In the

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 21-3314 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.

TRAVIS GATES, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division. 

No. 20-cr-00284 — Sarah Evans Barker, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 30, 2022 — DECIDED OCTOBER 19, 2022 

____________________ 

Before WOOD, ST. EVE, and KIRSCH, Circuit Judges. 

ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Travis Gates embarked on a multiday spree of vandalism, threats, and violence directed at his 

ex-girlfriend, culminating in Gates firing several shots in her 

direction. He was arrested and pleaded guilty to being a felon 

in possession of a firearm. The district court calculated the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range as 18–24 months in prison 

but sentenced Gates to 48 months, an upward variance Gates 
2 No. 21-3314

challenges on appeal. Because Gates’s sentence was procedurally sound and substantively reasonable, we affirm.

I. Background

In September 2020, soon after Gates split up with his girlfriend, B.F., he began violently threatening her. On September 

22, B.F. discovered a broken car window near the house 

where she was staying. Three days later, someone tried to set 

the house on fire. On September 28, one of the house’s windows was broken; Gates was arrested nearby for disorderly 

conduct but released after a few hours. 

Shortly after midnight on September 29, Gates called B.F.

to say, “I posted bond, bitch. I’m on my way.” She looked outside and saw Gates across the street. He fired five shots in her 

direction, then fled. Police arrived and stationed themselves 

nearby, but they left to pursue a car they suspected contained 

Gates. He was not in the car, and when the officers returned 

to their posts, B.F. informed them that Gates had called again, 

saying he was on her front porch. After Gates called a third 

time to say he was coming to “bust you down,” a woman 

drove Gates past the house. He leaned out the passenger-side

window and shot at B.F. again. Police stopped the car and arrested Gates.

Gates was charged with, and pleaded guilty to, being a 

felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(g)(1). The presentence report (“PSR”) recounted Gates’s

extensive 25-year criminal history. Prior to the felon-in-possession charge, Gates had two juvenile adjudications, six misdemeanor and two felony convictions, three sets of pending 

charges, and seven other arrests. Additionally, in 2016, the 

mother of two of Gates’s children received a one-year order 
No. 21-3314 3 

of protection against Gates based on domestic violence allegations. September 2020 saw an uptick in Gates’s criminal activity. In the weeks before he shot at B.F., he was arrested for 

domestic violence and was charged with drunk driving. 

Despite Gates’s long criminal record, the Guidelines assigned him just one criminal history point, placing him in the 

lowest criminal history category. His offense level was 15, 

which incorporated a four-level increase for using a firearm 

in connection with a felony offense. The advisory Guidelines 

range was 18–24 months in prison. The government sought an 

upward variance to 60 months. Gates requested a withinGuidelines sentence, arguing that the Guidelines adequately 

took his criminal history and the circumstances of the offense 

into account. Gates also emphasized the importance of his

children and his desire to return home to care for them. 

After adopting the PSR’s findings,1 the district court determined that an upward variance was appropriate. The court

found Gates’s mitigating arguments unconvincing, particularly his claims about the importance of his children. The 

court said the most important thing a father can do for his

children is to love their mother, but Gates was “not very good 

to their mother, at least the mother of two of them whom you 

were threatening.”2 The court cited several 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 

1 Gates did not object to the Guidelines-range calculation but raised 

one objection to the PSR’s factual findings: Gates said he “shot more toward the air,” not “directly at” B.F. The district court revised its finding to 

that Gates “fired in her direction.” Gates made no further objection.

2 The record is unclear on this point, but the court may have mistakenly believed B.F. was the mother of two of Gates’s children. Gates does 

not argue that the possible misidentification constitutes reversible error, 
4 No. 21-3314

sentencing factors to justify the upward variance. The court 

noted Gates’s history and characteristics under § 3553(a)(1), 

observing that it was a “miracle” Gates wound up in the lowest criminal history category given his extensive criminal history; the court also mentioned the order of protection. The 

court explained that the nature and circumstances of the offense, § 3553(a)(1), further supported an upward variance because Gates’s behavior represented a “pattern of escalating violence” and Gates acted “to terrorize” B.F. Last, the court referenced § 3553(a)(2)(A) and (C), explaining that an aboveGuidelines sentence was necessary “to protect the public” and 

“to provide a reminder that this kind of behavior and this 

course on which you’ve been journeying is unacceptable.” 

