J-S73001-17

____________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

TERRANCE BERNARD ROBINSON 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 595 MDA 2017

Appeal from the PCRA Order March 27, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Adams County Criminal Division at No(s): 

CP-01-CR-0000706-2013

BEFORE: OLSON, J., DUBOW, J., and STRASSBURGER*, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED JUNE 22, 2018

Appellant, Terrence Bernard Robinson, appeals from the order entered 

on March 27, 2017, dismissing his petition filed pursuant to the Post 

Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

We briefly summarize the facts and procedural history of this case as 

follows. In June 2012, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with criminal 

conspiracy, three counts of possession with intent to deliver (PWID) cocaine, 

and three counts of criminal use of a communications facility.1 At the time, 

Appellant’s whereabouts were unknown. On September 19, 2012, police 

took Appellant into custody on unrelated charges in Baltimore, Maryland. 

Thereafter, the Commonwealth entered a detainer against him. On April 12, 

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903, 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30), and 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 7512, 

respectively. 
J-S73001-17

- 2 -

2013, Appellant requested that the Commonwealth dispose of the charges 

pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD), 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9101, et seq.

2

 As a result, Maryland authorities returned Appellant to 

Pennsylvania on June 6, 2013. Counsel for Appellant sought, and received, 

two continuances of Appellant’s preliminary hearing. The trial court held the 

preliminary hearing on July 31, 2013, wherein all charges were bound for 

court. On September 23, 2013, the trial court formally arraigned Appellant, 

who then formally requested a jury trial. On December 2, 2013, prior to 

jury selection, Appellant presented a motion to dismiss all charges for 

violating Article III(a) of the IAD, claiming that he was not brought to trial 

within 180 days of his request for final disposition of the charges. The trial 

court continued the trial until the January 2014 term, so that it could hold a 

hearing on Appellant’s motion to dismiss on December 3, 2013. Following 

that hearing, the trial court denied Appellant’s motion to dismiss. 

____________________________________________

2 “The IAD is an agreement between forty-eight states, the District of 

Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and the United States, that 

establishes procedures for the transfer of prisoners incarcerated in one 

jurisdiction to the temporary custody of another jurisdiction which 

has lodged a detainer against a prisoner.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 886 

A.2d 689, 695 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citations omitted). “Unlike a request for 

extradition, which is a request that the state in which the prisoner is 

incarcerated transfer custody to the requesting state, a detainer is merely a 

means of informing the custodial jurisdiction that there are outstanding 

charges pending in another jurisdiction and a request to hold the prisoner for 

the requesting state or notify the requesting state of the prisoner's imminent 

release.” Id. (citations omitted).
J-S73001-17

- 3 -

On January 14, 2014, Appellant entered into an agreement with the 

Commonwealth wherein the parties stipulated to facts that were sufficient to 

find Appellant guilty of criminal conspiracy and three counts of PWID.

3

 In 

exchange, the Commonwealth agreed to withdraw the three counts of 

criminal use of a communications facility. Further, the parties agreed to an 

aggregate sentence of five to ten years of imprisonment, consecutive to any 

sentence Appellant was already serving. The stipulated facts were entered 

on the record and, after finding Appellant guilty, the trial court sentenced 

Appellant according to the sentencing agreement. We affirmed Appellant’s 

judgment of sentence in an unpublished memorandum on December 12, 

2014. See Commonwealth v. Robinson, 2014 WL 10752295 (Pa. Super. 

2014). On April 15, 2015, our Supreme Court denied further review. See 

Commonwealth v. Robinson, 114 A.3d 416 (Pa. 2015). 

____________________________________________

3 Appellant agreed to a bench trial on stipulated facts, with a negotiated 

sentencing agreement, in order to preserve his right to challenge the trial 

court’s ruling on his pre-trial motion to dismiss under the IAD. A stipulated 

bench trial functions similarly to a guilty plea except that a guilty plea 

constitutes a waiver of all defects and defenses except lack of jurisdiction,

invalidity of the guilty plea, and illegality of sentence. See Commonwealth 

v. Eichinger, 108 A.3d 821, 828, (Pa. 2014) (stipulating to evidence is 

functionally the same as a guilty plea, but preserves rights to challenge pretrial rulings); compare Commonwealth v. Main, 6 A.3d 1026, 1028 (Pa.

Super. 2010) (“The entry of a guilty plea constitutes a waiver of all defects 

and defenses except lack of jurisdiction, invalidity of the plea, and illegality 

of the sentence.”).
J-S73001-17

- 4 -

On April 30, 2015, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition. The PCRA 

court appointed counsel, who filed an amended PCRA petition. The PCRA 

court held an evidentiary hearing on December 19, 2016 and ultimately 

denied Appellant relief by opinion and order entered on March 27, 2017. 

This timely appeal followed.

4

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

A. The [PCRA c]ourt committed an error of law and/or abused its 

discretion in denying [Appellant’s] PCRA claim [that trial 

counsel was ineffective for failing to bring a motion] pursuant 

to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 regarding [Appellant’s] right to a speedy 

trial, when the Commonwealth failed to use due diligence in 

bringing [Appellant] to trial within the statutory requirement.

