The Law Library of Congress, Global Legal Research Directorate

(202) 707-5080 (phone) • (866) 550-0442 (fax) • law@loc.gov • http://www.law.gov

Initiatives to Counter Fake News 

in Selected Countries

Argentina • Brazil • Canada • China • Egypt • France 

Germany • Israel • Japan • Kenya • Malaysia

Nicaragua • Russia • Sweden 

United Kingdom

April 2019 
This report is provided for reference purposes only. 

It does not constitute legal advice and does not represent the official 

opinion of the United States Government. The information provided 

reflects research undertaken as of the date of writing. 

It has not been updated.
Contents

Comparative Summary............................................................................................................................. 1

Argentina..................................................................................................................................................... 4

Brazil ............................................................................................................................................................ 7

Canada....................................................................................................................................................... 11

China.......................................................................................................................................................... 18

Egypt.......................................................................................................................................................... 25

France......................................................................................................................................................... 29

Germany.................................................................................................................................................... 33

Israel........................................................................................................................................................... 41

Japan .......................................................................................................................................................... 52

Kenya ......................................................................................................................................................... 57

Malaysia .................................................................................................................................................... 67

Nicaragua .................................................................................................................................................. 78

Russia......................................................................................................................................................... 80

Sweden ...................................................................................................................................................... 87

United Kingdom .................................................................................................................................... 100
The Law Library of Congress 1

Comparative Summary

Peter Roudik

Director of Legal Research

This report examines the legal approaches of fifteen countries, representing all regions of the 

world, to the emerging problem of manipulation with “fake news” using mass and social media, 

especially the impact of fake news on ongoing political processes and elections, and the legislative 

measures undertaken to counteract the dissemination of false information. Fake news as a 

phenomenon is not new and has been known since ancient times, but the present-day 

proliferation of digital and social media platforms, which allow for much broader distribution of 

information to a global audience, makes the need to counter fake news much more acute. With 

the exception of Japan, which appears to be the only country in this study where fake news 

scandals are limited to newspapers and tweeted messages that have no outside influence, a fact 

explained by the difficulty of the Japanese language for foreigners, the widespread distribution 

of false information and its impact on decision making and democratic processes is becoming a 

challenge worldwide. In 2017, a parliamentary committee in Egypt identified the dissemination 

of 53,000 false rumors over a period of two months. In Germany, 59% of survey participants 

stated that they had encountered fake news, and in some segments of the population this number 

was up to almost 80%. In Kenya, a country where 90% of the population has access to high-speed 

internet, 90% of surveyed users said that they received false or inaccurate information regarding 

the recent elections through social media.

The countries included in this study are addressing the fake news problem through one or more 

of the following four approaches: 

• In the absence of legislation that expressly addresses the objectivity of news posted on social 

media, some of the surveyed countries apply relevant provisions of existing civil, criminal, 

administrative, and other laws regulating the media, elections, and anti-defamation (Canada, 

Japan, Nicaragua, Sweden, and the United Kingdom), even though these laws, enacted in the 

pre-internet era, do not always reflect current technological and 

telecommunications developments. 

• Others are choosing to enact new and more focused legislation that imposes sanctions on 

social media networks that spread false news, usually imposing fines and ordering the 

removal of information identified as false (China, Egypt, France, Germany, Israel, Malaysia, 

and Russia). In Malaysia and Egypt these provisions apply extraterritorially. 

• Another option reflected in the country surveys is to engage election authorities and digital 

platforms to secure a well-informed electorate, either by identifying and blocking fake news, 

providing fact-checking resources for the general public, or through the mass publication of 

“real” news during election season and beyond (Argentina, the UK, China, and Malaysia). 

Argentina, for example, is considering legislation that would create a Commission for the 

Verification of Fake News within the National Election Chamber. During national election 

campaigns, the Commission would recognize, label, and prevent the distribution of news

considered “of doubtful credibility.” Both the UK and China have programs in place to 
Initiatives to Counter Fake News: Comparative Summary

The Law Library of Congress 2

systematically rebut fake news by publishing reliable information, while Malaysia provides a 

fact-checking portal.

• Some of the countries are also addressing the issue in a more general way by educating 

citizens about the dangers of fake news (Sweden and Kenya). Sweden starts at a young age, 

having enlisted a famous cartoon character to teach children about the dangers of fake news

through a cartoon strip that illustrates what happens to the bear’s super-strength when false 

rumors are circulated about him. The US Embassy in Kenya launched a media literacy 

campaign in 2018, initially aimed at the Kenya chapter of the Young African Leaders 

Initiative, with the specific goal of stopping the dissemination of fake news. 

Among the countries surveyed, there is no common position regarding the definition of “fake 

news” and its scope. The UK government attempts to avoid use of the term altogether, instead 

using the words “disinformation” and “misinformation.” Countries with established anti-fake 

news laws have more elaborate terminology. Malaysian legislation defines fake news as “any 

news, information, data and reports, which is or are wholly or partly false, whether in the form 

of features, visuals or audio recordings or in any other form capable of suggesting words or 

ideas.” Russia passed a law penalizing the publication of fake news in March 2019, defining the 

term as “socially-significant false information distributed under the guise of truthful messages if 

they create a threat of endangering people’s lives, health, or property; create possibilities for mass 

violations of public order or public security; or may hinder the work of transportation and social 

infrastructure, credit institutions, lines of communications, industry, and energy enterprises.” 

China has made it a crime to “fabricate false information on [a] dangerous situation, epidemic, 

disaster or alert and disseminate such information via [an] information network or any other 

media while clearly knowing that it is fabricated, thereby seriously disturbing public order.” 

Relying on the 1881 Freedom of the Press Law, France has made it illegal to “disturb public peace 

through the publication, dissemination, or reproduction of fake news in bad faith.” The bad-faith 

publication, dissemination, or reproduction of forged or altered items, or items falsely attributed 

to third parties, is also prohibited. 

 

Broad definitions are usually found in the laws of those countries that are rated low in indices 

related to freedom of speech, and such laws are often viewed by human rights organizations as 

government attempts to further restrict free speech and stifle opposition. The new Malaysian 

government tried unsuccessfully to repeal a 2018 act under which the government is required to 

“take measures to remove” the publication of recognized false information and imprison the 

publisher for up to six years. In Canada and Kenya courts have found anti-fake news provisions 

unconstitutional as a violation of freedom of expression and have thus suspended the 

implementation of such provisions.

Following the events of the US 2016 election campaign, several countries introduced legal 

mechanisms aimed at protecting the integrity of the democratic process, although depending on 

country specifics these laws apply to varied actors. In Sweden, the focus was on self-regulation 

by professional organizations of journalists and other media providers and strengthening ethics 

rules. This solution followed the European Union’s approach where an EU-wide voluntary Code 

of Practice on Disinformation has been introduced. However, in view of the inadequacy of 

voluntary measures taken by social media platforms, Germany enacted the Network 

Enforcement Act in 2017. While this Act does not create new obligations for social media, it 
The Law Library of Congress 3 

Initiatives to Counter Fake News: Comparative Summary

imposes heavy fines for noncompliance with existing legislation and creates rules for the

investigation and removal of illegal content hosted by networks with a very large number of 

registered users. French law also provides for special preventive measures that need to be 

implemented by operators of large-scale online platforms. Russian law distinguishes between 

news published by online media, news aggregators, and individual social network users. There 

are specific rules for the removal of information and the liability of authors, publishers, and 

internet providers depending on the type of the online platform. 

Some countries are also taking steps to prevent foreign influence in their national elections. 

Interesting examples include an Israeli bill targeting foreign propaganda that, if passed, would 

allow the head of the Central Election Commission, who serves as a Supreme Court justice, to 

issue injunctions preventing the receipt of prohibited donations, monetary or otherwise, under 

current law. Under French law, a judge may order any measures necessary to stop the online 

dissemination of misleading information during the three months preceding an election. 

During the same period, foreign television broadcasts may be suspended if they deliver false 

information. 

The governments of several countries included in this report recognize that a 

substantive response to disinformation could be an effective way to tackle fake news. 

The British government’s position is that it is more important to inform citizens of the facts 

than to simply rebut false information. For this purpose, a Rapid Response Unit within the 

executive branch monitors news and engages with the public online. In China, a government 

online platform called “Refuting Rumors” was launched to broadcast “real” news sourced 

from government agencies and state-owned media. A similar web portal allowing the public 

to check the authenticity of news found online has been established in Malaysia. In 

addition, Kenya and Sweden have general education campaigns aimed at young people in 

place to counter the fake news trend, as noted above. 

The individual country surveys that follow analyze current and proposed initiatives to limit the 

spread of false information undertaken at the national level, each country’s challenges 

associated with these efforts, and efforts undertaken by national governments to secure the 

validity and accuracy of legal information. 
The Law Library of Congress 4 

Argentina 

Graciela Rodriguez-Ferrand 

Senior Foreign Law Specialist

SUMMARY Argentina is advancing some initiatives against fake news in advance of next year’s 

presidential elections. Proposed legislation would create a Comisón de Verificación 

de Noticias Falsas (CVNF) (Commission for the Verification of Fake News) within the 

Cámara Nacional Electoral (CNE). The CVNF would be in charge of the detection,

recognition, labeling, and prevention of fake news exposed through digital media 

broadcasts during national election campaigns. The CNE has already created a National 

Registry of social media accounts and websites of candidates, political parties, and 

party leadership, which is intended to enable the detection of false accounts. The 

accuracy of legal information is secured through the official publication of the national 

laws and regulations in an official portal online as well as in print. 

The widespread manipulation of fake news through social media has become a serious concern 

in Argentina, particularly in light of next year’s presidential elections.1 Of the two basic 

approaches governments have taken to address this problem—regulating and applying sanctions 

to social media networks spreading fake news, and engagement between election authorities and 

digital platforms to secure a well-informed electorate—Argentina has taken steps toward the 

second approach.2 

Argentina is considering proposed legislation to create a Comisón de Verificación de Noticias 

Falsas (CVNF) (Commission for the Verification of Fake News) within the Cámara Nacional 

Electoral (CNE),3 which would be in charge of the detection, recognition, labeling, and prevention 

of fake news exposed through digital media broadcasts during national election campaigns.4 It 

would only operate during national election campaigns.5

According to proposed legislation, the CVNF’s aim would be to preserve the value of truth in 

broadcasting by digital media, the protection of freedom of expression, respect for the values and 

beliefs of news consumers via the internet, and the truthfulness of facts reported through social 

1 Laura Serra, Fake News. Una Alerta para el Sistema Democrático, LA NACIÓN (Oct. 7, 2018), 

https://www.lanacion.com.ar/2178565-fake-news-una-alerta-sistema-democratico, archived at

https://perma.cc/42R7-BLC2. 

2 Id. 

3 Proyecto de Ley Creación de Comisión de Verificación de Noticias Falsas, Aug. 28, 2018, art. 1, Honorable 

Cámara de Diputados de la Nación, https://www.hcdn.gob.ar/proyectos/texto Completo.jsp?exp=5228-D2018&tipo=LEY, archived at https://perma.cc/7YZX-AYMA.

4 Id. 

5 Id. art. 3. 
Initiatives to Counter Fake News: Argentina 

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networks .6 The proposal recognizes the right to internet access as a human right, based on full 

respect for human dignity, freedom, equality, and diversity in all its expressions.7

Under the measure, all individuals and entities would have the right to create, transmit, and 

publish digital content via the internet and/or to receive such content without being subject to 

restraint, interference, or discrimination, except when the content is false information published 

as real and intentionally causes harm to another.8

The CVNF would operate by reviewing publications to verify the reality of the facts on which 

they are based, excluding those that are only based on ideological positions or reasoning 

expressed discursively.9 The CVNF would identify potentially fake news through the 

following methods: 

 Checking the actual existence of the facts reported in the news by contrasting them with 

users’ comments 

 Excessive viralization of the news 

 By complaint made by persons, openly or anonymously, on the special website created by the 

CNE for this purpose 

 Other evidence of false news in the opinion of the CNE10

The proposal provides for fake news verification procedures that would be triggered by a 

complaint filed with the CVNF. Verification would encompass the identification of the source of 

information, verification of the actual facts on which the story is based, and cross-checking data 

on the origin and development of the reported facts, among other measures.11 

Once news was identified as false, the CVNF would report it to the CNE, which could take the 

following measures: 

 Order internet providers to tag and label the information subject to verification under the 

caption “Notice of doubtful credibility” 

 Require internet service providers to reduce the distribution of the labeled news 

 Register it on the public website created by the CNE as news of dubious credibility as 

determined by the Commission 

 

6 Id. art. 4. 

7 Id. art. 7. 

8 Id. art. 8. 

9 Id. art. 9. 

10 Id. art. 10. 

11 Id. art. 11. 
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A secretariat of the CNE Chamber would be tasked with monitoring the entire process on the 

identification and labeling of false news. Internet service providers would be required to comply 

with a CNE order within twelve hours.12 

Violations of the law would be subject to a range of sanctions, including warnings, fines, 

disqualification as a government contractor/provider for up to ten years, loss of benefits or 

special tax regimes, and suspension for two years of the portal or network that failed to remove 

false or malicious content after being ordered to do so.13

In addition, the CNE has issued a resolution creating a registry of social media accounts and 

websites of candidates, political parties, and its leadership.14 The registration requirement is 

intended to allow the detection of false accounts.15 Under the resolution, the CNE will 

periodically publish the results of the monitoring of election campaign advertising on social 

media and websites.16 Registered political parties will be required to submit the audiovisual 

material that they broadcast on the internet and social media.17

With regard to securing the accuracy of legal information, the government provides free access 

to comprehensive national and provincial legislation through its portal infoleg.gov.ar, within the 

Ministry of Justice and Human Rights.18

The Boletín Oficial (Official Gazette) is the official publication of legislation in the country.19 Its 

content is considered authentic both in its printed and electronic editions.20 Currently, the 

National Directorate of the Official Registry depends functionally on the Legal and Technical 

Secretariat of the Presidency of the Nation, which is the entity in charge of publishing the 

Official Gazette.21 

 

12 Id. art. 12. 

13 Id. art. 13. 

14 Acordada Extraordinaria No. 66/2018, Aug. 16, 2018, art. 2, Cámara Nacional Electoral, 

https://www.electoral.gob.ar/nuevo/paginas/pdf/AE_066_18.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/ C2L3-

TBCS. 

15 Serra, supra note 1. 

16 Acordada Extraordinaria No. 66/2018, art. 1. 

17 Id. art. 3. 

18 Infoleg, Información Legislativa y Documental, MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA Y DERECHOS HUMANOS, PRESIDENCIA DE LA 

NACIÓN, http://www.infoleg.gob.ar (last visited Mar. 8, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/UVG8-3ZVC. 

19 BOLETÍN OFICIAL DE LA REPÚBLICA ARGENTINA, https://www.boletinoficial.gob.ar/#!estatica/ institucional

(last visited Mar. 8, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/6ALA-ZC37. 

20 Id. 

21 Id.
The Law Library of Congress 7 

Brazil 

Eduardo Soares 

Senior Foreign Law Specialist

SUMMARY With no laws regulating fake news, Brazil is making use of existing federal laws to try to 

mediate the problem. Attempts were made by a Superior Court to curb the use of fake 

news during the 2018 general elections. In the meantime, Congress is analyzing several 

bills of law that have been introduced to criminalize the practice. Law portals maintained 

by different branches of the government provide legal information to the population.

I. Introduction 

Brazil has yet to enact specific legislation aimed at protecting the objectivity of any type of news 

regardless of media and so far has no legal definition of “fake news.” Currently, the Penal Code, 

Electoral Code, and federal law are being used to fight the phenomenon. Furthermore, for the 2018 

general elections, the Superior Electoral Tribunal enacted a resolution that targeted fake news 

viewed as hate speech in electoral advertising during the electoral campaign. In an attempt to 

address the problem, several bills of law dealing with this subject are under discussion in Congress. 

II. Legal Framework 

A. Penal Code 

The Penal Code punishes with detention from six months to two years and a fine the slandering 

of someone (calúnia) by falsely imputing to a person a fact defined as a crime.1 The same 

punishment applies to anyone who propagates or divulges the imputation, knowing it is false.2 

To defame somebody (difamação) by imputing to that person offensive facts to his or her 

reputation is punishable with detention from three months to one year and a fine.3 To injure 

someone (injúria) by offending his or her dignity is punishable with detention from one to six 

months or a fine.4 If the injury involves the use of elements referring to race, color, ethnicity, 

religion, origin, or the condition of an elderly person or person with disability, the punishment is 

imprisonment from one to three years and a fine.5

 

1 CÓDIGO PENAL, Decreto-Lei No. 2.848, de 7 de Dezembro de 1940, art. 138, http://www.planalto. 

gov.br/ccivil_03/decreto-lei/Del2848compilado.htm, archived at https://perma.cc/5U3D-NT7K. 

2 Id. art. 138(§ 1). 

3 Id. art. 139. 

4 Id. art. 140. 

5 Id. art. 130(§ 3). 
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The Law Library of Congress 8

B. Electoral Code 

The Electoral Code determines that advertising meant to slander, defame, or injure any person or 

the organs or entities exercising public authority is not to be tolerated.6 The person, organ, or 

entity who has been slandered, defamed, or injured, without prejudice to and regardless of the 

competent criminal action, may demand compensation for moral damages in Civil Court.7 The 

offender and his or her political party may be jointly and severally liable for the offenses.8 

Voting, when corrupted by falsehood, fraud, coercion, use of the means referred to in article 237 of the 

Electoral Code, or use of a process of advertising or obtaining votes prohibited by law is voidable.9 

Article 237 determines that the interference of economic power and the abuse of the power of 

authority, contrary to freedom of the vote, will be curbed and punished.10

Article 323 determines that to publicize through advertising facts known to be untrue in relation 

to parties or candidates that are capable of exerting an influence on the electorate is punishable 

with detention of two months to one year, or payment of a fine.11 The penalty is increased if the 

crime is committed through the press, radio, or television.12

C. Law No. 12,965 of April 23, 2014 

Law No. 12, 965 of April 23, 2014, establishes principles, guarantees, rights, and duties for the use 

of the internet in Brazil and determines the guidelines for action by the Union, states, Federal 

District, and municipalities in relation to the matter.13 Article 7 of Law 12,965 determines that 

access to the internet is essential to the exercise of citizenship, and the user is guaranteed, among 

other things, the following rights: 

I - inviolability of intimacy and private life, their protection and compensation for material 

or moral damage resulting from their violation; 

II - inviolability and secrecy of the flow of their communications over the internet, except 

by judicial order, according to the law.14

 

6 CÓDIGO ELEITORAL, Lei No. 4.737, de 15 de Julho de 1965, art. 243(IX), http://www.planalto. 

gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/L4737.htm, archived at https://perma.cc/QE2P-28GH. 

7 Id. art. 243(§ 1). 

8 Id. 

9 Id. art. 222. 

10 Id. art. 237. 

11 Id. art. 323. 

12 Id. art. 323 (sole para.). 

13 Lei No. 12.965, de 23 de Abril de 2014, art. 1, http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2011-

2014/2014/lei/l12965.htm, archived at https://perma.cc/8DRS-ANU3. 

14 Id. art. 7. 
Initiatives to Counter Fake News: Brazil 

The Law Library of Congress 9

In order to ensure freedom of expression and prevent censorship, providers of internet 

connections are normally not liable for damages arising from content generated by third parties.15 

However, internet providers may be held liable for damages arising from content generated by 

third parties if they fail to comply with a specific court order to make infringing content 

unavailable, acting within the scope and technical limits of its service and within the deadline 

indicated, except where there are legal provisions to the contrary.16 The court order must contain, 

under penalty of nullity, a clear and specific identification of the content deemed to be infringing, 

allowing the unambiguous identification of the material.17

D. Resolution TSE No. 23,551 of December 18, 2017 

On December 18, 2017, the Superior Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, TSE) issued 

Resolution No. 23,551, which provides for electoral advertising, illicit campaign practices, and 

free election time.18 In regard to fake news viewed as hate speech, article 17(I) determines that 

advertising that conveys prejudices based on origin, race, sex, color, age, and any other forms of 

discrimination will not be tolerated. The offender must respond for the use of prohibited 

advertising and, if applicable, for abuse of power.19

III. Law Portals 

The Presidency of the Republic of Brazil maintains a national law portal,20 which provides access 

to federal laws and state constitutions. The national press21 has a website that provides access to 

the federal official gazette (Diário Oficial da União). 

The Federal Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal, STF) maintains a portal that makes 

available the electronic judicial gazette (Diário da Justiça Eletrônico), which is an instrument of 

official communication, publication, and dissemination of judicial acts of the STF.22

Official gazettes for the states are maintained by the respective state governments and provide 

access to state laws and regulations. 

 

 

15 Id. art. 18. 

16 Id. art. 19. 

17 Id. art. 19(§ 1). 

18 Resolução TSE No. 23.551, de 18 de Dezembro de 2017, art. 1, http://www.tse.jus.br/legislacaotse/res/2017/RES235512017.html, archived at https://perma.cc/RLC8-L7PW. 

19 Id. art. 17(I). 

20 PORTAL DA LEGISLAÇÃO, http://www4.planalto.gov.br/legislacao/, archived at https://perma.cc/ 5Y2VXJDT. 

21 IMPRENSA NACIONAL, CASA CIVIL DA PRESIDÊNCIA DA REPÚBLICA, http://www.in.gov.br/web/ guest/inicio, 

archived at https://perma.cc/R8MQ-BVJ7. 

22 DIÁRIO DA JUSTIÇA ELETRÔNICO, SUPREMO TRIBUNAL FEDERAL, http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/ 

diariojusticaeletronico/pesquisardiarioeletronico.asp, archived at https://perma.cc/U3PH-A4BT. 
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IV. Bills of Law 

Both the Chamber of Deputies (Câmara dos Deputados) and the Federal Senate are currently 

analyzing proposals criminalizing the dissemination or sharing of false or incomplete 

information on the internet. 

A. Chamber of Deputies 

In the Chamber of Deputies, several proposals have been attached to Bill of Law 6,812,23 which, in 

summary, would 

 address the criminalization of the dissemination or sharing of false or incomplete information on 

the internet, 

 hold social networks liable when untrue materials are posted on the internet and the content is not 

removed within twenty-four hours, 

 force social network websites to provide filters and tools to prevent the dissemination of harmful 

information, and 

 hold providers of content and providers of internet services liable for damages caused by the 

dissemination of fake news on the internet.24

B. Federal Senate 

In the Federal Senate, Bill of Law No. 473 of 2017 punishes with detention from six months to two 

years and a fine those who disclose false information that may distort, alter, or corrupt the truth 

about information related to health, public safety, the national economy, the electoral process, or 

relevant matters of public interest.25

 

23 CÂMARA DOS DEPUTADOS, PL 6812/2017, https://www.camara.leg.br/proposicoesWeb/ 

fichadetramitacao?idProposicao=2122678&ord=1, archived at https://perma.cc/VTL5-QL7H. 

24 Comissão de Ciência e Tecnologia, Comunicação e Informática, CÂMARA DOS DEPUTADOS, PL 6812/2017, 

https://www.camara.leg.br/proposicoesWeb/prop_mostrarintegra?codteor=1694884&filename=TramitacaoPL+6812/2017, archived at https://perma.cc/PCC4-T7DT. 

25 Projeto de Lei do Senado No. 473, de 2017, https://www25.senado.leg.br/web/atividade/ materias/-

/materia/131758#diario, archived at https://perma.cc/3XGD-CFQR. 
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Canada 

Tariq Ahmad 

Foreign Law Specialist

SUMMARY Currently, there does not appear to be any law in Canada that prohibits the 

dissemination of incorrect information unless that information is defamatory, covered 

by libel laws, or within the ambit of Canada’s broadcasting regulations. Section 181 of 

Canada’s Criminal Code prohibits the spreading of false news, but that provision was 

declared unconstitutional in 1992 by the Supreme Court of Canada. No information 

was found specifically on fake legal news. The government provides a variety of 

official online sources of legal information that are publicly accessible, however.

I. Background 

Canadian lawmakers have been grappling with the issue of fake news and considering policy 

options in the aftermath of the 2017 mosque shooting in Quebec City. According to one news 

report, “[f]alse information about the suspects in [that shooting] circulating on the internet 

has raised new questions about how to fight the explosion of ‘fake news.’ ”1

A national survey conducted by Nanos Research for the organization Canadian Journalists for 

Free Expression (CJFE) found that “[m]ore than eight in ten Canadians agree or somewhat agree 

that search engines like Google should be forced to remove search results related to a person’s 

name when they are inaccurate, incomplete, or outdated and that fake news is making it more 

difficult to find accurate sources of information. More than seven in ten Canadians agree or 

somewhat agree that government regulation is needed to prevent the proliferation of fake news.”2

Canadian MPs and the federal Privacy Commissioner have shown great concern over the role of 

Facebook and the dissemination of fake news, as reflected in this excerpt from an article in 

The Guardian: 

“What we want to hear from Mark Zuckerberg directly, is his response to the data breaches 

in Canada . . . and also the response to how they’re going to handle fake news in the 

future,” Bob Zimmer, chair of parliament’s access to information, privacy and ethics 

committee, told reporters. He said the government is “deeply concerned” about the effect 

Facebook has on democracy and the extensive control it has over data and advertising. 

In September, the privacy commissioner said it would investigate Facebook over the 

harvesting of user data. “The digital world, and social media in particular, have become 

																																																																						 1 Kathleen Harris, MPs Look For Ways to Fight ‘Fake News’ in Wake of Mosque Shooting, CBC (Feb. 2, 2017), 

https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-fake-news-google-facebook-twitter-1.3961992, archived at

https://perma.cc/UR3G-D5JZ. 

2 NANOS RESEARCH, NATIONAL SURVEY SUMMARY SUBMITTED BY NANOS TO CJFE 2 (May 2018), 

http://www.nanos.co/ wp-content/uploads/2018/06/2018-1191-CJFE-Populated-report-without-Journaliststurning-over.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/3Z4X-JF4T. 
Initiatives to Counter Fake News: Canada 

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entrenched in our daily lives and people want their rights to be respected,” the 

commissioner, Daniel Therrien, said in a statement.3

On February 9, 2018, Prime Minister Trudeau warned Facebook that it needed to fix its “fake 

news” issues or face stricter federal regulations.4

II. National Approach to Countering Fake News 

A. Policy Framework

In February 2018 Global News reported that 

“[t]he federal government doesn’t believe it can do much on its own to stem the growing 

tide of fake news in Canada, according to briefing notes prepared for Canadian Heritage 

Minister Melanie Joly. 

The documents, obtained by The Canadian Press through an access-to-information 

request, highlight that even though the government recognizes that fake news could 

threaten Canada’s democratic institutions at a time when traditional news outlets are 

facing cutbacks and financial challenges, there’s not much they can do to stop it. 

The government’s inability to decide for Canadians what should and shouldn’t be 

considered fake news is one reason it can’t take direct action, according to the briefing 

notes, prepared in November by deputy Heritage minister Graham Flack. 

Even if the government did attempt to publicly identify fake news stories, Flack said it 

could backfire, making readers more convinced the stories are true and increasing the 

likelihood they’d share the stories. 

Overall, the briefing notes concluded that the role of combating misinformation should not 

rest on the government’s shoulders alone and that “there is not likely one single, 

easy solution”5

B. Legislative Framework 

Currently there does not appears to be any law that prohibits “the dissemination of incorrect 

information unless it is defamatory and covered by libel laws.”6 Section 181 of Canada’s Criminal 

Code prohibits the spreading of false news: 

																																																																						 3 Facebook Fake News Inquiry: The Countries Demanding Answers, GUARDIAN (Nov. 27, 2018), https://www.the 

guardian.com/technology/2018/nov/27/facebook-fake-news-inquiry-the-countries-demanding-answers, 

archived at https://perma.cc/6GSF-EC5F. 

4 Alex Boutilier, Prime Minister Trudeau Warned Facebook that It Needed to Fix Its “Fake News” Issues or Face Stricter 

Federal Regulations, THE STAR (Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2018/02/08/trudeau-tofacebook-fix-your-fake-news-problem-or-else.html, archived at https://perma.cc/7S26-8NKR. 

5 Levi Garber, Canada Can’t Do Much to Stem Fake News, According to Government Documents, GLOBAL NEWS (Feb. 

21, 2018), https://globalnews.ca/news/4039886/canada-stem-fake-news-government/, archived at

https://perma.cc/4DWL-9UQG. 

6 Harris, supra note 1. 
Initiatives to Counter Fake News: Canada 

The Law Library of Congress 13

Spreading false news 

181 Every one who wilfully publishes a statement, tale or news that he knows is false and 

that causes or is likely to cause injury or mischief to a public interest is guilty of an 

indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years.7

However, in R v. Zundel (1992),8 Canada’s Supreme Court held that the offense is unconstitutional 

as it violates section 2(b) (freedom of expression) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 

Freedoms.9 The section therefore appears to have no legal effect or force and the government 

appears to be in the process of removing this “zombie” provision.10

Canada has other laws that may be relevant to fake news that have been outlined by Canada’s 

Department of Justice as follows: 

 The hate propaganda provisions in sections 318 and 319 of the Criminal Code can be 

used to deal with false news that promotes hatred. 

 The defamatory libel provisions in section 300 of the Criminal Code prohibit people 

from knowingly publishing false information that has been designed to insult or that 

is likely to harm the reputation of someone. 

 Federal regulations such as section 8(1) of the Broadcasting Distribution Regulations 

prohibit radio and television broadcasters from broadcasting false or misleading news 

and abusive comments that are likely to expose persons to hatred based on 

listed grounds. 

 Some provincial laws, such as section 14 of Saskatchewan’s Human Rights Code, 

prohibit publications that are likely to expose groups to hatred. 

 Some provincial laws provide civil means to deal with libel of racial, religious or other 

groups (for example, section 19 of Manitoba’s Defamation Act). 

 Various codes of practice direct certain professionals not to propagate false news or 

hate propaganda (for example, the Canadian Association of Journalist’s 

Ethics Guidelines).11

																																																																						 7 CRIMINAL CODE, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46, § 181 https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/c-46/FullText.html, 

archived at https://perma.cc/7EDV-P7WF. 

8 R. v. Zundel [1992] 2 SCR 731, https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/904/index.do, archived at

https://perma.cc/7LJS-GCDA. 

9 R. v. Zundel: Case Analysis, GLOBAL FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, https://globalfreedomof 

expression.columbia.edu/cases/r-v-zundel/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/RY9QSWCW. 

10 Questions and Answers – An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Removing Unconstitutional Portions or Provisions), 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/pl/cuol-mgnl/qa-qr.html (last updated Mar. 

9, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/7D69-Z62H; Alysha Hasham, Purging Criminal Code of Defunct ‘Zombie 

Laws’ No Simple Task, THE STAR (Jan. 1, 2017), https://www.thestar.com/news/gta/2017/01/01/purgingcriminal-code-of-defunct-zombie-laws-no-simple-task.html, archived at https://perma.cc/3AVSZ9AQ?type=image. 

11 Id. 
Initiatives to Counter Fake News: Canada 

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Federal broadcasting regulations issued under the Broadcasting Act12 that deal with false or 

misleading news include the following: 

 section 8(1)(d) of the Broadcasting Distribution Regulations; 

 section 3(d) of the Radio Regulations, 1986; [and] 

 section 5(1)(d) of the Television Broadcasting Regulations, 1987[.]13

Generally “these provisions prohibit licensees of radio and television programming undertakings 

and broadcasting distribution undertakings from broadcasting programs that contain false or 

misleading news.”14 

In 2011 the Parliament’s Standing Joint Committee for the Scrutiny of Regulations (SJC), citing 

the SCC’s Zundel judgment, raised concerns over whether the “existing false or misleading news 

provisions might not be in keeping with the freedom of expression provision under section 2(b) 

of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the Charter).”15 To address these concerns, the 

Commission proposed “to amend the relevant provisions such that the above-noted prohibition 

would be narrowed to ‘news that the licensee knows is false or misleading and that endangers or 

is likely to endanger the lives, health or safety of the public.’ ” According to one news report, 

[t]he proposed change sparked concerns that the CRTC was about to allow into Canada 

the more toxic — often grossly distorted — political discourse that pervades the American 

airwaves. Those suspicions were fuelled by the timing of the proposal, only weeks before 

next month’s launch of a new, right-leaning all-news network, Sun TV.16

In March 2011, the Commission received a letter from the SJC “in which it informed the 

Commission that it no longer saw the Zundel judgment as an impediment to the continued 

application of the current regulations” and the Commission announced “that it will not amend 

the false or misleading news provisions set out in various Commission regulations.”17

In 2017, the Federal Heritage Committee published a report on the changing media landscape in 

Canada that noted the problems with fake news and observed the lack of guidelines for digital 

																																																																						 12 Broadcasting Act, S.C. 1991, c. 11, https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/PDF/B-9.01.pdf, archived at

https://perma.cc/ G5XG-MV7N. 

13 Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission, Broadcasting Regulatory Policy CRTC 

2011-308 (May 11, 2011), https://crtc.gc.ca/eng/archive/2011/2011-308.htm, archived at

https://perma.cc/QQ6Y-24M3. 

14 Id. 

15 Id. 

16 False News Proposal Killed by CRTC, THE CANADIAN PRESS (Feb. 25, 2011), https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/ 

false-news-proposal-killed-by-crtc-1.1117504, archived at https://perma.cc/PR8V-QE5Q. 

17 Broadcasting Regulatory Policy CRTC 2011-308, supra note 13. 
Initiatives to Counter Fake News: Canada 

The Law Library of Congress 15

media. The Committee recommended that “the vigilance of existing ethics guidelines and press 

councils must apply equally to digital media.”18

The Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics published a report in 

which it stated that “changes to Canada’s legislative and regulatory landscape are needed in 

order to neutralize the threat that disinformation and misinformation campaigns pose to the 

country’s democratic process.”19

C. Elections 

In December 2017 Canada passed an omnibus bill20 that amended the Canada Elections Act21 and 

other Acts to modernize its election laws. Among the changes included was “a provision that 

makes it an offence to make false statements about a candidate for the purpose of influencing the 

outcome of an election.”22 However, according to a news report, “that provision applies quite 

narrowly to false statements about whether a candidate has broken the law or withdrawn from 

the election, as well as about a candidate’s citizenship, place of birth, education, professional 

qualifications or membership in a group.”23 The provision states as follows: 

Publishing false statement to affect election results 

91 (1) No person or entity shall, with the intention of affecting the results of an election, 

make or publish, during the election period, 

(a) a false statement that a candidate, a prospective candidate, the leader of a political 

party or a public figure associated with a political party has committed an offence under 

an Act of Parliament or a regulation made under such an Act — or under an Act of the 

legislature of a province or a regulation made under such an Act — or has been charged 

with or is under investigation for such an offence; or 

(b) a false statement about the citizenship, place of birth, education, professional 

qualifications or membership in a group or association of a candidate, a prospective 

candidate, the leader of a political party or a public figure associated with a 

political party. 

