast – as “becoming the hostage of Iran’s ambitions”

once the latter acquired nuclear weapons. Seeking to “transform the region

and to exercise its hegemony, once it acquires nuclear weapons [Iran] will

be able to accomplish what it has so far been unable to do, and without

dropping a single atom bomb.”14 Saudi observers frequently concluded

that a nuclear Iran, indeed, would be able to “change the map.”15 An

editorial in a Saudi-owned newspaper stressed that Iran would use its

nuclear weapons to extract “major concessions, that is to turn the region

into a hostage to the conduct of Iranian policy.”16 Iran’s nuclear weapons

would be used “to frighten and then attrit the Arab states in an arms race

[as the latter try] to achieve a nuclear balance.”17

Another article in the military media focused on the implications for

affecting the Gulf countries’ decision-making once Iran became a nuclear

power, noting that “the intent in [Iran’s] acquiring this [nuclear] weapon is

to blackmail the Gulf countries and to score political gains...which will

limit the independence of political decision-making in the Gulf in general

terms, and which will impose on the GCC countries a new security reality

in both regional and domestic terms.”18 Indeed, Iran would then use the

new capability to demand from the West a new strategic deal which would

recognize Iran’s dominant role in the Gulf’s security and recognition of

the legitimacy of its regime.19 Some Saudis speculated that Iran might not

even declare it had nuclear weapons but might rely on a strategy of

ambivalence.20 And, even if Iran acquired sufficient enriched uranium for

one nuclear bomb at first, it could wait until it had accumulated enough

material for “a small arsenal” before proceeding to weaponization, since

“a single nuclear weapon is not useful to establish a nuclear deterrence

balance.”21

Saudis emphasized not only the material character but also the

psychological aspect of nuclear weapons as part of a new strategic

equation. Some Saudis felt that simply living next door to a nuclear-armed

Iran could unhinge the regional balance by pulling the GCC apart as a

result of what one might term the “avalanche syndrome.” That is one

could equate such a situation to living in the shadow of a snow-covered

mountain, when one might unconsciously start to tip-toe even inside one’s

own house out of concern about triggering an avalanche. The GCC’s

smaller members, in particular, intimidated by Iran’s hegemony and

conscious of their vulnerability, might become wary of irritating Iran and
Analyzing the Threat in Riyadh: Why Would a Nuclear Iran Be So Dangerous?

51

drift into the latter’s orbit. As one Saudi commentator warned, “There is a

fear that some of the Gulf states, acting out of fear, will prefer to lie down

under Iran’s nuclear wing. If that happens, the Gulf states’ orientation will

change, thereby causing a split in the Arab world.”22 As another Saudi

observer put it, Iran’s “hegemony will be entrenched and will become a

tangible reality when it acquires nuclear weapons.”23

Exporting the Revolution and “Offensive Deterrence”

In addition, according to a retired senior Saudi military officer,

“acquiring a nuclear deterrent is what will provide it [i.e. Iran] the

appropriate conditions to export and impose the Revolution.”24 Another

Saudi military overview concluded that Iran’s objective was to establish

its hegemony over the entire Middle East and some countries in Central

and South Asia, and especially where there were Shia communities, by

exporting its revolution, as it had been trying to do even without nuclear

weapons.25 The study assessed that the only element of Iran’s national

power that had been missing was the nuclear one, which was now said to

be on its way.

In particular, according to a Saudi editorial emphasizing Iran as the

primary nuclear threat, Tehran relied on its ability to use “sectarian

differences as justification and then as [potential] for incitement,”

referring to Iran’s alleged involvement with Shia communities in Iraq,

Kuwait, Bahrain, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia itself.26 Riyadh, in particular,

appeared apprehensive about its own indigenous Shia communities in the

oil-rich Eastern Province and along the southern border with Yemen,

attributing discontent there not to the long-standing discriminatory

treatment at the hands of the Saudi government but to Iranian incitement.

Saudi policymakers and public opinion became increasingly concerned

about what was viewed as Iran’s capability to incite and support the Shia

communities the region after the unrest in Bahrain in 2011, which Riyadh

blamed on Iran. As the Saudi Land Forces’ journal saw it, Iran would

utilize its nuclear status “to blackmail the Arab states beginning with the

Gulf States in order to incite and support Iran’s extended hands [i.e. the

Shia communities] inside those states on a continuous basis in order to

carry out Iranian plans.”27 One political commentator argued that Iran was

planting agents in the Gulf “in order to destabilize the Gulf.”28 Another
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

52

commentator writing in the Saudi military academy’s official journal,

focused on Iran’s exploitation of the local Shia communities as part of its

“interference” in the Gulf States, which he compared to that of the United

States in Iraq and Afghanistan.29 According to the Saudi foreign minister,

in fact, “Iran’s interference in the internal affairs of the Gulf states is

continuing.”30

As one Saudi opinion piece saw it, as dangerous as the threat that Iran

posed already by its creation of “a fifth column” in the region already was,

“the threat today cannot be compared in any way to the threat in the future

when [Iran] acquires nuclear weapons.”31 Even those Saudis who

dismissed Iran’s saber-rattling as largely bluster were concerned that the

acquisition of nuclear weapons by the latter would change the regional

military equation decisively.32 Specifically, according to a military study,

“if Iran acquires nuclear weapons that will provide it with an ideal military

screen (ghita’) with which to carry out that mission [i.e. of exporting the

revolution].”33 That is, the perception has been that Iran could use its

nuclear weapons as a deterrent against regional or international retaliation

for an aggressive policy directed against the Arab Gulf states using

conventional or unconventional means. Iraqi military thinkers had already

discussed years earlier this aspect of using nuclear weapons and had

labeled such a strategy “offensive deterrence” (al-rad al-hujumi).34

It was this Iran/domestic Shia threat backed up by a nuclear deterrent

that Saudi official circles viewed as the most lethal likely combination.

While the current Iranian threat was already viewed with concern, Iran’s

acquisition of nuclear weapons was seen as increasing that threat

exponentially. One writer highlighted that “the psychological dividing line

between nuclear and conventional weapons is enormous, despite the

increase in the lethality of modern conventional weapons.”35

Saudis also have feared that Iran, as a nuclear power, might also be

emboldened to engage in conventional military operations at a higher level

than at present. Here, too, Iran could use a nuclear capability as a deterrent

behind which it could feel secure that the international community would

not likely intervene or retaliate. Addressing Iran’s future nuclear

capability, one Saudi observer noted that “Iran dreams of completely

deterring the United States and of obliging the latter to defer to Iran’s

interests.”36 An editorial, likewise, stressed that even the great powers

would not risk war against a nuclear state, noting that “even if tomorrow
Analyzing the Threat in Riyadh: Why Would a Nuclear Iran Be So Dangerous?

53

Iran undertook to occupy Bahrain – which is something only too possible

– or if its militias seized southern Iraq, there would be no great power

which would dare to prevent Iran from doing so by military means.”37

Another editorial in a Saudi-owned newspaper, typically, argued that

thanks to nuclear weapons Iran would be able to expand and even occupy

Kuwait.38

However, others believed that Iranian aggression would likely not

take the form of a ground or amphibious invasion, for which Iran has

limited capabilities. Rather, many Saudis assessed that Iran would most

likely have recourse to its air, naval, and SSM assets in any confrontation

with the regional countries. Iran had already publicized explicitly a

potential target list on the Saudi side of the Gulf in a conventional

confrontation – including oil facilities, cities, power stations, and ports –

many of which are vulnerable and whose loss would threaten Saudi

Arabia’s vital interests, and such information was often communicated to

the Saudi public by its own media.39

Nuclear Weapons and Warfighting

But, apart from acquiring nuclear weapons as a deterrent and political

lever, might Iran also resort to nuclear weapons in a warfighting mode?

Even if the Saudis recognized that Iran’s use of nuclear weapons in a war

as a far less likely contingency than its use of these weapons to support its

use of force at lower levels, they did not, and could not, dismiss that

possibility entirely.

Specifically, some Saudi observers concluded that Iran was unlikely

to use nuclear weapons in a war against the Arab states because that would

also threaten the Shia communities living in those countries.40 However,

there were also Saudi “pessimists,” that is those who did not exclude the

possibility that Iran might use a nuclear capability in a warfighting mode.

Thus, one commentator in a Saudi-owned newspaper dismissed those who

felt that Iran would not use nuclear weapons against an Arab state, given

that it was Muslim, by pointing out that Iran had already used chemical

weapons in the Iran-Iraq War against Iraq.41 However low the probability

of a nuclear war, some – and perhaps even most – Saudis did not dismiss it

offhand. Certainly, most Saudis believed that Israel “would not hesitate to

use whatever WMD it has, including nuclear weapons, in any future war
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

54

with the Arabs” not only as a last resort but even in other situations, such

as not being able to deal with a conventional Arab attack.42 Even Saudi

Arabia’s foreign minister, Prince Saud Al-Faysal, was not reassuring on

this count, as he noted in 2010 with regard to the Iranian nuclear program

that “history shows that no weapon has entered the region without its

ending up being used.”43

As an editorial in a Saudi-owned newspaper also asked plaintively in

a discussion on nuclear weapons, “is it possible for us to imagine how our

current human era will be described if a fool one day commits the fatal

error of pressing the button?”44 Some believed that Iranian leaders could

miscalculate and that such human errors could result in a nuclear war.45

Other observers considered that Iran was willing to use, or at least to

threaten to use, nuclear weapons, based on the latter’s eschatological

worldview and desire to bring about the reappearance of the occulted

Imam of Shia doctrine.46 One editorial in 2013 was skeptical that

deterrence would work with Iran, since it claimed that the Iranian

leadership was unpredictable, and that even potential alternatives to the

current leadership believed in the return of the awaited Mahdi and might

be willing to hasten the process at any cost. The editorial concluded by

asking “How, then, can we trust a nuclear Iran?”47

Other Saudis also feared that Iran was not a rational actor, suggesting

that the Iranian leadership had mental issues.48 Yet another editorial in

2008 also focused on the uncertainties of the Iranian leadership’s

perceptions of the nuclear factor. As the editorial saw it: We are

confronted by two possibilities: either we believe and trust that the Iranian

leadership understands the risks and is governed by logic and will not

cause the death of a million human beings in order to win a war which

could be decided instead peacefully...but that means that we have not

learned our lesson from Saddam Hussein or...the other possibility is that

we do not trust anyone.

The same writer, for his part, concluded that “we cannot build our

future by trusting in good intentions; the past has taught us not to trust any

leader.”49 And, he too also interjected the element of imponderable

ideological considerations that had to be factored into the risk of nuclear

war, namely that some “thoughtless leaders” in Israel or Iran might

actually view a nuclear war as hastening the coming of the Messiah or the

Mahdi, respectively.50 At least one Saudi commentator, in fact, felt that
Analyzing the Threat in Riyadh: Why Would a Nuclear Iran Be So Dangerous?

55

Israel would have no qualms about targeting large Arab cities and the

industrial and oil infrastructure, as well as military facilities, with its

nuclear weapons.51

The above 2008 editorial then asked against whom Iran might use its

nuclear weapons. Even in case of a confrontation with the United States,

Iran was judged as unlikely to strike the United States with its nuclear

weapons. Instead, if Iran wanted to hit at U.S. interests indirectly, the

writer posited that although either Israel or the Gulf could be direct

targets, Israel too was unlikely because of its ability to retaliate. He

concluded that “Therefore, that leaves Iran with virtually a single target if

it wanted to harm the United States and minimize the risk of retaliation:

the Gulf.”52 Likewise, a Saudi military journal rejected the likelihood that

Iran would strike either the United States or Israel with its nuclear

weapons, given the overmatch Iran would face. In light of that, the writer

argued that “the clearest and most feasible objective of a war, in the

thinking of Iran’s leaders, would be to embark on a war against the Arabs

and, in particular, against the Gulf States.”53 Another editorial derided

“some Arabs...who believe that the use of nuclear weapons against them

would be impossible as long as they themselves did not have [such

weapons],” labeling such attitudes as “naiveté,” and assessing that Israel

would have used that capability in 1973, as would have Iran or Iraq during

the Iran-Iraq War.54 Indeed, the same writer maintained that “Iran’s

arming itself with the bomb might entice it in the future to use it, not

against nuclear-armed Israel but, rather, against the Sunni Arab states

which do not possess a strategic weapon capable of deterring or

responding.”55

One Saudi military writer recently discussed the categories of

potential targets in a first strike – which he believed would be focused on

counter-force military targets – if ever there should be a nuclear war.

Although his assessment was in generic terms, with no specific countries

named, given the timing and current Saudi security concerns, the intent

was clearly to address the situation in the Gulf. In his view,

For those countries possessing nuclear weapons, there is a whole

other target set for selection, focusing on a strategy of striking the enemy’s

standing forces, provided there are forces that are vulnerable to a first

strike, which would give an advantage for taking the initiative to the party

initiating the war. This strategy is directed against military targets only,
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

56

and he who has the capability to launch a first-strike must calculate

whether he has the ability to destroy every missile in the other party’s

arsenal. Otherwise, the result can be a guaranteed disaster.56

Although Iran was not specifically mentioned in this assessment,

given the recent Saudi preoccupations with the threat posed by a potential

Iranian nuclear capability, the assumed linkage for Saudi military readers

was no doubt clear.

The Threat to Saudi Arabia’s Economy

Saudi decision-makers have also been concerned that an assertive

nuclear–armed Iran could easily threaten the economic pillar of the ruling

family’s legitimacy and, in particular, the energy sector upon which most

of Saudi Arabia’s national income and stability depend. Even before Iran

would become a nuclear power, Saudis feared that strikes by the United

States or Israel intended to prevent Iran from acquiring that nuclear

capability could lead the latter to unleash a costly attack aimed at Saudi

Arabia’s economy, as Iran had threatened to do in retaliation for any strike

against its nuclear program. In particular, Saudi and Gulf oil and gas

facilities and export mechanisms are vulnerable to such attacks. Even the

“soft power” option of punishing sanctions put in place, while less

confrontational than a military strike, it was feared, might elicit a forceful

Iranian response if the Iranian regime believed its stability was being

undermined. However, the tangible steps Iran only took the form of

warnings, such as forays by Iranian naval vessels near Saudi oil facilities

and the cyber attack on Aramco, Saudi Arabia’s national oil company,

which many suspected had been carried out by Iran.57

Saudis were divided over the likelihood and feasibility of Iran’s

carrying through with its repeated threats to close the Straits of Hormuz,

which could disrupt – even if not stop – oil exports from Saudi Arabia,

with some hoping that the West would not accept such a significant

economic challenge. Despite being a supporter of harsh sanctions against

Iran, one Saudi newspaper editor worried that Iran could even resort to

“committing suicide by closing and mining the Straits of Hormuz” in a

situation fraught with uncertainty.58 Indeed, one Saudi commentator

warned Iran that if the latter closed the Straits the West would react by

striking Iran with nuclear weapons, and would then destroy the regime and
Analyzing the Threat in Riyadh: Why Would a Nuclear Iran Be So Dangerous?

57

occupy the country.59 However, given the widespread assumption in Saudi

Arabia that not even a great power would confront a country that had

nuclear weapons, the implicit assumption was that once Iran actually

acquired that capability it could pose a more credible threat to close the

Straits of Hormuz than it could now. As a writer in a Saudi military

journal feared – although projecting such views as being felt in Israel – a

nuclear-armed Iran could control oil in the Gulf, thereby giving it a

decisive voice on pricing.60 In the event, Riyadh began preparing to

revitalize the pipeline to the Red Sea that it had used to bypass the Straits

of Hormuz during the Iran-Iraq War in case shipping through the Gulf was

disrupted again.61

Notes

1. Yusuf Al-Kuwaylit, “Al-Shaykh al-shija” [The Brave Shaykh], Al-Riyadh, Online, Internet, 11 February 2013, available from www.alriyadh.com/2013/02/11/

article809304.html.

2. Ghassan Al-Imam, “Al-amn al-qawmi al-arabi wa’l-qunbula al-iraniya” [Arab

National Security and the Iranian Bomb], Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, On-line, Internet, 10 May

2005, available fromwww.aawsat.com/print.asp?did=298477&issueno=9660.

3. “Al-Tasrihat wahdaha la takfi!” [Declarations Alone Are Not Enough!], AlMadina, On-line, Internet, 5 September 2011, available from www.al-madina.com/node/

324918.

4. Yusuf Al-Kuwaylit, “Al-Khalij wa-kabus al-makhawif” [The Gulf and the

Nightmare of Horrors], Al-Riyadh, On-line, Internet, 8 December 2012, available from

www.alriyadh.com/2012/12/08/article790854.html.

5. Ibid.

6. Major General Husam Suwaylim (Ret), “Ahdaf Iran al-siyasiya wa’l-istratijiya

wa-asalib tahqiqha,” [Iran’s Political and Strategic Objectives and the Methods to

Achieve Them], Al-Haras Al-Watani, part 1, August 2011, 36.

7. Staff Major General Salama bin Hadhdhal Bin Saydan (Ret), “Al-Tahdid al-irani

fi thawbih al-jadid” [The Iranian Threat in Its New Garb], Al-Jazira, On-line, Internet, 16

August 2008, available from www.al-jazirah.com.sa/2008jaz/aug/16/ar8.htm.
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

58

8. “Qunbulat Iran ‘al-muntazhara’ didd man ya tura?” [I Wonder, Against Whom Is

Iran’s “Expected” Bomb?], Al-Watan, On-line, Internet, 9 January 2012, available from

www.alwatan.com.sa/Articles/detail.aspx?ArticleId=7992. A similar Saudi press editorial

saw as Iranian policy “for the Persians to enslave the Arabs and to take revenge against

the latter; what was taken in the past by means of preaching religion would now be

returned by means of nuclear weapons and intercontinental missiles.” Muhammad AlHarbi, “Sharr Iran akbar min quwwatha” [Iran’s Evil Exceeds Its Power], Ukaz, On-line,

Internet, 14 October 2011, available from www.okaz.com.sa/new/Issues/20111014/

PrintCon20111014451120.htm.

9. Yusuf Al-Kuwaylit, “Al-Shaykh al-shija” [The Brave Shaykh], Al-Riyadh, Online, Internet, 11 February 2013, available from www.alriyadh.com/2013/02/11/

article809304.html.

10. Sultan Abd Allah, “Nawawi Iran yutghi ala muhadathat Salman-Jabir fi AlRiyad” [Iran’s Nuclear [Program] Dominates the Salman-Jabir Talks in Riyadh], Ilaf,

On-line, Internet, 20 November 2011, available from www.elaph.com.

11. Hay’at Al-Tahrir [Editorial Board], “Al-Mashru al-irani al-iqlimi wa’l-nawawi”

[The Iranian Regional Project and the Nuclear [Program]], Majallat Kulliyat Al-Malik

Khalid Al-Askariya, On-line, Internet, 1 June 2009, available from

www.kkmaq.gov.sa/detail.asp?InNewsItemID=319120&InTemplateKey=print.

12. Major General Husam Suwaylim (Ret), “Ahdaf Iran al-siyasiya wa’l-istratijiya

wa-asalib tahqiqha,” [Iran’s Political and Strategic Objectives and the Methods to

Achieve Them], Al-Haras Al-Watani, part 1, August 2011, 33-34.

13. Ibid., 37.

14. Abd Al-Rahman Al-Rashid, “Lasna kha’ifin min qunbulat Iran al-nawawiya”

[We Are Not Afraid of Iran’s Atom Bomb], Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, On-line, Internet, 21

February 2010, available from www.aawsat.com/leader.asp?section=3&article=558022&

issueno=11408.

15. For example, Bayyina Al-Milham, “Kharitat Iran...izalat al-arab am izalat

Isra’il?” [Iran’s Roadmap: The Elimination of the Arabs Or of Israel?], Anba’ukum

(Riyadh), On-line, Internet, 12 June 2011, available from www.anbacom.com/print.php?

action=print&m=articlesm&id=8269, and Usama Said Al-Qahtani, “Hal tamlik Iran alqunbula?” [Will Iran Get the Bomb?], Al-Watan, On-line, Internet, 9 March 2012,

availablefromwww.alwatan.com.sa/Articles/Detail.aspx?ArticleId=9890.

16. Abd Al-Rahman Al-Rashid, “Li-hadhihi al-asbab nakhsha Iran” [These Are the

Reasons Why We Fear Iran], Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, On-line, Internet, 18 April 2006,

available from www.aawsat.com/leader.asp?section=3&article=358858&issueno=10003.
Analyzing the Threat in Riyadh: Why Would a Nuclear Iran Be So Dangerous?

59

17. Major General Husam Suwaylim (Ret), “Ahdaf Iran al-siyasiya wa’l-istratijiya

wa-asalib tahqiqha,” [Iran’s Political and Strategic Objectives and the Methods to

Achieve Them], Al-Haras Al-Watani, part 1, August 2011, 37.

18. “Al-Ru’ya al-istratijiya li’l-qiyada al-saudiya nahw watan amin wa-Khalij

mustaqirr” [The Saudi Leadership’s Strategic View of a Secure Country and a Stable

Gulf], Al-Barriya (Riyadh), On-line, Internet, 27 October 2010, available from

http://RSLF.GOV.SA/English/AlBarriyaMagazine/ArticleSharingDocs/368110ef-abc2-

a309-338e212fc9ff.doc.

19. Major General Husam Suwaylim (Ret), “Ahdaf Iran al-siyasiya wa’l-istratijiya

wa-asalib tahqiqha,” [Iran’s Political and Strategic Objectives and the Methods to

Achieve Them], Al-Haras Al-Watani, part 1, August 2011, 35.

20. Abd Al-Jalil Zayd Al-Marhun, “Al-Nawawi al-irani...ayn yattajih?” [Iran’s

Nuclear Program...Where Is It Headed?], Al-Riyadh, On-line, Internet, 7 June 2013,

available fromwww.alriyadh.com/2013/06/07/article841654.html.

21. Ibid.

22. Fa’iq Fahim, “Duwal majlis al-taawun al-khaliji wa’l-tahaddi al-nawawi alirani” [The Gulf Cooperation Council States and the Iranian Nuclear Challenge], AlIqtisadiya (Riyadh), On-line, Internet, 25 June 2011, available from www.aleqt.com/

2011/06/25/article_552510.print.

23. Abd Al-Aziz Al-Suwayd, “Ahyanan...istikbar wa-salaf siyasi” [Sometimes...

Arrogance and Political Bragging], Al-Hayat (Saudi edition), On-line, Internet, 21

February 2012, available from http://ksa/daralhayat.com/ksaarticle/353250.

24. Staff Major General Salama bin Hadhdhal Bin Saydan (Ret), “Al-Tahdid alirani fi thawbih al-jadid” [The Iranian Threat in Its New Garb], Al-Jazira, On-line,

Internet, 16 August 2008, available from www.al-jazirah.com.sa/2008jaz/aug/16/ar8.htm.

25. Major General Husam Suwaylim (Ret), “Ahdaf Iran al-siyasiya wa’l-istratijiya

wa-asalib tahqiqha,” [Iran’s Political and Strategic Objectives and the Methods to

Achieve Them], Al-Haras Al-Watani, part 1, August 2011, 30-31.

26. Turki Abd Allah Al-Sudayri, “Iran awwalan wa-Isra’il thaniyan” [Iran First and

Israel Second], Al-Riyadh, On-line, Internet, 13 October 2011, available from

www.alriyadh/com/2011/10/13/article675147.html.

27. Ibid.

28. Sultan Abd Al-Aziz Al-Anqari, “Ghawwasat Iran fi’l-Bahr Al-Ahmar” [Iranian

Submarines in the Red Sea], Al-Madina, On-line, Internet, 10 June 2011, available from
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

60

www.al-madina.com/print/308754.

29. Bassam Al-Asali, “Al-Tahaddiyat al-iraniya wa’l-amn al-arabi” [The Iranian

Challenges and Arab Security], Majallat Kulliyat Al-Malik Khalid Al-Askariya, On-line,

Internet, 21 June 2011, available from www.kkmaq.gov.sa/detail.asp?InNewsItemID=

393305&InTemplateKey=print.

30. Fahd Al-Shiyabi, “Al-Nawawi al-irani tahdid jiddi li’l-amn wa-’l-istiqrar aliqlimi wa’l-duwali” [Iran’s Nuclear [Weapons] Are a Serious Threat to Regional and

International Security and Stability], Ukaz, On-line, Internet, 5 December 2011, available

from www.okaz.com.sa/new/Issues/20111205/Princon20111205460826.htm.

31. Khalid Al-Sulayman, “Al-Radikaliya al-nawawiya!” [Nuclear Radicalism!],

Ukaz, On-line, Internet, 6 December 2011, available from www.okaz.com.sa/new/Issues/

20111206/PrinCon20111206461025.htm. Other Saudi sources have also highlighted this

concern. See Abd Al-Munim Mustafa, “Kull shay’ lam yaud kafiyan” [All of That Is Not

Enough], Al-Madina, On-line, Internet, 14 February 2010, available from www.almadina.com/print/224041. Also, Jasir Al-Jasir, “Al-Saudiya nawawiyan” [A Nuclear

Saudi Arabia], Al-Sharq (Dammam), On-line, Internet, 25 February 2012, available from

www.alsharq.net.sa/2012/02/25/138984.

32. Nasir Al-Sirami, “Al-Tahdidat al-iraniya waqaha am daf?” [Are the Iranian

Threats Arrogance or Weakness?], Al-Jazira, On-line, Internet, 17 January 2012,

available fromwww.al-jazirah.com/20120117/ar6.htm.

33. Major General Husam Suwaylim (Ret), “Ahdaf Iran al-siyasiya wa’l-istratijiya

wa-asalib tahqiqha,” [Iran’s Political and Strategic Objectives and the Methods to

Achieve Them], Al-Haras Al-Watani, part 1, August 2011, 36. Similar ideas were

expressed by Yusuf Al-Kuwaylib, “Sibaq al-tasalluh bayn al-rad wa-makhawif al-hurub”

[The Arms Race between Deterrence and the Fear of War], Al-Riyadh, On-line, Internet,

20 September 2010, available from www.alriyadh.com/2010/09/20/article561050.html.

34. See Norman Cigar, Saddam Hussein’s Nuclear Vision: An Atomic Shield and

Sword for Conquest. (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2011), 25-30.

35. Abd Al-Jalil Zayd Al-Marhun, “Al-Alam al-thalith wa-mudilat al-intishar alnawawi” [The Third World and the Problem of Nuclear Proliferation], Al-Riyadh, Online, Internet, 15 June 2001, available from www.alriyadh.com/2001/06/15/

article32562.html.

36. Ibid.

37. Abd Al-Rahman Al-Rashid, “Lasna kha’ifin min qunbulat Iran al-nawawiya”

[We Are Not Afraid of Iran’s Atom Bomb], Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, On-line, Internet, 21

February 2010, available from www.aawsat.com/leader.asp?section=3&article=558022&
Analyzing the Threat in Riyadh: Why Would a Nuclear Iran Be So Dangerous?

61

issueno=11408.

38. Huda Al-Husayni, “Iran al-nawawiya tuid ihya’ al-imbiraturiya al-farisiya” [A

Nuclear Iran Will Revive the Persian Empire], Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, On-line, Internet, 26

January 2006, available from www.aawsat.com/print.asp?did=345175&issueno=9921.

This became a common theme in Saudi discourse, Al-Anqari, “Ghawwasat Iran.”

39. For example, “Iran tuhaddid bi-imtar duwal Al-Khalij al-mutaawina ma

Amirika bi’l-sawarikh” [Iran Threatens to Rain Missiles on Any Gulf State Cooperating

with America], Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, On-line, Internet, 11 June 2007, available from

www.aawsat.com/print.asp?did=423146&issueno=10422.

40. Suhayla Zayn Al-Abidin Hammad, “Al-Ijtima al-tashawuri li-duwal al-20 watajrid al-mintaqa min al-silah al-nawawi” [The Consultative Meeting of the G20 and

Clearing the Region of Nuclear Weapons], Al-Madina, On-line, Internet, 6 March 2012,

available from www.al-madina.com/printhtml/362496.

41. Ghassan Al-Imam, “Al-amn al-qawmi al-arabi wa’l-qunbula al-iraniya” [Arab

National Security and the Iranian Bomb], Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, On-line, Internet, 10 May

2005, available fromwww.aawsat.com/print.asp?did=298477&issueno=9660.

42. Yusuf Kamil Khattab, “Qira’a fi al-malaff al-nawawi al-isra’ili” [An Analysis

of the Israeli Nuclear Program], Majallat Kulliyat Al-Malik Khalid Al-Askariya, 1

December 2002, 62.

43. Prince Saud Al-Faysal, speaking at a press conference in Riyadh, 15 February

2010, “Al-Mu’tamar al-suhufi al-mushtarak li-sahib al-sumuww al-malaki al-amir Saud

Al-Faysal ma maali wazirat al-kharijiya al-amirikiya” [Joint Press Conference with His

Royal Highness Prince Saud Al-Faysal and Her Excellency the American Secretary of

State], Saudi Foreign Ministry website, On-line, Internet, available from

www.mofa.gov.sa/Minister/PressConferences/Pages/NewsArticleID105722.aspx.

44. “Madha law daghat ahmaq ala zurar?” [What If a Fool Pressed the Button?], AlSharq Al-Awsat, On-line, Internet, 3 June 2009, available from www.aawsat.com/

print.asp?did=521831&issueno=11145.

45. Khalis Halabi, “Madha law imtalakat Iran silah al-shaytan?” [What If Iran

Acquired the Devil’s Weapon?], Al-Watan, On-line, Internet, 2 August 2010, available

from www.alwatan.com.sa/Articles/detail.aspx?ArticleId=1551.

46. Abd Al-Aziz Al-Khamis, “Han waqt al-silah al-nawawi al-saudi” [The Time has

come for a Saudi Nuclear Weapon], Ibda (Sanaa), On-line, Internet, 23 February 2012,

available from http://ebdaa.com/?act=artc&id=5577&print=1. This concern was also

repeated in Al-Jasir, “Al-Saudiya nawawiyan.”
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

62

47. Abd Al-Rahman Al-Rashid, “Isra’il tashinn harb Al-Khalij al-muqbila!” [Israel

Will Spark the Next Gulf War!], Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, On-line, Internet, 18 April 2013,

available from www.aawsat.com.

48. “Qunbulat Iran ‘al-muntazhara’ didd man ya tura?” [I Wonder, Against Whom

Is Iran’s “Expected” Bomb?], Al-Watan, On-line, Internet, 9 January 2012, available

from www.alwatan.com.sa/Articles/detail.aspx?ArticleId=7992.

49. Abd Al-Rahman Al-Rashid, “Ala man tarmi Iran qunbulatha al-nawawiya?”

[On Whom Would Iran Drop Its Atom Bomb?], Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, On-line, Internet, 26

November 2008, available from www.aawsat.com/print.asp?did=495492&issueno=

10956.

50. Ibid.

51. Id bin Masud Al-Juhani, “Al-quwwa al-salam wa’l-nasr” [Power, Peace, and

Victory], Al-Hayat, On-line, Internet, 21 February 2009, available from

www.daralhayat.net/actions/print.php.

52. Al-Rashid, “Ala man tarmi. The same idea was developed in Hamad bin Abd

Allah Al-Luhaydan, “Abad al-tasalluh al-nawawi wa-tadaiyatih” [Dimensions of Nuclear

Arming and of Its Consequences], Al-Riyadh, On-line, Internet, 29 May 2009, available

from www.alriyadh.com/2009/05/29/article433463.html.

53. Al-Asali, “Al-Tahaddiyat al-iraniya.” Other editorials shared this view, such as

Adnan Kamil Salah, “Tasawwaru uhlumu udu!” [Imagine, Dream, Pray!], Al-Madina,

On-line, Internet, 13 May 2010, available from www.al-madina.com/print/247504.

54. Ghassan Al-Imam, “Qanabil nawawiya li’l-aghrad al-silmiya!” [Nuclear Bombs

for Peaceful Purposes], Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, On-line, Internet, 11 May 2010, available

from www.aawsat.com/print.asp?did=569092&issueno=11487.

55. Ibid.

56. Staff Major General Khidr Al-Dahrawi (Ret), “Al-Ahdaf al-akthar taarrudan

li’l-hajamat al-jawwiya wa’l-sarukhiya fi halat al-harb” [The Targets Most at Risk to Air

and Missile Attacks in Case of War], Majallat Kulliyat Al-Malik Khalid Al-Askariya, Online, Internet, 21 June 2011, available from www.kkmaq.gov.sa/detail.asp?

InNewsItemID=393312&InTemplateKey=print.

57. Muhammad Al-Tayir, “Al-Rashid: Tihran arsalat qawarib musallaha li-mintaqa

qariba min abar al-naft al-saudiya” [Al-Rashid: Tehran Sent Armed Vessels to an Area

Near the Saudi Oil Fields], Sabq (Riyadh), On-line, Internet, 21 January 2012, available

from http://sabq.org/58bfde, and Ibrahim Al-Athimin, “Al-Saudiya-Iran-Al-Saudiya

wa’l-asliha al-saybaraniya” [Saudi Arabia-Iran-Saudi Arabia and the Cyber Weapons],
Analyzing the Threat in Riyadh: Why Would a Nuclear Iran Be So Dangerous?

63

Al-Yawm, On-line, Internet, 12 December 2012, available from www.alyaum.com/News/

mobile/art/65454.html.

58. Yusuf Al-Kuwaylit, “Ma hiya dawafi al-munawarat al-askariya fi Al-Khalij?”

[What Are the Motives for the Military Exercises in the Gulf?], Al-Riyadh, On-line,

Internet, 18 December 2012, available from www.alriyadh.com/2012/09/18/

article769115.html.

59. Isam Al-Zamil, “Iran wa-imdadat al-naft” [Iran and Oil Supplies], Al-Yawm,

On-line, Internet, 2 January 2012, available from www.alyaum.com/News/art/

39772.html.

60. Sayyid Isa Muhammad, “Al-Sira al-irani-al-isra’ili” [The Iranian-Israeli

Conflict], Majallat Kulliyat Al-Malik Khalid Al-Askariya, On-line, Internet, 1 December

2009, available from www.kkmaq.gov.sa/detail.asp?InNewsItemID=342409&InTemplate

Key=print.