B. The [PCRA c]ourt committed an error of law and/or abused its 

discretion in denying [Appellant’s] PCRA claim of an illegal 

sentence, whereby the [trial c]ourt imposed sentence outside 

of the sentencing guidelines without disclosing, in open court 

at the time of sentencing, a statement of reason or reasons 

for the sentence imposed. In every case where a court of 

record imposes a sentence outside the sentencing guidelines[, 

there] shall be recorded on the guideline sentence form a 

copy of which shall be transmitted to the Pennsylvania 

commission on sentencing.

C. The [PCRA c]ourt committed an error of law and/or abused its 

discretion in denying [Appellant’s] PCRA claim of an illegal 

sentence, [based on the contention that] the [trial c]ourt 

____________________________________________

4 Appellant filed a notice of appeal on April 3, 2017. On April 10, 2017, the 

PCRA court entered an order directing Appellant to file a concise statement 

of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant 

complied timely on April 28, 2017. The PCRA court issued an opinion 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on May 18, 2017, which also incorporated its 

prior decision entered on March 27, 2017. 
J-S73001-17

- 5 -

improperly imposed mandatory minimum sentences on each 

count.

D. The [trial c]ourt committed an error of law and/or abused its 

discretion in denying [Appellant’s] PCRA claims related to 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 620 (jury waiver) when trial counsel failed to 

advise [Appellant] of his constitutional right to a jury trial and 

the [trial c]ourt failed to ascertain whether [Appellant] 

knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial 

pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. [] 620.

Appellant’s Brief at 5.

Appellant’s first and fourth claims allege, under the PCRA, that trial 

counsel was ineffective. We will examine those issues first. Our standard 

and scope of review are as follows:

An appellate court reviews the PCRA court's findings of fact to 

determine whether they are supported by the record, and 

reviews its conclusions of law to determine whether they are free 

from legal error. The scope of review is limited to the findings of 

the PCRA court and the evidence of record, viewed in the light 

most favorable to the prevailing party at the trial level.

To establish trial counsel's ineffectiveness, a petitioner must 

demonstrate: (1) the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) 

counsel had no reasonable basis for the course of action or 

inaction chosen; and (3) counsel's action or inaction prejudiced 

the petitioner.

Furthermore, a PCRA petitioner will be granted relief only when 

he proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his 

conviction or sentence resulted from the ineffective assistance of 

counsel which, in the circumstances of the particular case, so 

undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable 

adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place. 

Counsel is presumed effective, and to rebut that presumption, 

the PCRA petitioner must demonstrate that counsel's 

performance was deficient and that such deficiency prejudiced 

him.
J-S73001-17

- 6 -

Counsel's assistance is deemed constitutionally effective once 

this Court determines that the defendant has not established any 

one of the prongs of the ineffectiveness test.

Commonwealth v. Freeland, 106 A.3d 768, 775 (Pa. Super. 2014)

(internal citations, quotations and brackets omitted).

In his first issue presented, Appellant claims that trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to raise a violation of Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 prior to the 

commencement of trial. Appellant’s Brief at 9.5 Appellant avers that the 

trial court erred by determining that the Commonwealth exercised due 

diligence in bringing Appellant to trial within 365 days of filing the criminal 

complaint against him. Id. at 13-14. More specifically, Appellant argues 

that “[a]t the time the charges were filed [in June 2012], Appellant resided 

in Baltimore, Maryland at the residence listed on the original criminal 

complaint[,]” but “[t]he record is void of any evidence to show that law 

enforcement tried to serve a warrant or otherwise secure Appellant’s 

apprehension when Appellant’s whereabouts were admittedly known to the 

Commonwealth.” Id. at 14. Appellant maintains that “[o]nce his 

whereabouts were confirmed” the Commonwealth “failed to contact the 

____________________________________________

5 Appellant’s trial counsel sought dismissal of the charges under the IAD 

prior to jury selection by filing a motion to dismiss on December 3, 2013, 

arguing that Appellant was not brought to trial in Pennsylvania within 180 

days of his request for final disposition of the charges. The trial court 

denied relief and we affirmed. See Commonwealth v. Robinson, 2014 WL 

10752295 (Pa. Super. 2014) (unpublished memorandum). Appellant is now 

claiming that trial counsel also should have raised a Rule 600 claim, in 

addition to a claim under the IAD, to challenge this same period that he 

spent in custody in Maryland.
J-S73001-17

- 7 -

Baltimore City Detention Center to inquire about Appellant’s availability for 

trial in Pennsylvania[,]” “simply put a detainer on Appellant[,]” and did not 

make a request for extradition. Id. at 16. “Only because Appellant was 

pro-active and took the onus upon himself [to request a transfer from 

Maryland pursuant to the detainer] to face charges in Pennsylvania, was 

Appellant finally transported to Adams County on June 6, 2013.” Id. at 21. 

Appellant contends that these actions constitute a lack of due diligence by 

the Commonwealth and trial counsel should have sought dismissal of the 

charges, with prejudice, under Rule 600. Id. at 22.

Regarding Rule 600, we have stated:

The proper scope of review is limited to the evidence on the 

record of the Rule 600 evidentiary hearing, and the findings of 

the trial court. An appellate court must view the facts in the light 

most favorable to the prevailing party.