																																																																						 18 STANDING COMMITTEE ON CANADIAN HERITAGE, DISRUPTION: CHANGE AND CHURNING IN CANADA’S MEDIA 

LANDSCAPE 63 (June 2017), 

http://www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/421/CHPC/Reports/RP9045583/chpcrp06/ chpcrp06-

e.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/G6F9-AC7D. 

19 STANDING COMMITTEE ON ACCESS TO INFORMATION, PRIVACY AND ETHICS, DEMOCRACY UNDER THREAT: RISKS 

AND SOLUTIONS IN THE ERA OF DISINFORMATION AND DATA MONOPOLY 75 (Dec. 2018), 

http://www.ourcommons.ca/ Content/Committee/421/ETHI/Reports/RP10242267/ethirp17/ethirp17-

e.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/BGS9-2BBY. 

20 Bill C-76, First Session, Forty-second Parliament, 64-65-66-67 Elizabeth II, Statutes of Canada 2018, Ch. 31, 

http://www.parl.ca/DocumentViewer/en/42-1/bill/C-76/royal-assent, archived at https://perma.cc/HKT8-

K8VW. 

21 Canada Elections Act, S.C. 2000, c. 9, https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/E-2.01/FullText.html, archived 

at https://perma.cc/BSA3-R97Z. 

22 Not Much Elections Canada Can Do about Fake News Spread about Candidates, NATIONAL POST (Feb. 7, 2019), 

https://nationalpost.com/pmn/news-pmn/canada-news-pmn/not-much-elections-canada-can-do-aboutfake-news-spread-about-candidates, archived at https://perma.cc/YY44-Z7RT. 

23 Id. 
Initiatives to Counter Fake News: Canada 

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Clarification 

(2) Subsection (1) applies regardless of the place where the election is held or the place 

where the false statement is made or published.

Publishing false statement of candidate’s withdrawal 

92 No person or entity shall publish a false statement that indicates that a candidate 

has withdrawn.24

In January 2019, the federal government announced that it will implement a series of new 

measures aimed at “further shoring up Canada’s electoral system from foreign interference, and 

enhancing Canada’s readiness to defend the democratic process from cyber threats and 

disinformation.”25 One of the measures was to establish a “Critical Election Incident Public 

Protocol” that will “monitor and notify other agencies and the public about disinformation 

attempts. That task force will be led by five non-political officials and is an addition to a ‘rapid 

response mechanism’ housed within the Department of Foreign Affairs.”26

III. Accuracy of Legal Information 

No information was located on Canada’s efforts to deal with specifically fake legal news. 

However, Canada does provide a range of official, online sources of legal information that are 

accessible to the public. 

The Justice Laws Website provides an “official consolidation, or updated version, of the federal 

Acts and regulations,”27 which is maintained by the Department of Justice as a “convenient way 

for the public to view the state of the law, without having to carry out research and put together 

the various amended provisions.”28 As of June 1, 2009, “all consolidated Acts and regulations on 

the Justice Laws Website are ‘official’, meaning that they can be used for evidentiary purposes.”29

According to a note from the Department of Justice Canada, 

[a]mendments made to the Statute Revision Act, renamed the Legislation Revision and 

Consolidation Act by chapter 5 of the 2000 Statutes of Canada, in force on June 1, 2009, 

authorize the Minister of Justice to publish an electronic consolidation of statutes and 

regulations and provide that the consolidation is evidence of those statutes and 

																																																																						 24 Canada Elections Act §§ 91 & 92. 

25 Rachel Aiello, Feds Unveil Plan to Tackle Fake News, Interference in 2019 Election, THE STAR (Feb. 8, 2018), 

https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2018/02/08/trudeau-to-facebook-fix-your-fake-news-problem-orelse.html, archived at https://perma.cc/ZCF9-WN87. 

26 Daniel Funke, A Guide to Anti-misinformation Actions around the World, POYNTER, 

https://www.poynter.org/ifcn/ anti-misinformation-actions/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2019), archived at 

https://perma.cc/F3EW-XT4N. 

27 Consolidated Acts, JUSTICE LAWS WEBSITE, https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/ (last updated Feb. 22, 

2019), archived at https://perma.cc/M629-DD77; Consolidated Regulations, JUSTICE LAWS WEBSITE, https://lawslois. justice.gc.ca/eng/regulations/ (last updated Feb. 22, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/NV3F-DHVQ. 

28 Frequently Asked Questions, JUSTICE LAWS WEBSITE https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/FAQ/#g9, (last 

updated Feb. 22, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/NM5A-CACV. 

29 Id. 
Initiatives to Counter Fake News: Canada 

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regulations. The Act also provides that, in the case of an inconsistency between the 

consolidated statute or regulation and the original or a subsequent amendment, the 

original or amendment prevails.30

In 1994, the Supreme Court of Canada began collaborating with the Université de Montréal’s 

research team Lexum, “to make judgments, news releases and bulletins available on the Internet 

free of charge. The Judgments of the Supreme Court of Canada by Lexum continues to be the 

main public source for judgments, news releases and bulletins.”31 According to the Department 

of Justice website, “[w]ith the exception of the Canadian Charter of Rights Decisions, the 

Department does not publish court decisions. The Lexum Collection provides free access to all of 

the Supreme Court of Canada decisions since 1907, while the Office of the Commissioner for 

Federal Judicial Affairs provides access to Federal Court decisions.”32 Lexum’s website states that 

[t]he official version of a Supreme Court of Canada decision is the one published in the 

S.C.R. Counsel may cite either the print or the PDF version of the S.C.R. in documents 

filed with the Supreme Court of Canada, and both versions should be cited in the same 

way.33 The official versions of decisions and reasons for decisions of the Supreme Court of 

Canada are published in the Supreme Court Reports (S.C.R.). An electronic version can be 

found in the “Resources” section.34

The Canada Gazette is the official newspaper of the Government of Canada. It contains “new 

statutes, new and proposed regulations, administrative board decisions and public notices.”35

The public can read or browse editions published since 199836 and access archives of gazette 

editions from 1841 (when the official publication began) to 1997.37 

																																																																						 30 Note from The Department of Justice Canada, JUSTICE LAWS WEBSITE, https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/ 

ImportantNote/ (last updated Feb. 22, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/4FPU-9CF4; see also Legislation 

Revision and Consolidation Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. S-20, § 31 https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/S20/section-31.html, archived at https://perma.cc/8G7K-EZT4. 

31 Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ), SUPREME COURT OF CANADA, https://www.scc-csc.ca/contact/faq/qa-qreng.aspx#f27 (last updated Oct. 5, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/4FE5-SE4W. 

32 Guide to Canadian Legal Information, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/contact/ 

Comm2.html (last updated Feb. 20, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/UV2E-FY22. 

33 Id. 

34 Important Notices, LEXUM’S JUDGMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA, https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scccsc/en/page.do?location=important-notices.html (last updated Oct. 5, 2018), https://perma.cc/E7RQ-AVW9. 

35 Canada Gazette, GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, http://www.gazette.gc.ca/accueil-home-eng.html (last updated 

Mar. 6, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/6BKX-9VY2. 

36 Canada Gazette Publications, GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, http://www.gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/publicationseng.html (last updated Jan. 25, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/5LUE-CGQK. 

37 Browse the Canada Gazette Archives, GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, http://www.gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/archiveseng.html (last updated Jan. 11, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/BCE7-M723. 
The Law Library of Congress 18 

China 

Laney Zhang 

Foreign Law Specialist

SUMMARY Spreading fake news that seriously disturbs public order through an information 

network or other media is a crime under China’s Criminal Law and is punishable by up 

to seven years in prison. The 2016 Cybersecurity Law prohibits manufacturing or 

spreading fake news online that disturbs the economic and social order. The Law also 

requires service providers, when providing services of information publication or 

instant messaging, to ask the users to register their real names.

 According to the rules on internet news information services issued by the Cyberspace 

Administration of China, entities providing such services must obtain a license. When 

reprinting news, internet news information service providers may only reprint what 

has been released by certain news organizations prescribed by the state. The service 

providers and users are prohibited from producing, reproducing, publishing, or 

spreading information content prohibited by laws and administrative regulations. Once 

service providers find any prohibited content, they must immediately stop transmitting 

the information, delete the information, keep the relevant records, and report the matter 

to competent government authorities. 

I. Introduction 

In China, despite strict regulation of the media and internet, fake news, or what Chinese laws and 

domestic media often refer to as “rumors,” appears to be permeating the internet and social 

media. Tencent, the operator of China’s biggest social media platform Wechat, released a report 

in January 2019 on its fight against rumors spread online. According to the report, Wechat 

intercepted over 84,000 rumors in 2018. The report said 3,994 anti-rumor articles were published 

through Wechat during the year by 774 entities, including the government internet information 

authority, the police, the food and drug administration, and state media, and the articles were 

read by 294 million users. Popular fake news topics include food safety, health care, and other 

social issues.1 

In an effort to fight fake news, in 2018, China launched a platform named “Piyao”—a Chinese 

word meaning “refuting rumors.”2 The platform, which also has a mobile app and social media 

 

1 2018 Report on Managing Online Rumors Published, 774 Institutions Refuted Rumors on Wechat, PEOPLE.CN (Jan. 

18, 2019), http://society.people.com.cn/n1/2019/0118/c1008-30574893.html (in Chinese), archived at

https://perma.cc/8QCK-37ZQ. 

2 Homepage, CHINA INTERNET JOINT RUMOR REFUTING PLATFORM, http://www.piyao.org.cn/ (last visited Mar. 

13, 2019) (in Chinese), archived at https://perma.cc/JN4X-F8UA. 
Initiatives to Counter Fake News: China 

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accounts, broadcasts “real” news sourced from state-owned media, party-controlled local 

newspapers, and various government agencies.3

The spreading of fake news may not simply be due to the availability of technologies to circulate 

it. A Foreign Policy article points out that, in China, there are other factors propelling the 

phenomenon: a deep sense of societal insecurity, the increasing politicization and 

commercialization of information, and a craving for self-expression.4 The article argues that, “the 

party-led campaigns against rumors have been seen as attempts to take out potential critics and 

enemies. When the government labels something a rumor, that information comes to be seen not 

as fake but as something the government doesn’t want the public to know.”5

II. Legal Framework 

A. Criminal Law on Fake News 

On August 29, 2015, China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) Standing Committee adopted the 

Ninth Amendment to the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). 6 The 

Amendment added into the Law a crime of spreading fake news that seriously disturbs public 

order through an information network or other media. This offense is punishable by up to seven 

years in prison. Paragraph 2 of article 291a added by the Ninth Amendment states that 

[w]hoever fabricates false information on [a] dangerous situation, epidemic situation, 

disaster situation or alert situation and disseminates such information via information 

network or any other media, or intentionally disseminates above information while clearly 

knowing that it is fabricated, thereby seriously disturbing public order, shall be sentenced 

to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than three years, criminal detention or public 

surveillance; if the consequences are serious, he shall be sentenced to fixed-term 

imprisonment of not less than three years but not more than seven years.7

 

 

3 Stella Qiu & Ryan Woo, China Launches Platform to Stamp Out ‘Online Rumors’, REUTERS (Aug. 30, 2018), 

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-internet/china-launches-platform-to-stamp-out-online-rumorsidUSKCN1LF0HL, archived at https://perma.cc/3976-TPRB. 

4 Maria Repnikova, China’s Lessons for Fighting Fake News, FOREIGN POLICY (Sept. 26, 2018), 

https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/06/chinas-lessons-for-fighting-fake-news/#, archived at

https://perma.cc/U2N4-KKQ6. 

5 Id.

6 Ninth Amendment to the PRC Criminal Law (adopted by the National People’s Congress (NPC) Standing 

Committee on Aug. 29, 2015, effective Nov. 1, 2015), http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2015-

08/31/content_1945587.htm (in Chinese), archived at https://perma.cc/JZL6-XV2K. English translation 

available at Westlaw China (by subscription). 

7 Id. art. 32. 
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B. Cybersecurity Law 

1. Manufacturing or Spreading Fake News Online 

On November 7, 2016, the PRC Cybersecurity Law was adopted by the NPC Standing 

Committee. 8 Paragraph 2 of article 12 of the Law prohibits a series of activities from being 

conducted online, including manufacturing or spreading fake news online that disturbs the 

economic and social order. 9 Article 70 of the Law further provides that the publication or 

transmission of the information specified under article 12 paragraph 2, or information that is 

prohibited from publication or transmission under other laws or administrative regulations, is 

subject to penalties prescribed by relevant laws and regulations.10

2. Real-Name Registration 

Under the Cybersecurity Law, when providing services of information publication or instant 

messaging, service providers must ask users to register their real names. The service providers 

must not provide relevant services to any users who do not perform the identity 

authentication steps.11 

Where service providers fail to authenticate users’ identities, the competent authorities may order 

them to rectify their wrongdoings, suspend their businesses, shut down their websites, revoke 

relevant licenses, or impose a fine of 50,000 to 500,000 yuan (about US$7,500 to $75,000) on the 

service providers and/or 10,000 to 100,000 yuan (about US$1,500 to $15,000) on the 

responsible persons.12

C. Administrative Measures on Internet Information Services 

On September 25, 2000, the State Council issued a regulation, the Administrative Measures on 

Internet Information Services, governing activities associated with providing internet 

information services within the territory of the PRC.13 

The Measures prohibit internet information services providers from producing, reproducing, 

publishing, or spreading prescribed information content, including rumors that disrupt social 

order or undermines social stability.14 Whenever a service provider finds that prohibited content 

 

8 PRC Cybersecurity Law (adopted by the NPC Standing Committee on Nov. 7, 2016, effective June 1, 2017), 

http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/ xinwen/2016-11/07/content_2001605.htm (in Chinese), archived at

https://perma.cc/3HAP-D6MZ. 

9 Id. art. 12 para 2. 

10 Id. art. 70. 

11 Id. art. 24. 

12 Id. art. 61. 

13 State Council, Administrative Measures on Internet Information Services (Sept. 25, 2000, effective on the 

same day), http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2000/content_60531.htm (in Chinese), archived at

https://perma.cc/M6J4-HV7V. 

14 Id. art. 15. 
Initiatives to Counter Fake News: China 

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is being transmitted on their website, they must immediately stop the transmission, keep the 

relevant records, and report the matter to competent government authorities.15

D. Provisions on Internet News Information Services 

On the basis of the PRC Cybersecurity Law and the Administrative Measures on Internet 

Information Services, on May 2, 2017, China’s central internet information authority, the 

Cyberspace Administration of China, issued the Provisions on Administration of Internet News 

Information Services.16 

1. License Control 

Under the Provisions, any entities providing internet news information services to the public—

no matter whether that is through websites, apps, online forums, blogs, microblogs, social media 

public accounts, instant messaging tools, or live broadcastings—must obtain a license for internet 

news information services and operate within the scope of activities of the license.17 The licenses 

are only issued to legal persons incorporated within the territory of the PRC, and the persons in 

charge and editors-in-chief must be Chinese citizens.18 

Providing internet news information services without a proper license is punishable by a fine of 

10,000 to 30,000 yuan (about US$1,500 to $4,500).19

2. Restrictions on Reprinting News 

When reprinting news, internet news information service providers may only reprint what has 

been released by official state or provincial news organizations, or other news organizations 

prescribed by the state. The original sources, authors, titles, and editors must be indicated to 

ensure that the sources of the news are traceable.20 

State or local internet content authorities may issue a warning to violators of this provision, order 

them to rectify their wrongdoings, suspend their news services, or impose a fine of 5,000 to 30,000 

yuan (about US$750 to $4,500). Violators may also be criminally prosecuted, according to 

the Provisions.21

 

 

15 Id. art. 16. 

16 Cyber Administration of China, Provisions on Administration of Internet News Information Services (May 2, 

2017, effective June 1, 2017) art. 1, http://www.cac.gov.cn/2017-05/02/c_1120902760.htm (in Chinese), 

archived at https://perma.cc/Y5VB-XZJV. 

17 Id. art. 5. 

18 Id. art. 6. 

19 Id. art. 22. 

20 Id. art. 15(1). 

21 Id. art. 24. 
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The Law Library of Congress 22

3. Prohibited Content 

The Provisions also prohibit internet news information service providers and users from 

producing, reproducing, publishing, or spreading information content prohibited by laws and 

administrative regulations.22 State or local internet content authorities may issue a warning to 

violators of this provision, order them to rectify their wrongdoings, suspend their news services, 

or impose a fine of 20,000 to 30,000 yuan (about US$3,000 to $4,500). Violators may also be 

criminally prosecuted, the Provisions state.23

4. Obligations of Service Providers 

Once internet information service providers find any content prohibited by the Provision or other 

laws and administrative regulations, they must immediately stop transmitting the information, 

delete the information, keep the relevant records, and report the matter to competent 

government authorities.24 

The Provisions also repeat the requirement of real-name registration under the Cybersecurity 

Law, providing that internet news information services providers must ask users of the internet 

news information publication platform services to register their real names.25 

Violators of these provisions are punishable by the state or local internet information authority 

in accordance with the Cybersecurity Law.26

 

 

22 Id. art. 16(1). 

23 Id. art. 25. 

24 Id. art. 16(2). 

25 Id. art. 13(1). 

26 Id. art. 26. 
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The Law Library of Congress 23

III. Access to Accurate Legal Information 

A. Online Publication of Laws and Regulations 

On March 15, 2015, the NPC revised the PRC Law on Legislation.27 In this revision, two websites 

were added into the Law to officially publish Chinese laws and regulations: the NPC website28

and the Chinese Government Legal Information Network.29

The NPC website is designated by the Law to officially publish laws adopted by the NPC and its 

standing committee. The laws are also published in the official NPC gazette and nationallycirculated newspapers. 30 Local regulations made by local people’s congresses must also be 

published on the NPC website, as well in the local people’s congresses’ gazettes and on their 

official websites, and in newspapers circulated within the regions.31

The Chinese Government Legal Information Network is designated by the Law to officially 

publish administrative regulations made by the State Council. 32 The website also publishes 

administrative rules made by the ministries and commissions under the State Council and by 

local governments.33

B. Online Publication of Court Judgments 

Since 2013, courts in China at various levels have been requested by the Supreme People’s Court 

(SPC) to publish their judgments on an SPC platform, China Judgments Online.34 According to 

the SPC, judgments must be posted on the platform within seven business days of taking 

 

27 Law on Legislation (adopted by the NPC on Mar. 15, 2000, rev. Mar. 15, 2015) (Legislation Law), 

http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/dbdhhy/12_3/2015-03/18/content_1930713.htm, archived at

https://perma.cc/92MR-NRX6. See Laney Zhang, A Guide to Chinese Legal Research: Official Online Publication of 

Chinese Law, IN CUSTODIA LEGIS (Sept. 5, 2018), https://blogs.loc.gov/law/2018/09/a-guide-to-chinese-legalresearch-official-online-publication-of-chinese-law/, archived at https://perma.cc/6B8W-FLE9. 

28 Homepage, THE NATIONAL PEOPLE’S CONGRESS OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, http://www.npc.gov.cn/

(in Chinese, last visited Mar. 14, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/B9EU-KBWJ. 

29 Homepage, MINISTRY OF JUSTICE OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, CHINESE GOVERNMENT LEGAL 

INFORMATION NETWORK, http://www.chinalaw.gov.cn/ (in Chinese, last visited Mar. 14, 2019), archived at

https://perma.cc/9RDG-8MMB. 

30 Legislation Law art. 58. 

31 Id. art. 79 

32 Id. art. 71. 

33 Id. art. 86. 

34 Homepage, CHINA JUDGEMENTS ONLINE, http://wenshu.court.gov.cn/Index (in Chinese, last visited Mar. 14, 

2019), archived at https://perma.cc/Y9NR-WYC5. See Laney Zhang, China: Rules of Online Publication of Court 

Judgments Revised, GLOBAL LEGAL MONITOR (Feb. 9, 2017), http://www.loc.gov/law/foreignnews/article/china-rules-of-online-publication-of-court-judgments-revised/, archived at

https://perma.cc/KPJ3-T3K3. 
Initiatives to Counter Fake News: China 

The Law Library of Congress 24

effect.35 Courts must redact names of certain people when publishing the judgments, including 

the names of all minors and their representatives.36 

The SPC exempts certain types of cases from being published on the platform, such as those 

involving state secrets, crimes conducted by minors, divorce, or child custody, and the courts are 

also allowed to decide that other cases are not appropriate to be published.37 If a court decides 

not to publish a judgment online, it must still publish the judgment’s case number, the name of 

the trial court, the judgment date, and the reasons for non-publication, except where publishing 

the information may reveal state secrets.38 

 

35 SPC, Provisions on the Publication of Judgment Documents by the People’s Courts (Aug. 29, 2016) art. 7, 

http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing-25321.html (in Chinese), archived at https://perma.cc/P8G8-P4ED. 

36 Id. art. 8. 

37 Id. art. 4. 

38 Id. art. 6. 
The Law Library of Congress 25 

Egypt 

George Sadek 

Foreign Law Specialist 

SUMMARY In 2017, the Egyptian Parliament’s Communication and Information Technology 

Committee revealed that 53,000 false rumors had spread in Egypt in just sixty days. 

The Egyptian authorities have adopted a number of measures to combat the 

phenomenon of the dissemination of false information. The Egyptian government has 

passed three domestic laws to regulate the distribution of information and its accuracy 

in print and online media as well as online social networks. Those laws include Law 

No. 180 of 2018 on Regulating the Press and Media, Law No. 175 of 2018 on AntiCybercrime, and Law No. 58 of 1937 and its amendments on the Penal Code. To 

facilitate the access to accurate legal information, the Court of Cassation, the Supreme 

Constitutional Court, and the Administrative Court post on their websites laws and 

regulations published in the official gazette and recent decisions issued by those 

courts. There are no fees to access such legal information.

I. Government Measures 

In 2017, the Communication and Information Technology Committee in the Egyptian Parliament 

revealed that 53,000 false rumors had spread in Egypt in just sixty days. The Committee 

announced that most of this false news had originated and circulated on social-media platforms.1

In an effort to combat the dissemination of false news, the Cabinet issues statements refuting false 

information circulated in the media or via online social networks.2 In September 2018 the 

Associated Press also reported that the Egyptian authorities had suspended or blocked five 

hundred websites that were suspected by the authorities of distributing false information.3 

Furthermore, the Egyptian authorities have arrested a number of journalists and website 

administrators suspected by the government of publishing false news.4 For instance, in April 

2018, State Security Prosecution summoned the editor-in-chief of the newspaper Al-Masry AlYoum and seven correspondents, accusing them of distributing false information. In another 

example, Adel Sabri, Editor-in-Chief of the Masr El-Arabiya website was detained and charged 

 

1 Amina Khairy, Trapped in a Sea of Rumours, AL-AHRAM WEEKLY (Aug. 1, 2018), http://weekly.ahram. 

org.eg/News/25012.aspx, archived at https://perma.cc/8R75-VVRN. 

2 Samy Magdy, Egypt Says It Fights Fake News, Critics See New Crackdown, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 17, 2018), 

https://www.apnews.com/5b17cf57b4384f559a3035a167f8e211 , archived at https://perma.cc/REV4-GZKL. 

3 Id. 

4 The Quarterly Report on the State of Freedom of Expression in Egypt 3rd Quarter (July-September 2018), FREEDOM OF 

THOUGHT AND EXPRESSION (Oct. 16, 2018), https://afteegypt.org/en/afte_releases/2018/ 10/16/16036-

afteegypt.html , archived at https://perma.cc/AR53-CC8N.
 Initiatives to Counter Fake News: Egypt 

The Law Library of Congress 26 

with the dissemination of false news. The website was also fined 50,000 Egyptian pounds (about 

US$2,855) by the Supreme Council for Media Regulation for disseminating false information.5 

In its efforts to combat the dissemination of false information on social media networks, the 

Egyptian authorities have detained some individuals, accusing them of the dissemination of false 

news on Facebook and Twitter. For example, Amal Fathi, Wael Abbas, and Haytham 

Mohammaden were all charged with using social media to spread false information.6

In an extra measure to prevent the dissemination of false news, the Egyptian Public Prosecutor 

has announced the creation of a new hotline for citizens to file complaints against false news 

posted by media outlets or by individuals on social medial networks.7 

II. Legal Framework 

The Egyptian government has passed three domestic laws to regulate the distribution of 

information and its accuracy in print and online media including social networks. Those laws 

include Law No. 175 of 2018 on Anti-Cybercrime, 8 Law No. 180 of 2018 on Regulating the Press 

and Media,9 and Law No. 58 of 1937 and its amendments on the Penal Code.10 

A. Law 180 of 2018 Regulating the Press and Media 

Article 4 of Law No. 180 of 2018 stipulates that press institutions, media outlets, and news 

websites must not broadcast or publish any information violating the principles cited under the 

Constitution. Article 4 grants the Supreme Media Council the authority to ban or suspend the 

distribution, broadcast, or operation of any publications, newspapers, media outlets, or 

advertising materials containing information deemed to threaten national security; disturb the 

public peace; or promote discrimination, violence, racism, hatred, or intolerance.11

Article 19 of the Law authorizes the Supreme Media Council to suspend or block any personal 

website, blog, or social media account that has a high number of followers—exceeding 5,000—if 

it publishes fake news advocating and inciting the violation of a specific law or promoting 

violence or hatred.12 

 

5 The Quarterly Report on the State of Freedom of Expression in Egypt 2nd Quarter (April-June 2018), FREEDOM OF 

THOUGHT AND EXPRESSION (July 10, 2018), https://afteegypt.org/en/afte_releases/2018/07/10/15525-

afteegypt.html, archived at https://perma.cc/LU79-VK8M.

6 Id. 

7 Jehad Al-Sayed, How Can Egypt Combat Fake News?, EGYPT TODAY (Mar. 15, 2018), http://www.egypt 

today.com/Article/2/45300/How-can-Egypt-combat-fake-news , archived at https://perma.cc/644Y-R5SJ . 

8 Law No. 175 of 2018, Al Jariddah Al-Rasmyiah, vol. 32 (bis) (c), 14 Aug. 2018. 

9 Law No. 180 of 2018, Al Jariddah Al-Rasmyiah, vol. 34 (bis) (h), 27 Aug. 2018. 

10 PENAL CODE, Law No. 58 of 1937, as amended by Law No. 95 of 2003, Vol. 25, Al Jariddah Al-Rasmyiah, 19 June 

2003. 

11 Law 180 of 2018, art. 4. 

12 Id. art. 19. 
 Initiatives to Counter Fake News: Egypt 

The Law Library of Congress 27 

Article 21 prohibits news outlets from posting information in print or online concerning a specific 

court case if such information will negatively affect the defendant in the case or the 

trial proceedings.13 

Article 22 requires media outlets to rectify any false information that was posted on their websites 

without any financial compensation. This is meant to prevent media outlets from demanding 

payment as a condition for withdrawing/correcting false information they publish. Such 

rectification must take place within three days from the date of being notified that the information 

posted was false.14 

Article 101 sanctions the director of a media outlet or website administrator violating articles 21 

and 22 with a fine of between fifty thousand and one hundred thousand Egyptian pounds (about 

US$2,855–$5,711).15 

B. Law No. 175 of 2018 on Anti-Cybercrime 

Article 7 grants the investigating authority the power to block or suspend Egyptian-based or 

foreign websites featuring content that is deemed threatening to national security or the 

national economy.16 

Article 14, paragraph 2 punishes any individual who hacks a website in order to alter the 

information posted on such website or redistributes such information after altering it with a term 

of imprisonment of not less than two years and/or a fine of between one hundred thousand and 

two hundred thousand Egyptian pounds (about US$5,700–$11,400).17

Article 20, paragraph 3 punishes individuals who hack a government website in order to erase or 

modify information posted on such website, or redistribute the information after modifying it, 

with a term of imprisonment and a fine of between one million and five millions Egyptian pounds 

(about US$57,000–$285,000).18 

Article 9 authorizes the public prosecutor to impose a travel ban on individuals suspected of 

committing any act considered a crime under Law 175 of 2018.19

 

 

13 Id. art. 21. 

14 Id. art. 22. 

15 Id. art. 101. 

16 Law 175 of 2018, art. 7. 

17 Id. art. 14, para. 2. 

18 Id. art. 20, para. 3. 

19 Id. art. 9. 
 Initiatives to Counter Fake News: Egypt 

The Law Library of Congress 28 

C. Penal Code, Law No. 58 of 1937, and Its Amendments 

Article 80(d) of the Penal Code states that whoever deliberately spreads false information or 

rumors abroad about the internal conditions of the country that might weaken the country’s 

financial credibility or harm the country’s national interests is punishable by six months’ to five 

years’ imprisonment and a fine.20 

III. Access to Legal Information 

To facilitate access to accurate legal information, the Court of Cassation (the highest court of the 

land) posts domestic legislation and ministerial resolutions published in the official gazette 

online. There are no financial charges to use and obtain such online legal information.21 

Similarly, the Supreme Constitutional Court22 and the Administrative Court23 publish on their 

official websites updated decisions issued by those courts. The purpose of publishing such legal 

information is to educate the public about recent cases and legal principles adjudicated by 

both courts. 

 

20 PENAL CODE art. 80(d). 

21 OFFICIAL GAZETTE, COURT OF CASSATION, http://www.cc.gov.eg/Legislations/Egypt_Legislations.aspx (last 

visited Jan. 4, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/A2NT-Q6WN. 

22 SUPREME CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, http://www.sccourt.gov.eg/SCC/ (last visited Jan. 4, 2019), archived at

https://perma.cc/38BR-ZBU4.

23 EGYPTIAN STATE COUNCIL (ADMINISTRATIVE COURT), http://www.ecs.eg/ (last visited Jan. 4, 2019), archived at

https://perma.cc/8ZJK-S2M9.
The Law Library of Congress 29 

France 

Nicolas Boring 

Foreign Law Specialist

SUMMARY France does not have a law prohibiting the dissemination of fake legal news specifically, 

but it has legislation against fake news in general, which would be applicable to legal 

information. The French government can rely on the 1881 Law on Freedom of the Press 

to stop the dissemination of fake news that could disturb public peace. Additionally, a 

provision of the Electoral Code prohibits the spread of fake news that could affect an 

election. In light of the large scale at which fake news can now be disseminated on the 

internet, France recently adopted a new law that requires large-scale online platform 

operators to adhere to certain standards of conduct during the three months preceding 

general elections. These standards of conduct include the requirement to be transparent 

about sponsored content and the use of personal data in content promotion, and the 

requirement to publish the amount of payments received for the promotion of 

informational content. The new law also provides that, during the three months 

preceding an election, a judge may order “any proportional and necessary measure” to 

stop the dissemination of fake or misleading information online. 

 With regard to specifically legal information, the French government promotes access 

to accurate information by maintaining a free legal database online. 

I. Introduction 

France appears to have a fairly robust legal arsenal against the dissemination of fake news.1 Until 

recently, the French government was able to rely on an 1881 statute against the publication of 

fake news, as well as a provision of the Electoral Code that prohibits the dissemination of fake 

news in an electoral context. While these provisions are still in effect, they were increasingly seen 

as inefficient to fight against fake and manipulative news disseminated on a large scale through 

the internet.2

The provisions described below do not address legal information specifically, but would be 

applicable to fake legal information. To ensure public access to accurate legal information, the 

French government maintains a free legal database online, which is described in Part IV, below. 

 

1 Les enjeux de la loi contre la manipulation de l’information [The Stakes of the Law Against Information Manipulation], 

CULTURE.GOUV.FR [website of the French Ministry of Culture] (Nov. 21, 2018), 

http://www.culture.gouv.fr/Actualites/Les-enjeux-de-la-loi-contre-la-manipulation-de-l-information, archived 

at https://perma.cc/4NQK-FWYF. 

2 Id. 
Initiatives to Counter Fake News: France 

The Law Library of Congress 30

II. 1881 Law on Freedom of the Press and Article L.97 of the Electoral Code 

A 1881 law contains a provision, which is still in force, that makes it illegal to disturb public peace 

through the publication, dissemination, or reproduction of fake news in bad faith.3 In addition to 

fake news, this provision bars the bad-faith publication, dissemination, or reproduction of forged 

or altered items, or items falsely attributed to third parties.4 Such acts are punishable by a fine of 

up to €45,000 (approximately US$51,000), or €135,000 (US$153,000) if the fake news, forged or 

altered item, or item falsely attributed to another was of a nature to harm the discipline or morale 

of troops, or to impair the nation’s war effort.5 Additionally, the Electoral Code prohibits the 

dissemination of “fake news, defamatory rumors or other fraudulent schemes” that affect the 

result of an election.6 Such acts are punishable by up to one year in jail and a fine of up to €15,000 

(US$17,000).7

III. New Legislation Against the Dissemination of Fake News During 

Election Periods 

In addition to previously existing legislation, the French government recently adopted a pair of 

new laws to deal more specifically with the large-scale dissemination of fake news through the 

internet before an election.8 This new legislation requires large-scale online platform operators 

to adhere to the following conduct during the three months preceding general elections:

- Provide users with “honest, clear and transparent information” about the identity and 

corporate address of anyone who paid to promote informational content related to a 

“debate of national interest”; 

 

3 Loi du 29 juillet 1881 sur la liberté de la presse [Law of 29 July 1881 on Freedom of the Press], art. 27, 

https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070722&dateTexte=vig, archived at

https://perma.cc/2P43-E2D8. 

4 Id.

5 Id. 

6 CODE ELECTORAL [ELECTORAL CODE], art. L97, https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCodeArticle.do? 

cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070239&idArticle=LEGIARTI000006353232, archived at https://perma.cc/9QAN2KVC. 

