USMC

USMC

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Marine Corps

Planning Process

PCN 143 000068 00

MCWP 5-10

(Formerly MCWP 5-1)

U.S. Marine Corps
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Headquarters United States Marine Corps

Washington, D.C. 20350-3000

4 April 2018

CHANGE 1 to MCWP 5-10

Marine Corps Planning Process

1. This publication has been edited to ensure gender neutrality of all applicable and appropriate 

terms, except those terms governed by higher authority. No other content has been affected.

2. File this transmittal sheet in the front of this publication.

Reviewed and approved this date.

BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

ROBERT S. WALSH

Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps

Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration

Publication Control Numbers:

Publication: 143 000068 00

Change: 143 000068 01
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2 May 2016

ERRATUM

to

MCWP 5-1

MARINE CORPS PLANNING PROCESS

1. Change all instances of MCWP 5-1, Marine Corps Planning Process, to MCWP 5-10, Marine 

Corps Planning Process.

2. File this transmittal sheet in the front of this publication.

PCN 143 000068 80
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Headquarters United States Marine Corps

Washington, D.C. 20308-1775

24 August 2010

FOREWORD

Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 5-1, Marine Corps Planning Process,

was first published in January 2000. Since that time, the planning process has been used by

Marine Corps forces at all echelons of command to conduct a range of military operations.

The planning associated with these diverse operations has demonstrated the fundamental

soundness of the process. Practical application has also revealed that portions of the planning process and MCWP 5-1 require clarification or elaboration to enhance comprehension and utility. Among these, design has emerged as a term requiring further emphasis. 

A fundamental responsibility of command, design is present not only in planning, but

also throughout the planning-execution-assessment continuum. This publication emphasizes the importance of understanding the problem, the environment, the enemy, and the

purpose of an operation. This awareness is fundamental to the first step in planning—formerly named mission analysis—and has, accordingly, been renamed problem framing to

better convey its purpose and importance. Moreover, the publication includes a discussion of battlespace, centers of gravity, commander’s intent, and commander’s critical

information requirements as part of design, versus its former heading of commander’s

battlespace area evaluation. 

Marine Corps Planning Process also clarifies the distinction between intent and guidance. Intent describes the purpose of the action being directed and an idea of its end state.

The intent promotes subordinate initiative that is consistent with the higher commander’s

aims when the task assigned is no longer appropriate for the situation. Constructs, such as

“method,” are forms of guidance that may be transitory.

This publication supersedes, MCWP 5-1 w/chg 1, Marine Corps Planning Process, dated

5 Jan 2000.

MCWP 5-1 implements North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Standardization

Agreement (STANAG) 2014, NATO Formats for Orders and Designation of Timing,

Locations, and Boundaries.
Reviewed and approved this date.

BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS 

GEORGE J. FLYNN

Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps

Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration

Publication Control Number: 143 000068 00

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Imagery Intelligence __________________________________________________________________________________________ A-iii 

MARINE CORPS PLANNING PROCESS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 1. Planning Overview

Doctrinal Underpinnings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2

Introduction to Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3

Synopsis of the Marine Corps Planning Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4

Tenets of the Marine Corps Planning Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5

Chapter 2. Problem Framing

Design. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1

Staff Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-4

Present a Problem Framing Brief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-7

Commander’s Course of Action Guidance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-8

Issue the Warning Order. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-9

Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-9

Chapter 3. Course of Action Development

Develop Courses of Action. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2

Conduct a Course of Action Brief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4

Commander’s Wargaming Guidance and Evaluation Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4

Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-5

Chapter 4. Course of Action War Game

War Game Courses of Action. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-2

Refine Staff Estimates, Estimates of 

Supportability, and Support Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-2

Prepare Course of Action War Game Brief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-3

Commander’s Comparison and Decision Guidance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-3

Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-3

Chapter 5. Course of Action Comparison and Decision

Evaluate Courses of Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1

Compare Courses of Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1

Commander’s Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-2

Refine the Concept of Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-2

Update the Warning Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-2

Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-2
iv _________________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

Chapter 6. Orders Development

Prepare the Order or Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-1

Approve the Order or Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-2

Considerations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-2

Chapter 7. Transition

Transition Brief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-2

Transition Drills . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-2

Confirmation Brief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-2

Appendices

A Marine Corps Planning in Joint Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1

B Warfighting Functions and Lines of Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-1

C Organization for Planning. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-1

D Marine Corps Planning Process Diagrams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-1

E Marine Corps Planning Process Tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-1

F Wargaming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F-1

G Staff Estimates and Estimates of Supportability. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-1

H Rapid Response Planning Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . H-1

I Interagency Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .I-1

J Design: An Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . J-1

K Basic Operation Plans, Operation Orders, and Attachments . . . . . . . . . K-1

Glossary

References
CHAPTER 1

PLANNING OVERVIEW

Planning is the art and science of envisioning a desired future and laying out effective ways

of bringing it about.

—Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 5, Planning

The Marine Corps doctrinal philosophy of

maneuver warfare describes planning as an essential part of the broader field of command and control. The aim of command and control is to

enhance the commander’s ability to make sound

and timely decisions. Effective decisionmaking

requires both the situational understanding to recognize the essence of a given problem and the

creative ability to devise a practical solution.

Hence, an essential function of planning is to promote understanding of the problem—the difference between existing and desired conditions—

and to devise ways to solve it. Planning involves

elements of both art and science, combining analysis and calculation with intuition, inspiration,

and creativity. The Marine Corps employs several

planning processes: 

 Troopleading steps, used principally as an

introduction to planning by small unit leaders

without staffs, comprise six steps—BAMCIS

[begin planning, arrange for a reconnaissance,

make the reconnaissance, complete the plan,

issue the order, and supervise].

 For units with staffs, the Marine Corps planning process (MCPP), described in this publication, is most appropriate. It is also a six-step

process (see fig. 1-1), comprising problem

framing, course of action (COA) development,

COA wargaming, COA comparison and decision, orders development, and transition. The

Marine Corps often operates in a joint environment, where the MCPP is the vehicle

through which commanders and their staffs in

the operating forces provide input to the joint

planning process (see app. A).

 If time does not allow use of the full, six-step

MCPP, the commander and the planners may

use the rapid response planning process (R2P2),

Problem

Framing

Course of Action

Comparison and

Decision

Orders

Development

Transition Course of Action

Development

Course of Action

Wargaming

Figure 1-1. Overview of the Marine Corps Planning Process.
1-2 ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

which is a time-constrained version of the

MCPP. The R2P2 enables the Marine expeditionary unit (MEU) to plan and begin execution

of certain tasks within six hours and is highly

dependent on the use of standing operating procedures (SOPs).

Because planning must support the commander’s decisionmaking—especially in a time

competitive and evolving situation—the MCPP

codifies the central role of the commander in

planning. The process is applicable across the

range of military operations and at any echelon

of command. It can be as detailed or abbreviated

as time, staff resources, experience, and the situation permit or require. 

Doctrinal Underpinnings 

Planning should never be viewed as an isolated

activity or process; rather, as a part of the planning-execution-assessment continuum. Because

situations change continuously, decisions are

made in the face of relative uncertainty. While it

is natural to seek additional information to lessen

that uncertainty, it usually comes at the expense of

time. Success in such a fluid environment

demands that Marines think critically, examine

the nature of the problem as well as the purpose of

the operation, and learn and adapt during the

entire planning-execution-assessment continuum.

Environmental factors; enemy action; other stakeholders’ involvement; updated intelligence;

changing resources; revised guidance from higher

headquarters (HHQ); and input provided as a

result of operations and concurrent planning by

subordinate, adjacent, and supporting units all

contribute to making planning endeavors highly

complex and nonlinear. The problem will evolve

even while trying to solve it. 

While this publication presents the six steps of

the MCPP sequentially, planning seldom occurs

in a straightforward manner. For example, information gained during COA development or wargaming will often require planners to return to the

problem framing step of the planning process.

Knowledge of the planning hierarchy is essential

to the effective application of the MCPP. 

As described in MCDP 5, at the highest level of

the planning hierarchy is conceptual planning. It

establishes aims, objectives, and intentions and

involves developing broad concepts for action. In

general, conceptual planning is a process of creative synthesis supported by analysis. It generally

corresponds to the art of war. Developing tactical,

operational, or strategic concepts for the overall

conduct of military actions is conceptual planning. 

At the lowest level of the hierarchy is detailed

planning, which is concerned with translating the

broad concept into a complete and realistic plan.

Detailed planning generally corresponds to the

science of war and encompasses the specifics of

implementation. It generally is an analytical process of decomposing the concept into executable

tasks, although it likely involves some elements

of synthesis as well. Detailed planning works out

the scheduling, coordination, or technical issues

involved with moving, sustaining, administering,

and directing military forces. Examples of

detailed planning include load plans and air tasking orders. Unlike conceptual planning, detailed

planning does not involve the establishment of

objectives. Detailed planning works out actions to

accomplish objectives assigned.

Between the highest and lowest levels of the hierarchy is functional planning, which involves elements of both conceptual and detailed planning.

Functional planning is concerned with developing

supporting plans for discrete functional activities,

such as maneuver, fires, logistics, intelligence, and

force protection.

Normally, due to the importance of conceptual

planning, the commander directs the formulation

of plans at this level. While the commander is
Marine Corps Planning Process ______________________________________________________________________________ 1-3 

also engaged in both functional and detailed planning, the specific aspects of these are often left to

the staff.

Conceptual planning provides the basis for all

subsequent planning and should progress from

the general to the specific. For example, the overall intent and concept of operations (CONOPS)

lead to subordinate intents and CONOPS as well

as to supporting functional concepts; these intents

and concepts lead to the specifics of execution. 

The planning dynamic does not operate in only

one direction. Conceptual planning must be

responsive to functional constraints. For example,

the realities of deployment schedules (a functional concern) can dictate employment schemes

(a conceptual concern). Functional planning in

turn must be responsive to more detailed requirements of execution. In this way, the levels of

planning mutually influence one another. Conceptual, functional, and detailed planning are seldom conducted sequentially because the situation

and available information are continually evolving. While conceptual, functional, and detailed

planning are described in sequence, in practice

they are conducted in a more interactive manner

due to uncertainty and time. 

Introduction to Design

Design is the conception and articulation of a

framework for solving a problem. It is appropriate to problem solving at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. As commanders

conceptualize their operation, their periodic guidance is in the form of visualization, description,

and direction and guides the staff throughout

planning. Design provides a means to learn and

adapt and requires intellectually versatile leaders

with high-order thinking skills who actively

engage in continuous dialogue and collaboration

to enhance decisionmaking at all levels. 

The purpose of design is to achieve a greater

understanding of the environment and the nature

of the problem in order to identify an appropriate

conceptual solution. While not prescriptive or a

checklist, design is based on—

 Critical thinking.

 Conceptual planning.

 Visualization.

 Emergence of a hypothesis.

 Continuous activity.

Critical thinking is purposeful and reflective

judgment about what to believe or what to do in

response to observations, experience, verbal or

written expressions, or arguments. Critical thinking involves the high-order cognitive skills of

analysis, synthesis, and evaluation. Analysis

allows planners to see the parts and to recognize

and explain patterns and meanings. Synthesis

allows planners to predict and draw conclusions,

create new ideas, and discuss “what if” situations. Evaluation allows planners to critique

ideas, make recommendations, assess value, and

make choices. All three high-order thinking skills

are required in design.

Conceptual planning allows commanders, members of their staffs, and others to develop an

understanding of the environment and problem as

well as develop a broad approach to solve the

problem. As the conceptual element of the planning hierarchy, design shapes the functional and

detailed planning that follows. As the examples

on page 1-4 show, at the campaign level, design

may take the form of a campaign concept.

In both instances, the commander had a deep

appreciation for the wholeness of the problem,

including the adversary and environment. The

commander’s resulting visualization concisely

expressed how he/she intended to achieve success.

The same is true at the tactical level where design

may take the form of a commanders vision of

actions. See app. J for another example of design. 

Visualization is the commander’s “mental snapshot

in time” that represents his/her current understanding of the environment, the problem, or how
1-4 ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

he/she sees solving the problem. Human beings

constantly form and reform mental images as their

environments change or new information becomes

known. Early in the planning process the commander shares his/her mental image with the staff,

using his/her visualization to focus and guide their

efforts. As planning progresses, the commander

continues to update and provide a refined visualization through his/her guidance.

Understanding the environment and the nature of

the problem will eventually lead to the emergence

of a hypothesis on how the problem might be

solved. The commander may visualize the

hypothesis by describing how to move from an

existing set of conditions to a desired set of conditions. This visualization requires the commander to understand the current situation,

broadly define the future situation, and determine the necessary actions to bring about the

desired future state. It is expressed using operational terms of reference and concepts that shape

the language governing the conduct (planning,

execution, and assessment) of operations. It

addresses questions, such as—

 Will planning, execution, and assessment

activities use traditional constructs, such as

center of gravity (COG), decisive points, and

warfighting functions?

 Are other constructs, such as leverage points,

fault lines, lines of operations (LOOs), or critical variables, more appropriate to the situation?

(More information on warfighting functions

and LOOs can be found in app. B.)

Design is a continuous activity and must never be

viewed as an isolated event occurring only during

problem framing. It occurs throughout the planning-execution-assessment continuum. Design is a

way of organizing conceptual work within an

organization to assist commanders in understanding, visualizing, and describing the operational

environment and to develop approaches to solving problems. Because the environment is

dynamic, problems also evolve. As a result,

design must occur throughout planning, execution, and assessment. 

Synopsis of the 

Marine Corps Planning Process

A commander may begin planning on his/her own

initiative, based on indications and warnings, or in

response to specific guidance and direction from

HHQ. The planning process is designed to promote understanding among the commander, the

staff, and subordinate commanders regarding

During the Korean War, General MacArthur succinctly restated his campaign concept in

his Far East Message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Operation planned mid-September is

amphibious landing of a two-division corps in rear of enemy lines for purpose of enveloping and destroying enemy forces in conjunction with attack from south by Eighth Army.”

Guided by this design, his staff planned multiple COAs. This planning revealed that the

most strategically advantageous COA—an amphibious assault at Inchon—also involved

the greatest operational risks. General MacArthur accepted the risks of landing at Inchon

and subsequent staff actions focused on the functional and detailed planning necessary to

both flesh out the COA and minimize the attendant risks. The latter included using a discarded COA, a landing at Kunsan, as the basis for a deception effort. 

In 1864 and 1865, General Grant’s strategic concept called for coordinated military actions

in Virginia, Georgia, and Tennessee. These actions were complemented by a naval blockade and put overwhelming, simultaneous pressure on all the Confederate armies, thereby

removing their ability to shift resources to reinforce any one army.
Marine Corps Planning Process ______________________________________________________________________________ 1-5 

the nature of a given problem and the options for

solving it. The plans which result may be considered hypotheses that will be tested and refined as

a result of execution and assessment. The six

steps of the planning process are—

 Problem Framing. Problem framing enhances

understanding of the environment and the

nature of the problem. It identifies what the

command must accomplish, when and where it

must be done and, most importantly, why—the

purpose of the operation. The purpose is articulated in the mission statement (task and purpose). The purpose of the operation, which is

enduring, is restated and amplified as desired

in the commander’s intent. Since no amount of

subsequent planning can solve a problem

insufficiently understood, problem framing is

the most important step in planning. This

understanding allows the commander to visualize and describe how the operation may unfold,

which he/she articulates as the commander’s

concept—the overall picture of the operation.

The commander’s concept is also known as the

CONOPS, operational concept, or method. As

planning continues, the commander’s concept

becomes more detailed, providing additional

clarity and operational context. Design does

not end with problem framing, because the situation constantly evolves and requires the

commander to continually review and possibly

modify the design. 

 COA Development. The COA development

step produces options for accomplishing the

mission in accordance with commander’s

intent. It provides options for the commander;

refines the design; and promotes understanding of the environment, problem, and the

approach to solving the problem. 

 COA Wargaming. The COA war game examines and refines the option(s) in light of adversary capabilities and potential actions/reactions

as well as the characteristics peculiar to the

operating environment, such as weather, terrain,

culture, and non-Department of Defense (DOD)

entities or stakeholders. This detailed examination of the operational environment and possible

adversary reactions should forge a greater

understanding of the environment, the problem,

and possible solutions.

 COA Comparison and Decision. During

COA comparison and decision, the commander reviews the pros and cons of the

option(s) and decides how to accomplish the

mission, either by approving a COA as formulated or by assimilating what has been learned

into a new COA that may need to be further

developed and wargamed.

 Orders Development. The orders development step translates the commander’s decision

into oral/written/graphic direction sufficient to

guide implementation and initiative by subordinates.

 Transition. The transition step may involve a

wide range of briefs, drills, or rehearsals necessary to ensure a successful shift from planning

to execution. A number of factors can influence

how the transition step is conducted, such as

echelon of command, mission complexity, and,

most importantly, available time.

Tenets of the Marine

Corps Planning Process 

The tenets of the MCPP—top-down planning,

single-battle concept, and integrated planning—

derive from the doctrine of maneuver warfare.

These tenets guide the commander’s use of the

staff to plan and execute military operations. 

 Top-Down Planning. Planning is a fundamental responsibility of command. The commander

must not merely participate in planning, but

also drive the process. The commander’s personal involvement and guidance are keys to
1-6 ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

planning. The commander uses planning to

increase understanding of the environment and

the problem to support his/her decisionmaking. 

 Single-Battle Concept. Operations or events in

one part of the battlespace often have profound

and consequent effects on other areas and

events; therefore, a commander must always

view the battlespace as an indivisible entity.

Commanders prepare for a single battle effort

during planning primarily through their intent,

which provides the larger context for subordinate units so they can exercise judgment and

initiative when the unforeseen occurs while

remaining consistent with larger aims. 

 Integrated Planning. Integrated planning is

conducted to coordinate action toward a common purpose by all elements of the force. Integrated planning is facilitated by the assignment

of personnel with an appropriate level of knowledge of their respective organization or activity

to the operational planning team (OPT). The

key to integrated planning is to involve the right

personnel from the right organizations in the

planning process as early as possible to consider

all relevant factors, reduce omissions, and share

information as broadly as possible. (See app. C

for information on organization for planning.)

Planning is a complex process of interacting

activities with feedback loops. The six steps of

the MCPP aid in understanding and generally follow a sequence; however, it is important to

remember that planning is not a simple sequence

of steps. Any one step of the process may involve

multiple phases (see app. D for planning process

diagrams). Any step in the process may feed back

into a previous one. For example, conceptualizing

a COA generally follows establishing goals and

objectives, but it is difficult to establish meaningful goals and objectives without some idea of

how to accomplish them. Likewise, new information received during orders development may

reveal a weakness in the CONOPS, which would

require the development of new COAs or a

branch plan. 
CHAPTER 2

PROBLEM FRAMING

To comprehend and cope with our environment we develop mental patterns or concepts of

meaning . . . we cannot avoid this kind of activity if we intend to survive on our own terms.

—John R. Boyd, Destruction and Creation

First, we didn’t know ourselves. We thought we were going into another Korean War, but

this was a different country. Secondly, we didn’t understand our Vietnamese allies. We

never understood them, and that was another surprise. And we knew even less about North

Vietnam. Who was Ho Chi Minh? Nobody really knew. So, until we know the enemy and

know our allies and know ourselves, we’d better keep out of this dirty kind of business. It is

very dangerous.

—General Maxwell Taylor, Vietnam: A History 

Problem framing is the first step in the MCPP

(see fig. 2-1). It may begin informally in response

to indications and warnings or more formally

when an order or directive—including the HHQ 

mission and tasks to subordinate commands—is

received. The purpose of problem framing is to

gain an enhanced understanding of the environment and the nature of the problem. This greater

understanding allows a commander to visualize

the operation and describe his/her conceptual

approach, providing context for the examination

of what the command must accomplish, when

and where it must be done, and most importantly, why—the purpose of the operation. 

This higher level of understanding is especially

useful in debunking invalid assumptions, inaccurate stereotypes, and erroneous capability assessments. Since no amount of subsequent planning

can solve a problem insufficiently understood,

framing the problem is critical. To achieve this

understanding, problem framing requires both the

judgment of synthesis and the systematic study of

analysis. Accordingly, problem framing consists

of a commander-driven design effort supported

by staff actions.

Design

The goal of design is to achieve understanding

gained largely through critical thinking and dialogue—the basic mechanism of design. The ability to address complex problems lies in the power

of organizational learning through design. Group

dialogue, when conducted within the proper command climate, can foster a collective level of

understanding not attainable by any individual

within the group.

Problem

Framing

Course of Action

Comparison and

Decision

Orders

Development

Transition Course of Action

Development

Course of Action

Wargaming

Figure 2-1. Problem Framing.
2-2 ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

To conceive and articulate a framework for solving a problem, commanders must understand the

environment and nature in which the problem

exists; the understanding of a problem points

directly to possible solutions. Design begins

during problem framing, but once underway it is

continuous—informing and being informed by

the results of the other planning steps, execution,

and assessment.

Commander’s Orientation

The commander’s orientation is the first of many

venues where the commander, the staff, and subordinate commanders collaborate through the

exchange of information and the sharing of ideas

and perspectives. Accordingly, the commander’s

orientation is the initial step in the design effort to

begin to frame the problem as a basis for developing possible solutions.

The specific content of the commander’s orientation will vary by the uniqueness and maturity

of the situation and the experience of the commander. For example, Operations Desert Shield

and Desert Storm did little to prepare I Marine

Expeditionary Force (MEF) for Joint Task

Force Los Angeles [LA riots] and Joint Task

Force Somalia [Operation Restore Hope], which

represented entirely different paradigms. Other

than terse planning directives to prepare for

possible operations, there was little initial information other than what could be gleaned from

media outlets. In contrast, multiple Operation

Iraqi Freedom (OIF)/Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) tours could enable commanders to

provide a wealth of information to initiate their

planning efforts.

Most importantly, the commander’s orientation

demonstrates the commander’s personal involvement in the planning process and allows him/her

to set the tone for a dialogue. Once the commander provides the orientation, the commander,

the staff, and others (as designated) participate in

subsequent discussions, or “design dialogue,” to

collectively gain an enhanced understanding of

the environment and the nature of the problem. 

Understanding the Environment

Understanding the environment is an important

aspect of design. The essential activities in

understanding the environment include critical

thinking and open discussion by all participants,

including the commander, to help expose a broad

range of ideas to be considered in the identification of the problem. Useful items to consider

include the following:

 Design results from HHQ, including intent,

orders, directives, estimate of the situation,

and commander’s guidance.

 Available intelligence products, including

intelligence preparation of the battlespace

(IPB).

Note: The IPB enables the commander to

gain an understanding of the adversary

within the context of the broader operational environment. The nature of the intelligence products required to support the

commander’s systemic examination of the

operational environment emphasizes the importance of this activity. 

 Information environment, which includes the

physical, informational, and cognitive

domains.

 Culture.

 Language.

 Demographics.

 Religion. 

 Geography.

 Local economics.

 Key actors. 

 Tendencies.

 Relationships.

 Potential.

 Security.

 Climate.

 Time.

Understanding the environment provides background information, facts, status, connections,

relevant actors, habitat, local beliefs, and a broad
Marine Corps Planning Process ______________________________________________________________________________ 2-3 

range of other factors that serve as context for the

commander and the staff to better understand the

problem. These factors also help the commander

gain an appreciation for the situation as it exists.

Coupled with any assigned or anticipated tasks,

participants engaged in design can determine a

desired future state. The difference between the

current and desired states enables the participants

to narrow their focus on the environment to determine the nature of the problem.

Understanding the Problem 

Armed with an appreciation of the environment,

the design effort shifts to understanding the problem. The essential activities in understanding the

problem continue to be critical thinking and an

open, frank dialogue to help reveal the underlying

nature of the problem. Understanding the problem points to possible solutions. Useful items to

consider include the following:

 Existing design results from HHQ in the form

of mission and intent, orders, directives, estimate of the situation, and commander’s guidance.

 Adversary.

 Friendly force update.

 Information environment.

 Terrain and weather.

 Troops and support available.

 Civil considerations (to include indigenous/

local population).

 Difference between existing and desired conditions.

 Limitations.

 Assumptions.

 Specified tasks.

 Initial staff estimates.

 Input from other commanders.

 Experience and judgment.

 Range of potential actions.

 Tempo.

With the larger environment as context, additional elements of the problem may emerge that

require resolution during subsequent planning.

For example, planners not only identify relevant

actors, but also begin to understand their relationships, tensions, and trends. All of these dynamics

suggest ways to interact not only with adversaries, but also with the population and other elements within the battlespace. In this manner,

commanders use their understanding of the problem to formulate their intent and guidance.

Commander’s Initial Intent and Guidance 

Having engaged in a design dialogue with the

planners and staff in order to gain insight into the

problem, the commander provides his/her initial

intent and guidance in order to direct continued

actions in the planning process.

Commander’s intent is the commander’s personal expression of the purpose of the operation.

It must be clear, concise, and easily understood. It

may also include end state or conditions, that,

when satisfied, accomplish the purpose. Commander’s intent helps subordinates understand the

larger context of their actions and guides them in

the absence of orders. It allows subordinates to

exercise judgment and initiative—when the task

assigned is no longer appropriate given the current situation—in a way that is consistent with the

higher commander’s aims. This freedom of

action, within the framework of the commander’s

intent, creates tempo during planning and execution. Higher and subordinate commanders’ intents

must align. The purpose of the operation derives

from the “in order to...” portion of the mission

statement or the execution paragraph of the higher

commander’s operation plan (OPLAN) or operation order (OPORD).

As with visualization, the commander may develop

his/her intent early in the planning process, but 

will review and revise it as required. As the commander proceeds through the planning process, he/

she gains additional levels of understanding about

the environment, which allows him/her to formulate and refine his/her intent and vision of actions.

The commander’s initial guidance can be as

detailed or as broad as the commander desires.
2-4 ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

The initial guidance should address the understanding of the environment and the nature of the

problem. This is the kind of information you

would expect to read in Paragraph 1 (Situation)

of a five-paragraph order. This guidance may

also include the commander’s thoughts on

friendly and enemy COGs as well as information

requirements.

There is no prescriptive format for the commander’s initial guidance. In some instances, the

commander may quickly understand the environment, the problem, and how the problem may be

solved. In other instances, the commander may

need the staff to provide additional information

and will not be ready to describe how the

problem will be solved until later in the problem

framing step.

Staff Actions

Design does not occur in isolation; much of the

information available to the commander comes

from staff actions, primarily in the form of analysis. Accordingly, staff actions should be viewed

as concurrent and complementary—versus

sequential—activities. For example, understanding the nature of the problem, to include the purpose of the operation, provides the context to

drive task analysis. Conversely, the learning

gained through task analysis deepens the understanding of the problem and contributes to design.

These complementary activities are of little value

unless they interact. The planning process provides

venues for interactions between the commander

and the staff, the OPT, and/or subordinate units.

When the staff or OPT briefs the commander, they

are providing, in part, the results of their actions.

When the commander provides guidance, his/her

direction represents a synthesis of the staff’s input,

along with other sources of information, which

manifest in the form of a decision about how to

proceed. All of the following actions enhance

understanding and increase planning effectiveness.

Analyze Tasks 

Commands normally receive tasks that planners

analyze as a basis for determining the unit’s mission. The principal source for tasks is the HHQ

plan or order, but there may be other sources,

such as verbal guidance, from which to derive

tasks. Additionally, as the problem and purpose

are understood as a result of the design effort, the

command develops implied tasks based on this

understanding. Using the commander’s initial

intent and guidance and HHQ orders, the staff

identifies specified and implied tasks; of these,

tasks that define mission success and may be

applicable to the force as a whole become essential tasks:

 Specified tasks derive primarily from the execution paragraphs of the HHQ OPORD, but

they may be found elsewhere, such as in the

mission statement, coordinating instructions,

or annexes. Any specified task that pertains to

any element of the unit should be identified

and recorded. 

 Implied tasks are not specifically stated in the

HHQ order, but they are necessary to accomplish specified tasks. Implied tasks emerge

from analysis of the HHQ order, the impending threat, and the understanding of the problem.

Routine, inherent, enduring, or SOP activities

are not implied tasks. 

 Essential tasks are specified or implied tasks

that define mission success and apply to the

force as a whole. If a task must be successfully

completed for the commander to accomplish

his/her purpose, it is an essential task. Planners

develop the mission statement from the essential tasks. 

Analyze Centers of Gravity 

The staff conducts a COG analysis based on the

understanding gained through design and task

analysis to identify or refine adversary and

friendly COGs and to determine which friendly

and adversary weaknesses may become critical

vulnerabilities. A critical vulnerability is some
Marine Corps Planning Process ______________________________________________________________________________ 2-5 

aspect of the COG that is, or can be made, vulnerable to attack. Critical vulnerabilities provide

aiming points for the application of friendly

strengths against adversary weaknesses. Conversely, planners identify friendly critical vulnerabilities to protect against the application of

adversary strengths against friendly weaknesses.

The staff identifies and directs the force’s strengths

against enemy critical vulnerabilities in order to

hamper the enemy’s ability to defend, attack, sustain, or command forces. Critical vulnerabilities,

once identified, assist the commander in choosing

where, when, and what will constitute decisive

action. The staff also identifies friendly COGs and

critical vulnerabilities in order to leverage strengths

while protecting weaknesses.

This COG analysis is a means to focus the commander and staff on what is most important

among all the variables and factors that can influence the conduct of operations. Determining

COGs is an art. At a minimum, commands should

think in terms of strengths and weaknesses. 

Relative combat power assessment provides planners with an understanding of friendly and adversary force strengths and weaknesses relative to

each other. While force ratios may be important,

the numerical comparison of personnel and major

end items is just one factor to balance with other

factors, such as leadership, morale, equipment

maintenance, training levels, weather, demographics, and cultural environment.

Develop Assumptions 

Assumptions are suppositions about the current

situation or about future events assumed to be

true in the absence of facts in order to continue

planning and allow the commander to make a

decision concerning a COA. They apply to both

friendly and adversary situations as well as the

environment. A valid assumption should answer

all of the following questions: 

 Is it logical? 

 Is it realistic? 

 Is it essential for planning to continue? 

 Does it avoid assuming away an adversary

capability?

As planning continues, additional assumptions

may be needed and previous assumptions may be

deleted. A record is kept of assumptions in order

to track and validate them as they are confirmed

or disapproved. Assumptions are contained in

OPLANs, but are not included in OPORDs. If the

OPLAN contains assumptions that are not validated before execution, the assumptions become

part of the inherent risks of the operation.

If possible, assumptions are forwarded to HHQ

for validation. This ensures the HHQ commander understands the potential risks that a subordinate command is accepting. It may prompt

the HHQ to pursue facts that support the assumption or to request additional information.

Determine Limitations

Restraints (what cannot be done) and constraints

(the options to which one is limited) that do not

qualify as specified tasks need to be identified

and carried forward into COA development and

subsequent planning as they can affect the conduct of operations. 

Develop the Mission Statement

The purpose of the operation and the essential

tasks are the foundation for the mission. A properly constructed mission statement answers the

following questions: 

 Who (the forces that will conduct the operation)?

 What (the type of operation)? 

 When (the time or event that determines when

an operation will start and end)? 

 Where (the location of the area of operations)?

 Why (the purpose/intent of the operation)?

The essential tasks determine who, what, when,

and where. The purpose of the operation determines the why.
2-6 ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

The commander approves the proposed mission

statement or modifies or develops a new mission

statement as a prelude to COA development. The

approved mission statement becomes a key part

of an OPLAN or OPORD. The mission statement also connects friendly forces with the other

elements of the operational environment, such as

adversaries, local population, the infrastructure,

and other friendly forces and non-DOD entities. 

Perform Ongoing Activities

Staff actions include a number of ongoing activities that begin during problem framing and continue through the other steps of the planning

effort. Conducting staff estimates, for example,

involve functional and detailed planning conducted at the same time as, and in support of, the

overall planning effort. Other examples include

the continued refinement of IPB products to

keep pace with the changing situation; subordinate units providing detailed planning data, such

as resupply requirements or sortie generation

rates; and the maintenance of feedback loops that

address information gaps, the validation of

assumptions, or the introduction of new information that can change the understanding of the situation. Examples of ongoing activities include—

 IPB Product Refinement. The staff reviews

and refines IPB products, to include enemy

COAs, to support COG analysis. The IPB

products must mature as planning progresses.

For example, as the OPT works through problem framing, COA development, and COA war

game, it may conduct pattern analysis of

enemy actions—as well as the activities of

local inhabitants—to better understand the

operational environment. This pattern analysis

feeds the development of various templates.

Eventually, these contribute to a decision support template complete with named areas of

interest (NAIs), target areas of interest (TAIs),

and decision points.

 Red Cell Activities. The purpose of a red cell

is to assist the commander in assessing COAs

against a thinking enemy. Depending on the

size of the organization, a red cell can range in

size from an intelligence officer to a task-organized group of subject matter experts (SMEs).