Additionally, when considering the trial court's ruling, this Court 

is not permitted to ignore the dual purpose behind Rule 600.

Rule 600 serves two equally important functions: (1) the 

protection of the accused's speedy trial rights, and (2) the 

protection of society. In determining whether an accused's right 

to a speedy trial has been violated, consideration must be given 

to society's right to effective prosecution of criminal cases, both 

to restrain those guilty of crime and to deter those 

contemplating it. However, the administrative mandate of Rule 

600 was not designed to insulate the criminally accused from 

good faith prosecution delayed through no fault of the 

Commonwealth.

So long as there has been no misconduct on the part of the 

Commonwealth in an effort to evade the fundamental speedy 

trial rights of an accused, Rule 600 must be construed in a 

manner consistent with society's right to punish and deter crime. 

In considering these matters ... courts must carefully factor into 

the ultimate equation not only the prerogatives of the individual 
J-S73001-17

- 8 -

accused, but the collective right of the community to vigorous 

law enforcement as well.

Rule 600, [] provides, in pertinent part, that “trial in a court case 

in which a written complaint is filed against the defendant shall 

commence within 365 days from the date on which the 

complaint is filed.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(2)(a). For purposes of 

computing when trial must commence, “periods of delay at any 

stage of the proceedings caused by the Commonwealth when the 

Commonwealth has failed to exercise due diligence shall be 

included.... Any other periods of delay shall be excluded from the 

computation.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(1). “When a defendant has 

not been brought to trial within the time periods set forth in 

paragraph (A), at any time before trial, the defendant's attorney, 

or the defendant if unrepresented, may file a written motion 

requesting that the charges be dismissed with prejudice on the 

ground that this rule has been violated.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(D)(1).

The Comment to the Rule explains the computation of time, in 

relevant part, as follows:

For purposes of determining the time within which 

trial must be commenced pursuant to paragraph (A), 

paragraph (C)(1) makes it clear that any delay in the 

commencement of trial that is not attributable to the 

Commonwealth when the Commonwealth has 

exercised due diligence must be excluded from the 

computation of time Thus, the inquiry for a judge in 

determining whether there is a violation of the time 

periods in paragraph (A) is whether the delay is 

caused solely by the Commonwealth when the 

Commonwealth has failed to exercise due diligence. 

If the delay occurred as a result of circumstances 

beyond the Commonwealth's control and despite its 

due diligence, the time is excluded. In determining 

whether the Commonwealth has exercised due 

diligence, the courts have explained that “[d]ue 

diligence is fact-specific, to be determined case-bycase; it does not require perfect vigilance and 

punctilious care, but merely a showing the 

Commonwealth has put forth a reasonable effort.”

Pa.R.Crim.P. 600, Comment (citations omitted).
J-S73001-17

- 9 -

Commonwealth v. Plowden, 157 A.3d 933, 936–37 (Pa. Super. 2017)

(case citations, quotations and original brackets omitted).

Moreover, we recognize the Comment to Rule 600 further states:

In addition to any other circumstances precluding the availability 

of the defendant or the defendant's attorney, the defendant 

should be deemed unavailable for the period of time during 

which the defendant contested extradition, or a 

responding jurisdiction delayed or refused to grant extradition; 

or during which the defendant was physically incapacitated or 

mentally incompetent to proceed; or during which the 

defendant was absent under compulsory process 

requiring his or her appearance elsewhere in connection 

with other judicial proceedings.

Comment, Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 (emphasis added).

Here, upon review of the record, at the PCRA hearing, Appellant 

admitted that he was arrested in Maryland on September 19, 2012 and

facing trial for charges there. N.T., 12/20/2016, at 16. Thus, by his own 

admission, Appellant was in custody in connection with other judicial 

proceedings. For this reason, we could find Appellant was unavailable during 

the time period of September 19, 2012 (when he was arrested and jailed in 

Maryland) until June 6, 2013 (when he was returned to Pennsylvania) for 

Rule 600 purposes. 

“A criminal defendant who is incarcerated in another jurisdiction is 

unavailable within the meaning of Rule 600 if the Commonwealth 

demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that it exercised due 

diligence in attempting to procure the defendant's return for trial.” 

Commonwealth v. McNear, 852 A.2d 401, 404 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation 
J-S73001-17

- 10 -

omitted). “The Commonwealth's stewardship [] must be judged 

by what was done rather than by what was not done” in Rule 600 cases. 

Commonwealth v. Selenski, 919 A.2d 229, 232 (Pa. Super. 2007).

In addressing Appellant’s current claim, the PCRA court first noted that 

“the history in bringing [Appellant] to trial has been extensively discussed by 

both [the trial court] and the Superior Court in the context of the IAD.” 

PCRA Court Opinion 3/27/2017, at 8. Moreover, the PCRA court recognized 

that Appellant did not cite any law, and our independent research on appeal 

did not reveal, “that the Commonwealth must comply with the time 

requirements of both the IAD and Rule 600 independently.” Id. at 9 n.8. 

Regardless, for the reasons that follow, we conclude that the Commonwealth 

complied with the Rule 600 time requirements by filing a detainer with 

Maryland authorities. 