7 Id.

8 Les enjeux de la loi contre la manipulation de l’information, CULTURE.GOUV.FR, supra note 1; Loi organique n° 2018-

1201 du 22 décembre 2018 relative à la lutte contre la manipulation de l’information [Organic Law No. 2018-

1201 of 22 December 2018 Regarding the Fight Against Information Manipulation], 

https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do;jsessionid=3EA914DFE69980E3FBB01324A666B5D1.tplgfr22s_

1?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000037847556&dateTexte=&oldAction=rechJO&categorieLien=id&idJO=JORFCONT000

037847553, archived at https://perma.cc/CS7C-FBAA; Loi n° 2018-1202 du 22 décembre 2018 relative à la lutte 

contre la manipulation de l’information [Law No. 2018-1202 of 22 December 2018 Regarding the Fight Against 

Information Manipulation], https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte. 

do;jsessionid=3EA914DFE69980E3FBB01324A666B5D1.tplgfr22s_1?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000037847559&categor

ieLien=id, archived at https://perma.cc/9LD2-WWTW. 
Initiatives to Counter Fake News: France 

The Law Library of Congress 31

- Provide users with “honest, clear and transparent information” about the use of 

personal data in the context of promoting content related to a “debate of 

national interest”; 

- Make public the amount of payments received for the promotion of informational 

content when these amounts are above a certain threshold.9

The new legislation also provides that, during the three months preceding an election, a judge 

may order “any proportional and necessary measure” to stop the “deliberate, artificial or 

automatic and massive” dissemination of fake or misleading information online.10 A public 

prosecutor, a candidate, a political group or party, or any person with standing can bring a fake 

news case before the judge, who must rule on the motion within forty-eight hours.11

In addition to the above, the new legislation requires large-scale online platform operators to 

implement measures to prevent the dissemination of false information that could disturb public 

order or affect the validity of an election.12 Online platform operators must also put into place a 

visible and easily-accessible means for users to flag fake information, and they are required to 

provide a yearly statement to the Conseil supérieur de l’audiovisuel (CSA, Superior Council on 

Audiovisual) detailing the measures they have taken to fight against the dissemination of 

fake information.13

Finally, the new legislation allows the CSA to suspend television broadcasting services that are 

controlled or influenced by a foreign government, if it finds that these services are deliberately 

broadcasting false information during the three months preceding a national election.14

IV. Free Online Legal Database 

 The French government has long promoted the free access to official legal information online. 

As early as 1994, it started publishing an online version of the “Laws and Decrees” section of the 

Journal official de la République française, the French official gazette.15 This database was later 

incorporated into a website called Legifrance, created in 2002, which represented a larger effort 

 

9 Loi n° 2018-1202 du 22 décembre 2018, art. 1 (amending CODE ELECTORAL [ELECTORAL CODE], art. L163-1, 

https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070239, archived at

https://perma.cc/W36D-E5JZ). 

10 Id. art. 1 (amending C. ELECTORAL, art. L163-2). 

11 Id.

12 Id. art. 11. 

13 Id.

14 Id. art. 6. 

15 Arrêté du 12 octobre 1994 portant dispositions relatives à la création et à la diffusion de la base de données 

informatisée du Journal officiel des lois et décrets [Order of 12 October 1994 Establishing Provisions Regarding 

the Creation and the Dissemination of a Computer Database of the Official Gazette of Laws and Decrees], 

https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT00000 5616760&dateTexte=20190222, 

archived at https://perma.cc/MS9S-AKH9. 
Initiatives to Counter Fake News: France 

The Law Library of Congress 32

to provide the public with free and accurate access to legal information.16 The Legifrance website, 

which is accessible at www.legifrance.gouv.fr, aims to provide the official version of all current 

legislative and regulatory texts, including the French Constitution, the legal codes, laws, and 

national regulations.17 It also includes international agreements to which France is a party, as 

well as directives and regulations of the European Union. Additionally, Legifrance provides all 

the recent decisions of the country’s highest courts: the Conseil constitutionnel (the Constitutional 

Council, which judges whether laws are constitutional), the Conseil d’Etat (Council of State, the 

highest jurisdiction for administrative law), the Cour de cassation (the highest jurisdiction for 

civil and criminal matters), and the tribunal des conflits (Tribunal of Conflicts, which resolves 

jurisdictional disputes).18 Legifrance does not publish all decisions of lower courts, but instead 

publishes a selection of the more significant ones.19

 

16 Décret n° 2002-1064 du 7 août 2002 relatif au service public de la diffusion du droit par l’internet [Decree No. 

2002-1064 of 7 August 2002 Regarding the Public Service of Publication of Law through the Internet], 

https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/eli/decret/2002/8/7/PRMX0205836D/jo, archived at 

https://perma.cc/5V5N-MU4B; Arrêté du 9 octobre 2002 relatif au site internet de Légifrance [Order of 9 

October 2002 Regarding the Legifrance Website], https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cid 

Texte=JORFTEXT000000416293, archived at https://perma.cc/J5C9-H5KZ. 

17 Décret n° 2002-1064 du 7 août 2002, art. 1. 

18 Id. 

19 Id. 
The Law Library of Congress 33 

Germany 

Jenny Gesley 

Foreign Law Specialist

SUMMARY Reports about the dissemination of fake news during the 2016 US election campaign 

fueled fears that the same could happen during the 2017 German federal elections. 

However, surveys conducted after the elections revealed that the fears were unfounded. 

Nonetheless, the public perceived that fake news had played a major role. 

 Germany has a number of civil and criminal law provisions that may be applicable to 

safeguard individuals or the public from fake news in social networks. In addition, in 

2017, the Network Enforcement Act was passed with the specific aim of fighting fake 

news on social networks by improving the enforcement of the current laws. Social 

networks that do not remove clearly illegal content may be fined up to €50 million 

(about US$57.8 million). Germany also tries to ensure that citizens have access to 

accurate legal information by providing free access to legislation and court 

decisions online.

I. Introduction 

In December 2016, the Parliamentary Research Services of the German Bundestag (parliament) 

published a report on dealing with the dissemination of false information (“fake news”), 

including the current legal situation and reform proposals.1 The reason for the report was, among 

other things, a criminal complaint that the politician Renate Künast from the Green Party had 

filed against the authors of fake news published on Facebook.2 According to news reports, several 

Facebook pages had posted a picture of the politician with a quote in which she allegedly 

commented on the recent highly publicized murder of a student and the arrest of a suspect in 

Freiburg, stating that “[e]ven though the traumatized young refugee has killed, he should be 

helped nonetheless.”3 The picture named the newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung as a source for the 

quote. The politician filed a criminal complaint against the operators of a right-wing Facebook 

page and against unknown persons.4 She criticized the fact that it took Facebook three days to 

delete the false information.5 Around the same time, reports about the dissemination of fake news 

 

1 WISSENSCHAFTLICHE DIENSTE [PARLIAMENTARY RESEARCH SERVICES], DER UMGANG MIT FAKE-NEWS. RECHTSLAGE 

UND REFORMANSÄTZE [DEALING WITH FAKE NEWS. CURRENT LEGAL SITUATION AND REFORM PROPOSALS], Report 

No. WD 10 - 3000 - 067/16 (Dec. 20, 2016), https://www.bundestag.de/blob/494418/4321d22920408 

0dce488ebd0356b5db2/wd-10-067-16-pdf-data.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/ZD2V-SSHP. 

2 Id. at 5; Künast stellt Strafanzeige wegen Falschnachricht auf Facebook [Künast Files Criminal Complaint for False 

News on Facebook], FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG (Dec. 10, 2016), https://www.faz.net/-gpg-8o93s, 

archived at http://perma.cc/M3KS-Z4B2. 

3 Künast stellt Strafanzeige wegen Falschnachricht auf Facebook, supra note 2. 

4 Id. 

5 Id.
Initiatives to Counter Fake News: Germany 

The Law Library of Congress 34

regarding the 2016 US elections on Facebook and other social media platforms were published 

and fueled fears that the same could happen in the upcoming German federal elections in 2017.6 

A survey conducted in 2017 on behalf of the Media Authority of North Rhine-Westphalia 

(Landesanstalt für Medien Nordrhein-Westfalen, LfM) found that 59% of survey participants 

have encountered fake news on the internet.7 Among fourteen- to twenty-four-year-olds, the 

number was 77%.8 It is unclear whether false information has had any influence on the democratic 

process in Germany, for example, on elections.9 Whereas some studies have found that it has had 

an influence, others see the phenomenon more limited in nature.10 A survey conducted after the 

last federal elections in Germany found that there were not nearly as many fake news reports as 

expected and that no major piece of fake news had any impact on the results, but that there was 

a difference between that reality and the perception of most voters.11 In total, 61% of voters said 

that they were under the impression that a lot of fake news was distributed by the media.12

Among survey participants that were critical of the media and among younger people, the 

numbers were 75% and 72% respectively.13 Thirty percent of participants overall thought that 

fake news also had a major influence on the results.14 One possible explanation for this distortion 

found in the survey was the omnipresence of the topic “fake news” in media coverage of the US 

and the ambiguous meaning of the term “fake news.”15 In addition, most fake news in Germany 

is used by right-wing populist parties and supporters to advance their agendas and believed by 

their supporters when it correlates with their world views.16

As a reaction to the spread of fake news, several initiatives have been started. In 2017, Germany 

passed the Network Enforcement Act (the so-called Facebook Act), which explicitly aims to 

 

6 WISSENSCHAFTLICHE DIENSTE, supra note 1, at 4. 

7 FORSA, FAKE NEWS 1 (May 2017), http://www.lfm-nrw.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Ergebnisbericht_ 

Fake_News.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/4ZDL-6LMS. 

8 Id. at 2. 

9 DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN UND PROTOKOLLE [BT-DRS.] 19/2224, at 1, http://dipbt.bundestag.de/ 

doc/btd/19/022/1902224.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/Q4NX-BF2K. 

10 Id. at 1 (referencing the survey on behalf of the LfM, see supra note 7, and a study from 2017, see Simon 

Hegelich, Social Bots, Trolle, Fake-News [Social Bots, Trolls, Fake-News], in 62 DIE POLITISCHE MEINUNG 543 (2017), 

https://www.kas.de/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=fb6dc26f-b391-995a-263b-cae7ed108176& 

groupId=252038, archived at http://perma.cc/7HTG-RFEG). 

11 ALEXANDER SÄNGERLAUB, VERZERRTE REALITÄTEN. DIE WAHRNEHMUNG VON „FAKE NEWS“ IM SCHATTEN DER 

USA UND DER BUNDESTAGSWAHL [DISTORTED REALITIES. PERCEPTION OF “FAKE NEWS“ OVERSHADOWED BY THE 

USA AND THE FEDERAL ELECTIONS] (Oct. 2017), https://www.stiftung-nv.de/sites/default/files/fake_ 

news_im_schatten_der_usa_und_der_bundestagswahl_0.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/SRK7-DKPR. 

12 Id. at 6. 

13 Id. 

14 Id. at 7. 

15 Id. at 11. 

16 Id. at 10. 
Initiatives to Counter Fake News: Germany 

The Law Library of Congress 35

combat hate speech and fake news in social networks.17 However, it should be noted that the 

Network Enforcement Act did not enter into force until October 1, 2017, after the Federal Elections 

of September 24, 2017.18 Likewise, the European Union (EU) in 2018 published an EU-wide 

voluntary Code of Practice on Disinformation and is planning to create an independent European 

network of fact-checkers to combat the spread of disinformation (fake news) online.19 The EU 

Code of Practice on Disinformation is the latest among a series of initiatives that the EU has 

started with regard to countering the spread of disinformation.20

II. Legal Framework 

In Germany, there is no general law that prohibits the creation and dissemination of fake news. 

However, depending on the facts of the case, there are a number of civil and criminal law 

provisions that may be applicable to safeguard individuals or the public from fake news in social 

networks. The aforementioned Network Enforcement Act did not create new duties to delete 

content and relies on the violation of enumerated criminal law norms. 

A. Criminal Law 

Under German criminal law, there are several provisions that prohibit the assertion or 

dissemination of personal information that is either false or cannot be proved to be true.21 A 

 

17 Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Rechtsdurchsetzung in sozialen Netzwerken [Netzwerksdurchsetzungsgesetz] 

[NetzDG] [Act to Improve the Enforcement of Rights on Social Networks] [Network Enforcement Act] 

[NetzDG], Sept. 1, 2017, BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL.] [FEDERAL LAW GAZETTE] I at 3352, http://www.gesetzeim-internet.de/netzdg/NetzDG.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/5HML-PQT5, unofficial English translation 

available at 

https://www.bmjv.de/SharedDocs/Gesetzgebungsverfahren/Dokumente/NetzDG_engl.pdf;jsessionid=AD9

9C47B2608D12B014859D5FF786F29.2_cid289?__blob=publicationFile&v=2, archived at http://perma.cc/J86HGTY4. 

18 Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Rechtsdurchsetzung in sozialen Netzwerken [Netzwerksdurchsetzungsgesetz] 

[NetzDG] [Act to Improve the Enforcement of Rights on Social Networks] [Network Enforcement Act] 

[NetzDG], Sept. 1, 2017, BGBL. I at 3352, art. 3, 

http://www.bgbl.de/xaver/bgbl/start.xav?startbk=Bundesanzeiger_BGBl&jumpTo=bgbl117s3352.pdf, 

archived at http://perma.cc/5QZR-TYVD. 

19 EU Code of Practice on Disinformation (Sept. 2018), https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm? 

doc_id=54454, archived at http://perma.cc/456J-N5HV; Communication from the Commission to the European 

Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Tackling 

Online Disinformation: A European Approach, COM (2018) 236 final (Apr. 26, 2018), at 9, https://eur-lex. 

europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52018DC0236&rid=2, archived at

http://perma.cc/MMP9-4VP7. 

20 For an overview, see Jenny Gesley, European Union: Commission Proposes EU-Wide Code of Practice to Combat 

Fake News Online, GLOBAL LEGAL MONITOR (May 11, 2018), http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/ 

european-union-commission-proposes-eu-wide-code-of-practice-to-combat-fake-news-online/, archived at

http://perma.cc/75EG-QUD7. 

21 STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [CRIMINAL CODE], Nov. 13, 199, BGBL. I at 3322, as amended, §§ 186, 187, 

http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/stgb/StGB.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/X8TS-UCBK, unofficial 

English translation available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.pdf (English 

version updated through Oct. 10, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/335U-E4RV. 
Initiatives to Counter Fake News: Germany 

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requirement is that the information is capable of defaming a person or of negatively affecting 

public opinion of the person.22 The crime of defamation is punishable with imprisonment not 

exceeding one year or a fine and, if it was committed publicly or through the dissemination of 

written materials, with imprisonment not exceeding two years or a fine.23 If the defamation was 

done intentionally, the term of imprisonment may not exceed two years or a fine; if it was 

committed publicly, in a meeting, or through the dissemination of written materials, it will be 

punished with imprisonment not exceeding five years or with a fine.24 If the defamation is 

directed towards a politician and it makes his or her public activities substantially more difficult, 

the punishment ranges from three months’ to five years’ imprisonment.25 Social networks are 

generally considered public places, except when information is posted in closed groups. 

Defamation and intentional defamation are only prosecuted upon the request of the victim.26 The 

Public Prosecutor, however, will only open an investigation if it is in the public interest.27 

In addition to a criminal prosecution, a person who has been defamed may also sue for libel in 

civil court and request a preliminary injunction.28

B. Media Law 

The media law states that electronic information and communication services (“telemedia”)29 that 

provide journalistic content must conform to recognized journalistic standards, in particular 

when they completely or partially reproduce texts or visual contents of periodical print media.30

 

22 Id. 

23 Id. § 186. 

24 Id. § 187. 

25 Id. § 188. 

26 Id. § 194, para. 1. 

27 STRAFPROZEßORDNUNG [STPO] [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE], Apr. 7, 1987, BGBL. I at 1074, 1319, as 

amended, §§ 374, 376, http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/stpo/StPO.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/68A4-

GZZF, unofficial English translation available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stpo/ 

englisch_stpo.pdf (English version updated through Apr. 23, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/9V5G-GUDE. 

28 ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], Dec. 5, 2005, BGBL. I at 3202; BGBL. 2006 I at 431; 

BGBL 2007 I at 1781, as amended, §§ 935, 940, http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/zpo/ZPO.pdf, archived at 

http://perma.cc/MB6Z-7ZZ6, unofficial English translation available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet. 

de/englisch_zpo/englisch_zpo.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/9TLR-A3VD. 

29 Telemediengesetz [TMG] [Telemedia Act], Feb. 26, 2007, BGBL. I at 179, as amended, § 1, para. 1, 

http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/tmg/TMG.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/3YJK-9N48, unofficial 

English translation available at https://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/28/2016/ 

02/Telemedia_Act__TMA_.pdf (English version not updated), archived at http://perma.cc/77GL-8FNJ. 

30 Staatsvertrag für Rundfunk und Telemedien [Rundfunkstaatsvertrag] [RStV] [Interstate Treaty on 

Broadcasting and Telemedia] [Interstate Broadcasting Treaty], Aug. 31, 1991, as amended, art. 54, para. 2, 

https://www.die-medienanstalten.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Rechtsgrundlagen/Gesetze_Staats 

vertraege/Rundfunkstaatsvertrag_RStV.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/U5GH-BE8V, unofficial English 

translation available at https://www.die-medienanstalten.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Rechtsgrundlagen/ 
Initiatives to Counter Fake News: Germany 

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This means that news must be “verified by the provider prior to their [sic] transmission with the 

diligence appropriate to the circumstances concerning their content, source and truthfulness.”31

However, the law does not provide any consequences for a violation of journalistic standards. 

The only sanctions available to the German Press Council (Deutscher Presserat) are public 

reprimands.32 In addition, the Press Code (Pressekodex) enforced by the German Press Council 

is only applicable to people who have voluntarily agreed to be bound by it, which is typically not 

the case for social media platforms or persons posting content on social media platforms. 

C. Host Provider Liability 

Host providers are generally not liable for false information published by third parties on their 

platforms as long as they do not have actual knowledge of the rights violation. 33 However, once 

they are notified of the rights violation, they must delete the content immediately in order to 

avoid liability.34 The notification itself must be so specific and provide enough information that 

the host provider has a basis to qualify and verify the illegality of the posted information.35

However, in practice, host providers have regularly ignored notifications, which was one of the 

reasons for enacting the Network Enforcement Act, described below. 

D. Network Enforcement Act 

One of the objectives of the Network Enforcement Act, adopted in 2017, was to fight fake news 

in light of the events during the last US election campaign. The explanatory memorandum 

stated that 

fighting fake news on social networks [is] a priority. To do so requires improvements in 

law enforcement on social networks in order to promptly remove objectively criminal 

content, such as incitement to hatred, abuse, defamation or content that could lead to a 

breach of the peace by misleading authorities into thinking a crime has been committed.36 

 

Gesetze_Staatsvertraege/Rundfunkstaatsvertrag_RStV_20_english_version.pdf (English version updated 

through Sept. 1, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/7LF3-5D2W. 

31 Id.

32 Presserat [German Press Council], Publizistische Grundsätze [Pressekodex] [German Press Code] (2017), 

Complaints Procedure, § 12, para. 5, in conjunction with Press Code, § 16, https://www.presserat.de/ 

fileadmin/user_upload/Downloads_Dateien/Pressekodex2017_web.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/2S8CCB3L, English translation available at https://www.presserat.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Downloads_ 

Dateien/Pressekodex2017english.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/AA56-Z4K7. 

33 Telemedia Act, § 10. 

34 Id. 

35 Oberlandesgericht Hamburg [OLG Hamburg] [Higher Regional Court Hamburg, Mar. 2, 2010, docket no. 7 

U 70/09, 7 MULTIMEDIA UND RECHT [MMR] 490, 491 (2010). 

36 BT-Drs. 18/12356, at 1, http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/123/1812356.pdf, archived at

http://perma.cc/MD44-LD9G, English version available at http://ec.europa.eu/growth/tools-databases/ 

tris/en/index.cfm/search/?trisaction=search.detail&year=2017&num=127&dLang=EN, archived at 

http://perma.cc/BAE2-KAJX. 
Initiatives to Counter Fake News: Germany 

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Surveys conducted on the deletion practices of social networks revealed that the voluntary 

commitments of social media platforms were insufficient. The government concluded that 

[s]ince the current mechanisms and the voluntary measures agreed on by social networks 

are inadequate and given the significant problems in enforcing the current law, it is 

necessary to introduce rules to make social networks comply on pain of a fine in order to 

enable prompt, effective action against hate crime and other criminal content on 

the internet.37

The Network Enforcement Act has been very controversial and has been criticized as 

unconstitutional, in particular with regard to free speech.38 Several political parties have 

submitted proposals to amend the law.39 However, none of the proposals have yet advanced 

very far. 

As previously mentioned, the law in its current form does not create any new duties for social 

media platforms,40 but imposes high fines for noncompliance with existing legal obligations.41

1. Scope of Application 

The Network Enforcement Act is only applicable to social media networks that have two million 

or more registered users in Germany.42 Social media networks are defined as “telemedia service 

providers that operate online platforms with the intent to make a profit and on which users can 

share content with other users or make that content publicly available.”43 The Act does not apply 

to platforms that post original journalistic content, or to email or messaging services.44

2. Removal of Illegal Hosted Content 

The Act obligates the covered social media networks to remove content that is “clearly illegal” 

within twenty-four hours after receiving a user complaint.45 If the illegality of the content is not 

obvious on its face, the social network has seven days to investigate and delete it. The seven-day 

 

37 Id. at 2. 

38 For a summary of the criticism, see Georg Nolte, Hate-Speech, Fake-News, das »Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz« 

und Vielfaltsicherung durch Suchmaschinen [Hate Speech, Fake News, the ”Network Enforcement Act“ and Assuring 

Diversity Through Search Engines], 61 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR URHEBER- UND MEDIENRECHT [ZUM] 552, 554 (2017). 

39 See, e.g., the draft act submitted by the Green Party, BT-Drs. 19/5950, http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/ 

btd/19/059/1905950.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/FBW8-FJDP. 

40 With the exception of reporting requirements. 

41 See also Jenny Gesley, Germany: Social Media Platforms to Be Held Accountable for Hosted Content Under “Facebook 

Act”, GLOBAL LEGAL MONITOR (July 11, 2017), http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/germany-socialmedia-platforms-to-be-held-accountable-for-hosted-content-under-facebook-act/, archived at

http://perma.cc/KX9D-V6JL. 

42 Network Enforcement Act, § 1, paras. 1, 2. 

43 Id. § 1, para. 1, sentence 1. 

44 Id. § 1, para. 1, sentences 2, 3. 

45 Id. § 3, para. 2, no. 2. 
Initiatives to Counter Fake News: Germany 

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deadline may be extended if additional facts are necessary to determine the truthfulness of the 

information or if the social network hires an outside agency to perform the vetting process (a 

recognized “Agency of Regulated Self-Regulation”). 

In order to determine whether an act is “illegal,” the Network Enforcement Act refers to the 

Criminal Code, in particular to the provisions on dissemination of propaganda material or use of 

symbols of unconstitutional organizations, encouragement of the commission of a serious violent 

offense endangering the state, commission of treasonous forgery, public incitement to crime, 

incitement to hatred, and defamation, among others.46

3. Complaint Mechanism and Biannual Reports 

The social media platforms are obligated to offer their users an easy and transparent complaint 

mechanism that is constantly available.47 The decisions taken with regard to the complaint and 

the reasoning behind accepting or rejecting it must be communicated to the complainant and the 

affected user without undue delay.48 

Social media networks that receive more than one hundred complaints about illegal content in a 

calendar year are required to publish biannual reports in German on how they deal with these 

complaints. The report has to be published in the Federal Gazette and on the homepage of the 

social media network one month after the end of each half-year period.49 The report must be easily 

identifiable, immediately accessible, and permanently available.50 It must include information on 

the general efforts to prevent illegal actions on the platform, a description of the complaint 

procedure, the number of complaints received, the number and qualifications of employees who 

are handling the complaints, the network’s association memberships, the number of times an 

external party has been used to decide the illegality of the content, the number of complaints that 

led to the content being deleted, the time it took to delete the content, and measures that were 

taken to inform the complainant and the member who posted the deleted content.51

4. Fines 

A social media network that intentionally or negligently violates certain of the abovementioned 

obligations may be fined up to €50million (about US$57.8 million).52 If the Ministry of Justice 

wants to fine a company because it considers the content that was not deleted to be illegal, it must 

 

46 Id. § 1, para. 3. 

47 Id. § 3, para. 1. 

48 Id. § 3, para. 2, no. 5. 

49 Id. § 2, para. 1. 

50 Id. 

51 Id. § 2, para. 2. 

52 Id. § 4, in conjunction with Gesetz über Ordnungswidrigkeiten [OWiG] [Act on Regulatory Offenses], Feb. 19, 

1987, BGBL. I at 602, as amended, § 30, para. 2, sentence 3, http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/owig_1968/ 

OWiG.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/CSB5-6UHE, unofficial English translation available at http://www. 

gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_owig/englisch_owig.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/3U36-ZJJL. 
Initiatives to Counter Fake News: Germany 

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first obtain a court decision to this effect.53 The court decision is final and binding on the Ministry 

of Justice.54

III. Access to Accurate Legal Information 

The German federal and state governments as well as the courts provide free access to legal 

information online. The Federal Law Gazette as well as all the state law gazettes can be viewed 

online.55 The Federal Law Gazette is also available as a free app.56 The Federal Ministry of Justice 

publishes almost all laws online and provides English translations for selected laws.57 The same 

website provides links to administrative regulations of the Federal Ministries58 and to the 

jurisprudence of all federal courts.59 The Justice Portal of the Federation and the states provides 

links to the jurisprudence of all federal as well as state courts.60 It also provides access to various 

other online services, including links to all state legislation.61

On the website of the German Bundestag (parliament), citizens can access parliamentary 

documentation for the Bundestag and the Bundesrat, the constitutional body through which the 

states participate in the legislative process, including draft laws and explanatory memoranda, 

verbatim records of parliamentary sessions, and answers to parliamentary requests, 

among others.62

 

53 Network Enforcement Act, § 4, paras. 4, 5. 

54 Id. § 4, para. 5. 

55 For the Federal Law Gazette, see http://www.bgbl.de/xaver/bgbl/start.xav?startbk=Bundesanzeiger_ 

BGBl&jumpTo=bgbl119005.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2019), archived at http://perma.cc/RHK8-AHHJ. 

56 BGBl. Mobile [Mobile Federal Law Gazette], BUNDESANZEIGER VERLAG [BUNDESANZEIGER PUBLISHING COMPANY], 

http://mobile.bgbl.de/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2019), archived at http://perma.cc/4QLA-LFVE. 

57 Gesetze/Verordnungen alphabetisch sotiert [Statutes/Regulations Sorted Alphabetically], BUNDESMINISTERIUM DER 

JUSTIZ UND FÜR VERBRAUCHERSCHUTZ [FEDERAL MINISTRY FOR JUSTICE AND CONSUMER PROTECTION], 

http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/aktuell.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2019), archived at

http://perma.cc/6BRW-3Z6Q. 

58 Verwaltungsvorschriften nach Normgeber sortiert [Administrative Regulations Sorted by Author], BUNDESREGIERUNG 

[FEDERAL GOVERNMENT], http://www.verwaltungsvorschriften-im-internet.de/ erlassstellen.html (last visited 

Feb. 27, 2019), archived at http://perma.cc/WT9W-YA3Z. 

59 Rechtsprechung im Internet [Jurisprudence Online], BUNDESMINISTERIUM DER JUSTIZ UND FÜR 

VERBRAUCHERSCHUTZ [FEDERAL MINISTRY FOR JUSTICE AND CONSUMER PROTECTION], http://www.recht 

sprechung-im-internet.de/jportal/portal/page/bsjrsprod.psml (last visited Feb. 27, 2019), archived at 

http://perma.cc/PL37-WL7C. 

60 JUSTIZPORTAL DES BUNDES UND DER LÄNDER [JUSTICE PORTAL OF THE FEDERATION AND THE STATES], 

https://justiz.de/onlinedienste/rechtsprechung/index.php (last visited Feb. 27, 2019), archived at

http://perma.cc/4CU8-7ALM. 

61 Onlinedienste [Online Services], JUSTIZPORTAL DES BUNDES UND DER LÄNDER, https://justiz.de/onlinedienste/ 

index.php (last visited Feb. 27, 2019), archived at http://perma.cc/75NU-BN8M. 

62 DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG, DOKUMENTATIONS- UND INFORMATIONSSYSTEM [DIP] [PARLIAMENTARY MATERIAL 

INFORMATION SYSTEM], http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21.web/bt (last visited Feb. 27, 2019), archived at

http://perma.cc/D7B2-95DR. 
The Law Library of Congress 41 

Israel 

Ruth Levush 

Senior Foreign Law Specialist

 

SUMMARY Israeli legislators and officials have raised concerns over threats posed by the possible 

dissemination of false information by private individuals and foreign powers. These 

concerns have been heightened by the approaching 2019 elections and warnings by 

Israel’s heads of security services. 

 A high-level committee of experts appointed by the President to examine the current 

law on campaign advertising (“propaganda”) issued its report in November 2017. The 

report recommended extending application of the substantive provisions of the 

Elections (Modes of Propaganda) Law to the internet and social platforms to ensure 

fairness and transparency, and to require disclosure of the identifying information of 

those persons on whose behalf the election advertisement was published. Bills based 

on the committee’s recommendations, as well as other pending bills addressing threats 

posed by the dissemination of fake news, have not yet been adopted. 

 Opponents of government control of the dissemination of information have opined that 

such control constitutes a threat to the democratic nature of the state because, among 

other things, it would violate freedom of expression. 

 In adjudicating fake news-related claims, judicial bodies have evaluated legal aspects 

of the dissemination of fake news based on general principles of law. The Israel Central 

Elections Committee has ordered the Ministry of Education to remove misleading 

information intending to serve as promotional material in violation of the Elections 

(Modes of Propaganda) Law. Addressing non-election-related misleading and 

defamatory information, the Tel Aviv District Court recognized liability for defamation 

under the Prohibition on Defamation Law, 5725-1965 for sharing defamatory posts 

on Facebook. 

 Israeli media and international corporations active in Israel have, for their part, adopted 

policies to confront threats posed by fake news. While one of Israel’s leading 

newspapers has launched a fact-checking system, both Facebook and Google have 

announced the adoption of special measures designed to block certain types of electionrelated ads.

I. Introduction 

Many in Israel have shared concerns about the dissemination of false information (“fake news”), 

especially in the digital era. These concerns are reflected in legislative developments as well as in 

media and academic reports. 

A 2017 report by the Knesset (Israel’s parliament) Information and Research Center (KIRC) 

recognized that dissemination of fake news as real facts was not a new phenomenon, as it had 
Initiatives to Counter Fake News: Israel 

The Law Library of Congress 42

apparently existed even before the invention of print.1 However, the availability of cyber 

technology in modern times might facilitate much larger-scale manipulation of political processes 

by both private individuals recruited by political rivals and by foreign powers.2 

Concerns regarding the impact of technology on the dissemination of fake news have resulted in 

various legislative and judicial developments. Israel’s Central Elections Committee has similarly 

engaged in attempts to protect the integrity of elections. Israeli media, Google, and Facebook, on 

their part, have also undertaken various commitments to fight the phenomenon. 

This report describes potential threats posed by fake news to the Israeli legal system and 

especially to the upcoming April 2019 elections. The report discusses legislative and 

administrative steps taken by Israeli government agencies and by the private sector to 

counter fake news. 

II. Means of Viral Dissemination of Fake News 

KIRC’s report surveys the potential means of cyber dissemination of fake news, including social 

bots, active measures, and hybrid warfare. 

A. Social Bots 

Social bots consist of digital algorithms that are designed to look like real social media users, 

thereby serving as a platform for the intentional dissemination of content for a variety of interests, 

including commercial, political, or criminal, all designed to use a fictitious identity to influence 

the flow of information and its dissemination.3

B. Active Measures 

Active measures may include certain overt and covert techniques used to influence the policies 

of another government, undermine confidence in its leaders and institutions, disrupt 

international relations, and discredit and weaken governmental and nongovernmental 

opponents. Citing Professor Roy Godson’s written testimony to the US Senate Select Committee 

on Intelligence on March 30, 2017, KIRC’s report notes that active measures frequently involve 

 

1 ROI GOLDSMIDT, KIRC, DISSEMINATION OF FALSE INFORMATION ON THE INTERNET AND CYBERATTACKS FOR 

INFLUENCE ON ELECTIONS 3 (June 11, 2017), https://fs.knesset.gov.il/globaldocs/MMM/17103500-0233-e711-

80d4-00155d0aee17/2_17103500-0233-e711-80d4-00155d0aee17_11_6989.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/ 

5LTZ-FV23 (citing Jacob Soll, The Long and Brutal History of Fake News, POLITICO MAGAZINE (Dec. 18, 2016), 

https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/12/fake-news-history-long-violent-214535, archived at 

https://perma.cc/RF52-6PZR). 

2 David Siman-Tov et al., Cyber Threats to Democratic Processes, 1(3) CYBER, INTELLIGENCE & SECURITY 51, 53 (Dec. 

2017), http://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/CyberENG1.3_6-53-65.pdf, archived at

https://perma.cc/E4VZ-8JWW. 

3 Goldsmidt, supra note 1, at 3-5. 
Initiatives to Counter Fake News: Israel 

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attempts to deceive foreign governmental and nongovernmental actors or mass audiences, and 

to distort their perception of reality.4 

C. Hybrid Warfare 

Citing Christopher Chivvis’s testimony before the US House Armed Services Committee on 

March 22, 2017, KIRC’s report notes that one of the main characteristics of hybrid warfare is that 

it concentrates on the targeted country’s population itself, including by cyberattacks and 

political influence.5 

III. Government Publications 

Free access to legal information and services in Israel is available on a national law portal.6 The 

Ministry of Justice website routinely posts copies of legal publications published in Rashumot (the 

official gazette).7 The Israeli Judicial Authority website publishes Supreme Court decisions and 

provides access to a variety of services.8 Government ministries and the Prime Minister’s office 

maintain websites and post information via such websites. 