61. “Khabir: Imkaniyat ziyadat al-taqa al-istiabiya li’l-khatt al-qadim ila 1.65

milyun barmil; Al-Saudiya tuid ta’hil khatt al-naft al-badil li-Hurmuz” [An Expert: It Is

Possible to Increase the Capacity of the Old Pipeline to 1.65 Million Barrels; Saudi

Arabia Again Activates the Alternate Pipeline to Hormuz], Al-Arabiya TV, On-line,

Internet, 29 June 2012, available from www.alarabiya.net/save_print.php?print=1&

cont_id=223395.
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

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CHAPTER 6

Thinking in Terms of Solutions: Stopping Iran

Highlighting the looming Iranian problem publicly begged the

question of what could be done to neutralize the nuclear threat if and when

it actually came to pass. Even if not challenged openly by public opinion,

any government would likely feel sensitive about providing an answer to a

threat about which it had repeatedly informed the public, thereby raising

the latter’s level of concern. By and large, Saudi Arabia recognized that

there was not much it could do about countering the nuclear threat from

Israel. It was too late for that. Moreover, as noted, Israel increasingly has

been seen as a far less imminent threat than that emanating from Iran. Not

surprisingly, the Saudis’ focus has been, instead, on how to deal with Iran.

Saudi Arabia hoped to avoid creating a repetition of the situation it had

come to face with Israel and believed that there was still time to act.

Saudis addressed this issue directly, with Saudi spokesmen and analysts

considering possible solutions to stopping Iran’s march toward nuclear

weapons. Such options ranged from doing nothing, to accepting a foreign

nuclear umbrella, to hoping for a strike derailing or delaying the

development of an Iranian bomb, to relying on the effectiveness of soft

power, and, ultimately, to seeking a countervailing nuclear deterrent.

Doing Nothing?

As for the first option, that of doing nothing and merely adjusting to a

new situation, Saudi Arabia implicitly rejected it. To do nothing, from the

Saudi perspective, would have been to abdicate any possibility of

countering what was perceived as an active threat already, as noted above,

and a threat that would only increase if Iran acquired nuclear weapons. If

anything, Saudis believed that a passive attitude on their part would only

encourage Iran in its aggressiveness. As a Saudi political analyst noted,
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

66

the Gulf states “must seek immediately and resolutely to acquire nuclear

weapons, using any possible means,” arguing that “it is not logical for

Iran, whose objectives of expansion are well-known, to seek nuclear

weapons while the Gulf states do nothing.”1

True, some senior Saudis may have at least considered the possibility

of accommodating Iran by recognizing the latter’s interests. For example,

in July 2011, the country’s Foreign Minister, Prince Saud Al-Faysal – in a

departure from the harsh rhetoric that had been emanating from Saudi

Arabia – appeared to suggest that one needed to recognize Iranian interests

and power when he said that “Iran is a neighboring country; if it wants a

leadership role it must take into consideration the interests of the countries

of the region and not [only] its own interests.”2 However, in what was a

highly unusual follow-up, a Saudi academic took Prince Saud Al-Faysal to

task publicly, noting that his remarks differed from previous positions, that

it seemed that Saudi Arabia was accepting Iran’s leading role in the

region, and asking whether this represented a change in Saudi policy and

if Saudi Arabia was now willing to share influence in the Gulf with Iran.

Indeed, he asked openly if that meant that the Gulf States now accepted

Iran’s leadership, if this was really Saudi policy, and if Saudi Arabia was

now prepared to coexist with Iran’s ambitions. Clarifying Saudi Arabia’s

policy and interests, the commentator stressed, instead, that “there is no

substitute for Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states to be an effective player in

the regional power balance equation...and there is no excuse for asking

Iran to safeguard our interests.” And, he added, “I do not believe that

Saudi Arabia can or will accept coexistence with a leading role or

hegemony by Iran in the Gulf.” Asking himself if Prince Saud Al-Faysal

really meant to link a leading role for Iran in return for the latter’s

protecting the Gulf States’ interests, he concluded that accepting such a

role for Iran would represent “a revolution in Saudi policy.” Instead, what

Saudi Arabia had to do was ensure its own self-defense and demand that

Iran end its quest for nuclear weapons.3

Given the context of the Saudi political system, such immediate and

forceful public questioning of a senior member of the royal family

probably suggests some backing from influential circles within the royal

family and may reflect differences of opinion at the top about the approach

to Iran. Subsequently, Prince Saud Al-Faysal reverted to the more standard

Saudi hard-line, as at a GCC Foreign Ministers’ summit held in Riyadh in
Thinking in Terms of Solutions: Stopping Iran

67

November 2011, where he condemned not only Iran’s “persistent

interference” in the affairs of neighboring states but also its pursuit of

nuclear weapons, which he noted “is considered a patent threat to the

security and stability of the region.”4

Nevertheless, some elements of a Saudi carrot and stick policy, or at

least a desire to avoid a direct confrontation with Iran remained, as in

February 2012 two Iranian warships deploying to the Red Sea were

allowed to make a port call in Jeddah. Likewise, a Saudi military journal

at the end of 2012 published two articles – albeit written by foreigners –

which focused on the desirability of good Arab-Iranian relations and the

need to come to an understanding, based on the fact that they shared a

common geography, history, culture, and political, economic, and security

interests, and suggested many potential joint projects, even on civilian

nuclear energy.

5

The principal stumbling block, however, was said to

remain the doubts around Tehran’s nuclear intentions, which had to be

resolved first. Urging Iran to abandon its nuclear quest, the Saudi media

even appealed to Iran’s purported shared interest with the Gulf countries

as common victims of a supposed “vast conspiracy” by the West and

Israel to spark a war between Iran and its Gulf neighbors, which would

destroy both belligerents and allow Israel to dominate the region.6

A Foreign Nuclear Umbrella as an Alternative?

Could the provision of a nuclear umbrella by another country provide

a viable policy incentive that would influence the Saudi leadership to

consider alternates to a nuclear option of its own in response to an Iranian

nuclear breakout? Such guarantees have been effective in limiting

proliferation in several regions of the world, but the Saudi case may be

less amenable to such a solution, and there has been long-standing

skepticism in Saudi Arabia about such proposals. As a Saudi observer put

it, when discussing the nuclear threats in the region, “only the Arabs

themselves can defend the Arabs’ security.”7

First, it is doubtful that the Saudis would view the Pakistani nuclear

deterrent as a reliable umbrella for their own security based just on

religious solidarity. As a member of the royal family who was later to

become Prince Sultan’s adviser on national security noted, “Saudi Arabia

does not accept the notion that a Pakistani bomb is an Islamic bomb.
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

68

Instead, national interest is regarded as the most likely factor affecting

how nuclear capabilities will be used.”8

Likewise, when then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton floated the

possibility in 2009 of an American nuclear umbrella for the Middle East,

the Saudi press was skeptical at best, and even hostile, perhaps reflecting

official views which the Saudi leadership would have been reluctant to

express openly. One Saudi editorialist claimed that the inclusion of Israel

in such an arrangement represented a political stumbling block, and he

asked “Is Israel a friendly country?” – A key question for him, since Israel

was also to be included in the program.9 According to the same

editorialist, it was Israel’s nuclear weapons that were the “real threat to

peace in the region.” In fact, by offering protection to “friends,” that

limitation would even spur others to acquire nuclear weapons, as they

would feel vulnerable to attacks by a country protected by the American

nuclear umbrella.10 Another concern was that such a relationship would

create an uncomfortable dependence by the junior partner. As the same

writer put it, speaking of the 2009 U.S. proposal,

This situation reminds us of what happened with Europe when the

Soviet Union was still in existence, when the United States extended a

nuclear umbrella “with the intent of protecting its European allies from

Soviet nuclear weapons.” Some of the countries even today are finding it

difficult to free themselves from that American domination; the same

thing is happening with the countries of Eastern Europe, as the United

States is extending a nuclear umbrella, which Washington claims is

intended to protect those countries from a nuclear Iran, but which raises

concerns in Russia and in other countries, which see it as a threat to their

own security.11

In the event, Riyadh did not need to oppose the idea officially, as

Egypt’s President Husni Mubarak came out against it, effectively

obstructing it, at least for the time being.12 In the wake of the regime

changes resulting from the Arab Spring, there was likely to be even less

regional support or “cover” for a Saudi acceptance of an umbrella than

before. Even those, such as Prince Turki Al-Faysal, who have considered

an American nuclear umbrella as theoretically workable, did so only on

condition that the Middle East as a whole became a nuclear-free zone,

including the requirement that Israel relinquish its nuclear arsenal, thereby

voiding any realistic near-term possibility of such a nuclear umbrella.13
Thinking in Terms of Solutions: Stopping Iran

69

At the same time, there was a growing sense that the United States

would simply not be able to control nuclear proliferation everywhere by

using this mechanism. As an editorial in a Saudi-owned paper put it, “the

world policeman [i.e. the United States] will not be able to establish a

nuclear umbrella to defend its spheres of influence from threats.”14 In fact,

reflecting an anarchic world system, this same editorial envisioned the

possibility that the NPT would collapse and that the world would become

a “law of the jungle” environment, which “will force ‘the school principal’

[i.e. the United States] to think about just protecting himself instead of

worrying about protecting others.”15 Another editorial by an academic

from the UAE, but published in a Saudi-owned newspaper, went even

further in discussing a response to Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons and

the threat that posed to the Gulf, as it openly raised doubts about U.S.

reliability:

The GCC has legitimate concerns about the United States,

and it is particularly not wise to rely on American

protection in light of the decline of American unipolarity.

There is mounting skepticism about the United States’

ability and willingness to fulfill its security and stability

obligations in the region over the long term...Relying solely

on the American protection services is not convincing and

its date of expiration has almost been reached. What

Washington offers in security and military services is no

longer of the same quality as before.16

Beyond that aspect, there were also uncertainties about the reliability

of American guarantees, with concerns about the depth of the United

States’ commitment to support its allies in the region, especially in the

wake of the forced departure of a number of rulers during the Arab Spring.

Revealingly, senior Saudi policymakers were reportedly upset by what

they interpreted to have been the United States’ abrupt abandonment of its

close regional ally, Egyptian president Husni Mubarak, which might raise

doubts about the reliability in other cases of expected U.S. support and

protection. Prince Turki Al-Faysal, for example, probably reflecting

impressions at the senior levels of the royal family, noted that relations at

the time between Saudi Arabia and the United States were “below

average,” among other reasons, due to Saudi irritation with “the haste with
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

70

which the American leadership, for example, pushed President Husni

Mubarak out of power, even before the Egyptian people had expressed

their opinion...this angered me personally...Saudi citizens [on the

contrary] are faithful to their friends and allies...if only [President Barack

Obama] had waited a little and let the Egyptian people make their own

decision.” In contrast, according to Prince Faysal, at the same time, Saudi

King Abd Allah had been providing advice to Mubarak privately,

apparently with how to deal with the crisis.17

As one commentary in the Saudi press also argued, “America is no

longer a reliable friend for its strategic friends and allies, with the

exception of Israel.” As a result, the United States’ friends in the Middle

East “must look out for their own interests without reference to those of

the USA.” Specifically, alluding to the experience with Mubarak, the

commentary concluded that “if America expects that its biggest selling

point to its friends is a security umbrella, that umbrella was smashed on

the banks of the Nile.”18

Moreover, Saudis were raising concerns already by mid-decade about

a perceived U.S. retrenchment in the region vis-à-vis Iran. Although not

articulated openly by official sources, there was an undercurrent in the

Saudi media critical of the United States, claiming that the latter’s

invasion of Iraq in 2003 had made it possible for Iran to become dominant

there. Expressions such as that the United States had “delivered Iraq to

Iran on a golden platter” became common, even by influential journalists

close to the palace.19 At the time of the 2013 Korean crisis, some Saudis

even interpreted the commitment which the United States displayed for its

regional allies as an indication that Washington differentiated between

those friends in East Asia which “it would avoid sacrificing at any price,”

and countries in the Middle East, where only Israel was said to qualify for

that status for the United States.20

Some Saudis limited themselves to raising general – but transparent –

reservations about outside protectors, as did one editorialist, who noted

pointedly when discussing the Iranian threat that “we all understand full

well that...friendships do not last forever...and we do not trust other

parties to concur with our views and objectives.”21 Others were openly

alarmist, often fearing that the United States could decide to make a deal

with Iran or, as one academic put it, “what if the United States decides to

cooperate with Iran to divide up influence and interests in the region?”22
Thinking in Terms of Solutions: Stopping Iran

71

Saudi journalists were often suspicious of Iranian-U.S. negotiations. One

journalist claimed that “the Gulf States feel that the secret as well as open

talks which are being conducted between Washington and Tehran do not

take [the Gulf States] into consideration to any degree,” which “annoys the

Gulf states.”23

In late 2012, a Saudi newspaper editor raised the possibility of secret

U.S.-Iranian talks at the expense of the Gulf countries. Although he

acknowledged that “this perhaps may not be at the expense of U.S.-Gulf

relations, at least for now,” he also wondered “should we become

prisoners of a foreign umbrella or should we [instead] take into account

what is of benefit to our future by relying on ourselves?”24 One

commentator, likewise, thought that the United States “will inevitably act

to reach an understanding [with a nuclear-armed Iran] on the Gulf’s

future.”25 And, with reference to Iran’s future nuclear capability, the same

writer concluded that “the time has come for self-reliance...and to create

the conditions for a strategic defense balance.”26 As a new round of

negotiations was set to begin in February 2013, the Saudi media expressed

discontent – although attributed to other Gulf diplomats – that the Gulf

countries would not have a role, and claimed that the GCC countries “do

not hide their concern that a deal will be reached at the expense of their

regional security and of their strategic interests.”27

Such expressions of doubt about the reliability of outside guarantees

often went hand-in-hand with the promotion in Saudi circles of greater

GCC unification, as was the case with one editorialist writing in favor of a

unified GCC, as he asserted that “regional powers [i.e. Iran] will not find a

deterrent to reduce the impact of their ambitions of expansion except by

confronting these [ambitions] with a barrier of unity.”28 As another Saudi

editor put it, in calling for greater GCC unity in the face of a potential

Iranian nuclear threat, “the defense [of the Gulf] must not be decided by

outside states.”29

In practical terms, as emerged at a roundtable at Al-Riyadh newspaper

in April 2012 between a delegation of visiting Japanese politicians and

businessmen and a group of Saudi journalists, the Saudi hosts confirmed

to their guests that “the Gulf states cannot dispense with the United States,

and the strategic alliance with the latter is profound and deeplyrooted...the alliance with the United States is the best option.” At the same

time, however, as one of the Saudis present stressed, the Gulf countries
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

72

“have a right...to look to a variety of sources for armaments, from any

country whatsoever.” And, the same speaker continued, “reliance on the

United States is not a completely dependable option, and the Kingdom

will turn to any country with which it can cooperate.”30 All this, of course,

does not mean that the long-standing U.S.-Saudi relationship would not

continue. On the contrary, one can expect it to remain robust. However, as

far as the nuclear threat, Saudis simply may view this relationship as

insufficient.

Significantly, a frequent theme in Saudi writing has been that even

U.S. allies are not comfortable with a total reliance on the latter. Drawing

on perceived lessons from the Cold War, for example, a Saudi writer

asserted that Great Britain and France had both pursued their own nuclear

weapons precisely because they did not have “the assurance...that

Washington would come to their assistance with nuclear weapons in case

they were subjected to a Soviet nuclear attack; ultimately, the United

States would not sacrifice Washington or New York, for example, for the

sake of defending Paris and London.”31 Similarly, when speaking of the

potential Iranian nuclear threat, a Saudi observer noted that “the West

cannot always be relied upon, and those in the Gulf are the ones best

suited to defend their own security.”32

The Active Options –

Striking or Squeezing Iran’s Nuclear Program?

The Strike Option

In a way, Saudi Arabia would probably have been content to do

nothing, provided the problem of the Iranian threat was solved by third

parties, something over which Riyadh had little, if any, control.

Specifically, Riyadh followed closely the prospects for the international

community to deal with Iran’s nuclear program either by military strikes

or by pressure using economic and political sanctions.

If successful, a strike against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure could have

resolved the issue permanently or at least would have postponed the

necessity for Riyadh to make a decision about acquiring its own nuclear

capability. However, the success of such a strike was by no means certain,

while the security, political, and economic consequences in the region
Thinking in Terms of Solutions: Stopping Iran

73

could be severe. Not surprisingly, the Saudis were very interested in trying

to determine the likelihood of such a strike. Informed Saudi opinion on

whether or not a strike was forthcoming was often divided and continued

to oscillate between the two prospects, although an evolution appears to

have occurred towards skepticism over the years.

A few years ago, Saudi sources suggested they were convinced that

the United States would act decisively to prevent Iran’s acquisition of

nuclear weapons. As the SANG’s journal saw it, Iran would be targeted by

the United States with an air and missile attack “because the latter believes

that Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons and the missiles capable of

delivering the latter are a direct and grave threat to its vital interests, and it

will not allow that even if it requires striking dozens of facilities, sites, and

military targets.”33 By 2009, however, the Saudi press had begun to

suggest that the United States was still considering its options and had not

made a decision about whether or not to strike Iran.34

Initially, according to foreign press reports, the Saudi leadership

supported strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities – including by Israel –

although not in public.35 As one could have expected, once that support

became public, the resulting reactions in the region were exploited against

the Saudi regime by religious dissidents and, in particular, by domestic

and regional Shia sources.36 At least in public, Saudi decision-makers and

other senior figures sought to engage in damage control to respond to the

negative publicity caused by the leaks and began to express vehement

opposition to such strikes against Iran. As Prince Turki Al-Faysal told a

German magazine, “I have dealt with these issues all of my life and I am

telling you: Saudi Arabia would never accept to allow Israel to attack any

country in the area whatever that country was.”37 Likewise, reflecting this

political sensitivity, Saudi Arabia strenuously denied rumors that it had

handed over to the United States an Iranian nuclear scientist who had

come on the Pilgrimage.38 Apart from the issue of image, Saudi

policymakers quite probably were also becoming increasingly concerned

about escalating Iranian threats of reprisals in case of an attack on its

nuclear program. As a senior figure in the Saudi royal family remarked to

the author, he was “fully against any Israeli or American” military strike,

citing concerns about Iranian retaliation, and he termed Iran “a paper tiger

with steel claws.”39
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

74

As one Saudi observer noted, a strike against Iran might not succeed,

but would result instead in retaliation by the latter against its neighbors –

which could include the targeting of vulnerable Gulf oil facilities, power

grids, and water desalination plants – as well as lead to heightened Iranian

support for subversion in the region.40 Some in Saudi Arabia believed a

strike would only delay Iran’s progress in any case, with an end to the

nuclear quest only possible through regime change, given Tehran’s strong

commitment to the program.

41 Others continued to be unsure about the

chances of decisive success for an Israeli strike, wondering whether a

regional war would be sparked or whether Iran’s nuclear program would

be destroyed for good, with one editorialist noting in 2013 that “History

does not permit us to sleep [soundly] by relying on this second

scenario.”42

Over the years, moreover, a gradual pessimism appears to have taken

over in decision-making circles in Riyadh, with an increasing conviction

that efforts by the international community or even of the likelihood of a

U.S. or Israeli strike against Iran or any other likely measure might prove

of only limited effectiveness in derailing Iran’s march toward nuclear

weapons. Some in the Saudi and Saudi-linked press had concluded already

at an early stage that a U.S. strike was unlikely, such as an Egyptian

commentator, Abd Al-Munim Said, who, writing in a Saudi-owned

publication, cited a lack of U.S. public support, doubts about the success

of a surgical strike, the unlikely option of a ground commitment, fear of

Iranian retaliation, and fear of a repetition of the effect of the Israeli attack

on the Osirak reactor that actually spurred Iraq to greater efforts in its

nuclear program.43

Many believed that the United States would not make a final decision

on whether to strike Iran in any case while it was still involved in Iraq and

Afghanistan, given the potential consequences for U.S. forces in the

region.44 Others in military circles seemed to have concluded that even

after the conclusion of these wars the United States might be reluctant to

act. For example, a Saudi military study in 2009 posited that, as a result of

the cost of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, “the United States’

confidence in the effectiveness of preventive wars has been shaken.”45 In

particular, as another military study argued, the United States simply

would not be able to undertake another potential war, as “the U.S. wars –

against terrorism, in Iraq, and in Afghanistan – have attrited U.S. power
Thinking in Terms of Solutions: Stopping Iran

75

and have made it impossible for [the United States] to attack any other

country.”

46

A Saudi pundit, for his part, also judged that a U.S. strike was not

probable, since the state of the U.S. economy made American

policymakers wary of starting a new war, although a strike by Israel might

be more likely.47 Another Saudi observer calculated in 2012 that “there is

not sufficient consensus [in the United States] to launch a war against

Iran.” According to that same author, “the Vietnam experience” and what

he said were at least partial U.S. defeats in Iraq and Afghanistan “have

made...American leaders...think long and hard and to delay making

difficult decisions such as this.”48 Likewise, a Saudi editorialist, claiming

to cite U.S. military experts to the effect that a strike against Iran would

not be decisive in any case, concluded that “President Barack Obama is

not a man who wants to embark on conflicts.”49 By 2012, a Saudi

commentator had also determined that “the military option against [Iran]

has become a remote likelihood.”50 At the end of 2012, a senior officer

writing in a military journal analyzed in detail the divided opinion in both

the United States and Israel – with the United States having the final say,

in his view – and concluded that Washington for now at least would hold

off on a strike in order to give economic sanctions time to work.51 By

early 2013, one Saudi pundit stated openly that “Iran knows full well that

hints of a military option will not be fulfilled,” and even interpreted

harsher warnings from President Obama during his visit to Israel in March

2013 as “empty promises,” and affirmed that “I do not believe they will

see the light of day.” 52

Other observers assumed that the international community as a whole

simply lacked the resolve to stop Iran.53 Still others believed that the West

had concluded that it was already too late for a military strike to reverse

Iran’s trajectory in any case.54 One Saudi observer judged that the political

and media escalation by the United States was intended merely to pressure

Iran and to reassure the Gulf countries that the West would not abandon

the region.55 A Saudi researcher, for his part, speculated that the United

States, instead, would seek to contain Iran with a Cold War-style strategy,

since military action entailed too many drawbacks.56 By the end of 2011,

Prince Turki Al-Faysal had decided that convincing Iran to stop its nuclear

program had already failed.57
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

76

The Saudi media in general also viewed the likelihood of an Israeli

strike as increasingly limited as time went by. Some initially were of the

opinion that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu “will not accept Iran’s

emergence and continuation as a nuclear power in the region.”58 However,

by 2010, a consensus seemed to be coalescing progressively in Saudi

opinion that neither the United States nor Israel was probably going to

mount a strike to derail Iran’s nuclear program, although such assessments

would fluctuate depending on varying news reports from the West. As one

observer noted in November 2011, Israeli talk of preparations to strike

were little more than “bogus propaganda,” ostensibly intended to divert

attention from the Palestinian issue.59 An editorial commented that, at

best, the Israeli government itself was divided over whether to launch a

strike.60 As another editorial asserted, moreover, “objective conditions and

the strategic interconnection of interests among various parties bring talk

of directing a military strike by Israel and its allies into the realm of the

impossible.”61

Key to this view was the Saudi assumption that “Israel knows that

Tehran has passed the point of vulnerability in its nuclear program.”62

Indeed, others even accused the United States and Israel of doing nothing

to stop Iran, and claimed that this was part of a pattern also applied to

North Korea’s nuclear program.63 Alleging that Israeli and Iranian

interests against the Arabs coincided, one observer claimed that Israeli

influence exercised through the Jewish community in America, who he

said has a disproportionate presence in Congress, “not to speak of their

control of financial capital, centers of influence, and the media, and their

dominance over most of the think tanks...and influence over centers of

decision-making,” shaped U.S. policy to work toward a secret

understanding with Iran.64

Squeezing Iran – The Soft Power Option

Saudi Arabia, perhaps not surprisingly, seemed to prefer that nonmilitary methods, whether negotiations or economic and political

sanctions, succeed in stopping Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons rather than

seeing a military strike with its attendant risks or doing nothing. However,

the Saudi media expressed doubts whether international sanctions would

be effective, with one editorial characterizing such efforts as
Thinking in Terms of Solutions: Stopping Iran

77

“insufficient,” and concluding that “this situation raises doubts about how

serious the West is about dealing with the potential Iranian nuclear threat

if Iran succeeds in achieving its goals.”65 In particular, there were doubts

about the effectiveness of sanctions in general if not enforced strictly, with

one editorial noting that Iran had been able to deal with sanctions during

the Khomeini era while, due to Iran’s increased capabilities and expected

sanction-busting, “any future Western or international sanctions will be

insufficient as long as major industrial nations are not serious about

enforcement.”66 By 2010, some Saudis were already suggesting that even

the tougher sanctions then being discussed might delay, but not prevent,

Iran’s going nuclear.67

However, with the new, more stringent, financial and oil sanctions

that the United States and the European Union began applying on Iran in

2011 and 2012, Saudi Arabia appeared to become more optimistic about

the prospects for the success of “soft power.” In fact, a senior figure in the

Saudi royal family, speaking to an American audience, stressed the

desirability of “squeezing” Iran through the latter’s oil sector as a way to

make it more difficult for Tehran to meet its citizens’ needs, to thus

convince it to forgo the nuclear option.68 Saudi Arabia, in fact, supported

the sanctions actively, with Prince Abd Al-Aziz bin Salman, Saudi

Arabia’s Deputy Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, among

other Saudi officials, reassuring domestic opinion and the international

community that his country would ensure sufficient oil supplies to replace

reduced oil deliveries from Iran, whether as a result of the embargo or if

Iran tried to disrupt traffic through the Straits of Hormuz.69

Watching and Waiting

Increasingly, Riyadh seems to have concluded that it could do little to

affect the situation and that it would be prudent to wait and see what the

international community could accomplish in stopping Iran, especially

after the new sanctions on Iran had begun to take effect. Over time, there

developed a noticeable change in Saudi press coverage, with a decrease by

mid-2012 of the earlier extensive analytical writing on Iran in the military

media. In the civilian media, editorials on the Iranian nuclear threat

continued to appear, although fewer than before, although all the reports

still agreed with previous positions and, in particular, with the assessment
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

78

that Iran was continuing on its nuclear path. To a certain extent, at the

same time, Saudi authorities may have felt that a solid analytical and

political case had already been made for the domestic public and that it

might now be prudent to keep a low profile while the international

community exerted pressure on Iran.

There was a noticeable increase in media coverage, as one could

expect, whenever there were new developments, such as a new round of

talks with Iran. However, Saudi media opinion remained highly skeptical

of the prospects for any significant progress in negotiations between the

international community and Iran. Saudi observers have consistently

interpreted Iran’s willingness to negotiate as “trickery in order to gain

time,” and even held that “Tehran has copied successfully the policy of

negotiating just to negotiate on the nuclear issue” from Israel’s tactics in

dealing with the Palestinian issue.70 As the Saudis saw it, Iran’s stalling

was in fact succeeding and, as one Saudi press source put it, “the Obama

Administration’s and the West’s failed soft policy has been countered with

Tehran’s tortuous policy, whose objective is to gain time.”71

When the 5+1 (the members of the United Nations Security Council

plus Germany) talks with Iran reconvened in February 2013 in

Kazakhstan, Saudi commentators, typically, were doubtful there would be

any genuine progress. One commentator predicted that “the negotiations

...will lead to a dead-end,” since “from the beginning of the negotiations

[Iran’s] approach has been a tactical one characterized by gaining time in

order to speed up its nuclear development.”72 Saudi Arabia’s Foreign

Minister, Prince Saud Al-Faysal, for his part, feared some compromise

between the 5 + 1 Group and Iran, and went out of his way to reiterate his

country’s position: “We are not looking for appeasement or an

arrangement between Iran and anybody with which it negotiates. What we

want, instead, is a solution that prevents the increase of nuclear weapons

in the Middle East.”73

With the introduction of the more stringent sanctions, Saudi press

reports began to focus on the resulting severe economic difficulties which

Iran was experiencing as a result of the cutbacks in oil exports and of the

financial transaction restrictions.74 Indeed, one editorial in the influential

Saudi daily Al-Riyadh assessed that Iran was jeopardizing its economic

stability and that the resulting domestic discontent could lead to an

“internal explosion.” The editorial even called for, in essence, regime
Thinking in Terms of Solutions: Stopping Iran

79

change through a movement similar to those elsewhere during the Arab

Spring, with hopes for free elections and a pluralistic democracy.75

However, in time, Saudi media opinion, based on the apparent lack of

progress in negotiations, began to doubt that the economic sanctions

would succeed, claiming that the Iranian regime “does not care if the

people are hungry or sick” and that Tehran would continue to pursue its

nuclear goals.76 The 2013 crisis with North Korea seemed to reinforce this

perception, as Saudis noted with amazement the extent to which a state

was willing to sacrifice its economic well-being in order to obtain nuclear

weapons for its security.77 At the same time, there were suggestions in the

Saudi-owned media that the United States had exhausted all its options

with Iran and – reluctant to use military force – was now backtracking

from prevention to a posture of containment, and was only looking for

ways to rationalize the change.78 In fact, one Saudi commentator evaluated

that “waiting, containment, diplomacy, and sanctions have become

incentives” for Iran rather than deterrents and concluded that “only a

nuclear weapon deters a nuclear weapon.”79

If Iran’s progress was not halted by the international community, this

would reinforce the skepticism that some in Saudi Arabia nurtured about

the international community’s ability to prevent countries in general from

acquiring nuclear weapons. According to an editorial in Al-Sharq AlAwsat from mid-2009, for example, North Korea’s experience was said to

show that the latter “was able to defy the world and to continue with its

nuclear program and be neither attracted by the carrot nor frightened by

the stick,” and the writer pointed out that “it will not be long before Iran,

too, will join the nuclear club.”80 He concluded that “it will not be possible

for America, or the world policeman as some view the latter, to stop the

virus of nuclear proliferation.”81 As Prince Turki Al-Faysal also

maintained in December 2011, “our efforts and the world’s efforts failed

to convince Israel to abandon its WMD, as has also been the case with

Iran’s arming with the same weapons.”82 In a way, by its focus on the

international community’s efforts, the Saudi media may have been shifting

the blame for any future Saudi acquisition of nuclear weapons to the

United States or the West for shirking their responsibility to stop Iran’s

quest for nuclear weapons, with the Saudis then able to argue at some time

in the future that they had had no other choice but to follow Iran’s
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

80

example in the wake of the international community’s ineffectiveness in

stopping Iran.

Notes

1. Interview with Sami Uthman, “Muhallil siyasi li’l-Marsad Ala duwal Al-Khalij

wa-khassatan Al-Saudiya al-say li’l-husul ala qunbula nawawiya” [A Political Analyst to

Al-Marsad: The Gulf States, and In Particular Saudi Arabia, Must Seek to Acquire an

Atom Bomb], Al-Marsad, On-line, Internet, 21 December 2011, available from www.almarsd.com.

2. “Al-Faysal: Iran talab aqd hiwar thulathi fi Al-Kuwayt. Fa qult lima nuhammilha

khilafatna?” [Al-Faysal: Iran Requested Tripartite Talks in Kuwait. I Said, Why Burden

the Latter with Our Disputes?], Al-Madina, On-line, Internet, 6 July 2011, available from

www.al-madina.com/print/313975.

3. Khalid Al-Dakhil, “Tasrihat Saud Al-Faysal: Hal taghayyar al-mawqif min aldawr al-irani?” [Saud Al-Faysal’s Declarations: Has the Position on the Iranian Role

Changed?], Al-Hayat (Saudi edition), On-line, Internet, 10 July 2011, available from

http://international.daralhayat.com/ksaarticle/28643.

4. “Saud Al-Faysal: Iran tuhaddid amn wa-istiqrar al-mintaqa bi-qudratha alnawawiya” [Prince Saud: Iran Threatens the Security and Stability of the Region with Its

Nuclear Capabilities], Al-Riyadh, On-line, Internet, 24 November 2011, available from

www.alriyadh.com/2011/11/24/article685758.html.

5. Ibtisam Al-Kutubi, “Al-Alaqat al-khalijiya al-iraniya darurat wa-majalat altaawun” [Gulf-Iranian Relations: The Imperatives and Scope for Cooperation], Al-Haras

Al-Watani, November-December 2012, 18-24, and Bashir Abd Al-Fattah, “Al-Arab waIran...furas al-shiraka wa’l-taawun” [The Arabs and Iran: Opportunities for a Partnership

and Cooperation], Al-Haras Al-Watani, November-December 2012, 26-37.

6. Hamad bin Abd Allah Al-Luhaydan, “Al-Ahdath tasir nahw tadmir Iran waduwal Al-Sharq Al-Awsat” [Events Are Heading Toward a Destruction of Iran and the

Middle East Countries], Al-Riyadh, On-line, Internet, 31 May 2013, available from

www.alriyadh.com/2013/05/31/article839788.html.

7. Talal Salih Bannan, “Al-Arab bayn kammashat al-rub al-nawawi!” [The Arabs

between the Pincers of Nuclear Terror!], Ukaz, On-line, Internet, 2 April 2006, available

from www.okaz.com.sa/okaz/osf/20060402/PrinCon200604026920.htm.
Thinking in Terms of Solutions: Stopping Iran

81

8. Prince Naef bin Ahmed Al Saud, “Underpinning Saudi National Security

Strategy,” Joint Forces Quarterly (Washington, DC), Autumn 2002, 130.

9. Fawzi Al-Asmar, “Amrika wa’l-mizhalla al-nawawiya” [America and the

Nuclear Umbrella], Al-Riyadh, On-line, Internet, 18 September 2009, available from

www.alriyadh.com/2009/09/18/article460327.html.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. See Usama Saraya’s interview with President Husni Mubarak, “Ziyarat

Washington li-tarh ru’yat Misr li-tahqiq al-salam” [Visit to Washington to Present

Egypt’s View on Achieving Peace], Al-Ahram (Cairo), On-line, Internet, 17 August 2009,

availablefromwww.ahram.org.eg/archive/Index.asp?CurFN=fon1.htm&DID=10042.

13. Interview with Prince Turki Al-Faysal, BBC Arabic News (London), On-line,

Internet, 8 July 2011, available from www.youtube.com/watch?=Kfw.R7j4-HwZO.

14. “Madha law daghat ahmaq ala zurar?” [What If a Fool Pressed the Button?], AlSharq Al-Awsat, On-line, Internet, 3 June 2009, available from www.aawsat.com/

print.asp?did=521831&issueno=11145.

15. Ibid. The writer uses the term “Harat kull min idu ilu,” a reference to a popular

play in the Arab world which has become symbolic of the law of the jungle. My thanks to

my wife, Nidhal, for clarifying that point.