The PCRA court further opined that “a panel of the Superior Court, in 

dicta, signaled the Commonwealth would meet its due diligence requirement 

by initiating extradition proceedings within 365 days from the filing of the 

complaint for a defendant imprisoned in another state.” PCRA Court Opinion 

3/27/2017, at 8 n.8, citing Commonwealth v. Booze, 947 A.2d 1287, 

1292 (Pa. Super. 2008). In Booze, “the Commonwealth knew [Booze] was 

being held in Maryland yet failed to follow the proper steps to secure her 

upon the disposition of the Maryland charges.” Booze, 947 A.2d at 1291. 

“Although the Commonwealth faxed a copy of the complaint to the Maryland 

authorities, there were no assurances made on behalf of Maryland that this 
J-S73001-17

- 11 -

would in fact serve as a detainer.” Id. We determined that the 

Commonwealth did not exercise due diligence because it did not initiate 

extradition proceedings or file a formal detainer with the proper authorities 

in Maryland. Id. However, we suggested that “the Commonwealth should 

at least initiate extradition proceedings within 365 days from the filing of the 

complaint for defendants who are imprisoned in another state in order to 

meet its duty as to due diligence [under Rule 600].” Booze, 947 A.2d at 

1292 (emphasis in original). It does not appear that our appellate courts 

have addressed what actions constitute the “initiation of extradition.”

Next, we examine the case law cited by Appellant regarding detainers 

and due diligence and, for the reasons that follow, reject his reliance on 

them. In arguing his Rule 600 claim, Appellant principally relies on two of 

this Court’s prior decisions: Commonwealth v. Alexander, 464 A.2d 1376 

(Pa. Super. 1983)6 and Commonwealth v. Colon, 87 A.3d 352 (Pa. Super. 

2014). See Appellant’s Brief at 12, 18, 20, and 22. In Colon, the 

Commonwealth only presented evidence regarding efforts to locate Colon, 

before filing a criminal complaint against him. Thereafter, we noted that 

“although the Commonwealth asserted that ‘Trooper Scott faxed a copy of 

the [Pennsylvania] complaint’ to the state institution in which [Colon] was 

____________________________________________

6

 While Appellant purports to cite to a case captioned “Commonwealth v. 

Hamilton” at page 22, n.22 in his appellate brief, the legal citation goes to 

Alexander, supra. 
J-S73001-17

- 12 -

confined, and that ‘a detainer was lodged against [Colon] therefore assuring

his release from state custody’ no evidence was presented to support this 

assertion.” Colon, 87 A.3d at 359. Here, there is no dispute that a detainer 

was filed against Appellant. Thus, Colon is inapplicable. 

Next, Appellant relies upon our decision in Alexander. In that case, 

the Commonwealth filed a complaint against Alexander in March of 1979. 

Alexander assured police he would turn himself in, but he did not. 

Thereafter, Pennsylvania police entered Alexander’s information into the 

National Crime Information Center. In January of 1980, Pennsylvania police 

received a call that Alexander was arrested in New Jersey and that there 

were outstanding charges pending against him there. On January 22, 1980, 

the Commonwealth learned that Alexander was incarcerated in New Jersey. 

The Commonwealth took no action, however, until it filed a detainer on 

March 27, 1980, after Alexander received his New Jersey sentence on 

February 27, 1980. Following Alexander’s conviction in Pennsylvania, he 

appealed to this Court asserting that his right to a speedy trial had been

denied. We agreed, reasoning that the 65-day period between January 22, 

1980 (when the Commonwealth became aware of Alexander’s whereabouts) 

and March 27, 1980 (when the Commonwealth requested Alexander’s return 

from a correctional facility in New Jersey under the Detainers Act) was not 

excludable under Rule 600’s predecessor because the Commonwealth failed 

to act for an extended period of time after learning of Alexander’s 

whereabouts. See Alexander, 464 A.2d at 1385-1385. We further held 
J-S73001-17

- 13 -

that the Commonwealth’s insufficient efforts to return Alexander to trial in 

Pennsylvania over the next six months constituted further grounds to award 

relief. As we explain below, these facts are not present in this case.

Although decisions from other states, as well as the opinions and 

standards of the American Bar Association (ABA), are not binding authority 

upon us, we may look at them for persuasive value. See Commonwealth 

v. Maguigan, 511 A.2d 1327, 1336 (Pa. 1986).

The American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice provides:

Standard 12-3.1. Prosecutor's obligations; notice to and 

availability of prisoner

To protect the right to speedy trial of a person serving a term of 

imprisonment either within or without the jurisdiction, it should 

be provided by rule or statute and, where necessary, interstate 

compact that:

(a) if the prosecuting attorney knows that a person 

charged with a criminal offense is serving a term of 

imprisonment in a penal institution of that or another 

jurisdiction, he or she must promptly:

(i) undertake to obtain the presence of the 

prisoner for trial; or

(ii) cause a detainer to be filed with the official 

having custody of the prisoner and request 

the official to so advise the prisoner and to 

advise the prisoner of his or her right to 

demand trial[.]

American Bar Association, Standards for Criminal Justice, Standard 12-3.1 

(2d ed.1980).