While a red cell’s principal duties center on

COA development and the COA war game, it

participates in the analysis of COGs and also

supports the commander’s understanding of

the problem during the initial stages of design.

 Green Cell Activities. The purpose of a green

cell is to consider the population in order to

promote a better understanding of the environment and the problem. At a minimum, the

green cell provides for the independent will of

the population. The green cell may also provide considerations for non-DOD entities, such

as intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) or

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

Green cell membership can range from an individual to a task-organized group of SMEs that

may include liaisons from the local populace

and non-DOD agencies. 

 Refinement of Staff Estimates and Estimates

of Supportability. The staff and subordinate

units gather and refine information in support of

staff estimates or estimates of supportability.

These estimates provide a timely examination

of factors that support decisionmaking and can

affect mission accomplishment. Depending on

the level of command and the time available,

the estimates could be a formal, detailed written

document or an informal verbal briefing. 

 Battlespace Refinement. Battlespace includes

the area of interest, area of influence, and operational areas. Operational areas for Marine airground task forces (MAGTFs) are usually an

area of operations. The staff may recommend

battlespace refinements based on the analysis

of the terrain and tasks as well as friendly and

adversary COGs, capabilities, and limitations.

The size of the area of interest may change

based on the commander’s understanding of

the situation. The extent of the area of influence may change if forces are added or deleted,

equipment capability and availability change,
Marine Corps Planning Process ______________________________________________________________________________ 2-7 

or rules of engagement change. The commander’s area of operations may need to

change based on the scope of the mission, the

results of operations, operational reach, or to

ensure sufficient battlespace to maneuver and

protect the force.

 Resource Shortfalls Identification. Based on

the tasks and available resources, the commander and staff identify critical resource

shortfalls in order to determine additional support requirements. Shortfalls can include a

need for SMEs. 

 Commander’s Critical Information Requirement Review/Update. Only the commander

decides what information is critical, but the

staff may propose commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs) to the commander. The CCIRs are continually reviewed

and updated or deleted as required and are

divided into two subcategories—friendly force

information requirements and priority intelligence requirements. Initially, CCIRs may identify intelligence or information requirements to

assist with the planning and decision-making

process. When answered, CCIRs may often

serve to inform the ongoing design and provide

information proving or disproving the hypothesis. As the planning moves forward and execution is imminent, the CCIRs will reflect key

information/intelligence requirements tied to

decision points needed for execution. 

 Requests for Information. Planners identify

requirements for information necessary to

remove assumptions, support future plans, or

conduct current operations. Based on the initial IPB and information requirements (including CCIRs), the commander and staff identify

gaps in information and intelligence. Planners

forward requests for information (RFIs) to the

appropriate staff section or to HHQ for

answers. Over time, the number of RFIs can

make the tracking effort very difficult. A software-based RFI management tool and an individual tasked to track RFI submission and

response can help accomplish this task.

Present a Problem Framing Brief

The staff presents a problem framing brief to the

commander to review the completed products and

to ensure a shared understanding within the staff.

When approved by the commander, these products inform COA development. The brief may

include the following: 

 Situation update (battlespace organization, status of friendly forces, stakeholders and existing

command relations, area of operations, area of

interest, area of influence). 

 Intelligence estimate and IPB products (terrain

analysis, weather analysis, human environment estimate/cultural analysis, adversary integration [possible COAs]). 

 HHQ missions. 

 HHQ commanders’ intents (two levels up). 

 A review of the commander’s initial intent and

guidance. 

 Task analysis (specified, implied, and essential tasks).

 Assumptions. 

 Limitations—restraints/constraints. 

 Resource shortfalls. 

 COG analyses (friendly, enemy). 

 RFIs. 

 Recommended CCIRs. 

 Proposed mission statement (approved by the

commander). 

 Other updated products from ongoing activities.

Both the brief and the work generating the products can influence the commander’s understanding of the environment and the problem itself.

Accordingly, the commander may use this opportunity to refine his/her initial intent and guidance

or modify the mission statement.

The commander may conclude the brief by

approving the mission statement and providing

his/her COA development guidance. The commander may also want to further consider the
2-8 ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

problem framing products, as well as any additional information that emerged during the brief,

before approving the products or providing additional guidance. 

Commander’s Course of Action Guidance

The commander should articulate his/her commander’s concept, a clear and concise expression

of what is intended to be accomplished and how

it will be done using available resources. As planning continues, this concept enables the planners

to develop and refine COAs. This visualization

reflects the commander’s understanding of the

situation and his/her hypothesis for achieving the

overall purpose. Based on a variety of considerations, such as available time or understanding of

the problem and its complexity, the commander’s guidance may be narrow and directive

or it may be broad and inquisitive. The former

may include development of a single COA, while

the latter may direct exploration of several COAs.

Specific guidance can be in terms of warfighting

functions, line of or types of operations, or forms

of maneuver, but should include the commander’s vision of decisive, shaping, and sustaining actions (which assists the staff in determining

the main effort); parts of the operation; location

of critical events; and other aspects the commander deems pertinent to COA development:

 Decisive Actions. The purpose of any military

operation is mission success. Decisive actions

are those the commander deems fundamental

to achieving mission success. They cause a

favorable change in the situation or cause the

adversary to change or cease planned/current

activities. For an action to be decisive, it must

lead directly to a larger success. Decisive

actions create an environment in which the

adversary has lost either the means or the will

to resist. In counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, this situation usually occurs when the

majority of the population supports the legitimate government. The unit envisioned to be

conducting the decisive action is normally

identified as the main effort. 

 Shaping Actions. Shaping sets conditions for

decisive actions. Shaping actions are interactions with selected elements within the battlespace to influence an enemy’s capabilities

or force, or the enemy commander’s decisionmaking process. The commander shapes the

battlespace by protecting friendly critical vulnerabilities and attacking enemy critical vulnerabilities. Shaping can incorporate a wide

array of functions and capabilities and is more

than just fires and targeting. It may include

direct attack, information operations, engineer

activities, and civil-military operations. Shaping makes the enemy vulnerable to attack,

impedes or diverts their attempts to maneuver, aids friendly maneuver, and influences the

decisionmaking of key actors to achieve information superiority. Shaping dictates the time

and place for decisive actions. It forces the

enemy to adopt COAs favorable to the commander’s plans. The commander attempts to

shape events in a way that allows several

options for achieving the decisive action.

 Sustaining Actions. Sustaining actions are

shaping actions directed at friendly forces.

Planning is a sustaining action. It prepares

friendly forces for military operations by

improving their understanding, which minimizes shock or surprise and promotes intuitive

decisionmaking to enhance tempo. Other

examples of sustaining actions include preventive medical services and logistic operations,

such as stockpiling critical ammunition, fuel,

and supplies to facilitate future operations.

Additionally, COA development guidance may

include—

 Adversary vulnerabilities. 

 Risk. 

 Any further restraints/constraints. 

 Selection and employment of the main effort. 

 Types of operations. 

 Forms of maneuver. 

 Communication strategy. 

 Command relationships. 

 Task organization. 
Marine Corps Planning Process ______________________________________________________________________________ 2-9 

 Arrangement of the operation (phasing). 

 Timing of the operation. 

 Reserve. 

 Evaluation of the battlespace. 

 Mobility and countermobility. 

 Minimum number of COAs to be developed.

Issue the Warning Order 

Upon completion of problem framing, the commander should direct the release of a warning

order (WARNORD), which allows subordinate

commands to begin concurrent planning as the

higher command begins COA development. The

WARNORD should contain all available information to facilitate concurrent planning. Consistency

with formats used for subsequent orders products

will help speed the information flow because subordinates will know where to look for critical

information. When operating with coalition and

partner nation forces, WARNORDs should reflect

language and cultural considerations.

Considerations

The human nature present in a problem leads to

complexity. No amount of critical thinking will

ensure complete understanding or 100 percent

accuracy. Accordingly, design does not end with

problem framing. The commander must continually return to his/her understanding of the problem; refine the guidance; and provide an update

or even a new vision/description of who, what,

when, where, and why as the planners and staff

work through the planning process.

The lists of considerations on the preceding pages

provide a broad framework for an open-ended

dialogue with no predetermined conclusion during the command’s efforts to gain an understanding of the environment and the problem. The

problem framing brief or any other planningrelated brief has an intrinsic value far beyond the

information presented. Whenever the commander and the staff and, when possible, subordinate commanders and their staffs share a common

venue where dialogue takes place, the amount of

learning is enhanced. Group dialogue, when conducted within the proper command climate, can

foster a collective level of understanding not

attainable by any individual within the group

regardless of experience or seniority. Short of

direct interaction with object systems, such as the

adversary or populations, group interactions

involving frank and candid input are the best way

to replicate the nonlinear nature of conflicts and

the parties involved.
2-10 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

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CHAPTER 3

COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT

Decisionmaking requires both the situational awareness to recognize the essence of a given

problem and the creative ability to devise a practical solution.

—MCDP 1, Warfighting

. . . make plans to fit circumstances, but do not try to create circumstances to fit plans.

—George S. Patton, Jr., Gen, War As I Knew It

Course of action development (see fig. 3-1) leads

to one or more options for how the mission and

commander’s intent might be accomplished in

accordance with the commander’s understanding

as a result of the design effort that began during

problem framing. Design helps to inform the

commander’s intent and guidance and provides

options for the commander while continuing to

refine the understanding of the environment and

problem. To be distinguishable, each COA must

employ different means or methods that address

the essential tasks and incorporate the commander’s intent and guidance. 

During COA development, planners use the products carried forward from problem framing to

generate options or COAs that satisfy the mission

in accordance with the commander’s intent and

guidance. Developed COAs should be—

 Suitable: Does the COA accomplish the purpose and tasks? Does it comply with the commander’s guidance?

 Feasible: Does the COA accomplish the mission within the available time, space, and

resources?

 Acceptable: Is the COA proportional and

worth the cost in personnel, equipment, materiel, time involved, or position? Is it consistent

with the law of war and is it militarily and

politically supportable?

 Distinguishable: Does the COA differ significantly from other COAs?

 Complete: Does the COA include all tasks to

be accomplished? Does it address the entire

mission (main and supporting efforts, reserve,

and associated risks)?

The staff develops COAs for follow-on wargaming and comparison. Accordingly, the commander may limit the number of COAs the staff

develops or direct a single COA if he/she is comfortable doing so based on his/her intuition and

experience or if operating under severe time constraints. Planning tools useful in COA development include—

 Design products, such as commander’s intent

and guidance.

 Updated IPB products.

 Task analysis (specified, implied, and essential).

Framing Framing

Course of Action

Comparison and

Decision

Orders

Development

Transition Course of Action

Development

Course of Action

Wargaming

Figure 3-1. Course of Action Development.
3-2 ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

 Restraints/constraints.

 Assumptions.

 Resource shortfalls.

 COG analysis (friendly and enemy).

 CCIRs.

 RFIs.

 Initial staff estimates and estimates of supportability.

Planners develop broad COAs considering a number of factors, including mission, enemy, terrain

and weather, troops and support available-time

available (METT-T); adversary versus friendly

capabilities assessment; civilian and cultural considerations; and possible employment options.

Planners consider two fundamental questions:

 What needs to be accomplished?

 How should it be done?

Answering the second question is the essence of

COA development. The following staff actions

assist COA development:

 Update IPB Products. The IPB enables planners to view the battlespace in terms of the

adversary and the environment. It helps planners determine how the adversary will react to

proposed friendly COAs, the purpose of

adversary actions, the most likely and most

dangerous adversary COAs, and the type of

friendly operations that the terrain and infrastructure will allow. It is critical that planners

continue to update and refine IPB to deepen

their understanding of the situation and to

answer the two fundamental questions posed

in COA development.

 Display Friendly Forces. The graphic display

of friendly forces in relation to the terrain

allows planners to see the current and projected

locations of friendly forces and can help reveal

possible options. 

 Refine COG Analysis. The COG analysis

began during problem framing. The commander and staff refine COG analysis based on

updated intelligence and IPB products, initial

staff estimates, and input from the red and

green cells. The refined COGs and critical vulnerabilities are used in the development of the

COAs. If COGs and critical vulnerabilities are

not known yet, the focus should be on both

friendly and adversary strengths and weaknesses.

 Continue Red and Green Cell Planning. In

problem framing, the red cell performed an

analysis from the adversary’s perspective

while the green cell provided insights regarding civilian considerations. There could be

multiple adversaries to consider as well as

varying civilian groups, such as tribes, families, ethnicities, and agencies. Red and green

cells should be prepared to “play” them all.

During COA development, the red cell continues to analyze and refine adversary COAs. The

red cell should have COAs completed in sufficient detail for wargaming by the completion

of COA development. The green cell continues

to develop consequent reactions by civilian

groups within the context of friendly and

adversary actions.

 Update Staff Estimates. Staff estimates assist

planners during COA development by providing essential information on areas of concern,

identifying requirements and capabilities,

determining shortfalls, and identifying potential solutions to those shortfalls.

Develop Courses of Action 

Guided primarily by the commander’s COA

development guidance, along with the aforementioned planning tools, planners begin developing

possible ways to accomplish the mission. This

development requires critical thinking skills and

unbiased, open-minded participants. The number

of COAs and level of detail depend on the commander’s guidance and the time available for

planning. Planners should not judge or eliminate

initial or “rough-cut” COAs; all possibilities are

recorded for consideration in order to provide the

commander with a variety of options. 
Marine Corps Planning Process ______________________________________________________________________________ 3-3 

There are numerous techniques for developing

COAs. Some Marines envision a sequence of

actions given goals and objectives; others consider key factors, such as METT-T, a useful starting point; and others consider ways to counter the

adversary’s most dangerous and most likely

COAs. Regardless of the specific COA development technique used, the following factors should

be considered:

 Establish Battlespace Framework. The framework allows the commander to relate his/her

forces to one another in time, space, and purpose.

 Array Forces. Friendly, adversary, and, when

relevant, populations should be arrayed in the

same venue while developing COAs.

 Assign Purpose and Then Tasks. Ensure

each task associated with envisioned actions

has a purpose to accomplish the mission. Begin

with the main effort and follow with the supporting effort(s) and reserve (if assigned).

 Task Organize. Proper task organization

ensures each unit is constructed, sized, and

resourced for success.

 Integrate. The OPT depicts the integration of

actions across time and space in the COA

graphic and narrative.

 Determine Control Measures. Control measures should expedite actions and ensure forces

have sufficient battlespace and flexibility to

accomplish their mission while protecting their

forces.

 Consider the Adversary. Consideration of the

adversary’s most dangerous/most likely COAs

must be addressed by every friendly COA.

The commander reviews the initial COAs to see

if they meet his/her intent. Normally an informal

review, it is referred to as a rough-cut COA brief,

is conducted as soon as possible once the initial

COAs are complete, and saves time by avoiding

refinements to COAs that will not be approved.

The review also helps the commander further

refine his/her understanding while seeing tangible

results of his/her intent. The commander may

direct modifications to the initial COAs or may

direct the development of additional COAs. 

Using the commander’s guidance and a review of

the initial COAs, the staff further develops,

expands, and refines the COAs to be taken forward into COA wargaming. A complete COA

normally consists of a COA graphic and narrative, task organization, synchronization matrix,

and supporting concepts. Additionally, the staff

may recommend to the commander how a COA

should be wargamed. This recommendation may

include the war game method and which adversary COA to use. 

Course of Action Graphic and Narrative

The COA graphic and narrative portray how the

organization will accomplish the mission.

Together, the graphic and narrative identify who

(notional task organization), when, what (tasks),

where, how, and why (intent). The COA graphic

and narrative are essential and inseparable.

Together, they help the commander, subordinate

commanders, and the staffs understand the

method by which the organization will accomplish its mission. During conventional operations, the graphic portrays the activities of the

main and supporting efforts and critical maneuver

control measures (such as objectives, boundaries,

and phase lines) and fire support coordination

measures. The narrative provides the purpose and

tasks of the main and supporting efforts, the

reserve, and the sequencing of the operation.

In other types of operations, such as stability

operations, the graphic may display civil-military

activities, locations of relief organizations and

dislocated civilians, demographic variations

(tribal, ethnic, religious patterns) of the population, key infrastructure, and culturally or historically significant areas. The COA graphic and

narrative, when approved by the commander,

form the basis for the CONOPS and operations

overlay in the basic plan or order. 

Task Organization

The task organization captures how the commander intends to structure the force’s resources

to accomplish the mission. It can also establish
3-4 ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

command and support relationships. Proper task

organization ensures each unit is properly constructed, sized, and equipped to support the commander’s CONOPS.

Synchronization Matrix

The synchronization matrix is a working document showing the activities of the command and

subordinate elements over time. It can display

how units and tasks interrelate, providing additional details that complement and amplify the

COA graphic and narrative. The synchronization

matrix should not be used as a “script” or “playbook” for execution, rather as a way to provide

structure for the war game.

Supporting Concepts

The staff prepares supporting functional concepts for each COA to ensure actions are integrated and coordinated. Once the commander

selects a COA, the supporting concepts provide

the basis for such concepts as intelligence, fires,

or logistics in the order or plan. 

Conduct a Course of Action Brief 

Planners brief each COA separately. Standardized briefing formats help keep the brief focused

and prevent omission of essential information.

The COA brief includes the COA graphic and

narrative. It may also include refined facts,

assumptions, or risks carried forward from problem framing, such as possible adversary COAs,

the response of the local population to each COA,

the rationale for each COA, and recommendations for wargaming. 

The COA brief may include initial running estimates from subordinate commands and the staff.

These estimates should identify significant

aspects of the situation which can influence the

COA. The key to running estimates is to identify “show stoppers” as early as possible in the

planning effort.

Commander’s Wargaming

Guidance and Evaluation Criteria

Following the COA development brief, the commander will select or modify the COAs and/or

suggest additional COAs for wargaming. The

commander also provides wargaming guidance

and evaluation criteria.

The commander’s wargaming guidance may

include a list of friendly COAs to be wargamed

against specific adversary COAs. For example,

COA 1 is wargamed against the adversary’s most

likely, most dangerous, or most advantageous

COA. It may also include a timeline for the phase

or stage of the operation and a list of critical

events, such as shifting the main effort. 

Before the staff can begin the COA war game,

the commander must choose the evaluation criteria that will be used to select the COA that will

become the CONOPS. The commander establishes evaluation criteria based on METT-T,

judgment, personal experience, and the overall

understanding of the situation. Commanders may

choose evaluation criteria related to the principles

of war, such as mass or surprise. These evaluation criteria help focus the wargaming effort and

provide the framework for data collection by the

staff. The commander will use the data collected

during the next planning step, COA comparison

and decision. Other criteria may include—

 Limitation on casualties.

 Exploitation of enemy weaknesses/friendly

strengths.

 Defeat of the adversary’s COG(s).

 Degree of asymmetrical operations.

 Information operations.

 Opportunity for maneuver.

 Concentration of combat power.

 Speed.

 Balance between mass and dispersion.

 Success despite terrain or weather restrictions.

 Risk.

 Phasing.

 Weighting the main effort.
Marine Corps Planning Process ______________________________________________________________________________ 3-5 

 Logistical supportability.

 Political considerations.

 Considerations within the information environment.

 Force protection.

 Time available and timing of the operation.

 Impact on local population/issues.

The commander should also provide guidance to a

green cell, if formed, relating the wargame to the

actions of and the effects upon the civilian population.

Considerations 

A COA must contain sufficient detail to facilitate COA wargaming. The war game, if done

properly, will usually reveal an incomplete

COA. Planners often have to return to COA

development during wargaming, not because

their COAs are infeasible, but because they are

incomplete and require additional detail to continue the war game (see appendices E through I

for information and examples regarding planning processes, tools, and other coordination).

The COA development process continues to inform

the commander and the staff and leads to products that

drive subsequent steps in the MCPP. The updated

commander’s visualization resulting from COA

development can include a possible reframing of the

problem and purpose. The COA development brief

provides another venue for further discussion to

deepen understanding of the problem.
3-6 _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

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CHAPTER 4

COURSE OF ACTION WAR GAME

Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril. When you

are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself, your chances of winning or losing are equal. If

ignorant both of your enemy and of yourself, you are certain in every battle to be in peril.

—Sun Tzu, Warriors’ Words: A Quotation Book

The purpose of COA wargaming (see fig. 4-1) is

to improve the plan. It examines and refines the

option(s) in light of adversary capabilities and

potential actions/reactions as well as other factors peculiar to the operational environment, such

as the local population and how it may respond to

friendly and adversary interactions. Planners wargame friendly COAs against selected adversary

COAs through an iterative action-reaction-counteraction process. On larger staffs, a free-thinking red cell builds and “fights” adversary COAs,

while a green cell develops probable responses

and actions of the population. This form of interaction coupled with feedback loops accounts for

the nonlinear nature of military operations.

Whether conducted formally as a disciplined, interactive process or informally through a simple

“what if ” conversation between the commander

and staff, wargaming relies heavily on the operational judgment and experience of the participants.

Computer-aided modeling and simulation applications provide another method for wargaming.

A continuation of design, the process of COA

wargaming contributes to a better understanding

of the environment and the problem, the identification of potential branches and sequels, and

required modifications to each COA.

Wargaming enables the commander and the staff to

determine the advantages and disadvantages of

each COA and forms the basis for the commander’s

COA comparison and decision. It involves a

detailed assessment of each COA, to include support estimates, as that COA relates to the enemy

and the other elements of the battlespace. 

The COA war game requires the commander’s

designated friendly COAs for wargaming, adversary COAs against which to war game (most

likely, most dangerous, and most advantageous to

friendly forces), wargaming guidance with specific techniques (such as an avenue of approach, a

belt, key event, or sequence of essential tasks),

and evaluation criteria. Other inputs useful in

COA wargaming may include—

 Planning support tools including the COA

graphic and narrative and synchronization

matrix. The purpose of a synchronization

matrix is to relate forces and their actions to

one another in time, space, and purpose and

converge combat power to achieve a decision.

Framing Framing

Course of Action

Comparison and

Decision

Orders

Development

Transition Course of Action

Development

Course of Action

Wargaming

Figure 4-1. Course of Action Wargaming.
4-2 ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

A synchronization matrix should not be used

to overly script the actions of subordinate units

with expectations of specific outcomes. If a

plan is too tightly coupled, it is easily damaged, difficult to repair, and lacks the flexibility to address the inherent friction and

uncertainty resident in military conflicts.

 Estimates of supportability and additional

requirements from subordinate commanders.

 Staff estimates and additional requirements

from staff/warfighting representatives, including an updated intelligence estimate with an

event template and adversary COAs.

 Updated facts and assumptions.

War Game Courses of Action 

The war game evolves around one or more “turns.”

Each turn includes discussion of the friendly

action, anticipated reaction of adversaries and the

local population, and friendly counteraction.

 Action. Armed with the appropriate guidance,

criteria, and support estimates, the staff begins

the war game with the friendly force’s representative(s), briefing friendly actions across the

warfighting functions (or LOOs in COIN)

while moving icons on a map or electronic

overlay if physical positioning is applicable. 

 Reaction. The red cell, or adversary representative, will react to friendly actions by briefing

the adversary’s (or the element that represents

a threat to friendly success) actions according

to its plan. 

 Counteraction. The counteraction will require

some degree of synthesis in order to respond to

the adversary’s initial actions. The war game

facilitator determines the outcome, whether

failure, success, losses, or casualties, as a basis

for the next cycle. The war game continues

until the entire avenue of approach, belt(s), key

event, or sequence of essential tasks has been

thoroughly wargamed. 

During wargaming—

 Evaluate each COA independently. Do not

compare one COA with another during the

war game.

 Remain unbiased and avoid premature conclusions.

 Continually determine if each COA is suitable, feasible, acceptable, distinguishable, and

complete.

 Use the green cell (if formed) to discuss anticipated civilian population responses to friendly

and adversary actions, reactions, and counteractions.

 Record the advantages and disadvantages of

each COA.

 Record issues and mitigations for risk, assumptions, and limitations.

 Record data based on commander’s evaluation

criteria for each COA.

 Keep to the established timeline of the war

game.

 Identify possible branches and sequels for further planning.

Refine Staff Estimates, Estimates of 

Supportability, and Support Concepts

The staff and subordinate commands continue to

develop their estimates and supporting concepts.

These estimates and supporting concepts are critical to the COA comparison and decision step and

eventually become a part of the plan or order.

Criteria used in the development of estimates

may include—

 Risk assessment.

 Casualty projections and limitations.

 Personnel replacement requirements.

 Projected enemy losses.

 Enemy prisoner of war procedures.

 Intelligence collection requirements and limitations.

 Rules of engagement.
Marine Corps Planning Process ______________________________________________________________________________ 4-3 

 High-value targets (HVTs).

 High-payoff targets (HPTs).

 Support (fires, information operations, logistics, aviation) strengths and limitations.

 Projected assets and resource requirements. 

 Projected effects on the information environment.

 Operational reach.

 Projected allocation of mobility assets, lift, and

sorties versus availability.

 Requirement for prepositioning equipment and

supplies.

 Projected location of units and supplies for

future operations.

 Projected location of the combat operations

center and command post echelons.

 Command and control system’s requirements.

Prepare Course of Action War Game Brief 

The COA war game brief includes the advantages

and disadvantages of each COA and suggested

modifications. It may also include—

 Enemy COA situation templates:

 Updated intelligence estimate regarding terrain, weather, adversaries, or local population.

 Wargamed adversary COA.

 Wargamed responses of the population

 Problem framing and COA development

products:

 Higher, supporting, supported, and adjacent

commanders’ mission statements (two levels

up).

 Tasks and intent provided by HHQ.

 Commander’s intent for subordinate units.

 Overview of COAs.

 Wargame technique used.

 COA war game products and results—

 COA war game worksheet.

 Identification of any additional tasks.

 Revised COA graphic and narrative.

 Decision support template and matrix.

 Synchronization matrix.

 Branches and potential sequels.

 Resource shortfalls.

 New RFIs.

 Estimated time required for the operation.

 Risk assessment. 

Commander’s

Comparison and Decision Guidance 

The COA war game brief concludes with the

commander’s approval of any recommended

changes to the COAs before they are compared.

The commander can also take this time to provide

guidance for the comparison of the COAs. 

Considerations

Initial, informal war games will likely take place

during problem framing when the commander

and staff consider and wargame possible solutions as a basis for understanding and the subsequent generation of a commander’s concept that

informs the COA development guidance.

When formally conducted, a well run COA war

game can often be a time-consuming and onerous process, but it is worth every minute of the

effort. The iterative nature of the action-reactioncounteraction process leads to the emergence or

discovery of critical aspects of the operation,

such as an adversary unit, dominant terrain, or a

key leader engagement. The intuitive level of

understanding gained reduces decisionmaking

time in execution.

A successful war game fosters a better understanding of the situation, which will lead to modified COAs that better reflect the problem

planners are attempting to solve. 

Wargaming two levels down has been a generally accepted practice in order to adequately

examine key events to determine support and

coordination requirements. 
4-4 ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

The more turns examined in a war game, the further forward in time the staff must project events.

This projection will result in less detail and a

greater number of assumptions—factors that

commanders and staffs must recognize when considering their results.

There are two main reasons planners may have to

stop the war game and return to COA development:

 A COA is beyond repair.

 A COA lacks sufficient information upon

which to base the war game.
CHAPTER 5

COURSE OF ACTION COMPARISON AND DECISION

The first principle of a [commander] is to calculate what he must do, to see if he has all the

means to surmount the obstacles with which the enemy can oppose him and, when he has

made his decision, to do everything to overcome them.

—Napoleon Bonaparte, Warriors’ Words: A Quotation Book

When all is said and done the greatest quality required in commanders is ‘decision’. . . 

—Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, Memoirs

During COA comparison and decision (see fig.

5-1), the commander evaluates each friendly

COA against established criteria, compares them

with each other, and selects the COA believed to

best accomplish the mission. The COA comparison and decision inputs require graphics and narratives for each wargamed COA and the

commander’s evaluation criteria. Other inputs

useful in COA comparison and decision may

include—

 Updated IPB products.

 Planning support tools:

 COA war game worksheet.

 Synchronization matrix.

 War game results:

 Initial task organization.

 Resources and any shortfalls.

 Updated CCIRs.

 List of critical events and decision points.

 Staff estimates.

 Subordinate commander’s estimates of supportability.

 Branches and sequels identified for further

planning. 

Evaluate Courses of Action 

Using his/her evaluation criteria, the commander

or his/her representative (deputy commander,

chief of staff, or operations officer) leads a discussion about the relative merits of each COA.

The staff records the advantages and disadvantages for each. To the extent that operations

allow, subordinate commanders, staffs, and planners should participate and provide input based

on their estimates of supportability. 

Compare Courses of Action 

The COA comparison provides the commander with

an understanding of the relative merit of each COA

and aids in his/her decisionmaking. The commander

compares the COAs against one another using the

Framing

Course of Action

Comparison and

Decision

Orders

Development

Transition Course of Action

Development

Course of Action

Wargaming

Figure 5-1. Course of Action 

Comparison and Decision.
5-2 ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

results of the COA evaluation. The commander may

use a comparison and decision matrix to help compare one COA with another. 

Commander’s Decision 

The commander selects a COA. In making the

decision, the commander may—

 Select a COA without modification.

 Modify a COA.

 Develop a new COA by combining favorable

elements of multiple COAs.

 Discard all COAs and resume problem framing

or COA development, as required. 

Once the commander has made a decision, he/she

should review the approved COA with subordinate commanders. With a decision, detailed planning can accelerate now that the entire command’s

focus is on a single COA. To facilitate detailed

planning, the staff uses the approved COA as the

basis for the CONOPS. 

Refine the Concept of Operations 

Based on the approved COA, the staff refines the

CONOPS, which is the basis for or may include

supporting concepts, such as the concepts of fires,

logistics, and force protection. Within the context

of military operations, concepts are a vision of

actions. Accordingly, a CONOPS is a general

description of actions to be taken in pursuit of

mission accomplishment. Armed with the CONOPS and supporting concepts, planners can proceed with the functional and detailed planning

essential for the development of the plan or order

and implementation of the plan during execution.

Update the Warning Order 

With the preparation of the CONOPS, the commander will update the WARNORD or issue a

planning order to inform subordinate commanders’ concurrent planning. 

Considerations

The results of COA comparison and decision provide the basis for orders development and consist

of the CONOPS. Additional results may include—

 Updated IPB products. 

 Planning support tools. 

 Updated CCIRs.

 Staff estimates. 

 Commander’s identification of branches for

further planning. 

This step requires the involvement of the commander, subordinate commanders, and their staffs

from start to finish. Ideally, all participants would

attend one meeting. The dialogue during the comparison and decision step represents a continuation of the design effort because it offers multiple

perspectives that deepen the group’s understanding of the environment and the problem. 

During this discussion, participants should be

able to view each COA through electronic presentations, maps with icons, or a terrain board.

In the event of a single COA, the time saved

could be allocated to additional wargaming or

developing branches and sequels.

In the event the commander approves a modified

COA, planners should fully develop the COA then

war game it against selected adversary’s COAs.

Since military operations are nonlinear by nature

and the smallest input can have a disproportional effect, the numerical weighting of factors

offers little insight into the merits of one COA

over another.

The COA comparison and decision process at

lower levels of command may simply be an informal exchange of information between the commander and selected staff members concerning

the results of the war game. At higher levels of

command, the process is normally a formal

sequence of activities centered on a commanderled discussion.
CHAPTER 6

ORDERS DEVELOPMENT

As a rule, plans should contain only as much detail as required to provide subordinates the

necessary guidance while allowing as much freedom of action as possible.

—MCDP 5, Planning

The purpose of orders development (see fig. 6-1)

is to translate the commander’s decision into oral,

written, and/or graphic communication sufficient

to guide implementation and promote initiative

by subordinates. A form of detailed planning, the

plan or order, once completed, becomes the principal means by which the commander expresses

his/her decision, intent, and guidance.

The orders development step in the MCPP communicates the commander’s decision in a clear,

useful form that can be understood by those executing the order. An order is a written or oral

communication that directs actions and focuses a

subordinate’s tasks and activities toward accomplishing the mission. Various portions of the

order, such as the mission statement and the

CONOPS, have been prepared during previous

steps of the MCPP. The development of the order

begins during problem framing and continues

throughout the process.

The order contains only critical or new information and not routine matters normally found in

SOPs. A good order is judged on its usefulness—

not its size. 

The initial task organization, mission statement,

commander’s intent, CONOPS, and specified and

implied tasks are the required inputs to orders

development. Other inputs may include—

 Updated intelligence and IPB products.

 Planning support tools.

 Updated CCIRs.

 Staff estimates.

 Commander’s identification of branches for

further planning. 

 WARNORD/planning order.

 Existing plans and orders.

 The chief of staff’s or executive officer’s

orders development guidance. 