16. Abd Al-Khaliq Abd Allah, “Sibaq al-tasalluh fi Al-Khalij Al-Arabi mukallaf

lakin la mafarr” [The Arms Race in the Arab Gulf Has Been Imposed But There Is No

Escaping It], Al-Sharq al-Awsat, On-line, Internet, 25 November 2010, available from

www.aawsat.com/print.asp?did=596759&issueno=11685.

17. Interview with Prince Turki Al-Faysal, BBC Arabic News (London), On-line,

Internet, 8 July 2011, available from www.youtube.com/watch?=Kfw.R7j4-HwZO.

18. Abd Allah bin Musa Al-Tayir, “Amrika al-lati lan taud” [An America That Is

Gone Forever], Al-Riyadh, On-line, Internet, 18 June 2013, available from

www.alriyadh.com/2013/06/18/article844720.html.

19. For example, Badr Al-Rashid, “Al-Rabi al-arabi yatgha ala ahdath al-alam am

2011” [The Arab Spring Overshadowed Other World Events in 2011], Al-Riyadh, 31

December 2011, www.alriyadh.com/2011/12/31/article696623.html, and Turki Abd

Allah Al-Sudayri, “Thumma madha bad?” [What Next?], Al-Riyadh, On-line, Internet, 17

June 2012, available from www.alriyadh.com/2012/07/17/article752397.html.
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

82

20. Muhammad Maruf Al-Shibani, “Muqaranatan bi-Kuriya” [Compared with

Korea], Al-Bilad, On-line, Internet, 1 April 2013, available from http://albiladdaily.com/

articles.php?action-show&id-14984.

21. Yusuf Al-Kuwaylit, “Kayf nakhtu bi’l-ittihad al-khaliji al-arabi” [How Do We

Proceed with the Arab Gulf and Union?], Al-Riyadh, On-line, Internet, 24 February 2012,

available fromwww.alriyadh.com/2012/02/24/article712535.html.

22. Abd Allah Al-Qafari, “Amrika wa-Iran...madha law kan thamma safqa?”

[America and Iran...What If There Were a Deal?], Al-Riyadh, On-line, Internet, 8

November 2010, available from www.alriyadh.com/2010/11/08/article575386.html.

23. Fa’iq Fahim, “Duwal majlis al-taawun al-khaliji wa’l-tahaddi al-nawawi alirani” [The Gulf Cooperation Council States and the Iranian Nuclear Challenge], AlIqtisadiya (Riyadh), On-line, Internet, 25 June 2011, available from www.aleqt.com/

2011/06/25/article_552510.print.

24. Yusuf Al-Kuwaylit, “Hal qawwamna alaqatna ma Amrika?” [Have We

Adjusted Our Relations with America?], Al-Riyadh, 9 December 2012,

www.alriyadh.com/2012/12/09/article791185.html.

25. Abd Allah Al-Qafari, “Iran wa’l-Khalij madha bad dukhul Iran al-nadi alnawawi?” [The Gulf and Iran: What Happens after Iran Joins the Nuclear Club?], AlRiyadh, On-line, Internet, 17 April 2006, available from www.alriyadh.com/2006/

04/17/article146938_s.html.

26. Ibid.

27. Ayman Al-Hammad, “Dawr duwal al-taawun fi muhadathat al-milaff al-nawawi

al-irani” [The Role of the GCC Countries in the Talks on the Iranian Nuclear Issue], AlRiyadh, On-line, Internet, 21 February 2013, available from www.alriyadh.com/

2013/02/21/article811918.html.

28. Muhammad Al-Rumayhi, “Ittihad duwal Al-Khalij Al-Arabi wa-tahammul almakhatir” [The States of the Arab Gulf and Taking on the Burden of Risk], Al-Sharq AlAwsat, On-line, Internet, 28 February 2012, available from www.aawsat.com/

print.asp?did=665686&issueno=12145.

29. Yusuf Al-Kuwaylit, “Hal nu’akkid annana lasna al-ha’it al-qasir?” [Are We

Sure That We Are Not a Pushover?], Al-Riyadh, 23 February 2013, www.alriyadh.com/

2013/02/23/article812425.html.

30. Ahmad Al-Jamia, “Wafd yabani yatrah tasa’ulat an mustaqbal al-takattul alkhaliji wa’l-alaqat ma Iran wa-Turkiya wa-Amrika wa-ta’thirat al-rabi al-arabi” [A

Japanese Delegation Raises Questions About the Future of Gulf Blocs, Relations with
Thinking in Terms of Solutions: Stopping Iran

83

Iran, Turkey, and America, and the Impact of the Arab Spring], Al-Riyadh, On-line,

Internet, 24 April 2012, available from www.alriyadh.com/2012/04/24/

article729874.html.

31. Talal Salih Bannan, “Adw jadid fi al-nadi al-nawawi...ya ilahi!” [A New

Member in the Nuclear Club, Oh My God!], Ukaz, On-line, Internet, 15 October 2006,

availablefromwww.okaz.com.sa/okaz/osf/20061015/PrintCon2006101555252.htm.

32. Abd Al-Rahman Al-Turayri, “Al-Khalij arabi am farisi?” [The Gulf: Arab or

Persian?], Al-Iqtisadiya, On-line, Internet, 23 August 2011, available from

www.aleqt.com/2011/08/23/article_572330.print.

33. Brigadier General Saba’ Abd Allah Bahibri (Ret.), “Al-Barnamaj al-nawawi alirani hal yasmud amam al-mutatalabat wa’l-tahdidat al-dawliya?” [Will the Iranian

Nuclear Program Withstand the International Demands and Threats?], Al-Haras AlWatani, September 2005, 67.

34. Abd Al-Jalil Zayd Al-Marhun, “Amn Al-Khalij ... hal min mutaghayyir amiriki

jadid?” [Gulf Security...Is There an American Shift?], Al-Riyadh, On-line, Internet, 20

March 2009, available from www.alriyadh.com/2009/03/20/article417096.html.

35. David E. Sanger, James Glanz, and Jo Becker, “Around the World, Distress

Over Iran,” New York Times, On-line, Internet, 28 November 2010, available from

www.nytimes.com, and Hugh Tomlinson, “Saudi Arabia Gives Israel Clear Skies to

Attack Iranian Nuclear Sites,” The Times (London), On-line, Internet, 12 June 2010,

available from www.timesonline.co.uk.

36. “Al-Ahil al-saudi alahh ala Washington li-darb Tihran” [The Saudi Ruler Pressed

Washington to Strike Tehran], Al-Haramayn website, On-line, Internet, 11 December 2010,

available from www.alhramain.com/hiic/index.php?sec=V1d4a1IySm5QVDA9&sub=

V1cweFYwMHlUak5RVkRBOQ==&r=%7B0000B3DC35CA2C4CFF6A9734BF9C59E

13/000053724F182C7DAE863/00000009E2D0E6EE%7D&id=17384&act=show&Secty

p=219. Al-Haramayn is a dissident Saudi Shia website.

37. “Spiegel Interview with Saudi Prince Turki bin [sic] Faisal,” Der Spiegel

(Hamburg, Germany), On-line, Internet, 12 June 2010, available from www.spiegel.de/

international/world/0,1518,druck-733054,00.html.

38. “Riyadh Refutes Allegations by Tehran,” Arab News (Jeddah), On-line,

Internet, 10 December 2009, available from www.arabnews.com/services/print/print.asp?

artid=129362&d=.

39. As told to the author 8 November 2011.
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

84

40. Adnan Kamil Salah, “Al-Qadiya al-iraniya bi-ru’ya arabiya muwahhada” [The

Iranian Case from a United Arab Perspective], Al-Madina, On-line, Internet, 7 January

2010, available from www.al-madina.com/print/213010. Also, Adnan Kamil Salah,

“Tasawwaru uhlumu udu!” [Imagine, Dream, Pray!], Al-Madina, On-line, Internet, 13

May 2010, available from www.al-madina.com/print/247504.

41. Major General Husam Suwaylim (Ret), “Ahdaf Iran al-siyasiya wa’l-istratijiya

wa-asalib tahqiqha,” [Iran’s Political and Strategic Objectives and the Methods to

Achieve Them], Al-Haras Al-Watani, part 1, August 2011, 37.

42. Abd Al-Rahman Al-Rashid, “Isra’il tashinn harb Al-Khalij al-muqbila!” [Israel

Will Spark the Next Gulf War!], Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, On-line, Internet, 18 April 2013,

available from www.aawsat.com.

43. For example, Abd Al-Munim Said, “La darba askariya amrikiya li-Iran!” [No

American Military Strike against Iran], Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, On-line, Internet, 31 January

2007, available from www.aawsat.com/leader.asp?section=3&issueno=10291&article=

404265&search.

44. Abd Al-Jalil Zayd Al-Marhun, “Amn Al-Khalij...hal min mutaghayyir amiriki

jadid?” [Gulf Security...Is There an American Shift?], Al-Riyadh, On-line, Internet, 20

March 2009, available from www.alriyadh.com/2009/03/20/article417096.html.

45. Hay’at Al-Tahrir [Editorial Board], “Al-Mashru al-irani al-iqlimi wa’l-nawawi”

[The Iranian Regional Project and the Nuclear [Program]], Majallat Kulliyat Al-Malik

Khalid Al-Askariya, On-line, Internet, 1 June 2009, available from www.kkmaq.gov.sa/

detail.asp?InNewsItemID=319120&InTemplateKey=print.

46. Ayyad Al-Batniji, “Al-Siyasa al-kharijiya al-iraniya” [Iranian Foreign Policy],

Majallat Kulliyat Al-Malik Khalid Al-Askariya, On-line, Internet, 21 June 2011, available

from www.kkmaq.gov.sa/detail.asp?InNewsItemID=393306&InTemplateKey=print.

47. Ahmad Dayf, “Darb Iran: ma mada jiddiyat al-tahdidat?” [A Strike on Iran:

How Serious Are the Threats?], Al-Jazira, On-line, Internet, 22 November 2011,

available from www.al-jazirah.com.sa/20111122/du4.htm.

48. Usama Said Al-Qahtani, “Hal tamlik Iran al-qunbula?” [Will Iran Get the

Bomb?], Al-Watan, On-line, Internet, 9 March 2012, available from www.alwatan.com.sa/

Articles/Detail.aspx?ArticleId=9890.

49. Adnan Kamil Salah, “Al-Qadiya al-iraniya bi-ru’ya arabiya muwahhada” [The

Iranian Case from a United Arab Perspective], Al-Madina, On-line, Internet, 7 January

2010, available from www.al-madina.com/print/213010. A similar editorial by Yusuf Abd

Allah Makki reinforced the view that the United States was reluctant to engage in another

“military adventure,” “Azmat al-malaff al-nawawi al-irani ila ayn?” [Where Is the Crisis
Thinking in Terms of Solutions: Stopping Iran

85

over the Iranian Nuclear Issue Headed?], Al-Watan, On-line, Internet, 23 November 2011,

availablefromwww.alwatan.com.sa/Articles/Detail.aspx?ArticleID=8329.

50. A Saudi editorial in 2012, likewise, suggested that a strike against Iran was

unlikely, Saud Kabili, “Al-Mintaqa ala washk sibaq al-tasalluh al-nawawi” [The Region

Is on the Brink of a Nuclear Arms Race], Al-Watan, On-line, Internet, 22 April 2012,

availablefromwww.alwatan.com.sa/Articles/Detail.aspx?ArticleId=10530.

51. Major General Husam Suwaylim (Ret), “Al-Inqisamat al-amrikiya wa’lisra’iliya hawl darb Iran” [The American and Israeli Divisions on Striking Iran], AlHaras Al-Watani, November-December 2012, 44-53. This view seemed predominant in

the Saudi military media, as in Brigadier General Saba’ Abd Allah BaHabri (retired), “LiMadha ta’akhkharu fi muhajamat al-mansha’at al-nawawiya al-iraniya?” [Why Have

They Delayed Striking the Iranian Nuclear Facilities?], Al-Haras Al-Watani, JanuaryFebruary 2013, 34-39.

52. Ibrahim Al-Athimin, “Iran wa-mufawadat Kazakhstan” [Iran and the

Negotiations in Kazakhstan], Al-Yawm, On-line, Internet, 27 February 2013, available

from www.alyaum.com/News/art/73493.html. See also Ibrahim Al-Athimin, “Iran: kalam

sawwi shahi” [Iran: Like Saying Make Me Tea], Al-Yawm, On-line, Internet, 20 March

2013, available from www.alyaum.com/News/art/76170.html.

53. Editorial, “Iran al-nawawiya” [A Nuclear Iran], Al-Madina, On-line, Internet, 13

July 2010, available from www.al-madina.com/print/256294.

54. Abd Al-Munim Mustafa, “Kull shay’ lam yaud kafiyan” [All of That Is Not

Enough], Al-Madina, On-line, Internet, 14 February 2010, available from www.almadina.com/print/224041.

55. Ibrahim bin Abd Allah Al-Mutrif, “Lin fat al-fawt...ma yanfa al-sawt”

[Shutting the Barn Door after the Horses Have Left], Al-Yawm, On-line, Internet, 8

December 2011, available from www.alyaum.com/News/art/37586.html.

56. Dayf Allah Al-Dayan, “Al-Alaqat al-amrikiya al-iraniya al-wajh al-akhar”

[U.S.-Iranian Relations: The Other Face], Al-Bayan (London), 1428/2009, 242, On-line,

Internet, available fromwww.albayan.co.uk/Files/articleimages/takrir/4-3-2.pdf.

57. Salim Al-Sharif, “Turki Al-Faysal: Al-Alam fashal fi iqna Isra’il wa-Iran min

‘al-nawawi’ wa-khiyaratna maftuha” [Turki Al-Faysal: The World Failed to Convince

Israel and Iran on the Nuclear [Issue] and Our Options Are Open], Al-Madina (Jeddah),

On-line, Internet, 6 December 2011, available from www.al-madina.com/print/343006.

58. The same opinion was shared by Nasir Al-Shihri, “Al-Khalij wa makhatir almustaqbal” [The Gulf and the Perils of the Future], Al-Bilad, On-line, Internet, 8 March
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

86

2009, available from www.albiladdaily.com/print.php?action=print&m=articlesm&id=

2209.

59. Uthman Al-Khuwaytir, “Isra’il wa-qunbulat Iran” [Israel and Iran’s Bomb], AlIqtisadiya, On-line, Internet, 20 November 2011, available from www.aleqt.com/2011/

11/20/article_599776.print.

60. “Al-Takhabbut al-isra’ili hawl barnamaj Iran al-nawawi” [Israeli Fumbling on

Iran’s Nuclear Program], Al-Watan, On-line, Internet, 27 April 2012, available from

www.alwatan.com.sa/editors_note/Editor_Note_Detail.aspx?ID=739.

61. “Malaff Iran al-nawawi mujaddadan...hal min muwajaha askariya?” [Iran’s

Nuclear Issue Once Again; Will There Be a Military Confrontation?], Al-Watan, On-line,

Internet, 9 November 2011, available from www.alwatan.com.sa/Articles/Detail.aspx?

ArticleID=8126.

62. Mutlaq Saud Al-Mutayri, “Al-Khuruj an al-nass; Madha law qalat Al-Mamlaka

naam” [Departing from the Script; What If the Kingdom Said Yes], Al-Riyadh, On-line,

Internet, 25 August 2012, available from www.alriyadh.com/2012/08/25/

article762523.html.

63. Hamad bin Abd Allah Al-Luhaydan, “Abad al-tasalluh al-nawawi watadaiyatih” [Dimensions of Nuclear Arming and of Its Consequences], Al-Riyadh, Online, Internet, 29 May 2009, available from www.alriyadh.com/2009/05/29/

article433463.html.

64. Ibid.

65. “Sibaq nawawi fi Al-Sharq Al-Awsat” [A Nuclear Arms Race in the Middle

East], Al-Madina, On-line, Internet, 20 February 2010, available from www.almadina.com/print/225775.

66. Ibid.

67. Abd Al-Munim Mustafa, “Kull shay’ lam yaud kafiyan” [All of That Is Not

Enough], Al-Madina, On-line, Internet, 14 February 2010, available from www.almadina.com/print/224041.

68. See Norman Cigar, Saddam Hussein’s Nuclear Vision: an Atomic Shield and

Sword for Conquest. (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2011), 25-30.

69. “Abd Al-Aziz bin Salman: Al-Mamlaka tasa li-tawfir imdadat kafiya fi suq alnaft” [Abd Al-Aziz bin Salman: The Kingdom Is Striving to Provide Sufficient Supplies

on the Oil Market], Al-Watan, On-line, Internet, 23 February 2012, available from

www.alwatan.com.sa.
Thinking in Terms of Solutions: Stopping Iran

87

70. Abd Al-Aziz Al-Suwayd, “Ahyanan...istikbar wa-salaf siyasi” [Sometimes...

Arrogance and Political Bragging], Al-Hayat (Saudi edition), On-line, Internet, 21

February 2012, available from http://ksa/daralhayat.com/ksaarticle/353250.

71. Abd Al-Rahman Al-Turayri, “Al-Khalij arabi am farisi?” [The Gulf: Arab or

Persian?], Al-Iqtisadiya, On-line, Internet, 23 August 2011, available from

www.aleqt.com/2011/08/23/article_572330.print.

72. Ibrahim Al-Athimin, “Iran wa-mufawadat Kazakhstan” [Iran and the

Negotiations in Kazakhstan], Al-Yawm, On-line, Internet, 27 February 2013, available

from www.alyaum.com/News/art/73493.html.

73. Fahd Al-Dhiyabi, “Saud Al-Faysal: Yajib tamkin al-shab al-suri min al-difa an

nafsih, wa-Iran ghayr sadiqa hawl barnamijha al-nawawi” [Saud Al-Faysal: The Syrian

People Must Be Empowered to Defend Themselves, and Iran Is Not Sincere about Its

Nuclear Program], Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, On-line, Internet, 13 February 2013, available

from www.aawsat.com/print.asp?did=717110&issueno=12496.

74. For example, Mahmud Lauta, “Iran fi ma’ziq; Taraju mabiat al-naft ila 135 alf

barmil yawmiyan” [Iran in Critical Situation: Reduction in Oil Sales to 135,000 Barrels

Per Day], Al-Iqtisadiya, On-line, Internet, 26 December 2012, available from

www.aleqt.com/2012/12/26/article_719885.print.

75. Yusuf Al-Kuwaylit, “Hal najahat al-quwwa al-naima ma Iran?” [Has Soft

Power Succeeded with Iran?], Al-Riyadh, On-line, Internet, 3 October 2012, available

from www.alriyadh.com/2012/10/03/article773134.html.

76. Adnan Kamil Salah, “Ma al-thaman al-ladhi sayadfahu Ubama li-tuhibbahu

Tihran?” [What Price Is Obama Willing to Pay So That Tehran Loves Him?], Al-Madina,

On-line, Internet, 19 February 2013, available from www.al-madina.com/printhtml/

434687, and Editorial, “Takalif al-hawas al-nawawi fi Iran” [The Cost of Nuclear Folly

in Iran].

77. Raqiya Sulayman Al-Huwayrini, “Al-Manshud al-nawawi qabl al-khubz

ahyanan!” [Sometimes Nuclear Aspirations before Bread!], Al-Jazira, On-line, Internet, 9

April 2013, available from www.al-jazirah.com/2013/20130409/ar1d.htm. See also Ali

Al-Jahali, “Kuriya Al-Shimaliya: ‘Al-Amn muqabil al-ghidha’’” [North Korea: “Security

in Exchange for Food”], Al-Iqtisadiya, On-line, Internet, 14 April 2013, available from

www.aleqt.com/2013/04/14/article_747226.html.

78. Amir Tahiri, “Iran wa’l-qunbula al-nawawiya: Hujaj ghayr mubashira fi

Washintun” [Iran and the Atom Bomb: Indirect Excuses in Washington], Al-Sharq AlAwsat, On-line, Internet, 26 April 2013, available from www.aawsat.com/print.asp?did=

726127&issueno=12568.
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

88

79. Yazid Bin Muhammad, “Iran al-nawawiya lan tantazhirkum...irdauha” [A

Nuclear Iran Will Not Wait for You Deter It], Al-Watan, On-line, Internet, 30 April 2013,

availablefromwww.alwatan.com.sa/Articles/Detail.aspx?ArticleID=16512.

80. “Madha law daghat ahmaq ala zurar?” [What If a Fool Pressed the Button?], AlSharq Al-Awsat, On-line, Internet, 3 June 2009, available from www.aawsat.com/

print.asp?did=521831&issueno=11145.

81. Ibid.

82. Salim Al-Sharif, “Turki Al-Faysal: Al-Alam fashal fi iqna Isra’il wa-Iran min

‘al-nawawi’ wa-khiyaratna maftuha” [Turki Al-Faysal: The World Failed to Convince

Israel and Iran on the Nuclear [Issue] and Our Options Are Open], Al-Madina (Jeddah),

On-line, Internet, 6 December 2011, available from www.al-madina.com/print/343006.
CHAPTER 7

Thinking in Terms of Solutions: 

Considering a Saudi Nuclear Option

As noted already, senior Saudi officials often warned that their

country could adopt another option, that of acquiring its own nuclear

weapons in order to off-set and neutralize the effect of any future Iranian

bomb.

Saudi Arabia’s Traditional View of a Nuclear Option and

Its Evolution

Although there had been reports of attempts by the Saudis as early as

1989 to obtain experimental nuclear reactors from China as a start toward

eventually acquiring a weapons program, nothing had come of such talk.1

And, the Saudi media would respond routinely with vehement denials to

any suggestions of Saudi nuclear plans or activity. For example, in the

wake of press coverage based on revelations by a defecting Saudi

diplomat about his country’s cooperation in that field with other countries,

the Saudi media dismissed such reports as just “a press campaign targeting

Saudi Arabia.”2Likewise, whenever reports surfaced about SaudiPakistani cooperation in the nuclear field, Saudi sources would deny them

heatedly, as in a Saudi editorial following Prince Sultan’s visit to Pakistan

in 2006, which dismissed accounts of cooperation in the nuclear arena as

“asinine allegations.”3

Prince Sultan, the Saudi Minister of Defense at the time, himself

rejected such reports as “baseless allegations.”4The official organ of the

Muslim World League (a Saudi-based and financed international

organization), while maintaining that Saudi Arabia had a right to nuclear

weapons, likewise characterized any such Western speculation about
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

90

cooperation with Pakistan as “surprising” and “ridiculous.” And, this

source attributed such accounts to “the Zionist lobby” and to U.S. efforts

to blackmail Saudi Arabia into cooperating with the United States’ Middle

East policy.5 More recently, Saudi Arabia appears to have been anxious to

show that, had it wanted to, it could have acquired nuclear weapons years

ago. For example, a Saudi-owned newspaper reported that the post-Soviet

Ukrainian government had proposed to Riyadh in 1994 to help the latter

develop nuclear weapons, but that the then-monarch, King Fahd, had

declined the offer.6

Moreover, the focus of Saudi policy in the past was to put its faith in

a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East. Although such appeals by

policymakers and the media for a nuclear-free zone have continued, with

somewhat of a revival in 2013, these calls appear to be largely pro-forma

nowadays, although they offer an opportunity to elicit praise in the local

media for the efforts by the Saudi authorities on behalf of such goals. As

one Saudi writer enthused, Saudi Arabia had “left no stone unturned” in its

efforts to promote a nuclear-free region, and its efforts were proof of the

principled, noble, and bold character of Saudi diplomacy.7 However, in

practical terms, the intent seemed designed to generate diplomatic pressure

on Israel and Iran, as consensuses had emerged in Saudi Arabia that such

proposals had been a failure and were unrealistic, with many observers

pointing specifically to Israel’s continuing nuclear arsenal as a decisive

obstacle.8 As a military study concluded, “there is no possibility of making

the Middle East region free of WMD in the near future.”9

In fact, Saudi Arabia’s policymakers came to believe, as Prince Turki

Al-Faysal expressed it, that “our efforts and the world’s efforts to convince

Israel to relinquish its WMD and now Iran, too, with respect to the same

weapons have failed.”10 A corollary was that the effort to promote a WMDfree Middle East “has resulted in failure,” as one newspaper editor assessed

it.11 At base, Saudis were skeptical of the likelihood of nuclear disarmament

in general. One typical Saudi press article reflecting this outlook termed

nuclear disarmament “a dream for some, a nightmare for others,” and

argued that “it will never happen” unless underlying political issues are

resolved first. Indeed, the writer concluded that it was not “practical” that

the great nuclear powers would denuclearize and predicted that “all states

will seek to assure their security and their effectiveness by acquiring

nuclear weapons, even if only in small quantities.”12
Thinking in Terms of Solutions: Considering a Saudi Nuclear Option

91

Nuclear Proliferation and the Issue of Fairness

Quite apart from the justification for acquiring nuclear weapons based

on security concerns, Saudis also routinely raised the issue of fairness and

justice, which have an impact on Saudi thinking on proliferation.

Specifically, Saudis have long objected to what they see as a double

standard on the part of the United States and the West, who are said to

ignore Israel’s nuclear arsenal while denying similar weapons to others.

As a well-placed former royal adviser complained with some intensity to

the author, “The United States did not criticize Israel for its nuclear

weapons, but now it criticizes Pakistan [just] because it is a Muslim

state.”13

A Saudi pundit, likewise, lamented the fact that “it is permissible

(halal) for it [i.e. Israel] to possess weapons to destroy, obliterate, and kill

us, [yet] it is forbidden (haram) for others to possess arms for selfdefense.”14 Praising in ironic terms Israel for its determination in

developing its nuclear arsenal, another Saudi criticized the pressure

exerted on the Arabs to sign the NPT while at the same time not doing so

with Israel.15 Yet another Saudi analyst, likewise, accused the United

States of being one of the biggest nonproliferation violators because of its

support for Israel’s nuclear program.16

One Saudi observer even alleged that the United States had turned a

blind eye to Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and even “gave the green

light to Iran” while shortchanging the Arabs and the Turks in the region.17

Still another Saudi writer, declaring that “it is logical for the Arabs

to...reject double standards,” noted that “for every action there is a

reaction...and the Arabs can be called to account for their attempt to

acquire nuclear weapons only once there is the removal of weapons of

WMD from the entire region.”18 A Saudi editorial, in fact, blamed this

double standard for complicating the international community’s ability to

deal with Iran, since the latter could argue that Israel’s nuclear weapons

are permitted.19

Saudi audiences interpreted President Obama’s 2009 landmark speech

in Cairo as heralding a new U.S. effort to halt nuclear proliferation the

Middle East, but were soon expressing their disappointment with what

they viewed as a double standard by the United States towards Israeli

nuclear weapons. Typically, one commentator noted with respect to the
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

92

continuing U.S.-Israeli nuclear cooperation that “barely a year passed

since Obama’s speech before he was forced to eat his words and he

appeared before the entire world bereft of any power and ability to make

decisions freely when faced with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin

Netanyahu” and took the U.S. president to task for “flip-flopping...on his

‘firm’ position.’20

There has also been an enduring Saudi resentment about what is seen

as the double standard and hypocrisy exercised by the Great Powers in

general toward smaller powers wishing to join the nuclear club, with one

military journal arguing that “the Great Powers who possess these

[nuclear] weapons talk about steps to prevent nuclear arms and participate

in international conferences on this topic. They even sign treaties to limit

nuclear arms and confront and combat any step to acquire nuclear

weapons by states outside the nuclear club. However, when it comes down

to the actual situation, we find a different standard.”21 Other commentators

criticized specifically the United States for retaining its own nuclear

arsenal while condemning other countries for trying to also acquire that

capability.22

One Saudi writer, using a sarcastic tone for an underlying serious

message, noted that Iran was building a nuclear reactor in a quest for

nuclear weapons with which to “terrorize us and deprive us of our sleep,”

making it impossible to go to work or school or to move without living in

fear. Referring to the West ironically, he questioned whether “our friend

the West who loves us without doubt and without ambiguity prefers [Iran]

over us” and asked “why doesn’t it allow us to build a very small factory

in which we can manufacture a small bomb...which would put our minds

at ease and not harm [the West] at all? Just asking...Maybe it is a

daydreaming question, the question about building a small bomb [even]

the size of an orange.”23

Promoting Nuclear Weapons

The General Desirability of Nuclear Weapons

By the middle of the last decade, as Iran announced its success with

the enrichment of uranium, one could notice a spike in Saudi writings

about the significance of nuclear weapons in providing security. Saudi
Thinking in Terms of Solutions: Considering a Saudi Nuclear Option

93

observers frequently viewed other countries’ experience with acquiring

nuclear weapons in a positive light, thereby legitimizing the process itself

in an indirect way. For example, one senior military writer noted that “we

can see that many countries, especially developing ones, have spared no

expense in order to acquire capabilities to ensure for themselves a position

among the world’s states, as is the case with North Korea, or in order to

preserve their unity or for their population’s security, as is the case with

Pakistan.”24

At times, Saudi observers proposed the adoption of nuclear weapons

in generic terms. For example, a Saudi military study concluded that

“modern-day states have begun to understand clearly that their existence

and ability to protect their people from any foreign aggression is

intimately linked with their national security, which in turn will not be

achieved except by developing weapons for security, the principal one of

which is nuclear weapons, which contribute to deterring foreign

aggressors.”25 Another observer posited that “some” understood that “the

countries in the region have as their only option to follow the example of

countries such as India, Pakistan, and Israel” and that merely discussing

such an option openly might induce other countries – clearly intending

Israel and Iran – to reconsider their policies.26

An “Arab” or “Gulf” Deterrent

At other times, the Saudi media promoted the nuclear option using

circumlocutions intended not to be too provocative, such as “the Arabs” or

“the Gulf countries,” as the prospective nuclear power in response to

nuclear threats. Even as early as at least 2007, the Saudi press was already

writing that “there is no dispute that most of the Arabs wish that an Arab

state would acquire WMD.”27 Likewise, one Saudi media commentator

noted that if Iran did not agree to a nuclear-free Middle East then “there is

no alternative to taking Arab decisions for self-defense whether by means

of overt or covert plans” and, that in order to counter the Iranian threat,

predicted that “small and large neighboring states will also seek to acquire

nuclear weapons.”28 Again, an editorial in 2010 depicting a looming dual

nuclear threat from both Israel and Iran hinted that “some” assessed that

“there is no alternative but to think in terms of a nuclear option,” since

“the existence of the Arabs between the pincers of an Israeli and an
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

94

Iranian nuclear deterrent is not an option.” Highlighting the need to deal

with Israel’s nuclear weapons, this Saudi editorialist likewise asserted that

The only single genuine option in dealing with the conflict with Israel

is Arab self-reliance, and relying above all on God. One of the most

important elements of that self-reliance is creating a genuine nuclear

deterrence balance with both Israel now and with Iran in the future,

beginning with a joint decision by all the Arab states to withdraw from the

current NPT which allows some countries to possess [nuclear weapons]

and forbids it to others, and to Arab countries in particular and to Islamic

countries in general. The combined Arab countries can cooperate in

developing a peaceful and a military nuclear program.29

Responding, in particular, to a projected Iranian nuclear threat, some

Saudi sources issued indirect but transparent warnings of unspecified

others in the Middle East who would be likely to seek nuclear weapons if

Iran did so. For example, one editorial advised that “The international

community must demonstrate its will and resolve to prevent the start of a

nuclear arms race in the Middle East, as it will not be possible to

otherwise prevent [such a race] if Tehran enters the nuclear club.”30

Affirming that the Arab states have the same right to self-defense as any

other state, one writer observed that “the need is increasing for a joint

Arab nuclear strategy to acquire nuclear weapons, whatever the legality of

the path taken to achieve that, in order to provide for deterrence and selfdefense and to confront the Israeli and the Iranian [nuclear] programs.”31

As a Saudi newspaper editor put it, “one cannot be reassured about the

intent of either Israel or Iran,” as the Gulf and Peninsula Arabs would find

themselves “between two fires” once Iran also acquired nuclear weapons.

For him, “the only plausible option for the Arab Gulf states is to begin

immediately the development of a nuclear program with the intent of

producing a nuclear weapon deterrent which will make us at least equal in

defensive capabilities.”32 In fact, he advised that “the Gulf Arabs are in

dire need of this weapon and [must acquire it] quickly, before we are

subjected to the dual nuclear hegemony – Israeli hegemony and Iranian

hegemony.”33

For his part, a senior Saudi military officer noted that Iran’s failure to

comply with international controls of its nuclear programs could “lead to a

new conventional and unconventional arms race in the Gulf region.”34

Another military observer also argued that the “Gulf states...will have to
Thinking in Terms of Solutions: Considering a Saudi Nuclear Option

95

build a nuclear arsenal in order to create a balance of terror that will deter

Iran from blackmailing the non-nuclear Arab and Islamic states.”35

Similarly, a Saudi newspaper editor called for a “Gulf nuclear weapon.”36

Yet another Saudi commentator argued that “the Gulf states” must create a

nuclear balance in the Gulf to neutralize the Iranian nuclear threat.37 In

2013, a key Saudi editor expressed his concern about the looming Iranian

threat to the Gulf in dire terms as “a challenge to our existence,” with “the

clock ticking, so that no time is left for our options except to also acquire

power as quickly as possible.” Addressing the Gulf States, he warned that

anyone desiring peaceful coexistence with Iran would need first to create

“a military and strategic balance – including the possession of nuclear

weapons, whether by development or purchase,” which he saw as “an

option that is unavoidable, at whatever cost.”38

Realistically, of course, none of the smaller Gulf countries could have

been expected to respond to Iran’s nuclear arsenal with one of their own,

and such calls for a “Gulf” weapon could only be interpreted as a

convenient cover of plausible denial for Riyadh.