The commentary following ABA standard 12-3.1 states that the
J-S73001-17

- 14 -

above standard, addressed to the broader problem of a 

prisoner's right to speedy trial, requires the prosecutor to initiate 

procedures whereby the prisoner may demand trial whenever 

the prosecutor does not choose to undertake an immediate trial.

American Bar Association, Standards for Criminal Justice, Standard 12-3.1, 

Commentary at 12.37. 

Moreover, the commentary to ABA standard 12-2.2(a) states that 

[t]he prisoner should have the option (1) of demanding trial in 

order to overcome whatever disadvantages flow from the fact a 

detainer has been lodged against him, or (2) of not making the 

demand in the hope that the charges will be dropped before or 

at the time he completes his sentence [in the foreign 

jurisdiction]. 

American Bar Association, Standards for Criminal Justice, Standard 12-2.2, 

Commentary at 17-18. 

Several courts have implemented the above-mentioned American Bar 

Association standards in determining due diligence requirements under state 

speedy trial right rules. See State v. Anderson, 828 P.2d 1161, 1165

(Wash. App. 1992) (“While requiring prosecutors to lodge detainers against 

defendants and promptly secure their presence for trial may result in 

additional expense or give rise to some of the problems associated with 

detainers, these considerations do not outweigh the fundamental concerns 

underlying a defendant's right to a speedy trial.”); Conway v. State, 707 

P.2d 930, 936 (Alaska App. 1985) (“The prosecutor must either undertake 

to obtain the presence of the prisoner for trial by, for example, instituting 

extradition proceedings or filing a habeas corpus petition with the court in 

the jurisdiction in which the prisoner is incarcerated, seeking the defendant 
J-S73001-17

- 15 -

for purposes of trial, or the prosecutor must file a detainer with the 

appropriate officials and request that the defendant be made aware of the 

detainer.”). 

Moreover, several other jurisdictions have examined their speedy trial 

rules, in conjunction with federal and state constitutional principles, and 

determined that lodging detainers constitutes due diligence. See State v. 

Grant, 738 P.2d 106, 109 (Montana 1987) (“The time chargeable to 

defendant began on January 22, 1985, when the State of Montana issued 

the first detainer to defendant and the State of Idaho notifying them of 

charges pending against defendant in Montana. That time, as chargeable to 

defendant, ceased to run on June 19, 1985[,] when defendant asserted his 

right to a speedy trial by requesting final disposition of the charges against 

him in Montana.... Knowing that charges were pending against him in 

Montana, it was up to defendant to request speedy and final disposition of 

the charges against him.”); see also O'Bryan v. State, 326 So.2d 83, 87 

(Fla. App. 1976) (“The period for speedy trial is made to commence on the 

concurrence of the foreign prisoner's demand for trial and the State's filing 

of a detainer[.]”); see also Eaddy v. State, 352 So.2d 98 (Fla. App. 1977)

(Filing of a detainer against an accused who is in prison 

outside jurisdiction of authority which filed detainer does not activate 

180-day period within which accused must be tried under speedy trial rule; 

rather, speedy trial time begins to run when authority which 

filed detainer obtains custody of accused); see also State v. Wood, 924 
J-S73001-17

- 16 -

S.W.2d 342, 348 (Tenn. 1996) (“Wood deliberately chose to forgo 

a speedy trial request, hoping instead that the Tennessee charges would die 

of neglect. He acquiesced in the delay from the time he learned of 

the detainer in 1984 until 1990, after Alabama had offered conditional 

parole.”); see also State v. Dolack, 533 P.2d 1282, 1292 (Kan. 1975) (To 

obtain a speedy trial guaranteed by state Bill of Rights, as legislatively 

defined, it is incumbent upon an accused incarcerated in a penal institution 

to comply with all provisions of legislation applicable to his incarceration, 

including the preparation of his written request for disposition of detainer to 

be addressed to court in which the indictment, information or complaint is 

then pending against him and to the county attorney charged with the duty 

of prosecuting it.). 

In this matter, the PCRA court ultimately determined there was no 

violation of Rule 600, offering the following calculations:

The criminal complaint was filed against [Appellant] on June 17, 

2012. Therefore, the mechanical run-date of 365 days 

thereafter require[d] the Commonwealth to have brought 

[Appellant] to trial under Rule 600 on or before June 17, 2013. 

[Appellant] was arrested in Maryland in September 19, 2012 and 

returned to this jurisdiction under the IAD on [June 6, 2013].

[7]

 

This time is clearly excludable[]. Removal of this [260-day] time 

period from the mechanical calculation results in an adjusted 

____________________________________________

7 The PCRA court incorrectly noted the date of Appellant’s return to Adams 

County, Pennsylvania as April 12, 2013. That date is the date on which 

Appellant’s request for disposition of the Pennsylvania charges was received 

by the Adams County District Attorney’s office. Appellant was not returned 

to Pennsylvania until June 6, 2013.
J-S73001-17

- 17 -

trial date of approximately [March 4, 2014]. After [Appellant] 

was returned to this jurisdiction, through counsel, his 

preliminary hearing date was continued [twice from June 12, 

2013] until July 31, 2013. As this [49-day time period] is also 

excludable, [Appellant’s] adjusted Rule 600 run-date extends [to 

late April 2014]. [...T]he charges against [Appellant] were 

resolved in January 14, 2014. [...] Accordingly, [Appellant] is not 

entitled to relief on his [Rule 600] claim as counsel cannot be 

held ineffective for failing to pursue a meritless position.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/27/2017, at 8-9 (footnote omitted). 