The chief of staff or the executive officer, as

appropriate, directs orders development by dictating the format for the order, setting and enforcing the time limits and development sequence,

and assigning annexes to specific staff sections. 

Prepare the Order or Plan

Orders appear in a variety of forms, ranging from

detailed, written documents with numerous

annexes to simple verbal commands. Their form

depends on the time available, complexity of the

operation, and level of command involved. Staff

estimates, subordinate commanders’ estimates of

supportability, and other planning documents

Framing Framing

Course of Action

Comparison and

Decision

Orders

Development

Transition Course of Action

Development

Course of Action

Wargaming

Figure 6-1. Orders Development.
6-2 ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

inform a plan or order’s annexes and appendices

(see app. K for order/plan formats).

The order in narrative form with graphics and a

range of supporting documents serves to focus

the command during transition. The order is the

vehicle by which the commander expresses his/

her intent and assigns tasks to subordinates. The

order ensures common understanding and serves

to put every staff section and subordinate unit on

the same azimuth pointed at the same objective.

If a basic order has been published, a fragmentary

order (FRAGO) may be issued to subordinate

commanders. Whatever the format, orders and

plans must be clear, concise, timely, and useful.

Orders development also includes two essential

quality control techniques—orders reconciliation

and orders crosswalk. 

Orders Reconciliation

Orders reconciliation is an internal process during

which the staff conducts a detailed review of the

entire order. The purpose of reconciliation is to

ensure the basic order and all the annexes, appendices, and other attachments are complete and in

agreement. It identifies discrepancies or gaps in

the planning that will require corrective action.

Specifically, the staff compares the commander’s

intent, the mission, and the CCIRs against the

CONOPS and the supporting concepts, such as

maneuver, fires, or support. The priority intelligence requirements and the intelligence collection plan must support the CCIRs. 

Orders Crosswalk 

Orders crosswalk is an external process in which

the staff compares its order with the orders of

higher, adjacent, and subordinate commanders to

achieve unity of effort and ensure the superior

commander’s intent is met. Similarly, confirmation briefs and rehearsal of concept (ROC) drills

(discussed in chap. 7) can help a commander

ensure his/her subordinate units nest within the

plan or order. For additional information, see

MAGTF Staff Training Program Pamphlet 5-0.2,

Operational Planning Team Leaders Guide.

Approve the Order or Plan 

The final action in orders development is the

approval of the order or plan by the commander.

While the commander does not have to sign

every annex or appendix, it is important he/she

review and sign the basic order or plan. 

Considerations 

When writing plans or orders, words matter.

Writers must remain consistent in their use of

approved terminology, particularly tactical tasks.

For example, there is a significant difference

between “defeat” and “destroy.” Inappropriate

terminology can lead to unintended consequences, including mission creep, gaps, or redundancies. For more information on tactical tasks,

see MCDP 1-0, Marine Corps Operations. 

Updated SOPs are critical to producing a concise

plan or order. For example, Annex U (Information Management) of the order should only

address information management topics specific

or unique to an operation or location. Meanwhile, the command can train to baseline information management procedures contained in the

SOP to promote tactics, techniques, and procedures excellence so critical to tempo. The SOPs

need to be current, widely disseminated, and used

if the plan or order references them.

The entire staff develops the order/plan. Planners

develop and refine functional concepts throughout the process, such as the concept of logistics or

concept of fires. The staff principals and their

respective sections are responsible for completing

the annexes. The staff should ensure all tasks are

either in the basic order or no lower than an

appendix. Tasks that appear in tabs, exhibits, or

attachments often lose visibility by the subordinate units and may not be accounted for and

accomplished.
CHAPTER 7

TRANSITION

 . . . plans and orders exist for those who receive and execute them rather than those who

write them.

—MCDP 5, Planning

Transition may involve a wide range of briefs,

drills, or rehearsals necessary to ensure a successful shift from planning to execution and be subject to the variables of echelon of command,

mission complexity, and, most importantly, time.

At a minimum, this step includes a CONOPS

brief along with the handover and explanation of

any execution tools developed during planning,

such as a decision support matrix or an execution

checklist. If time and resources allow, the transition step may include ROC drills and confirmation briefs by subordinate units. Successful

transition enhances the situational understanding

of those who will execute the order, maintains the

intent of the CONOPS, promotes unity of effort,

and generates tempo. 

Transition is a continuous process that requires a

free flow of information between commanders

and staffs by all available means. At higher echelons where the planners may not be executors, the

commander may designate a representative as a

proponent for the order or plan. After orders

development, the proponent takes the approved

order or plan forward to the staff charged with

supervising execution. As a full participant in the

development of the plan, the proponent is able to

answer questions, aid in the use of the planning

support tools, and assist during execution in determining necessary adjustments to the order or plan. 

Transition occurs at all levels of command. A formal transition normally occurs on staffs with separate planning and execution teams. For transition

to occur, an approved order or plan must exist.

The approved order or plan and the products of

continuing staff actions form the input for transition. These inputs may include—

 Refined intelligence and IPB products.

 Planning support tools.

 Outlined FRAGOs for branches.

 Information on possible future missions (sequels).

 Any outstanding issues. 

Regardless of the level of command, a successful transition ensures those who execute the

order understand the commander’s intent, the

CONOPS, and any planning tools. Transition

may be internal or external and in the form of

briefs, drills, or the relocation of a planner to the

current operations for execution. Internally,

transition occurs either between future plans and

the future operations center or future operations

and current operations centers. Externally, transition occurs between the commander and his/

her subordinate commanders. 

Framing Framing

Course of Action

Comparison and

Decision

Orders

Development

Transition Course of Action

Development

Course of Action

Wargaming

Figure 7-1. Transition.
7-2 ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

Transition Brief 

At the higher levels of command, transition may

include a formal transition brief to subordinate or

adjacent commanders and to the staff supervising

execution of the order. At lower levels, it might

be less formal. The transition brief provides an

overview of the mission, commander’s intent,

task organization, and adversary and friendly situation. The commander, deputy commander, or

chief of staff provides transition brief guidance,

which may prescribe who will give the brief, the

briefing content, the briefing sequence, and who

is required to attend. Time available may dictate

the level of detail in the transition brief. Orders

and supporting materials should be transmitted as

early as possible before the transition brief. The

brief may include items from the order or plan,

such as—

 HHQ mission (tasks and intent).

 Situation (friendly, adversary, and civilian population).

 Mission.

 Commander’s intent. 

 CCIRs.

 Task organization.

 CONOPS.

 Assumptions (for plans).

 Execution (including branches and potential

sequels).

 Planning support tools. 

Transition Drills

Drills are important techniques during transition

to ensure the greatest possible understanding of

the plan or order by those who must execute it.

Drills improve the ability of the commander and

staff to command and control operations. A transition drill is a series of briefings, guided discussions, walk-throughs, or rehearsals used to

facilitate understanding of the plan throughout all

levels of the command. Transition drills are conducted by the commander and his/her subordinate

commanders or the commander and the staff

tasked with execution of the plan or order. Typically, a transition drill is the only drill used at

lower levels of command, where the staff both

develops and executes the plan. Transition drills

also allow the commander to express thoughts on

design, thereby increasing the situational understanding of the subordinate commanders and the

staff. Sand tables, map exercises, and ROC drills

are examples of transition drills.

The ROC drills are a technique to review an order

or selected aspects of an order. They can be conducted in a number of ways and can focus on the

overall CONOPS or specific functional concepts,

such as fires, aviation, collection, or logistics. A

large scale, MEF-level ROC drill can involve a

terrain board the size of a football field with designated representatives walking through specific

unit actions. A productive ROC drill is characterized by the willingness of participants to recognize and address disconnects that may arise. The

ROC drills can also serve as a venue for confirmation briefs. 

Confirmation Brief 

Subordinate commanders conduct a confirmation

brief with their higher commander to confirm

their understanding of commander’s intent, their

specific task and purpose, and the relationship

between their unit’ s mission and that of the other

units in the operation. The confirmation brief

allows the higher commander to identify gaps in

the plan, identify discrepancies between his/her

and the subordinate commanders’ plans, and

learn how subordinate commanders intend to

accomplish their missions. Successful transition

products are commanders and staffs who are

ready to execute the order and possible branches

and prepared to plan sequels. 
APPENDIX A

MARINE CORPS PLANNING IN JOINT OPERATIONS

Given that the Marine Corps will, more than

likely, continue to operate in a joint environment. The MCPP is the vehicle through which

commanders and their staffs in the operating

forces provide input to the joint planning process. See Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Operation Planning.

Joint Planning

Joint planning is a coordinated process used by

joint force commanders to determine the best way

to accomplish the mission. Joint planning is conducted in accordance with the policies and procedures established for the Joint Operation Planning

and Execution System (JOPES) and its supporting systems. The JOPES is the foundation for

joint planning and is the principal system for

translating policy decisions into operation plans,

concept plans, and operation orders.

Joint planning integrates military actions with

those of multinational partners and other instruments of national power to achieve a specified

end state. The military contribution to national

strategic planning consists of joint strategic

planning and its three subsets—security cooperation planning, force planning, and joint operation planning. Joint operation planning consists

of contingency planning and crisis action planning (CAP) (see fig. A-1).

Contingency planning and CAP share common

planning activities and are interrelated. Contingency planning occurs in noncrisis situations. The

process is highly structured to support iterative,

concurrent, and parallel planning to produce comprehensive, detailed plans. In-progress reviews

provide commanders opportunities to interact

with their staffs, giving them further guidance to

ensure the planning effort meets their vision.

Contingency planning facilitates the transition to

CAP. A combatant commander can use CAP to

adjust previously prepared contingency plans for

rapid execution. The process is shortened in CAP

to support the dynamic requirements of changing

events (see fig. A-2 on page A-2).

The Marine Corps Planning

Process and Joint Planning

The MCPP aligns with and complements JOPES,

especially during the plan development phase.

Supporting plans are developed once the combatant commander’s concept has been approved;

Marine Corps supporting plans address the tasks

identified for Marine Corps operational forces

and outline the actions of assigned and augmenting forces. The MCPP provides an approach for

the Marine Corps component commanders and

staffs to prepare Marine Corps supporting plans.

Marine Corps Order P3000.18, Marine Corps

Planner’s Manual, establishes Marine Corps policies, procedures, and standards for developing and

Joint

Strategic

Planning

Joint

Operation

Planning

Security

Cooperation

Planning

Force

Planning

Crisis

Action

Planning

Contingency

Planning

Figure A-1. Joint Strategic Planning.
A-2 _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

executing plans for the deployment and redeployment of Marine Corps forces. The Marine Corps

deployment planning and execution process

describes Marine Corps Service responsibilities

within JOPES. It provides specific procedures for

Headquarters, Marine Corps planners and for the

commanders and staffs in the Marine Corps operating forces for contingency planning and CAP.

This order addresses the combatant commander’s

requirements for standing plans, which include

sourcing the types and numbers of units, sustainment for units, and replacement manpower. 

The MCPP aligns with CAP beginning with situation development and continuing throughout the

process as Marine Corps planners develop new

plans or expand or modify existing plans.

Figure A-2. Contingency and Crisis Action Planning Activities, Functions, and Products.

Situational Awareness

Operational

Activities

Planning

Functions

Products

Planning

Execution

Approved

Mission

Approved

Plan

Deployment

Order

Execute

Order

Approved

Concept

Warning

Order

Operation

Order

Planning

Order

Alert

Order

Plan Assessment

(Refine, Adapt, Terminate, Execute)

Plan

Development

Concept

Development

Strategic

Guidance

IPR IPR IPR

Base Plan

Operation Plan

Concept Plan

Six Month Review Cycle

Legend

IPR in-progress review
APPENDIX B

WARFIGHTING FUNCTIONS AND LINES OF OPERATIONS

Warfighting Functions

Marine Corps warfighting functions encompass

all military activities in the battlespace. Planners

consider and integrate the warfighting functions

when determining how to accomplish the mission. Integrating the warfighting functions ensures

an integrated plan and helps achieve unity of

effort and focus.

As stated in MCDP 1-2, Campaigning, Marine

forces obtain maximum impact by harmonizing

the warfighting functions to accomplish the

desired objective within the shortest time possible

and with minimum casualties. The six warfighting functions are command and control, maneuver, fires, intelligence, logistics, and force

protection. They apply equally across the range

of military operations and are the building blocks

for all types of operations, including prolonged,

amphibious, distributed, information, and COIN.

Command and Control

Command and control is the exercise of authority and direction over assigned or attached forces

in the accomplishment of a mission. It is how the

commander transmits his/her intent and decisions to the force and receives feedback. Command and control involves arranging personnel,

equipment, and facilities to allow the commander to extend influence over the force during

the planning and conduct of military operations.

Good planning facilitates command and control.

Maneuver

In JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of

Military and Associated Terms, the DOD defines

maneuver as the employment of forces in the

operational area through movement in combination with fires to achieve a position of advantage

in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the

mission. Maneuver allows for the distribution or

concentration of capabilities in support of a commander’s CONOPS. The Marine Corps maneuver warfare philosophy expands the concept of

maneuver to include taking action in any dimension, whether temporal, psychological, or technological, to gain an advantage. In COIN

operations, for example, forces may achieve

advantages through key leader engagements, provision of security, governance, economics, and

the rule of law. 

Fires

In JP 1-02, the DOD defines fires as the use of

weapon systems to create a specific lethal or nonlethal effect on a target. Fires harass, suppress,

neutralize, or destroy in order to accomplish the

targeting objective, which may be to disrupt,

delay, limit, persuade, or influence. Fires include

the collective and coordinated use of target acquisition systems, direct and indirect fire weapons,

armed aircraft of all types, and other lethal and

nonlethal means. Fires are normally used in concert with maneuver, which helps shape the battlespace, setting conditions for decisive action.

Intelligence

Intelligence provides the commander with an

understanding of the adversary and the operational environment and it identifies the adversary’s COGs and critical vulnerabilities. It assists

the commander in understanding the situation,

alerts him/her to new opportunities, and helps

with assessing the effects of actions within the

battlespace. This warfighting function supports

and is integrated with the overall operational

effort and must be focused on the commander’s

intelligence requirements. 
B-2 _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

Logistics

Logistics encompasses all activities required to

move and sustain military forces. At the tactical

level, logistics is combat service support (CSS)

that deals with feeding, fueling, arming, and

maintaining troops and equipment. Tactical

logistics involves the actual performance of the

logistic functions of supply, maintenace, transportation, health services, general engineering,

and other services.

Force Protection

Force protection is the measures taken to preserve the force’s potential so that it can be

applied at the appropriate time and place. It

includes those measures the force takes to

remain viable by protecting itself from the

effects of adversary activities and natural occurrences. Force protection safeguards friendly

COGs and protects, conceals, reduces, or eliminates friendly critical vulnerabilities.

Lines of Operations

The DOD defines a line of operation (LOO) as

either a logical line that connects actions on

nodes/decisive points related in time and purpose

with an objective(s) or a physical line that defines

the interior or exterior orientation of the force in

relation to the adversary or that connects actions

on nodes and/or decisive points related in time

and space to an objective(s).

The logical definition specifically addresses irregular warfare in which positional reference to the

adversary may have little relevance, hence the link

to the purpose versus a physical objective. As a

result of OIF and OEF, LOOs have become the

primary framework for relating force activities to

one another and promoting unity of effort toward

a common purpose. The LOO examples in COIN

include governance, economics, essential services,

security, training host nation forces, and combat.

The relative priority of a given LOO in a designated area may change as the situation evolves. 
APPENDIX C

ORGANIZATION FOR PLANNING

The commander organizes the staff to gather,

manage, and process information essential to

decisionmaking. Organization for planning not

only involves personnel and structure, but it is

also affected by planning modes.

Planning Modes and Levels

The MCPP facilitates planning at all levels and

satisfies three modes of planning—orientation,

contingency, and commitment—as described in

MCDP 5. Orientation planning is used when the

degree of uncertainty is so high that it is not

worthwhile to commit to a specific plan. Planners focus on assessing the situation and designing flexible preliminary plans that can be adapted

to a broad variety of situations. Contingency

planning applies to situations when there is less

uncertainty, but not enough is known to allow for

the adoption of a specific plan. Normally, planners prepare for several contingencies, allowing

the commander to respond quickly when the situation requires action. During commitment planning, the commander selects a plan and commits

resources to executing the plan. See MCDP 5 for

further discussion on planning modes. Commanders and planners consider these modes when

organizing their planning efforts to ensure they

use a mode and planning sequence appropriate to

the situation.

These modes span the planning horizon based on

degrees of uncertainty. Additionally, planning

may also be viewed as a hierarchical continuum

with conceptual, functional, and detailed levels of

planning. As discussed in chapter 1, conceptual

planning is the highest level, establishing aims,

objectives, and broad concepts for action.

Detailed planning is the lowest level of planning,

translating the broad concept into a complete and

practicable plan. In between these two levels is

functional planning, which involves elements of

both conceptual and detailed planning and is concerned with designing supporting concepts for

warfighting functions, such as maneuver or force

protection. Planning modes and levels are interrelated. For instance, commitment planning normally includes considerable detailed planning

that facilitates execution, while orientation planning most often remains at the conceptual planning level.

To gain and maintain tempo, commanders and

their staffs must be involved in all modes and levels of planning by ensuring a constant flow of

information vertically within the chain of command and laterally among staff sections. At the

small-unit level, this information exchange can be

simple and direct—commander to commander or

operations officer to operations officer. In largersized units, such as the component or MEF, a

more formal arrangement that uses liaison officers and distinct planning organizations is necessary due to the scope and detail involved as well

as the requirement to align with HHQ planning

organizations and to properly address the entire

planning continuum.

Planning is an event-dominated process; therefore, commanders should organize planning

organizations to enhance planning for significant events, such as changes in mission. Conversely, time-driven processes are a necessary,

yet subordinate, aspect of planning. Planners

must address both time- and event-driven processes, while maintaining the proper perspective

between the two. For example, the air tasking

order is critical to the planning and execution of

operations and it is produced in a cycle that

requires timely input from subordinates. Nevertheless, the air tasking order is produced in support of the plan—it is not the plan.
C-2 _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

Planning Organizations

The MCPP is scalable from the component level

down to the battalion and squadron level. Lower

command levels, such as battalions and squadrons, adapt and consolidate certain planning

responsibilities and functions within their limited

structures. Normally at these command levels,

most MCPP procedures are performed by the

commander and the primary staff officers and

selected special staff officers. Figure C-1 shows

the planning organization and relationships found

at lower levels of command, such as a battalion. 

Only the higher levels of command (MEF, division, wing, or logistic group) form specialized

planning staff elements and organizations. Figure

C-2 illustrates planning organizations at the

Marine Corps component and MEF and their link

to HHQ.

Planning Organizations

Three planning organizations—future plans,

future operations, and current operations—at the

component and MEF levels are primarily

responsible for the conduct of the planning process. They must coordinate their efforts to

ensure a smooth transition from long-term planning to execution.

Future Plans Division

The future plans division is normally under the

staff cognizance of the G-5. Among its many

responsibilities, the G-5 normally forms a liaison

element to the HHQ staff; integrates the HHQ

plan into the MEF’s planning process; plans the

next mission, phase, or operation; and oversees

the force deployment planning and execution process for the command. Upon receipt of tasks from

HHQ, this division initiates the MEF’s planning

process by assisting the commander with the initial design and developing an outline plan.

Depending on the situation, it may focus on a

phase of a campaign, develop reconstitution

requirements, or plan deployment. This division’s

responsibility is to conduct the initial design

effort as a basis for subsequent planning.

Regiment/Group

Special

Staff

Principal

Staff

Battalion/Squadron

Subordinate/

Mission Commanders Special

Staff

Principal

Staff

Battalion/Squadron

Subordinate/

Mission Commanders Special

Staff

Principal

Staff

Figure C-1. Lower Level Organizations and Planning Relationships. 
Marine Corps Planning Process _______________________________________________________________________________ C-3 

The future plans division may also develop

sequels, support relationships for the next phase,

and develop plans to ensure the force does not

reach a culminating point. Future plans will transition an outline plan to the future operations center. The outline plan provides the salient features

of a mission and precedes detailed planning. 

Future Operations Center

The future operations section is under the staff

cognizance of the G-3 and is the focal point of

the planning process. It usually forms the nucleus

of an OPT and coordinates with both the future

plans and current operations centers to integrate

planning. The future operations center will either

inherit outline plans from the future plans division or receive planning requirements from the

current operations center that exceed its planning

horizon. The future operations center fully integrates the other staff centers’ plans officers, warfighting function representatives, and subordinate

unit representatives into the planning process. It

takes the outline plan from the future plans division and uses it as the basis for further planning.

The future operations center focuses on changes

to subordinate missions and develops branch

plans and sequels. This center interacts with intelligence collection and the targeting process to

shape the next battle. The current operations center may provide a representative to the future

operations center to facilitate an efficient transition process. This representative returns to the

current operations center during transition. The

future operations center’s efforts generate tempo

internal to the force.

Current Operations Center

The current operations center is under the staff

cognizance of the G-3. During operations, it

receives the OPORD from the OPT at the transition brief. The current operations center—

 Coordinates and executes the OPORD. 

 Prepares and transmits FRAGOs.

 Monitors operations of the force.

 Tracks CCIRs and reports relevant information to the commander.

 Analyzes and synthesizes battlespace information.

Figure C-2. Component and Marine Expeditionary

Force Organizations and Planning Relationships.

Joint Force

Commander

Joint

Planning

Group

Marine Corps Component

Future

Plans

Operational

Planning

Group

Current

Operations

MEF

Future

Operations

Future

Plans Current

Operations

Crisis

Action

Team

Operational

Planning

Team

Plans

Liaison

Element
C-4 _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

When unforeseen events develop, the current

operations center refines or develops branch

plans. To support the commander, the current

operations center may develop new COAs, allocate resources, and prepare FRAGOs to modify

the current OPORD. This center assesses change

in the battlespace and progress toward the mission and purpose; monitors the status of forces

and materiel; monitors rear area operations; coordinates terrain management; maintains a common operational picture and information; and

provides the future operations center with situational awareness.

Teams

Operational Planning Team

The OPT is a dynamic, ad hoc organization

formed by either the future plans division or

future operations center to conduct integrated

planning. The OPT helps frame problems, develops and wargames COAs, and assists the staff in

the preparation and transition of the order. Normally, the OPT is built around a core group of

planners from either the future plans division or

the future operations center and may include the

future plans or future operations officer, assistant

plans or assistant future operations officer, future

plans or future operations chief, and a clerk/plotter. It integrates additional staff representatives,

such as the G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, G-5, G-6, staff

judge advocate, provost marshal, health services,

or public affairs, as appropriate to the mission.

The OPT may also include the warfighting function or LOO representatives, liaison officers, and

SMEs needed to support planning. While all staff

sections conduct planning in their respective

areas of expertise and mini-OPTs can be formed

to address specific problems, the commander’s

integrated, single battle effort resides in the OPT,

whether formed by future plans or future operations. Commanders of smaller organizations that

lack separate staff sections may also form OPTs

because the term often applies to working groups

and integrated planning teams formed to address

any issue of importance to the commander.

Crisis Action Team

The crisis action team (CAT) falls under the staff

cognizance of the G-3. The CAT is usually

formed in the initial stages of a crisis and has the

requirement to rapidly collect and manage information. It can be task-organized to reflect the

unique nature of a crisis. Often, at the initial stage

of a crisis, the commander’s primary concern is

force readiness status and deployment planning.

The CAT may initiate the planning process,

develop situational awareness, and access previously prepared and emerging planning products

from JOPES. To facilitate a common situational

awareness, potential members of the CAT are

identified in advance and recalled for initial CAP.

For extended operations, the CAT’s planning and

execution functions transition to the normal planning organizations, whether current operations,

future operations, or future plans, and their staffing and functions are redefined. 

Warfighting Function Representatives

The MEF or a major subordinate command is

not restricted in their planning or conduct of

operations. For example, the ground combat element (GCE) does not only consider maneuver

and the aviation combat element (ACE) does not

only consider fires. Planners at all echelons of

command must consider and integrate activities

within and among all the warfighting functions.

For Marines, maneuver is much more than movement in concert with fires to gain a positional

advantage. Maneuver is taking action in any

dimension to gain an advantage. Other dimensions include governance, economics, rule of law,

and security; it can also include temporal, psychological, and technological issues.

Warfighting function or LOO representatives

should be selected because of their experience

and training. They should also be trained and

experienced in the MCPP and consideration

regarding the rank of the representative, which

may be necessary at higher command levels. A
Marine Corps Planning Process _______________________________________________________________________________ C-5 

warfighting function or LOO representative may

be on the commander’s staff, a member of a subordinate unit staff, a commander of a supporting

unit or organization from another Service or

nation, or any Marine qualified to address the

issues of a particular functional area or LOO.

Designation as a representative may be an additional responsibility; for example, a Marine could

serve simultaneously as a warfighting function/

LOO representative, a staff member, and a staff

representative to the OPT.

Use of Liaisons

Liaison is the point of contact through which

intercommunication is maintained between elements of military forces to ensure shared understanding and unity of purpose and action.

Liaisons help to reduce the fog of war through

direct communications. They ensure senior commanders remain aware of the tactical situation by

providing them with exceptional, critical, or routine information; verification of information; and

clarification of operational questions. Overall, the

liaisons are another tool to help commanders

overcome friction and accomplish the mission.

Command Liaison

Commanders of all organizations routinely initiate contact with commanders of other units in

their locale even though there may be no official

command or support relationship between them.

This contact opens the channels of communications to facilitate mutual security and support.

Staff Liaison

Staff officers of all organizations routinely initiate contact with their counterparts at higher,

lower, adjacent, supporting, and supported commands. This contact opens channels of communication that are essential for the proper planning

and execution of military operations. Staff liaisons may also include the temporary assignment

of liaisons to other commands.

Liaison Officers

The most commonly used way to maintain close,

continuous contact with another command is

through the liaison officers. They are the commander’s personal representatives and have the special trust and confidence of the commander to make

appropriate recommendations and estimates in the

absence of communications. As necessary, the commander uses liaison officers to transmit or receive

critical information directly with key persons in the

receiving headquarters. Liaison officers must possess the requisite rank and experience to properly

represent the command. The ability to communicate effectively, exercise sound judgment, and be

immediately accessible to the commander are critical skills for liaison officers.

Liaison Team

A liaison team, usually headed by an officer, is

assigned when the workload or need for better

communications is greater than the capabilities of

a single liaison officer. The liaison team will normally consist of an officer, a liaison chief, clerical personnel, drivers, and communications

personnel with equipment. Members of the liaison team may function as couriers when necessary. The grade of the senior member of the

liaison team depends on the unit’s size and personnel available. Liaison teams are generally

required for continuous operations.

Couriers

Although infrequently used because of the capabilities of electronic communications, couriers

remains a valuable liaison element. Couriers are

more than messengers. They are expected to provide more information than is contained in the

message being delivered. For this reason, couriers

should possess sufficient experience and maturity

to respond to questions and provide more than

superficial insight into the situation or issues of

concern. Individuals selected as couriers are often

junior officers or staff noncommissioned officers.

If such personnel are available, dedicated couriers
C-6 _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

may be used to augment the liaison officer or liaison team.

Operational Planning Team Representatives

The subordinate command’s OPT representatives are key contributors to the planning process

and the future operations plan. These individuals

provide timely and accurate movement of information between the OPT and their commands.

Normally, this individual’s primary responsibility is to the planning effort. He/She may only be

able to provide part-time support to other activities, such as logistic coordination or targeting.
APPENDIX D

MARINE CORPS PLANNING PROCESS DIAGRAMS

Figures D-1 through D-6 are graphic depictions of

the injects, activities, and results for each step of

the planning process. The results of each step provide the injects for the following step, keeping in

mind the process as a whole is as much iterative as

it is sequential. The diagrams are not intended to

be used as a checklist, but as a ready reference to

help promote clarity of understanding for the

entire process. The information shown in bold is

meant to highlight the personal involvement of the

commander for this part of each step. In addition to

the injects, activities, and results, each diagram

also displays the ongoing activities described in

chapter 2, such as refinement of IPB products, red

cell actions, and RFIs. 

Figure D-1. Injects, Activities, and Results Diagram for Problem Framing.

Confirmation briefs

Tasks (specific/implied/essential)

Shortfalls (resources/SME)

COG analysis

Assumptions/limitations

RFIs

Initial staff estimates

CCIRs

Problem framing brief

IPB products

COA development guidance

WARNORD

Mission statement

Commander’s intent

Situational Information

Outside Information

HHQ

- Guidance and intent

- WARNORD/OPORD

- Intelligence/IPB products

- Indications and warnings

- Government agencies

- Other service

- Open source

Commander and staff

- Expertise

- Experience

- Judgement

- Knowledge

Design

Staff Actions

- Understanding the

 environment

- Understanding the problem

- Commander’s initial intent

 and guidance

- Task analysis

- COG analysis

- Assumptions/limitations

- Draft mission statement

Ongoing activities

- Refine intelligence and 

 IPB products

- Alert/convene red and

 green cells

- Running estimates

- Refine area(s) of interest and

 area of influence

- Shortfalls (resources/SME)

- CCIRs/RFIs

INJECTS ACTIVITIES RESULTS

Ongoing Activities
D-2 _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

Figure D-2. Injects, Activities, and Results Diagram for Course of Action Development.

Tasks (specified/implied/essential)

Shortfalls (resources/SME)

COG analysis

Assumptions/RFIs

Approved CCIRs

Initial staff estimates

IPB products

Updated planning products

COA development guidance

WARNORD

Mission statement

Commander’s intent

Limitations

Assess relative combat power

Develop initial COA(s):

Develop COA graphic and narrative

Ensure conformance with

COA criteria

Prepare COA briefing

Update IPB products

Display friendly forces

Commander’s wargaming guidance

Issue evaluation criteria

Refine COGs

- Commander’s input

- COA refinement

Planning support tools and

COA graphic and narrative

Initial staff estimates

Commander’s designated

COA(s) for wargaming 

Commander’s wargaming

guidance

Commander’s evaluation criteria

Course of action brief

Updated IPB products

Initial estimates of supportability

INJECTS ACTIVITIES RESULTS

Ongoing Activities
Marine Corps Planning Process ______________________________________________________________________________ D-3 

Figure D-3. Injects, Activities, and Results Diagram for Course of Action Wargaming.

Updated IPB products

Planning support tools,

COA graphic, and narrative

Initial estimates of supportability

Initial staff estimates

Branches/sequels

Approved COAs for

comparison and decision

Comparison criteria/

guidance (required)

Commander’s designated

COA(s) for wargaming

Commander’s wargaming

guidance

Commander’s evaluation

criteria

The wargamed COA(s)

 - Graphic and narrative

Planning support tools

Refined staff estimates

Estimates of supportability

War game results

COA war game brief

Updated IPB products

- Initial task organization

- Identify required assets and

 shortfalls

- Refined CCIRs

- Critical events and

 decision points

- Recommended COA

 refinements

Red cell brief

Refine IPB products

Conduct COA war game

Prepare COA war game brief

Refine staff estimates and

estimates of supportability

- Gain understanding of

 possible adversary COAs

- Friendly action

- Enemy reaction (red cell)

- Friendly counteraction

COA refinement

recommendations 

INJECTS ACTIVITIES RESULTS

Ongoing Activities

Green cell brief

- Gain understanding of

 possible populace actions
D-4 _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

Figure D-4. Injects, Activities, and Results Diagram

for Course of Action Comparison and Decision.

The wargamed COA(s)

 - Graphic and narrative

Planning support tools

Branches/sequels

Approved COAs for

comparison and decision

Comparison criteria/

guidance (as required)

Refined staff estimates

Estimates of supportability

Prepare the CONOPS

Commander’s decision

Update the WARNORD/

prepare the planning order

Refine IPB products

Evaluate COAs

Compare COAs

Updated IPB products

Planning support tools

Updated CCIRs

Staff estimates

Estimates of supportability

Branches for further planning

Update WARNORD/

issue planning order

Approved COA

CONOPS

War game results

Updated IPB products

- Initial task organization

- Identify required assets and

 shortfalls

- Refined CCIRs

- Critical events and

 decision points

- Recommended COA

 refinements

INJECTS ACTIVITIES RESULTS

Ongoing Activities
Marine Corps Planning Process ______________________________________________________________________________ D-5 

Figure D-5. Injects, Activities, and Results Diagram for Orders Development.

Orders reconciliation

Orders crosswalk

Refine IPB products

Finalize/complete order or plan

Updated IPB products

Planning support tools

Updated CCIRs

Staff estimates

Estimates of supportability

Branches for further planning

WARNORD/planning order

Approved COA

CONOPS

Planning support tools

Outline FRAGOs for branches

Approved order or plan

Refined IPB and intelligence

products

INJECTS ACTIVITIES RESULTS

Ongoing Activities
D-6 _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

.