IV. Specific Warning of Foreign Threats to the Integrity of the 2019 Elections 

Awareness of potential threats posed by false news has increased, particularly in the context 

of elections. According to Israeli scholars, 

[c]yber threats to the election process in democratic countries may be categorized as threats 

that aim to disrupt the process through technological tools designed to corrupt information 

systems and the polling and voting systems, and as material threats to democratic 

institutions by sullying their good name and by undermining the public’s faith in them. 

While the first category of threats is well known and countries are well prepared to contend 

with them, the second—which is more abstract—is a new type of threat that requires 

appropriate consideration and analysis.9

 

4 Id. at 5 (citing Disinformation: A Primer in Russian Active Measures and Influence Campaigns: Hearing Before the 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 115th Cong. 11 (Mar. 30, 2017) (Written Testimony of Roy Godson, 

https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/os-rgodson-033017.pdf, archived at 

https://perma.cc/BXD6-RYQQ).

5 Id. at 6 (citing Understanding Russian “Hybrid Warfare” and What Can Be Done about It: Hearing Before the 

House Armed Services Committee, 115th Cong. 59 (Mar. 22, 2017) (Testimony of Christopher S. Chivvis), 

https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-115hhrg25088/pdf/CHRG-115hhrg25088.pdf, archived at

https://perma.cc/8ANA-GA98. 

6 GOVERNMENT SERVICES AND INFORMATION PORTAL, https://www.gov.il/ last visited Feb. 5, 2019), archived at

https://perma.cc/VD6Q-NBT3. 

7 Rashumot, MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, https://www.gov.il/he/Departments/official_gazette (in Hebrew; last visited 

Feb. 5, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/K7G6-CT73.

8 THE ISRAELI JUDICIAL AUTHORITY, https://www.gov.il/he/Departments/the_judicial_authority (in Hebrew; 

last visited Feb. 5, 2019). archived at https://perma.cc/22EG-WXH7. Limited content is available in other 

languages, including English. 

9 Siman-Tov et al., supra note 2, at 52. 
Initiatives to Counter Fake News: Israel 

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Concerns over online dissemination of misleading information have been heightened in 

anticipation of the upcoming Israeli national elections scheduled for April 9, 2019.10 According 

to Israeli news reports, on January 7, 2019, Nadav Argaman, Israel’s Shin Bet (General Security 

Service) Chief, said that a foreign country intends to intervene in Israel’s upcoming election via 

hackers and cyber technology, but that “it remains unclear at this point what the foreign nation’s 

political interests are.”11 

Erez Kriner, former head of the Shin Bet Agency for Cybersecurity, opined that there were several 

regional entities, in addition to Russia, that might be interested in influencing the Israeli elections: 

Turkey, Syria, Iran, the Palestinian Authority, and Hamas.12 An Israeli cybersecurity company, 

however, estimated that Iran, Russia, and China pose the biggest threats, as they seek “to 

influence the outcome of elections or undermine confidence in the democratic process . . . [and] 

have the most money and people.”13 

Among threats to the conduct of fair elections are voter data breaches, the hacking of party 

systems, and denial-of-service attacks on official sites: 

In the end, however, what might present the biggest threat comes from people trying to 

manipulate opinions by disseminating misleading information online; for example, by 

using fake Facebook profiles. . . . [T]he number of bots – fictitious social media users – 

could be enormous. Bots can be set up and maintained for three or four years and activated 

as an election gets underway. . . . The challenge is to maintain credibility and public trust 

in the process . . . . Sometimes it’s enough to force down a government site for a few hours 

in order to instill public doubts about the cleanliness of the system.14 

According to Mossad (Israel’s Secret Intelligence Service) Chief Tamir Pardo, “what we’ve seen 

so far with respect to bots and the distortion of information is just the tip of the iceberg. It is the 

greatest threat of recent years, and it threatens the basic values that we share—democracy and 

the world order created since World War Two.”15

 

 

10 Amitai Ziv, Massive Manipulation, Foreign Influence Campaign and Cyber: The Threats to Israel’s Election, What’s 

behind the Shin Bet Chief Warning that a ‘Foreign Country’ Intends to Intervene in the Israeli Election, HAARETZ.COM

(Jan. 9, 2019), https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/elections/massive-manipulation-foreign-influencecampaign-and-cyber-the-threats-to-israel-s-election-1.6822455, archived at https://perma.cc/Q2RG-KQME. 

11 ‘Foreign Country’ Intends to Intervene in Israeli Elections, Shin Bet Chief Says, HAARETZ (Jan. 8, 2019), 

https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/elections/.premium-foreign-country-intends-to-intervene-in-israelielections-shin-bet-chief-says-1.6824615, archived at https://perma.cc/DM7P-Z69S. 

12 Uri Berkowits, “There Are At Least Four Countries in the Region that Will Be Interested in Influencing on the 

Elections in Israel,” GLOBES (Jan. 10, 2019), https://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001268589 (in 

Hebrew), archived at https://perma.cc/ZX64-CJW5. 

13 Ziv, supra note 10. 

14 Id.

15 Id. 
Initiatives to Counter Fake News: Israel 

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V. Committee for Examination of the Elections (Modes of Propaganda) Law 

Concerns for threats to the election process in Israel led to the appointment of a special committee 

to examine the threats and find ways to address them. 

On July 8, 2015, Israel’s President Reuven Rivlin and Justice Salim Joubran, the Chairman of the 

Central Elections Committee (CEC) for the 20th Knesset, appointed the Committee for 

Examination of the -ט"תשי ,)תעמולה דרכי (הבחירות חוק) Elections (Modes of Propaganda) Law, 5719-

1959) (CEEMPL). 16 This Law governs the broadcasting of election messages in Israel.17 The 

CEEMPL was established in response to past CEC chairs’ recommendations to reform the Law, 

and adjust its provisions to reflect technological changes. The CEEMPL included former 

President of the Supreme Court Dorit Beinish, former Minister of Justice Dan Meridor, former 

Knesset Member Itshak Levi, Professor Suzi Navot, and Professor Karin Nahon. The CEEMPL 

issued a comprehensive report and recommendations to the President on November 21, 2017.18

The report states that the Law was enacted in the pre-internet era. 19 It provides that the Supreme 

Court has called on a number of occasions for reformation of the Law in view of technological 

and telecommunication developments that have taken place over the years.20 

One of the report’s main recommendations was to extend the application of substantive 

provisions of the Law to the internet and to social platforms.21 An additional recommendation 

was to add to the Law a special provision specifying its objectives as the regulation of election 

propaganda, “[i]n fairness and transparency and in accordance with principles of freedom of 

expression, equal opportunity among candidates in elections and the dignity of men.”22

A draft bill proposed by the CEEMPL clarified that transparency required disclosure of 

identifying information of the person, candidate, or candidates’ list on behalf of whom the 

election advertisement was published, including on the internet.23

 

16 Elections (Modes of Propaganda) Law, 5719-1959, SEFER HAHUKIM [SH] [BOOK OF LAWS (official gazette)] 

5719 No. 284 p. 138, as amended; Appointment Letter Re: the Committee for Examination of the Elections 

(Modes of Propaganda) Law, 5719-1959 (July 8, 2015), CEC, http://bechirot.gov.il/election/Decisions/ 

vadattaamula/Documents/KtavMinui.pdf (in Hebrew), archived at https://perma.cc/Q8H4-BFL4. 

17 Note that the word “propaganda” in Hebrew relates to election ads and does not necessarily have negative 

connotations, as it might in English. The term “propaganda” is being used in this report according to its 

Hebrew meaning and refers to political ads in general. 

18 Report of the Committee for Examination of the Elections (Modes of Propaganda) Law, 5719-1959 (Jerusalem, 

5778-2017), http://bechirot.gov.il/election/Decisions/vadattaamula/Documents/-%20סופי%20ביניש%20דוח

לפרסום%20.pdf (in Hebrew), archived at https://perma.cc/86WN-KZTT. 

19 Id. at 6-7. 

20 Id. at 7-8. 

21 Id. at 15. 

22 Id. at 25. 

23 Proposed Text of Elections (Modes of Propaganda) Law (Consolidated Text of Existing Law with 

Committee’s Recommendations), § 2A2, id. at 53 (this and other proposed bills in Hebrew). 
Initiatives to Counter Fake News: Israel 

The Law Library of Congress 46

VI. Legislative Responses 

A. Bills Addressing Threats to Integrity of Election Process 

Following the issuance of the CEEMPL report, the Knesset Constitution, Law and Justice 

Committee drafted the Elections (Modes of Propaganda) (Amendment No. 34) Bill, 5778-2018.24

The bill proposes, among other things, adding a section 2A1 to the Propaganda Law.25 The 

proposed section would require an election ad to include the name and address of the person 

responsible for ordering it. If that person acted on the behalf of a competing person, party, or a 

Knesset candidates’ list, or on behalf of another body, the election ad would need to 

identify them.26

The bill defines “election ad” as either “election propaganda done by a person competing in the 

election, by a body connected to a party group, a body active in the elections or on their behalf,”27

or as “the content of election propaganda that was written or disseminated for a fee.“28 For the 

purpose of transparency of the latter, a fee includes monetary and nonmonetary payment, 

provision of service, or any other benefit.29

According to the bill’s explanatory notes, the distribution of any election ad, including on internet 

platforms and social media, is subject to the requirement of transparency. This requirement does 

not apply to ads circulated by individuals acting on their own, who are not paid or who do not 

pay for writing or distributing the ads.30

Although the bill passed the first of the three readings required for adoption into legislation, there 

appears to have been no further progress regarding its adoption.31 

An additional bill focusing on the transparency of election propaganda was proposed by six 

Knesset Members on November 5, 2018. This private members’ draft bill does not appear to have 

yet been considered.32

 

24 Elections (Modes of Propaganda) (Amendment No. 34), 5778-2018, HATSAOT HOK [HH] [KNESSET DRAFT 

BILLS] No. 805 p. 273 (July 11, 2018), https://fs.knesset.gov.il//20/law/20_ls1_503185.pdf, archived at

https://perma.cc/S6GH-NJU5. 

25 Id. § 5. 

26 Proposed section 2A1(a), id. For information on the election system see Elections for the Knesset, 

https://main.knesset.gov.il/en/mk/pages/elections.aspx (last visited Jan. 17, 2019), archived at 

https://perma.cc/3EFR-8CU5. 

27 Proposed section 2A1(b), Elections (Modes of Propaganda) (Amendment No. 34), 5778-2018, § 5. 

28 Id.

29 Id.

30 Id., Explanatory Notes, at 275. 

31 Id.

32 Elections (Modes of Propaganda) (Restricting Financing of Unidentified Propaganda) Draft Bill for 

Preliminary Reading, 5778-2018 (filed Nov. 5, 2018), https://main.knesset.gov.il/Activity/Legislation/ 
Initiatives to Counter Fake News: Israel 

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B. Bill Addressing Foreign Propaganda 

A private members bill targeting propaganda directed by foreign countries was submitted on 

December 3, 2018, by three Knesset Members. According to explanatory notes to this bill, its 

intention was “to prevent advertising propaganda from abroad, or by corporations that are 

prohibited from donating to Knesset candidates’ lists.”33 

The bill proposes to authorize the head of the CEC, who is a serving justice in the Supreme Court, 

to issue an injunction preventing the receipt of prohibited donations, monetary or otherwise, in 

accordance with the Parties Financing Law, 5733-1973.34 

C. “Facebook Laws” 

Two additional bills were submitted to the Knesset in December 2016. The bills, dubbed 

“Facebook Laws,” called for the removal of prohibited content from the internet. The first was a 

private members bill that required a webmaster to remove from a social platform content that 

incites the commission of terrorist acts and sought to impose fines on violators.35 

The government submitted its own bill on December 28, 2016. The government bill called for 

authorizing the Administrative Matters Court, under conditions enumerated by law, to issue a 

decree requiring the removal or disabling of the identification of content that constitutes a 

criminal act where there was a real possibility that continued publication would harm the safety 

of a person, public safety, or state security.36 The bill was reportedly withdrawn per Prime 

Minister Netanyahu’s request.37

 

Laws/Pages/LawBill.aspx?t=lawsuggestionssearch&lawitemid=2074696 (click on link at left), archived at 

https://perma.cc/5PD8-FXWS. 

33 Elections (Modes of Propaganda) (Amendment- Injunctions against Propaganda from a Foreign Country) 

Draft Bill for Preliminary Reading, 5779-2018 (filed Dec. 3, 2019), https://main.knesset.gov.il/Activity/ 

Legislation/Laws/Pages/LawBill.aspx?t=lawsuggestionssearch&lawitemid=2076227 (click on link at left), 

archived at https://perma.cc/S5YM-9HLN. 

34 Id.; Political Parties (Financing) Law 5733-1973, SH, 5733 No. 680 p. 52. For information on the financing of 

national elections in Israel see Ruth Levush, Campaign Finance: Israel, LAW LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (Apr. 2009), 

https://www.loc.gov/law/help/campaign-finance/israel.php, archived at https://perma.cc/9L63-BLF2. 

35 Removal of Inciting Advertisement Published on a Social Network Platform, Bill, 5776-2016 (Private 

Members Draft Bill) (June 27, 2016), https://main.knesset.gov.il/Activity/Legislation/Laws/Pages/Law 

Bill.aspx?t=lawsuggestionssearch&lawitemid=577014 , archived at https://perma.cc/4GSB-RX8R. 

36 Removal from the Internet of Content the Publication of which Constitutes an Offence, Bill 5777-2016, 

HATSAOT HOK (Government), Issue No. 1104 p. 741 (Dec. 28, 2016), available at https://www.justice.gov.il/ 

Units/Reshomot/publications/Pages/Bill.aspx (click on Issue No. 1104), archived at https://perma.cc/2UM2-

UC2T. 

37 Moran Azulai, Netanyahu Ordered to Stop Legislative Procedure for Enactment of “Facebook Law”, YNET (July 18, 

2018), https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-5312098,00.html , archived at https://perma.cc/5WF4-GWB7; 

see also Rafaela Goichman, Facebook Law Returns: Arden Requests Netanyahu to Re-Promote the Bill, THE MARKER

(Dec. 4, 2018), https://www.themarker.com/technation/1.6719704, archived at https://perma.cc/8KT5-TDQJ. 
Initiatives to Counter Fake News: Israel 

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A private members bill combining the two 2016 Facebook Bills was submitted on July 17, 2018. 

The 2018 bill called for facilitating, under relevant conditions, the issuance of content removal 

decrees within forty-eight hours from the filing of an application. It further authorized the 

issuance of decrees for the removal of content the publication of which constituted a basis for the 

conviction of a person for an offense. Under certain circumstances, the bill called for authorizing 

consideration of inadmissible evidence in evaluating the merits of content removal requests.38

Opponents of the bill argued that it constituted a threat to the democratic nature of the state, as 

it would violate freedom of expression and allow censorship to be imposed ex parte, and would 

be based on inadmissible evidence.39 

VII. CEC and Court Decisions Involving “False News” 

A. Duty of Government to Distribute Accurate Information 

A decision rendered on January 20, 2019, by Hanan Melcer, Deputy Supreme Court President 

and Chairman of the CEC, addresses the dissemination of misleading information by government 

institutions in the guise of election propaganda.40

The case involves a petition filed with the CEC against Minister of Education Naftali Benet, who 

is a candidate in the upcoming election, and the Ministry of Education requesting a halt to the 

dissemination of an allegedly false message produced by the Ministry asserting that the Minister 

has been successful in reducing classroom size throughout Israel during Benet’s tenure.41

Accepting the petition, Melcer recognized that the message constituted “election propaganda” 

within the meaning of the Election (Modes of Propaganda) Law, and could not be produced or 

broadcast with public money.42 Melcer’s conclusion was based on an examination of the 

broadcast’s “dominant objective” as reflected not only by the external circumstances of its 

publication, but also its substance: 

Therefore, the accuracy of the information presented in the publication, biased editing of 

material data, omission of details, which may affect the messages presented in the 

publication may also testify to the propaganda purpose which lies at the basis of the 

publication, and cast doubt on attempts to present it as useful [and] informative to 

the public.43

 

38 Prevention of Perpetrating Offenses by Publication on the Internet (Removal of Content) 5778-2018 (July 17, 

2018), https://fs.knesset.gov.il//20/law/20_ls2_503728.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/BX8A-2NPE. 

39 Omer Kabir, The Law for Facebook Censorship in Israel Approved for Second and Third Reading, CALCALIST (July 15, 

2018), https://www.calcalist.co.il/internet/articles/0,7340,L-3742306,00.html ([in Hebrew), archived at 

https://perma.cc/24E4-3XBT. 

40 Election Case 3/21 Shahar Ben Meir v. Naftali Benet, Minister of Education et al., THE CENTRAL ELECTION 

COMMITTEE FOR THE 21 KNESSET (Jan. 20, 2019), https://bechirot21.bechirot.gov.il/election/Decisions/ 

AllDecisions/knesset21/documents/tbk_3.21.pdf (in Hebrew), archived at https://perma.cc/Y2YY-543Y. 

41 Id. ¶¶ 2-3. 

42 Id. ¶ 20. 

43 Id. ¶ 29. 
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The broadcast of such a message, according to Melcer, violates the constitutional foundation for 

equality required in the Knesset elections process as it gives preference to the incumbent in 

relation to other candidates. This inequality, Melcer emphasized, was 

[r]einforced by the phenomenon of “false news” (Fake News), which has gained 

momentum in recent years. The need for publications to be accurate and devoid of any 

bias or political touch, and it constitutes another reason for imposing a duty on the public 

authority to adhere to the truth and accuracy in every detail given on its behalf to 

the public.44

The fear of dissemination of false information, justifies, in Melcer’s opinion, a sharpening of the 

guidelines and directives relating to government publications, to ensure that the “competent 

authority will fulfill its function only within the framework of its authority and will not obstruct 

public officials in activity in violation of . . . [election and government service laws].”45 

Melcer held that any publication intended to be produced or disseminated by a controlled body 

(generally state and local government and bodies receiving government funding) should be 

examined by its legal adviser for a determination of its accuracy and compliance with 

requirements under the Propaganda Law. Publications produced or disseminated in the absence 

of approval by the legal adviser will be deemed in violation of the prohibition on use of public 

assets in connection with election under the Propaganda Law.46 

The petition was accepted and the respondents were ordered to refrain from publishing the 

message and to remove it from any internet sites under their control. The Ministry was also 

ordered to remove the name of the Minister from any references to the Ministry’s programs.47

B. Liability of Individual Facebook Users for Publication of Defamatory “Fake News” 

On January 16, 2018, the Tel Aviv District Court partially accepted an appeal over a decision of 

the Tel Aviv Circuit Court rejecting a suit to recognize liability under the Prohibition on 

Defamation Law, 5725-1965 (the Defamation Law)48 for the act of “liking” and sharing two 

defamatory posts on Facebook.49 

 

44 Id. ¶ 30. 

45 Id. ¶ 32. 

46 Id.

47 Id. ¶ 39. 

48 Prohibition on Defamation Law, 5725-1965, SH 5725 No. 464, p. 240, as amended. 

49 CC (TA) 35757-10-16 Needaily Telecommunications Ltd. v. Yoel Shaul et al. (decision by Judge Yashayau 

Shanler with Kobi Vardi and Enat Ravid concurring, Jan. 16, 2019), available in the Takdin Legal Database (in 

Hebrew, by subscription). For a summary of the decision see Ruth Levush, Israel: Court Distinguishes Between 

Facebook’s “Share” and “Like” For Defamation Lawsuit, GLOBAL LEGAL MONITOR (Feb. 5, 2019), https://www. 

loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/israel-court-distinguishes-between-facebooks-share-and-like-fordefamation-lawsuit/, archived at https://perma.cc/3P24-39U6. 
Initiatives to Counter Fake News: Israel 

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Analyzing the differences between sharing and liking, the Court held that contrary to liking, 

sharing is based on the intention of a user to transmit content. It therefore complies with the 

requirement under the Defamation Law that defamatory content must be intended for a specific 

person other than the actual injured person and must in fact be delivered to the other person.50

VIII. Nongovernmental Responses to Fake News 

A. Media Fact Checking 

Reflecting concerns over fake news, one of Israel’s leading newspaper, Globes, established a fact 

checking system, the “Whistle.” According to Globes, 

[t]he whistle system deals with public statements made by public figures in order to 

provide the news consumers an essential tool for their informed and critical examination. 

Through a quick, comprehensive, balanced, and real-time examination of statements 

regarding the day’s issues, the whistle seeks to lead a more credible, accurate and factual 

public and media discourse in Israel. 

The principles that guide the work of the whistle are precision, accuracy of facts and 

details, and the use of reliable and open sources (without the use of anonymous sources), 

regardless of the speaker’s identity or the position presented in examined statement. The 

whistle system operates according to the Press Council Code of Ethics and the Ethics Code 

of the International Network of Fact-Finding Organizations (IFCN) . . . . 

The whistle system ranks the statements measured according to the following scores: 

 The statement is correct and accurate. 

 For the most part, the statement is correct, but it contains an incorrect or 

inaccurate component. 

 Partly true – Part of the statement is correct and incomplete, or it does not contain any 

significant details that may change its meaning. 

 For the most part, a small part of the statement is false and incorrect, or it omits 

fundamental details in a way that creates a significant deception about its meaning. 

 Wrong statement is not at all true. 

 Deceptive statement creates false representation or impression, although it is based on 

the correct facts . . . .51

B. Facebook’s Blocking of Paid Election Ads and Fake News 

According to Israeli media, Facebook has announced that it will block anonymous paid Israeli 

political ads on its site prior to the April 9, 2019, Knesset election. According to its new policy, 

”advertisers on Facebook will be required to provide a verified local contact person and 

 

50 CC (TA) 35757-10-16, ¶¶ 69–74. 

51 The Whistle of Globes, GLOBES, https://www.thewhistle.co.il/aboutUs (in Hebrew; last visited Feb. 5, 2019), 

archived at https://perma.cc/EM2Q-M4KA. 
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disclosure [sic] what was paid for the ad and by whom.”52 Facebook’s commitment to block 

anonymous ads might address fraudulent depiction of political parties’ sponsored ads in the 

guise of private ads.53

In a January 31, 2019 press release,, Facebook announced that it had 

removed 783 Pages, groups and accounts for engaging in coordinated inauthentic behavior 

tied to Iran. There were multiple sets of activity, each localized for a specific country or 

region, including . . . Israel . . . . The Page administrators and account owners typically 

represented themselves as locals, often using fake accounts, and posted news stories on 

current events. This included commentary that repurposed Iranian state media’s reporting 

on topics like Israel-Palestine relations.54

C. Google’s Blocking of Personalized Advertising During the 2019 Election Period 

Google reportedly informed Israeli media companies in early February 2019 that they will not be 

able to execute personal advertising on the company’s systems until after the April 9 elections. 

This means that Google will block all advertising options related to segmentation (advertising to 

a segmented audience), retargeting, and using a list of names to anyone engaged in 

political advertising.55

 

52 Chaim Levinson, Facebook to Block Anonymous Paid Political Ads Before Israel’s Election, HAARETZ (Jan. 28, 2019), 

https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/elections/.premium-facebook-to-block-anonymous-paid-political-adsbefore-israel-s-election-1.6883187 , archived at https://perma.cc/BB3S-ARRZ. 

53 Id. 

54 Removing Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior from Iran, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Jan. 31, 2019), https://newsroom. 

fb.com/news/2019/01/removing-cib-iran/, archived at https://perma.cc/K2HX-D4CE. 

55 Anat Bain Lubobitz, Google’s Dramatic Decision - Stops Personalized Advertising During Election Time, GLOBES

(Feb. 2, 2019), https://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001272384 (in Hebrew), archived at

https://perma.cc/75FT-EW2P. 
The Law Library of Congress 52 

Japan 

Sayuri Umeda 

Foreign Law Specialist

SUMMARY Fake news has been of concern to the Japanese government and the public in recent 

years. Several laws exist that can be utilized to counter fake news. A study group of 

the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications is deliberating measures to 

counter fake news. The government also provides texts of laws and the official gazette 

online for free. 

I. Overview of the “Fake News” Phenomenon 

Leading Japanese newspapers have become embroiled in a number of fake news scandals in 

recent years. One such example involved a famous fake news case circulated by the Asahi 

Shimbun, one of the leading newspapers in Japan, which published many articles in the 1980s and 

90s on the comfort women issue. Among other things, some of its reports relied on an individual 

who falsely “claimed he had forcibly taken Korean women to wartime Japanese military 

brothels.”1 It took a long time for these articles to be corrected. The Asahi Shimbun admitted that 

serious errors had been made in the articles and apologized in its print edition and on its website 

in 2014.2 Another leading newspaper, the Mainichi, published online vulgar articles that “were 

sourced from unreliable Japanese tabloids” from 2001 to 2008, when it admitted that many stories 

in the articles were untrue and ceased publishing the series.3

Fake news through social media is also becoming a serious issue, although it appears there are 

not as many extreme fake news cases in Japan as in other countries. The difficulty of the Japanese 

language for foreigners prevents fake news postings from outside Japan, according to one expert 

in journalism.4 

 

1 Asahi Shimbun Retracts Two More Articles on Sex Slaves, JAPAN TIMES (Dec. 24, 2014), https://www.japantimes. 

co.jp/news/2014/12/24/national/asahi-shimbun-retracts-two-more-articles-on-sex-slaves/, archived at

https://perma.cc/CD45-4XZP. 

2 慰安婦報道検証 第三者委員会 [Examination of Comfort Women Reports, Third Party Committee], ASAHI 

SHIMBUN, http://www.asahi.com/shimbun/3rd/3rd.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2019), archived at

https://perma.cc/K67E-UJX5. The Committee’s abridged report dated December 22, 2014, is available in 

English at http://www.asahi.com/shimbun/3rd/report20150728e.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/H73RWSU3. 

3 Matthew Moore, Japanese Newspaper Admits Infamous Sex Column Was Untrue, TELEGRAPH (July 22, 2008), 

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/howaboutthat/2443937/Japanese-newspaper-admitsinfamous-sex-column-was-untrue.html, archived at https://perma.cc/33UX-6NVU. 

4 藤代裕之 [Hiroyuki Fujii], 

フェイクニュースへの危機感が乏しい日本政府、問題は若者より中高年のリテラシー [Japanese Government 

Lacks the Sense of Impending Crisis of Fake News, At Issue Is News Literacy of Middle-aged and Older, Not Young 

People], YAHOO JAPAN NEWS (June 21, 2018), https://news.yahoo.co.jp/byline/fujisiro/20180621-00086295/, 

archived at https://perma.cc/72DH-8TAB. 
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It appears that the government and many people are particularly concerned about post-disaster 

fake news. One such notable case involved a false tweet just after the 2016 Kumamoto earthquake 

by a person far from the City of Kumamoto stating, and appearing to depict via an attached 

photograph, that a lion in the Kumamoto Zoo was on the loose because of damage caused by the 

earthquake. Many neighbors were scared and the Zoo received more than a hundred phone calls 

inquiring about the matter.5 After an earthquake in Hokkaido in 2018, many fake news reports 

concerning infrastructure, such as water and cell phone availability, were spread.6 Fake news 

circulated during elections for public office is also of concern to experts.7 The 2018 Okinawa 

gubernatorial election was the first public election in which an enormous volume of fake social 

media news was distributed. Media outlets and experts are calling for countermeasures against 

fake news.8 

II. Countering “Fake News” 

A. Broadcasting Act 

Japanese law regulates broadcasters and establishes a system to keep broadcasting programs 

from distorting the facts. The Broadcasting Act states that, when a broadcaster edits broadcast 

programs, it must ensure the reporting does not distort the facts.9 The Broadcasting Act also 

states that a broadcaster must establish a deliberative body for broadcast programs in order to 

ensure that those programs are appropriate.10 “A broadcaster must set forth a basic plan relating 

to the program standards and editing of the broadcast programs and, when it intends to make 

amendments thereto, must consult with the deliberative body.”11 

In cases where the content of a broadcast is not factual, and the individual who was the subject 

of an infringement of rights owing to the broadcast complains within three months of the date of 

the broadcast, the broadcaster must, without delay, investigate whether the information 

broadcast was factual. If it finds that the matters were not factual, it must, within two days of the 

 

5 フェイクニュース特集 あなたは被害者?加害者? [Fake News Special: Are You a Victim or Aggressor?], CLOSEUP GENDAI, NHK (Feb. 7, 2017), http://www.nhk.or.jp/gendai/articles/3930/1.html, archived at

https://perma.cc/H5JQ-WDHH. 

6 服部良祐 [Ryosuke Hattori], 北海道地震でデマ拡散が止まらない真のメカニズム [True Mechanism of Spreading 

False Rumors after Hokkaido Earthquake], IT MEDIA (Sept. 11, 2018), 

https://www.itmedia.co.jp/business/articles/ 1809/11/news036.html, archived at https://perma.cc/XG8XPANY. 

7 選挙の年 日本で“フェイクニュース”は...[Election Year: “Fake News” in Japan ...], NHK NEWS WEB (Dec. 25, 

2018), https://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/html/20181225/k10011759211000.html, archived at

https://perma.cc/7Z84-2Q7G. 

8 社説, 偽情報検証 新たな責務 [Editorial, Examination of Fake Information, New Responsibilities], OKINAMA TIMES 

(Oct. 16, 2018), https://www.okinawatimes.co.jp/articles/-/330433, archived at https://perma.cc/K9V6-S37G. 

9 Broadcasting Act, Act No. 132 of 1950, amended by Act No. 96 of 2014, art. 4, para. 1, item 3, 

http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?printID=&ft=2&re=02&dn=1&yo=broadcasting&ia=03

&ph=&x=0&y=0&ky=&page=1&vm=02, archived at https://perma.cc/HA6K-YXC2. 

10 Id. art. 6, para. 1. 

11 Id. art. 6, para. 3. 
Initiatives to Counter Fake News: Japan 

The Law Library of Congress 54

day of making this finding, broadcast a correction or revocation using an appropriate method 

through the same broadcasting equipment as the broadcasting equipment used in the challenged 

broadcast.12 A violator is punishable by a fine of not more than 500,000 yen (approximately 

US$4,500).13 When a broadcaster discovers nonfactual particulars in its broadcasts on its own 

initiative, it must take the same measures.14 

In addition, Nippon Hoso Kyokai (NHK), a government-affiliated public broadcasting 

corporation, was established based on the Broadcasting Act in order to provide quality programs 

for the public.15 

B. Penal Code 

The Penal Code has provisions that may be used to punish persons who post fake news. 

One provision concerns defamation. A person who defames another by alleging facts in public 

is punishable by imprisonment for not more than three years or a fine of not more than 500,000 

yen, regardless of whether such facts are true or false.16 If such act is found to relate to matters of 

the public interest and to have been conducted solely for the benefit of the public, and if the 

alleged facts are proven to be true, the person is not punishable.17 Likewise, when the alleged 

facts concern a public officer or a candidate for election and are proven to be true, the person is 

not subject to punishment.18

Obstruction of business by spreading fake news is also punishable under the Penal Code. A 

person who damages the credit or obstructs the business of another by spreading false rumors is 

punishable by imprisonment for not more than three years or a fine of not more than 500,000 yen 

(approximately US$ 4,500). The person who falsely tweeted about a lion on the loose after the 

Kumamoto earthquake was arrested on the basis of this crime as he obstructed the business of 

the zoo, but he was not indicted.19 

 

12 Id. art. 9, para. 1. 

13 Id. art. 186, para. 1. 

14 Id. art. 9, para. 2. 

15 Id. art. 15. 

16 PENAL CODE, Act No. 45 of 1907, amended by Act No. 72 of 2017, art. 230, para. 1. A tentative translation of the 

Code as amended by Act No. 49 of 2013 is available on the Japanese Laws Translation website at

http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?printID=&ft=2&re=02&dn=1&yo=penal&ia=03&ph=

&x=0&y=0&ky=&page=4&vm=02, archived at https://perma.cc/8XK2-VZG3. 

17 Id. art. 230-2, para. 1. 

18 Id. art. 230-2, para. 3. 

19 “ライオン脱走”フェイクツイッター男を起訴猶予 [“Escaped Lion”, Fake Twitter Man, Not to Be Indicted], 

SANKEI (Mar. 22, 2017), https://www.sankei.com/smp/west/news/170322/wst1703220056-s1.html, archived at 

https://perma.cc/P5XX-W67B. 
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C. Election Law 

The Public Offices Election Act states that anyone who conducts an election campaign via the 

internet must make his/her online contact information available for viewers or recipients of the 

information. 20 The purpose of this provision is to reduce the circulation of defamatory 

information and “spoofing” (i.e., impersonating another device or user for a 

malicious purposes).21 

A person who seeks to make a candidate win or not win during an election by using a false name 

or status is punishable by imprisonment for not more than two years or a fine of not more than 

300,000 yen (approximately US$2,700).22 Likewise, a person who publicizes false information 

about a candidate for the purpose of making the candidate win is punishable by imprisonment 

for not more than two years or a fine of not more than 300,000 yen.23 If a person publicizes false 

or distorted information about a candidate for the purpose of making the candidate lose, the 

person is punishable by imprisonment for not more than four years or a fine of not more than 1 

million yen (approximately US$9,000).24

D. Internet Provider Law 

The Act on the Limitation of Liability of Internet Providers exempts internet providers from 

liability when they prevent distribution of the infringing information of others. In cases where 

there is a reasonable ground for a provider to believe that the rights of others are infringed 

without due cause by distribution of the information via its service, the provider may block the 

information and is not liable for the conduct of the person who sent the information.25 In addition, 

when a person alleging that his/her rights have been infringed by information distributed via a 

provider’s service asks the provider to take measures to prevent the infringing information from 

being transmitted, the provider must ask the sender of the infringing information whether he/she 

agrees with implementing the transmission prevention measures. If the provider does not receive 

a notice from the sender indicating disagreement within seven days, the provider is not liable to 

the sender for any damages caused by the distribution prevention measure implemented 

regarding the information.26 

 

20 Public Offices Election Act, Act No. 100 of 1950, amended by Act No. 75 of 2018, art. 142-3, para. 3. 

21 インターネット選挙運動等に関する各党協議会 [Consultative Meeting of Parties Concerning Online 

Campaign], 改正公職選挙法(インターネット選挙運動解禁)ガイドライン [Guidelines on Amended Public 

Offices Election Act (Lifting of Ban of Online Campaign)], at 29 (Apr. 26, 2013), 

http://www.soumu.go.jp/main_content/000 222706.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/QHH4-XFTN. 