Upon review, we discern no abuse of discretion or error of law in 

finding no merit to Appellant’s Rule 600 claim. Initially we note that 

Appellant’s argument centers primarily on the actions he believes the

Commonwealth should have taken; however, we must review only the 

actions actually taken by the Commonwealth. See Selenski, 919 A.2d at 

232. The ABA Standards suggest, and courts in Washington and Alaska 

agree, that in order to comply with speedy trial rights regarding a defendant 

incarcerated in a foreign jurisdiction, a state must initiate procedures to 

obtain their presence for trial. Without actually deciding the issue, we 

suggested as much in Booze and are guided by that decision. In further 

examining the initiation of transfer procedures, we recognize there are two 

mechanisms available to the Commonwealth to procure a defendant’s return 

to Pennsylvania: (1) by formal extradition or, (2) by lodging a detainer with 

the foreign jurisdiction so that the defendant can then demand trial. Jones, 

886 A.2d 689, 695. Thus, we summarily reject Appellant’s suggestion that 

the Commonwealth was required to initiate extradition proceedings. Here, 

there is no dispute that the Commonwealth, in fact, promptly filed a detainer 
J-S73001-17

- 18 -

against Appellant with Maryland authorities. Other jurisdictions, as well as 

the ABA, have determined that lodging a detainer qualifies as due diligence 

for speedy trial purposes. Taken together, the record supports the PCRA 

court’s findings that the Commonwealth took diligent steps to secure 

Appellant’s presence for trial in Pennsylvania, by lodging a detainer with 

Maryland authorities and informing him that there were outstanding charges 

against him in Pennsylvania. Appellant then started the extradition process. 

Accordingly, the time between the Commonwealth’s filing of the detainer 

and Appellant’s return to Adams County is excluded from the speedy trial 

calculation and the PCRA court properly determined that Appellant’s time 

spent in custody in Maryland was excludable under Rule 600. Moreover, 

since there is no dispute that extensions requested by defense counsel were 

excludable, it is clear, as the PCRA court found, that the disposition of 

Appellant’s criminal complaint was reached within 365 days after the filing of 

the criminal complaint when the original mechanical run date is adjusted by 

the delays attributable to Appellant. Accordingly, we need not review the 

time period between the filing of the complaint and Appellant’s subsequent 

arrest in Maryland. As such, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to 

raise a Rule 600 claim. Hence, Appellant’s first issue fails. 

In his fourth issue presented, Appellant claims that trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to advise Appellant of his right to a jury trial pursuant 

to Pa.R.Crim.P. 620. Appellant’s Brief at 38. Appellant claims that the trial 

court did not orally colloquy him regarding waiver of his right to a jury trial, 
J-S73001-17

- 19 -

and he did not sign a written colloquy. Id. at 39. Appellant claims that the 

trial court erred by determining that he was a savvy criminal defendant who 

was familiar with the criminal justice system and jury trial waivers when he 

proceeded to a stipulated bench trial. Id. at 40-42. In sum, Appellant 

claims that “the [trial c]ourt, the Commonwealth, and trial counsel 

presumed that Appellant knew [his] rights or did not care to confirm said 

presumption, or just flatly forgot Appellant’s constitutional rights and their 

respective obligations.” Id. at 43.

Our Supreme Court has stated:

Of course, lawyers have an obligation to counsel their clients in 

conjunction with the waiver of basic rights, including the waiver 

of a jury; but the mere absence of [an on-the-record] oral 

waiver colloquy does not automatically prove that a right was 

relinquished unknowingly or involuntarily and that the trial 

lawyer was ineffective for causing the waiver. When a 

presumptively-valid waiver is collaterally attacked under the 

guise of ineffectiveness of counsel, it must be analyzed like any 

other ineffectiveness claim. Such an inquiry is not resolved by 

the mere absence of an oral waiver colloquy; instead, the 

analysis must focus on the totality of relevant circumstances. 

Those circumstances include the defendant's knowledge of and 

experience with jury trials, his explicit written waiver (if any), 

and the content of relevant off-the-record discussions counsel 

had with his client.

* * *

Absence of an oral colloquy alone does not prove that 

a jury waiver was in fact unknowing or involuntary; rather, the 

PCRA court must look to the totality of the circumstances 

including the discussions between the lawyers and their clients 

regarding the jury waiver. The analysis regarding the underlying 

merits of appellants' ineffectiveness challenge must be more 

precise and must account for all relevant circumstances 

surrounding the waiver.
J-S73001-17

- 20 -

Commonwealth v. Birdsong, 24 A.3d 319, 339 (Pa. 2011) (internal 

citations, quotations, and ellipses omitted).

Furthermore, we have previously determined:

For a waiver to be knowing, the defendant must be made aware 

of the “essential ingredients” of the right he or she is waiving to 

ensure there is an understanding of the significance of what he 

or she is giving up.

For example, for a defendant to knowingly and 

intelligently waive his right to a jury trial, the defendant must 

know the essential ingredients, basic to the concept of 

a jury trial, including the requirements that the jury be chosen 

from members of the community (a jury of one's peers), that the 

verdict be unanimous, and that the accused be allowed to 

participate in the selection of the jury panel.