Figure D-6. Injects, Activities, and Results Diagram for Transition.

Confirmation briefs

Transition brief

Drills (rehearsal of concept)

Planning support tools

Outline FRAGOs for branches

Approved order or plan

Refined IPB and intelligence

products

Subordinate commanders

and staffs that are—

- Ready to execute the order

 and possible branches

- Prepared to plan sequels

INJECTS ACTIVITIES RESULTS

Ongoing Activities
APPENDIX E

MARINE CORPS PLANNING PROCESS TOOLS

The commander and staff use MCPP tools to

record, track, and analyze critical planning information. These tools help the commander and the

staff to better understand the environment, facilitate the commander’s decisionmaking, assist in

the preparation of plans and orders, and increase

tempo. The MCPP tools must serve the needs of

the commander and the requirements of the situation. Commanders and staffs can tailor these tools

to meet their needs and use other tools available

that are appropriate for their particular situation. 

Table E-1 identifies commonly used templates,

worksheets, and matrices and notes how each

tool supports the MCPP. The examples in this

appendix are at the MEF level, but these tools

may be employed at any level of command. The

formats and uses of these tools may be modified

as required. 

Table E-1. Marine Corps Planning Process Tools. 

Overlays, Templates, 

Matrices, Worksheets, and Graphics 

and Narratives

Problem 

Framing

COA 

Development

COA War 

Game

Comparison 

and Decision

Orders 

Development Transition

Modified

combined

obstacle overlay (see 

fig. E-1)

XX X

Adversary template 

(see fig. E-2)

XX X

Situation template

(see fig. E-3)

XX X

Event template (see fig. 

E-4)

XX X

Event matrix (see table 

E-3)

XX X

Decision support template (see fig. E-5)X XX XX

Decision support matrix 

(see table E-4)

X XX XX

COA graphic and narrative (see fig. E-6)X XX X

Synchronization matrix 

(see table E-5)

X XX XX

COA war game worksheet (see table E-6)XX X

Comparison and decision matrix with comments (see table E-7)X
E-2 ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

Intelligence Preparation 

of the Battlespace Products

The IPB is a systematic process of analyzing and

visualizing the portions of the mission variables of

the adversary, terrain, weather, and civil considerations in a specific area of interest and for a specific mission. By applying IPB, commanders gain

the information necessary to selectively apply and

maximize operational effectiveness at critical

points in time and space. A continuous planning

activity undertaken by the entire staff, IPB builds

an extensive database for each potential area in

which a unit may be required to operate. 

The IPB describes the environment in which the

command is operating and the effects of that environment on the command’s operations. Battlespace and weather evaluations assist in

identifying obstacles, mobility corridors, and avenues of approach; predicting weather effects for

numerous mobility options; and estimating sea

conditions. The IPB process consists of the following steps:

 Define the operational environment.

 Describe the effects on operations.

 Evaluate the adversary.

 Determine the adversary’s COAs. 

In conventional military operations, determining

adversary COAs will normally include templating with an adversary assessment. Templating

continues from planning to execution, both to

assess current operations and to support planning

for future operations. In irregular warfare, adversary templating will focus on pattern analysis,

which involves tracking, analyzing, and identifying specific trends, such as improvised explosive

devices or population support, over time. 

Table E-2. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace

Integration Throughout the Marine Corps Planning Process. 

Problem 

Framing

COA 

Development

COA War 

Game

Comparison 

and Decision

Orders 

Development Transition

Modified

combined

obstacle overlay

Adversary 

template

Continuous1

Situation 

template

Continuous1

Pertinent

adversary COAs

Continuous1

Refined and

prioritized adversary COAs and 

event templates 

and matrices

Continuous1

Initial decision 

support template

Continuous1

Decision support 

template matrix

Continuous1

Note

1

Templates are updated throughout the operation.

G-2/S-2

G-2/S-2

G-2/S-2

G-2/S-2

G-2/S-2

G-3/S-3/OPT

G-3/S-3/OPT
Marine Corps Planning Process ______________________________________________________________________________ E-3 

The IPB products graphically display the results

of the IPB process. Table E-2 identifies the major

IPB products and shows their integration with the

planning process. Note that both the G- 2/S-2 and

the G-3/S-3 are responsible for specific products.

While IPB starts as an intelligence effort, it

expands to an operational process and has logistic

and communications applications that are not

shown in the table. The following sections provide a short description of each product.

Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay

The modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO)

(see fig. E-1) is a graphic of the battlespace’s

effects on military operations. It is normally based

on a product depicting all obstacles to mobility

and it is modified as necessary. Modifications can

include cross country mobility classifications,

objectives, avenues of approach and mobility corridors, likely obstacles, defensible battlespace,

likely engagement areas, key terrain, cultural factors, built-up areas, and civil infrastructure

Adversary Template

Adversary templates (see fig. E-2 on page E-4)

are models based on postulated adversary doctrine. They illustrate the disposition and activity of

adversary forces conducting a particular operation arrayed on ideal terrain. Adversary templates

depict the adversary’s nominal organization,

frontages, depths, boundaries, and control measures for combat. They are usually scaled for use

with a map background and they are one part of

an adversary model. In irregular warfare, adversary templating will focus on pattern analysis,

which involves tracking, analyzing, and identifying specific trends, such as improvised explosive

devices or population support, over time. 

Vegetation

Surface Drainage

All Other Effects

Combined Obstacles

Modified Combined

Obstacle Overlay

Mobility Corridors and

Avenues of Approach

Figure E-1. Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay.
E-4 ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

Situation Template

A situation template (see fig. E-3) is an adversary

template that has been modified to depict adversary dispositions based on the effects of the battlespace and the pursuit of a particular COA.

This template accounts for the adversary’s current situation with respect to the terrain, training

and experience levels, logistic status, losses, and

dispositions. Normally, the situation template

depicts adversary units two levels down and critical points in the COA. Situation templates are

one part of an adversary COA model. Models

may contain more than one situation template to

depict locations and formations at various times.

Figure E-2. Adversary Template.

Legend

CSG

DSG

For information on military symbology,

see MIL-STD2525C, Common Warfighting Symbology.

corps support group

division support group

x

Advance Guard

Rear Security

Covering Force

24 km

Main Body

x

DSG

CSG

DSG
Marine Corps Planning Process ______________________________________________________________________________ E-5 

Event Template and Matrix

The event template is derived from the situation

template and depicts the NAIs, areas where

activity—or lack of activity—will indicate

which COA the adversary has adopted. The

NAIs are described in MCRP 2-3A, Intelligence

Preparation of the Battlefield/Battlespace.

Event templates contain time phase lines that

depict movement of forces and the expected

flow of the operation. Movement rates depend

on the terrain (MCOO) and the adversary COA

(DRAW-D [defend, reinforce, attack, withdraw,

delay]). The event template is the IPB starting

point for COA wargaming. The event matrix

depicts types of activity expected in each NAI,

when the NAI is expected to be active, and any

additional information to aid in collection planning. See figure E-4 and table E-3 on page E-6.

x

x

DSG

DSG

CSG

Legend

CSG

DSG

corps support group

division support group

unrestricted terrain

restricted terrain

severely restricted terrain

For information on military symbology,

see MIL-STD2525C, Common Warfighting Symbology.

Figure E-3. Situation Template.
E-6 ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

H+48

H+12

5

3

1

2

4

H+24

H+36

Capital city

of Cohanab

1

Gray City

1

Jasara oil fields

Jade City

1

Legend

restricted terrain

avenue of approach

named area of

interest, point

named area of

interest, area

Blueland Army

positions

2

4

potential boundary

of enemy-occupied

territory

Table E-3. Event Matrix.

Named Area

of Interest

No Earlier 

Than

No Later

Than Event/Indicator

1 H+6 H+12 Brigade-sized forces moving north.

2 H+6 H+12 Brigade-sized forces moving north.

3 H+12 H+24 Orangeland forces enter Blueland. Northern operational 

group driving on Jesara oil fields.

4 H+14 H+24 Orangeland forces seize junction of highways 7 and 8. 

Northern operational group turns northwest toward 

Jesara.

5 H+18 H+24 Orangeland forces enter Tealton. Northern operational 

group driving on Jesara.

Figure E-4. Event Template.
Marine Corps Planning Process ______________________________________________________________________________ E-7 

Decision Support Template and Matrix

The decision support template is normally developed during COA wargaming. It is derived from

adversary, situational, and event templates. The

decision support template depicts decision points,

time phase lines associated with movement of

adversary and friendly forces, the flow of the

operation, and other information required to execute a specific friendly COA. The decision support template is a key planning tool for use during

transition and execution. The decision support

matrix provides a recap of expected events, decision points, and planned friendly actions in a narrative form. It shows where and when a decision

must be made if a specific action is to take place.

It ties decision points to NAIs, TAIs, CCIRs, collection assets, and potential friendly response

options. The decision support template and

matrix may be refined as planning progresses

after the war game. See figure E-5 and table E-4. 

H+48

H+12

5

3

1

2

4

1

H+24

H+36

Capital city

of Cohanab

decision point

target area of

interest

1

Legend

restricted terrain

avenue of approach

named area of

interest, point

named area of

interest, area

Blueland Army

positions

2

4

1

Gray City

1

Jade City

1 potential boundary

of enemy-occupied

territory

C

2

A B

Table E-4. Decision Support Matrix.

Event

Number Event

No Earlier Than/

No Later Than

Named Area

of Interest

Target Area

of Interest Friendly Action

1 Orangeland forces enter Blueland. Northern operational group division driving on Tealton.

H+14/H+24 1, 2 A, B Covering force withdraws; Marine air- craft wing conducts interdiction west of 

phase line TEAL.

2 Orangeland forces seize junction of Highways 7 and 8. Northern operational group turns northwest on 

Jesara.

H+18/H+24 3, 4 C 1st and 3d

 Marine divisions execute 

branch plan HAWK.

Figure E-5. Decision Support Template.
E-8 ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

Planning Support Tools

Planning support tools support the commander’s

and staff’s planning effort by recording and displaying critical planning information on the

COAs and the commander’s decisions and guidance. They aid the commander in decisionmaking by displaying critical information in a useful

format. Planning support tools include the COA

graphic and narrative, synchronization matrix,

COA war game worksheets, and the comparison

and decision matrix.

Course of Action Graphic and Narrative 

Figure E-6, the COA graphic and narrative, is a

visual depiction and written description of a COA.

1 MLG

XVII

BELACTON

GREENTOWN

XVII

1/205

205

PL TEAL

3

GRAY CITY

TEALTON

JADE CITY

MEF RES

202

401

x

402

x

103

102

104

204

1

301

203

BLUE

A MARDIV, as the main effort, conducts an envelopment to defeat adversary forces north of Gray City. A MARDIV (-) (rein), as a supporting effort, attacks in zone to fix and defeat adversary forces west of Tealton and conducts a link up with Blueland forces in Tealton. The

Marine aircraft wing (MAW), as a supporting effort, isolates the MEF battlespace from enemy reinforcements from the south, while focusing efforts against the 102d

 and 103d Armored Brigades and the 401st and 402d Artillery Regiments. The supporting MARDIV (-) (rein)

designates one infantry regiment as the MEF reserve and one battalion as the MEF tactical combat force. This phase concludes with

enemy forces defeated north of Gray City.

Figure E-6. Course of Action Graphic and Narrative.
Marine Corps Planning Process ______________________________________________________________________________ E-9 

They clearly portray how the organization will

accomplish the mission, identifying the who

(notional task organization), what (tasks), when,

where, how, and why (intent). It should include

the tasks and purpose of the main effort, supporting efforts, and reserve. It also includes maneuver

control measures, such as boundaries. The COA

narrative and graphic, when approved by the commander, forms the basis for the CONOPS and

operations overlay in the OPLAN or OPORD. 

Synchronization Matrix

A synchronization matrix (see table E-5 on page

E-10) is a planning support tool designed to integrate the efforts of the force. It can be organized

across the warfighting functions, LOOs, or other

activities based on the situation. It can also

record the results of the COA war game. It

depicts, over time, the diverse actions of the

entire force necessary to execute the COA. When

completed, it provides the basis for an execution

matrix or Annex X (Execution Checklist) to the

OPLAN or OPORD.

Course of Action War Game Worksheet

The COA war game worksheet (see table E-6 on

page E-11) is used during the war game to record

friendly action, adversary reaction, and friendly

counteraction involved in each COA. It is also

used to capture critical information that may be

identified during the war game, such as potential

CCIRs, decision points, and NAIs. 

Course of Action 

Comparison and Decision Matrix

The COA comparison and decision matrix is a

planning support tool designed to assist the commander and staff in recording the advantages and

disadvantages of each COA as it is compared

against the commander’s evaluation criteria. It

also provides a venue for further discussion. It

may reflect various techniques for weighing the

COA against the commander’s evaluation criteria,

as shown in table E-7 on page E-11. The commander may use the COA comparison and decision matrix to aid his/her decision-making process

during the selection of a COA for execution.

Commanders and staffs should guard against relying on numerical “rankings” or other simplistic

methods that can fail to underscore the complexity involved in the decision-making process. 

Planning Support 

Tools for Stability Operations

The following planning support tools have

emerged and evolved as a result of OIF and OEF

lessons learned. 

Civil Considerations

Civil considerations are a factor in all types of

military operations, but they are of particular significance in stability operations. If the mission is

to support civil authorities, civil considerations

define the mission.

Civil considerations generally focus on the immediate impact of civilians on operations in

progress; however, they also include larger, longterm diplomatic, informational, and economic

issues at higher levels. At the tactical level, they

directly relate to key civil considerations within

the area of operations. The world’s increasing

urbanization means that the attitudes and activities of the civilian population in the area of operations often influence the outcome of military

operations. Civil considerations can either help or

hinder friendly or adversary forces and will influence the selection of a COA.

An appreciation of civil considerations—the ability to analyze their impact on operations—

enhances several aspects of operations, such as the

selection of objectives; location, movement, and

control of forces; use of weapons; and protection

measures. Civil considerations comprise six characteristics—areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events—expressed in the

acronym ASCOPE (see fig. E-7 on page E-12).

Areas 

Areas are key localities or aspects of the terrain

within a commander’s operational environment
E-10 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

Table E-5. Synchronization Matrix.

Time/Event Pre D-day D-day – D+2 D+3 – D+4 D+5 – D+6

Adversary

Action

Decision Points 1 2

Intelligence

MEF conducts reconnaissance in zone

NAI 1, 2 3, 4 5

Force Protection

Survivability Establish combat air patrol 

over MEF area of 

operations

Chemical, biological, radiological, and 

nuclear

Priority of support to ACE

Maneuver

Deep MAW attacks northern opera- tional group armor and artillery, command and control, and 

CSS facilities

MAW attacks 102, 103, 401, and 

402

Security Covering forces conduct security operations

Close 1st and 3d

 MARDIVs complete 

rupture of adversary defenses

1st MARDIV attacks adversary 

forces south of phase line TEAL

The 3d MARDIV conducts link up 

with Blueland forces

1st MARDIV and MAW defeat 

adversary forces south of 

phase line TEAL

The 3d

 MARDIV conducts a 

link up with SPMAGTF-B

Reserve 3d

 MARDIV—one regiment to MEF reserve

Rear 3d

 MARDIV—one battalion 

to tactical combat force

Mobility Priority of main supply 

route develoment in main 

effort zone

Countermobility Complete execution of barrier plan 

south

Fires

Lethal Execute long duration family of 

scatterable mines in TAIs B

Nonlethal Fire expendable jammer to disrupt 

northern operational group attack

TAIs A B

Logistics Sustainment Logistic throughput plan

Transport Movement control plan

C2 MEF assumes tactical control of 

Blueland forces in the vicinity of 

Tealton

Electronic 

warfare

Build adversary electronic 

order of battle nodal 

analysis

Attack northern operational 

group C2 notes

Legend

C2—command and control

MAW—Marine aircraft wing

SPMAGTF-B—special purpose Marine air-ground task force-B
Marine Corps Planning Process _____________________________________________________________________________ E-11 

that are not normally thought of as militarily significant. Failure to consider key civil areas, however, can seriously affect the success of any

military mission. 

Civil-military operations planners analyze key

civil areas from two perspectives: how do these

areas affect the military mission and how do military operations impact civilian activities in these

areas? At times, the answers to these questions

may dramatically influence major portions of the

COAs being considered. 

Table E-6. Course of Action War Game Worksheet.

COA 1, STAGE A; BOX: MOST LIKELY

Action Reaction Counteraction Assets

Approximate 

Time DP CCIR Remarks

MARDIV envelops Orangeland 

forces north of 

Gray City

102d

 and 103d

Armored 

Brigades 

counterattack

MAW interdicts moving 

adversary forces

MARDIV engages and 

destroys adversary 

armor at long range

Surge MAW attack 

assets to interdict 

adversary armor

D+3 DP 3 Will 102d

 and 103d

Armored Brigades 

move west to 

counterattack

MARDIV has priority of close air 

support

Legend

DP—decision point

MAW—Marine aircraft wing

Table E-7. Comparison and Decision Matrix with Comments.

Commander’s Evaluation 

Criteria COA 1 COA 2 COA 3

Force protection Moderate casualties High casualties

Increased chemical, biological, 

radiological, and nuclear threat

Light casualties

Tempo, surprise Achieving surprise unlikely High chance of achieving 

surprise

Shapes the battlespace ACE interdiction of adversary 

lines of communications limits 

adversary’s ability to reinforce

Deception likely to be effective

Asymmetrical operations ACE operates against second 

echelon armor forces

GCE mechanized forces attack 

adversary dismounted infantry

MEF mechanized forces 

against adversary mechanized 

forces

Maneuver Frontal attack followed by 

penetration

Frontal attack Turning movement

Decisive actions ACE disrupts deployment of 

second echelon forces through 

interdiction

Isolate first echelon forces

Disrupt lines of communications, logistic facilities, and 

assembly areas

Simplicity Simplest Demanding command and 

coordination requirements.
E-12 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

Structures

Structures are architectural objects, such as

bridges, communications towers, power plants,

and dams, and are often identified as traditional

HPTs. Other structures, such as churches,

mosques, national libraries and hospitals, are cultural sites generally protected by international

law or other agreements. Still other structures are

facilities with practical applications, such as jails,

warehouses, schools, television stations, radio

stations, and printing plants, which may be useful for military purposes. 

Structures analysis involves determining their

location, functions, capabilities, and application

in support of military operations. It also involves

weighing the military, political, economic, religious, social, and informational consequences of

removing them from civilian use; the reaction of

the populace; and replacement costs. 

Capabilities 

Civil capabilities can be viewed from several perspectives. The term capabilities may refer to—

 Existing capabilities of the populace to sustain

itself, such as through public administration,

public safety, emergency services, and food

and agriculture systems. 

 Capabilities with which the populace needs

assistance, such as public works and utilities,

public health, public transportation, economics, and commerce. 

 Resources and services that can be contracted

to support the military mission, such as interpreters, laundry services, construction materials, and equipment. Local vendors, the host

nation, or other nations may provide these

resources and services. In hostile territory, civil

capabilities include resources that may be taken

and used by military forces consistent with

international law. 

Areas and Structure (AS)

Political boundaries

Government centers

Social, political, religious,

 or criminal enclaves

Agriculture and mining

 regions

Trade routes and

 commercial zones

Displaced civilian

 sites

Bridges

Communication

 towers

Power plants

Dams

Religious buildings

National libraries

Hospitals

Jails

Warehouses

Television and radio stations

Print plants

Toxic industrial material

 locations

Tunnels

Street and urban patterns

Building blueprints and

 construction materials

Organizations,

People, and Events (OPE)

Religious groups

Fraternal organizations

Patriotic or service

 organizations

Labor unions

Criminal organizations

Community watch groups

Multinational corporations

United Nations agencies

USG

NGOs

IGOs

Key communicators

Loyalties

Authorities

Perceptions

Relationships

Tribes and clans

Demographics

National and religious

 holidays

Agricultural and market

 cycles

Elections

Civil disturbances

Celebrations

Disasters

Combat operations

Redeployments

Paydays

Capabilities (C)

Fuel

Fire and rescue

Electrical power

Water supply

Transportation

Communications

Health services

Technology

Terrain Infrastructure Society

AS C OPE

Figure E-7. Sample Civil Considerations (ASCOPE).
Marine Corps Planning Process _____________________________________________________________________________ E-13 

Analysis of the existing capabilities of the area of

operations is normally conducted based on civil

affairs functional specialties. The analysis also

identifies the capabilities of partner countries and

organizations involved in the operation. In doing

so, civil-military operations planners consider

how to address shortfalls, as well as how to capitalize on capability strengths. 

Organizations 

Civil organizations are groups that may or may

not affiliate with government agencies. They can

be church groups, fraternal organizations, patriotic or service organizations, or community

watch groups. They might be IGOs or NGOs.

Organizations can assist the commander in keeping the populace informed of ongoing and future

activities in an area of operations and influencing

the actions of the populace. They can also form

the nucleus of humanitarian assistance programs,

interim governing bodies, civil defense efforts,

and other activities.

People

People, both individually and collectively, can

have a positive, negative, or no impact on military operations. The “people” element of

ASCOPE includes civilians or nonmilitary personnel encountered in an area of operations. The

term may also extend to those outside the area of

operations whose actions, opinions, or political

influence can affect the military mission. In all

military operations, US forces must be prepared

to encounter and work closely with civilians of

all types. When analyzing people, Marines should

consider historical, cultural, ethnic, political, economic, and humanitarian factors. Working with

the “people” assists Marines in identifying the

key communicators as well as the formal and

informal processes used to influence people. 

Regardless of the nature of the operation, military

forces will usually encounter civilians living and

operating in and around the supported unit’s area

of operations. Major categories of civilians likely

to be encountered include—

 Local nationals, such as town and city dwellers, farmers, other rural dwellers, and nomads. 

 Local civil authorities, such as elected and traditional leaders at all levels of government. 

 Expatriates. 

 Foreign employees of IGOs or NGOs. 

 US Government (USG) and third-nation government agency representatives. 

 Contractors, who may be US citizens, local

nationals, or third-nation citizens providing

contract services. 

 DOD civilian employees. 

 The media, including journalists from print,

radio, and visual media.

Events 

As there are many different categories of civilians, there are many categories of civilian events

that may affect the military mission. Some examples are planting and harvest seasons, elections,

riots, and voluntary and involuntary evacuations.

Likewise, there are military events that impact

the lives of civilians in an area of operations.

Some examples are combat operations, including

indirect fires, deployments, and redeployments.

Civil-military operations planners determine what

events are occurring and analyze the events for

their political, economic, psychological, environmental, and legal implications.

Tactical Conflict Assessment 

and Planning Framework

To increase the effectiveness of stability operations, the US Agency for International Development created the tactical conflict assessment and

planning framework (TCAPF). Use of TCAPF,

which is further amplified in US Army Field

Manual 3-07, Stability Operations, can help commanders and their staffs identify causes of instability, plan activities to diminish or mitigate them,

and then to evaluate the effectiveness of those

activities at the tactical level (provincial or local).

Conceptual Framework

Tactical conflict assessment and planning

framework is based on four premises—instability, assessment, the population, and measures

of effectiveness. 
E-14 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

Instability. Instability results when the factors

fostering instability overwhelm the ability of the

host nation to mitigate these factors (see fig. E-8

on page E-17). To understand why there is instability or determine the risk of instability, the following factors must be understood: 

 Grievances. 

 Key actors’ motivations and means. 

 Windows of vulnerability. 

Grievances are factors that can foster instability.

They are based on a group’s perception that other

groups or institutions are threatening its interests.

Examples include ethnic or religious tensions,

political repression, population pressures, and

competition over natural resources. Greed can

also foster instability. Some groups and individuals gain power and wealth from instability. Drug

lords and insurgents fall in this category.

Key actors’ motivations and means are ways they

transform grievances into widespread instability.

Although there can be many grievances, they do

not foster instability unless key actors with both

the motivation and the means to translate these

grievances into widespread instability emerge.

Transforming grievances into widespread violence requires a dedicated leadership, organizational capacity, money, and weapons. If a group

lacks these resources, it will not be able to foster

widespread instability. Means and motivations

are the critical variables that determine whether

grievances become causes of instability. 

Windows of vulnerability are situations that can

trigger widespread instability. Even when grievances and means are present, widespread instability is unlikely unless a window of

vulnerability links grievances to means and motivations. Potential windows of vulnerability

include an invasion, highly contested elections,

natural disasters, the loss of a key leader, and

economic shocks. 

Even if grievances, means, and vulnerabilities

exist, instability is not inevitable. For each of

these factors, there are the following parallel

mitigating forces:

 Resiliencies. 

 Key actors’ motivations and means. 

 Windows of opportunity. 

Resiliencies are the processes, relationships, and

institutions that can reduce the effects of grievances. Examples include community organizations and accessible, legitimate judicial structures. 

Key actors’ motivations and means are ways key

actors leverage resiliencies to counter instability.

Just as certain key actors have motivation and

means to create instability, other actors have the

motivation and the means to rally people around

nonviolent procedures to address grievances. An

example could be a local imam advocating peaceful coexistence among opposing tribes. 

Windows of opportunity are situations or events

that can strengthen resiliencies. For example, the

tsunami that devastated the unstable Indonesian

province of Aceh provided an opportunity for

rebels and government forces to work together

peacefully. This cooperation led to a peace agreement and increased stability. 

While understanding these factors is crucial to

understanding stability, they do not exist in a vacuum. Therefore, their presence or absence must be

understood within the context of a given environment. Context refers to longstanding conditions

that do not change easily or quickly. Examples

include geography, demographics, natural

resources, history, as well as regional and international factors. Contextual factors do not necessarily cause instability, but they can contribute to the

grievances or provide the means that foster instability. For example, although poverty alone does

not foster conflict, poverty linked to illegitimate

government institutions, a growing gap between

rich and poor, and access to a global arms market

can combine to foster instability. Instability

occurs when the causes of instability overwhelm a

societal or governmental ability to mitigate it. 
Marine Corps Planning Process _____________________________________________________________________________ E-15 

Assessment. Assessment is necessary for targeted

and strategic engagement. Since most stability

operations occur in less developed countries,

there will always be a long list of needs and

wants, such as schools, roads, and health care,

within an operational area. Given a chronic shortage of USG personnel and resources, effective

stability operations require an ability to identify

and prioritize local sources of instability and stability. They also require the prioritization of

interventions based on their importance in diminishing those sources of instability or building on

sources of stability. For example, if village elders

want more water, but water is not fostering instability because farmers and pastoralists fight over

land, then digging a well will not stabilize the

area. In some cases, wells have been dug based

on the assumption that stability will result from

fulfilling a local want; however, ensuring both

farmers and pastoralists have access to water will

help stabilize the area only if they were fighting

over water. Understanding the causal relationship between needs, wants, and stability is crucial. In some cases, they are directly related; in

others, they are not. Used correctly, the TCAPF

and data obtained from other sources will help

establish whether there is a causal relationship.

Understanding the difference between symptoms and causes is another key aspect of stability. Too often, interventions target the

symptoms of instability rather than identifying

and targeting the underlying causes. While there

is always a strong temptation to achieve quick

results, this often equates to satisfying a superficial request that does not reduce the underlying

causes of instability and, in some cases, actually increases instability. 

For example, an assessment identified a need to

reopen a local school in Afghanistan. The prevailing logic held that addressing this need would

increase support for the government while

decreasing support for antigovernment forces.

When international forces reopened the school,

however, antigovernment forces coerced the

school administrator to leave under threat of

death, forcing the school to close. A subsequent

investigation revealed that the local populace harbored antigovernment sentiments because host

nation police tasked with providing security for

the school established a checkpoint nearby and

demanded bribes for passage into the village. The

local populace perceived the school, which drew

the attention of corrupt host nation police, as the

source of their troubles. Rather than improve

government support by reopening the school, the

act instead caused resentment since it exposed the

local populace to abuse from the police. The

result was increased support for antigovernment

forces, which were perceived as protecting the

interests of the local populace. While the assessment identified a need to reopen the school, the

act did not address a cause of instability. At best,

it addressed a possible symptom of instability and

served only to bring the true cause of instability

closer to the affected population. 

The Population. The population is the best source

for identifying the causes of instability. Since stability operations focus on the local populace, it is

imperative to identify and prioritize what the population perceives as the causes of instability. To

identify the causes of instability, the TCAPF asks

the local populace to identify and prioritize the

problems in the area. 

Measures of Effectiveness. Measures of effectiveness are a means of gauging success. Often,

the terms output and effect are used interchangeably among civilian agencies; however, the

terms measure very different aspects of task performance. While “outputs” indicate task performance, “effects” measure how well the activities

performed toward achieving a predetermined

objective. Measures of effectiveness are crucial

for determining the success or failure of stability tasks. 

The TCAPF Process 

The TCAPF process focuses on the local populace. Organizations using the TCAPF follow a

continuous cycle of see-understand-act-measure. The TCAPF includes four distinct, but
E-16 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

interrelated activities—collection, analysis,

design, and evaluation. 

Collection. The collection of information on the

causes of instability within an operational area is

a two-step process. The first step uses the following four questions to draw critical information

from the local populace:

 Has the population of the village changed in

the last twelve months? Understanding population movement is crucial to understanding the

operational environment. Population movement often provides a good indicator of

changes in relative stability. People usually

move when deprived of security or social

well-being. The sudden arrival of dislocated

civilians can produce a destabilizing effect if

the operational area lacks sufficient capacity

to absorb them or if there is local opposition to

their presence. 

 What are the greatest problems facing the village? Providing the local populace with a

means to express problems helps to prioritize

and focus activities appropriately. The local

populace is able to identify their own problem

areas, avoiding mistaken assumptions by the

intervening forces. This procedure does not

solicit needs and wants, but empowers the

people to take ownership of the overall process. 

 Who is trusted to resolve problems? Identifying the individuals or institutions most trusted

to resolve local issues is critical to understanding perceptions and loyalties. Responses may

include the host nation government, a local

warlord, international forces, a religious

leader, or other authority figure. This question

also provides an indication of the level of support for the host nation government, a key

component of stability. This often serves as a

measure of effectiveness for stability tasks. It

also identifies key informants who may assist

with vetting or help to develop messages to

support information engagement activities. 

 What should be done first to help the village?

Encouraging the local populace to prioritize

their problems helps them to affirm ownership.

Their responses form the basis for local projects and programs. 

Central to the collection effort is the ability to

determine the relationship between the symptoms and to understand why a symptom exists—

both essential to addressing the cause. For example, an assessment completed in Afghanistan

identified a lack of security as the main problem

within a specific operational area. Analysis indicated this was due a shortage of host nation security forces in the local area, so an additional

detachment of local police was assigned to the

area. However, the assessment failed to identify

the relationship between the symptom and cause

of the problem. The implemented solution

addressed the symptom, while the actual cause

remained unaddressed. A subsequent assessment

revealed that the local police were actually the

cause of the insecurity: it was common practice

for them to demand bribes from the local populace while discriminating against members of

rival clans in the area. By addressing the symptom of the problem rather than the cause, the

implemented solution actually exacerbated the

problem instead of resolving it. 

The second collection step involves targeted

interviews with key local stakeholders, such as

traditional leaders, government officials, business leaders, and other prominent citizens. These

interviews serve two purposes. First, they serve

as a control mechanism in the collection effort. If

the responses from a key stakeholder match those

from the local populace, it is likely the key stakeholder understands the causes of instability and

may be relied upon to support the assessment

effort; however, if the answers do not match, then

the stakeholder may either be uninformed or possibly part of the problem. Second, targeted interviews provide more detail on the causes of

instability while helping determine how best to

address those causes and measure progress

toward that end. 

Information obtained during collection is assembled in a formatted TCAPF spreadsheet. This

allows the information to be easily grouped and
Marine Corps Planning Process _____________________________________________________________________________ E-17 

quantified to identify and prioritize the most

important concerns of the population. 

Analysis. During analysis, the information gained

through collection is compiled in a graphical display (see fig. E-8). This display helps identify the

main concerns of the population and serves as a

reference point for targeted questioning. The

TCAPF data is combined with input from other

staff sections and other sources of information,

such as IGOs, NGOs, and private sector entities.

All this input is used to create a prioritized list of

the causes of instability and sources of resiliency

that guide the conduct of stability operations.

Design. The design effort is informed through

analysis, the results of which are used to create a

tactical stability matrix (see table E-8, page E-18)

for each of the causes of instability. After identifying the causes of instability and sources of

resiliency, a program of activities is designed to

address them. Three key factors guide program

design, which ensures program activities—

 Increase support for the host nation government. 

 Decrease support for antigovernment forces. 

 Build host nation capacity across each of the

stability sectors. 

The tactical stability matrix and program activities form the basis for planning within an operational area. The plan targets the least stable areas

and ensures instability is contained. It is nested

within the HHQ plan and details how specific stability tasks will be integrated and synchronized at

the tactical level. The TCAPF data is collated at

each echelon to develop or validate assessments

performed by subordinate elements. 