22 Public Offices Election Act, art. 235-5. 

23 Id. art. 235, para. 1. 

24 Id. art. 235, para. 2. 

25 Act on the Limitation of Liability for Damages of Specified Telecommunications Service Providers and the 

Right to Demand Disclosure of Identification Information of the Senders, Act No. 137 of 2001, amended by Act 

No. 10 of 2013, art. 3, para. 2, item 1. 

26 Id. art. 3, para. 2, item 2. 
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The waiting period for the sender’s reply is shortened from seven days to two days in cases where 

the request asking a provider to prevent distribution of defamatory information comes from an 

election candidate.27 If the contact information of the sender of the defamatory information of 

the candidate is not available, the provider does not have to submit an inquiry to the sender.28 

E. Discussion of Countermeasures against Fake News in Government 

The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC) formed the Platform Services Study 

Group and collected relevant agenda items from the public in October 2018.29 In December 2018, 

the Study Group added the issue of fake news to the agenda.30 In the Study Group’s interim 

report, it stated that it would explore a self-cleaning mechanism for information, examine factchecking systems, and study the voluntary cooperation between platform services and factchecking organizations. The Study Group plans to issue its final report by the end of 2019.31

III. Efforts to Provide Accurate Legal Information 

The Japanese government’s e-Government website maintains an online database that includes 

laws, Cabinet orders, ordinances, and regulations.32 Government agencies’ notifications and 

circulars are available on their websites, and also through e-Gov.33 The content of official gazettes, 

including the text of legislation, can be searched on the National Printing Bureau’s website.34 

 

27 Id. art. 3-2, item 1. 

28 Id. art. 3-2, item 2. 

29 Press Release, MIC,「プラットフォームサービスに関する研究会における検討アジェンダ(案)」に対する

提案募集 [Accepting Proposals of “Agenda to Be Discussed at Platform Services Study Group”] (Oct. 19, 2018), 

http://www.soumu.go.jp/menu_news/s-news/01kiban18_01000052.html, archived at 

https://perma.cc/PG4U-PFMY. 

30 プラットフォームサービスに関する研究会の検討アジェンダ [Agenda of Platform Services Study Group], MIC 

(Dec. 21, 2018), http://www.soumu.go.jp/main_content/000591109.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/S2TKZBLC. 

31 MIC, プラットフォームサービスに関する研究会 中間報告書(案) [PLATFORM SERVICES STUDY GROUP 

INTERIM REPORT (draft)] 46 (Feb. 13, 2019), http://www.soumu.go.jp/main_content/000600599.pdf, archived at 

https://perma.cc/9HC7-APG9. 

32 E-GOV 法令索引 [LAW SEARCH], https://elaws.e-gov.go.jp/search/elawsSearch/elaws_search/lsg0100/. 

33 所管の法令・告示・通達等 [Laws, Notifications and Circulars on Their Jurisdictions], E-GOVERNMENT, 

http://www.e-gov.go.jp/law/ordinance.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2019). 

34 インターネット版官報 [OFFICIAL GAZETTE ON INTERNET], NATIONAL PRINTING BUREAU, 

https://kanpou.npb.go.jp/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2019). 
The Law Library of Congress 57 

Kenya 

Hanibal Goitom 

Chief, Foreign, Comparative, and 

International Law Division I

SUMMARY The spread of false information, particularly during election seasons, has recently 

presented challenges in Kenya. Kenya’s existing laws, particularly the Penal Code and 

the Information and Communications Act, bar the dissemination of false information 

in different contexts. 

 In 2017, the Communications Authority of Kenya issued guidelines that include 

provisions on the responsibility of mobile network operators and mobile virtual 

network operators to vet political messages they transmit. The Guidelines also require 

political content authors to ensure the accuracy of the content they publish. In addition, 

they direct social media platform administrators to moderate and control undesirable 

contents and social media service providers to take down accounts used in the 

dissemination of undesirable political content. 

 In May 2018, Kenya enacted the Computer Misuse and Cyber Crimes Act, which 

contains provisions that criminalize “false publication” and the “publication of false 

information.” The constitutionality of various parts of the Act, including these two 

provisions, were immediately challenged before the Constitutional and Human Rights 

Division of the Kenyan High Court, which suspended the implementation of the 

provisions pending an outcome of the case. It appears that the provisions remain 

suspended to date. 

 In March 2018, the United States Embassy in Kenya launched a one-year media literacy 

campaign aimed at countering the spread of false information in Kenya. The program 

has been expanded with the opening of an academic institution for the study of social 

media development and trends. 

 Kenya maintains an information portal, Kenya Law, for the dissemination of accurate 

and authoritative legal information, including legislation, parliamentary debates, and 

case law. 

I. Introduction 

The phenomenon of the spread of false news, primarily during election seasons, has been 

particularly challenging for Kenya in recent years. Although not a new problem, the permeation 

of false information through social media channels during the last few election cycles, particularly 

in the 2013 and 2017 election seasons, has been among the most notable in recent history.1 One 

source described the phenomenon as follows: 

 

1 Kelsey Lilley, Kenya’s Fake News Problem, ATLANTIC COUNCIL (Aug. 10, 2017), https://www.atlanticcouncil. 

org/blogs/new-atlanticist/kenya-s-fake-news-problem, archived at https://perma.cc/7JK6-W6ZZ. 
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Facebook, WhatsApp and Twitter are perhaps the three most popular social media 

platforms in Kenya, and have been used to share opinions, predictions and fabrications 

alike before and after the election. There have been websites as well, designed to give the 

impression that they are authoritative sources of news, that have carried all sorts of 

(mis)information and propaganda. As has been widely reported, fake news articles and 

videos bearing CNN, BBC and even NTV Kenya logos were also disseminated and shared 

widely on social media platforms.2

This was not just a case of isolated incidents of improvised individual actions spreading rumors 

and misinformation; there were allegedly concerted, highly organized efforts to disseminate false 

information and narratives. The most notable example of this was the involvement of Cambridge 

Analytica, a United Kingdom-based political consultancy firm, as a prominent player in the 2013 

and 2017 presidential election seasons. President Kenyatta of the Jublee Party retained 

Cambridge Analytica to help manage his 2013 and 2017 presidential runs, both of which he won.3 

Although the company denies any involvement in creating and pushing false information, Mark 

Turnbull, its managing director, was filmed boasting about his organization’s influence over the 

Kenyan elections, stating “[w]e have rebranded the entire [Jublee] party twice, written their 

manifesto, done two rounds of 50,000 surveys. . . Then we’d write all the speeches and we’d stage 

the whole thing. So just about every element of [President Uhuru Kenyatta’s] campaign.”4 On its 

website, the company is said to have presented its involvement in Kenya in the 2013 election as 

“the largest political research project ever conducted in East Africa,” which enabled the crafting 

of a campaign “based on the electorate’s real needs (jobs) and fears (tribal violence).”5 

The circulation of false information was enhanced due to a number of factors, including a high 

level of internet penetration in the country and a growing acceptance of social media as a trusted 

source of news. Kenya ranks fourteenth in the world in internet speed and close to 90% of its 

population has internet access.6 A recent survey of two thousand Kenyans found that close to 

half of those surveyed received news about the general election through social media sources.7 

 

2 Nanjira Sambuli, How Kenya Became the Latest Victim of ‘Fake News’, AL JAZEERA (Aug. 17, 2018), 

https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/08/kenya-latest-victim-fake-news-170816121455181.html, 

archived at https://perma.cc/62U4-XUGG. 

3 Eric Auchard, Cambridge Analytica State-Managed Kenya President’s Campaigns: UK TV, REUTERS (Mar. 19, 2018), 

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-facebook-cambridge-analytica-kenya/cambridge-analytica-stagemanaged-kenyan-presidents-campaigns-uk-tv-idUSKBN1GV300, archived at https://perma.cc/5ZA3-X7GD. 

4 Nick Miriello et al., Kenyans Face a Fake News Epidemic, VICE NEWS (Mar. 14, 2019), https://news.vice.com/ 

en_us/article/43bdpm/kenyans-face-a-fake-news-epidemic-they-want-to-know-just-how-much-cambridgeanalytica-and-facebook-are-to-blame, archived at https://perma.cc/B462-LLBU; Justina Crabtree, Here’s How 

Cambridge Analytica Played a Dominant Role in Kenya’s Chaotic 2017 Elections, CNBC (Mar. 23, 2018), 

https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/23/cambridge-analytica-and-its-role-in-kenya-2017-elections.html, archived 

at https://perma.cc/F386-VHXU. 

5 Crabtree, supra note 4. 

6 Lily Kuo, Kenya’s Mobile Internet Beats the United States for Speed, QUARTZ AFRICA (June 2017), https://qz.com/ 

africa/1001477/kenya-has-faster-mobile-internet-speeds-than-the-united-states/, archived at 

https://perma.cc/9LMV-YLJW. 

7 PORTLAND COMMUNICATIONS, THE REALITY OF FAKE NEWS IN KENYA 7 (2017), https://portlandcommunications.com/pdf/The-Reality-of-Fake-News-in-Kenya.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/JCK5-

VDGX. 
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According to another source, during the 2017 election season, due in part to the loss of faith in 

mainstream media, growing number of Kenyans turned to social media for information.8 The 

source noted that the “dominance [of mainstream media] has been violently disrupted. Social 

media burst onto the scene as a new regime of information production and dissemination, 

operating unencumbered by the structural and political limitations the country’s mainstream 

media often face.”9 

According to the above-noted survey, 90% of the participants “suspected having seen or heard 

false / inaccurate information [on social media] regarding the [2017] election.”10 

Adding further complications is the country’s history of ethnic tension that often turns violent 

during election season. For instance, following the 2007 election ethnic based violence erupted, 

which claimed 1,400 lives and displaced as many as 600,000 people.11 Although not at the scale 

of the 2007 post-election event, the 2017 election also saw some violence in which twenty-four 

people were killed.12 

This report looks at existing and new initiatives to curb the spread of false information and the 

challenges associated with such endeavors. 

II. Legal Framework 

A. Existing Laws 

1. Penal Code 

The Penal Code criminalizes what it calls “alarming publications.” It states that “[a]ny person 

who publishes any false statement, rumour or report which is likely to cause fear and alarm to 

the public or to disturb the public peace is guilty of a misdemeanor.”13 A person found to have 

committed this offense is, on conviction, subject to a custodial sentence not exceeding two years 

and/or a fine.14 The Code further states that “[i]t shall be a defence to a charge under [the 

“alarming publications” clause] if the accused proves that, prior to publication, he took such 

 

8 Kenya’s 2017 Elections: How New Media Stole the Mainstream’s Thunder, THE CONVERSATION (Dec. 14, 2017), 

http://theconversation.com/kenyas-2017-elections-how-new-media-stole-the-mainstreams-thunder-88613, 

archived https://perma.cc/8K55-RHUC. 

9 Id. 

10 PORTLAND COMMUNICATIONS, supra note 7, at 9. 

11 James Brownsell, Kenya: What Went Wrong in 2007, AL JAZEERA (Mar. 3, 2013), https://www.aljazeera.com/ 

indepth/features/2013/03/201333123153703492.html, archived at https://perma.cc/8F6R-X7ZS. 

12 Briana Duggan et al., 24 Killed in Post-Election Violence in Kenya, Rights Group Says, CNN (Aug. 13, 2017), 

https://www.cnn.com/2017/08/12/africa/kenya-elections-protests/index.html, archived at

https://perma.cc/2Z5R-LM3B. 

13 Penal Code of 1930, § 66, 16 LAWS OF KENYA, Cap. 63 (last updated Dec. 2014), http://www.kenyalaw.org/ 

lex//actview.xql?actid=CAP.%2063, archived at https://perma.cc/H9PR-FGLY. 

14 Id. § 36. 
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measures to verify the accuracy of the statement, rumour or report as to lead him reasonably to 

believe that it was true.”15 

The Code also criminalizes defamation. The relevant provisions state: 

194. Definition of libel 

Any person who, by print, writing, painting or effigy, or by any means otherwise than 

solely by gestures, spoken words or other sounds, unlawfully publishes any defamatory 

matter concerning another person, with intent to defame that other person, is guilty of the 

misdemeanour termed libel. 

195. Definition of defamatory matter. 

Defamatory matter is matter likely to injure the reputation of any person by exposing him 

to hatred, contempt or ridicule, or likely to damage any person in his profession or trade 

by an injury to his reputation; and it is immaterial whether at the time of the publication 

of the defamatory matter the person concerning whom the matter is published is living or 

dead. 

196. Definition of publication 

(1) A person publishes a libel if he causes the print, writing, painting, effigy or other 

means by which the defamatory matter is conveyed to be so dealt with, either by 

exhibition, reading, recitation, description, delivery or otherwise, that the 

defamatory meaning thereof becomes known or is likely to become known to 

either the person defamed or any other person. 

(2) It is not necessary for libel that a defamatory meaning should be directly or 

completely expressed; and it suffices if such meaning and its application to the 

person alleged to be defamed can be collected either from the alleged libel itself or 

from any extrinsic circumstances, or partly by the one and partly by the other 

means. 

197. Definition of unlawful publication 

Any publication of defamatory matter concerning a person is unlawful within the 

meaning of this Chapter, unless— 

(a) the matter is true and it was for the public benefit that it should be published; or 

(b) it is privileged on one of the grounds hereafter mentioned in this Chapter.16

2. Kenya Information and Communications Act 

This Act criminalizes the “improper use” of a telecommunication system, stating that anyone 

who, through a licensed telecommunication system, 

(a) sends a message or other matter that is grossly offensive or of an indecent, obscene or 

menacing character; or 

(b) sends a message that he knows to be false for the purpose of causing annoyance, 

inconvenience or needless anxiety to another person, 

 

15 Id. § 66. 

16 Id. 
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commits an offence and shall be liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding fifty thousand 

shillings, or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months, or to both.17 

The Act also criminalizes unlawful the sending of misleading messages. It states that 

[a]ny person who— 

(a) by means of radio communication, sends or attempts to send any message which to 

his knowledge is false or misleading and is to his knowledge likely to prejudice the 

efficiency of any safety-of-life service or endanger the safety of any person, or of any 

vessel, aircraft or vehicle, and, in particular, any message which to his knowledge 

falsely suggests that a vessel or aircraft is in distress or in need of assistance or is not 

in distress or not in need of assistance; or 

(b) otherwise than under the authority of the Minister for the time being responsible for 

internal security— 

(i) uses any radio communication apparatus with intent to obtain information as to 

the contents, sender or addressee of any message, (whether sent by means of radio 

communication or not) which neither the person using the station or apparatus 

nor any person on whose behalf he is acting is authorised to receive; or 

(ii) except in the course of legal proceedings or for the purposes of any report thereon, 

discloses any information as to the contents, sender or addressee of any such 

message, being information which would not have come to his knowledge but for 

the use of the radio communication station or radio communication apparatus by 

him or by any other person acting on his behalf, 

commits an offence and shall be liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding one million 

shillings, or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years, or both.18

3. Guidelines on Prevention of Dissemination of Undesirable Bulk and Premium Rate Political Messages 

and Political Social Media Content via Electronic Communication Networks 

In July 2017, based on authority accorded to it under the Kenya Information and Communications 

Act and the Kenya Information and Communications (Consumer Protection) Regulations, the 

Communications Authority of Kenya, in collaboration with the National Cohesion and 

Integration Commission, issued the Guidelines on Prevention of Dissemination of Undesirable 

Bulk and Premium Rate Political Messages and Political Social Media Content via Electronic 

Communication Networks (the Guidelines).19 

 

17 Kenya Information and Communications Act No. 2 of 1998, § 29 (commencement of relevant sections, July 1, 

1999), http://www.kenyalaw.org/lex//actview.xql?actid=No. 2 of 1998, archived at https://perma.cc/W4EZRFT2. 

18 Id. § 44. 

19 Communications Authority of Kenya & National Cohesion and Integration Commission, Guidelines on 

Prevention of Dissemination of Undesirable Bulk and Premium Rate Political Messages and Political Social 

Media Content via Electronic Communications Networks (Guidelines) (July 2017), https://ca.go.ke/wpcontent/uploads/2018/02/Guidelines-on-Prevention-of-Dissemination-of-Undesirable-Bulk-and-PremiumRate-Political-Messages-and-Political-Social-Media-Content-Via-Electronic-Networks-1.pdf, archived at

https://perma.cc/R62R-U252; Kenya Information and Communications Act, §§ 23 & 25; Kenya Information 
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The Guidelines require that, before transmitting a political message,20 mobile network operators 

(MNOs) and mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) must vet its content to, among others, 

ensure that it is not misleading or confusing.21 It further states that content service providers 

must “take legal responsibility for the content of Political Messages and shall fully indemnify and 

keep indemnified MNOs and MVNOs against any claims that may arise out of those 

Political Messages.”22

The Guidelines include a section on political social media guidelines. The “accuracy and 

accountability” clause in the section states that “[i]t shall be the responsibility of the political 

content author to authenticate, validate the source and truthfulness of their content prior to 

publishing to limit information that might spread rumors, mislead or cannot be supported by 

facts.”23 The “truthful posting and publishing” clause states that “[p]olitical content authors shall 

at all times maintain honesty and accuracy in their publications and shall be responsible for all 

their content as published.”24

In addition to political content authors, the Guidelines also impose certain responsibilities on 

social media platform administrators and social media service providers. The Guidelines state 

that “[i]t shall be the responsibility of the Administrator of a social media platform to moderate 

and control undesirable contents and discussions that have been brought to their attention on 

their platform.”25 The Guidelines further state that “[s]ocial media service providers shall be 

required to pull down accounts used in disseminating undesirable political contents on their 

platform that have brought to their attention within 24 hours.”26 

Undesirable political content includes content containing information “that is likely to mislead 

through inaccuracy, ambiguity, exaggeration, omission or otherwise and it should be clear to the 

consumers when time-sensitive information was last updated.”27

 

and Communications (Consumer Protection) Regulations, 2010, § 21 (Apr. 14, 2010), http://kenyalaw.org/ 

LegalNotices/pop_ln.php?file=392, archived at https://perma.cc/P7CM-ESFV. 

20 This is “content of a political nature originated by Political Parties and other individuals to the general public 

by SMS, MMS, premium messages, caller ring back tones, social media platform or any other similar medium 

that is capable of transmitting bulk content.” Guidelines § 5. 

21 Guidelines §§ 7 & 8. 

22 Id. § 11. 

23 Id. § 13. 

24 Id. 

25 Id. 

26 Id. 

27 Id. § 5; Communications Authority of Kenya, [Sample] Content Service Provider License Granted by the 

Communications Authority of Kenya, Condition 1 (2015), https://ca.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/ 

2018/03/Modified-CSP-Licence-2015.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/5NXA-FVDJ. 
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The Guidelines state that anyone “who knowingly spreads undesirable political content via social 

media networks shall be penalized according to the [National Cohesion and Integration Act], 

Penal Code and other relevant laws.”28

B. Recent Legislative Proposal 

In May 2018, President Uhuru Kenyatta signed into law the Computer Misuse and Cyber Crimes 

Act.29 This law includes a provision criminalizing “false publication,” which states as follows: 

(1) A person who intentionally publishes false, misleading or fictitious data or misinforms 

with intent that the data shall be considered or acted upon as authentic, with or 

without any financial gain, commits an offence and shall, on conviction, be liable to a 

fine not exceeding five million shillings or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 

two years, or to both. 

(2) Pursuant to Article 24 of the Constitution, the freedom of expression under Article 33 

of the Constitution shall be limited in respect of the intentional publication of false, 

misleading or fictitious data or misinformation that — 

(a) is likely to — 

(i) propagate war; or 

(ii) incite persons to violence; 

(b) constitutes hate speech; 

(c) advocates hatred that — 

(i) constitutes ethnic incitement, vilification of others or incitement to 

cause harm; or 

(ii) is based on any ground of discrimination specified or contemplated 

in Article 27(4) of the Constitution; or 

(d) negatively affects the rights or reputations of others.30

The Act also criminalizes the “publication of false information,” the elements of and punishment 

for which are as follows: 

A person who knowingly publishes information that is false in print, broadcast, data or 

over a computer system, that is calculated or results in panic, chaos, or violence among 

citizens of the Republic, or which is likely to discredit the reputation of a person commits 

 

28 Guidelines § 13; National Cohesion and Integration Act No. 12 of 2008 (commencement Mar. 9, 2009), 

http://kenyalaw.org/lex/actview.xql?actid=No.%2012%20of%202008, archived at https://perma.cc/YSE9-

GZY9. 

29 Matshelane Mamabolo, Kenya’s Computer Misuse and Cybercrimes Bill Now Law, IT WEB AFRICA (May 16, 2018), 

http://www.itwebafrica.com/security/515-kenya/244229-kenyas-computer-misuse-and-cybercrimes-billnow-law, archived at https://perma.cc/LD8K-Z87B. 

30 Computer Misuse and Cybercrimes Act No 5 of 2018, § 22, KENYA GAZETTE SUPPLEMENT (SPECIAL ISSUE) No. 

60 (May. 16, 2018), http://www.kenyalaw.org/lex//actview.xql?actid=No.%205%20of%202018, archived at

https://perma.cc/KD9J-V5GZ 
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an offence and shall on conviction, be liable to a fine not exceeding five million shillings or 

to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years, or to both.31

During the parliamentary debate on the Bill for this Act, Aden Duale, the Majority Leader of 

Kenya’s National Assembly, proposed an amendment to insert the crime of “publication of false 

information” into the Bill. He described the challenge of fake news, possible solutions to the 

challenge, and the sources of inspiration for the Bill language as follows: 

Hon. Chair, I looked for the term “fake news” in law and I could not get it. There 

is nowhere in law I could find that term. This amendment proposes to introduce and define 

the scope of the offence of publication of false information to tackle emerging offences of 

fake news. The ingredients have been informed by the existing legislation from similar 

jurisdictions in the Philippines and Malaysia. The definition falls within the offences that 

relate to the scope of the offence within the Bill and that are conducted over a computer. 

If Members can remember, the late Hon. Biwott “died” 10 times through fake 

news. Mugabe [former president of Zimbabwe] died five times through fake news. When 

Mzee Moi just went for a knee surgery in Israel, people decided to kill him. There is serious 

fake news and false publications. I want the Members to support it. The amendment does 

not offend the provisions of Article 34 of the Constitution. We really looked at it with the 

Legal Department of Parliament. If you publish false information, the offence is so grave 

that you either pay Kshs5 million or get a prison sentence not exceeding 10 years or both. 

Those people who use gadgets to create alarm, false news and publish to harm others must 

be dealt with under this law.32

Critics have panned the law as another opportunity for the government to clampdown on 

freedom of expression. According to a university professor on democracy, “[t]here is a serious 

risk that, as has happened in the past with issues such as anti-terror legislation, governments 

manipulate a genuine issue in order to push repressive changes that are really designed to 

strengthen their own power.”33 James Wamathai, the Director of Partnerships at the Bloggers 

Association of Kenya (BAKE) noted that “[i]n the past several years, there have been attempts by 

the government to clamp down on the freedom of expression online. This Act is a testament of 

these efforts, especially after other sections were declared unconstitutional by the courts.”34

 

31 Id. § 23. 

32 National Assembly Official Report 43 (Apr. 26, 2018), http://www.parliament.go.ke/sites/default/files/ 

2017-05/Hansard_Report_-_Thursday_26th_April_2018A_1.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/C3DY-563V. 

33 Dickens Olewe, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania ‘Anti-Fake News Campaigns’, BBC NEWS (May 16, 2018), 

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-44137769, archived at https://perma.cc/3HCB-LGDH. 

34 Wamathai, Justice Chacha Mwita Suspends 26 Sections of the Computer Misuse and Cybercrimes Act, BLOGGERS 

ASSOCIATION OF KENYA (BAKE) (May 29, 2018), https://www.blog.bake.co.ke/2018/05/29/justice-chachamwita-suspends-26-sections-of-the-computer-misuse-and-cybercrimes-act/, archived at

https://perma.cc/5AYF-6P29. 
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This criticisms reflect Kenya’s recent regression in the area of press freedom. According to the 

2018 Press Freedom Index, published by Reporters without Borders (RSF), Kenya ranks ninetysixth in the world in press freedom.35 According to RSF, 

Kenya has seen a slow erosion of media freedom in recent years. The political situation 

and security concerns have been used since 2016 as grounds for restricting the freedom to 

inform. . . . Journalists can pay dearly for covering opposition events or for portraying 

President Uhuru Kenyatta’s party and its flaws in a negative light. Four commercial TV 

channels were shut down at the start of 2018 for defying the president’s ban on live 

coverage of opposition leader Raila Odinga’s mock inauguration as president. The 2010 

constitution guarantees freedom of information, but laws criminalize and gag the media.36 

On May 30, 2018, in response to a petition from BAKE challenging the constitutionality of many 

of its provisions and seeking a temporary conservatory order to prevent its implementation, the 

Constitutional and Human Rights Division of the High Court of Kenya at Nairobi temporarily 

(until July 18, 2018) suspended various provisions of the Computer Misuse and Cyber Crimes 

Act pending a full hearing on the matter.37 The suspension order included the “false publication” 

and “publication of false information” clauses of the Act.38 On June 11, 2018, the government 

returned to court seeking to have the suspension lifted. The Court rejected the government’s 

petition to end the suspension.39 It appears that these provisions currently remain suspended. 

III. Education Campaign 

On March 14, 2018, the United States Embassy in Kenya started a media literacy campaign known 

as “YALI Checks: Stop.Reflect.Verify.” to counter the spread of false information in Kenya.40 

Launched with a mass email to the 47,000 members of the Kenya chapter of the Young African 

Leaders Initiative (YALI), the purpose of the campaign was described as follows: 

Over the course of the year, the campaign will provide a mix of online activities, including 

an email series, an online quiz, blog posts, online chats, public outreach, educational 

videos, and an online pledge. The Embassy’s five American Spaces, which reach across 

Kenya, will also provide platforms for in-person and virtual discussions with experts on 

media literacy tools. Additional components of the campaign will include tapping 

 

35 Kenya, REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS, https://rsf.org/en/kenya (last visited Mar. 18, 2019), archived at 

https://perma.cc/J8NP-9W28. 

36 Id. 

37 Bloggers Association of Kenya (Bake) v Attorney General & 5 others [2018] eKLR at 1, available at 

http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/export/159286/pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/2TZJ-AB9P. 

38 Id. 

39 Id. at 6. 

40 Ambassador Godec and U.S. Embassy Counter Fake News with Media Literacy Campaign, U.S. EMBASSY IN KENYA 

(Mar. 14, 2018), https://ke.usembassy.gov/ambassador-godec-u-s-embassy-counter-fake-news-media-literacycampaign/, archived at https://perma.cc/S2EG-5MPC; Yalichecks: Stop.Reflect.Verify, YOUNG AFRICAN LEADERS 

INITIATIVE, https://yali.state.gov/checks/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/D2DCB2P2. 
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Fulbright and other professional exchange programs to provide training opportunities 

both in Kenya and in the United States on ways to stop the spread of fake news.41

In an October 2018 report, the Office of Inspector General of the US Department of State 

highlighted the program as a success, noting that “[e]xpanding on the successes of the “YALI 

Checks” program, the [US] embassy launched Africa’s first academic institution for the study of 

social media development and trends, in partnership with U.S. International University–Africa 

in April 2018.”42

IV. Government Legal Information Portals 

Kenya maintains a central, free legal database where citizens can locate case law and legislation. 

Administered by the National Council for Law Reporting, a semi-autonomous state corporation, 

which is the official publisher of the Kenya Law Reports and the Laws of Kenya, this database 

serves as the official online source for government material.43 Among other documents, it makes 

available case law, acts, subsidiary legislation, and records of parliamentary debates.44 Some 

courts in the country also publish a limited number of their decisions on the judiciary website.45

 

41 Ambassador Godec and U.S. Embassy Counter Fake News with Media Literacy Campaign, supra note 40. 

42 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE & BROADCASTING BOARD OF GOVERNORS, INSPECTION 

OF EMBASSY NAIROBI, KENYA 16 (Oct. 2018), https://www.stateoig.gov/system/files/isp-i-19-08_0.pdf, archived 

at https://perma.cc/T3VF-8SW7. 

43 About Us, THE NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR LAW REPORTING, http://kenyalaw.org/kl/index.php?id=115 (last 

visited Mar. 18, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/SD4N-FVE6. 

44 Id. 

45 Supreme Court: Decisions, JUDICIARY, https://www.judiciary.go.ke/courts/supreme-court/#decisions (last 

visited Mar. 18, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/XKT3-MH5E; Court of Appeal: Decisions, JUDICIARY, 

https://www.judiciary.go.ke/courts/court-of-appeal/#decisions (last visited, Mar. 18, 2019), archived at

https://perma.cc/W8LQ-ZBHH. 
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Malaysia 

Kelly Buchanan 

Foreign Law Specialist

SUMMARY Malaysia’s Anti-Fake News Act 2018 was widely criticized when it was enacted in 

April 2018. Commentators and rights groups considered that the Act was vague and 

contained an overly broad definition of fake news, and the then-government was 

accused of seeking to stifle criticism of the administration. Following elections in May 

2018, the new government sought to repeal the Act, but the bill was defeated in the 

upper house of the Parliament in September 2018. It is unclear at this stage whether 

the government will again seek its repeal or introduce amendments. The government 

also undertook to review and possibly repeal several other laws that are considered 

oppressive and restrictive of free speech, including those that have been used to target 

what could be termed “fake news.” However, despite earlier announcing an 

enforcement moratorium, it has recently indicated a willingness to apply some of 

these laws in certain situations. 

 A government agency operates a fact-checking portal and app, where people can 

search for and submit information being circulated online in order to check its 

accuracy. Agencies also use social media to correct false information related to 

government activities. In addition, legal information is available through government 

web portals, including statute law, regulations, bills and other parliamentary 

information, and court decisions. 

I. Fake News and Freedom of Speech in Malaysia 

Malaysia has consistently received a low rating in global indices related to freedom of speech, 

including the World Press Freedom Index, in which it was ranked 145 out of 180 countries in 

2018,1 and the Freedom House Freedom of the Press report, in which it was given a “not free” 

rating in 2017.2 Freedom House also noted a decline in internet freedom in the country in 2018, 

primarily as a result of the passage and subsequent initial enforcement of the Anti-Fake News 

Act 2018.3

The Anti-Fake News Act 2018 was passed by the Malaysian Parliament in April 2018,4 a few 

weeks before national elections were to be held. The legislation was the subject of widespread 

 

1 See Malaysia, REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS, https://rsf.org/en/malaysia (last visited Feb. 27, 2019), archived at

https://perma.cc/P3KD-77MX. 

2 Freedom of the Press 2017: Malaysia, FREEDOM HOUSE, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2017/ 

malaysia (last visited Feb. 27, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/NMN9-XPKM. 

3 Freedom on the Net 2018: Malaysia, FREEDOM HOUSE, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2018/ 

malaysia (last visited Feb. 27, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/Z2Y9-CD7L. 

4 See Kelly Buchanan, Malaysia: Anti-Fake News Act Comes into Force, GLOBAL LEGAL MONITOR (Apr. 19, 2018),

http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/malaysia-anti-fake-news-act-comes-into-force/. 
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criticism by human rights organizations and there were accusations that it was passed to curtail 

speech that was critical of the government, including reporting on corruption investigations 

that implicated the then-Prime Minister.5 

The current coalition government, which was formed following the elections held in May 2018 

and represents the first change in government in nearly sixty years,6 has undertaken to enhance 

human rights protections in Malaysia, including through the possible repeal or amendment of 

certain laws, including the Printing Presses and Publications Act 1984, Sedition Act 1948, 

Peaceful Assembly Act 2012, Prevention of Crime Act 1959, Security Offences (Special 

Measures) Act 2012, Prevention of Terrorism Act 2015, and mandatory death sentence 

provisions.7 As a result, commentators expressed hope for a “new dawn” for freedom of the 

press in the country.8

The new Prime Minister also initially promised to review and amend the Anti-Fake News Act 

2018,9 but the government later introduced a bill for its full repeal.10 Explanatory information 

accompanying the bill states that its seeks to repeal the Act 

due to the change in the policy of the Government that fake news may be dealt with 

under existing laws such as the Penal Code [Act 574], the Printing Presses and 

Publications Act 1984 [Act 301] and the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 [Act 

588]. As such, Act 803 is no longer relevant.11 

 

5 See Malaysia Accused of Muzzling Critics with Jail Terms for Fake News, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 26, 2018), 

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/26/malaysia-accused-of-muzzling-critics-with-jail-termfor-fake-news, archived at https://perma.cc/3C55-YBCB; Malaysia: Anti-Fake News Act Should be Repealed in its 

Entirety, ARTICLE 19 (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.article19.org/resources/malaysia-anti-fake-news-actrepealed-entirety/, archived at https://perma.cc/QQQ7-45L7; Malaysia: Drop Proposed ‘Fake News’ Law, HUMAN 

RIGHTS WATCH (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/03/29/malaysia-drop-proposed-fakenews-law, archived at https://perma.cc/R56R-XWXT. 

6 See Malaysia Election: Opposition Scores Historic Victory, BBC NEWS (May 10, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/ 

news/world-asia-44036178, archived at https://perma.cc/4FKT-7FGW. 

7 Malaysia to Review Seven ‘Unsuitable’ National Security Laws: Muhyiddin, CHANNEL NEWSASIA (May 22, 2018), 

https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/malaysia-to-review-seven-unsuitable-national-security-laws10257488, archived at https://perma.cc/EY9Q-2XQ4. 

8 Scilla Alecci, After Black Magic, Censorship and Detention Comes New Dawn for Malaysian Press, INTERNATIONAl 

CONSORTIUM OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (June 6, 2018), https://www.icij.org/blog/2018/06/after-blackmagic-censorship-and-detention-comes-new-dawn-for-malaysian-press/, archived at https://perma.cc/HXK3-

RQER. See also Kristian Porter, Hope for Media Freedom in Malaysia?, PUBLIC MEDIA ALLIANCE (Sept. 14, 2018), 

https://www.publicmediaalliance.org/hope-for-media-freedom-in-malaysia/, archived at https://perma.cc/ 

EJ4E-F9L4; David Boyle, Malaysian Press Await Promised Reforms, VOICE OF AMERICA (June 12, 2018), 

https://www.voanews.com/a/malaysian-press-await-promised-reforms/4435008.html, archived at 

https://perma.cc/3JMD-8Z6Z. 