Being Candid – A Saudi Deterrent

Mirroring warnings from official circles, some Saudis also made the

case openly for an independent Saudi nuclear deterrent. For example,

Saudi human rights activist Abd Al-Aziz Al-Khamis, expressing his

support for a national nuclear deterrent, argued for self-reliance in defense

of the country’s natural resources from Iranian nuclear threats, since “only

our own power growing out of the people of the Gulf themselves will

protect these riches, and not the West’s fleets.”39 A paper that a Saudi

academic presented at a conference at the Institute for Diplomatic Studies

in Riyadh, likewise, concluded that, in view of the looming Iranian nuclear

threat, “it is vital to adopt a policy of nuclear deterrence...Saudi Arabia

must pursue the acquisition of nuclear weapons, even if only by

purchase.”40 Though acknowledging technical and financial obstacles, as

well as the likelihood of regional and international confrontation in

connection with a Saudi nuclear option, one Saudi commentator concluded

that, nevertheless, “some countries are willing to bear the burdens of

acquiring nuclear weapons as a trade-off for the feeling of having

achieved comprehensive long-term security assurance.”41
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

96

Ordinary Saudis on fora, blogs, tribal websites, and in comments

which are published to press articles online routinely express strong

popular support for a Saudi nuclear option. If anything, not fettered by the

constraints of policy responsibility, such commentators often seem to be

even more hard-line and supportive of nuclear weapons than are

government officials or the mainstream media. For example, responding to

an article discussing whether Saudi Arabia should acquire nuclear

weapons, one reader noted that “If Saudi Arabia had the atom bomb that

would provide the greatest security for its government, since neither

America nor anyone else can harm or provoke a state which has the atom

bomb.”42 Yet another reader held that “The Kingdom must think about and

begin to acquire weapons of deterrence, and this cannot wait...at whatever

the cost,” while a third stated that “I am one of those supporting Saudi

Arabia’s acquisition of nuclear weapons, because Saudi Arabia has a

trusteeship over Mecca the Venerable and Medina the Brilliant, and

America one day could abandon the Kingdom.”43

Typically, in a message “addressed to our people in the Kingdom of

Saudi Arabia,” one blogger hoped that Saudi Arabia would seek the help

of Pakistani and Chinese experts “so that the Kingdom can become the

eighth nuclear nation in the world.”44 For that blogger, “the Kingdom,

thanks to these [nuclear] weapons, will have the right to be a full member

in the nuclear club and, as a consequence, will be worthy of becoming a

member of the Security Council, since it will possess what the Great

Powers possess, and it will be a state which must then be recognized as

great and powerful.”45 Another blogger, whose message went viral in

Saudi Arabia, urged that “The Saudi government and [the country’s]

defense policymakers must begin a project to acquire nuclear weapons

immediately...I beg anyone who has access to the policymakers who deal

with the defense of the Kingdom to forward this request as an urgent

appeal from the people, since it is our duty for the defense of our religion

and our nation.”46 Such hints continued through 2013. As one press

commentator warned, “If Iran insists on nuclear weapons, there will be a

nuclear arms race in the region between Iran and Saudi Arabia.”47

If there are opponents in Saudi Arabia to a nuclear military option,

their views are not evident in public. It is true that there may be at least

some Saudis who may be concerned about further nuclear proliferation on

practical grounds. As one report noted, “there are some Saudis who do not
Thinking in Terms of Solutions: Considering a Saudi Nuclear Option

97

welcome a policy of a nuclear arms race in the region for a simple reason,

namely that the states in the region do not have the technical capability for

such a race.”48 One Saudi observer did express his malaise – albeit

obliquely – with the wisdom of anyone trusting in nuclear weapons.

Alluding to the potential destructiveness of nuclear weapons, and railing

against Iran’s quest for such weapons, he argued that what made the most

sense was the conduct of ants who, when attacked with destructive

substances by man, will not resist but will manage the situation by fleeing

to another area where they can avoid death and start new colonies in order

to stay alive – which is the supreme objective. He contrasted this nonconfrontational strategy with that of “some ignorant humans who adopt

confrontation and resist death with death.”49 Although directed at Iran,

there were also uncomfortable implications for any present or would-be

nuclear power.

Explaining Saudi Openness

Unlike the complete secrecy which surrounded Saudi Arabia’s

acquisition of the CSS-2 SSMs from China in 1986, official statements

and reporting about nuclear issues have been extensive, although one can

only speculate about the intent behind such openness. The purpose of such

coverage, on the one hand, may have been to deter Iran by warning the

latter that Saudi Arabia would respond in kind if Iran acquired nuclear

weapons and that this would thereby set off an expensive and hazardous

arms race in which any projected Iranian advantage would be neutralized.

As one Saudi commentator noted, “Simply considering this [nuclear]

option openly forces other countries in the region to reconsider, knowing

that they cannot continue to pursue their nuclear programs while the Arabs

remain in their nuclear backwardness.”50 More general media coverage

might also have been intended to convince the public and the military that

policymakers were in fact aware of the threat and were preparing to do

something meaningful about it.

The visibility and frequency of discussions in the Saudi media about

the nuclear issue may also indicate that Saudi policymakers wanted to

ensure support within society by giving the impression of a bottom-up

demand for a nuclear option. Highlighting what the government could

portray as popular demand might serve to prepare the public by creating a
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

98

consensus and allowing the royal family to gain credit for responding to

society’s ostensible security needs. Emphasizing the Iranian threat may

also be a means of unifying society on the basis of patriotism in an effort

to forestall discontent similar to that in other countries in the region as part

of the Arab Spring. Moreover, discussions in the military media may have

been intended to generate ideas about military doctrine, as well as

pursuing the same objectives as with the civilian media. To be sure, by

2013, there was not only a decrease in public analysis about Iran’s nuclear

program but also an apparent retrenchment in the accessibility of the

military media, which is no longer available online.

From available indications, the acquisition of nuclear weapons would

probably be a popular decision among Saudis in any event, and the

government needed only to crystallize and channel such inchoate support

rather than having to create it from scratch. In many ways, the Saudi

public’s available information about the Iranian threat and about nuclear

weapons, although filtered and shaped to produce specific effects, builds

on long-accepted popular negative attitudes toward the Shia, distrust of the

West, and national pride. In addition, public declarations may also have

been intended to pressure the United States and the international

community into being more proactive against Iran by warning about the

specter of runaway proliferation in the region if nothing was done.

Notes

1. The reports came from Saudi defector Muhammad Al-Khilaywi; see Marie

Colvin and Peter Sawyer, “Riyadh Bargained with Chinese for Nuclear Reactors,”

Sunday Times (London), 7 August 1994, 17.

2. For example, Uthman Al-Rawaf, “Madha bad iddia’ ann Al-Saudiya tasa liimtilak asliha nawawiya? As’ila tabhath an ijabat” [What Next after Claims That Saudi

Arabia Is Seeking Nuclear Weapons? Questions in Need of Answers], Al-Sharq AlAwsat, On-line, Internet, 26 September 2003, available from www.aawsat.com/

print.asp?did=194802&issueno=9068.

3. “Ukdhubat aslihat al-damar” [The Lie about WMD], Ukaz, On-line, Internet, 18

April 2006, available from www.okaz.com.sa/okaz/osf/20060418/PrinCon2006041810726.

htm.
Thinking in Terms of Solutions: Considering a Saudi Nuclear Option

99

4. Prince Sultan quoted from a press conference, Muhammad Al-Sanid, “Lada

wusulih Al-Riyadh qadiman min Bakistan” [On His Arrival in Riyadh Returning from

Pakistan], Al-Jazira, On-line, Internet, 17 April 2006, available from http://search.aljazirah.com.sa/2006jaz/apr/17/In2t.htm.

5. Munir Hasan Munir, “Al-Qunbula al-nawawiya al-saudiya!!” [The Saudi Atom

Bomb], Al-Alam Al-Islami, no. 1812, n.d. ca. late 2003, On-line, Internet, available from

www.muslimworldleague.org/paper/1812/articles/p16-a2.htm.

6. Amir Tahiri, “Ilaf takshif sirran li’l-marra al-ula: Al-Saudiya rafadat silahan

nawawiyan min Ukraniya” [Ilaf Reveals a Secret for the First Time: Saudi Arabia

Rejected Nuclear Weapons from Ukraine], Ilaf, On-line, Internet, 4 August 2007,

availablefromwww.elaph.com/ElaphWeb/akhbarKhasa/2007/8/253000.htm.

7. Malha Abd Allah in “Al-Siyasa al-saudiya tahkumha al-mabadi’ wa-qiyam alhaqq” [Saudi Policy Is Governed by Principles and Just Standards], Al-Yawm, On-line,

Internet, 18 April 2013, available from www.alyaum.com/News/art/79481.html.

8. For example, Jasir Abd Al-Aziz Al-Jasir, “Naam li-silah nawawi khaliji” [Yes to

a Gulf Nuclear Weapon], Al-Jazira, On-line, Internet, 7 December 2011, available from

www.al-jazirah.com.sa/20111207/du8.htm. Likewise, another opinion piece also

concluded that this objective was “impractical.” Abd Al-Munim Mustafa, “Kull shay’

lam yaud kafiyan” [All of That Is Not Enough], Al-Madina, On-line, Internet, 14

February 2010, available from www.al-madina.com/print/224041.

9. Hay’at Al-Tahrir [Editorial Board], “Hal yusbih Al-Sharq Al-Awsat mintaqa

khaliya min aslihat al-damar al-shamil?” [Will the Middle East Become a Region Free of

Weapons of Mass Destruction?], Majallat Kulliyat Al-Malik Khalid Al-Askariya, March

2004, 45.

10. Salim Al-Sharif, “Turki Al-Faysal: Al-Alam fashal fi iqna Isra’il wa-Iran min

‘al-nawawi’ wa-khiyaratna maftuha” [Turki Al-Faysal: The World Failed to Convince

Israel and Iran on the Nuclear [Issue] and Our Options Are Open], Al-Madina (Jeddah),

On-line, Internet, 6 December 2011, available from www.al-madina.com/print/343006.

11. Jasir Abd Al-Aziz Al-Jasir, “Naam li-silah nawawi khaliji” [Yes to a Gulf

Nuclear Weapon], Al-Jazira, On-line, Internet, 7 December 2011, available from

www.al-jazirah.com.sa/20111207/du8.htm.

12. Muhammad Al-Zawawi, “Naz al-silah al-nawawi min al-alam hulm li’l-bad wakabus li-akharin” [Global Nuclear Disarmament – A Dream for Some and a Nightmare

for Others], Majallat Al-Jazira (Riyadh), On-line, Internet, 18 July 2006, available from

www.al-jazirah.com.sa/magazine/18072006/almlfsais4.htm.
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

101

13. As told to the author in Riyadh during a visit to Saudi Arabia under the auspices

of The National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations, 2001.

14. Muhammad Abd Al-Wahid, “Sunna al-mawt” [Architects of Death], Al-Yawm,

On-line, Internet, 6 May 2011, available from www.alyaumonline.com/News/art/

10731.html.

15. Id bin Masud Al-Juhani, “Hal yufiq al-arab ala hadir al-quwwa al-isra’iliya?”

[Will the Arabs Awake from the Noise of Israeli Power?], Al-Hayat (London), On-line,

Internet, 12 April 2008, available from http://international.daralhayat.com/print/200023/

archive.

16. Sami Said Habib, “Qira’a fi qimmat al-junun al-nawawi al-alami” [An Analysis

of the International Nuclear Madness Summit], Al-Madina, On-line, Internet, 17 April

2010, available from www.al-madina.com/print/240768.

17. Jasir Abd Al-Aziz Al-Jasir, “Daqq jaras sibaq al-tasalluh al-nawawi fi almintaqa” [The Starting Bell for the Nuclear Arms Race in the Region Has Sounded], AlJazira, On-line, Internet, 16 April 2009, available from www.al-jazirah.com.sa/

20090416/du1.htm.

18. Yusuf Makki, “Al-Arab wa’l-tiknulujiya al-nawawiya” [The Arabs and Nuclear

Technology], Al-Khalij (Abu Dhabi, UAE), On-line, Internet, 15 March 2009, available

from www.alkhaleej.ae/portal/ab1b80b2-b23b-4e70-8021-a8af70d022d4.aspx.

19. “Iran al-nawawiya” [A Nuclear Iran], Al-Madina, On-line, Internet, 13 July

2010, available from www.al-madina.com/print/256294.

20. Sami Said Habib, “Safat Ubama al-nawawiya li’l-umma al-islamiya” [Obama’s

Nuclear Slap to the Islamic Umma], Al-Madina, On-line, Internet, 10 July 2010, available

from www.al-madina.com/printhtml/255964.

21. Salih Sulayman, “Al-Silah al-nawawi inhisar am mazid min al-intishar?”

[Nuclear Weapons: Rollback or Further Proliferation?], Al-Haras Al-Watani, OctoberNovember 2007, 34.

22. Ibid., 30-35. Also, “Al-Rad al-nawawi...ustura za’ifa” [Nuclear Deterrence Is a

Spurious Myth], Shams, (Riyadh), On-line, Internet, 6 February 2011, available from

www.shms.com.sa/html/ story.php?-124212. See also, Abd Al-Jalil Zayd Al-Marhun,

“Al-Alam al-thalith wa-mudilat al-intishar al-nawawi” [The Third World and the

Problem of Nuclear Proliferation], Al-Riyadh, On-line, Internet, 15 June 2001, available

fromwww.alriyadh.com/2001/06/15/ article32562.html.
Thinking in Terms of Solutions: Considering a Saudi Nuclear Option

100

23. Abd Allah Al-Nasir, “su’al bi-hajm al-burtuqala” [A Question the Size of an

Orange], Al-Riyadh, On-line, Internet, 3 May 2013, available from www.alriyadh.com/

2013/05/03/article831830.html.

24. Staff Brigadier Zayid bin Muhammad Al-Umari, “Dawafi imtilak al-qudrat alistratijiya al-sarukhiya al-fada’iya wa’l-nawawiya” [The Incentives for Acquiring

Strategic Rocket, Space, and Nuclear Capabilities], Quwwat Al-Difa Al-Jawwi Al-Malaki

Al-Saudi, December 2010, 12.

25. Ibid., 15.

26. Talal Salih Bannan, “Al-Arab bayn kammashat al-rub al-nawawi!” [The Arabs

between the Pincers of Nuclear Terror!], Ukaz, On-line, Internet, 2 April 2006, available

from www.okaz.com.sa/okaz/osf/20060402/PrinCon200604026920.htm.

27. Sadaqa Yahya Fadil, “Istikhdam al-silah al-nawawi...al-maful al-khafiy” [Using

Nuclear Weapons...the Hidden Impact], Ukaz, On-line, Internet, 25 March 2007,

availablefromwww.okaz.com.sa/okaz/osf/20070325/PrinCon2007032597841.htm.

28. Adnan Kamil Salah, “Tasawwaru uhlumu udu!” [Imagine, Dream, Pray!], AlMadina, On-line, Internet, 13 May 2010, available from www.al-madina.com/print/

247504.

29. Sami Said Habib, “Al-Khiyar al-arabi al-amthal fi al-taamul ma al-malaffat alnawawiya fi’l-mintaqa” [The Best Arab Option for Dealing with Nuclear Issues in the

Region], Al-Madina, On-line, Internet, 13 March 2010, available from www.almadina.com/node/231352.

30. “Sibaq nawawi fi Al-Sharq Al-Awsat” [A Nuclear Arms Race in the Middle

East], Al-Madina, On-line, Internet, 20 February 2010, available from www.almadina.com/print/225775.

31. Ibrahim Al-Amir, “Qunbula nawawiya wa-law sirran” [A Nuclear Bomb Even

If Covertly], Al-Watan, On-line, Internet, 10 September 2011, available from

www.alwatan.com.sa/Articles/Detail.aspx?ArticleID=7323.

32. Jasir Abd Al-Aziz Al-Jasir, “Naam li-silah nawawi khaliji” [Yes to a Gulf

Nuclear Weapon], Al-Jazira, On-line, Internet, 7 December 2011, available from

www.al-jazirah.com.sa/20111207/du8.htm. Also, Said Al-Farha Al-Ghamidi, “Khuturat

al-silah al-nawawi” [The Danger from Nuclear Weapons], Al-Madina, On-line, Internet,

6 July 2009, available from http://archive.al-madina.com/node/156695.

33. Ibid.
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

102

34. Major General Jamal Mazhlum, “Matalib duwal Al-Khalij min Iran” [The Gulf

States’ Demands on Iran], Al-Jazira, On-line, Internet, 8 October 2011, available from

www.al-jazirah.com.sa/20111008/du11.htm.

35. Major General Husam Suwaylim (Ret), “Ahdaf Iran al-siyasiya wa’l-istratijiya

wa-asalib tahqiqha,” [Iran’s Political and Strategic Objectives and the Methods to

Achieve Them], Al-Haras Al-Watani, part 1, August 2011, 37.

36. Jasir Abd Al-Aziz Al-Jasir, “Naam li-silah nawawi khaliji” [Yes to a Gulf

Nuclear Weapon], Al-Jazira, On-line, Internet, 7 December 2011, available from

www.al-jazirah.com.sa/20111207/du8.htm.

37. Hamad bin Abd Allah Al-Luhaydan, “Abad al-tasalluh al-nawawi watadaiyatih” [Dimensions of Nuclear Arming and of Its Consequences], Al-Riyadh, Online, Internet, 29 May 2009, available from www.alriyadh.com/2009/05/29/

article433463.html.

38. Yusuf Al-Kuwaylit, “Hal nu’akkid annana lasna al-ha’it al-qasir?” [Are We

Sure That We Are Not a Pushover?], Al-Riyadh, On-line, Internet, 23 February 2013,

available fromwww.alriyadh.com/2013/02/23/article812425.html.

39. Abd Al-Aziz Al-Khamis, “Han waqt al-silah al-nawawi al-saudi” [The Time has

come for a Saudi Nuclear Weapon], Ibda (Sanaa), On-line, Internet, 23 February 2012,

available fromhttp://ebdaa.com/?act=artc&id=5577&print=1.

40. The paper was by Abd Allah Al-Utaybi, as reported in Abd Allah bin Ibrahim

Al-Askar, “Malaffat sakhina” [Hot Issues], Al-Riyadh, On-line, Internet, 19 January

2011, available fromwww.alriyadh.com/2011/01/19/article595966.print.

41. Badr Al-Balawi, “Al-Qunbula al-nawawiya al-saudiya” [The Saudi Atom

Bomb], Al-Sharq (Dammam), On-line, Internet, 14 December 2011, available from

www.alsharq.net.sa/2011/12/14/46046.

42. Comments to Hisham Munawwar, “Al-Mamlaka Al-Arabiya Al-Saudiya waimtilak al-silah al-nawawi: al-muawwiqat wa’l-muhaffizat” [The Kingdom of Saudi

Arabia and Acquring Nuclear Weapons: The Obstacles and the Incentives], Al-Muslim

(Saudi Arabia), On-line, Internet, 23 Safar 1430/19 February 2009, available from

http://almoslim.net/node/107241.

43. Ibid.

44. “Li-madha la namlik al-silah al-nawawi?” [Why Don’t We Get Nuclear

Weapons?], Jazan News (Jazan, Saudi Arabia), On-line, Internet, 23 May 2006, available

from www.jazan4u.com/vb/showthread.php?t=42590.
Thinking in Terms of Solutions: Considering a Saudi Nuclear Option

103

45. Ibid.

46. “Quwwat al-rad al-nawawi al-saudi” [Saudi DeterrentPower], Aswaq Royal

Blog, On-line, Internet, 17 March 2003, available from www.aswaqroyal.com/

t18351.html.

47. Khalid Al-Dakhil, “Marhalat al-hudu’ wa’l-hifazh ala al-siyasa al-kharijiya” [A

Quiet Phase While Maintaining the [Same] Foreign Policy], Anba’ukum, On-line,

Internet, 21 June 2013, available from www.anbacom.com/print?action=print&m=

articlesm&id=16877.

48. The paper was by Abd Allah Al-Utaybi, as reported in Abd Allah bin Ibrahim

Al-Askar, “Malaffat sakhina” [Hot Issues], Al-Riyadh, On-line, Internet, 19 January

2011, available fromwww.alriyadh.com/2011/01/19/article595966.print.

49. Shahir Al-Nahari, “Al-Nawawi wa’l-naml” [Nuclear Weapons and Ants], AlSharq (Najran, Saudi Arabia), On-line, Internet, 16 April 2013, available from

www.alsharq.net.sa/2013/04/16/805815.

50. Talal Salih Bannan, “Al-Arab bayn kammashat al-rub al-nawawi!” [The Arabs

between the Pincers of Nuclear Terror!], Ukaz, On-line, Internet, 2 April 2006, available

from www.okaz.com.sa/okaz/osf/20060402/PrinCon200604026920.htm.
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

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CHAPTER 8

Thinking about Nuclear Strategy

Conceptualizing Nuclear Deterrence

Saudi Arabia’s policymakers did not discuss openly how they might

envision using a potential nuclear arsenal. Such indications as are

available have to be gleaned, instead, from discussions in the military and

civilian media, although here, too, one cannot expect a clear translation of

policy into concepts and doctrine. Saudi Arabia, although a propagator of

its version of Islamic practice and a supporter of proxies in other countries

as it seeks to enhance its influence and security in the region, is basically a

status-quo state and would almost assuredly intend to use any nuclear

arsenal in a deterrence capacity to enhance regional stability. Saudi

supporters of a nuclear option have stressed repeatedly this defensive

aspect of nuclear doctrine as a form of reassurance for foreign and

domestic publics, with one arguing that in the nuclear field “the [Arab]

Gulf states have proven to the world their maturity by not seeking [nuclear

weapons] in the past.”1

In the division between “pessimists” who, conceptually see nuclear

weapons as destabilizing, and “optimists,” who see nuclear weapons as

stabilizing through mutual deterrence, the Saudis tend to fall squarely in

the latter camp, although, as noted already, the Saudis also have doubts

about whether Iran is a rational actor relying on a calculus of balance of

power, or whether that approach could be overridden by what they

interpret as Iran’s messianic religious tendencies.

The Saudis pay close attention to the history of nuclear deterrence and

their understanding of other countries’ experience provides insights into

Saudi thinking on the role and advantages of nuclear deterrence as it might

apply to their own country. A Saudi newspaper editor encapsulated

eloquently the prevailing Saudi view of the utility of nuclear weapons. As
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

106

he saw it, “the simplest option if you wish to protect yourself and fortify

your nation and your people in case you are menaced by a neighbor who

covets your country’s riches and who has hostile intentions is for you to be

able to ward him off by having defensive means at least equal to, if not

better than, his, with capabilities that will deter him and make him think a

thousand times before he attacks you.”2 Another Saudi commentator

stressed the unique utility of nuclear weapons within the context of

deterrence, noting that “possessing force is the most unambiguous means of

preventing the use of the opponent’s force; only iron counters iron.”3In real

terms, as one senior retired Saudi military officer saw it, a Saudi deterrent is

needed to neutralize Iran’s deterrent advantage, for such a capability would

“constitute a counter-deterrent to an Iranian nuclear deterrent.”4

What stands out in Saudi discussions within policy, military, and

civilian circles is the consensus around the belief of the validity and

effectiveness of nuclear deterrence. In drawing lessons learned from the

past, the Saudis repeatedly referred not only to the relationships between

the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, but also to

Pakistan and India, and North Korea and the United States as proof that

mutual nuclear deterrence is an effective mechanism to ensure security

and stability.5

Typically, one Saudi journalist stated categorically that “nuclear

weapons are the safety valve for world peace.” As he saw it, mutual

nuclear deterrence during the Cold War had resulted in “the nuclear

paralysis...[that] imposed peaceful coexistence between the western camp

led by Washington and the eastern camp led by Moscow.” And, in light of

the perceived success of mutual deterrence, he expressed his absolute

confidence that “production of nuclear weapons today represents, in fact, a

peaceful nuclear path.”6 As another Saudi observer saw it, “The system of

the balance of nuclear terror between the eastern and western camps was a

success even with the presence of marginal nuclear powers such as

Britain, France, and China in that system, since both camps had the

strategic assurance that the eruption of a nuclear war between them was

impossible thanks to the presence of a second-strike capability on both

sides.”7In fact, Saudis believe that this “strategic stability” based on

nuclear weapons continues to this day as the basis of the security

relationship between the United States and Russia, and the difficulty in
Thinking about Nuclear Strategy

107

reducing the number of nuclear arms “shows the extent to which states are

[still] focused on that.”8

Saudis also see as the key lesson from Pakistan’s acquisition of

nuclear weapons that the nuclear option had been the only possible

response once India had developed its own nuclear program in 1974, for

Pakistan had then realized that without its own nuclear deterrent India

would initiate further military confrontations and that Pakistan “would

perish.”9 Highlighting the success of nuclear deterrence, this same article

concluded that, without a doubt, it had been Pakistan’s own nuclear tests

which had caused India to hesitate and back off from attacking Pakistan,

and drew a parallel to Israel’s nuclear threat to Saudi Arabia.10 Although

in the early stages there had been skepticism in Saudi Arabia that mutual

deterrence in the Pakistan-India dyad was stable and there was concern

that tension between the two countries could escalate into a nuclear war,

by the end of the last decade there was a growing perception that nuclear

deterrence had been successful and stabilizing in this case, with nuclear

weapons seen as enabling Pakistan to safeguard its independence.11

Significantly, in relation to the utility of deterrence, in a 1998 opinion

piece, the then-Assistant Defense Minister, Prince Khalid bin Sultan, had

highlighted the U.S. strike against a suspected chemical weapons factory

in Sudan, noting that Sudan had had to absorb the affront to its dignity and

sovereignty because “power talks.”12 That is, since Sudan could not

retaliate, all it could do was to remonstrate with words and seek sympathy,

whereas had it had the means to retaliate or to threaten to do so “the

language and conduct [of the United States] would have been different.”

He contrasted this case with the impact of nuclear weapons in the

Pakistan-India relationship, where “the voice of power was loud and

[India] threw its weight around and threatened, up until the time it heard

another voice of power no weaker than its own on the opposing side [i.e.

Pakistan], whereupon it moderated its language and requested a dialog.”

The cause imputed to this change in India’s attitude was “the balance of

power of conventional or nuclear weapons.” In effect, according to Prince

Khalid, in May of that year, India had conducted five nuclear tests, and

had accompanied the latter with demonstrations of power and

intimidation, including calls to Pakistan to negotiate, but not about the key

Kashmir issue, and threatened instead to occupy the rest of the disputed

province. As Prince Khalid saw it, “Power was talking, and what power –
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

108

nuclear power!” However, before the end of the same month, India had

had to moderate its tone and even became willing to discuss the future of

Kashmir, and all because Pakistan that month had exploded its first

nuclear weapon. As he concluded, “a balance of nuclear terror will create

peace” and “having power is vital, and a balance of power is inevitable.”13

Likewise, a Saudi military observer defined the pursuit of nuclear

weapons as a quest for “the equality of deterrence so that a state can be

secure from external threats, especially if it is confronted by a historic

enemy,” as he saw illustrated by Pakistan’s deterrent against India or

India’s deterrent against China.14 In general terms, Saudis also view

Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons as having been a factor enabling

the latter to withstand international pressure to join the NPT.15 As a senior

military officer expressed it, “Contemporary states began to realize clearly

that their existence and their ability to protect their populations against any

foreign aggression is tied intimately to its national security which, in turn,

will not be achieved except by developing defensive weapons, uppermost

of which are nuclear weapons, which support deterrence against foreign

aggressors.”

16

In selling the concept of nuclear deterrence, a dean at Naif Arab

University for Security Sciences, a senior academic institution run by the

country’s Ministry of the Interior, stressed the positive results of mutual

nuclear deterrence in terms of facilitating peaceful coexistence, citing the

case of Pakistan and India and the United States and the Soviet Union. For

him, in fact, this concept is “completely easy to understand,” and he

advised that “the GCC must strive to acquire a nuclear weapons

deterrent...at whatever sacrifice.”17 Otherwise, he concluded gloomily,

“everyone will regret it when it will be too late.”

Here, too, Saudi Arabia’s history with its SSMs may provide some

glimpses into its deterrence thinking, despite the recognized qualitative

differences with nuclear weapons. Saudi Arabia used its SSMs in an

explicit deterrent mode aimed, first, against any Israeli strike after the

SSMs were publicized in 1988 and, again, against Iraq following the

latter’s invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent Gulf War, 1990-91.

Although one cannot determine the effect the Saudi SSMs had on either

Israeli or Iraqi decision-making, Saudi leaders believed that their

deterrence had been successful.18 However, Saudi decision-makers

apparently were also prepared to launch the SSMs during the Gulf War in
Thinking about Nuclear Strategy

109

case Iraq caused unacceptable damage with its own Scuds or used

chemical weapons against Saudi Arabia.19 As Prince Khalid bin Sultan, at

the time Commander of the Combined Forces, maintained, Saudi Arabia

would have launched only as a last resort – “only if all other available

weapons had been used...and if this was absolutely vital and

unavoidable.”20

Nuclear Deterrence and Dealing with the Great Powers

The reality of a state’s overall power in international affairs generated

by nuclear weapons has long been a subject of Saudi interest and concern,

and Saudis have emphasized the accompanying benefits once a state

joined the nuclear club, in addition to that of defensive deterrence. In

particular, an aspect of the perceived utility of nuclear weapons from

Saudi Arabia’s perspective is that of the leverage they provide against

military and political pressure from the Great Powers. Some Saudis

believe that it was the possession of nuclear weapons that enabled the

Great Powers to “impose their hegemony over other states and to shape

international policy according to their interests.”21

Dealing with the Great Powers

While by no means in the same category as the looming Israeli or

Iranian threats, and although it is not discussed frequently in public, some

Saudis nevertheless feel concerns even about friendly outside powers. In a

way, some Saudis simply sense such subliminal threats in an indistinct

manner, sensitive to what they see as potential U.S. pressure in the future.

For example, for some Saudis, in addition to exercising defensive

deterrence, the United States was also seen as using nuclear weapons in a

more assertive manner, such as by deterring and coercing other countries

into not opposing its policies.22 An officer writing in a military journal, for

his part, was uncomfortable in general terms, as he noted that “it is not in

the interest of Arab national security that the United States continue to be

alone in possessing the strongest nuclear and missile strike force so that it

controls unilaterally the management of the international system,”

preferring instead a multipolar world.23 And, as a Saudi proponent of

nuclear weapons put it, “this call stems from a fear for the Arabness of the
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

110

Gulf not only because of Iran and its minions but also because of Western

control over the destiny of the Gulf states.”24

More specifically, some Saudis still bring up such threats as that

mooted in the United States in the wake of the 1973 October War to the

effect that Washington might retaliate with a food embargo for any future

Saudi oil embargo similar to the one Riyadh had implemented against

most Western countries during that war.25 However farfetched it may be,

some Saudis – though very probably only a small minority – also worry

that Israel and the United States might want to partition Saudi Arabia and

other Arab countries and turn them into mini-states that are not a threat to

Israel.26 Even a member of the royal family, the reformist Prince Talal, has

himself on occasion raised this possibility as an Israeli policy goal, and he

assumed that the United States would remain passive if that happened.27

Syria and Shia quarters in Iraq have actively fed such fears of partition

further.28

Comments such as those by a U.S. presidential candidate in 2007 to

the effect that Mecca and Medina should be held hostage to nuclear strikes

against further terrorist attacks have also generated fear and resentment, as

indicated by the Saudi media reaction at the time.29 Such latent fears

persist and are reawakened in the Saudi media from time to time by

injudicious remarks or incidents in the West, one of the most recent being

news of a course taught at a U.S. professional military educational

institution, which reportedly included options to “strike Mecca and

Medina with nuclear weapons in order to obliterate them and to kill as

many Muslims as possible.”30 Even in the mainstream Saudi press

occasionally one can find reports of conspiracies, such as one of an

alleged U.S.-Israeli-Iranian plot “to weaken and bring down the Arab

Umma as a whole and, in particular, the Gulf states.”31

Moreover, some Saudi observers believe that the United Sates could

use its nuclear weapons not only as a deterrent but also as a war fighting

tool in some circumstances. Particularly during the presidency of George

W. Bush, Saudi observers viewed the United States as prepared to actually

launch nuclear weapons against Iran or Syria if the latter attacked Israel

with WMD.32 And, some were convinced that the United States had

considered doing so against Libya and, later, against Syria.33 In general,

the United States was also seen as likely to consider using nuclear

weapons rather than accepting a war of attrition.34
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An op-ed in the Saudi press even claimed that it was only thanks to its

nuclear weapons that “Pakistan escaped from [America’s] clutches by a

miracle.”35 The same writer concluded that “the possession of a nuclear

deterrent by any state is a patriotic and a national duty even more than

being a strategic priority.”36 Recent events in Libya may have provided

especially worrisome lessons learned relevant to proliferation, as it is

widely believed in the Middle East that had Muammar Qaddafi retained

his nuclear program the United States and other NATO countries would

have been reluctant to become involved on behalf of the opposition

seeking to topple his regime. In one instance of advocacy, a writer in the

Saudi press asked whether NATO would have dared attack Libya if the

latter had had nuclear weapons, and “would the Europeans consider

admonishing Qaddafi if he insinuated he would launch a nuclear missile

against France?” Likewise, the author wondered whether Syria would be

under such pressure now if it had a nuclear capability.37 And, he suggested

that “once the Arabs possess nuclear weapons they will have a different

degree of influence in the international balance.”38 Another author was

confident that the world would respect the Arabs if they had nuclear

weapons and that it would then be possible to pressure Israel, as well Iran

into withdrawing from the disputed islands it occupies in the Gulf, to

prevent it from supporting the Asad regime in Syria, and to oblige the

United States and the West to change their policies because “they only

respect those who can rely on power when they negotiate.”39

North Korea: A Success Story in Deterrence?