Evaluation. The TCAPF provides a comprehensive means of evaluating success in addressing

the sources of instability. Through measures of

effectiveness, analysts gauge progress toward

improving stability while diminishing the sources

of instability. Measures of effectiveness are vital

to evaluating the success of program activities in

changing the state of the operational environment envisioned during the design effort. 

While evaluation is critical to measuring the

effectiveness of activities in fostering stability, it

2

5

4

1

3

Roads

Electric Power

Potable Water

Employment

Education

Security

Note: Numbers denote areas within an urban area

Figure E-8. Analyzing Causes of Instability.
E-18 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

also helps to ensure the views of the population

are tracked, compared, measured, and displayed

over time. Since these results are objective, they

cannot be altered by interviewer or analyst bias.

This creates a continuous narrative that significantly increases situational awareness. 

Best Practices and Lessons Learned 

Capturing and implementing best practices and

lessons learned is fundamental to adaptive organizations. This behavior is essential in stability

operations, where the ability to learn and adapt is

often the difference between success and failure.

The TCAPF leverages this ability to overcome the

dynamics of the human dimension, where uncertainty, chance, and friction are the norm. Examples of best practices and lessons learned gained

through recent experience include the following: 

 Activities and projects are products that foster

a process to change behavior or perceptions.

 Indicators and measures of effectiveness identify whether change has occurred or is occurring.

 Perceptions of the local populace provide the

best means to gauge the impact of program

activities.

 Indicators provide insight into measures of

effectiveness by revealing whether positive

progress is being achieved by program activities.

 “Good deeds” cannot substitute for effectively targeted program activities; the best

information engagement effort is successful

programming that meets the needs of the local

populace. 

 Intervention activities should—

 Respond to priority issues of the local populace. 

 Focus effort on critical crosscutting activities. 

 Establish anticorruption measures early in

the stability operation. 

 Identify and support key actors early to set

the conditions for subsequent collaboration. 

 Intervention activities should not—

 Mistake “good deeds” for effective action.

 Initiate projects not designed as program

activities. 

 Attempt to impose “western” standards. 

 Focus on quantity over quality.

The TCAPF has been successfully implemented

in practice to identify, prioritize, and target the

causes of instability in a measurable and immediately accessible manner. Since it maximizes

the use of assets in the field and gauges the

effectiveness of activities in time and space, it is

an important tool for conducting successful stability operations. 

Table E-8. Tactical Stability Matrix.

Grievance Causes (perceptions) Causes (system) Objective Impact Indicators

Monitoring 

Methods

Police abuse the locals

Police extort bribes and 

“protection”

Police commit violent 

crimes

Police use the law to 

help themselves

Police are predators, 

not protectors

Police are involved with 

drugs and prostitution

Police salaries consistently in arrears

Police are not representative of the local 

populace

Police are not disciplined or held 

accountable

Police include many former members of a 

hostile militia

Increase effectiveness 

and popular support of 

the police

People cease to fear the 

police

Police receiving more 

actionable intelligence

Reduced crime; less 

insurgent presence

Membership in the 

police becomes 

respectable

TCAPF or public 

surveys
APPENDIX F

WARGAMING

Wargaming pits friendly COAs against adversary

COAs to identify strengths and weaknesses of the

friendly COAs and opportunities that can be

exploited in future operations. The staff wargames

selected friendly COAs against selected adversary

COAs—most likely, most advantageous, or most

dangerous—to determine how best to attack adversary critical vulnerabilities while protecting

friendly critical vulnerabilities. The results of wargaming, like all the other planning steps, improve

the commander’s understanding of the problem and

influence his/her vision of actions. A better understanding inevitably leads to plan adjustments. Planners can conduct war games either manually or

through computer-aided modeling and simulation

applications. Time, resources, and priorities will

influence which method the command will use.

On larger staffs, a red cell plays the adversary

during the wargame. The red cell is a task-organized element under the staff cognizance of the G2/S-2. It presents a “thinking” adversary that combines the adversary’s doctrine with the red cell’s

operational experience. The red cell ensures

assessed adversary capabilities and vulnerabilities

are realistically evaluated against each friendly

COA. At the MEF or major subordinate command

level, the red cell may include four to six persons;

at the battalion or squadron level, the red cell function may be exercised by the S-2 or a representative designated by the commander. Similarly, a

green cell ensures environment and civilian

aspects are applied against the friendly COAs.

Generally, the COA war game step includes the

commander’s wargaming guidance and evaluation

criteria, war game preparation, and the conduct of

the war game. The results of the war game inform

COA comparison and decision, but, more importantly, wargaming generates an intuitive level of

understanding about the problem that will accelerate decisionmaking during execution. Wargaming

also generates the needed level of detail with

which to populate the plan or order (appendices,

tabs, exhibits, attachments) necessary for implementation. The following general guidelines may

assist in conducting the COA war game step.

Commander’s Wargaming 

Guidance and Evaluation Criteria

The commander assesses the time available at the

conclusion of the COA development brief before

providing guidance for the war game. The degree

to which a COA achieves the essential tasks allows

the commander to determine which COA is most

suitable, feasible, acceptable, distinguishable, and

complete based on the available time, space, and

resources. The evaluation criteria addresses specific issues/questions that the commander wants

the staff to determine on each validated COA

during the war game. At this point in the planning

process, the commander has begun to think about

various options and capabilities available to the

adversary commander. He/She is also mindful of

his/her own command’s vulnerabilities. The commander will evaluate the major concerns, select the

most important concerns, and incorporate them

into his/her wargaming guidance.

Wargaming Guidance

The commander’s wargaming guidance may

include the following items:

 Friendly COAs that will be wargamed against

specific adversary COAs, such as the adversary’s most likely, most dangerous, or most

advantageous COA.

 Critical events that must be wargamed in specific detail, such as critical decision points

identified during COA development.
F-2 ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

 The level of war game detail. Is there a key

event or major activity, such as a river crossing,

that requires a detailed examination to determine coordination and support requirements?

 Validation of the main effort.

 Specification of the weather conditions to be

assumed by the wargamers, such as rain,

although the norm for the time of year is dry

weather.

 Timeline for the phase or stage of the operation.

Commander’s Evaluation Criteria

To be adopted as the plan, a COA has to survive

two sets of evaluation criteria. The first broad set,

discussed in COA development in chapter 3,

requires that a COA be suitable, feasible, acceptable, distinguishable, and complete. The second

set is intended to identify which COA—among

those that passed the first test—is the best. The

commander’s evaluation criteria may include the

following items: 

 Principles of war. 

 Limitation on casualties.

 Exploitation of the adversary’s weaknesses/

friendly strengths. 

 Defeat of the adversary’s COGs. 

 Population considerations.

 Asymmetrical operations.

 Opportunity for maneuver.

 Concentration of combat power.

 Speed. 

 Mass versus dispersion.

 Risk. 

 Phasing. 

 Weighting the main effort. 

 Logistical supportability. 

 Political considerations.

 Force protection. 

 Time available and timing of the operation.

Staff Evaluation Criteria

The staff should also develop its own evaluation

criteria to support its staff estimates during the

COA comparison and decision step. The staff criteria may include the following items: 

 Risk assessment. 

 Casualty projections/limitations. 

 Personnel replacement requirements. 

 Projected adversary losses. 

 Adversary prisoner of war handling procedures. 

 Intelligence collection requirements and limitations. 

 HVT acquisition. 

 HPT identification. 

 Supporting arms limitations. 

 Support limitations or opportunities. 

 Projected assets and resource requirements.

 Operational reach. 

 Sorties/capabilities required versus sorties/

capabilities available. 

 Prepositioning equipment and supplies. 

 Projected location of units/supplies for future

operations. 

 Projected location of combat operations centers or command posts (rear, main, tactical). 

 Command and control systems shortfalls and

limitations.

War Game Preparations

Before the war game, planners should post the following information or have it readily accessible:

 Approved mission statement. 

 Commander’s intent and guidance. 

 Assumptions. 

 Constraints and restraints.

 CCIRs. 

 Maps covering the entire area of operations

and area of interest. 

 Friendly force list.

 COGs. 

 Adversary order of battle. 

 Population disposition, such as attitudes,

beliefs, and cultural considerations. 

 MCOO with terrain and weather analysis. 
Marine Corps Planning Process ______________________________________________________________________________ F-3 

 Current and projected adversary situation

overlay. 

 Current and projected friendly situation overlay.

 Situation templates for each adversary COA. 

 Adversary event template and matrix.

 Civil population event/situation template/matrix, if needed.

Planners should also have the following tools that

were completed during the COA development:

 Assessment of relative combat power.

 Assessment of the civilian population.

 COAs as selected and amended by the commander, including the COA graphic and narrative. 

 War game rules.

 Recording tools (synchronization and COA war

game matrices).

Review the Friendly Force List

The OPT reviews the friendly force list to consider all available units that can be committed to

the battle, paying special attention to command

relationships and task organization. They ensure

the force list reflects all units that may be

employed by the wargamers. Ideally, the wargamers employ units two levels down from their

level of command. For instance, MEF wargamers will represent the wing and division commanders and include all aircraft groups and

infantry regiments on their force list as well as all

separate battalions, such as light armored reconnaissance battalion and tank battalion. Because

commanders frequently task-organize forces,

wargamers should also list the number of subordinate units in each element; for example, one

regiment is currently operating with two battalions, another with three. Similarly, the wargamer

employing the ACE would be expected to know

the number of squadrons in each group (by type)

and the number of aircraft in each squadron.

Although task organizations may vary by COA,

the friendly force list remains constant for all

analyzed COAs.

Validate Assumptions

The planners review previous assumptions to

determine whether they are still valid. Assumptions can impact the war game. It is important the

wargamers analyze each assumption as they proceed so they can accurately brief the commander

regarding the consequences of the assumptions.

List and Graphically Display Known

Critical Events and Decision Points

Critical events influence mission accomplishment. They include—

 Events that accomplish essential tasks.

 Events that force a decision, creating a result

larger than itself.

A decision point is an event or a location in the

battlespace where a decision is required during

execution. Decision points do not dictate the substance of the decision, only that a decision must

be made because the event is expected to affect

friendly COAs. Geographical decision points are

almost always related to a specific type of adversary organization appearing at a specific location

in the battlespace. Event-related decision points

can relate to either the friendly force or the adversary. Examples of decision points include—

 The friendly commander specifies the main

attack will not begin until the supporting attack

has reached phase line red.

 The friendly force is in defensive positions

waiting for follow-on forces. The commander

determines that if the adversary does not begin

an attack on the friendly vital area within 48

hours, he/she will conduct a limited objective

attack to harass the adversary and disrupt their

timeline.

 The friendly force has occupied a village harboring an insurgent leader assessed as an HVT.

The capture of this HVT will allow the commander to shift operations to a more distant

area. 
F-4 ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

Decision points relate to critical events and are

linked to NAIs and TAIs. A decision point may

have an associated CCIR. When the commander

receives the information required, it becomes the

trigger to make a decision. Critical events and

decision points come from several planning documents that, at this point in the planning process, have been completed by the G-2/S-2. The

G-2/S-2 will already have completed situation

templates for each adversary COA as well as a

consolidated situation template, superimposing

all adversary COAs onto one graphic. From that

graphic, the G-2/S-2 develops an event template

to identify NAIs and time-distance projections

based on the adversary COA and the MCOO.

The G-2/S-2 identifies the adversary’s HVTs and

the times these targets may move through the

NAIs. The planners, in preparing the friendly

COAs, will use the COA war game to determine

which of the HVTs should be considered HPTs.

Select the War Game Method

Four wargaming techniques—key event or

sequence of critical tasks, avenue in depth, belt,

and box—are available. Each technique is suited

to a particular situation or type of command.

Key Event or Sequence of Critical Tasks

Wargaming a key event or critical tasks in sequence (if there is a sequence) allows the planners to determine timing, support requirements,

and how the accomplishment of a key event or

critical task predisposes success or accomplishment of subsequent tasks.

Avenue in Depth

Avenue in depth focuses on one avenue of

approach at a time, beginning with the main

effort. This technique is good for offensive COAs

or for defensive situations when canalizing terrain inhibits mutual support.

Belt

Belts divide the terrain into segments that span

the width of the sector (defense), zone (offense),

or area of operation. This technique is most

effective in cross-compartment terrain, phased

operations, or when the adversary is deployed in

clearly defined echelons. A belt will normally

include more than one event. When time is short,

the commander may use a modified belt technique, noncontiguous belts selected on the basis

of anticipated critical events, which may or may

not occur at the same time. At a minimum, belts

should include the area of—

 Initial contact along the forward line of own

troops, the line of departure/line of contact, or

in the covering force area. 

 Initial penetration or initial contact along the

forward edge of the battle area.

 Passage of the reserve or commitment of a

counterattack.

 The objective (offense) or defeat of the adversary (defense), such as the limit of advance for

the counterattack.

Box

The box technique is a detailed analysis of a critical area, such as a colored landing beach, an infiltration route, or a raid objective. It is most useful

when time is limited. This technique applies to all

types of units. The staff isolates the area and

focuses on the critical events within that area.

Select a Method to 

Record and Display Results

Recording the war game results gives the planners a record from which to—

 Confirm and refine event templates. 

 Integrate all warfighting functions. 

 Develop decision support templates. 

 Evaluate the COA by using the evaluation criteria outlined earlier. 

 Build the task organization. 

 Prepare the order. 

One method for recording the results of the war

game is the synchronization matrix. Planners

should avoid the “sync matrix trap” of attempting to script detailed actions of forces over any

extended period of time. Such efforts are unrealistic and risk the expenditure of critical resources
Marine Corps Planning Process ______________________________________________________________________________ F-5 

in an effort to conform the battlespace to the

planners’ expectations. Instead, the synchronization matrix should accomplish two objectives:

the integration and coordination of forces that do

not overtask specific capabilities and the convergence of combat power or other capabilities to

achieve a decision. 

As shown in table E-5 on page E-10, the first

entry is the time period or phase of the operation.

The second entry is the adversary action as determined by the red cell. The third entry records

friendly decision points identified for that time

interval based on the adversary’s actions.

Recorded on the remainder of the matrix are the

activities during the game turn that the friendly

force wargamers decide need to be performed to

support the COA, such as green cell input. 

The result is that the planners have evaluated

their COA for a specific period of time, they

have recorded the activities necessary to support

the COA, and they have prepared a comprehensive snapshot of what the entire command should

be executing during that period. As wargamers

work across the remaining time periods or

phases, they gain an appreciation of what the

command and its subordinate commands must do

to accomplish the mission. 

The completed matrix facilitates the writing of

two portions of the order if this COA is selected

as the basis for the plan. By working horizontally

across the matrix for each warfighting function,

planners are able to write a clear concept for each

warfighting function. By working across the

matrix for each subordinate command, planners

are able to prepare the tasks to subordinate commands portion of the order or plan.

Conduct the War Game

General Rules 

Time is a critical resource during wargaming and

rules are key to accomplishing its objectives as

quickly as possible. Rules structure the discussions and keep the process objective and focused.

The following rules can guide wargaming:

 Use approved adversary COAs as developed

by the G-2/S-2 and civilian actions according

to the green cell. The goal is to evaluate the

friendly COA, not for the red cell to win the

war game.

 Remain objective and unbiased.

 Continually assess feasibility. If a COA

becomes infeasible during the war game, the

commander rejects the COA.

 Analyze each COA independently.

 Avoid comparing one COA with another.

 Record advantages and disadvantages of each

COA.

 Adhere to the established timeline.

 Avoid premature conclusions.

 Record counteractions.

 Use COA war game worksheets.

Game Turns

A game turn covers all friendly, adversary, and

civilian actions that are planned or envisioned to

occur during a specified time interval and are

focused on a specific task or event. Each game

turn usually consists of three moves—two by the

friendly force, one by the adversary force, and any

civilian considerations as they may apply. The

friendly force has two moves because the activity

is intended to validate and refine the friendly force

COA. If necessary, additional moves may be

required to produce desired effects.

War Game Preparations

The facilitator has already determined the H-hour

for the war game’s starting point. The red cell

and the friendly force commander will have their

situation overlays at H-hour on the war game

map. The red cell apprises the facilitator of the

starting locations of key forces and their missions. The green cell provides civilian considerations as warranted. The facilitator will use the
F-6 ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

event template and matrix provided by the G-2 to

address friendly intelligence collection activities

(reconnaissance and surveillance [R&S]).

Game Turn Objective

The objective for each game turn is to answer any

or all of the following questions:

 Does the friendly forces’ planned action

accomplish the task(s)?

 What additional actions (and resources) would

be necessary to achieve the purpose if the original actions fall short?

 Has the adversary force executed any actions

that were not anticipated and that would

require the friendly force to change its COA or

prepare a branch plan?

 How do civilian actions and reactions affect

friendly and adversary plans?

Sequence of Moves

Although direct contact between combatants normally will not occur at the starting point, the red

cell has the first move by virtue of positioning its

forces and apprising the facilitator of its activities

at H-hour. From this point, each game turn proceeds as described in the following paragraphs.

Friendly Force Action

Friendly force commanders describe the operations of all forces involved during this event.

They describe the force, its mission, and the

desired outcome. They annotate the force list to

account for all forces employed in the event.

Adversary Reaction

The red cell commander describes the operations

his/her forces are currently executing. He/She

includes the forces outside the immediate area of

operations but within the area of interest he/she

intends to employ during this event. Friendly

wargamers can then validate the portion of their

plan that addresses these additional adversary

forces. The red cell commander and friendly

commanders determine where they would have

had contact. The red cell commander describes

the locations and activities of his/her assets identified as HVTs. He/She highlights points during

the operation where these assets are important to

the adversary’s COA. If these points affect the

friendly COA, friendly wargamers identify the

HVTs as HPTs, making their engagement an integral part of the friendly COA. With this information, the OPT updates the situation and event

templates to reflect tactical areas of interest that

support the engagement of those HPTs.

Civilian Reaction

The green cell will provide likely civilian responses to friendly and adversary actions.

The OPT discusses the impact of the contact on

friendly and adversary forces and the population.

Recording tools capture the discussion. If the

OPT members agree on the outcome, the game

turn proceeds. If they do not agree, the facilitator

determines the outcome and the war game proceeds. If one of the participants disagrees with the

ruling, and if the matter will bear on the feasibility, suitability, or acceptability of the COA, the

point is referred to an arbiter, such as the chief of

staff, G-3, or G-5, for final resolution. 

Each unanticipated event in the red cell or green

cell reactions may become a decision point for

the commander when executing the approved

plan. Each time the friendly wargamers identify a

decision point, the recorder makes appropriate

entries in the recording tools, such as the decision

support template, COA war game worksheet, and

the synchronization matrix. The recorder should

capture enough information to allow the staff to

anticipate and plan for each decision. At a minimum, the recorder includes these elements—

 Decision Points. Estimated time—H + number

of hours—and location if physical positioning

is relevant.

 Decision Criteria. What activity, event, or

information prompts a decision? This translates into potential CCIRs, information that
Marine Corps Planning Process ______________________________________________________________________________ F-7 

could trigger a decision to execute a planned

action. 

 Friendly Action/Response. What friendly

action must be decided? Decisions can result in

engagement of HPTs that may have a decisive

impact on one or more of the adversary’s critical vulnerabilities. 

 TAIs. The planners ensure the physical distance between the decision point and the TAIs

are computed on the basis of the time-distance

requirements involved. 

 NAIs that Support the Decision Point. The

recorder must tie each decision point to its

associated NAIs. 

At this point, one of two outcomes will be evident: either the friendly force’s planned action

was sufficient to achieve its purpose or it was

insufficient. If the action was sufficient and the

COA is on track, then the players can proceed to

the next game turn. If the action was insufficient

to produce the desired effect, then the friendly

force considers its counteraction. 

Friendly Counteraction

The friendly force commander, in discussion with

the red and green cells and the facilitator, determines the additional actions and resources necessary to achieve the original purpose. When

modifying the COA, it is necessary to revalidate

the location and composition of the main and

supporting efforts, reserves, and control measures that affect its employment. Possible

branches and sequels may emerge during friendly

counteraction. If resources needed for the counteraction are available and can be reallocated

from any intended use in a subsequent game turn,

the friendly commander may add the additional

forces to the COA.
F-8 _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

This Page Intentionally Left Blank
APPENDIX G

STAFF ESTIMATES AND ESTIMATES OF SUPPORTABILITY

Keeping commanders informed to facilitate their

decisionmaking is a critical requirement of planning. During planning, estimates are a primary

means of informing the commander. The two

basic types of estimates are the staff estimate provided by the staff and an estimate of supportability provided by subordinate units.

Staff estimates are generally functional in nature,

such as for fires, logistics, or intelligence, and

often require subordinate unit information, such

as the ACE’s sortie calculations. Once the commander approves a COA, staff estimates become

the first drafts of their respective portion of the

order or plan. Estimates of supportability from

subordinate commanders provide a single battle

approach to recommended COAs with a functional slant, whether air, ground, or logistics.

Commanders of the ACE, GCE, and logistics

combat element (LCE) discuss how each will

support the MAGTF COA(s) through their

respective CONOPS while addressing advantages and disadvantages of each COA.

Estimates may be text documents, graphic representations, or an oral presentation of the analysis

and recommendations. These estimates provide

commanders, staff, and planners feedback regarding possible solutions. Done properly, estimates

contribute information to the annexes and appendices to orders or plans.

Commanders and staffs use estimates as they collect, process, and evaluate information. A subordinate unit or a staff section, upon discovering a

“show stopper,” should not wait to complete a

document to raise concerns about a particular

COA. The sooner the commander and the planners know of a problem, the sooner they can

either discard the COA or modify it. The key

issue is time. Format or formality should never

delay the timely delivery of important information to the commander. At a minimum, commanders and their staffs should update their

estimates when their understanding of the environment or problem changes, assumptions

become invalid, new tasks are received, or

requirements or capabilities change.

Staff Estimates

The staff and warfighting function representatives

develop staff estimates. The staff summarizes significant aspects of the situation that influence the

COA, analyzes the impact of the factors on the

COA, and evaluates and determines how the

means available can best support the COA. Staff

sections may also require their functional representatives to develop functional estimates within

their areas of expertise. A staff estimate is not a

replacement for an order or for supporting concepts; however, a thorough staff estimate will

shorten the time it takes to fully develop a COA

and write the order or plan.

The generic staff estimate format (fig. G-1 on

page G-2) standardizes the way staff members

construct estimates. The G-2, with input assistance from all staff members, will still prepare

and disseminate the IPB as separate and continuously updated products.

The staff develops estimates for all the warfighting functions (see fig. G-2 on page G-3) and uses

these estimates to recommend a COA and to

develop plans to support the selected COA.

Incomplete estimates and erroneous projections

can lead to the selection of an improper COA.
G-2 _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

Estimate of Supportability

Estimates of supportability (see fig. G-3 on page

G-4) are produced by subordinate commanders in

order to assist the “higher” commander with

COA selection. Staff estimates support their commander’s estimate of supportability provided to

the MAGTF commander. Estimates of supportability should indicate the subordinate unit’s

ability to support each COA and identify the risks

associated in supporting each COA.

1. Mission. Mission statement results from problem framing.

2. Situation and Considerations

a. Characteristics of the Area of Operation

(1) Weather. How will different military aspects of weather affect specific staff areas of concern and

resources?

(2) Terrain. How will aspects of terrain affect specific staff areas of concern and resources?

(3) Other Pertinent Facts. Analyze political, economic, sociological, and psychological factors and infrastructure as they relate to the area.

b. Adversary Forces. Adversary disposition, composition, strength, capabilities, and COA(s) as they affect specific staff areas of concern.

c. Friendly Forces

(1) Friendly COA(s).

(2) Current status of resources.

(3) Current status of other resources.

(4) Comparison of requirements versus capabilities and recommended solutions.

(5) Key considerations (evaluation criteria) for COA supportability.

d. Assumptions

3. Analysis. Analyze each COA using key considerations (evaluation criteria) to determine advantages and disadvantages.

4. Comparison. Compare COA(s) using key considerations (evaluation criteria). Rank order COA(s) for each key

consideration. Visually support each comparison with a decision matrix.

5. Recommendations and Conclusions

a. Recommended COA based on the comparison (most supportable from specific staff perspective).

b. Issues, deficiencies, and risks with impact mitigations.

Figure G-1. Staff Estimate Format Sample.
Marine Corps Planning Process ______________________________________________________________________________ G-3 

1. Key Facts and Assumptions. Identify key facts and assumptions associated with the specific functional area.

2. Functional Units Available. List all units assigned to the MAGTF with the functional capability to include

known host nation and contracted support.

3. Computations. Focus on a worst case scenario. Break out all requirements. The category could be expressed

as classes of supply; field services; maintenance functions, such as maintenance support team support or recovery; transportation types, such a breakbulk, Class III, or water; or explosive ordnance disposal support.

4. Analysis

a. Issues. Excess capacity or shortfall. Indicate all shortfall and excess capabilities.

b. Vulnerabilities/Risks. Indicate how any shortfalls can impact the outcome of the MAGTF mission. Be

accurate, concise, and direct.

c. Recommendations. Indicate how you think the LCE can either reallocate internal CSS assets, find a way

to reduce requirements, or increase capacity to counter shortfalls. Also, recommend how to best make use of

idle CSS assets.

Category

Total

Requirements

Total 

Capabilities Shortfall

Excess 

Capability Potential Solutions

Figure G-2. Functional Staff Estimate Format Sample.
G-4 _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

CLASSIFICATION

Copy No. __ of __ copies

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF COMMAND

PLACE OF ISSUE

Date-time group

Message reference number

ESTIMATE OF SUPPORTABILITY (U)

(U) REFERENCES: (a) Maps: ________ 1:50,000 AMES Series, ________, Sheets ________, ________ and ________.

1. ( ) Mission

a. ( ) Basic Mission. List the issuing headquarters’ mission. If this is a running estimate early in the planning process, the mission

statement may not be completed. In this case, the issuing headquarters identifies what actions they need to take as part of the HHQ

COA(s).

b. ( ) Previous Decisions

(1) ( ) List in detail each essential/critical task already assigned to the issuing headquarters.

(2) ( ) These essential/critical tasks should contribute to the current HHQ COA(s) under consideration that the supportability estimate will address.

2. ( ) Situation and Considerations

a. ( ) Adversary

(1) ( ) Present disposition of major elements. (See intelligence estimate.)

(2) ( ) Capabilities. (See intelligence estimate)

b. ( ) Population. Disposition of the population, such as attitudes toward the insurgents, host nation, and allied or coalition forces.

c. ( ) Own Forces

(1) ( ) Present disposition of the issuing headquarters’ major subelements.

(2) ( ) Probable tactical developments.

(a) ( ) Summarize intended actions requried to support each COA.

(b) ( ) Estimate timelines when assigned tasks (or envisioned actions) are expected to be achieved under each COA currently

being considered, as in the example below:

(3) ( ) Own COAs.

(a) ( ) COA #1. Describe this COA in general terms (enough to give an overall picture and to distinguish it from the other

COA[s]). If COAs are still in development, describe the distinguishing features. For example, “This COA will have an

amphibious assault with additional deep fires.”

(b) ( ) COA #2 (and subsequent COAs). Describe this COA in general terms (enough to give an overall picture and to distinguish it from the other COA[s]).

(c) ( ) Describe the characteristics of the geographic area in which the operation is to be conducted. The issuing headquarters

can also provide cultural considerations or other aspects of the area that may impact operations. Readers may be referred to the

intelligence estimate.

Page number

CLASSIFICATION

OBJECTIVE A OBJECTIVE B

COA #1 D-day D-day

COA #2 D+2 D+1

Figure G-3. Estimate of Supportability Format Sample.
Marine Corps Planning Process ______________________________________________________________________________ G-5 

CLASSIFICATION

d. Assumptions

(1) ( ) List all assumptions regarding the adversary, friendly, and population situation.

(2) ( ) List assumptions about adversary and friendly capabilities.

(3) ( ) List assumptions about adversary and population intentions.

e. ( ) Special Factors. List any special aspects of the issuing headquarters’ situation that could affect resource allocation.

3. ( ) COA Analysis

a. ( ) The issuing headquarters rank orders the COA available to HHQ according to the ability of the issuing headquarters to support

them.

b. ( ) Concept of Employment. The issuing headquarters describes its concept of employment under each of the HHQ COA(s).

c. ( ) Adversary Situation and Capabilities. The issuing headquarters describes how the enemy situation and enemy capabilities might

affect its ability to support each or any of the HHQ COA(s).

d. ( ) Requirement for Support. The issuing headquarters explains how and to what degree it can support each of the HHQ COA(s). In

order for the ACE or LCE to determine its ability to support MAGTF COAs, it must be aware of the requirements for all other elements of the MAGTF concurrently.

e. ( ) Topography. The issuing headquarters describes how the topography might affect its ability to support each or any of the HHQ

COA(s).

f. ( ) Weather. The issuing headquarters describes how the weather might affect its ability to support each or any of the HHQ COA(s).

g. ( ) Observation and Surveillance. The issuing headquarters describes how the observation and surveillance issues might affects its

ability to support each or any of the HHQ COA(s).

h. ( ) Communications Requirements. The issuing headquarters describes how the communications issues might affect its ability to

support each or any of the HHQ COA(s).

i. ( ) Logistics. The issuing headquarters describes how the logistic issues might affect its ability to support each or any of the HHQ

COA(s).

j. ( ) Hydrographic Conditions. The issuing headquarters describes how the hydrographic issues might affect its ability to support each

or any of the HHQ COA(s) during amphibious operations.

4. ( ) Evaluation

a. ( ) COA #1

(1) ( ) Advantages

(a) ( ) List the advantages for this COA.

(b) ( ) These advantages are specific to the issuing headquarters, not necessarily to the force as a whole.

(2) ( ) Disadvantages

(a) ( ) List the disadvantages for this COA.

(b) ( ) These disadvantages are specific to the issuing headquarters, not necessarily to the force as a whole.

Page number

CLASSIFICATION

Figure G-3. Estimate of Supportability Format Sample. (Continued)
G-6 _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

CLASSIFICATION

b. ( ) COA #2

(1) ( ) Advantages

(2) ( ) Disadvantages

5. ( ) Conclusions

a. ( ) The issuing headquarters identifies the preferred COA while summarizing the reasons for its choice.

b. ( ) The issuing headquarters rank orders any other COAs adding the rationale for their order.

c. ( ) The issuing headquarters may also recommend changes to one or more of the COA(s) in this and subsequent paragraphs, based

on its ability to furnish support.

Page number

CLASSIFICATION

Figure G-3. Estimate of Supportability Format Sample. (Continued)
APPENDIX H

RAPID RESPONSE PLANNING PROCESS

The goal of the R2P2 is to spend less time planning in order to provide the executing forces with

the maximum time allowable to prepare for the

mission. When circumstances impose severe time

constraints on the executing command, the commander and the staff must allocate enough time to

develop a feasible COA, time to coordinate critical details, and time to prepare for execution. The

commander and the staff must be thoroughly

familiar with potential contingencies or missions

and the individuals involved with planning must

know their roles in the planning process. Successful rapid planning is predicated on—

 An understanding of the MCPP.

 Detailed preparation, training, and organization

of the force and equipment.

 Intelligence and mission planning products

developed previously.

 Current intelligence information.

 Refined, well-rehearsed SOPs.

If rapid planning is to be successful, both mission planning and preparation requirements are

conducted concurrently. The speed with which a

unit can plan an operation varies with the complexity of the mission, the experience of the commander and the staff, and METT-T factors. The

R2P2 was developed to enable the MEU to plan

and commence execution of certain tasks within

six hours. The rapid planning techniques discussed in this appendix focus on the MEU and its

six-hour timeline, but these techniques may be

tailored and employed to meet any unit’s needs.

Rapid planning by non-MEU units is usually

more effective when conducting routine missions

or tasks for which the unit has been well trained

and has established SOPs.

Actions Prior to Rapid Planning

To best employ R2P2, a unit must develop

capabilities in four areas—integrated planning

cells, planning and operations SOPs, intelligence, and information management. If one of

these areas is lacking, effective rapid planning

may not be achieved.

Integrated Planning Cells

The amount of staff turnover in the planning

cells, to include the commander, directly impacts

the staff’s ability to plan rapidly; therefore, the

composition and membership of the various planning cells used in rapid planning should remain

constant, especially during the predeployment

training program and deployment of the MEU

and amphibious ready group (ARG). The planning cells employed by the MEU and ARG usually include the CAT, the battlestaff, and the

mission planning cells. These cells must participate in frequent planning exercises that involve

real-world scenarios similar to those the unit

might encounter. These exercises ensure the

CAT, battlestaff, and mission planning cells are

thoroughly trained in rapid planning; their members know their commanders and each other; and

the planners possess situational awareness of

likely contingency missions and areas of operations. Planning cells should understand where

they are to meet, what they are to accomplish,

and how much time they have to complete their

planning efforts. The planning cells also must be

capable of conducting concurrent (simultaneous

at different echelons of the same command) and

parallel (between equivalent echelons of different commands) planning.
H-2 _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

Planning and Operations

Standing Operating Procedures

The SOPs are the cornerstone of rapid planning.