Commonwealth v. Baker, 72 A.3d 652, 667 (Pa. Super. 2013) (internal 

citations and most quotations omitted).

On this issue, the trial court determined:

Although instantly an oral colloquy was not conducted with 

[Appellant], he undoubtedly understood his rights at the time of 

waiver. [Appellant] did not present before the [c]ourt as a first 

[time] offender[,] but rather had previously been convicted of 

two felony drug offenses. Trial counsel’s hearing testimony as to 

[Appellant’s] sophistication and knowledge of criminal law is 

corroborated by his numerous pro se pleadings in this matter as 

well as his discussions with the [c]ourt during various 

proceedings. This fundamental knowledge of his rights was 

supplemented at the time of his arraignment when he waived 

formal arraignment and acknowledged in writing that he 

received and understood his rights including the right to a jury 

trial. Additionally, trial counsel testified that on at least two 

occasions following arraignment, he discussed with [Appellant] 

his right to a jury trial. On one of those occasions, [Appellant] 

initialed and signed a plea colloquy. 
J-S73001-17

- 21 -

PCRA Court Opinion, 3/27/2017, at 10-11 (footnotes omitted). The PCRA 

court found trial counsel’s testimony credible and concluded that Appellant 

understood his right to a jury trial prior to entering his plea. Id. at 11-12.

Upon review, we agree that although the trial court did not formally 

advise Appellant of his right to a trial by jury, based upon the totality of the 

circumstances, Appellant was aware of such right before opting to proceed 

with a stipulated bench trial. Here, the trial court credited trial counsel’s 

testimony that he discussed the essential elements of the right to a jury trial 

with Appellant. We will not usurp that determination on the record before 

us. Moreover, while not admitted into evidence at the stipulated bench trial, 

Appellant had signed and initialed a written guilty plea colloquy earlier. That 

written colloquy addressed all of the questions that the trial court should 

have covered in an oral jury waiver colloquy, including the requirements that 

the jury be chosen from members of the community, that the verdict be 

unanimous, and that the accused be allowed to participate in the selection of 

the jury panel. Moreover, while this written colloquy was not entered into 

the record at the time of the stipulated bench trial, Appellant does not 

contest that he signed it or claim that trial counsel did not discuss it with 

him prior to the stipulated trial. Finally, the PCRA court properly considered 

the fact that Appellant is a savvy defendant, having been twice convicted of 

drug-related felonies and filing numerous legally supported pro se

documents in this matter. Thus, we agree with the trial court that Appellant 
J-S73001-17

- 22 -

was properly informed of his right to a jury trial and there is no merit to 

Appellant’s claim that counsel was ineffective in this regard. 

Appellant’s second and third claims involve somewhat related 

sentencing issues, so we will examine them together. In his second issue, 

Appellant avers that the trial court abused its discretion or erred as a matter 

of law in imposing a sentence outside of the sentencing guidelines without 

stating the reason for the deviation on the record. Appellant’s Brief at 24-

25. More specifically, Appellant collectively challenges his three concurrent 

sentences for PWID, five to ten years of imprisonment each, contending that 

“[w]ith a prior record score of [four] (and an offense gravity score of [seven] 

or [eight] depending on the weight of the drug) the [s]tandard [g]uideline 

range for PWID is 21 to 27 months.” Id. at 26. Appellant claims that the 

sentencing guidelines were inaccurately calculated and ignored, and that the 

trial court never explained the reasons for deviating from them. Id. at 28. 

Instead, Appellant suggests that the trial court “only colloquied Appellant on 

the maximum penalties he could face for each charge [and d]efense counsel 

never objected to this error[.]” Id. at 29. 

In his third issue presented, Appellant “believes he was sentenced to 

mandatory minimum sentences” on each count of PWID and “relies on the 

sentencing guideline forms filled out after sentencing to support his claim.” 

Id. Appellant posits that “[i]f the [trial c]ourt sentenced Appellant to a 

mandatory minimum sentence, then Appellant believes said sentences are 
J-S73001-17

- 23 -

illegal in consideration of Alleyne v. U.S., 133 S.Ct. 2151 (2013)[.]” Id. at 

31.

Initially, we note that Appellant commingles two legally distinct 

sentencing issues, the discretionary aspects of sentencing and the illegality 

of his sentence.

8

 We have previously determined:

the term “illegal sentence” refer[s] to a class of cases that 

includes: (1) claims that the sentence fell outside of the legal 

parameters prescribed by the applicable statute; (2) claims 

involving merger/double jeopardy; and (3) claims implicating the 

rule in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 

[...I]llegal sentencing claims challenge the fundamental legal 

authority of the court to impose the sentence that it did.

Commonwealth v. Farrow, 168 A.3d 207, 212 (Pa. Super. 2017) (some 

quotations and citations omitted).

“A challenge to the legality of a particular sentence may be reviewed 

by any court on direct appeal; it need not be preserved in the lower courts 

to be reviewable and may even be raised by an appellate court sua sponte.” 