9 Malaysia Will Review Not Revoke Fake News Law, Says Mahatir, BBC NEWS (May 14, 2018), https://www.bbc. 

com/news/world-asia-44104879, archived at https://perma.cc/ZF4F-S42T. 

10 Anti-Fake News (Repeal) Bill 2018, D.R. 14/2018, https://www.parlimen.gov.my/files/billindex/pdf/ 

2018/DR/D.R. 14_2018 -ENG.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/HH6E-Z9DQ. 

11 Id. at 2. 
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The lower house of the Parliament voted in favor of a repeal bill in August 2018. However, the 

upper house, which is still controlled by supporters of the previous government, voted against 

the bill in September 2018.12 Under the Malaysian Constitution, the lower house can pass the bill 

again after a one-year period has elapsed and, should the upper house again fail to pass it, the 

bill can subsequently be presented for assent.13 It is unclear at this stage whether the 

government will propose amendments to the legislation or again seek its full repeal. 

In October 2018, the government instituted a moratorium on the enforcement of provisions in 

certain laws that affect freedom of speech and other human rights, including the Sedition Act 

1948, section 233 of the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 (see below), and other laws 

that were subject to review.14 However, it has subsequently indicated that it could use these 

laws in response to emergency situations that threaten national security, public order, or race 

relations, such as riots that took place in November 2018 at a temple in Subang Jaya following 

the spread of information on social media regarding its possible relocation.15 In addition, the 

government recently announced that it had decided to retain two laws that had been under 

review, the Prevention of Crime Act 1959 and the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act 

2012,16 and has proposed a new law to protect the monarchy from insult and criticism.17

Given this context, the problem of “fake news” in Malaysia can be difficult to define and assess. 

On the one hand, the country’s leaders have been accused of using similar terms and various 

laws to stifle dissent or criticism of the government.18 On the other, as in countries around the 

 

12 See Bill to Repeal ‘Anti-Fake News’ Act in Malaysia Fails, INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF JOURNALISTS (Sept. 13, 

2018), https://www.ifj.org/media-centre/news/detail/category/press-freedom/article/bill-to-repeal-antifake-news-act-in-malaysia-fails.html, archived at https://perma.cc/34RK-U6AU; Malaysia: Senate’s Rejection of 

Bill Abolishing Anti-Fake News Law a Backwards Step, ARTICLE 19 (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.article19.org/ 

resources/malaysia-senates-rejection-of-bill-abolishing-anti-fake-news-law-a-backwards-step/, archived at

https://perma.cc/27NG-LSLF. 

13 FEDERAL CONSTITUTION OF MALAYSIA, art. 68, http://www.agc.gov.my/agcportal/uploads/files/ 

Publications/ FC/Federal Consti (BI text).pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/F96H-K999. 

14 See Shakira Buang, Temple Riots: Cabinet Gives Approval to Enforce Sedition Act, MALAYSIAKINI (Dec. 2, 2018), 

https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/454395, archived at https://perma.cc/G59H-DMA8. 

15 Id. See also Nadia Hamid & Mohamad Ridzuan Anwar, Moratorium on Draconian Laws Suspended on Issues 

Threatening National Security, Public Order, Race Relations, NEW STRAITS TIMES (Dec. 3, 2018), https://www.nst. 

com.my/news/nation/2018/12/436806/moratorium-draconian-laws-suspended-issues-threatening-nationalsecurity; Press Release, Malaysian Bar, Don’t Break Your Promise, Pakatan Told After ‘Oppressive’ Laws 

Allowed For Use (Dec. 7, 2018), http://www.malaysianbar.org.my/legal/general_news/dont_break_ 

your_promise_pakatan_told_after_oppressive_laws_allowed_for_use.html, archived at https://perma.cc/DF5JBV6H.

16 See Press Release, Malaysian Bar, Government Must Fulfil Pledge to Abolish All Oppressive Laws (Jan. 5, 

2019), http://www.malaysianbar.org.my/press_statements/press_release_%7C_government_must_fulfil_ 

pledge_to_abolish_all_oppressive_laws.html, archived at https://perma.cc/2B7W-5VPX. 

17 See Malaysia: Law Proposed Against Criticizing Monarchy, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Jan. 11, 2019),

https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/01/11/malaysia-law-proposed-against-criticizing-monarchy, archived at

https://perma.cc/M24C-KW9F. 

18 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CREATING A CULTURE OF FEAR: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF PEACEFUL EXPRESSION IN 

MALAYSIA (Oct. 26, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/10/26/creating-culture-fear/criminalizationpeaceful-expression-malaysia, archived at https://perma.cc/UWF5-VZBC. 
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world, there does exist a potential threat to democracy and society from various actors, 

including those in other countries, creating fake news and disseminating this anonymously 

using social media. One commentator on the Malaysian situation recently noted that, 

[m]ore often than not, everyday fake news cases are relatively harmless. This points to an 

important fact to appreciate. The spectrum of harm caused by fake news is extremely 

broad, and legitimate questions abound on whether these cases need to be dealt with via 

the law. 

Regardless, this makes the case for delicate legislating — legislators need to be deliberate 

in approaching any regulation on fake news. Regulating fake news inevitably raises 

questions of censorship and potential infringement of the fundamental freedom of 

speech. Contextually, no freedom is limitless but the onus is on legislators to restrict 

freedoms only to the extent absolutely necessary to achieve the goal.19

As with others who raised concerns about the legislation, he opined that the Anti-Fake News 

Act 2018 does not meet such a test as it is overly vague, contains a “problematically broad” 

definition of fake news, and imposes “disproportionately high” punishments on creators, 

disseminators, and publishers of such information.20

II. National Approach to Fake News 

A. Anti-Fake News Act 2018 

The Anti-Fake News Act 2018 defines “fake news” as including “any news, information, data 

and reports, which is or are wholly or partly false, whether in the form of features, visuals or 

audio recordings or in any other form capable of suggesting words or ideas.”21 The main 

offense provision in the Act states as follows: 

Any person who, by any means, maliciously creates, offers, publishes, prints, distributes, 

circulates or disseminates any fake news or publication containing fake news commits an 

offence and shall, on conviction, by liable to a fine not exceeding five hundred thousand 

ringgit [approx. US$122,702] or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six years or to 

both, and in the case of a continuing offence, to a further fine not exceeding three 

thousand ringgit [approx. US$736] for every day during which the offence continues 

after conviction.22

 

19 Harris Zainul, No Silver Bullet for Fake News in Malaysia, THE DIPLOMAT (Jan. 12, 2019), https://thediplomat. 

com/2019/01/no-silver-bullet-for-fake-news-in-a-new-malaysia/, archived at https://perma.cc/ZUC9-LN2D. 

20 Id. See also David Hutt, The Real Problem with Malaysia’s Fake News Law, THE DIPLOMAT (Apr. 2018),

https://thediplomat.com/2018/04/the-real-problem-with-malaysias-fake-news-law/, archived at

https://perma.cc/TGY7-688X. 

21 Anti-Fake News Act 2018 (Act 803), s 2, http://www.federalgazette.agc.gov.my/outputaktap/20180411_ 

803_BI_WJW010830%20BI.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/E7JL-RGK3. 

22 Id. s 4(1). 
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A court may also order that a person convicted under this provision issue an apology.23

Providing financial assistance for the purpose of committing the above offense is punishable by 

the same penalties included in the above provision,24 while failure to immediately remove any 

publication containing fake news “after knowing or having reasonable grounds to believe that 

such publication contains fake news” is punishable by a fine of up to one hundred 

thousand ringgit (approx. US$24,540).25

The Act establishes a process for affected persons to seek a court order for the removal of a 

publication containing fake news.26 If the person who is the subject of such an order fails to 

remove the content, a police officer or other authorized officer may take “necessary measures” 

to remove the publication.27

The Act provides for its extraterritorial application, stating that where an offense is committed 

by any person, whether a Malaysian citizen or not, outside of Malaysia, and where the fake 

news concerns Malaysia or affects a Malaysian citizen, it may be dealt with as if it was 

committed within Malaysia.28

B. Other Legislation 

Provisions under several other pieces of legislation may also be utilized to target those accused 

of publishing or disseminating fake news. The below are among the laws that the new 

government stated it would review. However, as noted above, the government has recently 

faced criticism for failing to abolish certain laws and for apparently lifting an 

enforcement moratorium. 

1. Communications and Multimedia Act 1998

Section 233 of the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 states: 

(1) A person who— 

(a) by means of any network facilities or network service or applications 

service knowingly— 

(i) makes, creates or solicits; and 

(ii) initiates the transmission of, 

 

 any comment, request, suggestion or other communication which is obscene, 

indecent, false, menacing or offensive in character with intent to annoy, abuse, 

threaten or harass another person; or 

 

23 Id. s 4(2). 

24 Id. s 5. 

25 Id. s 6. 

26 Id. s 7. 

27 Id. s 9. 

28 Id. s 3. 
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(b) initiates a communication using any applications service, whether continuously, 

repeatedly or otherwise, during which communication may or may not ensue, 

with or without disclosing his identity and with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten 

or harass any person at any number or electronic address, 

commits an offence.29

The penalty for an offense under this provision is a fine of up to fifty thousand ringgit (approx. 

US$12,270) or imprisonment for up to one year, or both, with a further fine of one thousand 

ringgit (approx. US$245) applying for every day that the offense is continued after conviction.30

2. Printing Presses and Publications Act 1984 

The Printing Presses and Publications Act 1984 requires the licensing of persons who use a 

printing press and prohibits the use of printing presses for unlawful purposes, including 

producing any publication or document “which contains an incitement to violence against 

persons or property, counsels disobedience to the law or to any lawful order or which is or is 

likely to lead to a breach of the peace or to promote feelings of ill-will, hostility, enmity, hatred, 

disharmony or disunity.”31 The relevant government minister also has the “absolute discretion” 

to prohibit the printing, importation, sale, distribution, or possession of a publication that 

contains anything that is, or is likely to be, prejudicial to “public order, morality, security, or 

which is likely to alarm public opinion, or which is or is likely to be prejudicial to public interest 

or national interest.”32 Furthermore, section 8A of the Act provides: 

Where in any publication there is maliciously published any false news, the printer, 

publisher, editor and the writer thereof shall be guilty of an offence and shall, on 

conviction be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or to a fine not 

exceeding twenty thousand ringgit [approx. US$4,908] or to both.33

3. Sedition Act 1948 

The Sedition Act 1948 criminalizes, among other acts, the printing, publishing, selling, offering 

for sale, distribution, or reproduction of any “seditious publication.”34 Such publications are 

 

29 Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 (Act 588), s 233(1), http://www.agc.gov.my/agcportal/uploads/ 

files/Publications/LOM/EN/Act%20588.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/6UTK-59AD. 

30 Id. s 233(3). 

31 Printing Presses and Publications Act 1984 (Act 301), s 4(1)(b), http://www.agc.gov.my/agcportal/uploads/ 

files/Publications/LOM/EN/Act 301 - Printing Presses And Publications Act 1984.pdf, archived at

https://perma.cc/J5JF-X5QF. 

32 Id. s 7(1). 

33 Id. s 8A(1). 

34 Sedition Act 1948 (Act 15), s 4(1)(c), http://www.agc.gov.my/agcportal/uploads/files/Publications/ 

LOM/EN/Act%2015.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/AS4W-ZLGH, as amended by Sedition (Amendment) 

Act 2015 (A1485), http://www.federalgazette.agc.gov.my/outputaktap/20150604_A1485_BI_Act% 

20A1485.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/N5TK-THAQ.
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those with a “seditious tendency,” which includes, for example, having a tendency “to bring 

hatred or contempt or to excite disaffection against any Ruler” or “to promote feelings of ill will, 

hostility or hatred between different races or classes of the population of Malaysia.”35

The penalty under this provision, which was increased by amendments to the Act in 2015, is 

imprisonment of between three and seven years.36

Other changes to the Act in 2015 enabled the government, through the Malaysian 

Communications and Multimedia Commission (MCMC), to “block electronic media that is 

deemed to be seditious.”37 The Act now allows the public prosecutor to seek an order from a 

Sessions Court prohibiting the making or circulation of a seditious publication that is found to 

be likely to lead to bodily injury or damage to property; or that appears to promote feelings of 

ill will, hostility or hatred between different races or classes of people in Malaysia, or between 

persons or groups on the grounds of religion.38 Where such a publication is by electronic means, 

the order can 

(i) require the person making or circulating the prohibited publication to remove or 

cause to be removed wholly or partly the prohibited publication; and 

(ii) prohibit the person making or circulating the publication from accessing any 

electronic device.39

In addition, a new provision allows a court to make an order “directing an officer authorized 

under the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 [Act 588] to prevent access to such 

publication” where the person making or circulating it by electronic means cannot 

be identified.40

4. Penal Code

The Penal Code contains the following offense of defamation: 

Whoever, by words either spoken or intended to be read or by signs, or by visible 

representations, makes or publishes any imputation concerning any person, intending to 

harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm the 

reputation and shall also be liable to fine of such person, is said, except in the cases 

hereinafter excepted, to defame that person.41

 

35 Id. s 3(1)(a) & (e), as amended. 

36 Id. s 4(1), as amended. 

37 Malaysia Toughens Sedition Law to Include Online Media Ban, Mandatory Jail, REUTERS (Apr. 10, 2015), 

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-malaysia-lawmaking-sedition/malaysia-toughens-sedition-law-toinclude-online-media-ban-mandatory-jail-idUSKBN0N10AD20150410, archived at https://perma.cc/M59UEXFL. 

38 Sedition Act 1948, s 10(1), as amended. 

39 Id. s 10(1A)(b), inserted by Sedition (Amendment) Act 2015. 

40 Id. s 10A, inserted by Sedition (Amendment) Act 2015. 

41 PENAL CODE (Act 574), s 499, http://www.agc.gov.my/agcportal/uploads/files/Publications/LOM/EN/ 

Penal Code ACT 574 - TP LULUS 21_2_2018.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/CK89-Q3JK. 
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The Code penalizes defamation with imprisonment for up to two years.42

Further provisions criminalize “intentional insult with intent to provoke a breach of the peace,” 

which is punishable with imprisonment for up to two years,43 and the publication or circulation 

of any statement, rumor, or report 

(b) with intent to cause, or which his likely to cause, fear or alarm to the public, or to any 

section of the public where by any person may be induced to commit an offence 

against the State or against the public tranquillity; or 

(c) with intent to incite or which is likely to incite any class or community of persons to 

commit any offence against any other class or community of persons[.]44

This offense is also punishable by imprisonment for up to two years. 

C. Sebenarnya.my Portal and App 

In March 2017, the MCMC launched the “sebenarnya.my” portal to enable the public to “check 

on the authenticity of news spread through social websites.”45 In March 2018, the MCMC made 

the portal available as a smartphone app.46 According to the MCMC, the portal has over one 

hundred strategic partners comprising twenty-two government ministries and almost one 

hundred agencies “that cover numerous sectors and fields.”47

The portal remains active and publishes various fact-checking articles and statements in 

response to information being circulated online.48 In November 2018, for example, in light of the 

temple riots referred to above, the MCMC urged people not to share or spread information that 

has not been proven to be true and reminded the public to “check and report on widely-shared 

fake news” using the portal.49

 

42 Id. s 500. 

43 Id. s 504. 

44 Id. s 505(b) & (c). 

45 SEBERARNYA.MY Portal Launched for Checking Validity of News, THE STAR (Mar. 14, 2017), https://www.the 

star.com.my/news/nation/2017/03/14/sebenarnya-portal/, archived at https://perma.cc/7N58-G4T9. See also 

Press Release, Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission (MCMC), Sebenarnya.my Portal 

Launched, In Battle Against False News (Mar. 14, 2017), https://www.mcmc.gov.my/media/press-releases/ 

sebenarnya-my-portal-launched,-in-a-battle-against, archived at https://perma.cc/GMR4-DSUB. 

46 Sebenarnya.my Launches Smartphone App, THE SUN DAILY (Mar. 20, 2018), https://www.thesundaily.my/ 

archive/sebenarnyamy-launches-smartphone-app-MUARCH534018, archived at https://perma.cc/FBY4-

V5EN. 

47 Id.

48 See Homepage, SEBENARNYA.MY, https://sebenarnya.my (in Malaysian; last visited Feb. 28, 2019), archived at 

https://perma.cc/N9AX-UPSX. 

49 Angelin Yeoh, MCMC: Stop Spreading False Online News that Could Disrupt National Harmony, THE STAR (Nov. 

27, 2018), https://www.thestar.com.my/tech/tech-news/2018/11/27/mcmc-urge-users-to-be-mindful-onsocial-media/, archived at https://perma.cc/45RT-MFS8. 
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D. Education and Enforcement 

The MCMC reported that in 2017 it held 561 fake news awareness programs through eighteen 

strategic partners and conducted awareness campaigns through public service announcements 

broadcast on television and radio.50 It also “took action against 3,721 fake accounts in various 

social media platforms in which 80% of the perpetrators’ accounts were deleted for violating 

their terms and conditions.”51 At that time, criminal enforcement activities were based on 

section 233 of the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998, with forty investigating papers 

related to fake news being opened in 2017 and four cases brought before the court.52 A 

spokesman for the MCMC stated that it had “the capacity to prosecute individuals who spread 

false news within 24 hours after an offence is committed via social media.”53

In April 2018, the MCMC reported that more than 50% of the instances of fake news that had 

been verified using the sebenarny.my portal were being investigated.54 By then, ten individuals 

had “been convicted after a lengthy court process” of breaching section 233 of the 

Communications and Multimedia Act in relation to spreading fake news. The MCMC noted 

that it was often difficult to detect the original publisher of fake news “as some 30% of the cases 

were using fake social media accounts.”55

During the previous administration, there were also multiple actions taken against individuals 

under the Sedition Act 1948, including in relation to online speech,56 although it is unclear to 

what extent these involved what might otherwise be considered “fake news.” In 2018, the 

current government dropped some Sedition Act prosecutions that had been brought by the 

previous government, and rights groups called for the remaining cases to also be withdrawn.57

 

50 Sebenarnya.my Launches Smartphone App, supra note 46. 

51 Id.

52 Id. See also Whatsapp, Faceboo Main Sources of Fake News for Malaysians, NEW STRAITS TIMES (Mar. 26, 2018), 

https://www.nst.com.my/news/nation/2018/03/349523/whatsapp-facebook-main-sources-fake-newsmalaysians. 

53 Norhafzan Jaafar et al., MCMC Can Catch Fake News Spreaders in 24 Hours, NEW STRAITS TIMES (Mar. 8, 2018), 

https://www.nst.com.my/news/nation/2018/03/343116/mcmc-can-catch-fake-news-spreaders-24-hours. 

54 Over 50% of 1500 Fake News Being Investigated: MCMC, THE SUN DAILY (Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.thesun 

daily.my/archive/over-50-1500-fake-news-being-investigated-mcmc-CUARCH541166, archived at

https://perma.cc/N2N2-YH7S. 

55 Id.

56 See Press Release, Amnesty International, Malaysia: End Unprecedented Crackdown on Hundreds of Critics 

(Mar. 11, 2016), https://www.amnesty.org/en/press-releases/2016/03/malaysia-end-unprecedentedcrackdown-on-hundreds-of-critics-through-sedition-act/, archived at https://perma.cc/5JU9-UAVU. 

57 Malaysia: Drop Remaining Sedition Cases, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.hrw.org/news/ 

2018/08/01/malaysia-drop-remaining-sedition-cases, archived at https://perma.cc/EJ7R-C9Z2; Malaysia: 

Acquittal of Zunar and Others Must Lead to Repeal of Draconian Law, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (July 30, 2018), 

https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/07/malaysia-acquittal-of-zunar-and-others-must-lead-torepeal-of-draconian-sedition-law/, archived at http://perma.cc/JP4L-ZRSY. 
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However, in January 2019, Malaysian police arrested three people for Sedition Act offenses after 

they posted comments on social media deemed insulting to Sultan Muhammad V.58

The current Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad, was one of the first people investigated under 

the Anti-Fake News Act 2018, with authorities stating that the investigation related to false 

claims that his plane was sabotaged ahead of the election.59 The first person convicted under the 

Act, in April 2018, was a Danish citizen who published a video on YouTube that made false 

claims about the length of time it took police in Kuala Lumpur to respond to a shooting 

incident. He was fined ten thousand ringgit (approx. US$2,454) but opted instead to spend one 

month in prison.60 

More recent statistics and information regarding MCMC enforcement actions specifically 

related to fake news since the election of the new government have not been located. The 

MCMC website provides information to the public on complaint processes related to online 

content that refers to various laws and their respective enforcement agencies, including the 

Sedition Act and the Communications and Multimedia Act. It does not refer to the Anti-Fake 

News Act 2018.61 News reports on possible MCMC actions against individuals in relation to the 

November 2018 temple riots did not specify what legislation might be utilized for 

this purpose.62

In addition to the sebenaryna.my portal, it appears that government entities also use social 

media to inform and educate the public regarding fake news. For example, in January 2019 the 

Ministry of Women, Family and Community used Twitter and Facebook to inform the public 

that a viral message regarding a curfew on young people was fake news.63

 

58 Emmanuel Santa Maria Chin, Human Rights Group Slams Govt Following Arrests Under Sedition Act, MALAY 

MAIL (Jan. 9, 2019), https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2019/01/09/human-rights-group-slamsgovt-following-arrests-under-sedition-act/1710758, archived at https://perma.cc/DK85-DE64. 

59 Emily Chow & Praveen Menon, Go Ahead, Charge Me Over Fake News, Says Malaysia’s Mahthir of Plane Sabotage 

Claim, REUTERS (May 4, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-malaysia-election-fakenews/go-aheadcharge-me-over-fake-news-says-malaysias-mahathir-of-plane-sabotage-claim-idUSKBN1I50DS, archived at

https://perma.cc/ZF68-QYLL. 

60 First Person Convicted Under Malaysia’s Fake News Law, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 30, 2018), https://www.the 

guardian.com/world/2018/apr/30/first-person-convicted-under-malaysias-fake-news-law, archived at

https://perma.cc/2DSR-3G8K. 

61 FAQS: 1. What Are the Steps Required for Me to Lodge Complaints Regarding Content on the Internet?, MCMC,

https://www.mcmc.gov.my/faqs/online-content-problems/what-are-the-steps-required-for-me-to-lodgecompla (last visited Feb. 28, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/B6UC-ZJYV. 

62 See MCMC Acts Over False Info on Temple Riots (Updated), THE SUN DAILY (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www. 

thesundaily.my/local/mcmc-acts-over-false-info-on-temple-riots-updated-IX176280, archived at 

https://perma.cc/VX68-A4TU. 

63 Putrajaya Debunks Viral Message on Curfew for Those Below 18, CHANNEL NEWSASIA (Jan. 22, 2019),

https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/malaysia-fake-news-curfew-teenagers-11151206, archived at 

https://perma.cc/URU4-L58A. 
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III. Government Legal Information Portals 

The Malaysian government provides online access to legal information through the Laws of 

Malaysia portal on the website of the Attorney-General’s Chambers64 as well as through the eFederal Gazette portal (also maintained by the Attorney-General’s Chambers).65 The Laws of 

Malaysia site contains federal statute law, while the e-Federal Gazette contains federal laws and 

regulations published in the official gazette, dating back to 2011.66 In addition, published 

judgments of the federal courts are made available online on the website of the Office of the 

Chief Registrar of Federal Courts,67 and bills, order papers, and records of parliamentary 

proceedings are published on the Malaysian Parliament website.68

The Official E-Syariah Portal provides access to information related to Islamic law in Malaysia, 

including state-level statutes, case status information, and court procedures.69 State-level law 

portals also include those of Sabah70 and Sarawak,71 which have a higher degree of legislative 

autonomy compared to other states. Court judgments are available on the website of the High 

Court in Sabah and Sarawak.72

 

64 Laws of Malaysia (L.O.M.), ATTORNEY-GENERAL’S CHAMBERS OF MALAYSIA, http://www.agc.gov.my/ 

agcportal/index.php?r=portal2/lom&menu_id=VXlsMDlEclhJVXlGcUd6c0JreVhEUT09 (last visited Feb. 28, 

2019), archived at https://perma.cc/3WQE-NL3P. 

65 Homepage, E-FEDERAL GAZETTE, http://www.federalgazette.agc.gov.my (last visited Feb. 28, 2019), archived at

https://perma.cc/K3J4-ND5M. 

66 Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), E-FEDERAL GAZETTE, http://www.federalgazette.agc.gov.my/eng_main/ 

main_faq.php (last visited Feb. 28, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/5EJX-M6RB. 

67 Grounds of Judgment, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF REGISTRAR, FEDERAL COURT OF MALAYSIA, http://www.kehakiman. 

gov.my/en/grounds-judgment (last updated Feb. 26, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/428H-UPWV. 

68 Homepage, PARLIAMENT OF MALAYSIA, https://www.parlimen.gov.my/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2019), archived at

https://perma.cc/3SDH-WFWK. 

69 Homepage, E-SYARIAH OFFICIAL PORTAL, http://www.esyariah.gov.my/ (last updated Jan. 1, 2019), archived at

https://perma.cc/J97X-GUGV. 

70 Homepage, SABAH LAWNET, SABAH STATE ATTORNEY-GENERAL’S CHAMBERS, http://www.lawnet.sabah. 

gov.my/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/9NQB-UHN9. 

71 Homepage, SARAWAK LAWNET, http://lawnet.sarawak.gov.my/lawnet/Law/TLnetPubHome.jsp (last visited 

Feb. 28, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/8SFS-68YS. 

72 Homepage, HIGH COURT IN SABAH & SARAWAK, https://judiciary.kehakiman.gov.my/portals/ (last visited 

Feb. 28, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/EM63-GVPV. 
The Law Library of Congress 78 

Nicaragua 

Norma C. Gutiérrez 

Senior Foreign Law Specialist

I. Introduction 

Nicaragua has not enacted a general law specifically aimed at protecting the objectivity of news 

regardless of the media source or prohibiting the creation and dissemination of “fake news.” 

However, some provisions can be found in the Penal Code protecting individuals from false news 

that affects their reputation, and the Election Law contains additional provisions regulating 

electoral advertisements. 

II. Legal Framework 

A. Penal Code 

The Nicaraguan Penal Code uses the concept of “day fines” to determine applicable fines, with 

each day fine calculated on the basis of a third of the daily income of the convicted person. If that 

income cannot be determined, the minimum wage of the industrial sector in which the convicted 

person works will be taken as the basis for calculating the fine.1 

The Penal Code punishes with day fines of one hundred to two hundred days anyone who falsely 

imputes to another the commission of or participation in a specific crime (calumnia). A false 

imputation that is publicized is penalized with a day fine of 120 to three hundred days.2 Similarly, 

the crime of defamation (injurias) is penalized with a day fine of one hundred to two hundred 

days. If the defamation was publicized, the fine is increased to two hundred to three hundred 

day fines.3 

B. Electoral Law 

The Electoral Law prohibits the dissemination of electoral advertising with a view to damaging 

the integrity of registered candidates or calling for abstention from voting or violence. All such 

material must be withdrawn from circulation by the appropriate authority.4 

 

1 CÓDIGO PENAL, Ley No. 641, art. 64, LA GACETA [L.G.), May 5-9, 2008, http://legislacion.asamblea.gob. 

ni/Normaweb.nsf/164aa15ba012e567062568a2005b564b/5c6133ebd4b985e50625744f005a5b2e?OpenDocument, 

archived at https://perma.cc/B37H-T43G. 

2 Id. art. 202.

3 Id. art. 203. 

4 Ley Electoral, Ley No. 331, art. 87, L.G., Sept. 4, 2012, http://legislacion.asamblea.gob.ni/normaweb. 

nsf/3133c0d121ea3897062568a1005e0f89/8abab8f0a5a0cfd306257a830079bc60?OpenDocument, archived at

https://perma.cc/C6MZ-V32Z. 
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The Law provides that political parties or alliances of parties must strictly respect the ethical 

standards, morals, and due consideration between them, the nominated candidates, and the 

Nicaraguan people. The Law prohibits denigrating, offending, or disqualifying political 

adversaries in the political organizations’ advertising and states that any criminal action 

involving defamation and slander committed against political candidates will be heard in 

accordance with the general legislation,5 which is the Penal Code. 

 

5 Id. art. 107. 
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Russia 

Astghik Grigoryan 

Legal Research Analyst

SUMMARY The Russian Federation has been the subject of international criticism owing to its role 

in producing and disseminating fake news during and after the 2016 Presidential 

Elections in the US. Fake news is mostly distributed through social media networks, 

which are widely available to the population in the Russian Federation. 

Recently, the Russian Federation enacted legislation aimed at countering fake news. 

This legislation complements the existing Federal Law on Information, Information 

Technologies and the Protection of Information, which is the main piece of legislation 

addressing the spread of inaccurate or false information. Anti-defamation and anti-libel 

provisions of the Criminal Code establish liability and punitive measures for spreading 

libelous news. 

 Legislation of Russian Federation provides for access to legal information. Several 

official legal information portals provide free access to legal information and 

judicial acts. 

I. Introduction 

The Russian Federation has been the subject of international criticism for creating and 

disseminating fake news during and after the 2016 US Presidential Elections. The internet has 

been used as the main medium for disseminating fake news. Internet penetration is at a relatively 

high level in the Russian Federation, and according to the statistics portal Statista, it is projected 

that the number of internet users will increase steadily through 2022.1 Social networks have been 

the main channels for disseminating fake news. Statistics show that in 2017, 47% of the Russian 

population had an active account or accounts with major social networks, with the most dominant 

networks being YouTube and VKontakte.2 

The Russian Federation has created an infrastructure for the production and dissemination of 

fake news. One of the channels that produces and distributes fake news is the Internet Research 

Agency, a Russian entity created ostensibly to conduct internet research, but in reality serving as 

an internet troll-producing machine with the aim of shaping political landscapes internationally 

and domestically.3 According to the US Director of National Intelligence, the Internet Research 

 

1 Forecast of Internet Users in Russia from 2015 to 2022, STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/567007/ 

predicted-number-of-internet-users-in-russia/, archived at https://perma.cc/L87M-DHQD. 

2 Penetration of Leading Social Networks in Russia as of 4th Quarter 2017, STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/ 

statistics/284447/russia-social-network-penetration/, archived at https://perma.cc/6FAT-F9Z4. 

3 OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, BACKGROUND TO “ASSESSING RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES AND 

INTENTIONS IN RECENT US ELECTIONS”: THE ANALYTIC PROCESS AND CYBER INCIDENT ATTRIBUTION (Jan. 6, 2017), 

https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/FW3T-JUY2. 
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Agency employs an army of “content creators” who in reality created and multiplied fake social 

media accounts to conduct a widespread disinformation campaign during the 2016 US 

Presidential Elections. Additionally, other media outlets such as Russia Today and the Sputnik 

Information Agency were implicated for producing and disseminating fake news through 

various social media and other channels.4

The topic of fake news has been the subject of heated debates in the political discourse of the 

Russian Federation. Recently, the State Duma (the lower chamber of the Russian legislature) had 

to publish on its website a rebuttal of the fake legal news concerning a supposed measure under 

consideration that would have banned Russian citizens from purchasing a car if they do not have 

a parking space.5 This example along with others was used by the group of deputies who 

introduced anti-fake news legislation that was later enacted. The enforcement of these laws, 

which are discussed in more detail below, remains problematic, as expressed by various 

government agencies and law enforcement bodies. 

II. Legal Framework 

In March 2019, Russia adopted two anti-fake news laws, amending existing legislation governing 

the accuracy of information and prescribing monetary punitive measures for disseminating fake 

news.6 The Federal Law on Information, Information Technologies and the Protection of 

Information (Information Law) prescribes legal standards for the production and dissemination 

of trustworthy information.7 The Law is the main legislation in the information management 

field. Certain provisions of the Criminal Code prescribe punitive measures for the distribution of 

inaccurate, libelous, and false information, and for defamation. 

A. Federal Law on Information, Information Technologies and Protection of Information 

The Information Law contains provisions aimed at countering dissemination of inaccurate or 

untrue information.8 Article 3, paragraph 6 of the Law stipulates that the reliability and 

trustworthiness of information is one of the principles for the legal regulation of information. 9

 

4 Id. 

5 The State Duma Does Not Consider the Initiative to Ban the Purchase of a Car without a Parking Space, STATE DUMA

(Feb. 17, 2019), http://duma.gov.ru/news/29804/ (in Russian), archived at https://perma.cc/W63T-4FL9. 

6 Federal Law No. 31-FZ of March 18, 2019, on Amending Article 15-3 of the Federal Law on Information, 

Information Technologies and Protection of Information (hereinafter Law on Amending Article 15-3 of the 

Information Law), http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001201903180031 (in Russian), archived 

at https://perma.cc/7YEP-QHU8; Federal Law No. 27-FZ of March 18, 2019 on Amending the Code of 

Administrative Violations, http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001201903180021? 

index=1&rangeSize=1 (in Russian), archived at https://perma.cc/E3CL-H6KM.

7 Federalnii Zakon No. 149-FZ ob Informatsii, Informatsionnih Tekhnologiiah i o Zaschite Informatsii [Federal 

Law on Information, Information Technologies and Protection of Information (hereinafter Information Law)]

N149-FZ, July 27, 2006, available on the official legal information portal at http://pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/? 

docbody&nd=102108264, archived at https://perma.cc/M75Q-8EBC.