The planning SOP should be second nature to all

concerned. Operations SOPs are equally important because they allow planners to select proven

and practiced tasks that provide solutions to tactical problems. The SOPs allow major subordinate

elements (MSEs) to carry out familiar tasks effectively and efficiently with minimal or no higherlevel guidance or communications. The SOP for

each type of mission should include a predesignated task organization, equipment and ordnance

lists, elements of a landing plan, mission execution procedures, and an execution checklist with

code words.

The SOPs must be current, studied, rehearsed,

executable on a moment’s notice, and supported

by timesaving factors. For example, standard ordnance packages for likely missions, such as tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel (TRAP) or a

platoon-sized reinforcement, are prestaged in

readily accessible locations in their magazines in

order to reduce the time needed to break out and

issue ammunition. In addition, mission smart

packs are created for each mission profile. Smart

packs contain specific planning information and

SOPs based on the mission profile, such as for a

light, medium, or heavy helicopter raid. Smart

pack planning and coordination of information are

also used as references during mission execution.

Intelligence

The commander and the staff must anticipate possible contingencies based on continual analyses

of open-source news and classified intelligence

reports. For each situation, the staff should be

equipped with the latest intelligence (a MEU usually prepares mission folders), possible targets,

area studies, and other relevant information. Periodic reviews of potential contingencies permits

situational awareness to be maintained and provides current information. When appropriate, a

commander conducts contingency planning and

refocuses unit training based on likely scenarios.

The intelligence staff must also be familiar with

the Generic Intelligence Requirements Handbook (GIRH), which is produced by Marine

Corps Intelligence Activity. This handbook contains essential elements of information for various mission types.

Information Management

Due to the time constraints inherent in rapid planning, there is less opportunity for the commander

and the staff to analyze information requirements.

Also, computer technology is increasing the

speed and volume of information flow, so an

overabundance of information may obscure vital

facts. It is critical that each participant in the

planning process realizes the importance of his/

her mission area and takes positive steps to

appropriately share knowledge. Commanders and

staff officers must possess the ability to present

clear and concise information. Simple, concise

presentations best support rapid planning.

Composition of Marine

Expeditionary Unit Planning Cells

Crisis Action Team

The central planning cell in the MEU and ARG is

the CAT. Although the CAT’s final composition

depends on the commander and METT-T, its

basic composition is established in the command

SOP. Three factors to consider in determining

membership in the CAT are the physical space

available to accommodate the group, the benefits

of additional input from a wider array of functional areas, and the drawbacks of too many participants. The CAT members may include the

MEU and ARG commanders and their primary

staffs, MSE commanders and their operations

officers, and SMEs. Some MEUs interchangeably

refer to the CAT or the landing force operations

center watch team as the battlestaff.
Marine Corps Planning Process ______________________________________________________________________________ H-3 

Battlestaff

Some MEU and ARG commanders employ a battlestaff. The battlestaff may consist of staff officers at the MEU, ARG, and MSE levels, plus

representatives from attachments and functional

areas not included in the CAT. Ideally, any

potential member of a mission planning cell not

part of the CAT should be on the battlestaff. The

battlestaff convenes whenever the CAT is established, which provides leaders and planners an

opportunity to gain identical situational awareness with the CAT and to prepare for participation in any mission planning cell. Because there

are insufficient personnel in some functional

areas to staff all mission planning cells simultaneously, the battlestaff may have members that

support more than one mission planning cell.

Mission Planning Cell

Early in the planning process, the MEU and ARG

commanders designate a mission commander,

usually one of the MSE commanders. The mission commander then establishes the mission

planning cell to plan the details of the operation.

Consideration must be given to the feasibility of

separate planning cells due to limited staff members; therefore, the mission commander may designate more than one planning cell in order to

plan concurrent, contingency, or follow-on missions. Additionally, a separate R&S mission planning cell may be established to plan R&S

operations. 

Each mission planning cell should include appropriate representation from relevant experts. For

example, a battalion landing team planning cell

might include air and logistic SMEs and Navy

representatives. Maintaining the same personnel

in the planning cells throughout the work-up and

deployment speeds and improves the planning

process. For example, if the ACE is the primary

mission commander for a TRAP, then the GCE

should send the same representative to all TRAP

planning meetings. 

The planning cell’s working spaces must be predesignated so all cell members know where to

report and to ensure no two cells are competing

for the same space. Lower echelon units, such as

companies and platoons, must be prepared to plan

concurrently with the mission planning cells and

have a designated planning space.

Marine Expeditionary Unit

Rapid Response Planning Process

The R2P2 is a time-constrained, six-step process

that mirrors the MCPP. The six steps of the

R2P2 are—

 Problem framing.

 COA development.

 COA war game.

 COA comparison and decision.

 Orders development.

 Transition.

Problem Framing

Effective problem framing is achieved through

prior familiarization with both the situation and

the type of mission and reliance on intuitive decisionmaking, which emphasizes rapid recognition

of patterns based on experience, training, and

education. Planning times can be shortened if the

MEU and ARG perform anticipatory planning for

various contingencies.

Upon receipt/acknowledgement of a WARNORD

or an OPORD, the commander or a designated

individual establishes the CAT. The MEU and

ARG commanders may retain or delegate the

authority to establish a CAT to their operations

officers and/or the MEU executive officer and the

ARG chief of staff. The decision to establish the

CAT is passed immediately to the other ships. If it

is a standard mission covered by an SOP, the initiation of SOP-based cross-decking may occur.
H-4 _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

Designated personnel in the landing force operations center watch section produce copies of the

order for the CAT and battlestaff/mission planning cells and ensure planning spaces are prepared for use. The CAT and battlestaff/mission

planning cells assemble in their respective spaces.

These spaces should be selected or identified in

the SOP to prevent conflicts; for example, the

battlestaff is to assemble in the wardroom during

meal hours. The CAT and battlestaff/mission

planning cells should be in their spaces and have

copies of the WARNORD as soon as possible.

Designated staff personnel begin obtaining

updated personnel and equipment status reports.

Ideally, these reports are collected in a manner

that avoids distracting planners from the planning process, such as outside the planning cells or

on status boards in the planning spaces.

The MEU operations officer serves as the facilitator of the CAT and calls the group to order. A

designated recorder takes roll or members check

in with the recorder upon their arrival. The CAT

determines if there is a need for clarification

during problem framing. If so, a designated staff

member, who is not involved in the CAT,

requests clarification from HHQ. The CAT confirms cross-deck requirements and considers the

need for SMEs based on the nature of the mission. For example, if the mission involves a raid

on a chemical weapons site, the CAT may

include a chemical, biological, radiological, and

nuclear defense officer. If expertise in a critical

area is lacking, the CAT may initiate the process

of obtaining reachback expertise. The meteorology officer provides the latest weather information. The MEU S-2 and the ARG N-2 provide an

intelligence update. The division of labor

between these two officers should be clearly

stated in the SOP to avoid overlap. The entire

CAT then conducts problem framing in the same

manner as the MCPP. Specifically—

 MEU and ARG commanders gain an understanding of the environment and the problem

identified during problem framing. This

understanding is essential to the development

of a commander’s concept.

 Time-constrained units should have their IPB

products ready prior to starting the planning

process. During problem framing, these products are updated if time permits. If IPB products are not available, the staff generates them.

 Rapid planning requires that SOPs are already

understood. Units lacking well rehearsed

SOPs require additional time in all of the planning steps, leading to a more deliberate,

slower planning process.

 The lack of “orientation” time associated with

rapid planning may require an initial staff orientation. A staff orientation informs the planners of previously unknown mission-related

facts.

The beginning of this phase depends, however,

on whether and how the MEU and ARG commanders use the battlestaff. The workings of the

CAT may be viewed directly by the battlestaff or

the mission planning cells through video teleconferencing or a channel on the ship’s secure,

closed-circuit television, affording them the same

situational awareness as the CAT. If the battlestaff or mission planning cells do not have connectivity with the CAT, they can conduct their

own version of problem framing simultaneously

with the CAT; however, the results of the CAT’s

problem framing must be provided to the battlestaff or the mission planning cells to ensure all

planners have the same situational awareness.

Orientation of the staff occurs shortly after completion of problem framing in order to allow the

battlestaff or the appropriate mission planning

cells (identified during problem framing) to convene in their designated spaces.

The MEU and ARG commanders, beginning with

the supporting commander, provide their planning

guidance to the CAT and the battlestaff/mission

planning cells at the conclusion of problem framing or any required staff orientation. A mission

commander may be assigned at this point. The

supported commander follows the intent; an

assessment of COGs and critical vulnerabilities;

ongoing, standby, and follow-on mission priorities; COA considerations/restrictions; timing;
Marine Corps Planning Process ______________________________________________________________________________ H-5 

phasing; warfighting function considerations; and

other significant information that addresses planning for R&S as well as the main mission(s).

The commander’s guidance reflects the experience and proficiency of the staff. The supporting

commander provides any additional guidance.

The MEU S-3 provides the planning timeline and

assigns definite times for completing each step.

The locations for planning and any required augmentation for their planning cells are determined.

Augmentees acknowledge their requirements and

identify themselves to the mission commander.

Participants adjourn to their respective mission

planning cells once problem framing is complete

and the mission is determined.

Based on the type of mission assigned, the mission commander may also direct commencement

of specific preparations by his/her forces. For

example, if the ACE has been assigned to conduct

TRAP, the ACE can simultaneously prepare the

standard package of aircraft while the predesignated ground force draws the standard list of ordnance and prepares mission-associated equipment.

Course of Action Development

For simplicity purposes, this step of the R2P2

process assumes that the mission commander is

developing COAs. The mission commander

begins COA development by convening the mission planning cell and conducting roll call. He/

She may quickly review significant material from

the first step of the process if some cell members

were not present for problem framing. This

review may include an intelligence brief by the

S-2 and a presentation by the S-3 on the mission

and the CAT’s problem framing.

The mission commander summarizes the MEU

and ARG commanders’ guidance and then presents his/her own. If information is required to

support COA development, the commander

directs specific members of the mission planning

cell to gather the required information. The mission planning cell then begins to develop COAs.

Depending on the guidance received, the mission

planning cell may initially concentrate on a specific COA. Effective COA development relies on

intuitive decisionmaking and operational SOPs in

order to meet the reduced timeline of R2P2. The

planning cell develops each COA considering

such factors as—

 R&S linkup procedures, if applicable.

 Movement from the ship to the objective.

 Movement from objective back to the ship.

 Fire support.

 Command and control.

 Information operations.

 Task organization.

 Special equipment.

 General timeline.

The mission planning cell prepares graphics and

narratives for each COA. The COAs are typically

broken into phases and evaluated to ensure they

are suitable, feasible, acceptable, distinguishable,

and complete. If surface reconnaissance is

required, then the R&S mission commander convenes a planning cell and simultaneously

conducts R&S COA development.

To ensure the parallel planning efforts of the primary and R&S mission planning cells are coordinated, liaisons from each cell remain in constant

contact. For example, an R&S coordinator moves

from planning cell to planning cell while keeping

in close contact with the MEU S-3. Since R&S

elements are normally inserted prior to other

forces, the R&S cell must develop its COAs in a

shorter period of time, but the R&S effort must

support the information needs of the primary mission commander.

The COA brief follows. The COA brief can be

presented to the CAT, the entire battlestaff, or

only to the MEU and ARG commanders, the

MSE commanders, the primary mission commander, and a few key staff officers. The R&S

planning cell normally briefs first, while the primary mission planning cell is still developing

COAs. At the conclusion of the R&S COA brief,

the R&S portion of the operation can immediately move on to COA wargaming.
H-6 _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

At this point, the primary mission commander

has completed COA development and the planning cell is preparing its own brief. The MEU and

ARG commanders may approve the R&S COA

before receiving the COA brief for the primary

mission. Alternatively, the MEU and ARG commanders could delay COA wargaming and COA

comparison and decision for the R&S mission

until deciding on a COA for the primary mission,

but this delay would drastically reduce time

needed to prepare and launch R&S forces.

The COA brief for the primary mission is given

to the CAT and the battlestaff. If the battlestaff

concept is not employed, standby and follow-on

mission planning cells and designated additional

staff officers and attachment leaders may also

attend the COA brief. The brief follows the unit

planning SOP, but typically opens with the MEU

S-3’s review of any ongoing/projected missions

and provision of updates/clarifications obtained

from HHQ. The MEU S-2 and the ARG N-2 provide an updated intelligence picture, focusing on

changes since their last brief and including any

answers received to priority intelligence requirements, friendly force information requirements,

or RFIs.

The mission commander summarizes the MEU

and ARG mission, the envisioned end state, measures of effectiveness, and the COAs. He/She

presents the sketch; describes expected events by

phase; and provides the task organization, timeline, concept of fire support, other significant

details, and a list of key advantages/disadvantages

for each COA.

Course of Action War Game

Once all the COAs have been briefed, staff officers, including appropriate attachment leaders and

SMEs, develop their staff estimates according to

unit SOPs. To assist in reaching quick conclusions

and to avoid any oversights, each staff officer uses

a prepared matrix that lists each consideration relevant to the area of concern. For example, the S-4

could address supply quantities and transportation

means. Each staff member prepares an independent estimate that is based solely on his/her area

of expertise and includes each friendly COA’s

strengths and weaknesses, associated risks, and

asset shortfalls as they apply to a warfighting

function, staff section, or attachment. These estimates assist commanders in reaching their decisions. The order of briefing the estimates is

established in the SOP. This brief should—

 Identify which COAs are unsupportable, if all

are equally supportable, or if one is superior to

the others.

 Identify any salient facts requiring the attention

of the MEU and ARG commanders.

 Address impact of a COA on SOPs.

 Address impact of COAs on future operations.

For example, if “x” amount of helicopter and

flight deck time is used today, then “x” amount

will be available tomorrow.

An intelligence officer is also usually tasked to

produce an estimate from the adversary commander’s perspective. The adversary commander’s viewpoint, as expressed by the S-2/N-2,

and staff discussion of hypothetical situations

serve as additional wargaming within the time

constraints of the planning process. At a minimum, this estimate identifies the most dangerous

and hardest to counter COA. The recorder enters

the information on a clearly visible staff estimate

worksheet. The MSE commanders who are not

assigned as the mission commander also prepare/

provide concise estimates of supportability. An

execution matrix or synchronization matrix is

started at this point in the planning process. The

mission commander makes the final input to avoid

influencing staff estimates. Rapid planning wargaming differs from the MCPP in that it may be conducted internally within each staff section rather

than being conducted as one large war game

where all MSEs and staff sections are represented.

If time permits, the latter method is preferred.
Marine Corps Planning Process ______________________________________________________________________________ H-7 

Course of Action Comparison and Decision

Based on personal experiences and information

acquired from COA wargaming, the MEU and

ARG commanders compare the COAs and rapidly reach a decision. Although the supported

commander is the lead decisionmaker, he/she typically seeks concurrence from his/her counterpart,

particularly when he/she relies on assets from the

supporting command. The commanders may

accept a single COA, modify a COA, or decide to

execute something entirely different. Unless the

situation is changing rapidly, both time constraints and continuous involvement of the MEU

and ARG staff should preclude significant COA

alterations. In announcing their decision, the

commander’s provide their refined commander’s

intent and any additional guidance needed to

finalize the plan.

Orders Development

During orders development, all echelons involved

in the operation complete required detailed planning for the approved COA, which has become a

CONOPS. This vertical and horizontal flow of

information among the chain of command and all

elements of the MEU and ARG is vital to concurrent planning and preparation. If the mission

forces or supporting echelons encounter any difficulties or if the situation changes, the mission

planning cell is alerted immediately and the MEU

and ARG commanders are notified if any significant alterations to the COA arise. If changes in

the situation threaten the suitability of the COA

and if time permits, the commanders may direct

the staff and the mission planning cell to return to

an earlier step in the planning process.

The mission commander immediately passes the

results of COA comparison and decision to his/

her forces to assist their planning and preparations. The mission commander and the mission

planning cell continue to update and forward

planning details as changes occur. Plans for supporting or contingency missions may also be

developed. Such missions may be mass casualty, MEDEVAC [medical evacuation], platoonsize reinforcement, initial terminal guidance,

linkup, evasion, or recovery. Supporting echelons, such as ships or other MSEs, receive

updated information from their liaison officers

inside the mission planning cell. The mission

planning cell produces a confirmation brief,

which serves as the draft OPORD.

The MEU S-3 creates and delivers a written

CONOPS in addition to other documents

required by HHQ. To save time and ensure coordinated execution, the commander may not

approve the completed final order until after the

confirmation brief.

Transition

The commander approves the mission for execution immediately following the confirmation brief;

therefore, the confirmation brief is the primary

tool used to transition from planning to execution.

It is also the optimum means of final coordination

within the time available and it can serve as a form

of rehearsal. The brief’s purpose is to ensure those

involved in executing the plan completely understand it and achieve situational awareness.

The brief also ensures agreement among force

elements, since all critical participants are present. Because the confirmation brief is primarily

for those who have a role in executing the mission, all available members of the mission planning cell and the mission force should attend.

Supporting elements, such as ship personnel, not

represented in the mission planning cell should

also attend. All standby and follow-on mission

planning cells that might be affected by the primary mission should also observe the brief. The

CAT and battlestaff members should attend to

provide expertise and answer questions.

Using the format in the unit planning SOP, the

confirmation brief is conducted by the mission

commander. Each participant uses the SOP’s format and media in the brief to avoid overlaps or

omissions. The presentation media are collected

by the scribe and assembled into a smart pack that

may serve as the written order. An initial version

of the smart pack may be assembled during orders
H-8 _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

development, but it should not be issued until

sanctioned by the commander at the confirmation

brief. The original confirmation brief ’s contents,

together with any resulting changes or decisions,

must be provided to the R&S force, particularly if

no representative attended, to ensure that the

final, approved mission is understood.

The brief ’s major focus is on actions occurring in

the objective area. The commander of the element executing these actions, such as the raid

force commander, provides a detailed explanation

of the intended actions and the specific tasks

assigned to subordinate elements. During the

brief, the commanders and their staffs identify

any potential problems. Conflicts that arise from

the brief are resolved or planned for prior to the

completion of the brief. Additional planning must

occur if anything is briefed that is not yet planned

for or coordinated.

The primary mission confirmation brief is usually

limited to an hour. The MEU and ARG commanders may schedule confirmation briefs for standby

or follow-on missions following completion of the

primary mission brief. Upon completion of the

primary mission brief, various elements of the

force may conduct supporting briefs to the same

audience. The commander then designates time

for subordinate element leaders to accomplish any

remaining preparations and rehearsals and a final

inspection of troops and equipment is conducted

to ensure mission readiness. 

During the period before the launch of forces, the

MEU and ARG command echelons supervise the

final preparations and coordination of subordinate elements and prepare for their own role in

the command and control of the operation. The

SOPs establish command and control procedures

for various types of operations except that preparation time is limited. Assumptions and preconditions are validated and branch and sequel

planning should occur.

Sample Planning Matrix

Table H-1 is a sample planning matrix. Units normally develop their own timelines and SOPs.

Table H-1. Sample Planning Matrix. 

Timelines Who

Command and

Staff Actions Products

Concurrent and

Parallel Actions

Problem Framing

0:00-0:30 CAT Receipt of mission

Commander’s orientation

Break out IPB and intelligence 

folders

Conduct problem framing

Mission statement

Commander’s intent

Commander’s planning guidance

Updated IPB products

Specified tasks

Implied tasks

Essential tasks

Constraints (limitations)

Restraints (must not do)

Assumptions

Resource/SME shortfalls

COG analysis

Approved CCIRs

Battlestaff forms

Cross-deck requirements

Command and staff supervision
Marine Corps Planning Process ______________________________________________________________________________ H-9 

0:30-0:50 Battlestaff Initial staff orientation

Determine information 

requirements

Commander’s planning guidance

WARNORDs

Planning schedule

RFIs

Initial staff estimates

Acknowledge receipt

Issue planning schedule

R&S planning

Command and staff supervision

COA Development

0:50-1:10 Battlestaff Convene planning cells

(if not already done)

Update IPB/intelligence

Develop COA(s)

COAs written and

graphics developed

(time and distance identified)

Each potential response force 

commander prepares actions in 

objective area plan

Air support requirement to carrier 

battle group

Staff/subordinate command 

estimates

Commander’s wargaming guidance and evaluation criteria

R&S planning/brief

Command and staff supervision

COA War Game/COA Comparison and Decision

1:10-1:30 Battlestaff Conduct COA war game

Refine COAs/IPB

COAs briefed

Compare/evaluate COAs

Commander makes decision

War game results

WARNORDs

CONOPS

Execution matrix

Refined staff estimates

Identify branches/sequels

Updated CCIRs

Response force/support element 

planning

Command and staff supervision

Orders Development

1:30-3:00 Battlestaff Refine IPB

Prepare OPORD

Order reconciliation

Order crosswalk

OPORD approval

Timeline

Graphic and overlay

Fire support plan

Landing plan

Communications plan

Execution checklist

WARNORDs

Concept of operations message 

to HHQ

Charts/maps

Confirmation briefing slides

Develop timeline/plan

R&S launch

Command and staff supervision 

Cross-decker return

Final planning conference

Table H-1. Sample Planning Matrix. (Continued)

Timelines Who

Command and

Staff Actions Products

Concurrent and

Parallel Actions
H-10 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

Transition

3:00-4:00 Battlestaff Confirmation brief/issue the order Total understanding by all hands 

of the plan

Response from force commander

Briefs/response from

force/support elements

4:00-6:00 Amphibious 

Task Force

Drills All hands ready to execute 

mission

Alternate/sequel plan(s) developed

Table H-1. Sample Planning Matrix. (Continued)

Timelines Who

Command and

Staff Actions Products

Concurrent and

Parallel Actions
APPENDIX I

INTERAGENCY COORDINATION

Interagency coordination occurs between USG

agencies, including DOD, for the purpose of

accomplishing an objective. Similarly, in the

context of DOD involvement, IGO and NGO

coordination refers to coordination between

DOD elements and IGOs or NGOs to achieve an

objective. Refer to JP 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint

Operations (Volumes I and II), for additional

information. Volume I includes information on

the interagency, IGO, and NGO environment and

provides fundamental principles and guidance to

facilitate coordination between DOD and other

USG agencies, IGOs, NGOs, and regional organizations. Volume II describes key USG departments and agencies, IGOs, and NGOs and

includes their core competencies, basic organizational structures, and relationship or potential

relationship with the Armed Forces of the United

States.

Annex V of the OPORD or OPLAN reflects the

commander’s requests for and perception of

potential interagency support to the plan. Information in the annex serves as a starting point for

interagency coordination to ensure agreement

with the commander’s perception of interagency

support. Continued coordination strengthens the

whole of government efforts and improves the

probability of mission success. In developing

annex V consideration should be given to—

 Key Interagency Strategies. Marine planners

must become familiar with interagency strategies, assessments, and plans at all levels (see

table I-1 on page I-2). Requests for relevant

interagency strategies, such as counternarcotics

or counterterrorism, must be made through the

appropriate interagency coordination center

within each geographic combatant command or

Marine Corps force. A basic understanding of

these strategies, assessments, or plans is critical

to enable interagency activities. 

 Assessment and Planning Frameworks.

Interagency partners in many cases have developed assessment tools and have conducted or

are conducting assessments in the area of operations. Assessment tools, such as the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework and

TCAPF, should be the starting point for an

interagency team to assess conflict systematically and collaboratively prepare for interagency planning. Comprehensive tools, such as

Measuring Peace in Conflict Environments and

the Interagency Management System, need to

be learned and understood by Marines in order

to successfully enable interagency activities.

The United States Institute of Peace publication

Guiding Principles for Stabilization and

Reconstruction must be understood and incorporated into stability and reconstruction operations. Interagency planning structures will not

supersede Marine Corps planning structures.
I-2 _________________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

Table I-1. Interagency Documents.

Document Primary Office or Responsibility Summary of Document

Guidance for Employment of the Force DOD Annual classified document that prioritizes theater strategic end states that 

include interagency cooperation and 

integration

Country Assistance Strategy United States Agency for International 

Development (USAID)

5-year look at the needs of a country

Bureau Strategic Plan Department of State bureaus, both 

regional and functional

Annual interagency objectives and performance result indicators

Mission Strategic Plan (MSP), commonly referred to as country planChief of mission; to include all other 

USG agencies that reside on the country team

Annual interagency objectives by 

priority

Operational Plan USAID mission in country Annual plan that feeds into MSP
APPENDIX J

DESIGN: AN EXAMPLE

Iterative Design During 

Operation Iraqi Freedom II

During OIF II, the 1st Marine Division (MARDIV) employed a design (see fig. J-1 on page J-2)

similar to that used during the Philippine Insurrection. The commanding general, Major General

James N. Mattis, began with an assessment of the

people that the Marines, Soldiers, and Sailors

would encounter within the division’s area of operations, western Iraq’s Al Anbar province. Al

Anbar possessed a considerably different demographic than the imam-led Shia areas that dominated OIF I operations. 

Major General Mattis grouped Anbar provincial

constituents into three basic groups: the tribes, the

former regime elements, and the foreign fighters.

The tribes constituted the primary identity group in

Al Anbar. They had various internal tribal affiliations and looked to a diverse array of sheiks and

elders for leadership. The former regime elements

were a minority that included individuals with personal, political, business, and professional ties to

the Ba’ath Party. These included the civil servants

and career military personnel with the skills to run

government institutions. Initially, they saw little

gain from a democratic Iraq. The foreign fighters

were a small but dangerous minority of transnational Islamic jihadists. To be successful, US

forces had to apply a different approach to each of

these groups within the framework of an overarching plan. As in any society, some portion of each

of these groups was composed of a criminal element, further complicating planning and interaction. Major General Mattis’s “vision of

resolution,” as recounted in Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, was composed of two major elements

encompassed in an overarching “bodyguard” of

information operations.

The first element, and the main effort, was reducing support for insurgency. Guided by the maxims

of “first do no harm” and “no better friend, no

worse enemy,” the objective was to establish a

secure local environment for the indigenous population so people could pursue their economic, social,

cultural, and political well-being and achieve some

degree of local normalcy. Establishing a secure

environment involved both offensive and defensive

operations, with a heavy emphasis on training and

advising the security forces of the fledgling Iraqi

government. It also included putting the population

to work. Simply put, an Iraqi with a job was less

likely to succumb to ideological or economic pressure to support the insurgency. Other tasks included

the delivery of essential services, economic development, and the promotion of governance, all

geared toward increasing employment opportunities and furthering the establishment of local normalcy. Essentially, diminishing support for

insurgency was about gaining and maintaining the

support of the tribes, as well as converting as many

of the former regime members as possible. “Fencesitters” were considered a winnable constituency

and addressed as such.

The second element involved neutralizing the bad

actors, a combination of irreconcilable former

regime elements and foreign fighters. Offensive

combat operations were conducted to defeat disobedient former regime members. The task was

to make those who were not killed outright see

the futility of resistance and give up the fight.

With respect to the hard-core extremists, who

would never give up, the task was more straightforward: their complete and utter destruction.

Neutralizing the bad actors supported the main

effort by improving the local security environment. Neutralization had to be accomplished discriminately, however, to avoid unintentionally

increasing support for insurgency. 
J-2 ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

Both elements described above were wrapped in

an overarching “bodyguard” of information operations. Information operations, both proactive and

responsive, were aggressively employed to favorably influence the populace’s perception of all

coalition actions while discrediting the insurgents.

These tasks were difficult: corruption had historically been prevalent among Iraqi officials, generating cynicism toward government; and decades of

Arab media mischaracterization of US actions had

instilled mistrust of American motives. The magnitude of that cynicism and doubt highlighted the

critical importance of using information operations to influence every situation.

In pursuing this “vision of resolution,” 1st MARDIV faced an adaptive adversary. Persistent

American presence and interaction with the populace threatened the insurgents and caused the

adversary to employ more open violence in

selected areas of the Al Anbar province. This

response resulted in learning and adaptation

within 1st MARDIV. The design enabled 1st

MARDIV to adjust the blend of “diminishing

support for insurgents” and “neutralizing bad

actors” to meet the local challenges. Throughout

the operation, 1st MARDIV continued learning

and adapting with the espoused vision providing

a constant guide to direct and unify the effort.

Secure Local

Environment ( jobs)

The Tribes Criminals

Former

Regime

Elements

Criminals

Convert Defeat Destroy

Foreign

Fighters Criminals

Information Operations

Combat Operations

Develop Iraqi

Security Forces

Essential Services

Economic Development

Promotion of Governance

Diminish

Support to

Insurgency

Neutralize

Bad Actors

Figure J-1. I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward)

Design for Operation Iraqi Freedom II.
APPENDIX K

BASIC OPERATION PLANS,

OPERATION ORDERS, AND ATTACHMENTS

This appendix provides instructions and formats that govern the development of a basic operation plan and order, referred to as OPLAN and OPORD, respectively. The formats are based on

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3122.03, Joint Operation Planning

and Execution System (JOPES) Volume II, (Planning Formats and Guidance), and should be

used by all staffs, subordinate commands, and support agencies.

This appendix applies to commanders of Marine Corps forces at all levels. It contains two

sections. Section I provides general administrative guidance for writing a basic operation order

or plan. An operation plan/order foldout is included at the end of this publication for easy

reference. Section II includes sample formats of a plan summary, operation plan or order, and

other attachments. Sample formats are descriptive in nature and identify the information that

needs to be placed in the appropriate paragraph. The formats provided in section II are

followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, modifications are required. Only

those annexes, appendices, and tabs applicable to the level of command are required within the

operation order.

SECTION I. GENERAL

ADMINISTRATIVE GUIDANCE

The arrangement of information in a basic operation order or plan will conform to the formats

shown in this appendix. Paragraph and subparagraph headings indicated in the format will

always appear in each plan. In OPORDs, if information or instructions are not required in a

particular paragraph, then that paragraph is noted as “not applicable” to show that consideration has been given to that part of the order. Further subdivisions, if required, should conform

to the basic system of paragraph titles and numbering discussed below. The sequencing for

naming is as follows: annex, appendix, tab, exhibit.

The last page of the basic operation order or plan and each attachment will contain a list of any

included documents. The basic operation order or plan should refer to each annex. Information

provided in the basic operation order or plan is not normally repeated in the attachments.

Paragraphing, Titling, and Numbering

Paragraph titles are upper and lower case and underlined, as in Situation. All subparagraphs

and subtitles are upper and lower case and underlined, as in Concept of Operations, except

forces, commands, or agencies. Forces, commands, and agencies are capitalized and underlined

only in titles, as in SPECIAL PURPOSE MAGTF.
K-2 _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

When a paragraph is subdivided, it must have at least two subdivisions. When paragraphs are

subdivided, they will be numbered and lettered as follows:

1.

a.

(1)

(a)

1

a

(1)

(a)

Subsequent lines of text for each paragraph may be flush left or equally indented (as in the following examples) at the option of the chief of staff or executive officer as long as consistency

is maintained.

Example 1: Flush Left

a. (U) Situation. Follow-on text. Text, text, text, text, text, text, text, text, text, text, text, text,

text, text, text, text, text, text, text, text, text, text, text.

Example 2: Equally Indented.

a. (U) Situation. Follow-on text. Text, text, text, text, text, text, text, text, text, text, text, text,

text, text, text, text, text, text, text, text, text, text, text.

Classification Markings

Mark front and back covers with the overall classification of the plan. Mark the first page of

plan elements—plan summary, basic plan, and each annex, appendix, tab, and exhibit—with

the overall classification of the element. Unclassified plan elements are marked as such. Mark

each interior page of the classified plan element with the highest classification and sensitive

classified information code word of the material contained on the page. If the page does not

contain classified material, mark it as unclassified. Center classification markings between the

left and right margins at both the top and bottom of the page. The classification marking is

written in uppercase letters, as in UNCLASSIFIED.

All paragraphs will have a security classification level. Use parenthetical symbols (TS), (S),

(C), and (U) to indicate the security classification level of titles, paragraphs, and subparagraphs.

Page Numbering

Page numbers are located at the bottom of the page and centered. Page C-1-A-3, for example,

denotes page 3 of Tab A to Appendix 1 to Annex C. There is a single space between the page

number and the classification marking.
Marine Corps Planning Process _____________________________________________________________________________ K-3 

Formatting Instructions

The following list provides a line-by-line format for the OPLAN and OPORD:

Line 1—Classification.