Batts, 163 A.3d at 434. We review the legality of a sentence de novo and 

our scope of review is plenary. Farrow, 168 A.3d at 212 (internal citation, 

____________________________________________

8 “For appellate review purposes, challenges to a criminal sentence typically 

fall into one of two categories, implicating either the legality of

the sentence or the discretionary aspects of the sentence.” Commonwealth 

v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410, 434 (Pa. 2017). “[A] claim challenging a sentencing 

court's legal authority to impose a particular sentence presents a question of 

sentencing legality.” Id. “This distinction is critical, as the determination 

also encompasses matters of issue preservation, [an appellate court’s]

jurisdiction to decide the question presented, and the level of deference the 

reviewing court must give to the decision of the sentencing court.” Id.
J-S73001-17

- 24 -

quotation, and brackets omitted). Our Supreme Court has instructed that 

we must presume that statutes are constitutional and in order to declare a 

statute unconstitutional it must clearly, plainly, and palpably violate the 

constitution. Id.

Here, Appellant was sentenced concurrently to five to ten years of 

imprisonment for each of three counts of PWID cocaine and for one count of 

conspiracy. The statutory maximum sentence for PWID cocaine is fifteen 

years of incarceration. See 35 P.S. § 780-113(f). Moreover, as a repeat 

felony offender,9 Appellant was exposed to twice that prison time on each 

PWID offense. See N.T., 1/14/2014, at 935; see also Trial Court Opinion, 

3/27/2017, at 10 (Appellant “had previously been convicted of two felony 

drug offenses.”); see also 35 P.S. § 780-115(a) (“Any person convicted of a 

second or subsequent offense [of PWID] or of a similar offense under any 

statute of the United States or of any state may be imprisoned for a term up 

to twice the term otherwise authorized, fined an amount up to twice that 

otherwise authorized, or both.”) Inchoate crimes, like conspiracy, have the 

same maximum sentences as the underlying crimes to which they relate, but 

are not subject to sentencing enhancements. See Commonwealth v. 

Hoke, 962 A.2d 664, 668, 599 Pa. 587, 593 (Pa. 2009). Thus, Appellant’s 

statutory maximum penalty for conspiracy was also fifteen years of 

____________________________________________

9

 Appellant does not challenge his prior felony convictions or contend his 

prior criminal record was inaccurately reflected before entering his plea.
J-S73001-17

- 25 -

imprisonment, but not subject to doubling under the repeat offender 

enhancement. 

Despite Appellant’s attempt to characterize all mandatory minimum 

sentences as illegal following Alleyne/Apprendi, our Supreme Court has 

determined Section 780-115 is constitutional. See Commonwealth v. 

Aponte, 855 A.2d 800, 809 (Pa. 2004) (statute doubling statutory 

maximum penalty for PWID upon proof of a prior conviction without 

requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt before a jury did not violate 

defendant’s due process rights where prior drug convictions were capable of 

objective proof). Here, each of Appellant’s five to ten year sentences fell 

within constitutional, statutory maximums for the various crimes and, as 

such, Appellant did not receive illegal sentences.

Appellant’s related claim that the trial court failed to state its reasons 

for deviating from the sentencing guidelines is a discretionary aspect of 

sentencing claim, rather than a challenge to the illegality of sentence. 

See Commonwealth v. McLaine, 150 A.3d 70, 76 (Pa. Super. 2016). 

Unlike legality of sentence claims, which can be raised for the first time on 

appeal as long as the reviewing court has jurisdiction, discretionary aspects 

of sentencing claims must be properly raised below, even those couched in 

ineffective assistance of counsel under the PCRA. See Commonwealth v. 

Taylor, 65 A.3d 462, 465 (Pa. Super. 2013). Appellant did not raise his 

claim that the trial court failed to state its reasons for deviating from the 
J-S73001-17

- 26 -

sentencing guidelines in his PCRA petition or his amended PCRA petition. 

Thus, Appellant waived this aspect of his sentencing claim.

Regardless, the issue is otherwise without merit. “Assuming 

[a] plea agreement is legally possible to fulfill, when the parties enter 

the plea agreement on the record, and the court accepts and approves 

the plea, then the parties and the court must abide by the terms of 

the agreement.” Commonwealth v. Parsons, 969 A.2d 1259, 1268 (Pa.

Super. 2009). If the sentencing court gives a defendant “a lesser sentence 

than called for in the parties' agreement, the court overstep[s] its bounds, 

defeat[s] the Commonwealth's rightful expectations, and frustrate[s]

the quid pro quo of the plea bargain.” Id. at 1269–1270. Appellant has not 

cited law, and our independent research has not revealed any, that would 

suggest that the trial court has to consider the sentencing guidelines prior to 

accepting a negotiated plea agreement where the sentences all fall within 

the statutory guideline maximums. Here, the parties placed the terms of the 

completely negotiated plea agreement on the record and the trial court 

properly accepted it and is now bound by it. Moreover, Appellant does not 

challenge the plea process or otherwise suggest that his plea was entered 

unknowingly, involuntarily, or unintelligently. Accordingly, there is no merit 

to Appellant’s sentencing claims.

Order affirmed.

Judge Strassburger joins the memorandum.

Judge Dubow concurs in result of the memorandum.
J-S73001-17

- 27 -

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 06/22/2018