8 Id. 

9 Id. art. 3 para. 6. 
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The Law guarantees freedom of dissemination of information unless it is aimed at “propaganda 

of war, [or] incitement of national, racial, or religious hatred and enmity, as well as other 

information for the dissemination of which criminal or administrative responsibility 

is provided.”10

If the news is distributed through a news aggregator, the owner of aggregator (only Russian 

physical or legal persons can own news aggregators) must be responsible for verifying the 

validity of socially significant facts, as well as preventing the use of the news aggregator to 

conceal or falsify socially significant information, and disseminate false socially significant news 

information under the guise of reliable messages.11

If any facts reflecting the falsification of socially significant information are found on the news 

aggregator, together with the distribution of unreliable information of social significance under 

the guise of reliable messages and distribution of news information in violation of the legislation 

of the Russian Federation, the authorized state bodies have the right to apply to the federal 

executive body exercising control and supervision functions in the field of mass media, mass 

communications, information technologies (Roskomnadzor) to take necessary measures to stop 

the distribution of such information.12

If the information is distributed in violation of the law, the Prosecutor General of the Russian 

Federation or his deputies may petition Roskomnadzor with a demand to cease the distribution 

of said information.13

B. Criminal Code 

Libel and defamation are punished under the provisions of the Criminal Code. The Code defines 

libel as “dissemination of knowingly false information, discrediting the honor and dignity of 

another person or undermining his reputation.”14 The Code stipulates differentiated punishments 

for libel (monetary, compulsory public works, or imprisonment) based on its impact. Paragraph 

2 of article 128.1 states that “the libel contained in a public statement, a publicly displayed work 

or the media, is punishable with a fine of up to 1 million rubles (approximately US$15,000) or an 

amount equal to the salary or other income of the convicted person for a period of up to one year, 

or compulsory work for a period of up to 240 hours.”15

Special (more stringent) provisions of the Criminal Code aim to counter libel and defamation of 

persons involved in the administration of justice (judges, jurors, prosecutors, investigators, 

 

10 Id. art. 10. 

11 Id. art 10(4) paras. 2, 3, 12. 

12 Id. para. 8. 

13 Id. art. 15.3. 

14 UGOLOVNII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [CRIMINAL CODE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION], June 5, 1996, as 

amended, art. 128.1, http://pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?docbody&nd=102041891, archived at https://perma.cc/ 

APZ9-5MZ8. 

15 Id. (translation by the author). 
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The Law Library of Congress 83

persons conducting an inquiry, and bailiffs).16 According to article 298.1 of the Criminal Code, 

libel and defamation of a judge, juror, or other person involved in the administration of justice is 

punishable by a fine of up to 2 million rubles (approximately US$30,000) or an amount equal to 

the salary or other income of the convicted person for a period of up to three years, or compulsory 

work for a period of up to 360 hours. Defaming the prosecutor, the investigator, or other person 

involved in the criminal investigation is punishable with a fine of up to 1 million rubles or in the 

amount of the salary or other income of the convicted person for a period of up to two years, or 

compulsory work for a period of up to 320 hours. Knowingly defaming persons engaged in the 

administration of justice and criminal proceedings involving the commission of grave crimes is 

punishable with a fine of up to 5 million rubles (approximately US$75,000) or an amount equal 

to the salary or other income of the convicted person for a period of up to three years, or by 

compulsory work for up to 480 hours.17

C. Anti-Fake News Laws 

1. Overview 

In March 2019 two laws aimed at countering the creation and dissemination of fake news were 

adopted.18 The laws establish fines for knowingly spreading fake news, which is defined as 

socially-significant false information distributed under the guise of truthful messages if they 

create a threat of endangering people’s lives, health, or property; create possibilities for mass 

violations of public order or public security; or may hinder the work of transportation and social 

infrastructure, credit institutions, lines of communications, industry, and energy enterprises.19

According to a legislator who introduced this Law, the level of trustworthiness of information 

will be determined by Prosecutor General’s office. 20 The latter will forward to Roskomnadzor a 

demand to take measures on limiting access to such an information.21

The Law on Amending Article 15-3 of the Information Law states that Roskomnadzor is to inform 

the editorial body of an on-line publication concerning removal of fake news. Upon receipt of a 

notice from Roskomnadzor, the editorial body must immediately take steps to remove such 

information and if it fails to do so Roskomnadzor must take steps to limit access to the online 

publication. In such cases the internet service provider must also immediately block access to the 

sites where the fake news is published. 22

 

16 Id. art. 298.1. 

17 Id. 

18 Law on Amending Article 15-3 of the Information Law, supra note 6; Law on Amending the Code of 

Administrative Violations, supra note 6. 

19 Law on Amending Article 15-3 of the Information Law, supra note 6, § 1. 

20 What Are Fake News and What Punishment Their Spreading Entails, STATE DUMA, http://duma.gov.ru/news/ 

29982/ (in Russian; last visited Mar. 18, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/G5D2-9LGC.

21 Id. 

22 Law on Amending Article 15-3 of the Information Law, supra note 6, arts. 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4. 
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The Law on Amending the Code of Administrative Violations prescribes the following monetary 

punishments for spreading fake news. 

 For implicated citizens: From 30,000 to 100,000 rubles (approximately US$458 to $1,528). For 

repeat violations the amount of fines will be from 100,000 to 300,000 rubles (approximately 

US$1,528 to $4,580). 

 For implicated officials: From 60,000 to 200,000 thousand rubles (approximately US$916 to 

$3,000). For repeat violations the fines are set in the amount of 300,000 to 600,000 rubles 

(approximately US$4,580 to $9,100). 

 For implicated legal persons: From 200,000 to 500,000 rubles (approximately US$3,000 to 

$7,600) and confiscation of offending tools. For repeat violations the fines are set in the 

amount of 500,000 to 1 million rubles.23

Should the dissemination of fake information cause the “death of a person or harm to human 

health or property, a massive disturbance of public order and (or) public safety, the cessation of 

the functioning of life support facilities, transport or social infrastructure, communications, credit 

institutions energy or industry,“ fines are as follows: 

 For implicated citizens: From 300,000 to 400,000 rubles (approximately US$4,580 $6,100); 

 For implicated officials: From 600,000 to 900,000 rubles (US$9,100 to $13,700); and 

 For implicated legal entities: From 1 million to 1.5 million rubles (approximately US$15,270 

to $22,900).24

2. Reactions to the Laws 

The laws were passed by the Federation Council (the upper house of the Russian legislature) 

notwithstanding wide criticism from various government agencies and ministries, including the 

Ministry of Justice, Roskomnadzor, the Ministry of Communication, and the Office of the 

Prosecutor General.25 As noted by the representative of the Office of the Prosecutor General, the 

broad wording of the bills would require extensive and costly linguistic expertise. Additionally, 

she noted that bills do not specify sufficient criteria for extrajudicial blocking of sites. In her 

opinion, this may entail “an unreasonable restriction of the constitutional rights of citizens to free 

 

23 Law on Amending the Code of Administrative Violations, supra note 6. 

24 Id. 

25 The General Prosecutor’s Office Did Not Support Bills on Insulting Authorities and Fake News, VEDOMOSTI (Jan. 14, 

2018), https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/news/2019/01/14/791325-genprokuratura-oskorbleniyah (in 

Russian), archived at https://perma.cc/QDJ4-BY65. 
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dissemination of information.”26 Similar concerns regarding proposed bills were expressed by the 

representatives of the Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Communication, and Roskomnadzor.27 

The passage of the laws has been met with criticism from various nongovernmental organizations 

as well. For example, members of the Free Speech Association, PEN-Moscow Association, and St. 

Petersburg PEN Club issued an open letter expressing the opinion that the newly-passed laws 

restrict constitutional freedoms of free speech and “establish the right of an official, at his own 

discretion, without investigation and trial, by his sole decision, to forbid the dissemination of any 

information” and indefinitely and “immediately” block any media resources on the internet. 

Writers consider these bills as a manifestation of bureaucratic arbitrariness, a violation of the 

constitutional rights of citizens, and the creation of “unbearable discriminatory conditions for the 

Russian media industry,” as well as actual state repression against the entire journalistic and 

literary community.28

However, the spokesperson for the President of the Russian Federation expressed the opinion 

that a similar regulatory framework exists in many European countries, and that the reservations 

about the laws for being far-reaching in their scope are not justified based on past experience. 29

III. Access to Legal Information 

The Information Law provides for the right to search, disseminate, produce, and transfer 

information. 30 Article 8 of the Law provides that citizens and organizations must have the right 

to access, inter alia, regulatory legal acts affecting the rights, freedoms, and duties of a person and 

citizens, as well as those governing the legal status of organizations and prescribing the powers 

of state bodies and those of local government.31 Information concerning the activities of state and 

local government bodies is provided free of charge.32 The Decree of the President of 1995 on 

Presidential Programs of Legal Informatization established the foundations for the digitization of 

legal information.33 Additionally, the Federal Law on Ensuring Access to Information on the 

 

26 Id. 

27 Ministry of Communications Will Not Support Bills about Fakes in the Media and About Insulting the Authorities, 

RIA-NOVOSTI (Jan. 14, 2019), https://ria.ru/20190114/1549324352.html (in Russian), archived at

https://perma.cc/R8P4-MMD9. 

28 Council of Federation Approves Anti-Fake News Law and Law Prohibiting Disrespectful Treatment of Authorities, 

NEWSRU.COM (Mar. 13, 2019), https://www.newsru.com/russia/13mar2019/fake_accept.html (in Russian), 

archived at https://perma.cc/6CY6-Q24Q.

29 Id. 

30 Information Law art. 3. 

31 Id. art. 8, para. 4(1). 

32 Id. 

33 Ukaz Presidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii o Prezidentsikh Programmakh Pravovoi Informatizatsii [Decree of the 

President of Russian Federation on Programs of Legal Informatization], No. 808, Aug. 4, 1995, http://pravo. 

gov.ru/proxy/ips/?docbody=&firstDoc=1&lastDoc=1&nd=102036941, archived at https://perma.cc/5YZG33WY.
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Activities of State Bodies and Local Self-Government Bodies provides the legal framework for 

access to governmental information, based on the principles of transparency, accuracy, 

and accessibility.34

Currently, legal information is available through the official legal information portal.35 A 

centralized internet portal provides information about court decisions and other judicial acts.36

Additionally, the State Duma provides a searchable database of bills.37

 

34 Federal’nii Zakon ob Obespechenii Dostupa k Informatsii o Deyatel’nosti Gosudarstvennikh Organov i 

Organov Mestnogo Samoupravleniya [Federal Law “On Ensuring Access to Information on the Activities of 

State Bodies and Local Self-Government Bodies”], No. 8-FZ Feb. 9, 2009, art. 4, http://pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ 

ips/?docbody=&nd=102127629, archived at https://perma.cc/9WMX-5BS2.

35 See http://www.pravo.gov.ru/, archived at https://perma.cc/4DV4-9U67. 

36 PRAVOSUDIE [JUSTICE], https://sudrf.ru/, archived at https://perma.cc/4GKD-44RZ.

37 GOSDUMA [STATE DUMA], http://duma.gov.ru/legislative/lawmaking/, archived at https://perma.cc/N8JW282M. 
The Law Library of Congress 87 

Sweden 

Elin Hofverberg 

Foreign Law Specialist

SUMMARY Sweden has both state media and non-state media. State media are funded through a 

fee collected as part of the income tax system. Non-state media receive funding from 

the state, provided they have more than 1,500 subscribers. 

 Sweden protects free speech, access to public information, and the anonymity of sources 

in its Constitution. Types of speech that are not allowed include crimes against persons 

such as defamation, insults, threats, and hate speech (“racial agitation”), and crimes 

against the state such as the instigation of war. Information may also not be shared in 

the media when it violates secrecy provisions or endangers national security. All 

persons have a right to share information with the media without repercussions. 

 Media publications and broadcasts are bound by law, and media outlets must correct 

erroneous information. Several ethical boards enforce ethical compliance with media 

laws. The enforcement of laws and principles that forbid the publication of erroneous 

information is done by the Chancellor for Justice, the Swedish Broadcasting 

Commission, and self-regulatory boards. Crimes such as defamation or war instigation 

are addressed through the regular court system with the Chancellor of Justice acting as 

the prosecutor. Such “crimes against the freedoms of the press,” as they are called, are 

subject to fines or imprisonment. 

 

 There are also self-regulatory and voluntary ethical guidelines both for media 

publishers and individual journalists. The punishment for publishers includes 

monetary fines, which are determined by the publication’s circulation. Individual 

journalists may also be fined or excluded from the Union of Journalists. 

 All legislation must be made available free of charge. Laws are published online, and 

the online versions of laws are considered official. Legislative material from the 

Parliament and the government is also published online, as are some court cases, 

including Supreme Court precedent cases. In addition, the Supreme Court publishes 

most of its most recent cases, as well as leave for appeal decisions, on its website. 

 No new laws relating to fake news are currently pending before the Parliament. The 

media industry has voluntarily adopted several measures to combat fake 

news, however. 

I. Introduction 

A. Swedish Media Landscape

Sweden has three main state broadcasters of media content—Swedish Radio (Sveriges Radio, SR), 

Swedish Educational Radio (Sveriges Utbildningsradion, UR), and Swedish Television (Sveriges 
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Television, SVT)—that together are considered public services.1 Until January 1, 2019, they were 

funded through a separate TV and radio fee paid by all Swedish residents who had a television 

set or a TV receiver (certain computers included).2 Starting in fiscal year (calendar year) 2019, 

public services SR, UR, and SVT are now funded through the income tax.3 

Swedish state media are independent of the government. They receive funding from the 

government, but must adhere to principles of impartiality and accuracy, and must not consult 

with the government or Parliament prior to producing content.4 They must also broadcast in a 

manner that is viewable by 99.8% of the Swedish population residing in Sweden.5 Answering a 

question from a member of Parliament, the then Minister for Culture Alice Bah Kuhne in 2018 

stated that because of this independence the government could not intervene in state media to 

ensure that they did not distribute fake news.6

All non-state media are eligible for a state grant provided that they have more than 

1,500 subscribers.7 

B. Reports of Fake News 

A number of reports of fake news have been circulating in Sweden and about Sweden abroad,8

including locally produced fake news during the 2018 national election.9 Fake news was 

 

1 REGERINGSBESLUT [GOVERNMENT DECISION] No. 83, Dec. 12, 2013, https://www.svt.se/omoss/media/filer_ 

public/06/1f/061fc8d0-dfba-441c-9740-59639eafbe29/sandningstillstand_2014_-_2019.pdf, archived at

https://perma.cc/FQ72-V68B; LAG OM FINANSIERING AV RADIO OCH TV I ALLMÄNHETENS TJÄNST [ACT ON 

FINANCING RADIO AND TV FOR PUBLIC SERVICE] (Svensk författningssamling [SFS] 2018:1893), 

https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-lagar/dokument/svensk-forfattningssamling/lag-20181893-omfinansiering-av-radio-och-tv-i_sfs-2018-1893, archived at https://perma.cc/SW2U-4WEA. 

2 Elin Hofverberg, Sweden: Public TV and Radio Service Fee System Reformed, New Tax Introduced, GLOBAL LEGAL 

MONITOR (Dec. 14, 2018), http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/sweden-public-tv-and-radioservice-fee-system-reformed-new-tax-introduced/, archived at https://perma.cc/482L-FCK4. 

3 LAG OM FINANSIERING AV RADIO OCH TV I ALLMÄNHETENS TJÄNST.

4 13 REGERINGSBESLUT 83, supra note 1; 4 kap. 8 § RADIO- OCH TV LAG [RADIO AND TV LAW] (SFS 2010:696), 

https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-lagar/dokument/svensk-forfattningssamling/radio--och-tv-lag2010696_sfs-2010-696, archived at https://perma.cc/Z6E8-J9NH. 

5 1 § REGERINGSBESLUT 83, supra note 1. 

6 Ku2018/00151/MF Fake news i SVT, Svar på skriftlig fråga 2017/18:692 besvarad av Kultur- och 

demokratiminister Alice Bah Kuhnke (MP) (Feb. 7, 2018), http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokumentlagar/dokument/svar-pa-skriftlig-fraga/fake-news-i-svt_H512692, archived at https://perma.cc/Y9FA-SSVN. 

7 Applying for a Press and Media Subsidy, MPRT (Aug. 3, 2018), https://www.mprt.se/en/applying-for-a-presssubsidy/, archived at https://perma.cc/469A-3T7G. 

8 E.g., Christine Masters, Fake News Article Lauds Official Cryptocurrency Adoption by Sweden, CRYPTOVEST (Dec. 

20, 2018), https://cryptovest.com/news/fake-news-article-lauds-official-cryptocurrency-adoption-bysweden/, archived at https://perma.cc/4NZD-WTYU. 

9 Leonid Bershidsky, Fake News Takes Its Toll on Sweden’s Elections, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 15, 2019), https://www. 

bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-11-15/fake-news-roiled-sweden-s-elections-but-it-was-homegrown; see 

also Morgan Meaker, Inside the Online Disinformation War Trying to Tear Sweden Apart, WIRED (Sept. 9, 2018), 

https://www.wired.co.uk/article/sweden-election-polls-far-right, archived at https://perma.cc/U5Z8-X584. 
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reportedly prevalent during the 2018 election.10 SR also reported on fake news being 

disseminated by Russia.11 

C. National Legislation 

1. Constitutional Protections of Free Speech, Press, Access to Information, and the Right to Inform Media 

a. Free Speech 

Free speech is protected in the Swedish Constitution.12 The Swedish Constitution consists of four 

Acts: the Instrument of Government (Regeringsformen, RF),13 the Fundamental Law on Freedom 

of Expression (Yttrandefrihetsgrundlagen, YGL),14 the Freedoms of the Press Act 

(Tryckfrihetsförordningen, TF),15 and the Succession Act (Successionsordningen, SO).16 The right 

to publish is guaranteed by the TF,17 the goal of which is to ”ensure a free exchange of ideas, free 

enlightenment, and free artistic expression.”18

 

10 Alice Cuddy, 1 in 3 News Articles Shared about Sweden Election Are Fake, Finds Study, EURONEWS (Sept. 6, 2018), 

https://www.euronews.com/2018/09/06/1-in-3-news-articles-shared-about-sweden-election-are-fake, 

archived at https://perma.cc/GCY9-QP6D; Freja Hedman et al., News and Political Information Consumption in 

Sweden: Mapping the 2018 Swedish General Election on Twitter COMPROP DATAMEMO 2018.3 (Sept. 6, 2018), 

http://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/research/sweden-election/, archived at https://perma.cc/XU6D-UH28. 

11 Report: Russia Spread Fake News and Disinformation in Sweden, SVERIGES RADIO (Jan. 9, 2017), https://sveriges 

radio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=2054&artikel=6604516, archived at https://perma.cc/TD44-CQYJ. 

12 2 kap. 1 § REGERINGSFORMEN [RF] [INSTRUMENT OF GOVERNMENT] (SFS 1974:152), https://www.riksdagen.se/ 

sv/dokument-lagar/dokument/svensk-forfattningssamling/kungorelse-1974152-om-beslutad-nyregeringsform_sfs-1974-152, archived at https://perma.cc/Z8N6-BKWX. 

13 Id. 

14 YTTRANDEFRIHETSGRUNDLAG [YGL] [FUNDAMENTAL LAW ON FREEDOMS OF EXPRESSION] (SFS 1991:1469), 

https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-lagar/dokument/svensk-forfattningssamling/yttrandefrihets 

grundlag-19911469_sfs-1991-1469, archived at https://perma.cc/G3GS-2WNL. 

15 TRYCKFRIHETSFÖRORDNING [TF] [FREEDOMS OF THE PRESS ACT] (SFS 1949:105), https://www.riksdagen.se/ 

sv/dokument-lagar/dokument/svensk-forfattningssamling/tryckfrihetsforordning-1949105_sfs-1949-105, 

archived at https://perma.cc/PU77-9KDG. 

16 SUCCESSIONSORDNING [SUCCESSION ACT] (SFS 1810:0926), https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokumentlagar/dokument/svensk-forfattningssamling/successionsordning-18100926_sfs-1810-0926, archived at 

https://perma.cc/8EAE-JBV9; 1 kap. 3 § RF. 

17 Id. 1 kap. 1 §. 

18 Id. (all translations by author). 
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b. Public Access to Information 

Everyone has a right to request documents from public agencies.19 The public has the right of 

public access to all documents held by the government and government agencies, subject to 

secrecy law.20

c. Right to Inform Media 

The right to inform media (meddelarfriheten) is the right of public officials to leak information to 

the media.21 Under the Constitution individuals have the right to anonymously inform the 

media.22 This right may only be limited through law.23 The right to inform media is limited 

through the Public Access and Secrecy Act (Offentlighets- och Sekretesslagen, OSL).24 The 

government or a government agency may not investigate the identity of the person that informed 

the media,25 nor may the government or an agency take any measures against a person who has 

shared such information.26 The same applies to any organization that receives public funding or 

conducts public functions—i.e., private employees that work at privately run health clinics, 

homes for the elderly, etc.27 

2. Limits to Free Speech – Criminalization of Defamation, Insults, and Hate Speech 

Balancing constitutional freedoms, Sweden has specified limits on free speech in the TF that 

consist of crimes against persons and crimes against the state.28 They are nevertheless all called 

tryckrihetsbrott (crimes against the freedoms of the press) and are prosecuted by the Chancellor of 

Justice (Justitiekanslern, JK).29 These acts are also criminalized in the Penal Code.30

 

19 2 kap. 1 and 2 §§ TF. 

20 Id. 2 kap. 1 and 2 §§; OFFENTLIGHETS- OCH SEKRETESSLAGEN [OSL] [PUBLIC ACCESS AND SECRECY ACT] (SFS 

2009:400), https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-lagar/dokument/svensk-forfattningssamling/offent 

lighets--och-sekretesslag-2009400_sfs-2009-400, archived at https://perma.cc/AS25-22LH. 

21 1 kap. 7 § TF. 

22 Id. 1 kap. 7 § and 3 kap. 2 §. 

23 3 kap. 2 § TF. 

24 10 kap. 14 § OSL.

25 3 kap. 5 § TF. 

26 Id. 3 kap. 6 §. 

27 Id. 3 kap. 5 and 6 §§. 

28 5 kap. 1 § YGL (referring to 7 kap. 2-20 §§ TF). 

29 9 kap. 2 § TF. 

30 BROTTSBALKEN [BrB] [CRIMINAL CODE] (SFS 1962:700), https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-lagar/ 

dokument/svensk-forfattningssamling/brottsbalk-1962700_sfs-1962-700, archived at https://perma.cc/4FQEQ8WA. 
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a. Crimes Against Persons 

Sweden has criminalized printed (print or online), or broadcasted (over TV or radio) crimes 

against persons such as threats (hot),31 defamation (ärekränkning),32 and insults (förolämpning).33 In 

addition Sweden has criminalized “hate speech” when it can be considered “racial agitation” (hets 

mot folkgrupp), which is defined as ”a statement or other message that is spread/disseminated 

that threatens, or expresses condescension (missaktning) against, an ethnic group or another 

group of persons based on race, skin color, national or ethnic origin, faith, sexual orientation, 

gender, or gender identity or expression (könsöverskridande).”34 The publication of untrue 

statements in itself is not considered hate speech. 

The truth of an insult or defamatory statement is generally not a legitimate defense against such 

crimes under Swedish law.35 Thus, if a truthful statement (e.g., person X has been convicted of 

rape) is spread with the intent of causing that person harm, or harming his or her standing in 

society, it is still defamation.36 These crimes are punishable with a fine or imprisonment of up to 

six months for insults37 and two years for defamatory statements.38 These crimes can also be 

committed against a deceased person, provided that it is hurtful to his or her family, or because 

of the time that has elapsed since the person’s death.39 

b. Crimes against the State 

In addition to crimes against persons, Sweden has also criminalized crimes against the state, 

including spying.40 Information disseminated regarding the Swedish military is considered 

spying even if the information is false.41 Thus, publishing fake news about Swedish military 

operations, military holdings, etc. is a crime.42 Also, publishing certain documents that are 

deemed secret is criminalized, if publication risks the nation’s security.43 The accuracy of the 

information is not relevant. Any publication of such information, true or false, is a crime.44 Other 

 

31 Id. 7 kap. 1 §. 

32 Id. 7 kap. 2 §. 

33 7 kap. 3 § TF; 5 kap. 1 § BrB. 

34 7 kap. 6 § TF; 16 kap. 8 § BrB. 

35 5 kap. 1 § 2 st BrB. 

36 5 kap. 1 § BrB. 

37 Id. 5 kap. 3. 

38 Id. 5 kap. 1 -2 §§. 

39 Id. 5 kap. 4. 

40 7 kap. 14 § TF. 

41 Id. 

42 Id. 7 kap. 19 §. 

43 Id. 7 kap. 15 §. 

44 Id. 
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crimes include instigation of war (krigsanstiftan)45 and upheaval (uppror),46 crimes against a 

citizen’s freedoms (medborgerlig frihet),47 treason (högförräderi),48 and threats against servants of 

the state (hot mot tjänsteman).49 During times of war false rumors about the state are specifically 

criminalized.50 Thus, Swedish media corporations may not publish information that risks the 

security of the state. It is the publisher (ansvarig utgivare) that is responsible for any violation.51

In addition unlawful depictions of violence (olaga våldsskildring) are a crime.52 

3. Legislation on Media 

In addition to the freedoms and limits on the press found in the Constitution and the Criminal 

Code, all Swedish broadcast media are governed by the Radio and TV Act (Radio-och TV lag). 

That Act provides that broadcasters must adhere to the fundamental principles of a democratic 

society, all people’s equal value, and each individual human’s freedoms and dignity.53 The law 

also requires that if information has been incorrectly presented (i.e., is false) it must be corrected.54

4. Journalistic Rules of Conduct 

In addition to the rules above, journalists operating in Sweden are also bound by the professional 

ethical rules (Journalistiska Yrkesregler) published by the Swedish Union of Journalists (Svenska 

Journalist Förbundet, SJF).55 These rules do not include a specific duty of truthfulness, but do 

specify that a journalist should not falsify interviews or pictures.56 The rules currently in force 

were adopted in 2014;57 it is possible that future updates to these rules will address fake news. 

 

45 7 kap. 13 § TF. 

46 Id. 7 kap. 10 §. 

47 Id. 7 kap. 11 §. 

48 Id. 7 kap. 12 §. 

49 Id. 7 kap. 8 §. 

50 Id. 7 kap. 19 §. 

51 Id. 8 kap. 1 §. 

52 Id. 7 kap. 7 §. 

53 5 kap. 1 § RADIO- OCH TV-LAG. 

54 Id. 5 kap. 4 §. 

55 Yrkesregler, SJF (May 16, 2018), https://www.sjf.se/yrkesfragor/yrkesetik/spelregler-press-radio-ochtv/yrkesregler, archived at https://perma.cc/ZT5E-BYX8. 

56 Id. art. 9. 

57 Yrkesregler, SJF, supra note 55. 
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The Swedish Union of Journalists Member Congress meets about every four years. It last met in 

2018 and discussed the risk of letting creators of fake news become members as part of a 

discussion to open up membership to a wider network of writers.58

II. Enforcement of Legislation and Other Measures Undertaken to Fight Fake News 

A. Self-Regulation of Media Content 

In addition to constitutional limits in the form of offenses against the freedoms of the press and 

the freedoms of expression (tryckfrihetsbrott), the Swedish Media are constrained by several 

voluntary codes of conduct, including that of the Press Council (Pressens Opinionsnämnd, 

PON).59 These all include provisions on publishing unfounded statements, and could thus be 

used in combatting fake news. 

1. Press Ombudsman and Press Council

The Press Ombudsman (PO) (Allmänhetens pressombudsman) is responsible for investigating, 

at the request of an individual or on its own initiative, possible violations of “the use of good 

publishing practices,” which include accuracy of the information published.60 The PO refers cases 

to the PON when it finds that a violation has taken place.61 The PO review specifically includes 

social media content.62 

PON is responsible for determining what constitutes “the use of good publishing practices.”63

Examples of established violations relating to the truthfulness of an article include a recent 

decision against Aftonbladet for publishing what PON deemed to be allegations without a proper 

basis.64 In addition, the publication had failed to give the person mentioned by name a chance to 

comment or defend himself against the allegations when it emailed numerous questions shortly 

before the publishing deadline.65 Moreover, Aftonbladet was criticized for not publishing any 

 

58 Kongressen, SJF (Mar 27, 2018), https://www.sjf.se/omoss/kongressen, archived at https://perma.cc/XK9TYZ55; MOTIONER MED YTTRANDEN, JOURNALIST KONGRESSEN 2018, at 7, https://www.sjf.se/system/files/2018-

08/motioner_med_yttranden_journalistkongressen2018.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/U5WM-LKAK. 

59 E.g., Elin Hofverberg, Sweden: Swedish Media Criticized by Swedish Press Council for Publishing Names of #MeToo 

Accused Without Cause, GLOBAL LEGAL MONITOR (Oct. 4, 2018), http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/ 

article/sweden-swedish-media-criticized-by-swedish-press-council-for-publishing-names-of-metoo-accusedwithout-cause/, archived at https://perma.cc/N4FN-SWTH. 

60 1 § Instruktion for Allmänhetens Pressombudsman [Instruction for the Press Ombudsman], PO-PON, 

https://po.se/om-oss/instruktion-for-allmanhetens-pressombudsman-po/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2019), archived 

at https://perma.cc/S2C7-GZL4. 

61 Id. 

62 Id. 1 § c. 

63 1 § Stadgar för Pressens Opinionsnämnd [Bylaws for the Press Council], PO-PON, https://po.se/omoss/stadgar-for-pressens-opinionsnamnd-pon/, archived at https://perma.cc/4QGG-JB7E. 

64 Aftonbladet fälls för publicering om Stadsteaterns förre chef, PON (Mar. 11, 2019), https://po.se/fallningar/ 

aftonbladet-falls-for-publicering-om-stadsteaterns-forre-chef/, archived at https://perma.cc/KY5G-7W2C. 

65 Id. 
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comments from persons now working with the accused individual.66 Lastly, Aftonbladet was 

criticized for not validating the accuracy of the information it published.67 PON noted that ”[our 

conclusion] does not mean that the stories must be biased or false, only that the uncertainty 

surrounding them is considerable.”68 Specifically, PON cited a reference to an alleged forced 

abortion, which from the sources seems to have been described as “advised her to undergo an 

abortion.”69 In another case decided on February 19, 2019, PON found that publication of 

incorrect information regarding a person’s health was a violation of the ethical guidelines.70 

PON has previously explained that “[a] fundamental prerequisite for publishing must be that 

publishing is compatible with good publishing customs and that there is evidence to substantiate 

the information.”71 Thus, the publication of false information violates the ethical rules. However, 

the maximum fine to be paid by the publisher for such violations is only SEK 32,000 

(about US$3,500).72

2. Journalistic Professional Ethical Board 

The Journalistic Professional Ethical Board (Yrkesetiskanämnden)73 determines whether or not 

journalists should be criticized (klandrade) in relation to the Professional Code of Conduct (see 

above).74 Whether the Professional Ethical Board has received any requests for review in relation 

to recent fake news is unclear, as it has not published any decisions since May 2017.75

 

66 Id. 

67 Id. 

68 Id. 

69 Id. 

70 Expressen publicerade felaktiga uppgifter om filmskådespelares hälsa, PO-PON (Feb. 19, 2019), https://po.se/ 

fallningar/expressen-publicerade-felaktiga-uppgifter-om-filmskadespelares-halsa/, archived at

https://perma.cc/DDE8-PPJ2. 

71 Svenska Dagbladet klandras för publicering om NN [namn angivet], PO-PON (June 25, 2018), https://po.se/ 

fallningar/svenska-dagbladet-klandras-for-publicering-om-nn-namn-angivet/, archived at

https://perma.cc/VKR6-C8EA; see also Elin Hofverberg, Sweden: Swedish Media Criticized by Swedish Press 

Council for Publishing Names of #MeToo Accused Without Cause, GLOBAL LEGAL MONITOR (Oct. 4, 2018), 

http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/sweden-swedish-media-criticized-by-swedish-press-councilfor-publishing-names-of-metoo-accused-without-cause/, archived at https://perma.cc/Y3BQ-K6KM. 

72 Hur går det till?, PO-PON, https://po.se/hur-gar-det-till/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2019), archived at

https://perma.cc/7BCD-QYKE. 

73 Yrkesetiska nämnden, SJF (May 24, 2018), https://www.sjf.se/yrkesfragor/yrkesetik/yrkesetiska-namnden, 

archived at https://perma.cc/UXE8-L3FE. 

74 See above, Part I(C)(4). 

75 Beslut, SJF (Jan. 17, 2019), https://www.sjf.se/yrkesfragor/yrkesetik/yrkesetiska-namnden/beslut, archived 

at https://perma.cc/ATL6-28Z3. 
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3. Proposed New System of Self-Regulation 

In 2018, the Swedish media corporations proposed an alternative self-regulatory system, the 

Ethics Committee of the Media (Mediernas Etiska Nämnd), that would replace the PO and PON, 

but this system has yet to become a reality.76

B. Other Review 

The Swedish Broadcasting Commission (Granskningsnämnden) is part of the Swedish Press and 

Broadcasting Authority (Myndigheten för press, radio och tv). It is responsible for ensuring 

compliance with the TV and Radio Act.77 The Commission specifically investigates whether 

media corporations adhere to the principles of impartiality, factuality, and respect for privacy 

(private life).78 Only state media must conform to the provisions on impartiality.79 

In relation to fake news it is especially the provision on factuality that becomes relevant. News, 

as reported, must be factual, which means that it must be supported by sources. If the information 

turns out to be false the media provider must later rectify and clarify the information.80 For 

example, in a case regarding a radio program broadcast by the SR, the program did not mention 

that a person described as poor was the owner of a condominium (bostadsrätt), which meant that 

the information was so misleading that it violated the principle of factuality.81 In another example, 

on March 18, 2019, the Broadcasting Commission criticized the SVT in airing a program lacking 

in factuality on gangs in a suburb of Gothenburg.82 However, it did not find that the transgression 

was so great as to be deemed a violation.83 

In addition to providing fact-based written information, pictures used together with a program 

or news article must be factual and impartial. For example, the SVT used the party symbol and 

the picture of a representative for the populistic and anti-immigration party Swedish Democrats 

together with text stating that school principals wanted to ban Nazi parties from schools. That 

was deemed a violation of the rules on impartiality and factuality (saklighet).84 In 2013 the board 

 

76 Casten Almqvist et al., Medierna inför ett nytt etiskt system, EXPRESSEN (Apr. 3, 2018), https://www.express 

en.se/debatt/medierna-infor-ett-nytt-etiskt-system/, archived at https://perma.cc/DV6H-8ZZN. 