Line 2—Changes from Oral Orders. These changes are used when oral orders regarding

this operation were previously issued and are enclosed in parentheses. Example: “(No

change from oral orders except paragraphs 3b and 3f.).” This phrase is omitted in plans and

in orders when no oral orders were issued.

Lines 3–7—Heading Data. The heading data is formatted as follows:

Copy no. ____ of ____ copies

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF COMMAND

PLACE OF ISSUE

Date-time group

Message reference number

 The first line of the heading is the copy number assigned by the issuing headquarters. A

copy number is given to each copy. It is not shown on attached annexes. A log will be

maintained of specific copies issued to addressees. 

 The second line is the official designation of the command. It is always capitalized. Use a

code name if required for security. 

 The third line is the place of issue. It may be a code name, postal designator, or geographic location (including coordinates). The place of issue is always capitalized. 

 The fourth line is the date or date-time group the plan or order is signed, issued, and

becomes effective unless specified otherwise in coordinating instructions. 

 The fifth line is the message reference number. It is assigned by the originator and contains letters, numbers, or a combination of the two. The message reference number has no

connection with the message center numbering system. Annexes issued separately are

assigned different message reference numbers. It allows acknowledgement in the clear.

Line 8—Title. Orders are numbered consecutively for a calendar year. Two or more orders

issued on the same day are given consecutive numbers. A joint operation plan or order is so

designated. The code name, if any, is shown.

Line 9—Type of Document.

Lines 10–13—References. Documents, such as maps, charts, photo maps, or standing

operating procedures, necessary for understanding must be available to recipients. This

entry is always included. Use “References: None” when applicable. Map entries include

series number, country, sheet names or numbers, edition, and scale.

Line 14—Time Zone. If the time zone is the same for the place of issue and execution and

will be the same throughout execution, then this entry may be omitted. If the time zone is

different in the area of execution, as frequently occurs in amphibious or air-transported

operations, then state when the indicated time zone becomes effective.

Line 15—Task Organization. Task organization may be shown in the following ways:

 As an unnumbered entry before Paragraph 1 (Situation). Used when entire command of

issuing headquarters is organized into task organizations for a particular operation and

task organizations are too complicated to be shown using other methods.

 If there is no change to previous task organization, show as “No change.”
K-4 _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

 Under the proper subparagraph of paragraph 3. This method is the simplest and preferred

in a continuing ground combat situation. Show as “No change except paragraph 3b . . .”

 As an annex when lengthy, such as for a division or higher. It is used in amphibious operations, because it permits early dissemination and assists concurrent planning, and where

planning precedes operation by a considerable period of time.

The organization of the issuing headquarters, including Service and administrative groupings that will perform normal functions, is the first entry. Following that, each task grouping

that is to receive a tactical mission is shown in the sequence in which the missions are

assigned in paragraph 3. 

See fig. K-1 for an example of the aforementioned lines 1–15.

Lines 17–18—General. For plans, describe the general politico-military environment that

would establish the probable preconditions for execution of the plan. For orders, this can be

the commander’s estimate of the situation. In both cases, the lines are informed by the ongoing design effort.

Line 19—Battlespace. Battlespace includes the higher commander’s area of operation and

the command’s areas of interest, influence, and operations described by physical area and

forces of concern.

Line 20—Adversary Forces. Adversary forces include information vital to the entire command or information likely to affect accomplishment of mission. It may refer to such attachments as the intelligence annex, operation overlay (if adversary information is shown), or

intelligence summaries. It contains disposition, intent, objectives, vulnerabilities, centers of

gravity, and courses of action.

1 CLASSIFICATION

2 (No change from oral orders)

3 Copy no.__ of__ copies

4 I MEF

5 GREENTOWN, BLUELAND

6 17 Apr 2010

7 ABD-1

8 OPERATION ORDER 0002-10 (OPERATION SHARP SWORD) (U)

9 BASIC ORDER (U)

10 (U) REFERENCES:

11 (a) Maps and Charts: Series ONC, sheet G-2 (ORANGELAND, BLUELAND),edition 12, 

12 1:1,000,000

13 (b) USPACOM Planning Directive, 27 March 2001

14 (U) TIME ZONE: Zulu

15 (U) TASK ORGANIZATION. Annex A

Figure K-1. Sample Operation Plan or Operation Order Format, Lines 1–15.
Marine Corps Planning Process _____________________________________________________________________________ K-5 

Line 21—Friendly Forces. Friendly forces include information on own forces having a

bearing on the operation (higher, adjacent, and supporting). Artillery is listed as the first

supporting unit and then others are listed alphabetically. It may reference an annex or the

operation overlay.

Line 22—Attachments and Detachments. Nonorganic units attached and/or organic units

detached from the unit temporarily.

Lines 23–25—Paragraph 2. Paragraph 2 is the mission statement. There are no subparagraphs. The mission is always stated here even if shown on an operation overlay or map.

Line 26—Paragraph 3. Paragraph 3 addresses execution.

Line 27—Commander’s Intent. Commander’s intent is the commander’s personal expression of the purpose of the operation. It must be clear and concise. The purpose of providing

intent is to allow subordinates to exercise judgment and initiative—to depart from the plan

when the task assigned is no longer appropriate to the situation—in a way that is consistent

with the higher commander’s aims.

Line 28—Concept of Operations. The concept of operations is a summary statement of

how the operation will be accomplished. It amplifies paragraph 2 by providing the method,

end state, and other considerations. It may be shown graphically or published as an appendix to annex C. Specific unit designations are not used.

Lines 29–35—Tasks. This subparagraph identifies tasks to subordinate elements. Each task

assigned to a unit will include the purpose of the task, as in “in order to . . .” Each unit,

organic or attached, or tactical grouping that is executing a tactical task is assigned a separate, numbered subparagraph. All tactical tasks must be listed in the body of the basic order.

List tasks for major subordinate elements as follows:

 Offensive order—Ground combat units (infantry first followed by artillery and combat

support units numerically or alphabetically), aviation combat units or elements (aircraft

units, combat support, combat service support), and combat service support units or

logistic elements.

 Defensive order—Units or elements closest to the adversary are listed first. Ground and

aviation combat units in the forward defense area are then listed in numerical order followed by other units alphabetically.

Each tactical task assignment may show the assets (attached or in support) available to the

unit or element for the operation first, then tasks are enumerated. Priority must be stated if

missions are multiple and priority of accomplishment is desired. If all instructions to a unit

are shown on the operations overlay, list the unit after the proper subparagraph number and

reference the operation overlay appendix.

Line 36—Reserve. The reserve is tasked separately from the remainder of the units. It is

usually designated the main effort when committed. If there is no reserve designated, then

so state.

Line 37—Commander’s Critical Information Requirements. Commander’s critical

information requirements identify information the commander has deemed critical to maintaining situational awareness, planning future activities, and assisting in timely and

informed decisionmaking.

Line 38—Coordinating Instructions. This paragraph is the final subparagraph in paragraph 3. It contains instructions common to two or more units, coordinating details and

control measures applicable to the command as a whole, and time or conditions when the
K-6 _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

plan is to be executed. It refers to annexes or references for coordinating details when

appropriate. Communications instructions are shown in paragraph 5 only.

Line 39—Paragraph 4. Paragraph 4 contains logistic and personnel information and

instructions for the operation. It usually refers to appropriate annexes.

Line 40—Page number.

Line 41—Classification.

See fig. K-2 for an example of the aforementioned lines 16–42.
Marine Corps Planning Process _____________________________________________________________________________ K-7 

16 1. (U) Situation

17 a. (U) General. With the failure of deterrence, Blueland forces crossed the Orangeland border and 

18 have been successful in their initial battles.

19 b. (U) Battlespace. See appendix 18 to annex C.

20 c. (U) Adversary Forces. See annex B and current INTSUMs [intelligence summaries].

21 d. (U) Friendly Forces

22 e. (U) Attachments and Detachments

23 2. (U) Mission. On order, I MEF, as the main effort, conducts offensive operations to defeat adversary

24 forces in zone in order to restore the Blueland border. Be prepared to continue offensive operation into

25 Orangeland to destroy remaining Orangeland offensive military capabilities.

26 3. (U) Execution

27 a. (U) Commander’s Intent

28 b. (U) Concept of Operations. This operation will be conducted in three phases.

29 c. (U) Tasks

30 (1) (U) 1st MARINE DIVISION (Rein)

31 (2) (U) 3d

 MARINE DIVISION (-) (Rein)

32 (3) (U) 3d

 MARINE AIRCRAFT WING

33 (4) (U) 1st FORCE SERVICE SUPPORT GROUP (-) (Rein)

34 (5) (U) SPECIAL PURPOSE MAGTF-B

35 (6) (U) REAR AREA COMMANDER

36 d. (U) MEF Reserve

37 e. (U) Commander’s Critical Information Requirements

38 f. (U) Coordinating Instructions

39 4. (U) Administration and Logistics

40 Page number

41 CLASSIFICATION

Figure K-2. Sample Operation Plan or Operation Order Format, LInes 16–42.
K-8 _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

Page two of the OPLAN or OPORD provides the following information and is exemplified in

fig. K-3 on page K-10:

Line 1—Classification.

Lines 2–6—Paragraph 5. Paragraph 5 contains instructions that establish and maintain

command and signal procedures. 

 Command Relationships. Used in a large operation or when relationships are unusual,

otherwise omitted.

 Command Posts and Headquarters. May reference operations overlay for locations.

 Succession to Command. Designates the succession to command for the operation.

 Signal. Usually references annex K and other communication publications, such as standing operating procedures or communications-electronics operating instructions. Includes

instructions or restrictions about communications-electronics, such as radio restrictions or

pyrotechnic signals.

Use additional subparagraphs to show location and time of opening communications centers, recognition and identification instructions, code words and names, and liaisons.

Line 7—Acknowledgement Instructions. Acknowledgement instructions are included in

every order and in separately issued portions. It ensures that recipients receive and understand the order.

Lines 8–10—Signature and Authentication. The basic operation order or plan and each

annex within are signed or authenticated by the commanding officer. Full signature blocks

are used. Appropriate officers may be given authority to sign portions of the order. The

commander is the only person authorized to sign or approve any portion of the order unless

by direction authority has been granted to another individual.

 Appendices, tabs, exhibits, and maps do not require signature or authentication except

when distributed separately from the basic operation order or plan.

 Original is signed by commander, with name, rank and service, and title:

Name

Rank and Service

Title

Lines 11–31—Annexes. Annexes form a portion of the completed plan or order. They pertain to a particular concept, subject, or coordination aspect that is too voluminous, of insufficient general interest, or in an irregular form, such as overlays, graphs, or tables, for the

body of the plan or order. They contribute to the brevity and clarity of the basic operation

plan or order. Sequence and lettering must not be changed, but annexes may be omitted

when not required. Annexes are amplified where necessary by appendices to annexes, tabs

to appendices, and exhibits to tabs.

Annex formats and designations shown in this appendix are mandatory unless otherwise

indicated. The annex title is upper and lower case. Within the body of the basic operation

order or plan, the annex title is also enclosed in parentheses. When any of these annexes are

not required, the annex is noted as “not used” or “not applicable” in the table of contents.

Elements that will be developed later may be noted as “to be issued.”
Marine Corps Planning Process _____________________________________________________________________________ K-9 

Annex format is preferred for other attachments, such as appendices or tabs, but it may be

altered when information or instructions must be included for which no provision is made in

the standard format.

Additional annexes may be added when necessary to permit distribution separate from the

basic operation order or plan or when information must be included where no provision is

made in standard annexes. When included, letter additional annexes consecutively, beginning with the letter “R” and “Y.” The letters “I” and “O” are not used as annex designations.

Usually annexes A through D, J, and K will be provided as part of the basic operation order

or plan. Develop additional annexes and their associated appendices in an abbreviated format for those areas significantly affecting mission accomplishment.

Lines 32–36—Authentication. Authenticated by G-3/S-3 when commander’s or executive

officer’s signature is on the original only; G-3/S-3 authentication appears on all other copies. The original is signed by chief of staff/executive officer:

OFFICIAL:

Name

Rank and Service

Title

Line 37—Page number.

Line 38—Classification.
K-10 _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

1 CLASSIFICATION

2 5. (U) Command and Signal

3 a. (U) Command Relationships. See Annex J (Command Relationships).

4 b. (U) Command Posts and Headquarters

5 c. (U) Succession to Command

6 d. (U) Signal. See Annex K (Combat Information System).

7 ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

8 I. M. MARINE

9 Lieutenant General, USMC

10 Commanding

11 ANNEXES:

12 A—Task Organization

13 B—Intelligence

14 C—Operations

15 D—Logistics

16 E—Personnel

17 F—Public Affairs

18 G—Civil-Military Operations

19 H—Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations

20 J—Command Relationships

21 K—Combat Information Systems

22 L—Environmental Considerations

23 M—Geospatial Information and Services

24 N—Space Operations

25 P—Host Nation Support

26 Q—Medical Services

27 S—Special Technical Operations

U—Information Management

28 V—Interagency Coordination

29 W—Aviation Operations

30 X—Execution Checklist

31 Z—Distribution

32 OFFICIAL

33 s/

34 I. A. MARINE

35 Colonel, USMC

36 AC/S G-3

37 Page number

38 CLASSIFICATION

Figure K-3. Sample Operation Plan or Operation Order Format, Page 2.
Marine Corps Planning Process ____________________________________________________________________________ K-11 

SECTION II. SAMPLE FORMATS

Section II provides examples of a plan summary, basic operation plan or order, and some

appendices and tabs. Sample formats are descriptive in nature and identify the information that

needs to be placed in the appropriate paragraph. The following table of contents lists standing

formats. Bold text indicates the format is provided in this section. Italic text indicates that a

particular format is not used in Marine Corps plans or orders, but it is included in the list to

conform to CJCSM 3122.03.
K-12 _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

Page

Plan Summary K-16

Basic Order or Plan K-19

Annex A. Task Organization K-26

Appendix 1. Time-Phased Force and Deployment List

Appendix 2. Shortfall Identification

Appendix 3. Force Module Identification

Appendix 4. Deterrent Options

Appendix 5. Reserve Component Requirements Summary

Annex B. Intelligence K-29

Appendix 1. Priority Intelligence Requirements

Appendix 2. Signals Intelligence

Tab A. Communications Intelligence Collection Requirements

Tab B. Operational Electronic Intelligence Collection Requirements

Appendix 3. Counterintelligence

Tab A. Counterintelligence Target List

Tab B. Multidiscipline Counterintelligence Threat Report

Tab C. Designation of Theater Counterintelligence Executive Agency

Appendix 4. Targeting Intelligence

Tab A. Target List (Conventional)

Appendix 5. Human Resource Intelligence

Tab A. HUMINT Operations Cell Operations

Tab B. EPW/Civilian Detainees

Appendix 6. Information Operations Intelligence Integration

Appendix 7. Imagery Intelligence

Appendix 8. Measurement and Signature Intelligence

Appendix 9. Captured Adversary Equipment

Tab A. Specific Prioritized Intelligence Collection Requirements

Tab B. Equipment Releasable for Operational Purposes

Appendix 10. National Intelligence Support Team

Appendix 11. Intelligence Estimate

Appendix 12. Intelligence Products

Appendix 13. Intelligence Collection Plan

Appendix 14. Reconnaissance and Surveillance Plan

Appendix 15. Geographic Intelligence

Appendix 16. Intelligence Operations

Appendix 17. Support to Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape

Annex C. Operations K-34

Appendix 1. Nuclear Operations

Appendix 2. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense Operations

Appendix 3. Information Operations K-38

Tab A. Military Deception K-41

Exhibit 2. Intelligence K-46

Attachment A. Priority Intelligence Requirements K-49

Tab B. Electronic Warfare

Tab C. Operations Security

Tab D. Psychological Operations

Tab E. Computer Network Operations

Appendix 4. Special Operations

Appendix 5. Evasion and Recovery Operations

Appendix 6. Rules of Engagement

Appendix 7. Reconnaissance

Appendix 8. Air Base Operability
Marine Corps Planning Process ____________________________________________________________________________ K-13 

Page

Appendix 9. Combat Camera

Tab A. Combat Camera Customer Support Requirements

Appendix 10. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

Appendix 11. Escape and Evasion Operations

Appendix 12. Counterattack

Appendix 13. Explosive Ordnance Disposal

Appendix 14. Amphibious Operations

Tab A. Advance Force Operations

Tab B. Embarkation Plan

Tab C. Landing Plan

Tab D. Rehearsal Plan

Tab E. CSS Control Agencies Plan

Appendix 15. Force Protection

Tab A. Combating Terrorism

Tab B. Physical Security

Tab C. Base Defense

Appendix 16. Rear Area Operations

Appendix 17. Communications Strategy (Placeholder pending doctrinal development)

Appendix 18. Operations Overlay K-51

Appendix 19. Fire Support

Tab A. Aviation Support

Tab B. Artillery Support Plan

Tab C. Naval Surface Fire Support

Tab D. Current Fire Support Operations 

Tab E. Targeting 

Tab F. Fire Support Coordination Plan 

Tab G. Fire Support System Plan

Tab H. Reports 

Tab I. Coalition Fire Support Plan

Tab J. Counterfire Plan

Tab K. Liaison Plan 

Appendix 20. Countermechanized Plan

Appendix 21. Breaching Plan

Appendix 22. Obstacle Plan

Appendix 23. Counterimprovised Explosive Device Plan

Annex D. Logistics/Combat Service Support K-52

Appendix 1. Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants Supply

Appendix 2. Mortuary Affairs

Appendix 3. Sustainability Analysis

Appendix 4. Mobility and Transportation

Tab A. En Route Support Requirements

Tab B. Reception and Onward Movement

Appendix 5. Civil Engineering Support Plan

Appendix 6. Nonnuclear Ammunition

Tab A. Munitions Matrix

Appendix 7. Supply

Appendix 8. Services

Appendix 9. Health Services

Appendix 10. Aviation Logistic Support (normally in the aviation combat element plan or order)

Appendix 11. External Support

Appendix 12. Maintenance

Appendix 13. General Engineering
K-14 _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

Page

Annex E. Personnel

Appendix 1. Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees, and Other Detained Persons

Appendix 2. Processing of Formerly Captured, Missing, or Detained US Personnel

Appendix 3. Finance and Disbursing

Appendix 4. Legal

Appendix 5. Military Postal Service

Tab A. Aerial Mail Terminals

Tab B. Military Post Offices

Appendix 6. Chaplain Activities

Tab A. Inter-Service Chaplain Support

Tab B. Host Nation Religious Support

Tab C. Commander-Staff Chaplain Relationships

Annex F. Public Affairs

Appendix 1. Personnel Requirements for Joint Information Bureaus and Sub-Joint Information 

Bureaus

Appendix 2. Equipment and Support Requirements for Joint Information Bureaus and Sub-Joint 

Information Bureaus

Appendix 3. General Ground Rules for the Media

Appendix 4. DOD National Media Pool

Annex G. Civil-Military Operations

Annex H. Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations

Annex J. Command Relationships K-59

Appendix 1. Command Relationships Diagram K-62

Annex K. Combat Information Systems

Appendix 1. Information Systems Security

Appendix 2. Defensive Information Warfare

Appendix 3. Communications Planning

Appendix 4. Satellite Communications Planning

Tab A. UHF SATCOM Network List

Tab B. SHF SATCOM Network List

Tab C. EHF SATCOM Network List

Annex L. Environmental Considerations

Annex M. Geospatial Information and Services

Appendix 1. Geospatial Information and Services List

Annex N. Space Operations

Annex P. Host Nation Support

Appendix 1. List of Host Nation Support Agreements

Annex Q. Medical Services

Appendix 1. Joint Medical Regulating System

Appendix 2. Joint Blood Program

Appendix 3. Hospitalization

Appendix 4. Patient Evacuation

Appendix 5. Returns to Duty

Appendix 6. Medical Logistics (Class 8A) System

Appendix 7. Preventive Medicine

Appendix 8. Medical Communications and Information Systems

Appendix 9. Host Nation Medical Support
Marine Corps Planning Process ____________________________________________________________________________ K-15 

Page

Appendix 10. Medical Sustainability Assessment

Appendix 11. Medical Intelligence Support to Military Operations

Appendix 12. Veterinary Medicine

Appendix 13. Medical Planning Responsibilities and Task Identifications

Annex S. Special Technical Operations

Annex U. Information Management

Annex V. Interagency Coordination K-64

Annex W. Aviation Operations

Appendix 1. Air Defense/Antiair Warfare

Appendix 2. Offensive Air Support

Appendix 3. Assault Support

Appendix 4. Reconnaissance and Surveillance Plan

Appendix 5. Supplementary Air Operations

Appendix 6. Aircraft Armament

Appendix 7. Air Control

Appendix 8. Air Communications

Appendix 9. Air Movement Plan/Flight Ferry

Appendix 10. Aircraft Schedules

Appendix 11. Air Tasking

Annex X. Execution Checklist K-68

Annex Z. Distribution
Page number

CLASSIFICATION

K-16 _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

SAMPLE FORMAT OF A PLAN SUMMARY

A plan summary allows commanders, staffs, and

other individuals and agencies to quickly review

the envisioned activities of a command. They are

particularly useful in creating situational awareness in newly assigned personnel and in higher,

supporting, and adjacent commands. A plan summary is normally only prepared at higher levels of

command, such as the component (Marine Corps

forces) and Marine expeditionary force, in support of a unified command plan.

CLASSIFICATION

Copy no. ____ of ____ copies

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF COMMAND

PLACE OF ISSUE

Date-time group

Message reference number

OPLAN (Number) (Operation CODE WORD) (U)

PLAN SUMMARY (U)

1. (U) Purpose

a. (U) Describe the purpose to be achieved by executing the plan and the 

desired end state. If this is a supporting plan, indicate what plan it supports.

b. (U) Include a statement similar to the following: “This summary provides military decisionmakers with the major aspects of this plan. It is based 

on planning factors and estimates available at the time of preparation and is 

subject to modification in the context of a specific contingency. The information contained herein must be updated before use in adopting courses of 

action in a particular situation.”

2. (U) Conditions for Implementation/Execution

a. (U) Politico-Military Situation. Summarize the politico-military situation 

in which execution of the plan should be considered.

b. (U) Legal Considerations. Summarize any legal considerations that may 

affect plan implementation (status of forces, rules of engagement, international agreements, Law of Armed Conflict).

3. (U) Operations to be Conducted
Marine Corps Planning Process ____________________________________________________________________________ K-17 

Page number

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a. (U) Forces Assigned. Summarize the major forces (assigned, attached, or supporting) and augmentation required from other sources.

b. (U) Deployment. Summarize the movements of forces necessary to place combat 

forces in the operational area. When applicable, include operational security measures 

to be carried out before full execution of the plan.

c. (U) Employment. State the general nature of combat operations to be conducted, 

including amphibious operations, information operations, or electronic warfare, when 

applicable. These operations may be discussed in the phases of the operations. A mission statement, commander’s intent, and concept of operations may be written for each 

phase. This discussion may contain a concise statement of the operation’s end state 

and end state for each phase. It may include how unit dispositions at the end of each 

phase facilitate transition to the next phase. A discussion of the commander’s estimate 

of the adversary’s intent may also be included.

d. (U) Supporting Plans. List any requirements for supporting plans to be prepared by 

subordinate and supporting commands or agencies.

e. (U) Collateral Plans. List operation plans that could be implemented before, 

during, or after the subject plan.

4. (U) Key Assumptions. List assumptions deemed essential to the success of the plan,

including the degree of mobilization and mobility (sea and airlift) assumed.

5. (U) Operational Constraints. List major factors that may impede accomplishment of 

the mission.

6. (U) Time to Commence Effective Operations. If appropriate, include a table showing 

the required time-phased buildup of combat forces in the objective area. Indicate which 

forces must be available in the operational area before effective operations can begin. 

Show the elapsed time, following an order to implement the plan, when each significant 

level of combat force required by the plan could begin effective operations in the objective 

area. Note that the lowest level of force reported will be the smallest force increment that 

could initiate effective operations. List successively higher force levels up to the 

maximum level called for in the basic plan. List any assumptions applied in preparing the 

table that are not specified in the plan. In determining the time to commence effective 

operations, consider forces to be deployed or employed to be at normal conditions of 

readiness; that is, no preparations except those required for force protection. Also consider 

the following additional factors, as appropriate.

a. (U) Time required to carry out electronic warfare as specified in the relevant plans.

b. (U) Time for preparation and transmission of necessary orders.
K-18 _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

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c. (U) Reaction time, including all necessary preparations for movement and, if necessary, staging.

d. (U) Availability and capability of strategic transportation resources and facilities.

e. (U) Time en route to the operational area, using available lift and considering possible restrictions on the use of deployment routes.

f. (U) Possible adversary action against forces in transit.

g. (U) Reception and throughput capabilities of overseas terminals, where 

appropriate.

h. (U) Time to marry up forces and equipment deployed by separate movement 

modes, including marry up with prepositioned equipment, when appropriate.

i. (U) Availability and capability of transport systems within the area of operations, 

where required.

j. (U) Time required in the operational area for final preparation of forces, including 

movement to the objective area before employment.

7. (U) Command Relationships. Summarize the command arrangements to be employed 

on execution.

8. (U) Logistic Appraisal. Provide an estimate of logistic feasibility for the plan.

9. (U) Personnel Appraisal. Provide an estimate of personnel feasibility for this plan.

10. (U) Consolidated Listing and Impact Assessment of Shortfalls and Limiting Factors. 

Provide a consolidated listing and impact assessment of force, movement, and support 

shortfalls and limiting factors that impact significantly on the conduct of operations. Identify shortfalls in joint and Service doctrine, interoperability, and training. Specify the tasks 

that cannot be accomplished in view of the shortfalls. Include specific documentation of 

each significant shortfall and limiting factor and the efforts to resolve it in the appropriate 

annex to the plan. Address additional forces, including combat support and combat service 

support, recommended by the supported commander to reduce risk but not allocated in the 

plan summary. Do not include such forces in appendix 2 to Annex A (Task Organization) 

of the plan.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

Name

Rank and Service

Title
Page number

CLASSIFICATION

Marine Corps Planning Process ____________________________________________________________________________ K-19 

SAMPLE FORMAT OF A BASIC ORDER OR PLAN

CLASSIFICATION

Copy no. ____ of ____ copies

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF COMMAND

PLACE OF ISSUE

Date-time group

Message reference number

OPERATION ORDER OR PLAN (Number) (Operation CODE WORD) (U)

TITLE (U)

REFERENCES: List any maps, charts, standing operating procedures, or other 

documents essential to understanding the order or plan.

(U) TIME ZONE: Enter if area of operations is different than place of

issue.

(U) TASK ORGANIZATION. Annex A.

1. (U) Situation

a. (U) General. (May be omitted.) Describe the general politico-military 

environment that would establish the probable preconditions for execution 

of the plan. If applicable, state US policy goals and the estimated goals of 

other parties and outline political decisions needed from other countries to 

achieve US policy goals and conduct effective US military operations to 

attain US military missions. Similarly, this paragraph can also contain the 

results of the commander’s design, providing the larger context for the plan 

or order by explaining his/her understanding of the operational environment 

and the nature of the problem that the mission statement and concept of 

operations are meant to solve. 

b. (U) Battlespace

(1) (U) Joint Operations Area/Higher Commander’s Area of Operations. 

Describe the higher commander’s area of operations. A map may also be 

included as an attachment.
K-20 _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

Page number

CLASSIFICATION

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(2) (U) Area of Interest. Describe the commander’s area of interest covered by the 

basic operation order or plan. This description should address all air, ground, and 

sea areas that directly affect the operation. A map may also be included as an attachment.

(3) (U) Area of Operations. Describe the specific area covered by the operation. A 

map may also be included as an attachment.

c. (U) Adversary Forces. Identify the opposing forces expected on execution (location, disposition) and appraise their general capabilities and possible actions (defend, 

reinforce, attack, withdraw, delay). Limit this information to what is vital for the entire 

command or what is likely to affect mission accomplishment. See Annex B (Intelligence) for details. Address known or potential terrorist threats. When applicable, identify the adversary’s operational and tactical center(s) of gravity.

d. (U) Friendly Forces

(1) (U) This paragraph provides information on nonorganic forces having a bearing on the operation. The information is presented in the following order:

(a) (U) Higher. State the mission statement and commander’s intent of the 

higher commander.

(b) (U) Adjacent. State the mission statement or relevant tasks of adjacent 

commanders.

(c) (U) Supporting. State the command relationship with the supporting commanders (operational control, tactical control, tactical missions, general support, direct support) or relevant tasks of supporting commanders.

(2) (U) Identify applicable friendly centers of gravity that require support and protection for successful mission accomplishment.

(3) (U) If applicable, list the tasks of government interagency and nongovernmental departments, agencies, and organizations associated with the operation, 

such as Department of State, Doctors Without Borders, or Red Cross.

e. (U) Civilian Populace. List circumstances or factors regarding tribes, clans, religious, or ethnic groups that can impact operations.

f. (U) Attachments and Detachments. List nonorganic units attached to or units 

detached from the issuing headquarters. If no units are attached or detached, state 

“None.”
Marine Corps Planning Process ____________________________________________________________________________ K-21 

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g. (U) Assumptions. (Omitted in orders.) List all assumptions on which the plan is 

based.

h. (U) Legal Considerations. List those significant legal considerations on which the 

plan is based, such as status of forces agreements or law of land warfare.

2. (U) Mission. A concise statement of the tasks and purpose of the operation. State the 

who, what, when, where, why, and as much of the how as necessary to ensure command, 

control, and coordination. The who, what, when, and where are derived from the essential 

tasks. The why is derived from the purpose of the operation.

3. (U) Execution

a. (U) Commander’s Intent. Commander’s intent is the commander’s personal 

expression of the purpose of the operation. This paragraph contains the purpose from 

the mission statement as well as any additional information related to purpose that 

allows subordinate commanders to exercise proper initiative if the task they are 

assigned is no longer appropriate to the situation.

b. (U) Concept of Operations. A verbal or graphic statement that clearly and 

concisely expresses what the commander intends to accomplish and how it will be 

done using available resources. The concept of operations provides a basis for 

supporting concepts, such as—

(1) (U) Concept of Maneuver. See Annex C (Operations) and Annex W (Aviation 

Operations) for detailed description.

(2) (U) Concept of Fires. See Annex C (Operations) and Annex W (Aviation Operations) (if applicable) for detailed description.

(3) (U) Concept of Support. See Annex D (Logistics/Combat Service Support) for 

detailed description.

(4) (U) Other Concepts as Required. See appropriate annex for detailed 

description.

c. (U) Tasks

(1) (U) List the tasks assigned to each subordinate commander in separate, 

numbered subparagraphs. Tasks are listed in order of priority or accomplishment. 

Tasks may be listed by phase. Designation of main effort or supporting effort is 

noted in tasking.

(2) (U) Some actions are so critical that the commander may assign them as missions. These should be assigned as task and purpose (in order to . . .). Other actions 
K-22 _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

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are assigned simply as tasks because the purpose is understood. The commander 

assigns subordinate commanders tasks he/she deems necessary to fulfill the concept of operations.

(3) (U) Unit or element task assignments are listed in the following order:

(a) (U) Offensive operations: ground combat units or elements (infantry first 

followed by artillery and combat support units numerically or alphabetically), 

aviation combat units or elements (aircraft units, combat support, combat service support), combat service support units or logistic elements.

(b) (U) Defensive operations: units or elements closest to the adversary are 

listed first, ground and aviation combat units in the forward defense area are 

then listed in numerical order, other units are then listed alphabetically.

(4) (U) Each task assignment may begin with the assets (attached or in support) 

available to the unit or element.

d. (U) Reserve. List the tasks assigned to the reserve force. List all units or elements 

to be in reserve when the order is in effect. If the unit or element will be the reserve in 

the future, its current assigned tasks will be listed in paragraph 3c. If a unit or element 

in reserve is given a future mission or ordered to prepare plans for possible reserve 

missions, it is included in this subparagraph.

e. (U) Commander’s Critical Information Requirements. Commander’s critical information requirements identify information on friendly and adversary activities and the 

battlespace that the commander deems as critical to maintaining situational awareness, 

planning future activities, and assisting in timely and informed decisionmaking. They 

help the commander tailor the command and control organization and are central to effective information management, which directs the processing, flow, and use of information throughout the force.

f. (U) Coordinating Instructions. List the instructions applicable to the entire command or two or more elements of the command that are necessary for proper coordination of the operation but are not appropriate for inclusion in a particular annex. They 

should establish the conditions for execution and provide information about the timing 

of execution and deployments.