Drawing Lessons from North Korea

Focusing on the centrality of power politics, Saudis often have sought

lessons learned for dealing with the Great Powers from the success of

other small nuclear powers. For example, Saudi observers believe that

North Korea provides an instructive example since, by acquiring a nuclear

deterrent, Pyongyang increased its leverage, and the latter’s acquisition of

nuclear weapons was characterized in the Saudi press as having “provided

it with a powerful nuclear shield both on a regional level and beyond.”40

The Saudi media drew a stark contrast between the United States’

willingness to invade Iraq in 2003 but not North Korea even though – or
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

112

because – the latter had a proven WMD arsenal. For a Saudi military

journal, by claiming to have nuclear weapons “the [North] Korean

government responded in a practical way to American pressures which

sought to force it to relinquish its nuclear program, at a time when it

feared it would become Washington’s next target after the latter finishes

with the Iraqi case. It thus wants to inform Washington that it is not an

easy target like Iraq.”41

As a writer in the civilian media likewise argued in 2003, “the reason

[for not invading] is obvious, namely that [North] Korea has the atom

bomb while Iraq only has media noise about its imaginary power.” And,

the article added, “The United States knows the danger of ‘provoking’ a

nuclear country such as North Korea, and so has contented itself with

verbal protests void of any meaning.”42 The article concluded that “the

balance of terror may be one of the lessons of the war now in progress in

Iraq...What America has done may awaken dreamers and make them open

their eyes to the bitter truth in our ugly world and motivate them to arm.”43

Another observer concluded that once North Korea had acquired nuclear

weapons, the United States could no longer solve the Korean issue by

force and was obliged, instead, “to use the carrot with North Korea instead

of the stick.”44

Based on the North Korean experience, an article in a Saudi military

journal deduced that “it appears that one of the basic principles – albeit

one that has never been said openly because it is not possible to do so – on

which U.S. strategy is based is that of not taking lightly an initiative for

any military action against any country which has one of the WMD

(nuclear, chemical, or biological). That is what explains the fact that the

United States has not attacked North Korea, which may have a respectable

missile force and nuclear weapons.”45 Even the director of a liberal Saudi

website expressed his support for nuclear weapons as a deterrent against

hegemony and noted that thanks to its nuclear weapons North Korea had

succeeded in thwarting U.S. plans for such hegemony, since it was

henceforth impossible to threaten North Korea or to force it to be

submissive.46 Indeed, an editorial in a Saudi-owned newspaper assessed

that North Korea had successfully challenged the world and “was not

frightened of the stick,” and that by now “removing nuclear weapons from

a country like North Korea is not feasible in practical terms, since
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considerations of the cost and risks would make taking such a step a major

gamble whose cost most of mankind would have to pay.”47

North Korea has continued to propagate such ideas in the Gulf, as was

the case with that country’s ambassador to Kuwait, who told the Kuwaiti

press that “we were obliged to develop nuclear weapons, since American

nuclear weapons are deployed in South Korea at present...we will not

relinquish our nuclear weapons intended for the defense of our

country...we desire a dialog with [the United States] but aggression occurs

by the strong against the weak, the best examples of which is what

happened to Afghanistan and Iraq.”48

The 2013 Crisis with North Korea

Saudi Arabia, as one could expect, paid close attention to the

protracted crisis of 2013 between the United States and North Korea, a

crisis in which the latter’s nuclear arsenal has been a central component.

As is true of the rest of the international community, Saudi Arabia could

not predict the outcome of the confrontation but, at the very least, the

Korean crisis introduced an element of troubling uncertainty for the

Saudis. Not surprisingly, no official statements have emanated from

Riyadh as of this writing.

However, as far as the Saudi media was concerned, some potential

lessons learned seemed to be emerging. First, there was concern that the

United States’ preoccupation with East Asian affairs stemming from the

crisis with North Korea could mean that Washington would pay less

attention to problems in the Middle East.49 Another Saudi viewed North

Korea’s nuclear bluster in the evolving confrontation as confirmation that

rights could only be seized by power, and that weakness would mean a

loss of rights.50 Participants in the Saudi Hawamir Al-Bursa blog

discussing the implications of the North Korean crisis noted that the

United States had not attacked North Korea (or other nuclear powers).

But, according to the bloggers, this situation showed that the Arab world

was vulnerable because it lacked nuclear weapons, as “our Arab countries

have become the exemplary image of the model victim for an

executioner.” An accompanying undertone suggested a challenge to

decision-makers, as one blogger noted sarcastically that “it is impossible
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114

that our rulers are considering developing nuclear weapons in the Gulf,

because Auntie America would get mad at them.”51

Although the potential cost of nuclear weapons has never been raised,

at least insofar as Saudi Arabia is concerned, a theme that occurred

repeatedly in relation to the North Korean crisis was that of the enormous

economic burden which the North Korean population has had to carry to

pay for the country’s nuclear status. Observers have noted that the North

Korean case showed that possessing nuclear technology did not

automatically translate into prosperity, social progress, or achieving Great

Power status, quite apart from the repellant nature of that country’s

internal repression.52 It is unclear whether such writers assumed that Saudi

readers might apply such criticism subtly to their own situation and

national policy or whether an unintentional double standard is at play.

Some Saudis believed that North Korea was merely saber-rattling,

since it could not really match the United States in power, but others

worried that the high-risk brinkmanship might spill over into a nuclear

war.

53 In particular, Saudis may be pondering what the North Korean

crisis might mean for Iran’s behavior. Writing in a Saudi-owned

newspaper, the former head of Iraq’s military intelligence warned that the

effect of North Korea’s readiness to engage in nuclear threats would

encourage Iran to also adopt a defiant posture.54 Another editorialist in a

Saudi-owned newspaper, discussing Iran’s nuclear ambitions, likewise

compared Iran to North Korea, taxing both as “unpredictable.”55

Saudi opinion was often not critical of North Korea for the 2013

crisis, or at least not exclusively so. Some opinion pieces seemed to place

equal blame on the United States, or even predominantly on the latter,

suggesting that Washington had long threatened North Korea, that it was

using the crisis as a means to pressure South Korea into buying expensive

U.S. military equipment or as a way to cement its military presence in

South East Asia, and that the U.S.-led economic embargo perhaps

represented “a blatant attack.”56 And, some expressed a grudging

admiration of a nuclear North Korea, suggesting the latter was dealing

with the crisis as a Great Power would and that Pyongyang was willing to

sacrifice in order to “maintain its national sovereignty and

independence.”57
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How to Implement Deterrence

Establishing Credibility

There have been no official indications as to how Saudi Arabia would

implement nuclear deterrence in concrete terms if it’s acquired nuclear

weapons. Overall, however, Saudis seem to adhere to a “fleet-in-being”

view of deterrence. That is, by simply possessing nuclear weapons one

gains automatic deterrence, as well as the ability to translate that

deterrence into political clout. For one Saudi academic, who argued in

favor of acquiring nuclear weapons, military power is primarily a political

weapon, and “simply having military power supports a state’s position and

political independence, while the politician who negotiates having only a

sword will of course be weaker than his counterpart if the latter has a

rifle.”58

However, at the same time, Saudi military thinkers, in particular, have

shown that they are fully aware that an effective deterrent also requires

credibility. As a study in a Saudi military journal stressed, “the decisive

factor today, as it has been throughout history, is the ability to use a

weapon.” It is this factor which “must constitute a deterrent to the

leadership in Tehran in order to prevent that leadership from embarking on

a military venture whose outcome is uncertain or to prevent it from

igniting an armed conflict whose cost exceeds the value of that war.”59 In

that respect, according to the same author, “the GCC states’ arsenals of

arms and the ability to use them is in favor of the Gulf states more than in

Iran’s favor, and that must constitute a deterrent factor to Tehran’s

leadership.”60

Conversely, one can speculate that Saudi Arabia perhaps might not

limit itself to a passive sort of deterrence if and when it acquired a nuclear

capability. Rather, given the prevailing view of a nuclear-armed country’s

relative immunity from retaliation, Riyadh might be tempted to play a

more assertive hand in the confrontational situations which have already

developed in its shadow war against Iran in such areas as Iraq, Yemen,

Lebanon, and Syria, potentially opening the door to unintended escalation.

Would Saudi Arabia declare its nuclear capability? In order for a

nuclear deterrent to be effective, others must either know of its existence

or assume its existence. An undeclared capability, but one surrounded by
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

116

sufficient hints signaling its existence in no uncertain terms, might prove

attractive. That option would enable Saudi Arabia to use its nuclear

capability for the intended deterrent role while managing or delaying, if

not totally avoiding, potential discord with the international community.

Perhaps, here again, Saudi Arabia’s experience with its SSMs may be

instructive. As Prince Khalid bin Sultan was to note in reference to the

SSMs, “The effectiveness of a deterrent capability depends on a potential

enemy knowing of its existence.”61 Apparently, Saudi Arabia was relying

on their discovery as the preferred method of making their existence

known for, according to Prince Khalid, “if it [i.e. the weapon system] was

not detected by June 1989, we should consider leaking the news

ourselves.”62 And, as part of a deterrent strategy, Riyadh would have to

decide whether to communicate what the “red lines” might be that could

trigger nuclear use or whether to rely on a significant degree of

uncertainty.

Avoiding Escalation Dominance

Saudi Arabia will still face a threat from Iran whether or not the latter

acquires a nuclear capability and, in any event, Saudi Arabia is not likely

to rely solely on a potential future nuclear deterrent for its national

security. Riyadh completed a $30 billion arms deal with the United States,

announced in December 2011, for conventional military equipment

intended not only to deter Iran at present but, apparently, also as a means

to prevent Iran’s escalation dominance in the future.

On the one hand, as one editorialist saw it, if a nuclear-armed Iran

attacked the Gulf States even with conventional weapons, no country

would be able to call on foreign support because Iran’s nuclear capability

would serve as a deterrent to such aid.63 Moreover, a robust conventional

capability at every level could forestall placing Saudi Arabia in an

unenviable position in the future – should it decide to acquire nuclear

weapons – where nuclear weapons would be the only remaining military

option in case of a military conflict with Iran if it could not match Iran at

lower levels of force. One of the lessons a Saudi scholar highlighted from

the U.S. experience was that of “developing conventional military

capabilities in order to be able to engage in a limited war without having

recourse to using WMD.”64 Saudi Arabia frequently has showcased its
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117

conventional defensive capabilities – and especially its air and air/missile

defense systems – verbally and in field exercises, with the then-Deputy

Minister of Defense Prince Khalid bin Sultan noting after one such highvisibility air defense exercise, that the exercise had been “a message to

states which use surface-to-surface missiles to send messages [i.e. Iran]

that the Kingdom has the deterrence capability against such missiles.”

And, he reassured his audience that “we will be fully prepared for years to

come, not just for now.”65

Beefing Up the Strategic Rocket Force and the Space Sector

Saudi Arabia’s Ballistic Missiles

Although Saudi Arabia’s Strategic Rocket Force and the space sector

will be the subject of a subsequent study, what is important here is their

relationship to the broader nuclear issue. Most Saudis seem to recognize

that in order for nuclear deterrence to be effective there is also a need to

have a demonstrable or assumed capability to deliver the weapons and a

perceived willingness to actually use nuclear weapons. For example, one

commentator noted perceptively that “The possession of nuclear weapons

is meaningless from a strategic point of view as long as there is not a

parallel development in the system for delivering these nuclear weapons to

the selected targets.”66 In all probability, the most realistic method of

delivery of any nuclear weapons by Saudi Arabia would be by SSMs.

Aircraft are slow, have a limited range, are too vulnerable to

countermeasures and error, and pilots are too valuable, while SSMs are a

more reliable vehicle for such a mission.

Saudis view nuclear weapons, SSMs, and space-based capabilities as

interrelated elements of a cohesive deterrence package, as was the case

with one senior Saudi military officer who spoke of “strategic power in its

three dimensions: missiles, space, and nuclear.”67 Indeed, Saudi media

reports routinely link Iran’s missile developments to the latter’s projected

nuclear weapons acquisition.

The actual acquisition of new SSMs would be a strong indicator of

Saudi intent to acquire nuclear weapons. Although Saudi Arabia’s ageing

CSS-2s apparently have not been upgraded, for now at least, the

supporting infrastructure has been expanded and improved in recent years,
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

118

including the opening of a new headquarters in Riyadh in 2010 and of a

new training center and school in 2011, both of which received wide

media publicity. The Strategic Rocket Force’s personnel now number “in

the thousands,” according to the commander of one of the Strategic

Rocket Force bases.68 Foreign media reports also suggest that Saudi

Arabia is looking abroad for new SSMs.69 And, there is strong support in

the domestic media for such a step, with one commentator insisting that

new SSMs are “a right for the Kingdom for self-defense, whether the

American administration...approves or disapproves.”70

A likely follow-on system would be the CSS-5 from China, which

would take advantage of the long-standing bilateral relationship with

China in the field of SSMs and of China’s reputation for discretion in arms

sales. Indeed, the same commentator believed that Saudi Arabia has

actually already acquired the follow-on CSS-5 although, if true, that may

refer possibly only to an understanding with China to deliver such missiles

in the future on short notice.71

The Nascent Space Sector

Similarly, the Saudi military and civilian media have expressed

considerable support for the emerging space sector, citing the benefits in

terms of early warning, command and control, communications, and

reconnaissance and, in particular, for successful targeting.72 Some Saudis

view space capabilities as key for deterrence, even if for now in

conjunction only with SSMs.73 Saudis have become especially concerned

about the capabilities and implications of Israel’s space-based systems,

which provide the latter with the ability to obtain early warning and to

avoid a surprise first-strike, quite apart from the ability to spy on the

Arabs.74 One military study even urged “the Arabs” to manufacture their

own satellites, citing as a side benefit the spin-off of other science-based

industries, including that for the production of heavy water (which can be

a key component in reactors used to produce isotopes for dual nuclear

purposes).75

Cooperation in the space sector has expanded significantly recently

with Russia and other former Soviet states, and has included the launching

of numerous space satellites and collaboration in research. There are plans
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119

for a new Saudi space center and there is talk of establishing a Saudi space

agency to promote further progress.

Integrating a Nuclear Capability into the Saudi Force Structure

There is no hard information about how Saudi Arabia would integrate

a nuclear capability into its force structure if and when it does acquire

such a capability and, at this stage, all one can do is speculate.

Unquestionably, command and control would remain strictly in Saudi

hands and, moreover, within the ruling family, whatever formal

organizational relationships and ranks are involved. Here too, Saudi

Arabia’s history with its CSS-2 SSMs may be instructive about such

questions. During the Gulf War, according to Prince Khalid bin Sultan, it

was King Fahd (as the King is also commander-in-chief of the Armed

Forces) who had command and control of the SSMs, holding the ultimate

say about launching and canceling launches.76 To be sure, technical

support and very probably the actual operational handling of the SSMs

was in the hands of Chinese advisers, a situation that may well have

continued for many years thereafter, as suggested by the fact that as late as

2006 the King awarded one of the country’s highest decorations to the

Chinese head of the Joint Military Committee in recognition for

“strengthening friendship and cooperation.” Since the ceremony was

hosted by Saudi Arabia’s Strategic Rocket Force, the event was clearly in

connection with China’s support of the CSS-2 program.

77

Similarly, command and control over a nuclear device could be in

Saudi hands even if foreign advisers were required to maintain and operate

the actual systems. Nuclear devices may require foreign technical support

for some time to come, as in the case of the SSM program where, as noted,

Chinese personnel were – and may still be – present in Saudi Arabia. In

the event, the Saudis have continued to depend on foreign technical

support for even key conventional sectors of their military for many years

already.

It is also not clear whether nuclear weapons would be integrated with

the SSMs (where it would make operational sense for them to be

collocated), with the Saudi Air Force, or become a separate service, as was

the case with the CSS-2 SSMs, which eventually became the Strategic

Rocket Force.
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120

The Potential Mechanics of Acquisition

Developing a nuclear weapons capability is not an easy process, and

requires a complex technical infrastructure, skilled cadres, and effective

safety and command and control mechanisms, quite apart from the

necessary fissile material. It is implausible that Saudi Arabia would be

able develop nuclear weapons relying on its domestic capabilities for the

foreseeable future, given its lack of physical infrastructure and cadres in

this field. For Saudi Arabia to duplicate Iran’s path to nuclear weapons

would require many years. Saudis admit that “there is no doubt that such

[nuclear] technology requires great effort and internal development in the

fields of science and engineering over a long period of time in the future,”

noting that Iran’s program had begun already some thirty years earlier.78

Rather, acquisition would almost assuredly occur by purchase. As one

Saudi blogger in a forum connected to the Saudi Stock Exchange urged,

the country should not waste its money buying expensive conventional

Western arms but, instead, “for less than that, we can buy a ready-made

turnkey atom bomb.”79 Another blogger, likewise, urged that “thanks to

the wisdom and planning of our enlightened leaders, and the creative use

of oil money, [we] avoid the foolishness of repeating the initial steps and

instead proceed directly to a deterrent weapon which, with our money, we

can afford...we have awesome buying power.”80 In the Saudi case, the

traditional status of latency, in which a state could mobilize the necessary

technical and material prerequisites in preparation for a transition to

developing a nuclear weapon at the appropriate time, is a non-issue, as that

route would be bypassed by a direct transfer of a finished product.

Based on history and existing connections, the most likely source for

a nuclear weapon would be Pakistan, although additional know-how or

technology might also be forthcoming from other countries. There has

been a long-standing bilateral relationship in the field of nuclear power

between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.81 Saudi Arabian oil and financial aid

helped Pakistan overcome international sanctions following its first

nuclear detonation in 1998. When the then-Defense Minister Prince Sultan

visited Pakistan in 1999, he was allowed to tour the country’s nuclear

development facility at Kahuta – the first foreigner to do so, as the

Pakistani hosts stressed – and he was briefed on the program by the

country’s leading nuclear scientist, A. Q. Khan, often called the father of
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Pakistan’s atom bomb, who showed him several nuclear weapons,

including a Pakistani-made Ghauri SSM equipped with a nuclear

warhead.82 Saudi sources were anxious to downplay the visit, claiming

that Prince Sultan had only visited the first part of Pakistan’s nuclear

reactor and not the secret parts as had been reported.83 But, another Saudi

report also noted that Prince Sultan at Kahuta had “praised Dr. Abd AlQadir Khan and his colleagues...for the achievement of establishing this

wonderful scientific structure.”84 Prince Sultan’s son and Deputy Minister

of Defense, Prince Khalid, was reported to have been present at a

Pakistani nuclear test in October 2005.85 In promoting a Saudi atom bomb,

at least one Saudi pundit has called openly for nuclear cooperation with

such countries as Pakistan to bring to fruition what he termed “this great

dream.”86

To be sure, there is no hard evidence of any bilateral deal having been

struck for nuclear weapons, although unverifiable media reports have

surfaced periodically to that effect. For example, in 2003, an unnamed

“ranking Pakistani insider” was the source for the reported existence of a

secret agreement for “nuclear cooperation” intended to provide Saudi

Arabia with nuclear weapons technology.87 Again, an unnamed “senior

U.S. official” claimed that Saudi Arabia had helped finance Pakistan’s

nuclear program, and suggested that Pakistan could well make nuclear

weapons from its arsenal available to Saudi Arabia.88 More recently, based

on unattributed “intelligence reports,” the British press also reported an

alleged deal in which “the Saudi monarchy paid for up to 60% of the

Pakistani nuclear [program], and in return has the option to buy a small

nuclear arsenal (‘five to six warheads’) off the shelf if things got tough in

the [neighborhood].”89 Some Saudis have shown a particular sensitivity to

what they believe are U.S. plans to disarm Pakistan. A recurring theme for

Saudi pundits has been that Washington was promoting chaos in Pakistan

in order to achieve its ultimate objective...that of partitioning the country

and removing its nuclear arsenal, since both the United States and Israel

feared a transfer of nuclear technology to the Arabs.90

Warheads, or their components, could be transported fairly easily to

Saudi Arabia. All that would really be required in order to provide the

desired effect is a tangible presence of what can be portrayed with at least

some credibility to be a nuclear device. It is not necessary that any nuclear

weapon be in a state to be deployed or launched immediately or that it be
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122

on ready-alert. To some extent, perceptions can be as effective as reality,

as shown by the acquisition and presence even of some conventional stateof-the art equipment of which the Saudi military very likely cannot make

optimal use. As Prince Bandar bin Sultan, (long-time Saudi ambassador to

Washington and son of the late Defense Minister, and now Director

General of the Saudi Intelligence Agency), viewed the deterrent value of

his country’s SSMs, “the psychology behind [the missile] was more

important than its capability.”91

From the Saudi perspective, a physical presence would probably be

sufficient, at least initially, as an immediate psychological and political

factor to reassure the country and its regional friends that Riyadh had a

counterweight and deterrent to any political influence and military

advantage that Iran would have gained from acquiring a nuclear arsenal of

its own. An integrated system with a launch capability, command and

control, and other technical aspects to make the program genuinely

credible – even if to achieve only a rudimentary and an unlikely war

fighting option – could come considerably later.

Notes

1. Badr Al-Balawi, “Al-Qunbula al-nawawiya al-saudiya” [The Saudi Atom Bomb],

Al-Sharq (Dammam), On-line, Internet, 14 December 2011, available from

www.alsharq.net.sa/2011/12/14/46046.

2. Jasir Abd Al-Aziz Al-Jasir, “Naam li-silah nawawi khaliji” [Yes to a Gulf

Nuclear Weapon], Al-Jazira, On-line, Internet, 7 December 2011, available from

www.al-jazirah.com.sa/20111207/du8.htm.

3. Id bin Masud Al-Juhani, “Hal yufiq al-arab ala hadir al-quwwa al-isra’iliya?”

[Will the Arabs Awake from the Noise of Israeli Power?], Al-Hayat (London), On-line,

Internet, 12 April 2008, available from http://international.daralhayat.com/print/200023/

archive.

4. Major General Husam Suwaylim (Ret), “Ahdaf Iran al-siyasiya wa’l-istratijiya

wa-asalib tahqiqha,” [Iran’s Political and Strategic Objectives and the Methods to

Achieve Them], Al-Haras Al-Watani, part 1, August 2011, 37.

5. For example, Salih Al-Namla, “Pakistan wa-tajrubat al-rad al-nawawi” [Pakistan

and the Experience of Nuclear Deterrence], Al-Riyadh, 12 June 2002, 32.
Thinking about Nuclear Strategy

123

6. Rida Muhammad Lari, “Urid an aqul: Isra’il tastakhdim al-silah al-nawawi” [I

Want to Say: Israel Is Using Nuclear Weapons], Al-Riyadh, On-line, Internet, 2

November 2006, available from www.alriyadh.com/2006/11/02/article198567.html.

7. Talal Salih Bannan, “Adw jadid fi al-nadi al-nawawi...ya ilahi!” [A New Member

in the Nuclear Club, Oh My God!], Ukaz, On-line, Internet, 15 October 2006, available

from www.okaz.com.sa/okaz/osf/20061015/PrintCon2006101555252.htm.

8. Abd Al-Jalil Al-Marhun, “Man yarfud taqlis al-asliha al-hujumiya?” [Who Is

Refusing to Reduce Offensive Weapons?], Al-Riyadh, On-line, Internet, 15 January 2010,

available fromwww.al-riyadh.com/2010/01/15/article489828.html.

9. Fahd Amir Al-Ahmadi, “Al-Radi al-bakistani” [The Pakistani Deterrent], AlRiyadh, On-line, Internet, 12 January 2002, available from www.alriyadh.com/2002/01/

12/article29757.html.

10. Ibid.

11. For earlier skeptical views, see Muhammad Shuman and Uthman Anwar,

“Dirasa jadida an al-sibaq al-nawawi bayn Al-Hind wa-Bakistan al-tadaiyat wa-mawqi

Al-Sharq Al-Awsat” [A New Study on the Nuclear Race between India and Pakistan and

the Consequences for and the Situation of the Middle East], Al-Jazira, On-line, Internet,

3 June 1999, available from www.al-jazirah.com.sa/1999jaz/jun3/wt1.htm. Also, Abd AlJalil Zayd Al-Marhun, “Al-Alam al-thalith wa-mudilat al-intishar al-nawawi” [The Third

World and the Problem of Nuclear Proliferation], Al-Riyadh, On-line, Internet, 15 June

2001, available from www.alriyadh.com/2001/06/15/ article32562.html. For a

representative later view, see Said Al-Farha Al-Ghamidi, “Khuturat al-silah al-nawawi”

[The Danger of Nuclear Weapons], Al-Madina, On-line, Internet, 6 July 2009, available

from http://archive.al-madina.com/node/156695.

12. Prince Khalid bin Sultan bin Abd Al-Aziz, “Al-Quwwa tatahaddath” [Power

Talks], Al-Ahram, On-line, Internet, 2 November 1998, available from

www.ahram.org.eg/Archive/1998/11/2/OPIN3.HTM.

13. Ibid.

14. Staff Brigadier Zayid bin Muhammad Al-Umari, “Dawafi imtilak al-qudrat alistratijiya al-sarukhiya al-fada’iya wa’l-nawawiya” [The Incentives for Acquiring

Strategic Rocket, Space, and Nuclear Capabilities], Quwwat Al-Difa Al-Jawwi Al-Malaki

Al-Saudi, December 2010, 14.

15. Ma’mun Kayawan, “Kharitat aslihat al-damar al-shamil fi Al-Sharq Al-Awsat”

[Map of WMD in the Middle East], Majallat Kulliyat Al-Malik Khalid Al-Askariya, Online, Internet, 1 October 2009, available from www.kkmaq.gov.sa/detail.asp?

InNewsItemID=334526&InTemplateKey=print.
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

124

16. Staff Brigadier Zayid bin Muhammad Al-Umari, “Dawafi imtilak al-qudrat alistratijiya al-sarukhiya al-fada’iya wa’l-nawawiya” [The Incentives for Acquiring

Strategic Rocket, Space, and Nuclear Capabilities], Quwwat Al-Difa Al-Jawwi Al-Malaki

Al-Saudi, December 2010, 15.

17. Ali bin Fayiz Al-Juhani, “Majlis al-taawun al-khaliji wa-khiyar imtilak silah alrad” [The GCC and the Nuclear Weapon Deterrent Option], Al-Riyadh, On-line, Internet,

11 April 2012, available from www.alriyadh.com/2012/04/11/article726193.html.

18. According to Prince Khalid bin Sultan, “Hiwar sari ma qa’id al-quwwat almushtaraka fi harb Al-Khalij” [A Quick Interview with the Commander of the Combined

Forces During the Gulf War], Al-Ahram, 28 February 1992, 5.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

21. Yusuf Makki, “Al-Arab wa’l-tiknulujiya al-nawawiya” [The Arabs and Nuclear

Technology], Al-Khalij (Abu Dhabi, UAE), On-line, Internet, 15 March 2009, available

from www.alkhaleej.ae/portal/ab1b80b2-b23b-4e70-8021-a8af70d022d4.aspx.

22. Muhammad Al-Hajjar, “Sikulujiyat rad al-irhab bi’l-tahdid al-nawawi; AlIstratijiya al-jadida al-amrikiya fi al-harb al-nafsiya” [The Psychology of Deterring

Terrorism by Nuclear Threats; The New American Strategy in Psychological War], AlHaras Al-Watani, January 2006, 70.

23. Staff Brigadier General Zhafir bin Ali Al-Shihri, Al-Dar al-sarukhi al-amriki

wa-inikasatuh al-alamiya wa’l-iqlimiya [The American Missile Defense Shield and Its

International and Regional Impact], supplement to Al-Difa, January 2008, 70.

24. Abd Al-Aziz Al-Khamis, “Han waqt al-silah al-nawawi al-saudi” [The Time has

come for a Saudi Nuclear Weapon], Ibda (Sanaa), On-line, Internet, 23 February 2012,

available fromhttp://ebdaa.com/?act=artc&id=5577&print=1.

25. This fear had spurred a costly and environmentally-damaging program for selfsufficiency in grains which began to be phased out only in 2008. However, when the late

Prince Nayif became Crown Prince in 2011, he had ordered studies to rethink that

phasing out, “Al-Amir Nayif yuwajjih bi-dirasat iadat ziraat al-qamh fi’l-mamlaka”

[Prince Nayif Orders a Study to Bring Back Wheat Farming in the Kingdom], Sabq

(Saudi Arabia), On-line, Internet, 17 December 2011, available from http://sabq.org/

sabq/user/news.do?id=34980§ion=5&print=true.

26. Turki Al-Suhayl, “Mufti Al-Saudiya yuhadhdhir min mukhattat li-taqsim almintaqa ila ‘duwal mutakhallifa’ “[Saudi Arabia’s Mufti Warns of a Plan to Partition the

Region into “Backward States”], Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, On-line, Internet, 5 February 2011,
Thinking about Nuclear Strategy

125

available from www.aawsat.com/print.asp?did=606976&issueno=11757, and Sami Zayn

Al-Abidin Hammad, “Kayf tuhkam Amrika?” [How Is America Governed?], part 60, AlBilad, On-line, Internet, 17 December 2010, available from www.albiladdaily.com/

print.php?action=print&m=articlesm&id=8410.

27. “Al-Amir Talal Al Saud: Hunak mukhattat Qatari sahyuni li-darb Suriya”

[Prince Talal Al Saud: There Is a Qatari-Zionist Plan to Strike Syria], Watan (Amman),

On-line, Internet, 1 December 2011, available from http://watnnews.net/Print.aspx?

PageID=3&NewsID=38070.

28. “Masadir amirikiya tatahaddath an mashru li-taqsim Al-Saudiya ila thalath

duwaylat” [American Sources Talk of a Plan to Partition Saudi Arabia into Three MiniStates], Buratha News Agency (Iraq), On-line, Internet, 15 May 2011, available from

www.burathanews.com/index_lite.php?show=news&action=print&id=125057, and Yusuf

Al-Kuwaylit, “Kam yamlik Nasr Allah min qunbula nawawiya?” [How Many Atom

Bombs Does Nasr Allah Have?], Al-Riyadh, On-line, Internet, 4 June 2011, available

from www.alriyadh.com/2011/06/04/article638360.html.

29. Such fears can resurface even long after the event, “Ra’is al-majlis al-baladi fi

Makka: Al-Makan muqaddas laysa fa-qat lada al-muslimin” [The Head of the City

Council of Mecca: The Site Is Holy Not Only to Muslims], Al-Watan, On-line, Internet, 4

May 2010, available from www.alwatan.comsa./News/newsPrinting/newsPrinting.asp?

issueno-2511&id=18002.

30. “‘Bomb Mecca’ Minhaj yatimm tadrisuh li’l-zhubbat al-amrikiyin hawl mahw

Makka wa’l-Madina bi’l-qanabil al-nawawiya!” [“Bomb Mecca:” The Program Being

Taught to American Officers on Obliterating Mecca and Medina with Atom Bombs], AlMarsad, On-line, Internet, 12 May 2012, available from www.al-marsd.com.

31. For example, “Duwal Al-Khalij wa’l-difa an al-nafs” [The Gulf States and Selfdefense], Al-Madina, 26 May 2011, www.al-madina.com/print/305799. Also, Sultan Abd

al-Aziz Al-Anqari, “Abd Allah bin Abd Al-Aziz wa-tanqiyat al-ajwa’ al-arabiya” [Abd

Allah bin Abd Al-Aziz and Clearing the Arab Air], Al-Madina, On-line, Internet, 6

August 2010, available from www.al-madina.com/print/259378.

32. Muhammad Al-Hajjar, “Sikulujiyat rad al-irhab bi’l-tahdid al-nawawi; AlIstratijiya al-jadida al-amrikiya fi al-harb al-nafsiya” [The Psychology of Deterring

Terrorism by Nuclear Threats; The New American Strategy in Psychological War], AlHaras Al-Watani, January 2006, 70.

33. For example, Sami Said Habib, “Hal sayajlib Al-Qadhdhafi ala Libiya qasfan

nawawiyan?” [Will Qaddafi Bring on A Nuclear Strike against Libya?], Al-Madina, Online, Internet, 26 May 2011, available from www.al-madina.com/node/296506, and Sami

Said Habib, “Hal nahnu bi-sadad harb alamiya?” [Are We Facing a World War?], Al-
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

126

Madina, On-line, Internet, 9 September 2013, available from www.al-madina.com/

node/47706.

34. Muhammad Al-Hajjar, “Sikulujiyat rad al-irhab bi’l-tahdid al-nawawi; AlIstratijiya al-jadida al-amrikiya fi al-harb al-nafsiya” [The Psychology of Deterring

Terrorism by Nuclear Threats; The New American Strategy in Psychological War], AlHaras Al-Watani, January 2006, 70.

35. Talal Salih Bannan, “Adw jadid fi al-nadi al-nawawi...ya ilahi!” [A New

Member in the Nuclear Club, Oh My God!], Ukaz, On-line, Internet, 15 October 2006,

availablefromwww.okaz.com.sa/okaz/osf/20061015/PrintCon2006101555252.htm.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibrahim Al-Amir, “Qunbula nawawiya wa-law sirran” [A Nuclear Bomb Even

If Covertly], Al-Watan, On-line, Internet, 10 September 2011, available from

www.alwatan.com.sa/Articles/Detail.aspx?ArticleID=7323.

38. Ibid.

39. Muhammad Al-Mansur Al-Hazimi, “La yafull al-hadid illa al-hadid” [Only Iron

Blunts Iron], Jazan News, On-line, Internet, 15 November 2012, available from

www.jazannews.org/articles.php?action=print&m=&id=2177.

40. Talal Salih Bannan, “Adw jadid fi al-nadi al-nawawi...ya ilahi!” [A New

Member in the Nuclear Club, Oh My God!], Ukaz, On-line, Internet, 15 October 2006,

availablefromwww.okaz.com.sa/okaz/osf/20061015/PrintCon2006101555252.htm.

41. “Kuriya Al-Shimaliya tatarif bi-imtilakha asliha nawawiya” [North Korea

Admits to Having Nuclear Weapons], Majallat Kulliyat Al-Malik Khalid Al-Askariya,

On-line, Internet, 1 March 2003, available from www.kkmaq.gov.sa/detail.asp?

InNewsItemID=105721&InTemplateKey=print.

42. Abd Al-Wahid Al-Hamid, “Haqa’iq murra fi alam bash” [Bitter Truths in an Ugly

World], Al-Riyadh, On-line, Internet, 9 April 2003, available from www.alriyadh.com/

2003/04/09/article22250.html.

43. Ibid.

44. Talal Salih Bannan, “Akhiran intahat al-harb al-kuriya” [The Korean War Has

Finally Ended], Ukaz, On-line, Internet, 6 October 2007, available from

www.okaz.com.sa/okaz/osf/20071006/PrintCon20071006144318.htm.

45. Haytham Al-Kaylani, “Al-Azma al-kuriya” [The Korean Crisis], Majallat

Kulliyat Al-Malik Khalid Al-Askariya, December 2002, 78.
Thinking about Nuclear Strategy

127

46. Yusuf Makki, “Al-Rad al-nawawi fi muwajahat siyasat al-haymana” [The

Nuclear Deterrent against the Policy of Hegemony], Al-Tajdid Al-Arabi (Saudi Arabia),

On-line, Internet, 18 October 2006, available from www.arabrenewal.org/articles136/1/

CaNIU.

47. “Madha law daghat ahmaq ala zurar?” [What If a Fool Pressed the Button?], AlSharq Al-Awsat, On-line, Internet, 3 June 2009, available from www.aawsat.com/

print.asp?did=521831&issueno=11145.

48. Interview with Ho Jong, “Jung li’l-Anba’: ‘Ujbirna ala imtilak al-silah alnawawi li-wujud silah amiriki mumathil fi Kuriya Al-Janubiya wallad adam thiqa

mutlaqa’” [Jong to Al-Anba’: “We Were Obliged to Acquire Nuclear Weapons Due to the

Presence of Similar American Weapons in South Korea Which Engendered a Lack of

General Trust”], Al-Anba’ (Kuwait), On-line, Internet, 20 February 2011, available from

www.alanba.com.ku/AbsoluteNMNEW/templates/print-articleid=173538&zoneid=14.