77 16 kap. 2 § RADIO & TV-LAGEN. 

78 Krav och regler för medierna, MPRT (Jan. 2, 2017), https://www.mprt.se/sv/att-sanda/krav-och-regler/, 

archived at https://perma.cc/45KJ-PRX8. 

79 Id. 

80 E.g., Tillämpning av regler, MPRT, https://www.mprt.se/sv/att-sanda/krav-och-regler/tillampling-avregler/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/JR37-Z2H8. 

81 Id. (scroll to ”Kluvet land – Ingen är vän med en fattig, P1”).

82 Granskningsnämnden för radio- och tv, Beslut 2019-03-18 Dnr: 18/02663, https://www.mprt.se/case 

decisions/229222.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/628Z-C7AR. 

83 Id. 

84 Id. 
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published a guide to its decisions on impartiality; considering that it is dated, it does not address 

recent controversies surrounding fake news.85 

C. Courts and Case Law 

As mentioned above, violations of freedoms of the press (tryckfrihetsbrott) are generally 

prosecuted by the Chancellor of Justice and sanctioned with a monetary fine or a prison 

sentence.86 For example, in 1989, the Swedish Supreme Court sentenced a person to fifty day fines 

on the basis that he (as the responsible program director) had published defamatory statements 

against two persons that lacked sufficient factual basis.87 The Chancellor of Justice will not 

prosecute cases unless there is a public interest in doing so. For instance, in an April 2019 decision 

the Chancellor of Justice found that sixteen acts of publication constituted defamation, but as 

fourteen of the online publications had been removed or amended she decided to not press 

charges.88 The Chancellor of Justice is not the prosecutor of all crimes related to freedoms of the 

press—for instance, crimes against the right to inform in cases where private corporations 

perform public functions such as providing education.89 

D. Comments by the Government and Other Government Agencies 

Although government representatives and government agencies have made several statements 

against fake news, no actual legislation has been presented to the Swedish Parliament. However, 

the Nordic countries have collectively joined forces to combat fake news, proposing coordination 

of their national security strategies.90 In addition, the Swedish Defense Minister Peter Hultqvist 

has, together with the then Danish Defense Minister, publicly aired his fear about fake news in 

an op-ed piece, stating that fake news generated by Russia is a danger to Swedish security.91 Also, 

 

85 GRANSKAT OCH KLART – TEMA OPARTISKHET/STÄLLNINGSTAGANDE, GRANSKNINGSNÄMNDENS PRAXISSAMLING

(2013), https://www.mprt.se/documents/publikationer/gok%20tema/granskatochklart-tema-opartiskhetstallningstagande-2013.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/5P23-SRCH. 

86 7 kap. TF; 5 kap. and 16 kap. BrB. See Part I(C)(2), above. 

87 Nytt Juridiskt Arkiv [NJA](Swedish Supreme Court Reporter) 1987 s. 285, summary available at

https://lagen.nu/dom/nja/1987s285, archived at https://perma.cc/A8NR-JJWW. 

88 Justitiekanslern lägger ned förundersökningen om yttrandefrihetsbrottet förtal [Chancellor of Justice drops 

investigation on violation of the press, defamation], Diarienr: 6677-18-3.2 /Apr. 1, 2019, https://www.jk.se/ 

beslut-och-yttranden/2019/04/6677-18-32/?Tryck-, archived at https://perma.cc/ 2W9B-7ADH. 

89 See determination by the Chancellor of Justice in Justitiekanslern är inte behörig åklagare vid brott mot lagen 

(2017:151) om meddelarskydd i vissa enskilda verksamheter [The Chancellor of Justice is Not the Appropriate 

Prosecutor for Crimes against the Law on Right to Inform in Certain Private Corporations] (Diarienr: 1137-18-

3.2 / Beslutsdatum: 13 feb 2018), https://www.jk.se/beslut-och-yttranden/2018/02/ 1137-18-32/?Tryck-, 

archived at https://perma.cc/F3RN-J2TE. 

90 Press Release, Nordic Council, Nordic Fightback against Fake News (Oct. 30, 2018), https://www.norden. 

org/en/news/nordic-fightback-against-fake-news, archived at https://perma.cc/W8YL-LABR. 

91 Peter Hultqvist & Claus Hjort Frederiksen, Op-ed., ”Ryska ’fake news’ – en fara för våra länder”, REGERINGEN

(Aug. 31, 2017), https://www.regeringen.se/debattartiklar/2017/08/ryska-fake-news---en-fara-for-varalander/, archived at https://perma.cc/R6RX-5TZK. 
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the Swedish Civil Contingency Agency (Myndigheten för samhällsberedskap, MSB) is focusing 

on fake news,92 following an instruction by the government.93 

E. Nongovernmental Responses to Fake News 

In addition to government measures to increase public awareness of fake news, private entities, 

especially media corporations, are also trying to educate the public about the prevalence of fake 

news. For instance, during the 2018 election the two largest Stockholm-based media corporations, 

which own Dagens Nyhtere (DN) and Svenska Dagbladet (SCT), respectively, collaborated with 

public service companies SVT and SR to review the accuracy of election coverage and 

statements.94 In addition, the publishers of the Swedish cartoon Bamse are aiming to teach 

Swedish children about the consequences of fake news through cartoon strips, showing how a 

false rumor about Bamse (the cartoon bear) losing his powers (super-strength) is disseminated as 

part of an online news story.95

III. Accuracy of and Access to Legal Material 

A. Online Access to Legal Materials 

Sweden provides free online access to laws, statutes, and certain court documents.96 As of April 

1, 2018, the online version of the Swedish gazette, Svensk författningssamling, is considered the 

official version.97 To guarantee its accuracy, the online law is provided with an electronic stamp.98

However, to be able to view the stamp the user must use a computer that has software for the 

 

92 Nationell handlingsplan for samhallets informations och cybersakerhet, MSB (Mar. 5, 2019), https://www.msb.se/ 

sv/Om-MSB/Nyheter-och-press/Nyheter/Nyheter-fran-MSB/Nationell-handlingsplan-for-samhalletsinformations--och-cybersakerhet/, archived at https://perma.cc/GZ7U-MMWC. 

93 Nationell strategi för samhällets informations- och cybersäkerhet [National Strategy for Society’s Information 

and Cybersecurity], Skr. 2016/17:213, https://www.regeringen.se/4a095b/contentassets/00a3e76fcee44f54 

af2399b82ee1307f/skr-201617-213-bilaga-uppdatering-om-genomforandet.pdf, archived at

https://perma.cc/3UAA-BQRY. 

94 FAKTISKT, https://faktiskt.se (last visited Mar. 19, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/XR8R-S6SM. 

95 S. Rep. No. 115-21 (2018), at 111, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/FinalRR.pdf (citing Lee 

Roden, Why This Swedish Comic Hero Is Going to Teach Kids about Fake News, THE LOCAL (Jan. 16, 2017), 

https://www.thelocal.se/20170116/why-this-swedish-comic-hero-is-going-to-teach-kids-about-fake-newsbamse, archived at https://perma.cc/M4DE-NEBY). Original Bamse cartoon on file with author. 

96 SVENSK FÖRFATTNINGSSAMLING, https://svenskforfattningssamling.se/, archived at https://perma.cc/B965-

YNS2; DOMSTOL.se, https://www.domstol.se, archived at https://perma.cc/4WA9-HS3H; LAGRUMMET, 

https://www.lagrummet.se, archived at https://perma.cc/D4UM-D2SR. 

97 5 § LAG OM KUNGÖRANDE AV LAGAR OCH ANDRA FÖRFATTNINGAR [ACT ON PROCLAMATION OF LAWS AND OTHER 

REGULATIONS] (SFS 1976:633), http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-lagar/dokument/svenskforfattningssamling/lag-1976633-om-kungorande-av-lagar-och-andra_sfs-1976-633, archived at

https://perma.cc/4FNJ-DKGY. 

98 Om Svensk författningssamling, SVENSK FÖRFATTNINGSSAMLING https://svenskforfattningssamling.se/omsvensk-forfattningssamling.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/5T54-HQYV. 
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validation of certificates.99 The “About” section of the Swedish gazette’s official website does not 

include information on how such software works, where a user may find the needed software, or 

how the user may use it.100 The stamp is thus not readily available to the layperson user. Online 

versions of laws are provided both on the gazette website and on the national Parliament 

(Riksdagen) website.101 Only the text on the gazette webpage is legally binding.102 

According to an explanatory text in the bill preceding the adoption of the law governing 

electronic publication of laws, by making its laws official in the online version, Sweden has made 

itself more susceptible to internet attacks.103 Threats that are connected to online access include 

the manipulation of content, disruptions to access, and the online preservation of previous laws. 

Other risks also include natural disasters, power outages, and any failure to immediately 

recognize these threats.104 Safety measures include making backup copies of stored information 

and the possibility of issuing emergency proclamations in other forms (including broadcasting 

them on television).105

In addition to officially publishing all its legislation online, Sweden is legally required to maintain 

a legal database online.106 Information that must be provided in the database includes 

the following:107 

 An index of all government commissions (statliga kommiteer) with information on government 

decisions, members, and work plans 

 Committee directives 

 Explanatory notes to government regulations 

 Government reports that are published in the Swedish Government Official Reports (Statens 

offentliga utredningar, SOU) and the Department Series (Departementsserien, Ds) 

 Government bills (Regerings propositioner) 

 

99 Id. 

100 Id. 

101 RIKSDAGEN, http://www.riksdagen.se, archived athttps://perma.cc/MKF8-4L6Z; Dokument & lagar (4 950 

träffar), RIKSDAGEN, https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-lagar/?doktyp=sfs&dokstat=gällande+sfs (last 

visited Mar. 19, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/LKS4-B7CV. 

102 5 § LAG OM KUNGÖRANDE AV LAGAR OCH ANDRA FÖRFATTNINGAR. 

103 Proposition [Prop.] 2015/16:157 Elektroniskt kungörande av författningar [Electronic Proclamation of 

Legislation], at 13, https://www.regeringen.se/496f5b/contentassets/cdb84f2bef484af58d845f2ac47a 

2408/151615700webb.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/RGY8-F4KX. 

104 Id. at 13-14. 

105 Id. at 14; 4 and 7 §§ LAG OM KUNGÖRANDE AV LAGAR OCH ANDRA FÖRFATTNINGAR. 

106 1 § Rättsinformationsförordning [Regulation on Legal Information] (SFS 1999:175), http://rkrattsbaser. 

gov.se/sfst?bet=1999:175, archived at https://perma.cc/F3Q2-6K2A. 

107 Id. 3-8 §§. 
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 Swedish case law and legal precedent 

 International agreements 

In addition, information from municipalities may be included in the legal database.108 

With regard to case law the courts may exercise their own discretion and judgment to determine 

which cases may be included in an online database; moreover, certain cases need only be made 

available in summaries (referat).109 However, all cases are subject to the access principle 

(offentlighetsprincipen), meaning that anyone has a right to access them.110

Court cases that are considered to include legal precedent are publicly available online at 

Lagrummet.se.111 In addition, many recent Supreme Court decisions, including leave for appeal 

decisions, are published on the Supreme Court’s website.112 However, the official version is still 

the version published in the Supreme Court Reporter, Nytt Juridiskt Arkiv. 

As required by law, the Parliament makes all of its information (legislative materials such as 

committee reports, government reports, bills, and voting records) available for free online.113 It is 

unclear what it does to ensure that the information displayed is not altered. 

B. Requirement that Legal Material Forming Basis of Violation Be Freely Available 

The Swedish Supreme Court in 2017 determined that referral in a law to a set of standards for 

lasers that were only available subject to a fee violated the principle of legality (legalitetsprincipen), 

and the provision could not constitute a basis for a violation, as a perpetrator could not be 

expected to know of the contents of the standard.114

 

108 Id. 9 §. 

109 6, 6a, and 7 §§. 

110 2 kap. 1 § TF. 

111 Vägledande avgöranden, DOMSTOL, http://www.domstol.se/Ladda-ner--bestall/Vagledande-avgoranden/

(last visited Feb. 26, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/2E33-5SKG. 

112 Högsta domstolens vägledande domar och beslut (prejudikat), HÖGSTADOMSTOLEN (Sept. 12, 2017), http://www. 

hogstadomstolen.se/Avgoranden/Vagledande-domar-och-beslut-prejudikat/, archived at https://perma.cc/ 

593U-GC7Y. 

113 5 § Rättsinformationsförordning; Dokument & lagar, RIKSDAGEN, http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokumentlagar/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/V6YC-EB87. 

114 Supreme Court Decision Ö 4833-16, Mar. 15, 2017, HÖGSTA DOMSTOLEN, http://www.hogstadomstolen.se/ 

Domstolar/hogstadomstolen/Avgoranden/2017/2017-03-15 Ö 4833-16 Beslut.pdf (in Swedish), archived at

https://perma.cc/72KN-HQFF; see also Elin Hofverberg, Sweden: Court Rules Legislation Must Be Made Available 

Free of Charge, GLOBAL LEGAL MONITOR (Mar. 29, 2017), http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/ 

sweden-court-rules-legislation-must-be-made-available-free-of-charge/, archived at https://perma.cc/LKC4-

4J66. 
The Law Library of Congress 100 

United Kingdom 

Clare Feikert-Ahalt 

Senior Foreign Law Specialist 

SUMMARY “Fake news” has been present in the UK for several centuries. It has recently become 

an issue that poses a potential national security threat, with foreign actors seeking to 

influence UK citizens. The UK does not currently have any legislation that regulates 

the validity of news posted by online platforms. Several government reports have been 

issued on this subject that have recommended the introduction of a duty on tech 

companies to remove content identified as harmful or face fines. The government is 

currently in the process of compiling a white paper that will set out a framework of how 

it will approach issues caused by fake news posted online.

I. Introduction 

“Fake news” is not a new phenomenon in the United Kingdom. In 1688, the Privy Council issued 

a proclamation that prohibited spreading false information.1 With modern technology facilitating 

the distribution of information to a wide audience, and traditional channels of information being 

discarded for digital and social media platforms, the problem of false information being spread 

has become far more problematic than in 1688.2

 

The government has noted that, 

[i]n the era of fake news and concerted propaganda by hostile states, supporting a free 

media also means countering the incoming tides of disinformation. While it has never been 

easier to publish and receive information, it has also never been easier to spread lies and 

conspiracy theories. Social media offers a malign opportunity to whip up hatred and incite 

violence against vulnerable minorities.3

Over time, the term “fake news” has developed a variety of meanings. To help provide clarity 

and consistency, the Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee recommended that the 

 

1 “By the King, a Proclamation to Restrain the Spreading of False News” (1685–1688), available at https://quod. 

lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A87488.0001.001/1:1?rgn=div1;view=fulltext, archived at https://perma.cc/T5YD78EG. 

2 HM GOVERNMENT, NATIONAL SECURITY CAPABILITY REVIEW (2018) at 34, available at https://assets.publishing. 

service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/705347/6.4391_CO_NationalSecurity-Review_web.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/7FVT-3PFL. 

3 Britain Champions Free Speech, so We’re Leading the War on Fake News: Article by Jeremy Hunt (Nov. 1, 2018), 

GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/britain-champions-free-speech-so-were-leading-thewar-on-fake-news-article-by-jeremy-hunt, archived at https://perma.cc/X7YW-MZNK. 
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government not use the term “fake news” and instead use, and define, the words 

“misinformation” and “disinformation.”4 The government has defined these terms as follows: 

 

[D]isinformation [i]s the deliberate creation and sharing of false and/or manipulated 

information that is intended to deceive and mislead audiences, either for the purposes of 

causing harm, or for political, personal or financial gain. ‘Misinformation’ refers to the 

inadvertent sharing of false information.5

II. Current Approach to Fake News 

While there is currently no legislation that prohibits the online publication of fake news, the 

government is taking the issue seriously and is carefully investigating the impact of such news 

and the possibility of introducing legislation: 

Traditional channels have been largely discarded in favour of digital and social media 

platforms. This is combined with a decline of trust in traditional sources of information 

and the era of so-called ‘fake news’. In parallel, the rules of the game have changed. The 

democratization of information, and the means to exploit it, has allowed hostile actors to 

exert disproportionate influence in competition with the public interest.6 

If ‘fake news’ is tolerated and becomes commonplace, there would be grave consequences 

for public attitudes, democratic processes and for the conduct of public life. The risks 

increase with the growth in the use of social media, but the associated problems would not 

be confined to such material. Without reassurance that the false and the genuine are being 

distinguished, there is a real risk of “contamination” across all sources – with public trust 

and confidence in public life declining further still, whatever the origin of the information 

or its channel of communication. As the problem gets worse, mere allegations will 

undermine the credibility of facts which actually are accurate.7

The government considers that misinformation and disinformation are “fourth generation 

espionage” and are taking action on multiple levels to help counter this threat.8 It notes that a 

“whole-of-society approach to defensive and offensive measures in the information space is 

necessary to ensure protection against physical and cognitive attack and subversion of society, 

 

4 THE DIGITAL, CULTURE, MEDIA AND SPORT COMMITTEE, DISINFORMATION AND ‘FAKE NEWS’: INTERIM REPORT, HC 

363 (2018) ¶ 14, available at https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmcumeds/363/ 

363.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/DF8J-4PDG. 

5 HOUSE OF COMMONS DIGITAL, CULTURE, MEDIA AND SPORT COMMITTEE, DISINFORMATION AND ‘FAKE NEWS’:

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE COMMITTEE’S FIFTH REPORT OF SESSION 2017–19, HC 1630 (2018), at 2, available at

https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmcumeds/1630/1630.pdf, archived at

https://perma.cc/E92S-4GGC. 

6 HM GOVERNMENT, supra note 2, at 34. 

7 COMMITTEE ON STANDARDS IN PUBLIC LIFE, FAKE NEWS AND THE NOLAN PRINCIPLES (Mar. 6, 2017), https://cspl. 

blog.gov.uk/2017/03/06/fake-news-and-the-nolan-principles/, archived at https://perma.cc/KQM7-JMFF. 

8 MI6 ‘C’ Speech on Fourth Generation Espionage, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Secret Intelligence 

Service, and Alex Younger (Dec. 3, 2018), https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/mi6-c-speech-onfourth-generation-espionage, archived at https://perma.cc/9GUH-C2VC. 
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for example, through legislation and execution.”9 In the wake of Russian disinformation after the 

poisoning of Sergei Skripal and others in England,10 when the government “judged the Russian 

state promulgated at least 38 false disinformation narratives around this criminal act,”11 the Prime 

Minister announced that the intelligence services would be responsible for identifying social 

media platforms that distribute misinformation and disinformation under the recently 

introduced Fusion Doctrine. This doctrine provides the 

Government must use the full suite of security, economic, diplomatic and influence 

capabilities to deliver our national security goals. This means strategic communications 

are to be considered with the same seriousness as financial or military options.12

The UK already has considerable experience in strategic communications. Until recently, these 

had been directed towards domestic campaigns, such as to promote road safety or help stop 

individuals from smoking. The UK also has experience countering online propaganda and it, 

along with other international partners, launched the Counter-Daesh Communications Cell in 

2015 with the aim of defeating Daesh (the so-called Islamic State). In 2017, the government noted 

that its activities resulted in a drop in propaganda output of 75%.13 Given the influx of 

misinformation and disinformation campaigns, in 2018 the government announced that it “will 

significantly expand the National Security Communications Team,”14 and this is discussed 

further below. 

III. Legislation to Protect Objectivity of the News and Ensure Accuracy 

As noted above, the UK currently does not have legislation directly applying to news provided 

exclusively online. A number of government departments, including the Electoral Commission, 

the Office of Communications (Ofcom) and the Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, as 

well as an independent review, have been tasked with investigating the impact of fake news, and 

to provide recommendations on how to ensure that citizens have access to accurate, 

factual information. 

The UK does not have a regulatory body that oversees the various social media platforms and 

online written content as a whole. The closest regulatory body to address these types of issues is 

Ofcom, established under the Communications Act 2003 to enforce content standards across 

television and radio broadcasters, including rules that require accuracy and impartiality, and the 

 

9 MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, GLOBAL STRATEGIC TRENDS THE FUTURE STARTS TODAY 16 (6th ed. 2018), available at

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/77130

9/Global_Strategic_Trends_-_The_Future_Starts_Today.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/S8HV-7WK3. 

10 PM Statement on the Salisbury Investigation, Prime Minister’s Office, 10 Downing Street and The Rt Hon 

Theresa May MP (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-statement-on-the-salisburyinvestigation-5-september-2018, archived at https://perma.cc/6N7G-ADKC. 

11 HOUSE OF COMMONS DIGITAL, CULTURE, MEDIA AND SPORT COMMITTEE, supra note 5, at 16. 

12 Alex Aiken, “Disinformation Is a Continuing Threat to Our Values and Our Democracy, GOVERNMENT 

COMMUNICATION SERVICE BLOG (June 12, 2018), https://gcs.civilservice.gov.uk/disinformation, archived at 

https://perma.cc/CJ8H-JKXB. 

13 HM GOVERNMENT, supra note 2, at 34. 

14 Id. 
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UK’s media and telecommunications companies.15 Ofcom has argued the regulation of television 

and radio broadcasting and lack of regulation of online content has led to “a ‘standards lottery’ 

that allows social media platforms to take advantage of lax regulation while traditional 

broadcasters have to follow tough rules on protecting audiences.”16 Ofcom has called for more 

regulation over social media, specifically Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter, particularly 

regulation that would require the platforms to quickly and effectively remove inappropriate 

content or be fined.17 Ofcom has further proposed that transparency should be increased across 

all platforms to enable audiences to understand why they are being targeted by certain material.18 

Both Ofcom and the Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee have proposed that “the 

Government uses the rules given to Ofcom under the Communications Act to set and enforce 

contents standards for television and radio broadcasters, including rules relating to accuracy and 

impartiality, as a basis for setting standards for online content.”19 

IV. Reports into the Regulation of Online Content 

A number of government reports have recently been issued that, among other issues, consider 

whether the UK should introduce laws to regulate the accuracy of news on online platforms. 

Summaries of two of the most recent reports relating to fake news are provided below. The 

government is currently working on a white paper, entitled Online Harms, which “will set out a 

new framework for ensuring disinformation is tackled effectively, while respecting freedom of 

expression and promoting innovation.”20 

A. Cairncross Review 

In 2018, the Prime Minister requested that Dame Frances Cairncross undertake an independent 

investigation into “the sustainability of the production and distribution of high quality journalism 

[considering that] significant changes to technology and consumer behaviour are posing 

problems for high-quality journalism, both in the UK and globally.”21 The final report was 

published in 2019 and determined, among other things, that “[i]nvestigative journalism and 

democracy reporting are the areas of journalism most worthy and most under threat [and] . . . 

 

15 Communications Act 2003, c. 21, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2003/21, archived at

https://perma.cc/5NAX-VJH7. 

16 Aliya Ram & Nic Fildes, Ofcom Outlines Case for Regulating Social Media Networks, FINANCIAL TIMES (London) 

(Sept. 18, 2018) (by subscription). 

17 Id. 

18 Id. 

19 OFCOM, ADDRESSING HARMFUL ONLINE CONTENT 2 (Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/ 

assets/pdf_file/0022/120991/Addressing-harmful-online-content.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/ZPN9-

BWK7. 

20 Home Office in the Media Blog: Monday 18 February (Feb. 18, 2019), https://homeofficemedia.blog.gov.uk/ 

2019/02/18/home-office-in-the-media-blog-monday-18-february/, archived at https://perma.cc/3BJ4-QK8S. 

21 Press Release, Cairncross Report Recommends Levelling of the Playing Field for UK Journalism, Department 

for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport and The Rt Hon Jeremy Wright MP (Feb. 12, 2019), https://www.gov.uk/ 

government/news/cairncross-report-recommends-levelling-of-the-playing-field-for-uk-journalism, archived at

https://perma.cc/WNK8-659G. 
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that, given the evidence of a market failure in the supply of public-interest news, public 

intervention may be the only remedy.”22 The Cairncross Review recommended that every online 

platform should have a quality obligation for any news on its platform and that the platform 

should be overseen by a regulator with investigative powers.23 The report made several other 

key recommendations, including the following: 

 Introducing “codes of conduct to rebalance the relationship between publishers and 

online platforms”24

 Placing online platforms under regulatory supervision 

 Creating a new, independent, Institute to help continue the future provision of publicinterest news 

 Launching a new Innovation Fund to improve the supply of public interest news 

 Introducing tax relief to encourage the payment for online news content 

 Developing a media literacy strategy25 

The report further recommended an Institute for Public Interest News be established to focus on 

ensuring a robust system of local and regional news.26

B. Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Fake News and Misinformation 

The Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee released their final report on fake news and 

misinformation in late February 2019. The committee’s chair, Damian Collins, stated, 

[w]e need a radical shift in the balance of power between the platforms and the people. 

The age of inadequate self regulation must come to an end. The rights of the citizen need 

to be established in statute, by requiring the tech companies to adhere to a code of conduct 

written into law by Parliament, and overseen by an independent regulator.27

The report recommended that laws be introduced to establish a legal duty of care for companies 

that host online content and to provide 

. . . for clear legal liabilities to be established for tech companies to act against harmful or 

illegal content on their sites, and calls for a compulsory Code of Ethics defining what 

constitutes harmful content. 

 

22 THE CAIRNCROSS REVIEW, A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE FOR JOURNALISM 7 (Feb. 2019), available at https://assets. 

publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/779882/021919_DC

MS_Cairncross_Review_.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/624J-37RW. 

23 Press Release, Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport and The Rt Hon Jeremy Wright MP, supra

note 21. 

24 THE CAIRNCROSS REVIEW, supra note 22, at 10. 

25 Id.; Press Release, supra note 21. 

26 Id. 

27 OFCOM, supra note 19, at 2. 
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An independent regulator should be responsible for monitoring tech companies, backed 

by statutory powers to launch legal action against companies in breach of the code. 

Companies failing obligations on harmful or illegal content would face hefty fines.28

The committee recommended that any new regulator be funded through a levy on tech 

companies operating in the UK.29 The committee further recommended that a new category be 

created for social media companies that would tighten the liabilities of tech companies that are 

“not necessarily either a ‘platform’ or a ‘publisher.’ This approach would see the tech companies 

assume legal liability for content identified as harmful after it has been posted by users.”30 Ofcom 

responded positively to this recommendation of placing responsibility on platforms for the 

content that they host.31

The report touched upon the issue of the influence of information provided on social media 

platforms on the electoral process, noting that electoral law has failed to take into account new 

technologies and the move to online micro-targeted campaigning, which has rendered the current 

laws “not fit for purpose.“32 The committee recommended updating current electoral legislation 

to take into account current technology and include provisions that are “explicit on the illegal 

influencing of the democratic process by foreign players.”33 The committee called for electoral 

law to cover all political campaigning, and the inclusion of a legal definition of what constitutes 

digital campaigning and online political advertising, as well as requiring clear banners on all 

political advertisements and videos that identify the source of advertising and the advertiser.34 

This echoes recommendations made by the Electoral Commission, which noted that, while 

electoral law covered the funding of online campaigning, the law should be updated to provide 

“more clarity over who is spending what, and where and how, and bigger sanctions for those 

who break the rules.”35 

 

 

28 Democracy Is at Risk From the Relentless Targeting of Citizens with Disinformation, HOUSE OF COMMONS, 

https://houseofcommons.shorthandstories.com/dcms-committee-disinformation-fake-news/index.html (last 

visited Feb. 25, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/LM8H-R2XV. 

29 HOUSE OF COMMONS DIGITAL, CULTURE, MEDIA AND SPORT COMMITTEE, DISINFORMATION AND ‘FAKE NEWS’:

FINAL REPORT, 2019, H.C. 1791, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmcumeds/ 

1791/1791.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/5H2X-G2WU. 

30 Id. ¶ 14. 

31 Id. ¶ 13. 

32 Id. ¶ 211. 

33 Id. ¶ 249. 

34 Democracy Is at Risk, supra note 28. 

35 ELECTORAL COMMISSION, DIGITAL CAMPAIGNING INCREASING TRANSPARENCY FOR VOTERS 1 (June 2018), 

https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0010/244594/Digital-campaigningimproving-transparency-for-voters.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/ED2T-WXL4
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V. National Approach to Countering Fake News 

The government has stated it faces three challenges when tackling the spread of fake news: 

 

 identifying misinformation and disinformation; 

 choosing how to respond to such information; and 

 ensuring that government information is available and “highly visible to the public”36 to 

reassure citizens of the facts, rather than work to rebut the false information.37 

Government strategy towards tackling “fake news” has two aspects: pre-emptive responses 

aimed to counter misinformation surrounding predictable events, such as elections, and 

responses that follow a predetermined plan for unforeseen events.38 

While the regulatory approach to countering misinformation is currently under consideration, 

and in the wake of a series of false stories posted online that were damaging to the Conservative 

Party and the government,39 the Cabinet Office established a Rapid Response Unit in April 2018 

to help the government meet its policy of “reclaiming a fact based public debate.”40 

The Rapid Response Unit operates from within the executive branch of the government and is 

comprised of “specialists including analyst-editors, data scientists, media and digital experts.”41 

The role of the Rapid Response Unit is to “monitor[] news and information being shared and 

engaged with online to identify emerging issues with speed, accuracy and with integrity.”42 The 

results of this monitoring “helps government understand the current media environment and 

assess the effectiveness of their public communications.”43 

 

36 GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATION SERVICE, 5 TRENDS IN LEADING-EDGE COMMUNICATIONS 7 (Oct. 2018), available 

at https://gcs.civilservice.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/5-Trends.pdf, archived at 

https://perma.cc/4BDP-JTRN. 

37 Id. at 7. 

38 Id. 

39 Francis Elliot, Whitehall’s Online Rapid Response Unit Will Block Fake News, THE TIMES (London) (Jan. 20, 2018), 

https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/whitehall-s-online-rapid-response-unit-will-block-fake-news-bjjkv8sqp, 

archived at https://perma.cc/CX64-EZX9. 

40 Alex Aiken Introduces the Rapid Response Unit, GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATION SERVICE (July 19, 2018), 

https://gcs.civilservice.gov.uk/news/alex-aiken-introduces-the-rapid-response-unit/, archived at 

https://perma.cc/837J-UF2U. 

41 Id. 

42 Id. 

43 GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATION SERVICE, supra note 36, at 9. 
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The Rapid Response Unit has developed a model with the acronym FACT to help it identify and 

respond to misleading online content: 

Find: Constantly monitor online news sources and publicly available social media posts to 

identify themes/discussions/stories that promote false and misleading information 

relating to HMG [Her Majesty’s Government]. This may be misinformation 

or disinformation. 

Assess: Assess the scale of engagement with the risk identified and establish whether it is 

appropriate to respond to the content. Flag to relevant press offices and advisors, with a 

recommended approach to response. This is almost never direct rebuttal. 

Create: Create appropriate content with the aim of rebalancing the narrative and 

promoting official HMG information. This may be a press office line, a social media post, 

or the creation of a new asset. 

Target: Target content to ensure HMG information is highly visible and accessible to 

the public.44

The government has emphasized that the Rapid Response Unit is not a rebuttal, or fake news 

unit.45 Instead, it focuses on checking trends in new sources and, where certain search terms 

indicate a bias in results, it works to optimize government pages to appear higher in search results 

or will activate social media content to help “rebalance the narrative and reassure those who were 

most engaged with the topic.”46 An example provided from the government demonstrates action 

the Rapid Response Unit took after it detected misinformation: 

[F]ollowing the Syria airstrikes, the unit identified that a number of false narratives from 

alternative news sources were gaining traction online. These “alt-news” sources are biased 

and rely on sensationalism rather than facts to pique readers’ interest. 

Due to the way that search engine algorithms work, when people searched for information 

on the strikes, these unreliable sources were appearing above official UK government 

information. In fact, no government information was appearing on the first 15 pages of 

Google results. We know that search is an excellent indicator of intention. It can reflect bias 

in information received from elsewhere. 

The unit therefore ensured those using search terms that indicated bias— such as ‘false 

flag’—were presented with factual information on the UK’s response. The RRU improved 

the ranking from below 200 to number 1 within a matter of hours. Information on UKAID’s 

work in the region was also immediately amplified amongst audiences demonstrating the 

highest levels of interest in humanitarian issues affecting displaced Syrians.47

The Rapid Response Unit works closely with the National Security Communications Team, 

particularly in times of crisis, to provide highly visible public information.48 Examples of this 

action include countering misinformation on the origin of the nerve agent used to poison former 

 

44 Id. at 7. 

45 Alex Aiken Introduces the Rapid Response Unit, supra note 40. 

46 Id. 

47 Id. 

48 GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATION SERVICE, supra note 366, at 9. 
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Russian operatives in England, and the implementation of targeted digital communications to 

audiences during military action in Syria.49

VI. Ensuring Accurate Legal Information is Publicly Available 

The UK has a robust system in place of publishing government information online. It provides 

its legislation free online via Legislation.gov.uk,50 and the courts and tribunals judiciary provide 

judgments online.51 Parliament also provides up-to-date copies of bills being debated before 

Parliament,52 along with the debates in Parliament53 and committee and other 

government reports.54 

VII. Conclusion 

The government is responding to the issues posed by fake news and is currently in the process of 

considering different approaches to regulating such information. Reports from committees and 

an independent reviewer has recommended that legislation be introduced to place liability on 

technology companies in the UK to remove content that contains misinformation or 

disinformation, or face considerable fines. The government will issue a white paper that will 

outline its approach on this subject in the fall of 2019. 

 

49 Id. 

50 Home, LEGISLATION.GOV.UK, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2019), archived at 

https://perma.cc/9CBH-TDQU. 

51 Judgments, COURTS AND TRIBUNALS JUDICIARY, https://www.judiciary.uk/judgments/ (last visited Mar. 11, 

2019), archived at https://perma.cc/8ZYV-38BM. 

52 Bills and Legislation, PARLIAMENT.UK, https://www.parliament.uk/business/bills-and-legislation/ (last 

visited Feb. 20, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/2J2E-8TD5. 

53 Welcome to Hansard, UK PARLIAMENT, https://hansard.parliament.uk/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2019), archived at 

https://perma.cc/FPX3-9U5B. 

54 Publications, GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications (last visited Feb. 20, 2019), archived at

https://perma.cc/BV6K-H3F2.