The court then sentenced Gates to 48 months in prison. Gates 

appealed. 

II. Discussion

We review a criminal sentence in two steps. We begin by 

reviewing the district court’s sentencing procedures de novo. 

United States v. Swank, 37 F.4th 1331, 1334 (7th Cir. 2022). The 

district court must “(1) correctly calculate the applicable 

guidelines range; (2) give meaningful consideration to the 

§ 3553(a) factors and any nonroutine sentencing arguments 

raised by the defense; and (3) state the factors on which the 

sentence is based.” Id. (quoting United States v. Greene, 970 

F.3d 831, 834 (7th Cir. 2020)). If the sentence is procedurally 

sound, we review its substantive reasonableness for abuse of 

discretion. United States v. Walsh, 47 F.4th 491, 496 (7th Cir. 

2022). We do not presume an above-Guidelines sentence is 

and our decision would not change if he did because the court did not rely 

on the victim’s identity when deciding Gates’s sentence.
No. 21-3314 5 

unreasonable, id., and we give deference to carefully explained variances, United States v. Dickerson, 42 F.4th 799, 806 

(7th Cir. 2022). 

Gates’s procedural arguments lack merit. First, he argues 

that the district court’s discussion of the 2016 order of protection shows that he was “sentenced, at least in significant part, 

on mere allegations and not facts found by any tribunal.” This 

argument fails because Gates did not contest any of the facts 

related to the order, nor did he challenge the underlying allegations. The district court was thus entitled to rely on the 

PSR’s findings about the order. Second, Gates argues that the 

district court was required to consider whether to impose an 

upward departure within the Guidelines framework before 

applying the § 3553(a) factors or, in the alternative, that we 

should adopt this requirement. But our precedent is clear: a

court “may ground its justification by reference to the section 

3553(a) factors alone and need not ‘frame its explanation in 

terms of a departure from the guidelines range.’” United States 

v. Gonzalez, 3 F.4th 963, 966 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting United 

States v. Vasquez-Abarca, 946 F.3d 990, 994 (7th Cir. 2020)). 

Gates fares no better challenging the substance of his sentence. In several different ways, Gates argues that the district

court abused its discretion by imposing an upward variance

based on conduct the Guidelines already took into account. 

This argument misses the point of the § 3553(a) factors, which 

permit a district court to “deviate from the guidelines, so long 

as it offers an adequate statement of its reasons.” Gonzalez, 3 

F.4th at 965 (citations omitted). That is precisely what the 

court did here, thoroughly explaining why the § 3553(a) factors supported an upward variance. It noted that the lowest 

criminal history category did not capture Gates’s history and 
6 No. 21-3314

characteristics under § 3553(a)(1), pointing to “the frequency 

with which you have violated the law ... in a serious fashion 

sometimes, and sometimes just an irritatingly frequent basis. 

You just never seem to get the message.” Also under 

§ 3553(a)(1), the court found that the nature and circumstances of the offense justified the upward variance. The court 

observed that “the last time you were incarcerated and you 

got out, you posted bond, you called and said ‘I’m coming.’ 

And you went with a firearm and you did the terrorizing 

acts.” The court characterized Gates’s conduct as “culminating, recurring, escalating violence .... That’s what worries me 

because those things are not folded into the guidelines.” It

added that there was a heightened need “to protect the public” and “to provide a reminder that this kind of behavior ... 

is unacceptable,” referring to § 3553(a)(2)(A) and (C). This explanation was more than adequate; thus, the court did not 

abuse its discretion by sentencing Gates to 48 months in 

prison.

III. Conclusion

The district court committed no procedural error and imposed a substantively reasonable sentence. Its judgment is 

therefore

AFFIRMED.