49. “Al-Niza al-kuri wa-tahmish qadaya al-arab” [The Korean Dispute and the

Marginalization of Arab Issues], Al-Watan, On-line, Internet, 2 April 2013, available

from www.alwatan.com.sa/Editors_Note/Editor_Note_Detail.aspx?ID=1082.

50. Muhammad Maruf Al-Shibani, “Durus min Kuriya” [Lessons from Korea], AlBilad, On-line, Internet, 6 April 2013, available from www.albiladdaily.com/print.php?

action=print&m=articlesm&id=15026.

51. Hawamir Al-Bursa Al-Saudiya, On-line, Internet, 4 April 2013, available from

www.hawamer.com/vb/showthread.php?t=1217053.

52. For example, Turki al-Dakhil, “Al-Mulhaq al-kajwal” [The Casually-dressed

Attaché], Al-Riyadh, On-line, Internet, 17 April 2013, available from www.alriyadh.com/

2013/04/17/article827039.html, and Fahd Amir Al-Ahmadi, “Khamsat durus min Kuriya

Al-Shimaliya” [Five Lessons from North Korea], Al-Riyadh, On-line, Internet, 17 April

2013, available fromwww.alriyadh.com/2013/04/17/article826999.html.

53. Yusuf Al-Kuwaylit, “Man sayamhu Amrika – Kuriya Al-Shimaliya am Iran?”

[Who Will Obliterate America – North Korea or Iran?], Al-Riyadh, On-line, Internet, 1

April 2013, available from www.alriyadh.com/2013/04/01/article822202.html. See also,

Salih Bakr Al-Tayyar, “Hal tashal Kuriya Al-Shimaliya fatil harb nawawiya?” [Will

North Korea Light the Fuse for a Nuclear War?], Al-Bilad, On-line, Internet, 21 March

2013, available from www.albiladdaily.com/print.php?action=print&articlem&id=14889.

Also, Sami Said Habib, “Amrika wa-Kuriya Al-Shimaliya wa’l-lib bi’l-nar al-nawawiya”

[America, North Korea, and Playing with Nuclear Fire], Al-Madina, On-line, Internet, 6

April 2013, available from www.al-madina.com.
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

128

54. Wafiq Al-Samarra’i, “Hal istaslamat Amirika amam al-nawawi al-irani?” [Has

the United States Caved In to the Iranian Nuke?], Al-SharqAal-Awsat, On-line, Internet,

29 March 2012, available from www.aawsat.com/print.asp?did=722648&issueno=12540.

55. Abd Al-Rahman Al-Rashid, “Isra’il tashinn harb Al-Khalij al-muqbila!” [Israel

Will Spark the Next Gulf War!], Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, On-line, Internet, 18 April 2013,

available from www.aawsat.com.

56. Salim bin Ahmad Sahab, “Azmat Kuriya Al-Shimaliya: zawbaa am thawra?”

[The North Korean Crisis: Storm or Revolution?], Al-Madina, On-line, Internet, 8 April

2013, available from www.al-madina.com/printhtml/445094. Also, Ayman Al-Hammad,

“La-nuqaddim al-jazara li-Biyungh Yangh” [Let Us Offer a Carrot to Pyongyang], AlRiyadh, On-line, Internet, 12 April 2013, available from www.alriyadh.com/2013/04/

12/article825396.html. See also, Fahd Amir Al-Ahmadi, “Khamsat durus min Kuriya AlShimaliya” [Five Lessons from North Korea], Al-Riyadh, On-line, Internet, 17 April

2013, available from www.alriyadh.com/2013/04/17/article826999.html. Also, Rakan AlMajali, “Al-Bashariya al-mankuba bi-shurur al-qatl wa’l-ibada wa’l-damar” [Humanity

Afflicted by the Evils of Death, Extermination, and Destruction], Al-Riyadh, On-line,

Internet, 19 April 2013, available from www.alriyadh.com/2013/04/19/article827250.

html.

57. Alyan Alyan, “Maghza wa-abad al-tasid al-nawawi al-kuri al-shimali” [The

Meaning and Dimensions of the North Korean Nuclear Escalation], Al-Bilad, On-line,

Internet, 21 April 2013, available from www.albiladdaily.com/print.php?action=print&

m=articlesm&id=15146.

58. Staff Brigadier Zayid bin Muhammad Al-Umari, “Dawafi imtilak al-qudrat alistratijiya al-sarukhiya al-fada’iya wa’l-nawawiya” [The Incentives for Acquiring

Strategic Rocket, Space, and Nuclear Capabilities], Quwwat Al-Difa Al-Jawwi Al-Malaki

Al-Saudi, December 2010, 15.

59. Bassam Al-Asali, “Al-Tahaddiyat al-iraniya wa’l-amn al-arabi” [The Iranian

Challenges and Arab Security], Majallat Kulliyat Al-Malik Khalid Al-Askariya, On-line,

Internet, 21 June 2011, available from www.kkmaq.gov.sa/detail.asp?InNewsItemID=

393305&InTemplateKey=print.

60. Ibid.

61. HRH General Khaled Bin Sultan, Desert Warrior (London: Harper Collins,

1995), 150.

62. Ibid.
Thinking about Nuclear Strategy

129

63. Abd Al-Rahman Al-Rashid, “Isra’il tashinn harb Al-Khalij al-muqbila!” [Israel

Will Spark the Next Gulf War!], Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, On-line, Internet, 18 April 2013,

available from www.aawsat.com.

64. Abd Al-Jalil Zayd Al-Marhun, “Amn Al-Khalij...hal min mutaghayyir amiriki

jadid?” [Gulf Security...Is There an American Shift?], Al-Riyadh, On-line, Internet, 20

March 2009, available from www.alriyadh.com/2009/03/20/article417096.html.

65. Interview with Prince Khalid by Awad Mani Al-Qahtani, “Aqb riayatih faaliyat

tamrin itlaq al-sawarikh al-itiradiya al-balistiya al-amir Khalid bin Sultan: Al-Tamrin lays

risala muwajjaha li-ahad wa-lan nasmah li-ayy dawla bi’l-tadakhkhul fi amnina”

[Following His Observation of the Conduct of the Exercise Involving the Launch of AntiBallistic Missile Missiles, Prince Khalid bin Sultan: The Exercise Is Not a Message

Directed at Anyone, But We Will Not Permit Any Country to Interfere with Our

Security], Al-Jazira, On-line, Internet, 11 April 2009, available from www.aljazirah.com.sa/2009jaz/nov/4/fe15.htm.

66. Talal Salih Bannan, “Al-Arab bayn kammashat al-rub al-nawawi!” [The Arabs

between the Pincers of Nuclear Terror!], Ukaz, On-line, Internet, 2 April 2006, available

from www.okaz.com.sa/okaz/osf/20060402/PrinCon200604026920.htm.

67. Staff Brigadier General Zayd bin Muhammad Al-Amri, “Dawafi al-qudrat alistratijiya al-sarukhiya al-fada’iya wa’l-nawawiya” [The Incentives for Acquiring

Strategic Rocket, Space, and Nuclear Capabilities], Quwwat Al-Difa Al-Jawwi Al-Malaki

Al-Saudi, December 2010, 15.

68. Staff Major General Jar Allah Al-Alwit, quoted in Turki Al-Suhayl, “AlSaudiya: Al-Amir Khalid bin Sultan yaftatih mansha’at al-sawarikh al-istratijiya” [Saudi

Arabia: Prince Khalid bin Sultan Opens Strategic Rocket Facilities], Al-Sharq Al-Awsat,

On-line, Internet, 3 March 2010, available from www.aawsat.com/print.asp?did=

559516&issueno=11418.

69. Hugh Tomlinson, “Saudi Arabia Threatens to Go Nuclear ‘Within Weeks’ If

Iran Gets the Bomb,” The Times, 10 February 2012, 23.

70. Sami Said Habib, “Qira’a fi tasrihat Al-Faysal” [A Reading of [Turki] AlFaysal’s Statements], Al-Madina, On-line, Internet, 10 December 2011, available from

www.al-madina.com/print/343867.

71. Ibid.

72. Staff Brigadier General Zayd bin Muhammad Al-Amri, “Dawafi al-qudrat alistratijiya al-sarukhiya al-fada’iya wa’l-nawawiya” [The Incentives for Acquiring

Strategic Rocket, Space, and Nuclear Capabilities], Quwwat Al-Difa Al-Jawwi Al-Malaki

Al-Saudi, December 2010, 13.
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

130

73. Fawaz Hamad Al-Fawaz, “Alamat fi al-amn al-watani” [The Characteristics of

National Security], Al-Iqtisadiya, On-line, Internet, 21 November 2006, available from

www.aleqt.com/2006/11/21/article_7059.print.

74. Hamid Hawran, “Al-Tajassus al-fada’i: uyun Isra’il tulahiq al-arab” [Space

Espionage: Israel’s Eyes Pursue the Arabs], Majallat Kulliyat Al-Malik Khalid AlAskariya, On-line, Internet, 1 June 2010, available from www.kkmaq.gov.sa/detail.asp?

InNewsItemID=360638&InTemplateKey=print.

75. Ibid.

76. According to Prince Khalid bin Sultan, “Hiwar sari ma qa’id al-quwwat almushtaraka fi harb Al-Khalij” [A Quick Interview with the Commander of the Combined

Forces During the Gulf War], Al-Ahram, 28 February 1992, 5.

77. “Khalid bin Sultan yuqallid al-fariq al-awwal Li An Dong wisam al-malik Abd

Al-Aziz min al-daraja al-mumtaza” [Khalid bin Sultan Awards Lieutenant General Li An

Dong the King Abd Al-Aziz Medal, Exceptional Class], Al-Madina, On-line, Internet, 6

October 2006, available from www.al-madina.com/print/267573.

78. Salih Abd Al-Rahman Al-Mani, “Al-Tiqniya al-nawawiya fi Al-Khalij”

[Nuclear Technology in the Gulf], Ukaz, On-line, Internet, 16 December 2006, available

from www.okaz.com.sa/okaz/osf/20061216/PrinCon2006121671686.htm.

79. Hawamir Al-Bursa Al-Saudiya, On-line, Internet, 2 November 2010, available

from www.hawamer.com/vb/showthread.php?t=705888&page=3.

80. “Li-madha la namlik al-silah al-nawawi?” [Why Don’t We Get Nuclear

Weapons?], Jazan News (Jazan, Saudi Arabia), On-line, Internet, 23 May 2006, available

from www.jazan4u.com/vb/showthread.php?t=42590.

81. An excellent overview and analysis of the Saudi-Pakistan nuclear relationship

can be found in Kimberly Van Dyke and Steve A. Yetiv, “Pakistan and Saudi Arabia:

The Nuclear Nexus,” Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, xxxiv, 4,

Summer 2011, 68-84.

82. A.Q. Khan, “My Services Are Well-Known,” The News International (Karachi),

On-line, Internet, 8 October 2012, available from www.thenews.com.pk/PrintEdition.

aspx?ID=136329&Cat=9&dt=12/7/2012, and “Al-Amir Sultan bin Abd Al-Aziz

yakhtatim jawlathu bi-ziyara najiha wa-muthmira li-Pakistan” [Prince Sultan bin Abd AlAziz Completes His Trip with a Successful and Productive Visit to Pakistan], Ayn AlYaqin (Riyadh), On-line, Internet, 14 May 1999, available from www.ainalyaqeen.com/

issues/19910514/feat3ar.htm. The English-language version of Ayn Al-Yaqin omitted the

visit to Kahuta, perhaps indicating a desire to avoid highlighting the issue abroad.
Thinking about Nuclear Strategy

131

83. “Al-Amir Sultan yanfi sai Al-Saudiya li-imtilak silah nawawi” [Prince Sultan

Denies That Saudi Arabia Is Attempting to Acquire Nuclear Weapons], Al-Sharq AlAwsat, 5 August 1999, 1.

84. Nasir Al-Sarami, “Sumuww al-na’ib al-thani yakhtatim ziyarathu ila Pakistan

al-yawm” [His Highness the Crown Prince Concludes His Visit to Pakistan Today], AlRiyadh, On-line, Internet, 9 May 1999, available from www.alriyadh.com/Contents/

1999/09-05-1999/new.html.

85. Georges Malbrunot, “Les ambitions saoudiennes s’appuient sur le savoir-faire

pakistanais” [Saudi Ambitions Rely on Pakistani Know-how], Le Figaro (Paris), On-line,

Internet, 31 October 2010, available from www.lefigaro.fr/economie/2007/10/31/04001-

20071031ARTFIG90143_les-ambitions_saoudiennes_s_appuient_sur_le_savoir_faire_

pakistanais.php.

86. Ibrahim Al-Amir, “Qunbula nawawiya wa-law sirran” [A Nuclear Bomb Even

If Covertly], Al-Watan, On-line, Internet, 10 September 2011, available from

www.alwatan.com.sa/Articles/Detail.aspx?ArticleID=7323.

87. “Pakistan, Saudi Arabia in Secret Nuke Pact,” Washington Times, On-line,

Internet, 21 October 2003, available from www.washingtontimes.com/news/2003/oct/21/

20031021-112804-8451r/print.

88. Roula Khalaf, Farhan Bokhari, and Stephen Fidler, “Saudi Money Joins Forces

with Nuclear Pakistan,” Financial Times (London), On-line, Internet, 5 August 2004,

available from www.ft.com.

89. Julian Borger, “Pakistan’s Bomb and Saudi Arabia,” The Guardian, On-line,

Internet, 11 May 2011, available from www.guardian.co.uk, also see Tomlinson, “Saudi

Arabia Threatens,” 23.

90. Sami Said Habib, “Li-madha yastahdif hilf al-atlasi Bakistan?” [Why Is NATO

Targeting Pakistan?], Al-Madina, On-line, Internet, 3 December 2011, available from

www.al-madina.com/print/342312. Also, Hamad bin Abd Allah Al-Luhaydan, “Abad altasalluh al-nawawi wa-tadaiyatih” [Dimensions of Nuclear Arming and of Its

Consequences], Al-Riyadh, On-line, Internet, 29 May 2009, available from

www.alriyadh.com/2009/05/29/article433463.html. See also, Huda Al-Husayni, “Gharat

al-atlasi tushajji Bakistan ala fakk al-irtibat ma Amirika!” [The NATO Raid Encourages

Pakistan to Loosen Its Ties with America!], Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, On-line, Internet, 1

December 2011, available from www.aawsat.com/print.asp?did=652376&issueno=

12056.
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

132

91. Prince Bandar quoted in William Simpson, The Prince: The Secret Story of the

World’s Most Intriguing Royal, Prince Bandar Bin Sultan (New York: Regan, 2006),

164.
CHAPTER 9

Where Does the Civilian Nuclear Power

Sector Fit In?

Nuclear Energy Plans

In parallel with the increased attention that Saudi Arabia has paid to

nuclear weapons, there has also been progress in the civilian nuclear sector

which, to some extent at least, may be seen as a related facet of the nuclear

military option. Saudi discussions about civilian nuclear power provide

some insights into the Saudi understanding of nuclear power in general,

and official support for nuclear power can be viewed as a government

commitment to the nuclear idea overall. The primary mover for a civilian

capability, to be sure, has been a recognized need for future energy

supplies. In effect, increasingly frequently the Saudi media has been filled

with legitimate concern and even dire predictions about the growing

proportion of domestic oil production consumed for local power generation,

the rising demand for electricity, and the future depletion of oil reserves.

Promoters have focused on the many potential benefits for medicine,

agriculture, transportation, and industry, as well as power generation and

water purification, including the creation of thousands of new jobs.1

Riyadh has proposed ambitious plans entailing 16 nuclear reactors by

2030, to be devoted mainly to the generation of electricity and water

purification, as the central part of a strategy focused on renewable energy.

There is to be an initial 5-year study and planning cycle, to be followed by

a 5-year building phase.2The King Abd Allah Complex for Nuclear and

Renewable Energy, which is to oversee research, planning, and

management of the country’s nuclear activities, was established in April

2010. Riyadh has reached agreements for cooperation on nuclear

development with such countries as Pakistan, the United States, China,

Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Argentina, France, and South Korea.
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

134

True, in the case of a civilian nuclear option – unlike that of the

military option – doubts have been aired in the Saudi media as to its

desirability, although there was no structured public debate, and we are

not privy to the discussions that may have occurred within government

circles. The focus of those who were unconvinced about the wisdom of

pursuing a nuclear option varied, as they have argued over the years about

the high cost of reactors and nuclear fuel, the risk of accidents, or the

preference of other alternative forms of energy, such as solar.3 One critic

of the Saudi nuclear power program, who was a proponent of solar energy

instead, even sought to tap into fears of giving greater leverage to the

West, as he argued that the country would become dependent on the West

for uranium to fuel its planned reactors, and he assessed that “If we begin

to rely on others for energy, that opens the door to blackmail!”4Evidently,

such doubts have not had an impact on policy decisions, as one journalist

supportive of nuclear power pointed out that “avoiding nuclear power is

just not in the cards.”5

Nuclear Energy and National Security

For the vast majority of voices in the Saudi media, nuclear power in

itself is viewed as an element of national pride and as evidence of

modernity and, perhaps not coincidentally, the logo of the Saudi Ministry

of Higher Education is built around the symbol of an atom. As one

commentator noted, praising King Abd Allah for his vision, the civilian

nuclear sector will “raise Saudi society toward the knowledge society in

the century of knowledge-based economies.”6

Reflecting the psychological facet of nuclear power, Saudi observers,

often also explicitly conflate the development of a civilian nuclear sector

with national security and the balance of power in the region, with its

impact somehow perceived and promoted as a quasi-military factor. In

fact, one Saudi proponent of civilian nuclear projects in the Gulf openly

claimed that such countries as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, or the UAE did not

need nuclear capabilities for energy since they were already major oil

producers, but that a civilian nuclear program was part of the local

response to the threat from Iran.7 As a Saudi academic saw it, a peaceful

nuclear capability somehow would endow the GCC countries with the

ability to “withstand the demands of Israel and Iran.”8 And, he added, if
Where Does the Civilian Nuclear Power Sector Fit In?

the GCC countries adopt nuclear power for peaceful purposes, “they will

thereby augment their power, which will be added to their oil, economic,

and strategic power, which will provide them a powerful dynamism that

will enable them to demand from Israel and Iran a WMD-free zone in the

Middle East. This will not happen unless the other parties are convinced

that the GCC and the Arab states have entered the correct path to

mastering nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.”9 Others were more

explicit in blurring the civilian and military benefits of nuclear power,

with one Saudi observer noting that if Saudi Arabia, or Egypt, established

peaceful nuclear programs “that will pave the way for the development of

nuclear weapons.”10

Indeed, in arguing in favor of a civilian nuclear program, a writer in a

Saudi military journal even proposed that such a capability would enable

his country to be a major international player, with Mecca as the center of

the world. Paraphrasing Halford Mackinder’s 19th century geopolitical

argument about the dominance of the Heartland, he identified Saudi

Arabia as the latter and, by extension, as the actor destined to rule the

world, “provided it has the other elements of power.”11 One Saudi

editorial saw nuclear power as a lever for Riyadh to exert its influence

over its neighbors, as he called for merging the nuclear programs in the

GCC as part of the broader unification which Saudi Arabia has promoted,

although apparently there has not been any response in that vein from any of

the other member states.12 Likewise, a Saudi academic reminded readers

that the individual Gulf States have few cadres in the nuclear field and

should therefore pool their resources, implicitly under Saudi patronage.13

In more concrete terms, one Saudi editorial raised the possibility that

Iran could use its existing civilian nuclear reactor at Bushehr as a weapon

of war by releasing nuclear material on purpose in order to pollute the

Gulf to disrupt shipping and contaminate water for desalination plants.14

Similarly, a retired senior military officer encouraged the development of

a civilian nuclear capability, one which, however, he saw as “having the

possibility of being used for military purposes in case of need.”15 One

Saudi commentator, significantly, seemed to be concerned about the

potential diversion of a civilian program to military uses. Claiming that it

is easy to use spent material from civilian facilities for nuclear weapons –

but attributing such intentions only to unspecified neighbors – he worried

that “many countries seek to establish a nuclear reactor to generate
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

136

electricity...but the fear of their neighbors’ arming quickly causes them to

rush toward military escalation.” The same source also worried that civilian

reactors –although only those in other countries are mentioned – would be

able to produce spent plutonium sufficient for many atom bombs.16

All this is not to say that the Saudi civilian nuclear sector will be

misused for military purposes. One must remember that the covert

conversion of fissile materials to military use presents significant technical

difficulties, and especially so if effective international controls are

exercised to prevent the diversion of spent fuel.17 Rather, where there

could well be a crossover between the civilian nuclear sector and a

military program may be if the civilian nuclear sector over the longer term

is used as a support element for maintaining and expanding an acquired

military nuclear capability. That is, a civilian nuclear sector could provide

ancillary infrastructure and trained personnel, as well as serve as a source

for acquiring dual-use technology, components, and expertise which could

also be applied to developing or maintaining nuclear weapons.18 For

example, the creation of a civilian nuclear sector could help form and

sustain a cadre of nuclear experts – both Saudi and foreign – who could

function in either sphere. King Abd Al-Aziz University (which has the

only department of nuclear engineering in the GCC) and the nuclear

physics programs at three other Saudi universities already prepare both

academics and technicians who could participate as dual-program

personnel, as will the planned nuclear research center at King Abd AlAziz University – which is also to include many foreign experts.19 Over

the past few years, virtually every Saudi university has recruited faculty in

nuclear physics, although there is no indication as to how successful that

effort has been. In addition, Saudi students are pursuing nuclear studies

abroad in a number of countries.

Notes

1. Malha Abd Allah in “Al-Siyasa al-saudiya tahkumha al-mabadi’ wa-qiyam alhaqq” [Saudi Policy Is Governed by Principles and Just Standards], Al-Yawm, On-line,

Internet, 18 April 2013, available from www.alyaum.com/News/art/79481.html.
Where Does the Civilian Nuclear Power Sector Fit In?

2. Ali Sharaya, “Al-Saudiya: 16 mufail nawawi tatakallaf 3000 milyar riyal hatta

am 2030” [Saudi Arabia: 16 Nuclear Reactors Costing 300 billion Riyals by 2030], AlSharq Al-Awsat, On-line, Internet, 31 May 2011, available from www.aawsat.com/

print.asp?did=624264&issueno=11872.

3. See, for example, Muhammad bin Ibrahim Al-Jar Allah, “Al-Taqa al-nawawiya

ma laha wa-ma alayha bayn al-ams wa’l-yawm” [Nuclear Energy: Arguments For and

Against Past and Present], Al-Qafila (Dammam), On-line, Internet, 2003, available from

faculty.kfum.edu.sa. Also, Fahd Al-Thunayan, “Iqtisadiyun yantaqidun tawajjuh AlMamlaka ila al-taqa al-nawawiya bi-sabab taklifatha al-aliya” [Economists Criticize the

Kingdom’s Move to Nuclear Power Because of Its Cost], Al-Riyadh, On-line, Internet, 10

March 2012, available from www.alriyadh.com/2012/03/10/article716911.html, and

Uthman Al-Khuwaytir, “Al-Taqa al-shamsiya awwalan” [Solar Energy First], AlIqtisadiya, On-line, Internet, 24 June 2012, available from www.aleqt.com/2012/06/24/

article_669486.print.

4. Sufuq Al-Shammari, “Intabihu hatta la nakun rahina li-intiqamhim!” [Be Careful

So That We Do Not Become Hostages to Their Retaliation!], Al-Riyadh, On-line,

Internet, 18 September 2012, available from www.alriyadh.com/2012/09/18/article

769149.html.

5. Ihsan Ali Al-Hulaygi, “Al-Taqa al-dharriya...saudiya” [Saudi Nuclear Power],

Al-Yawm, On-line, Internet, 14 March 2012, available from www.alyaum.com/News/art/

45509.html.

6. Sami Said Habib, “Al-Taqa al-dharriya ra’ida fi ittijah takamul al-tiqniyat alistratijiya bi’l-Mamlaka” [Atomic Energy Leads the Way in Complementing Strategic

Technologies in the Kingdom], Al-Madina, On-line, Internet, 24 April 2010, available

fromwww.al-madina.com/print/242524.

7. Abd Al-Rahman Al-Turayri, “Al-Khalij arabi am farisi?” [The Gulf: Arab or

Persian?], Al-Iqtisadiya, On-line, Internet, 23 August 2011, available from

www.aleqt.com/2011/08/23/article_572330.print.

8. Id bin Masud Al-Juhani, “Hal yufiq al-arab ala hadir al-quwwa al-isra’iliya?”

[Will the Arabs Awake from the Noise of Israeli Power?], Al-Hayat (London), On-line,

Internet, 12 April 2008, available from http://international.daralhayat.com/print/200023/

archive.

9. Ibid.

10. Muhammad Al-Mansur Al-Hazimi, “La yafull al-hadid illa al-hadid” [Only Iron

Blunts Iron], Jazan News, On-line, Internet, 15 November 2012, available from

www.jazannews.org/articles.php?action=print&m=&id=2177.
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

138

11. Yusuf bin Ibrahim Al-Sallum, “Al-Abad al-istratijiya li-quwwat Al-Mamlaka

Al-Arabiya Al-Saudiya al-mutasaida” [The Strategic Dimensions of the Kingdom of

Saudi Arabia’s Growing Power], Al-Haras Al-Watani, On-line, Internet, 1 June 2006,

available fromhttp://haras.naseej.com.

12. Yusuf Al-Kuwaylit, “Kayf nakhtu bi’l-ittihad al-khaliji al-arabi” [How Do We

Proceed with the Arab Gulf and Union?], Al-Riyadh, On-line, Internet, 24 February 2012,

available fromwww.alriyadh.com/2012/02/24/article712535.html.

13. Salih Abd Al-Rahman Al-Mani, “Al-Tiqniya al-nawawiya fi Al-Khalij”

[Nuclear Technology in the Gulf], Ukaz, On-line, Internet, 16 December 2006, available

from www.okaz.com.sa/okaz/osf/20061216/PrinCon2006121671686.htm.

14. Yusuf Al-Kuwaylit, “Man yahmi bi’at Al-Khalij min Iran?” [Who Will Protect

the Gulf’s Environment from Iran?], Al-Riyadh, On-line, Internet, 16 October 2012,

available fromwww.alriyadh.com/2012/10/16/article776630.html.

15. Staff Major General Salama bin Hadhdhal Bin Saydan (Ret), “Al-Tahdid alirani fi thawbih al-jadid” [The Iranian Threat in Its New Garb], Al-Jazira, On-line,

Internet, 16 August 2008, available from www.al-jazirah.com.sa/2008jaz/aug/16/ar8.htm.

16. Mazin Abd Al-Razzaq Balayla, “Wa-Akhiran madina li’l-taqa al-dharriya”

[Finally, A Complex for Nuclear Energy], Al-Madina, On-line, Internet, www.almadina.com/print/242201.

17. Paul I. Bernstein and Nima Gerami, Proliferation Risks of Civilian Nuclear Power

Programs, Proceedings (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass

Destruction, June 2012), On-line, Internet, available from http://wmdcenter.dodlive.mil/

files/2012/06/CSWMD-Proceedings-3-FINAL.pdf.

18. Matthew Fuhrmann focuses on the potential threat of such overlap in civilian

and military programs through the acquisition of dual-use technology and expertise,

“Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreements,”

International Security, xxxiv, 1, summer 2009, 7–41.

19. Samir Al-Saadi, “KAU Campus to Get Nuclear Research Center, Says Tayeb,”

Arab News, On-line, Internet, 2 November 2008, available from www.arabnews.com/

services/print/print.asp?artid=113728&d=. See also, “Baramij li’l-majistayr wa’ldukturah wa-khutat mustaqbaliya tamuha” [Masters and Doctoral Programs and

Ambitious Plans for the Future], Al-Watan, On-line, Internet, 4 May 2010, available from

www.alwatan.com.sa/news/newsPrinting.asp?issueno=2921&id=76519.
CHAPTER 10

The Religious Sector:

Legitimization and Accountability

The Theological Reasoning

Ruling circles in Saudi Arabia have also sought to ensure support

from the country’s religious establishment, which could provide the

necessary legitimization and moral justification for the acquisition and use

of any future nuclear capability. In conceptual terms, Muslim clerics often

address WMD as a single analytical category, rather than differentiating

among different components, and their legal rulings are applicable to all

such aspects of WMD, but the focus is clearly on nuclear weapons, to

which they devote the greatest attention.

Such religious/ethical considerations are significant to most regimes

in the region, and of capital importance to Saudi Arabia’s ruling family,

given the latter’s foundations on a base of religious legitimacy within the

country and given the family’s claim to leadership for their country in the

Muslim world. As has been true throughout Islamic history, the clerics’

crafting of religious opinions is often intertwined with political

considerations. Any opposition or criticism on moral grounds from this

sector could prove embarrassing, so that this is always be a closelymonitored factor. Although the mainstream Saudi religious establishment

is essentially an administrative arm of the regime, this is not necessarily

true of all the country’s clerics.

Already in 2002, writing in the Saudi military journal Al-Jundi AlMuslim, a relatively liberal cleric, A’id Al-Qarni, drafted a fatwa, or

religious opinion, on the use of WMD in war, which set the official tone.1

The thrust of the fatwa was that there is no doubt that shooting (ramy) is

the greatest element of power and that the greatest means to terrify the

enemy of God by shooting is by possessing all the weapons with which
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

140

one can shoot against [those enemies], or at least the most powerful

weapons. Possessing WMD – nuclear, chemical, and biological – is

considered one of the means to strengthen the position of the Islamic states

vis-a-vis the infidel states and to make them feared, and a means for them

to ensure their survival, their position, and their stability, especially

nowadays when the whole world is challenging the Muslims.2

Navigating through different interpretations of legal principles and

historical analogies over the legality of using weapons that might cause

collateral damage among non-combatants and among fellow-Muslims

being used as human shields, Al-Qarni draws the conclusion that using

such weapons in this manner is permissible if to not do so would

otherwise hinder the mission – the jihad in this case. Of course, less

powerful weapons should be used if it is possible to achieve victory. If

not, or if one suspects that the enemy will do so, then the use of WMD is

permissible.3 Ultimately, Al-Qarni leaves discretionary power to the

leaders, basing his judgment on the legal principle of utility (maslaha), as

he concluded that “it is up to the discretion of a Muslim ruler to do as he

sees fit for the common good.”4

Likewise, a thesis prepared at Prince Nayif University for Security

Studies was published in 2004 addressing the legality of WMD. Using

classic Islamic texts and precepts as applied to the law of war, the author

stresses the permissibility of having the same weapons as the enemy –

particularly any weapons that an infidel has. As the author concludes: “all

these proofs confirm the duty incumbent on Muslims to acquire all the

categories of weapons that the infidels have so that [the Muslims] can deal

with [the infidels] as the latter deal with the Muslims.”5 While

acknowledging that international customary law of war would condemn

nuclear weapons in particular, he concludes that:

However, Islamic law has defined the objective of the

legality of arming, as God said: “Against them make ready

Your strength to the utmost Of your power, including

Steeds of war, to strike terror Into (the hearts of) the

enemies, Of Allah and your enemies.” [Qur’an, viii 60]

Therefore, any weapon that does not terrify the enemy and

does not frighten him is to be considered deficient in terms

of legitimacy, as it does not fulfill the objective for which
The Religious Sector: Legitimization and Accountability

141

arming was designed. A nuclear state fears only another

nuclear state.6

Moreover, arguing against those who maintain that Islamic states

have signed the NPT and must honor it even if Israel has not done so, the

author counters that “the Islamic states are obliged to force all countries to

divest themselves of WMD, and if the latter do not respond to that, then

[the Islamic states] are free to break those agreements.”7

An Egyptian scholar specializing on religious studies, writing in a

Saudi military journal, justified, in particular, the concept of nuclear

deterrence in religious terms. He stated that “deterrence was the first

military strategy [that emerged] in the shadow of Islam.”8Indeed,

deterrence was said to “lead...to the fulfillment of the Islamic mission

better than any other means.”9 And, the author stressed that deterrence

would only be effective if there was an offensive capability.10

The Saudi media has also elicited the views of non-Saudi clerics, such

as those at Al-Azhar, the influential Sunni religious educational and

religious complex in Egypt. In one media survey by a Saudi newspaper,

leading Al-Azhar clerics confirmed that Islam views as a religious duty

that Muslims acquire all forms of power to deter aggression, although they

engaged in some casuistry, differentiating between acquiring nuclear

weapons (which was allowed) and using such weapons, which was

forbidden, although, again the clerics made a distinction between just wars

of defense and unjust wars of aggression.11

Meshing Religion with Realpolitik

However, Saudi clerics can provide not only the necessary moral

backing for the government but they can also stray into the political arena

and pressure policymakers on this issue, potentially reducing the latter’s

room for maneuver. That is, clerics can push the issue even harder than the

government may have intended and question the policymakers’

effectiveness. For example, cleric A’id Al-Qarni, expressing annoyance

that the West arms itself while proscribing others from doing so, belittled

the Arabs’ alleged preoccupation with culture, and argued that the world

respects a country for its power, not for its good taste.12 Referring to

nuclear weapons, he claimed that Iran “has broken the code,” that is that
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

142

“manufacturing a single [atom] bomb is more awe-inspiring than a

hundred epics reminding us of our ancestors’ glory.” Indeed, the world

respects the Great Powers specifically because they have nuclear weapons.

He concluded, therefore, “Oh, Arabs, I beg you to develop the atom bomb

and nuclear weapons” because “the world is run according to the law of

the strongest.”13

Although this article appeared in a major Saudi-owned newspaper

and, therefore, was politically acceptable, the fact that it turned out to be

so popular that it quickly went viral, being reproduced on numerous blogs,

fora, and personal websites in Saudi Arabia and throughout the Arab

world, may have been disconcerting for Saudi policymakers, as it

channeled public opinion and served almost as a challenge to the latter to

do something quickly.

Saudi clerics could even put forth purely Realpolitik arguments,

rather than using religious terms. For example a prominent Saudi cleric,

Safar Al-Hawali, argued in favor of scientific development as a way to

confront the enemies of the Muslim world based on his political analysis,

as he claimed that “were it not for the atom bomb, India would not listen

to Pakistan.”14 Yet another Saudi cleric called for technological transfer to

the Muslim world, condemning western efforts to thwart such attempts, as

with Iraq’s nuclear program, and suggested covert transfers, “so that the

enemy is surprised by the effort once it is completed,” giving as an

example that of Pakistan’s atom bomb.15

Other external religious quarters may also provide support for, and

indirect pressure on, Saudi decision-making, as in the case of the Muslim

Brotherhood, which identified Israel as the biggest nuclear threat and

hoped that Saudi Arabia would balance the latter with its own nuclear

power.

16 Meshing theology and Realpolitik, a prominent Egyptian-born

cleric based in Kuwait likewise argued in apocalyptic terms that Iran’s

“nuclear [weapons] are not being developed [to be used] against the

Jews...but to slaughter the Arabs...wake up you slow ones...any

benighted policymaker who knows nothing about religion will...confuse

things.” He claimed that the Shia Iranians would even use nuclear

weapons to “wipe Mecca and Medina off the face of the earth.”17

More extreme Saudi clerical elements with jihadist ties also back the

pursuit of a nuclear capability, although they refrain from giving any

credit to the Al Saud. While beyond the accepted bounds of the political
The Religious Sector: Legitimization and Accountability

143

arena in Saudi Arabia, jihadists go even further in their support for nuclear

weapons than do spokesmen in the mainstream clerical establishment. For

example, the Saudi cleric Nasir bin Hamad Al-Fahd, who has been linked

to Al-Qaida and is now in prison, published a widely-distributed fatwa

giving great leeway for the use of WMD against infidels, noting that “if it

is not possible to repel the infidels from the Muslims except by using these

weapons [i.e. WMD] then they are permissible even if [these weapons]

kill them all and destroy their agriculture and progeny.”18 Indeed,

according to Al-Fahd, WMD are allowed even in the equivalent of

offensive wars (jihad al-talab).19

Although removing a potential source of criticism by eliciting the

views of the Saudi clerics, Saudi policymakers also risk raising

expectations and limiting their freedom of maneuver. Similarly,

confirmation by foreign clerics that might support the Saudi rulers’

assertions of being the protectors of Islam at the same time may place the

Saudi rulers in a predicament, as such arguments by the clerics could serve

as a touchstone for potential critics if nothing is perceived to have been

accomplished to protect Islam and its holiest shrines.

Notes

1. A’id Al-Qarni, “Al-Hurub al-nawawiya wa’l-kimawiya wa’l-biyulujiya fi almizan al-fiqhi” [Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Wars on the Scale of Religious Law],

Al-Jundi Al-Muslim (Riyadh), On-line, Internet, 3 January 2002, available from

http://jmuslim.naseej.com/Detail.asp?InsectionID=260&InNewsItemID=66247. Also,

On-line, Internet, 9 January 2002, available from http://jmuslim.naseej.com/Detail.asp?

InNewsItemID=85963&q=. Also, On-line, Internet, 11 January 2002, available from

http://jmuslim.naseej.com/Detail.asp?InNewsItemID=92526&q=.

2. Ibid., 3 January 2002.

3. Ibid., 11 January 2002.

4. Ibid., 3 January 2002.

5. Hajj Abd Allah Mahushiza, Mada mashruiyyat aslihat al-damar al-shamil fi

daw’ ahkam al-sharia al-islamiya [The Extent of Legality of WMD in Light of the

Regulations of Islamic Law]. (Riyadh: Nayif Arab University for Security Studies,
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

144

1425/2004), 180.

6. Ibid., 240.

7. Ibid.

8. Fathi Zaghrut, “Istiratijiyat al-rad fi al-askariya al-islamiya” [Deterrence Strategy

in Islamic Military Doctrine], Majallat Kulliyat Al-Malik Khalid Al-Askariya, On-line,

Internet, 1 October 2009, available from www.kkmaq.gov.sa/detail.asp?InNewsItemID=

334524&InTemplateKey=print.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.

11. Malha Abd Allah in “Al-Siyasa al-saudiya tahkumha al-mabadi’ wa-qiyam alhaqq” [Saudi Policy Is Governed by Principles and Just Standards], Al-Yawm, On-line,

Internet, 18 April 2013, available from www.alyaum.com/News/art/79481.html.

12. A’id Al-Qarni, “Al-Gharb yujahid wa-yuharrim alayna al-jihad” [The West

Goes on a Jihad but Forbids Us from Doing So], Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, On-line, Internet, 8

November 2011, available from www.aawsat.com/print.asp?did=648856&issueno=

12033.

13. Ibid.

14. Interview with Safar Al-Hawali, “Al-Shaykh Safar Al-Hawali yu’akkid: AlQiyada al-ilmiya mutawaffira lakin yanqusha wasa’il al-tawasul wa’l-takamul wa-tatwir

al-dirasat wa-insha’ al-mu’assasat al-mutakhassisa” [Shaykh Safar Al-Hawali Assures:

The Scientific Leadership Already Exists, But What Is Missing Are the Mechanisms to

Continue, Integrate, and Promote Studies, and the Creation of Specialized Institutions],

Al-Asr (Palestine), On-line, Internet, 28 June 2002, available from www.alasr.ws/

index.cfm?method=home.PrintContent&contentid=2576&action=Print&fa=Content.

15. Sulayman bin Salih Al-Kharashi, “Naql al-tiqniya al-mutatawwira ila al-duwal

al-islamiya...awa’iq wa-hulul” [The Transfer of Advanced Technology to the Muslim

World...Obstacles and Solutions], On-line, Internet, 5 Rabi II 1426/13 May 2005,

available from Tariq Al-Islam blog, http://ar.islamway.com/article/1296.

16. Ahmad Al-Tilawi, “Madha yani fath Al-Saudiya malaff al-khiyar al-nawawi alarabi?” [What Does Saudi Arabia’s Broaching the Arab Nuclear Option Mean?], On-line,

Internet, 9 December 2006, available from www.ikhwanonline.com/print.asp?ArtID=

25013&SecID=0.

17. Sermon by Shaykh Muhammad bin Abd Al-Malik Al-Zughbi, “Al-Silah al-
The Religious Sector: Legitimization and Accountability

145

nawawi al-irani li-nasf Makka wa’l-Madina wa’l-arab” [The Iranian Nuclear [Bomb] Is

for the Destruction of Mecca, Medina, and the Arabs], (video on Shaykh al-Zughbi’s

website), On-line, Internet, 12 August 2012, available from, www.alzoghby.com/

v_art.php?aid=94.

18. Nasir bin Hamad Al-Fahd, Hukm istikhdam aslihat al-damar al-shamil didd alkuffar [Ruling on the Use of WMD against Infidels], On-line, Internet, Rabi I 1424/May

2003, available fromhttp://72.29.89.164/showthread.php?t=3711&page=2.

19. Ibid.
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

146
CHAPTER 11

Reshaping Relations within an Evolving Gulf

Nuclear Environment

Transforming the Gulf Cooperation Council?

In one sense, the shadow of nuclear proliferation has already

stimulated potential geo-strategic change in the Gulf. For Saudi Arabia, a

key policy concern related to the emerging Iranian threat and, in

particular, to the nuclear aspect of that threat and to Riyadh’s potential

response in terms of also seeking nuclear weapons, has been the need to

reconsider and refashion its relationship with its smaller neighbors in the

GCC. Apparently seeing the evolving threat situation both as a challenge

and an opportunity, Saudi Arabia has sought to translate its own present

and future military clout into greater political influence in the immediate

region. According to a Saudi a military journal, the essential impetus for

such a development within the GCC was the need to “confront the

inequality in the balance of terror resulting from the existence of a nuclear

power in the Middle East, namely Israel, and of a regional power doing its

utmost to develop nuclear weapons [i.e. Iran].”1

Riyadh’s new vision for the GCC has been centered on unprecedented

integration which, unavoidably, would occur essentially under Saudi

Arabia’s aegis, given the latter’s disproportionate size, wealth, and unique

human and technical capabilities to protect the Gulf in comparison to its

GCC neighbors. Not surprisingly, it has been Saudi Arabia which has

taken the lead in efforts to reshape the future of the GCC, and which has

generated sweeping proposals for a significantly greater degree of

unification which, if implemented, would mark the greatest change in the

structure of that organization since its creation in 1981. As a writer in a

Saudi military journal, addressing recent developments, depicted the

situation, “the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was the main partner in bringing
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

148

about a developed institutional framework which would concretize the

aspirations of the sons of the region into a collective entity with which

they could confront the challenges of preserving security, achieving

development, and structuring and developing mutual cooperation.”2

Saudi Arabia sees itself as the natural leader of that key regional

organization and, characteristically, Saudis sometimes refer to their

country as “the Gulf states’ elder sister.”3Saudis stress their country’s

unique importance for the GCC’s security, with one Saudi press

commentary claiming that their country, “thanks to its regional and

international standing and to the wisdom of its leaders, represents the

strategic depth” of the GCC.4 As one senior Saudi military officer saw it,

Saudi Arabia “plays a pivotal and leading role in guaranteeing the security

and stability of the region.”5 Another senior military officer, a member of

the royal family, echoed this view: “Our country has become...a pivotal

axis for the states of the region...the sad recent events in Bahrain confirm

our country’s leading role and its ability to assume an important role in

guaranteeing the region’s security and stability.”6

Emphasizing the Nuclear Factor

Offering a Saudi Nuclear Umbrella?

The emerging nuclear factor has been a central component of

Riyadh’s envisioned new relationship within the GCC. In real terms, Saudi

Arabia has hinted it could provide at least an informal nuclear umbrella to

the rest of the GCC if the situation reached a nuclear stage.

Voices in Saudi Arabia have long suggested that their country is the

GCC leader and, noting that his country was “the representative of the

Gulf region,” one leading journalist, asked “what if Riyadh acquired a

nuclear weapon to confront Iran as part of that equation of balance?”7

Specifically in support of the idea of a unified GCC, Saudi sources have

argued that the country’s size would even provide strategic depth and

refuge for the GCC population in case there were nuclear leaks from Iran’s

nuclear infrastructure.8

Policymakers and the media in at least some of the smaller GCC

states concede the need for a major role by Saudi Arabia in Gulf security,

with the Qatari-born Secretary General of the GCC, Abd Al-Rahman Al-
Reshaping Relations within an Evolving Gulf Nuclear Environment

149

Atiya, depicting Saudi Arabia as “the basic pillar of the GCC and someone

who is able to protect the latter’s territory, skies, and borders.”9 Many

Kuwaitis – especially in the country’s Sunni community – as was the case

with one local politician, have readily acknowledged that Saudi Arabia is

“Kuwait’s strategic depth.”10

Recently, some of the GCC states have also recognized the need for a

nuclear deterrent should Iran acquire the atom bomb. In practical terms,

such a deterrent could only be achieved by the GCC’s biggest member,

Saudi Arabia. For example, the King of Bahrain hinted at his support for

Saudi Arabia’s nuclear option at a press conference, as he warned that

“although today we miss Egypt’s and Syria’s absence, if Iran develops the

atom bomb there is no doubt that the Arab countries will also acquire it.”11

In the context, it would hardly have been missed by a regional audience

that only one other Arab state could realistically be assumed to be able to

fill that role in confronting Iran – Saudi Arabia. As an editorial in the

Kuwaiti press urging the acquisition of a nuclear deterrent to respond to

Iran also acknowledged, a nuclear establishment requires depth for

physical space and security, “such as the Suman Desert in the Kingdom of

Saudi Arabia.”12

Increasing Saudi Leverage with the International Community

While perhaps a secondary consideration to promoting unification,

mobilizing regional approval for a Saudi nuclear deterrent provides further

legitimacy for the Saudi leadership with its own public to pursue that

option if it decides to do so. Such support from the smaller GCC states is

no doubt also welcome in Riyadh in order to provide to the latter greater

political leverage with the international community with respect to a

nuclear option. Clearly, a GCC consensus could facilitate international

acceptance of Saudi nuclear weapons. As a Saudi journalist recognized, “I

imagine that the hardest phase if the Kingdom or another Gulf state acts to

acquire WMD would be that of getting international agreement.”

However, he continued, “if there was a consensus and solidarity in

diplomacy among the Gulf countries for one of the countries to acquire

them [i.e. WMD], there is no doubt that this would contribute to

strengthening that country’s negotiating position with the international

community.”

13
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

150

Promoting the Idea of Union

The overall threat context has provided the framework for a tangible

plan for union from Saudi Arabia. Prince Turki Al-Faysal broached the

subject of union at least as early as March 2011 in a major speech which

he delivered at a conference in Abu Dhabi focused on Gulf security,

linking unity specifically to the Iranian nuclear threat.14 At the December

2011 GCC Summit, held in Riyadh, King Abd Allah formally called for

movement toward “a single entity.” Although the final communiqué called

for “the need for a confederation” and proposed a standardization of

financial practices, greater coordination in defense matters, and other

secondary agreements, an accompanying joint “Riyadh Declaration” –

citing “changes, challenges, and threats”– set loftier goals, such as a

transition of the GCC “from the stage of cooperation to that of a union.”

The latter declaration spelled out concrete areas for integration to be

studied, including a customs union, a common currency, a joint market,

coordinated diplomacy, and “close ties, cooperation, and rapprochement”

in education, the media, sports, and even the Boy Scouts.15

In his keynote speech focusing on Iran’s nuclear program at a

conference on Gulf affairs held in Riyadh in December 2011, Prince Turki

Al-Faysal presented his vision in detail of a more unified GCC in all

spheres as a necessary counter to the Iranian threat. His proposal went far

beyond any previous ones, as he advocated “the establishment of a unified

Arabian Peninsula, with an elected Shura for the single state, a unified

military, a unified economy, a single currency, a unified school syllabus,

and unified energy and petro-chemical industries.”16 At a conference held

in Riyadh in April 2012, a stand-in for the ill Foreign Minister Prince Saud

Al-Faysal called for “transitioning from the cooperation to the union

phase.”17 Prince Salman, Saudi Arabia’s Defense Minister, based on his

reading of history, also foresaw the development of the GCC into a unified

entity – one no doubt under Saudi leadership – for he touted Saudi

Arabia’s experience as the first state to have become unified in the

Arabian Peninsula since the early days of Islam.18 The effort to promote

unity soon became identified with King Abd Allah personally, placing

considerable Saudi prestige on the line.

The Saudi media, as one might expect, has supported such proposals

for unification enthusiastically, as when an editor close to the palace
Reshaping Relations within an Evolving Gulf Nuclear Environment

151

termed GCC unification “that about which minds dream and that which

the requirements of the present situation dictate,” while calling King Abd

Allah “a man of history” for proposing this initiative.19 A military journal

stressed that “The givens of the strategic situation in the Gulf region point

to an enlargement of the Saudi role, based on the wise vision of the

Servant of the Two Holy Shrines.”20 One Saudi press commentary called

for the establishment of a single federal or confederal political entity

resembling the United States, Canada, or Mexico.21

Gulf Responses

Acknowledging the Growing Threat

However, Riyadh’s political task has been a delicate one – to act as

the GCC’s big brother without frightening and alienating the smaller

members. To be sure, the ominous threat situation has resulted in an

unusual degree of receptiveness on the part of the smaller GCC states to

greater coordination. Indeed, the joint communiqué following the GCC

summit in Riyadh in December 2011 highlighted “the adoption of the

initiative [proposed] by the Servant of the Two Holy Shrines to transition

from the phase of cooperation to that of unification, so that the GCC’s

entities form a single entity which will bring about good and repel evil in

response to the aspirations of the GCC countries’ citizens and in order to

deal with the challenges which these countries face.”22 This situation stood

in stark contrast to that of earlier GCC summits, when some of the

member states had been openly reluctant to confront Iran. At the 2005

summit, for example, there had been no consensus to even mention Iran’s

nuclear weapons in the final communiqué, apparently much to the dismay

of the Saudis.23

Since then, there have been discussions on unified defense, security,

and foreign policies, and integration in such as areas as air defense and

early warning, the creation of a combined defense council, as well as calls

for a standing combined force under Saudi leadership and, in 2012, the

announcement of the creation of a joint nuclear radiation monitoring

center. Recognizing the growing threat, not only from Iran’s potential

nuclear weapons but also from its appeal to the local Shia communities,

some of the GCC states – and especially Bahrain and some quarters in
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

152

Kuwait, countries that have large Shia populations of their own and feel

most vulnerable to Iran – have shown unusual deference to Saudi

leadership, enabling Saudi Arabia to gain increasing recognition of its

regional leadership. As an editorial by an unnamed former Kuwaiti

diplomat noted, Saudi Arabia has replaced Egypt as the “powerbroker”

(wasit) in the region.24 Bahrain’s Prime Minister, Prince Khalifa bin

Salman, for his part, welcomed warmly the Saudi king’s call for a unified

GCC, and stressed that “we look forward to the unification of the Gulf as

soon as possible.”25

Dissonant Views on the Nuclear Issue

However, Saudi Arabia has not always found it easy to translate its

talk of the Iranian threat, offers of a future nuclear umbrella, and

promotion of a more unified GCC into universal acquiescence, as some of

the member states have become increasingly uncomfortable with Saudi

Arabia’s growing clout and pressure for unity.

First, in some states there is a different perception of the Iranian

threat, and there may be a reluctance to provoke Iran by being seen as

supporting a confrontational Saudi approach to relations with their

neighbor across the Gulf, and even more so if nuclear weapons were

involved. As a result, some in the GCC have been anything but receptive

to the Saudi initiative, differing with Riyadh on the nuclear threat

assessment and on potential remedies. As a Kuwaiti editorial complained

about such doubters, “it appears that some officials in some of the GCC

states can be described as not comprehending the extent of the Iranian

threat.”26 The Gulf’s Shia communities, as one could expect, have been

especially opposed to closer ties to Saudi Arabia, as has Oman, which

traditionally has felt only a limited immediate Iranian threat.

On relations with Iran, Fahd bin Mahmud Al Said, Oman’s Deputy

Minister for Cabinet Affairs, emphasized a more benign view of Iran than

that which Saudi Arabia had been promoting, as he noted that “geography

is determinant in the region and Iran, despite everything, is a neighboring

state and we cannot change that reality, and the GCC states do not want

our region to be one of tension.”27 Not surprisingly, speaking of King Abd

Allah’s proposal for Gulf unification, Oman’s foreign minister, Yusuf Bin

Alawi, likewise, noted that “in our view, the energy that was put into the
Reshaping Relations within an Evolving Gulf Nuclear Environment

153

[original] framework of the GCC is still the foundation and we have not

developed to where we are thinking of anything else...The situation

around us does not require [anything else] and neither do we; maybe the

next generation might be able to accomplish that.”28

Dubai, one of the constituent emirates within the UAE, with its longstanding economic relationship with Iran, too, has expressed a less

alarmist view of Iran than that projected by Saudi Arabia. For example,

Shaykh Muhammad bin Rashid Al-Maktum, the ruler of Dubai, remained

unconvinced as late as 2011 that Iran was developing nuclear weapons, as

he noted in an interview with CNN, “Iran is our neighbor, they are Muslim

and we lived next to each other for thousands and thousand years. I don’t

believe that Iran will get a nuclear weapon, I don’t think so. What can Iran

do with the nuclear weapon? Will they hit Israel? How many Palestinians

will die? And do you think if Iran hit Israel, Iran will be safe? They will be

gone the next day.”29 Significantly, an analyst from the UAE, while

acknowledging the need for a nuclear deterrent, apparently did not view

Saudi Arabia as the only option, as he posited as early as 2009 that such a

deterrent “could be local, Arab, or international, or even by means of a

[broader] nuclear umbrella for the defense of the Gulf.”30 He even openly

expressed a willingness to “accept in principle a nuclear umbrella from a

country such as the United States.”31 In fact, advocating nuclear weapons

for Saudi Arabia too visibly by Saudi spokesmen in neighboring countries

may sometimes be sensitive. Thus, a Saudi political analyst’s scheduled

appearance on a Kuwaiti TV program was cancelled after his views,

fervently in favor of a Saudi nuclear deterrent, were previewed by the

show’s producers.32

Sensitivity to Saudi Hegemony

Second, there are suspicions in some GCC states of creeping Saudi

hegemony under the guise of unification and of offers of a nuclear

umbrella. As part of the process of proposed unification, Prince Turki AlFaysal called for the unavoidable need to compromise some national

sovereignty by member states.33 However, the Saudis appear to have been

surprised by the lack of enthusiasm they have encountered, despite their

portrayal of the looming Iranian threat, and Saudi Foreign Minister Saud

Al-Faysal found it necessary to allay fears of Saudi domination, assuring
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

154

Gulf audiences that “it must be clear to all that union will not violate in

any way the sovereignty of any of the member states.”34

No doubt seeking to counter concerns on that score from some of the

other GCC states, the Saudi media has sought to dispel potential doubts

that some have apparently voiced about the wisdom of unification. One

Saudi editorialist taxed as “not correct” the apprehension of some states to

the effect that “unification may end their independence.” He stressed that

states could still retain their individual domestic policies, even as he

compounded GCC fears by noting that “strategic projects” such as roads,

electric power, railroads, the petrochemical industry, the import and export

sectors, energy, and arms purchases would be “subordinated to greater

coordination.” In particular, he emphasized “the nationalization of [the

petrochemical] industry and other sources of energy, whether nuclear or

other” and that the transition from present-day cooperation to unity would

lead to “a strong entity.”35 However, as a Saudi editorialist acknowledged,

some – albeit, as he saw it, a minority – in the GCC were “unenthusiastic”

about union, citing the small states’ fear of losing relative influence.36

Usually, those wary of greater GCC unification have expressed

concern officially in indirect terms, as did Shaykh Muhammad bin Rashid

Al Maktum, ruler of Dubai and the UAE’s Prime Minister and Vice

President, who emphasized such terms as “cooperation and

complementarity” in a communiqué released as he arrived in Riyadh for

the December 2011 GCC summit, rather than union.37 Likewise, Fahd bin

Mahmud Al Said, Oman’s Deputy Minister for Cabinet Affairs, noted

after the same summit that the experience of the European Union showed

that monetary unification should not be hasty, and that the Saudi-promoted

expansion of the GCC with the proposed admission of Jordan and

Morocco “requires time” and “many preliminary steps.”38 Later, the

Omani foreign minister was quoted as concluding curtly that “There is no

union.”39 Even a pro-Saudi Kuwaiti politician admitted to the Saudi press

that one could explain recent Kuwaiti accommodation to Iran, at least in

part, as “a reaction to what [Kuwaitis] consider ‘Saudi interference’ in

[Kuwait’s] internal affairs and its efforts to recruit the tribes.”40

While Bahrain, understandably due to the minority Sunni regime’s

need for Saudi support, has continued to second Saudi proposals

energetically, elsewhere in the GCC support for union has remained

limited. A Bahraini academic, writing in a Saudi newspaper, was appalled
Reshaping Relations within an Evolving Gulf Nuclear Environment

155

by the prevailing attitude at a conference of Gulf intellectuals in

November 2012 dealing with a potential GCC union. As he noted, the

presenters began with the potential benefits but “then suddenly switched to

doubts about [the union’s] success and to laying out the obstacles,” while

commentators “criticized extremely bitterly the direction and

achievements of the GCC over the past three decades, and even ridiculed

the very idea of union.”41 At the GCC summit in Bahrain the following

month, while the Bahraini foreign minister noted blandly that “not one

state said it did not want to enter a union,” he also admitted that progress

might appear slow, since “every state’s views must be considered.”42

Despite the Saudis’ positive “spin” on the summit, the final communiqué,

while acknowledging the Iranian nuclear threat, spoke pointedly of

“cooperation” more than once, not of union.43

Saudi Arabia may conclude from its disappointing experience with

the GCC that translating its talk of a nuclear threat and of its own nuclear

– or implied nuclear – clout and its offers of a future nuclear umbrella into

influence is not necessarily an automatic process. It is uncertain whether

the outlook in the smaller GCC states would change if and when Iran

actually acquired nuclear weapons, and in what direction – whether it

would move them toward greater cohesion with Saudi Arabia or in a

centrifugal pattern, with accommodation of Iran. In the end, however, the

smaller GCC states’ views would not be likely to sway Saudi Arabia’s

own views on nuclear weapons.

Notes

1. Abd Al-Azhim Mahmud Hanafi, “Al-Dawr al-qiyadi li’l-Mamlaka taht qiyadat

khadim al-haramayn al-sharifayn” [The Kingdom’s Leading Role under the Leadership

of the Servant of the Two Holy Shrines], Majallat Khalid Al-Askariya, On-line, Internet,

21 June 2011, available from www.kkmaq.gov.sa/detail.ap?InNewsItemID=393304&

InTemplateKey=print.

2. Major General Isa bin Ibrahim Al-Rashid, the Commandant of the Saudi National

War College, “Majlis al-taawun wa’l-radd al-hasim” [The GCC and the Resolute

Response], Majallat Khalid Al-Askariya, On-line, Internet, 21 June 2011, available from

www.kkmaq.gov.sa/detail.ap?InNewsItemID=393296&InTemplateKey=print.
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

156

3. Badr Al-Balawi, “Al-Qunbula al-nawawiya al-saudiya” [The Saudi Atom Bomb],

Al-Sharq (Dammam), On-line, Internet, 14 December 2011, available from

www.alsharq.net.sa/2011/12/14/46046.

4. “Abr tabanniha li’l-adid min qararat al-qimam al-khalijiya li-tawthiq awasir alukhuwwa bayn al-shuub Al-Mamlaka sahamat bi-dawr bariz fi tahqiq ahdaf Majlis AlTaawun wa-taziz al-amal al-mushtarak” [By Adopting Many of the Gulf Summits’

Decisions to Strengthen the Bonds of Brotherhood among Peoples the Kingdom Played a

Key Role in Achieving the GCC’s Objectives and in Solidifying Shared Activity], AlRiyadh, On-line, Internet, 7 December 2011, available from www.alriyadh.com/

2011/12/17/article692411.html.

5. Staff Brigadier General Zhafir bin Ali Al-Shihri, “Istratijiyat Al-Mamlaka limuwajahat al-mutaghayyirat al-duwaliya wa’l-iqlimiya li-tahqiq al-amn al-watani” [The

Kingdom’s Strategy to Deal with International and Regional Changes in Order to

Achieve National Security], Al-Difa, January 2007, 65.

6. Staff Major General Bandar bin Abd Allah bin Turki Al Saud, “Hadha al-yawm

al-khalid fi tarikhna al-majid” [This Memorable Day in Our Glorious History], Al-Difa,

September 2011, 81.

7. Abd Al-Rahman Rashid, “Raddan ala Iran: qunbulatan saudiya wi-misriya” [In

Response to Iran: Two Bombs, a Saudi One and an Egyptian One], Al-Sharq Al-Awsat,

On-line, Internet, 13 April 2006, available from www.aawsat.com/print.asp?did=

358088&issueno=9998.

8. Dr. Al-Qasim and Dr. Al-Anazi, “Al-Ittihad fi kiyan wahid yulabbi al-tumuhat alkhalijiya wa’l-mamlaka umq istratiji li-duwal Al-Khalij” [Unification in a Single Entity

Responds to Gulf Desires and the Kingdom Is the Strategic Depth for the Gulf States],

Al-Jazira, On-line, Internet, 22 December 2011, available from www.al-jazirah.com/

20111222/In1.htm.

9. Quoted in Hani Al-Fardan, “Iqtarahatha Al-Bahrayn wa-aqarraha qadat Al-Khalij

fi Al-Kuwait” [Bahrain Proposed It and the Gulf Leadership Confirmed It in Kuwait], AlWasat (Manama, Bahrain), On-line, Internet, 3 January 2010, available from

www.alwasatnews.com//2676/news/print/358170/1.html.

10. “Al-Jasim mutanaqqidan al-hukuma al-kuwaitiya: Al-Saudiya tumaththil alumq al-istratiji li’l-Kuwayt wa-laysat Iran” [Al-Jasim Criticizing the Kuwaiti

Government: Saudi Arabia Represents Kuwait’s Strategic Depth, Not Iran], Jazan News,

On-line, Internet, 13 March 2010, available from www.jazannews.org/newsphp?action=

print&m=id=2973. Likewise, see “Al-Nufudh al-farisi fi Al-Iraq yataazham’ [Persian

Influence in Iraq Is Growing], Al-Watan (Kuwait), On-line, Internet, 23 November 2011,

availablefromhttp://alwatan.tt/printarticle.aspx?Id=153450&iYearQuarter=0.
Reshaping Relations within an Evolving Gulf Nuclear Environment

157

11. Reported in Sultan Al-Qahtani, “Malik Al-Bahrain yulinha bi-saraha: ‘Mawaqif

al-bad fi Al-Kuwait kha’iba” [The King of Bahrain Says It Openly: “The Positions of

Some in Kuwait Are Disappointing”], Ilaf, On-line, Internet, 29 February 2012, available

fromwww.elaph.com.

12. Abd Al-Latif Sayf Al-Utaybi, “Mahattat Al-Suman li’l-taqa al-nawawiya” [AlSuman Nuclear Power Station], Al-Qabas (Kuwait), On-line, Internet, 12 December

2011, available fromwww.alqabas.com.kw/ArticlePrint.aspx?id=695181&mode=print.

13. Badr Al-Balawi, “Al-Qunbula al-nawawiya al-saudiya” [The Saudi Atom

Bomb], Al-Sharq (Dammam), On-line, Internet, 14 December 2011, available from

www.alsharq.net.sa/2011/12/14/46046.

14. Ali Al-Qahis, “Al-Amir Turki Al-Faysal yutalib bi-tahwil majlis al-taawun ila

ittihad ashbah bi’l-urubbi wa-insha’ jaysh khaliji muwahhad” [Prince Turki Al-Faysal

Calls for a Transformation of the [Gulf] Cooperation Council into a Union Resembling

the European Union and for the Establishment of a Unified Gulf Army], Al-Riyadh, Online, Internet, 22 March 2011, available from www.alriyadh.com/2011/03/22/

article615880.html.

15. “Nass al-bayan al-khitami” [Text of the Final Communique], Al-Sharq AlAwsat, On-line, Internet, 21 December 2011, available from www.aawsat.com//print.asp?

did=655296&issueno=12076, and Ayman Al-Hammad, Nayif Al-Wayil, and Bayyina AlMilham, “Al-Qada al-khalijiyun yakhtatimun ijtimaat dawrathim al-32” [The Gulf

Leaders Conclude the Meetings of Their 32nd Session], Al-Riyadh, On-line, Internet, 21

December 2011, available from www.alriyadh.com/2011/12/21/article693500.html.

16. Salim Al-Sharif, “Turki Al-Faysal: Al-Alam fashal fi iqna Isra’il wa-Iran min

‘al-nawawi’ wa-khiyaratna maftuha” [Turki Al-Faysal: The World Failed to Convince

Israel and Iran on the Nuclear [Issue] and Our Options Are Open], Al-Madina (Jeddah),

On-line, Internet, 6 December 2011, available from www.al-madina.com/print/343006.

17. “Saud al-Faysal: Al-Tahdidat tastadi al-amal al-jadd li’l-tahawwul min sayghat

al-taawun ila sayghat al-ittihad” [Saud Al-Faysal: The Threat Requires Serious Efforts to

Transition from the Cooperation Model to the Union Model], Al-Madina, On-line,

Internet, 28 April 2012, available from www.al-madina.com/printhtml/374157.

18. “Al-Amir Salman: Al-Shabab al-saudi ladayh namadhij min al-tarikh al-watani

tubriz ma qam bih al-aba’ wa’l-ajdad min juhud ashamat fi tawhid al-bilad” [Prince

Salman: Saudi Youth Has Examples from National History That Highlight Our Fathers’

and Ancestors’ Efforts Which Contributed to the Unification of the Country], Al-Sharq

Al-Awsat, On-line, Internet, 5 February 2012, available from www.aawsat.com/print.asp?

did=662105&issueno=12122.
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

158

19. Turki Abd Allah Al-Sudayri, “Mantiqi wa-waqii wa-daruri al-wusul ila ittihad

Al-Khalij” [Achieving a United Gulf Is Logical, Realistic, and Necessary], Al-Riyadh,

On-line, Internet, 21 December 2011, available from www.alriyadh.com/2011/12/21/

article693501.html.

20. Abd Al-Azhim Mahmud Hanafi, “Al-Dawr al-qiyadi li’l-Mamlaka taht qiyadat

khadim al-haramayn al-sharifayn” [The Kingdom’s Leading Role under the Leadership

of the Servant of the Two Holy Shrines], Majallat Kulliyat Al-Malik Khalid Al-Askariya,

On-line, Internet, 21 June 2011, available from www.kkmaq.gov.sa/detail.ap?

InNewsItemID=393304&InTemplateKey=print.

21. Dr. Al-Qasim and Dr. Al-Anazi, “Al-Ittihad fi kiyan wahid yulabbi al-tumuhat

al-khalijiya wa’l-mamlaka umq istratiji li-duwal Al-Khalij” [Unification in a Single

Entity Responds to Gulf Desires and the Kingdom Is the Strategic Depth for the Gulf

States], Al-Jazira, On-line, Internet, 22 December 2011, available from www.aljazirah.com/20111222/In1.htm.

22. Reported in Ayman Al-Hammad, Nayif Al-Wayil, and Bayyina Al-Milham,

“Al-Qada al-khalijiyun yakhtatimun ijtimaat dawrathim al-32” [The Gulf Leaders

Conclude the Meetings of Their 32nd Session], Al-Riyadh, On-line, Internet, 21

December 2011, available from www.alriyadh.com/2011/12/21/article693500.html.

23. Information about the discord in the closed sessions seems to have been leaked

to a Saudi-owned newspaper, which highlighted the absence of any mention of Iran’s

nuclear issue in the final communique and criticized the “minimal results” achieved by

the summit. Zuhayr Al-Harithi, “Iran wa-duwal Al-Khalij...tura li-madha yaqlaq alkhalijiyyun?” [Iran and the Gulf States...Do You Wonder Why Those in the Gulf Are

Worried?], Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, On-line, Internet, 22 December 2005, available from

www.aawsat.com/print.asp?did=339444&issueno=9886.

24. “Al-Siyasa al-kharijiya al-saudiya fi’l-waqt al-rahin” [Current Saudi Foreign

Policy], Al-Siyasa (Kuwait), On-line, Internet, 9 May 2011, available from www.alseyassah.com/ArticleView/tabid/59/smid/438/ArticleID/138658/reftab/94/Default.aspx.

25. “Khalifa bin Salman: Natatalla li’l-ittihad al-khaliji al-yawm qabl al-ghad”

[Khalifa bin Salman: We Look Forward to the Unification of the Gulf As Soon As

Possible], Al-Watan, On-line, Internet, 18 January 2012, available from

www1.alwatan.com.sa/Politics/News_Detail.aspx?ArticleID=83409&CategoryID=1.

26. Abd Al-Latif Sayf Al-Utaybi, “Mahattat Al-Suman li’l-taqa al-nawawiya” [AlSuman Nuclear Power Station], Al-Qabas (Kuwait), On-line, Internet, 12 December

2011, available fromwww.alqabas.com.kw/ArticlePrint.aspx?id=695181&mode=print.

27. Quoted in “Jalalat al-sultan yusharik fi amal al-qimma al-khalijiya wa-yu’akkid:
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159

‘Yatawajjab alayna muwasalat al-amal al-da’ib wa’l-juhud al-mushtaraka li-taziz awasir

al-taawun” [His Highness the Sultan Participates in the Work of the Gulf Summit and

Confirms: “We Must Continue Tirelessly Our Activity and Joint Efforts to Strengthen the

Bonds of Cooperation”], Al-Watan (Muscat, Oman), On-line, Internet, 20 December

2011, available from www.alwatan.com.

28. Interview with Yusuf Bin Alawi by Jabir Al-Harami, “Wazir kharijiyat Uman:

Dam Al-Khalij lana shiraka wa-lays ataya” [The Gulf Is Our Support as a Partnership Not

in Handouts], Al-Sharq (Doha, Qatar), On-line, Internet, 20 March 2012, available from

www.al-sharq.com.

29. Interview with Shaykh Muhammad by Erin Burnett, “Transcript of Shaikh

Mohammed’s interview with CNN,” Khaleej Times (Dubai, UAE), On-line, Internet, 6

December 2011, available from www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticle08.asp?xfile=data/

theuae/2011/December/theuae_December178.xml§ion=theuae.

30. Abd Al-Khaliq Abd Allah quoted in Hayyan Nuyuf and Mustafa Sulayman,

“Talabu bi-wujud mizhalla li-himayat al-mintaqa” [They Asked for an Umbrella to

Defend the Region], Al-Arabiya TV, On-line, Internet, 10 October 2009, transcript

available fromwww.alarabiya.net/mob/ar/866684.html.

31. Ibid.

32. Interview with Sami Uthman, “Muhallil siyasi li’l-Marsad Ala duwal Al-Khalij

wa-khassatan Al-Saudiya al-say li’l-husul ala qunbula nawawiya” [A Political Analyst to

Al-Marsad: The Gulf States, and In Particular Saudi Arabia, Must Seek to Acquire an

Atom Bomb], Al-Marsad, On-line, Internet, 21 December 2011, available from www.almarsd.com.

33. Ali Al-Qahis, “Al-Amir Turki Al-Faysal yutalib bi-tahwil majlis al-taawun ila

ittihad ashbah bi’l-urubbi wa-insha’ jaysh khaliji muwahhad” [Prince Turki Al-Faysal

Calls for a Transformation of the [Gulf] Cooperation Council into a Union Resembling

the European Union and for the Establishment of a Unified Gulf Army], Al-Riyadh, Online, Internet, 22 March 2011, available from www.alriyadh.com/2011/03/22/

article615880.html.

34. Reported in Ayman Al-Hammad, “Al-Amir Saud Al-Faysal muftatihan ijtima

al-wizari al-khaliji fi Al-Riyadh” [Prince Saud Al-Faysal Opens a Meeting of the Gulf

Ministers in Riyadh], Al-Riyadh, On-line, Internet, 5 March 2012, available from

www.alriyadh.com/2012/03/05/article715301.html.

35. Yusuf Al-Kuwaylit, “Kayf nakhtu bi’l-ittihad al-khaliji al-arabi” [How Do We

Proceed with the Arab Gulf and Union?], Al-Riyadh, On-line, Internet, 24 February 2012,

available fromwww.alriyadh.com/2012/02/24/article712535.html.
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

160

36. Muhammad Al-Rumayhi, “Ittihad duwal Al-Khalij Al-Arabi wa-tahammul almakhatir” [Unifiation of the Arab Gulf States and Assuming the Burden of the Threat],

Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, On-line, Internet, 28 February 2012, available from

www.aawsat.com/print.asp?did=665686&issueno=12145.

37. “Muhammad bin Rashid yasil ila Al-Riyadh” [Muhammad bin Rashid Arrives

in Riyadh], Al-Ittihad, On-line, Internet, 20 December 2011, available from

www.alittihad.ae/print.php?id=117659&y=2011.

38. Quoted in “Jalalat al-sultan yusharik fi amal al-qimma al-khalijiya wa-yu’akkid:

‘Yatawajjab alayna muwasalat al-amal al-da’ib wa’l-juhud al-mushtaraka li-taziz awasir

al-taawun” [His Highness the Sultan Participates in the Work of the Gulf Summit and

Confirms: “We Must Continue Tirelessly Our Activity and Joint Efforts to Strengthen the

Bonds of Cooperation”], Al-Watan (Muscat, Oman), On-line, Internet, 20 December

2011, available from www.alwatan.com.

39. “Yusuf bin Alawi: La yujad ittihad khaliji siwa fi uqul al-suhufiyin faqat!”

[There Is No Gulf Union Except in the Minds of Journalists], Al-Wisam (Saudi Arabia),

On-line, Internet, 4 June 2012, available from http://alwesam.org/news.php?action=

print&m=m+id5209.

40. “Al-Jasim mutanaqqidan al-hukuma al-kuwaitiya: Al-Saudiya tumaththil alumq al-istratiji li’l-Kuwayt wa-laysat Iran” [Al-Jasim Criticizing the Kuwaiti

Government: Saudi Arabia Represents Kuwait’s Strategic Depth, Not Iran], Jazan News,

On-line, Internet, 13 March 2010, available from www.jazannews.org/newsphp?action=

print&m=id=2973.

41. Abd Allah Al-Madani, “Mashru al-ittihad al-khaliji marra ukhra” [The Gulf

Union Plan, Yet Again], Al-Iqtisadiya, On-line, Internet, 4 November 2012, available

from www.aleqt.com/2012/11/04/article_706621.print.

42. Ayman Al-Hammad and Abd Allah Al-Hasani, “Wazir al-kharijiya al-bahrayni

wa-amin amm al-taawun fi mu’tamar sahafi: Fikrat al-ittihad maqbula min al-jami wa-la

mawqif khalijiyan min al-ikhwan” [Bahrain’s Foreign Minister and the GCC’s Secretary

General: The Idea of Union Is Acceptable to All and There Is No Gulf Position on the

[Muslim] Brotherhood], Al-Riyadh, On-line, Internet, 26 December 2012, available from

www.alriyadh.com/2012/12/26/article796055.html.

43. Ibid.
CHAPTER 12

The Rouhani Era in Iran:

The Potential Impact and Implications

Assessing President Rouhani

The result of the June 2013 presidential elections in Iran, in which

Hassan Rouhani emerged victorious, has raised hopes in the international

community for a resolution of the Iranian nuclear impasse. However,

Saudi views have been considerably less sanguine. Although official

circles have been noncommittal, Saudi media commentary was uniformly

negative or at least skeptical about Rouhani. Even before the elections,

Saudis had not been optimistic that there would be genuine change on the

nuclear issue no matter who won.1

Pundits in the Saudi media often argued that while some see Rouhani

as a reformist, that may be true only in relative terms by comparison to his

predecessor and that despite his peaceable personality and initial moderate

statements and reaching out to Saudi Arabia, Iran’s policies of expansion

and quest for nuclear weapons are part of that country’s enduring national

strategy dating back to the Shah’s era.

2 As one journalist asked

rhetorically, “is there anyone who can be considered a ‘moderate’

president in Iran?”3The Saudi media accused Rouhani of practicing a

policy of taqiya, or religious dissimulation, although that is a Shia

religious term, in concealing his true objectives, and attributed to Iran

“skill at deception in all its dealings.”4

Any potential change was seen as only one in style, intended to

improve Iran’s public image, and the Saudi media often set long lists of

litmus tests for Rouhani by which to prove he is really a moderate,

stipulations that would entail a wholesale reversal of most of Iran’s longstanding national policies, of which opening the country to full-scale

IAEA supervision of its nuclear sector was only one criterion.5In the end,
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

162

Saudis argued that it was Iran’s Supreme Leader, Sayyed Ali Khamenei,

who held the real power in the country and that he would continue the

existing policies.6

Adapting to New Developments in Iran’s Policy

Although there was very limited official Saudi commentary on

Rouhani’s outreach to the United States and the visible political progress

that was developing in the fall of 2013, the Saudi media indicated a

guarded and still suspicious attitude. Most Saudi media commentary

mirrored Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faysal’s cautionary

welcome of any change in Iran’s policy in October 2013, but demanded

concrete action from Tehran. Otherwise, he warned, “if it is not translated

into deeds [the Iranian outreach] will remain just empty words and have

no impact.”7The Saudi media interpreted Tehran’s new-found flexibility

and decision to seek a diplomatic solution, or dovishness (hama’imiya), to

a desire to have the potentially destabilizing economic sanctions lifted and

to avert a possible U.S. military strike following the experience in Syria.

And, Saudi observers also interpreted Iran’s more cooperative approach as

a desire to take advantage of what they termed President Obama’s

accommodating “weakness and indecisiveness.”8 In fact, the Saudi media

labeled Iran’s outreach in such distrustful terms as “putting on its sheep’s

clothing,” using “soft language,” and adopting “finesse.”9In using what

one commentator termed simply “different means,” the ultimate objective

was still seen by the latter as the intent by Iran to preserve the gains it had

already made in the nuclear field.10

The media also reiterated an unease that Saudi Arabia and the GCC

continued to be excluded from the negotiating process, fearing that it

would be “the Arabs” or “the Gulf” who could pay the price of a U.S.-

Iranian or even of an Iranian-Israeli deal. The frequency of this theme in

the media suggested that it reflected official thinking, even if the

authorities would not voice such concerns publicly.11 While Oman’s role

as the initial go-between in delivering messages between Washington and

Iran was accepted, the media also reflected its annoyance, stressing that it

was Saudi Arabia, not Oman with its “passive” foreign policy style, who

should be the one playing the key role in any negotiations.12
The Rouhani Era in Iran: The Potential Impact and Implications

Notes

1. Abd Al-Munim Mustafa, “Ra’is nawawi fi Faris” [A Nuclear President in Persia],

Al-Madina, On-line, Internet, 14 June 2013, available from www.al-madina.com/

printhtml/459763.

2. Turki Al-Dakhil, “Wuud Ruhani—hal tusaddiq?” [Rouhani’s Promises – Do You

Believe Him?], Al-Riyadh, On-line, Internet, 20 June 2013, available from

www.alriyadh.com/2013/06/20/article845289.html, and Rashid Fahd Al-Rashid “AlRa’is al-irani al-sabi wa-duwal Al-Khalij” [Iran’s Seventh President and the Gulf States],

Al-Riyadh, On-line, Internet, 17 June 2013, available from www.alriyadh.com/2013/

06/17/article844417.html.

3. Ali Al-Jahili, “Hal fihim mutadil?” [Are There Any Moderates among Them?],

Al-Iqtisadiya, On-line, Internet, 20 June 2013, available from www.aleqt.com/

2013/06/20/articl_764471.print.

4. Yusuf al-Kuwaylit, “Ruhani: Hal yunhi marhalat al-thawra li-maslahat aldawla?” [Rouhani: Will He End the Revolutionary Phase for Interest of State?], AlRiyadh, On-line, Internet, 29 September 2013, available from www.alriyadh.com/

2013/09/29/article871368.html.

5. Ali Al-Jahili, “Hal fihim mutadil?” [Are There Any Moderates among Them?],

Al-Iqtisadiya, On-line, Internet, 20 June 2013, available from www.aleqt.com/

2013/06/20/articl_764471.print.

6. Hamad bin Abd Allah Al-Luhaydan, “Hal yastati al-ra’is Ruhani lajm al-tatarruf

al-irani?” [Can President Rouhani Rein in the Iranian Extremism?], Al-Riyadh, On-line,

Internet, 21 June 2013, available from www.alriyadh.com/2013/06/21/

article845552.html, and Khalid Al-Dakhil, “Marhalat al-hudu’ wa’l-hifazh ala al-siyasa

al-kharijiya” [A Quiet Phase While Maintaining the [Same] Foreign Policy], Anba’ukum,

On-line, Internet, 21 June 2013, available from www.anbacom.com/print?action=print&

m=articlesm&id=16877.

7. Prince Saud Al-Faysal, joint press conference with Italy’s Foreign Minister, AlRiyadh, On-line, Internet, 4 October 2013, available from www.alriyadh.com/2013/

10/04/article872730.html.

8. Muhammad bin Abd Al-Latif Al Al-Shaykh, “Al-Iraniyun wa-Obama” [The

Iranians and Obama], Al-Jazira, On-line, Internet, 27 September 2013, available from

www.al-jazirah.com/2013/20130927/lp7.htm, and Ali Al-Ammari, “Iran takhsha alsinariyu al-suri wa-amrika ta’mul idhanha talafiyan li-darba askariya” [Iran Fears a

Syrian Scenario and America Hopes through Its Concessions to Obviate the Need for a

163
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

164

Military Strike], Al-Yawm, On-line, Internet, 25 September 2013, available from

www.alyaum.com/News/art/96016.html.

9. Mutlaq Saud Al-Mtiri, “Al-Ayn al-thalitha wa’l-tafawud ma Tihran” [The Third

Eye and Negotiating with Tehran], Al-Riyadh, On-line, Internet, 23 September 2013,

available fromwww.al-riyadh.com/2013/09/23/article869831.html.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid, “Muhammad Al-Athim, “Obama muharwilan” [Obama Is in a Rush], AlIqtisadiya, On-line, Internet, 2 October 2013, available from www.aleqt.com/2013/10/02/

article_790042.print, Mutlaq Saud Al-Mtiri, “Man tughatta bi’l-amrikan aryan” [He Who

Uses the Americans as Clothing Is Naked], Al-Riyadh, On-line, Internet, 2 October 2013,

available from www.alriyadh.com/2013/10/02/article872192.html, and Hamad bin Abd

allah Al-Luhaydan, “Al-Yawm al-watani 83 quwwa wa-izza wa-istidad” [The 83rd

National Day: Power, Pride, and Preparedness], Anba’kum, On-line, Internet, 20

September 2013, available from www.anbacom.com/print.php?action=print&m=

articlesm&id=17541.

12. Ibid.
CHAPTER 13

Conclusions

This study suggests several conclusions and potential implications

applicable not only to Saudi Arabia but, at least in part, more broadly to

the issue of nuclear proliferation.

A Saudi Nuclear Option Would Be Likely...If...

First, there is a strong likelihood that Saudi Arabia would seek to

acquire nuclear weapons when and if Iran did so. As one Saudi pundit put

it, “There is one thing on which we will not disagree...and that is that the

Gulf will be a nuclear one.”1 Of course, predicting categorically whether a

state will go nuclear, much less the timing for such a move, is difficult,

and even more so the further out one tries in terms of time. All one can do

is forecast the likelihood based on an analysis of available data against an

analytical background of a country’s strategic culture.

The sheer quantity of hints, overt warnings, and analyses from senior

policymakers and from those writing in the civilian and military media

indicates that Saudi Arabia would indeed seriously consider acquiring

nuclear weapons under certain circumstances. This vector in Saudi Arabia

is not a phenomenon attributable to a single driven leader or even to a

small nationalistic core, but seems to reflect a wider consensus. Although

it is difficult to judge definitively, the limited evidence available suggests

that there is probably broad-based public support for the official depiction

of the foreign threat and for pursuing a nuclear capability in relation to

that threat, and that there is little opposition even in dissident circles to

such an option. At the same time, since state-society relations involve an

interactive process to some extent, the media, while functioning as an

information mechanism that the decision-makers can use, also can

heighten demand and generate pressure on the decision-maker to actually
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

166

produce on the expectations that have been actively encouraged from

above. A failure by policymakers to actually fulfill expectations in this

arena is feasible, even if Iran did decide at some time to develop nuclear

weapons, of course, given the closed decision-making process and lack of

public accountability in Saudi Arabia, but such a failure to follow through

would nevertheless entail a loss of some prestige and credibility.

In particular, the country’s religious establishment’s at times strident

support for the acquisition of nuclear weapons would put pressure on the

Saudi decision-makers and opens up the latter to charges of being remiss if

it fails to do so as a way to protect the Umma, especially since the threat is

portrayed as emanating from Shia Iran, as well as from Israel, countries

that clerics can depict as enduring threats from a religious perspective.

In Saudi Arabia’s case, the decision-makers’ assessment of the threat

posed by the blatant challenge that a nuclear-armed Iran would pose to

Saudi Arabia’s vital interests would very likely override other

considerations. Decision-makers may interpret threats not only in strictly

speaking military terms, but also in terms of the fear the impact of nuclear

weapons would have on the regional political balance, which the Saudis

appear to view as primary. According to one Saudi military writer, in fact,

the quest for “political and economic blackmail and [the ability] to impose

[one’s] political conditions both nearby and further afield” can be a key

motivator for a country’s acquisition of nuclear weapons.

2

More broadly, this case study reinforces the assumption that a state’s

interpretation of its national interests and reading of the threat

environment can be expected to be a decisive consideration and will

outweigh outside admonitions or pressures against acquiring nuclear

weapons if – as seems to be the case with Saudi Arabia – it feels its vital

interests are at stake and that it has no other reliable means to fulfill that

requirement. For example, justifying Riyadh’s purchase of the CSS-2 after

the missiles had been discovered, King Fahd had maintained that “Our

country’s orientation is determined by our national interests; we are not

with anyone, but only with our interests.”3

Of course, it should be underlined that such policy trends in Saudi

Arabia are not irreversible. Ultimately, the key variable in Saudi decisionmaking on the nuclear issue is the perceived threat from Iran, and a

reversal in Iran’s nuclear policy would likewise almost assuredly translate

into a drawdown of Riyadh’s current preparations to very likely follow
Conclusions

167

suit on acquiring nuclear weapons. Given the relatively limited domestic

accountability for policy, the national leadership could change course. In

that case, however, one would expect to see an accompanying media

campaign supporting and justifying any policy reversal.

International Leverage May Sometimes Be Limited

Second, the case of Saudi Arabia suggests that in some instances the

international community’s leverage to prevent nuclear proliferation may

be limited if a country feels that its security is at stake. As Sagan points

out, the choice of the model which one believes is the most appropriate

one to explain nuclear proliferation will have a bearing on what counter

proliferation policies are selected.4 However, in general, to be able to deter

proliferation requires an overmatch in tools such as political, economic,

and credible military leverage and, ultimately, the ability to convince a

country that to forego a nuclear capability will yield greater security and

greater benefits than pursuing it – a daunting task in most instances, and

especially so with Saudi Arabia.

Admittedly, Saudi Arabia may be a special case, due to its unique

position in the international oil market. However, other countries as well,

whether for political or economic reasons, may also be able to resist

outside pressure or avert it altogether. In fact, Saudi policymakers

probably expect that the international reaction to Riyadh’s acquisition of

nuclear weapons would be muted, and they may quite possibly be correct,

some of which may depend on the timing. Since Saudi Arabia would

likely take such a momentous step only if Iran actually acquired a nuclear

weapon, international opinion at that point might be so incensed against

Iran and understanding of the need of other countries to respond for selfdefense that there might not be an outcry, as one might expect otherwise.

In any event, as one Saudi academic has posited, based on what he

believed was Washington’s more accepting attitude toward civilian

nuclear projects in the Arab countries, “the United States in the past used

to prohibit the Arab countries from developing nuclear technology, but

now has become more open to such an option, out of fear that Iranian

influence will increase, potentially leading to a sort of hegemony over

political developments in the region.”5 What is more, the Saudis may

argue that if Iran, for whatever reason, one day does announce a nuclear
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

168

breakout, they would have given the international community a fair

chance to do something to prevent Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons,

and that Riyadh had taken a decision to go nuclear only after the

international community had failed to meet its implied obligations to act

effectively.

In part, the Saudis may also believe that a reaction by the United

States, in particular, would be influenced by the latter’s political ties with

the proliferating country and that Saudi Arabia could rely on Riyadh’s

close relationship with Washington and other countries in the West for a

limited reaction. As one senior military officer writing in the SANG

journal posited, the United States was willing to exercise a selective

double standard on proliferators, depending on its political relationship

with the country, thus condemning North Korea’s nuclear program while

accepting those in India and Pakistan.6Likewise, an editorial in Al-Riyadh

also concluded that the West opposed the nuclear programs in North

Korea and Iran principally for political reasons, that is because those two

countries were outside the West’s orbit, whereas it accepted Israel’s

nuclear program.7

What is more, given Saudi Arabia’s unique position in the world oil

market, with no credible alternative source able to replace its production

without major and perhaps fatal disruptions in the international economy,

significant sanctions would simply not be realistic. In particular, if the

smaller oil and gas-producing Gulf states such as the United Arab

Emirates, Kuwait, and Qatar were unwilling to replace even part of any

lost Saudi production, either out of solidarity with Riyadh or due to the

latter’s pressure, any threat of effective economic sanctions against Saudi

Arabia would be untenable, certainly unless a potential shale-oil

revolution in the international oil markets became a reality. In addition,

Riyadh may be hoping that its substantial conventional arms purchases,

which are usually accompanied by significant numbers of foreign civilian

advisers, may strengthen security and political bonds with seller countries

and reduce the impact of potentially negative reactions when and if it

actually does acquire nuclear weapons.

Moreover, as noted earlier, the Great Powers’ credibility may be

limited, and that handicap may translate into a reduced ability to exert

moral suasion in any attempt to persuade Saudi Arabia not to pursue a

nuclear option. There is the Saudi perception that the Great Powers view
Conclusions

169

nuclear weapons as being useful for themselves and as wishing to retain a

monopoly in order to maintain their power relative to that of other

countries. In addition, the Saudis resent what they see as a double standard

on the part of the United States and the West with respect to their

acceptance of Israel’s nuclear arsenal while denying similar weapons to

the Arabs.

Modifying the Threat Environment Can Help

Modifying the regional threat environment perhaps can be key in

alleviating the pressure to proliferate. This case confirms the significance

of a country’s threat perceptions in stimulating and legitimizing the need

to acquire nuclear weapons. What the international community can do in

such cases is to try to remove or diminish the source of perceived

insecurity. Ultimately, of course, if the international community can

convince Riyadh that it has been able to stop Iran’s progress toward

nuclear weapons, such an outcome would preclude the need for Riyadh to

also follow suit and acquire a corresponding nuclear capability.

If the on-going diplomatic process with Iran succeeds in diverting the

latter from taking the final steps toward developing further and

weaponizing a nuclear capability, Saudi Arabia would clearly also not

proceed further along the nuclear path. What is more, a resolution of the

Iranian challenge would likely stem even more extensive proliferation for,

if Saudi Arabia then followed suit and acquired nuclear weapons, that

could well have been be the prelude to an additional, even if not

immediate, spate of proliferation in the region, with consequences that

may be difficult to foresee. Turkey, Egypt, or Algeria – for various

reasons of their own, not always tied to an Iranian threat – might also have

been tempted to follow Saudi Arabia’s lead, especially if the international

community appeared to express understanding for or acceptance of

Riyadh’s actions in light of Iran’s threat.

Even a positive outcome from the current negotiations with Iran,

however, would have to be enduring and carry solid guarantees. That is,

even if Iran does forgo producing a nuclear device at this time, there need

to be safeguards that it would not develop the components that could be

used to for a breakout in the future if there were another change in policy

in Tehran. If there should be a future Iranian nuclear breakout, Saudi
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

170

Arabia would again be faced with the same security dilemma as it has up

to now. In fact, as one Saudi editorialist worried, in his view Iran was

already on the threshold of a nuclear weapon, having all the necessary

components, and that in itself “will put the region on the threshold of

hell,” as Iran could then already possess “an enormous tool to blackmail

the states in the region.”8 However, unlike in the past, Riyadh now has or

will have developed all the components of legitimacy (popular, military,

religious, and regional), doctrinal thinking, and a support establishment to

follow suit quite rapidly if it felt it had to do so.

Even if an agreement between the international community and Iran

should result only in a delay of a few years for any breakout, such a respite

could still be very useful in preparing international security and political

safeguards for other countries in the region. Moreover, during such a

delay, selected countries in the international community could also help

develop relevant expertise in allied and partner nations, with an emphasis

on technical issues, such as the safety risks associated with nuclear

establishments, the instability of deterrence, and the perils of proliferation.

Visits to U.S. academic and scientific institutions, participation in

seminars, diplomatic contacts, scientist exchanges, or as part of

coursework in professional military education for military officers can all

contribute to such an effort. Given a potential gap in credibility, perhaps

an indirect approach through academia or private firms might be more

effective than an effort emanating only from official sources. Such

educational efforts may be directed to and tailored for the academic,

technocratic, religious, media, and military sectors – players who would

shape any proliferation process over the long term by translating guidance

into policy on safety or operational military doctrine.

Saudi Arabia: Commonalities and Uniqueness

Finally, in terms relating to broader theoretical considerations, the

Saudi case offers some empirical data to test some assumptions. At first

glance, Saudi Arabia would appear to constitute a classic example of the

realist security model, acting in response to a perceived nuclear treat and

in light of an assessment that there is no credible alternative, including its

doubts about reliable foreign support. Arguably, the Saudi perception of

an unacceptable potential nuclear threat that cannot be countered except
Conclusions

171

by an equivalent nuclear capability is perhaps the most widely-held

common variable at play when states consider whether or not to pursue

nuclear weapons.

However, such threat-based realism must be evaluated within the

parameters of the Saudi political and ideological system. That is, while

Saudi Arabia shares commonalities with some other cases on certain

aspects of this perspective, one has to be cautious to not conclude that

there is a deterministic response by all countries faced by a similar

security threat. For example, even though all the GCC states face a

similar, though not identical, security threat from Iran, their responses

have not necessarily been the same as that in Riyadh, given the differences

in their situations, whether in terms of their limited human resources,

severe geographic constraints, complex demographic composition, or

definition of national interest. The multiplicity of responses to a shared

threat in the GCC underlines the importance of understanding the specific

characteristics of a country’s socio-political system and of its decisionmaking process. Identifying and understanding such aspects as threat

perceptions, the interpretation of lessons learned from other cases, the

calculus of perceived costs and benefits, assumptions about the envisioned

modes of employment of nuclear weapons (political and military), and the

legal/ethical considerations involved, as well as each country’s strategic

culture and political decision-making process are key in understanding and

evaluating how actual and potential regional nuclear powers make

decisions on the nuclear issue.

Moreover, Saudi thinking has clearly also been tied to domestic

considerations of systemic legitimacy, as well as to narratives about the

country’s essential identity. The more expansive “nuclear mythmaking”

model need not conflict with the realist model in the Saudi case, but may

instead enrich and help explain the Saudi analysis and the decision-making

process on the nuclear issue. However, the “nuclear mythmaking”

approach, too, bears adjustment to specific countries, some of which may

not be amenable to all the components normally associated with this

approach. For example, it would be difficult to recognize in Saudi Arabia

a key step in Lavoy’s model, namely that in which a country’s national

elites (or, as he terms them, the “nuclear mythmakers”) seek “to convince

senior decision-makers to accept and act on these views,” that is to adopt a

nuclear option.9In the Saudi system, it is more likely that the promotion of
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

172

such a dynamic would be the result of a top-down process, with national

elites – not easily defined in this case in any event given the overlapping

of personal, family, and institutional allegiances – as the executors rather

than the initiators of such policies generated by the decision-makers.

In addition, the Saudi case does not seem to conform to certain

aspects or assumptions of some other models, which indicates that while

some variables in such models may be applicable, others may be irrelevant

for understanding certain countries. For example, one model which

proposes indicators (or “stages”) to determine when countries are

proceeding toward becoming nuclear powers includes as one of the four

stages to monitor that of a country’s “substantial efforts to develop

weapons.”10 Yet, there probably would be little development to detect if

the judgment is correct that Riyadh would most likely bypass attempts at

development and, instead, acquire such weapons outright by purchase. In

this case, there appear to be at least ample verbal indications and warning,

but in some cases even that may be missing, as in Libya’s attempt to

acquire the atom bomb from China or, as noted above, if King Fahd had

accepted the Ukrainian government’s offer in 1994 to help Saudi Arabia

acquire nuclear weapons.

Moreover, the same model also proposes a set of “explanatory

variables,” including a country’s industrial capacity index, its economic

interdependence, and exposure to the global economy.

11 Yet, in Saudi

Arabia’s case, while some of the variables used are applicable, others are

not, and negative results could suggest misleading conclusions. For

example, Saudi Arabia has no real industrial infrastructure, as is assumed

to be a variable by this model, while the country is, at the same time,

highly integrated in the international economy and heavily dependent on

the latter, even though this factor may not serve as a retardant in Saudi

Arabia’s case as the model would suggest. The outcome of calculating

such variables, which would indicate that Saudi Arabia is highly unlikely

to acquire nuclear weapons, however, may be questionable and a decision

need not really be dependent on the results stemming from applying the

variables in that model.

Nor would a focus on the psychology of individual decision-makers

be very informative in Saudi Arabia’s case, given the group-based

decision-making characteristic of the political system, despite the fact that,

as is true in any human collective, the Saudi royal family contains
Conclusions

173

members who may be outspoken and assertive, and others who are retiring

and reticent. Moreover, the “oppositional nationalist” approach is not

likely to be useful, as this type is the antithesis of the country’s cautious

royal elite taken as a whole, who display continuity over time and where a

diffuse consensus-making process is not necessarily dependent on any one

individual or on changes of individual position holders.12 The current

monarch in Saudi Arabia, 90-year old King Abd Allah, in particular, is a

modest, cautious, and pragmatic individual far from the stereotypical hardline strident personalities one has come to identify with oppositional

nationalists, such as Saddam Hussein.13 Neither does the heir apparent, 77-

year old Crown Prince and Minister of Defense Prince Salman, fit in the

oppositional nationalist mold.

Ultimately, the Saudi case, in many ways, may conform most closely

to Sagan’s concept of “multicausality.” As such, it reinforces the

perception that searching for a single theory of proliferation that will

explain the complexity of the phenomenon for all cases may be

impractical, given the numerous unique features that Saudi Arabia’s sociopolitical system and processes illustrate. Instead, it may be more

productive to accept the reality of a multiplicity of potential factors and,

rather than expecting a single theory to provide ready-made answers, to

accept that not all theoretical constructs or constituent elements may be

applicable or relevant to every case.

As in Karl von Clausewitz’s conception of war, with the phenomenon

of nuclear proliferation, too, perhaps there may be questions to ask related

to the phenomenon’s “nature” – unchanging, general shared attributes –

but also recognition that each case has an individual “character” – that is

distinctive features that are unique and not mere replications with minor

differences of other cases. Multiple theoretical constructs, of course, are

useful tools in the toolbox, and provide a variety of questions to ask that

one can select as appropriate to particular cases. The only commonalities

as causes for nuclear proliferation to look at may be such general truisms

as that a state faced by a nuclear threat will seek to maximize its national

interest, that it will strive to provide for its security, and will work to

ensure that its government is be able to project an appearance of success,

which can then be applied to specific cases, to be weighed against costs

(political, economic, and alternative defense options). Individual

motivations or causes, as well as the calculus for these common factors
Considering a Nuclear Gulf: Thinking about Nuclear Weapons in Saudi Arabia

174

may vary considerably from case to case and must be understood within

each country’s context. As such, the analyst’s overall experience and

knowledge of an individual case and of the subject country’s perspectives

are indispensable in selecting and applying the appropriate models and

questions as guides and, most importantly, in developing the answers.

Notes

1. Abd Al-Rahman Al-Turayri, “Al-Khalij arabi am farisi?” [The Gulf: Arab or

Persian?], Al-Iqtisadiya, On-line, Internet, 23 August 2011, available from

www.aleqt.com/2011/08/23/article_572330.print.

2. Staff Brigadier Zayid bin Muhammad Al-Umari, “Dawafi imtilak al-qudrat alistratijiya al-sarukhiya al-fada’iya wa’l-nawawiya” [The Incentives for Acquiring

Strategic Rocket, Space, and Nuclear Capabilities], Quwwat Al-Difa Al-Jawwi Al-Malaki

Al-Saudi, December 2010, 14.

3. Interview with King Fahd by Ahmad Jar Allah, “Al-Fahd: Anayt ka-ma law ann

al-ta’ira al-makhtufa saudiya” [Fahd: I Was As Concerned As If the Hijacked Aircraft

Had Been a Saudi One], Al-Siyasa, 28-29 April 1988, 7.

4. Sagan, “Why Do States,” 83.

5. Salih Abd Al-Rahman Al-Mani, “Al-Tiqniya al-nawawiya fi Al-Khalij” [Nuclear

Technology in the Gulf], Ukaz, On-line, Internet, 16 December 2006, available from

www.okaz.com.sa/okaz/osf/20061216/PrinCon2006121671686.htm.

6. Major General Ali Muhammad Rajab, “Qira’a fi al-barnamij al-amriki li-hazhr

intishar aslihat al-damar al-shamil” [Assessing the U.S. Strategy to Prevent WMD

Proliferation], Al-Haras Al-Watani, March-April 2005, 53.

7. “Al-Mamnu wa’l-masmuh fi intishar al-silah al-nawawi!!” [The Forbidden and

the Permitted Nuclear Proliferation!!], Al-Riyadh, On-line, Internet, 7 October 2006,

available fromwww.alriyadh.com/2006/10/07/article192609.html.

8. Abd Al-Munim Mustafa, “Iran fawq al-ataba al-nawawiya” [Iran on the Nuclear

Treshold], Al-Madina, On-line, Internet, 27 September 2013, available from www.almadina.com/printhtml/480894.

9. Lavoy, “Nuclear Proliferation,” 435.
Conclusions

175

10. Sonali Singh and Christopher R. Wray, “The Correlates of Nuclear

Proliferation: A Quantitative Test,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, xlviii, 6, December

2004, 866.

11. Ibid., 867-70.

12. Jacques E. C. Hymans, “Theories of Nuclear Proliferation; The State of the

Field,” in Peter R. Lavoy, ed., Nuclear Weapons Proliferation in the Next Decade.

(London and New York: Routledge, 2007), 27.

13. On Saddam Hussein, see Jerrold M. Post and Amatzia Baram, “‘Saddam Is Iraq,

Iraq Is Saddam’ (Until Operation Iraqi Freedom),” in Barry R. Schneider and Jerrold M.

Post, eds., Know Thy Enemy; Profiles of Adversary Leaders and Their Strategic Culture,

(Maxwell Air Force Base: USAF Counterproliferation Center, July 2003), 163-220.
01

USAF Counterproliferation Center

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

Providing Research and Education on 

WMD Threats and Responses for the US Air Force