4. (U) Administration and Logistics

a. (U) Personnel. In preparing this paragraph, refer to Annex E (Personnel). Identify 

detailed planning requirements and subordinate taskings. Assign tasks for establishing 

and operating personnel facilities, managing accurate and timely personnel accountability and strength reporting, and making provisions for staffing. Discuss the 

administrative management of participating personnel, the reconstitution of forces, 
Marine Corps Planning Process ____________________________________________________________________________ K-23 

Page number

CLASSIFICATION

CLASSIFICATION

command replacement and rotation policies, and required individual augmentation to 

command headquarters and other operational requirements.

b. (U) Logistics. In preparing a basic operation order or plan, refer to Annex D 

(Logistics/Combat Service Support). Logistic phases are normally concurrent with 

operational phases. This subparagraph should address sustainment priorities and 

resources, base development and other civil engineering requirements, host nation 

support, and inter-Service responsibilities. Identify the priority and movement of 

major logistic items for each option and phase of the concept. Identify strategic and 

theater ports for resupply. Outline transportation policies, guidance, and procedures 

for all options. Identify logistic and transportation assumptions and include them with 

other plan assumptions in subparagraph 1g (Assumptions). Identify detailed planning 

requirements and subordinate taskings.

c. (U) Public Affairs. Include appropriate information in this subparagraph or refer to 

Annex F (Public Affairs).

d. (U) Civil-Military Operations. Include appropriate information in this subparagraph or refer to Annex G (Civil-Military Operations).

e. (U) Meteorological and Oceanographic Services. Include appropriate information 

in this subparagraph or refer to Annex H (Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations).

f. (U) Geospatial Information and Services. Include appropriate information in this 

subparagraph or refer to Annex M (Geospatial Information and Services).

g. (U) Medical Services. In preparing the basic operation order or plan, refer to 

Annex Q (Medical Services). Identify planning requirements and subordinate taskings 

for hospitalization and evacuation. Address critical medical supplies and resources. 

Refer to wartime host nation support agreements or provisions to support in Annex P 

(Host Nation Support).

5. (U) Command and Signal

a. (U) Command Relationships. Include appropriate information in this subparagraph 

or refer to Annex J (Command Relationships). Indicate any changes to major commands and the time of the expected shift. Identify all existing memoranda of understanding and those that require development.

b. (U) Command Posts and Headquarters. The command post is the headquarters echelon (forward, main, rear) where the commander is located. List the designations and 

locations of the issuing commander’s headquarters echelons and appropriate senior, 

adjacent, and subordinate commanders’ headquarters echelons. When headquarters are 
K-24 _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

Page number

CLASSIFICATION

CLASSIFICATION

to be displaced, indicate the location and time of opening of the new headquarters and 

closing of the old headquarters.

c. (U) Succession to Command. Designate the succession of command for the 

operation.

d. (U) Signal. Include appropriate information in this subparagraph or refer to Annex K 

(Combat Information Systems). Provide instructions or restrictions about 

communications-electronics, such as radio restrictions, pyrotechnic signals, or lasers. 

Include a general statement concerning the scope of communications system and procedures required to support the operation. Highlight any communications system or 

procedures requiring special emphasis.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

Name

Rank and Service

Title

ANNEXES:

A–Task Organization

B–Intelligence

C–Operations

D–Logistics/Combat Service Support

E–Personnel

F–Public Affairs

G–Civil-Military Operations

H–Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations

J–Command Relationships

K–Combat Information Systems

L–Environmental Considerations

M–Geospatial Information and Service

N–Space Operations

P–Host Nation Support

Q–Medical Services

S–Special Technical Operations

U–Information Management

V–Interagency Coordination

W–Aviation Operations

X–Execution Checklist

Z–Distribution

OFFICIAL:
Marine Corps Planning Process ____________________________________________________________________________ K-25 

Page number

CLASSIFICATION

CLASSIFICATION

s/

Name

Rank and Service

Title
Page number

CLASSIFICATION

K-26 _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

SAMPLE FORMAT OF ANNEX A (TASK ORGANIZATION)

Organization for combat is a commander’s plan

for grouping organic and attached combat, combat support, and combat service support units to

effectively employ his/her forces to support the

scheme of maneuver. The organization for operations is determined after consideration of the

unit’s mission, missions assigned in subordinate

units, terrain, and adversary strength in each subordinate unit area and the amount of combat

power, including maneuver and fire support units,

available to the unit commander. These groupings may be shown, if simple, in paragraph 3 of

the basic OPORD or OPLAN. If these groupings

are complex, the task organization will be shown

in a separate appendix or just before paragraph 1

of the basic OPORD or OPLAN.

At a minimum, the task organization lists all

major commands or task groupings directly subordinate to the commander issuing the basic

OPORD or OPLAN. In addition, all organizations

that directly support the operation are listed and

designated as “support,” although they are not

under the command of the supported commander. Organizations to be established specifically to implement the basic OPORD or OPLAN

should appear in the task organization. The level

of detail in the task organization should only be

that necessary to convey a clear understanding of

the significant forces committed to the operation.

Underlining indicates that the unit or task

grouping has an assigned mission. Successive

subordinate echelons of units or task groupings

are shown by indentations beneath the underlined

unit or task grouping. Units or task groupings

with no assigned mission and not included in

another unit or task grouping are indented and

listed immediately after the issuing headquarters.

Subordinate units or task groupings that are

assigned missions are underlined and listed in

appropriate sequence. This sequence depends on

two factors—the type of units or task groupings

being assigned missions and the type of mission

(offensive or defensive). This sequence should

parallel the sequence of mission assignments in

paragraph 3 of the basic OPORD or OPLAN. The

sequence of listing major subordinate units or task

groupings is—

 Offensive Operations. Ground combat

units or elements (infantry units are listed

first, followed by artillery and combat support units numerically or alphabetically),

aviation combat units or elements (aircraft

units, combat support, combat service support), and combat service support units or

logistic elements.

 Defensive Operations. Units or elements

closest to the adversary are listed first.

Ground and aviation combat units in the forward defense area are then listed in numerical order followed by other units

alphabetically. 

When the commander, Marine Corps forces prepares

a supporting plan, he/she must include Appendix 1

(Time-Phased Force and Deployment List).
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OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF COMMAND

PLACE OF ISSUE

Date-time group

Message reference number

ANNEX A TO OPERATION ORDER OR PLAN (Number) (Operation CODE 

WORD) (U)

TASK ORGANIZATION (U)

(U) REFERENCES: List maps, charts, standing operating procedures, or other documents 

essential to understanding the order or plan.

ORGANIZATION

Issuing Headquarters

The first entry is the organization of the issuing headquarters.

Subordinate Unit or Task Grouping

Units or task groupings with no assigned mission, and

which are not assigned to any other grouping, are indented under issuing headquarters.

Subordinate Unit or Task Grouping

Subordinate units or task groupings with assigned missions, and which are not assigned to any other grouping, are indented under issuing headquarters.

Subordinate Unit or Task Grouping

Organic and attached units or task groupings are

indented under the subordinate unit or task grouping.

Units or task groupings that are not attached but

will provide support are listed under the supported unit or task grouping. The type of support,

whether general support or direct support, is

shown in parentheses.

Reserve Unit or Task Grouping

Units or task groupings in reserve are listed last.

If a unit or task grouping will be in reserve in the

future it is listed under reserve, as well as in its

normal sequence.

COMMANDER

Indicate names of commanders of the parent

organization and principal units.
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ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

Name

Rank and Service

Title

appendices:

1–Time-Phased Force and Deployment List

2–Shortfall Identification

3–Force Module Identification (Normally at the component or MAGTF level.)

4–Deterrent Options (Not used in Marine Corps plans or orders. Included to conform 

to CJCSM 3122.03.)

5–Reserve Component Requirements Summary

OFFICIAL:

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Name

Rank and Service

Title
Page number

CLASSIFICATION

Marine Corps Planning Process ____________________________________________________________________________ K-29 

SAMPLE FORMAT OF ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE)

The purpose of Annex B (Intelligence) is to provide detailed information/intelligence on the

adversary and the battlespace and to provide

guidance on intelligence and counterintelligence functions.

The G-2/S-2 prepares the intelligence annex,

based on the previously completed intelligence

estimate. This annex provides both encyclopedic

data and current information on the adversary,

including order of battle, location, biographical

information on adversary commanders, capabilities, and intentions. One of the most important

aspects covered in the adversary’s intentions is

the identification and discussion of the most

likely and most dangerous COAs.

The battlespace also includes information

regarding climate, topography, geography, terrain

analysis, physical infrastructure (roads, power

grids, information grids), cultural considerations

that affect the operation, political structure, and

leadership. Much of this information may have

been previously provided in intelligence

estimates and in intelligence reports and

summaries provided by national sources or HHQ.

This information may be referenced in the

intelligence annex to reduce the size of the basic

OPORD or OPLAN.

The intelligence annex normally provides

intelligence preparation of the battlespace

products to help further planning and execution.

They include such products as the situation

template and modified combined obstacle

overlay. These products are normally found in

Appendix 11 (Intelligence Estimate) or in

Appendix 12 (Intelligence Products).

CLASSIFICATION

Copy no. ____ of ____ copies

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF COMMAND

PLACE OF ISSUE

Date-time group

Message reference number

ANNEX B TO OPERATION ORDER OR PLAN (Number) (Operation CODE

WORD) (U)

INTELLIGENCE (U)

(U) REFERENCES:

(a) Maps and charts required for an understanding of this annex. Reference 

Annex M (Geospatial Information and Services).

(b) Documents providing intelligence required for planning. Including 

related annexes, such as Annex H (Meteorological and Oceanographic 

Operations).
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(c) Appropriate publications on Marine Corps and joint intelligence doctrine.

(d) Appropriate standing operating procedures and other documents providing guidance on intelligence operations.

(e) The originator of the annex should ensure that the units receiving or executing the 

plan or order have the cited references.

1. (U) Situation

a. (U) Characteristics of the Area. Summarize the conditions of the battlespace as 

they may influence the operation. Describe, as appropriate, the physical, economic, 

political, medical, social, religious, and psychological aspects and conditions of the 

people and infrastructure in the battlespace. Do not repeat information included in the 

general situation paragraph of the basic operation order or plan or detailed information 

contained in the appendices. Include sufficient analysis of the battlespace to permit 

development of appropriate supporting plans. Include complete information or 

reference documents and reports containing required intelligence.

b. (U) Hydrographic, Amphibious, Topographic, and Weather

(1) (U) Summarize the hydrographic data and amphibious considerations needed 

to support amphibious and logistic over-the-shore operations. Refer to Annex H 

(Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations) and Annex M (Geospatial Information and Services).

(2) (U) Address topographic aspects, including trafficability, key terrain, obstacles, 

cover, concealment, and avenues of approach. Reference Annex M (Geospatial 

Information and Services).

(3) (U) Include, as appropriate, climate and weather aspects of the battlespace. 

Coordinate with the staff weather officer or oceanographer and refer to reference 

Annex H (Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations).

c. (U) Estimate of Adversary Capabilities. Summarize the adversary’s situation, 

capabilities, and possible courses of action. Provide the adversary’s order of battle, 

estimates of the adversary’s strengths and weaknesses, and, at a minimum, the 

adversary’s most likely and most dangerous courses of action. When summarizing the 

adversary situation, refer to the general situation paragraph of the basic operation 

order or plan or refer to documents containing the required intelligence. Outline the 

adversary’s capability to collect, communicate to intelligence centers, process, and 

disseminate intelligence. Include specific intelligence cutoff dates and, when possible, 

identify finished intelligence products supporting these findings.
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2. (U) Mission and Concept of Intelligence Operations

a. (U) Mission. State the command’s mission in the basic operation order or plan.

b. (U) Concept of Intelligence Operations. Outline the purpose of intelligence operations and summarize the means and agencies used in planning, directing, collecting, 

processing, exploiting, producing, disseminating, and evaluating the necessary intelligence. When available and appropriate, integrate the resources of other Services and 

allied nations.

3. (U) Intelligence Activities. Identify intelligence resources and the intelligence planning, direction, collection, processing, production, dissemination, and evaluating efforts 

required to support the basic operation order or plan. Identify the required intelligence by 

proceeding from the priority intelligence requirements, through intelligence operations 

and capabilities or resources planning, to tasking of intelligence elements, including the 

following specific areas:

a. (U) Planning and Direction. Provide guidance for determining intelligence requirements (including those of subordinate commanders), preparing a collection plan, issuing orders and requests to information collection agencies, and monitoring the 

performance of collection agencies. Specify all exceptions to standard procedures.

(1) (U) Priority Intelligence Requirements. List priority intelligence requirements. 

If Annex B (Intelligence) is not published, list the priority intelligence requirements and other requirements for intelligence in the coordinating instructions of the 

basic operation order or plan. When the priority intelligence requirements and other 

requirements for intelligence are lengthy and detailed, place them in Appendix 1 

(Priority Intelligence Requirements) of this annex.

(2) (U) New Requirements. Provide specific guidance for new intelligence requirements during peace, crisis, and war, both before and during execution.

b. (U) Processing and Exploitation. Provide appropriate guidance for converting 

information into usable form, including required provisions for document translation; 

imagery, signals, and technical sensor processing and interpretation; and other 

pertinent processing activity.

c. (U) Production. Provide guidance on analyzing and reporting collected intelligence 

information by all collection sources used in support of the plan. Include guidance on 

multidiscipline reports that fuse information from multiple sources. Reference appropriate regulations, directives, and standing operating procedures specifying US-only 

and multinational reporting procedures. Identify the production effort, including any 

intelligence and counterintelligence products, required to support the plan.
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d. (U) Dissemination. Provide necessary guidance for conveying intelligence to 

appropriate units. Establish procedures and criteria to satisfy expanded requirements 

for vertical and lateral dissemination of finished intelligence and spot reports. 

Establish alternate means to ensure that the required intelligence will be provided to 

combat units as well as headquarters during crises and combat operations. Cover any 

of the following in this subparagraph:

(1) (U) Intelligence reports required from units (periods covered, distribution, and 

time of distribution).

(2) (U) Formats for intelligence reports (appendices, if required).

(3) (U) Distribution of intelligence studies.

(4) (U) Requirements for releasability to allied nations.

(5) (U) Requirements for secondary imagery dissemination.

4. (U) Assignment of Intelligence Tasks

a. (U) Orders to Subordinate and Attached Units. Use separate, numbered subparagraphs to list detailed instructions for each unit performing intelligence functions, 

including the originating headquarters, separate intelligence support units, and allied 

or coalition forces.

b. (U) Requests to Higher, Adjacent, and Cooperating Units. Provide separate, numbered subparagraphs applicable to each unit not organic or attached and from which 

intelligence support is requested, including allied or coalition forces.

c. (U) Coordinating Instructions. Provide any instructions necessary for 

coordinating collection and processing and exploitation, producing, and disseminating 

activities. Include—

(1) (U) Periodic or special conferences for intelligence officers.

(2) (U) Intelligence liaison, when indicated, with adjacent commanders, foreign 

government agencies or military forces, and host countries.

5. (U) Communications System. Summarize the US and non-US communications system 

and procedures to be used to carry out the intelligence function or reference the appropriate paragraphs of Annex K (Combat Information Systems). Include comments on interoperability of these communications system.
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6. (U) Miscellaneous Instructions. List under separate subparagraphs required items or 

information not covered above or in standing operating procedures, or items that require 

action different from that provided in standing operating procedures. As appropriate, 

include items, such as operations security, deception, disclosure of intelligence, releasability to coalition forces and public affairs, use of specialized intelligence personnel and personnel augmentation requirements, psychological operations, and exploitation of captured 

foreign materiel and documents.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

Name

Rank and Service

Title

appendices:

1–Priority Intelligence Requirements

2–Signals Intelligence

3–Counterintelligence

4–Targeting Intelligence

5–Human Resource Intelligence

6–Information Operations Intelligence Integration

7–Imagery Intelligence

8–Measurement and Signature Intelligence

9–Captured Adversary Equipment

10–National Intelligence Support Team

11–Intelligence Estimate

12–Intelligence Products

13–Intelligence Collection Plan

14–Reconnaissance and Surveillance Plan

15–Geographic Intelligence

16–Intelligence Operations

17–Support to Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape

OFFICIAL:

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Name

Rank and Service

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K-34 _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

SAMPLE FORMAT OF ANNEX C (OPERATIONS)

Annex C (Operations) provides substantive guidance for planning the conduct of operations. Plans

for the employment of non-US forces should

include proposed command arrangements and, as

necessary, consideration of requirements for furnishing essential combat and logistic support.

CLASSIFICATION

Copy no. ____ of ____ copies

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF COMMAND

PLACE OF ISSUE

Date-time group

Message reference number

ANNEX C TO OPERATION ORDER OR PLAN (Number) (Operation CODE

WORD) (U)

OPERATIONS (U)

(U) REFERENCES: List other plans, standing operating procedures, and doctrinal guidance to be followed in the conduct of operations.

1. (U) General

a. (U) Purpose. This annex provides guidance for the conduct of 

operations.

b. (U) Mission. State the mission as described in the basic operation order 

or plan.

c. (U) Area of Operations. Define the area of operations encompassed by 

the basic order or plan to include land, sea, and air space. The annex should 

also define any areas where reconnaissance and surveillance operations are 

authorized.

d. (U) Situation. Refer to the basic operation order or plan.

2. (U) Concept of Operations. Normally, the concept of operations is included 

in the basic operation order or plan; however, when lengthy and detailed, place 

it here. The format and content are similar to the concept of operations in the 

basic operation order or plan. Refer to Appendix 18 (Operations Overlay).

3. (U) Conduct of Operations. Provide any guidance required for the conduct of 

specific operations.
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a. (U) Aviation Operations. Refer to Annex W (Aviation Operations).

b. (U) Maritime Prepositioning Force Operations. Provide the concept of maritime 

prepositioning force operations in the plan.

c. (U) Information Operations. Refer to Appendix 3 (Information Operations).

d. (U) Counterinsurgency. If applicable, refer to pertinent country internal 

defense plans.

e. (U) Nuclear Operations. Not applicable.

f. (U) Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense Operations. If 

applicable, refer to Appendix 2 (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

Defense Operations).

g. (U) Special Operations. If applicable, refer to Appendix 4 (Special Operations).

h. (U) Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel. Refer to Appendix 5 (Evasion 

and Recovery Operations).

i. (U) Rules of Engagement. Refer to Appendix 6 (Rules of Engagement).

j. (U) Reconnaissance. Refer to Appendix 7 (Reconnaissance).

k. (U) Air Base Operability. If applicable, refer to Appendix 8 (Air Base Operability).

l. (U) Combat Camera. If applicable, refer to Appendix 9 (Combat Camera).

m. (U) Noncombatant Evacuation Operations. If applicable, refer to Appendix 10 

(Noncombatant Evacuation Operations).

n. (U) Escape and Evasion Operations. Refer to Appendix 11 (Escape and Evasion 

Operations).

o. (U) Counterattack. If applicable, refer to Appendix 12 (Counterattack).

p. (U) Explosive Ordnance Disposal. Refer to Appendix 13 (Explosive Ordnance 

Disposal).

q. (U) Amphibious Operations. If applicable, refer to Appendix 14 (Amphibious 

Operations).

r. (U) Force Protection. Refer to Appendix 15 (Force Protection).

s. (U) Rear Area Operations. Refer to Appendix 16 (Rear Area Operations).
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t. (U) Communications Strategy. Refer to Appendix 17 (Communications Strategy)

u. (U) Fire Support. Refer to Appendix 19 (Fire Support).

v. (U) Countermechanized Plan. If applicable, refer to Appendix 20 (Countermechanized Plan).

w. (U) Breaching Plan. If applicable, refer to Appendix 21 (Breaching Plan).

x. (U) Obstacle Plan. If applicable, refer to Appendix 22 (Obstacle Plan).

y. (U) Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Plan. If applicable, refer to Appendix 23, 

(Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Plan)

4. (U) Operational Constraints. List any constraints to the conduct of combat operations 

not enumerated elsewhere, such as the impact of deployment or employment of forces and 

materiel on airfield ramp space including possible host nation support. Estimate the 

impact of these operational constraints and indicate how the concept of operations and 

tasks to subordinate commanders would be modified if these constraints were removed. 

State the effect of incremental removal of constraints.

5. (U) Command and Signal

a. (U) Command. Refer to the basic operation order or plan.

b. (U) Signal. Refer to the basic operation order or plan or to Annex K (Combat Information Systems).

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

Name

Rank and Service

Title

APPENDICES:

1–Nuclear Operations (Not used in Marine Corps plans or orders. Included to conform to

CJCSM 3122.03.)

2–Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense Operations

3–Information Operations

4–Special Operations

5–Evasion and Recovery Operations

6–Rules of Engagement

7–Reconnaissance

8–Air Base Operability

9–Combat Camera

10–Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
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11–Escape and Evasion Operations

12–Counterattack

13–Explosive Ordnance Disposal

14–Amphibious Operations

15–Force Protection

16–Rear Area Operations

17–Communications Strategy (placeholder pending doctrinal development)

18–Operations Overlay

19–Fire Support

20–Countermechanized Plan

21–Breaching Plan

22–Obstacle Plan

23–Counterimprovised Explosive Device Plan

OFFICIAL:

s/

Name

Rank and Service

Title
Page number

CLASSIFICATION

K-38 _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

SAMPLE FORMAT OF APPENDIX 3

(INFORMATION OPERATIONS) TO ANNEX C

Appendix 3 (Information Operations) uses

operations security, military deception,

psychological operations, electronic warfare,

computer network operations, and other

capabilities to achieve information superiority at a

specific time and place in support of the MAGTF

mission. Information superiority is the operational

advantage gained by the friendly commander

through the effective execution of information

operations. Information operations take place

across the full range of military operations from

humanitarian relief operations to COIN to highintensity conventional operations. Information

operations can disrupt adversary information flow

by affecting command and control systems and

deceive the adversary by presenting them with

misleading information. These operations can

enhance friendly information flow by protecting it

from adversary attack or by influencing key target

audiences to take actions that support the MAGTF

mission. Information operations planning requires

a whole staff approach and extensive coordination

among commands to avoid conflicts and to ensure

nested and reinforcing efforts. Intelligence support

is critical to successful information operations.

Information operations planning requires

information, such as—

 Identification of critical information systems or processes.

 Identification of key decisionmakers and the

decisionmaking process used to arrive at and

disseminate a decision.

 Detailed descriptions of specific communications systems and information networks.

 Location of information and infrastructure

nodes.

 Determination of the potential values of possible targets.

 Adversary threat to friendly information systems and processes.

 Cultural, tribal, and historical information.

The information operations appendix should be a

short document that clearly states the primary

mission of each of the elements of information

operations. It should provide enough guidance to

ensure that the elements are all working toward

the accomplishment of information operations as

well as detailed execution instructions for each of

the elements in the subsequent tabs. 

CLASSFICATION

Copy no. ____ of ____ copies

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF COMMAND

PLACE OF ISSUE

Date-time group

Message reference number

APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX C TO OPERATION ORDER OR PLAN (Number)

(Operation CODE WORD) (U)
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INFORMATION OPERATIONS (U)

(U) REFERENCES:

(a) Any relevant plans or orders.

(b) Required maps and charts.

(c) Other relevant documents.

1. (U) Situation. Summarize the overall operational situation as it relates to information 

operations.

a. (U) Adversary. Summarize the adversary situation, force disposition, intelligence 

capabilities, and possible courses of action. If applicable, reference intelligence 

estimates or summaries. Address any specific information that bears directly on the 

planned information operations.

b. (U) Friendly. Summarize the situation of those friendly forces that may directly 

affect attainment of information operations objectives. Address any critical limitations 

and any other planned information operations.

c. (U) Assumptions. List any assumptions made of friendly, adversary, or third party 

capabilities, limitations, or courses of action. Describe the conditions that the commander believes will exist at the time the plan becomes an order. Omit in orders.

2. (U) Mission. Provide the command’s mission from the base order.

3. (U) Execution

a. (U) Concept of Support. Summarize how the commander visualizes the execution 

of information operations from its beginning to its termination. Describe how information operations will support the command’s mission. Summarize the concepts for 

supervision and termination of information operations.

(1) (U) The concept of support may be a single paragraph or divided into two or 

more paragraphs depending upon the complexity of the operation.

(2) (U) When an operation involves various phases, such as peace or prehostilities, 

crisis, war, or posthostilities, the concept of support should include subparagraphs 

describing the role of information operations in each phase.

b. (U) Information Operations Tasks. Identify the major tasks for each of the five elements of information operations. The five elements of information operations listed 

below are covered in tabs A through E.

(1) (U) Military deception.
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(2) (U) Electronic warfare.

(3) (U) Operations security.

(4) (U) Psychological operations.

(5) (U) Computer network operations.

c. (U) Coordinating Instructions. Address any mutual support issues relating to the elements of information operations.

4. (U) Administration and Logistics. Address any information operations administrative 

or logistic requirements.

5. (U) Command and Control. List any information operations command and control 

instructions. State the command structure for information operations. Identify any special 

information operations communications and reporting requirements.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

Name

Rank and Service

Title

TABS:

A–Military Deception

B–Electronic Warfare

C–Operations Security

D–Psychological Operations

E–Computer Network Operations

OFFICIAL:

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Name

Rank and Service

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Marine Corps Planning Process ____________________________________________________________________________ K-41 

SAMPLE FORMAT FOR TAB A 

(MILITARY DECEPTION) TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX C

Tab A (Military Deception) provides background

and guidance for the preparation of the military

deception tab of joint plans and orders. The

process for military deception planning conducted in support of joint operations is established in JP 3-13.4, Military Deception, which

also describes how the deception planning

process relates to the JOPES’s contingency,

crisis, and campaign planning processes. As a

general policy, any material related to planned,

ongoing, or completed military deception is

accorded controlled access. Production

guidelines are—

 “Need-to-know,” for the purposes of military deception, means limiting access to

those individuals who are involved in planning, approving, or executing deceptions

and who must have knowledge of the deception to perform their duties.

 The deception tab will normally be developed, published, distributed, and maintained

separately from the rest of the OPLAN.

 Standard administrative procedures are not

used to distribute or staff the deception tab.

Only positive control means, such as handto-hand delivery or STU-III [secure telephone unit-III] fax, will be used to distribute deception-related material.

 Specific deception events, such as unit

movements, may be included in the basic

OPLAN and its annexes if not identified as

being deception related.

 Deception-related documents will have

cover sheets with the appropriate classification markings. They will be annotated in

accordance with Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3211.01, Joint

Policy for Military Deception.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction

3211.01 establishes the review criteria for deception concepts and plans. Deception planners must

follow the specific administrative and security

procedures established by that document to

ensure that their plans are approved by the appropriate authority.

CLASSIFICATION

Copy no. ____ of ____ copies

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF COMMAND

PLACE OF ISSUE

Date-time group

Message reference number

TAB A TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX C TO OPERATION ORDER OR

PLAN (Number) (Operation CODE WORD) (U)

MILITARY DECEPTION (U)
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(U) REFERENCES: Identify plans, documents, maps, and charts that are essential to the 

effective execution of military deception.

1. (U) Situation

a. (U) General. See basic operation order or plan.

b. (U) Adversary

(1) (U) General Capabilities. Identify adversary military capabilities directly relating to the planned deception.

(2) (U) Deception Targets. Describe the political, military, or economic decisionmakers (or organizations) targeted by the deception plan. Include personalities, 

strengths, weaknesses, vulnerabilities, and people or factors known to influence 

decisions.

(3) (U) Target Biases and Predispositions. Provide information on known 

biases and predispositions of political, military, or economic decisionmakers 

(or organizations).

(4) (U) Probable Adversary Course of Action. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence).

c. (U) Friendly. Summarize the friendly situation, critical limitation, and concept of 

operations.

d. (U) Assumptions. List all assumptions on which the deception is based.

2. (U) Mission

a. (U) Operational Mission. Extract from paragraph 2 of the basic operation order 

or plan.

b. (U) Deception Mission

(1) (U) Deception Goal. Describe the desired effect or the end state a commander 

wishes to achieve (commander’s concept for the deception operation). For example, “To cause the adversary to weight their defense in the eastern corridor, to mislead the adversary as to the time and place of forcible entry operations, to cause 

dissension within the adversary coalition such that...”

(2) (U) Deception Objective(s). List the desired action or inaction by the adversary 

at the critical time and location.

(3) (U) Desired Adversary Perceptions. Describe what the deception target must 

believe for it to make the decision that will achieve the deception objective.
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(4) (U) Deception Story. Outline a scenario of friendly actions or capabilities that 

will be portrayed to cause the deception target to adopt the desired perception. This 

could be an alternate course of action to the one chosen for the basic operation 

order or plan itself.

3. (U) Execution

a. (U) Concept of the Operation

(1) (U) General. Describe the framework for the operation. Include a brief description of the phases of the deception operation.

(2) (U) Other Information Operations Elements. Discuss the use of other information operation elements in support of the deception operation. Discuss all other information operation element plans and operations pertinent to the deception. 

Include coordination required to deconflict if necessary.

(3) (U) Feedback and Monitoring. Provide a general statement of the type of feedback expected, if any, and how it will be collected (monitored). Include a brief 

statement on the impact of the absence of feedback on the plan.

(4) (U) Means. Describe available deception assets.

(5) (U) Tasks. Specify execution and feedback taskings to organizations participating in the execution and monitoring of the deception operation.

(6) (U) Risks. Give a brief risk analysis in the categories given below. Rate risk as 

low, moderate, or high in each category. Refer to Exhibit 3 (Operations) to this tab 

for detailed risk analyses.

(a) (U) Deception is successful. Include likely adversary response. Describe 

impact on friendly forces from adversary intelligence sharing.

(b) (U) Deception fails. Describe the impact if the target ignores the deception 

or fails in some way to take the actions intended.

(c) (U) Deception is compromised to allies or adversaries.

b. (U) Coordinating Instructions. Identify any tasks or instructions pertaining to two 

or more of the units listed in the preceding subparagraphs. List the tentative D-day and 

H-hour, if applicable, and any other information required to ensure coordinated action 

between two or more elements of the command.

4. (U) Administration and Logistics. State instructions regarding administrative and 

logistic support procedures to be used in developing, coordinating, and implementing the 
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deception plan. Do not include those administrative, logistic, and medical actions or ploys 

that are an actual part of the deception operation. Place detailed instructions in Exhibit 4 

(Administration and Logistics).

a. (U) Administration

(1) (U) General. Outline general procedures to be employed during planning, coordination, and implementation of deception activities.

(2) (U) Specific. Detail any special administrative measures needed to execute the 

deception operation.

b. (U) Logistics. Detail logistic requirements for the execution of the deception 

operation, such as the transportation of special material, or provision of printing equipment and materials. Do not include executions conducted by logistic elements as part 

of the portrayal of observables. Place detailed instructions in Exhibit 4 (Administration and Logistics).

c. (U) Costs. As applicable.

5. (U) Communications System

a. (U) Command Relationships. Use Exhibit 5 (Command Relationships) to illustrate 

command relationships by phase, if required.

(1) (U) Approval. State approval authority for execution and termination.

(2) (U) Authority. Designate supported and supporting commanders, supporting 

agencies as applicable, and any caveats to Exhibit 1 (Task Organization) or 

Exhibit 5 (Command Relationships).

(3) (U) Oversight. Detail oversight responsibilities particularly for executions by 

nonorganic units or organizations outside the chain of command.

(4) (U) Coordination. Identify coordination responsibilities and requirements related to deception executions and execution feedback. Address in-theater and out-oftheater requirements.

b. (U) Communications. Detail communications means and procedures to be 

used by control personnel and participants in the deception operation. Include all 

reporting requirements.

6. (U) Security

a. (U) General. Outline general procedures to be employed during planning, coordination, and implementation of deception activities.
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b. (U) Specific. State access restrictions, handling instructions, and who has authority 

to grant access to the deception appendix or plan. Describe use of cover stories if applicable, code words, nicknames, and procedures for planning and execution documents. If required, place access rosters and other detailed security considerations in a 

separate document.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

Name

Rank and Service

Title

EXHIBITS:

1–Task Organization

2–Intelligence

3–Operations

4–Administration and Logistics

5–Command Relationships

6–Execution Schedule

7–Distribution

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K-46 _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

SAMPLE FORMAT OF EXHIBIT 2 

(INTELLIGENCE) TO TAB A TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX C

Information and intelligence provided here must

be focused and specific to the deception. Do not

repeat information found in Annex B (Intelligence).

CLASSIFICATION

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OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF COMMAND

PLACE OF ISSUE

Date-time group

Message reference number

EXHIBIT 2 TO TAB A TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX C TO OPERATION

ORDER OR PLAN (Number) (Operation CODE WORD) (U)

INTELLIGENCE (U)

(U) REFERENCES: Identify plans, documents, maps, and charts that are essential to the execution of the deception.

1. (U) Deception CONOPS. Provide a concise statement of the deception operation. Identify the command executing the deception, the deception target, the 

deception objective(s), and the duration of the operation.

2. (U) Situation

a. (U) Adversary

(1) (U) Target Description. Describe the political, military, or economic 

decisionmakers (or organizations) targeted by the deception plan. Include 

personalities, strengths, weaknesses, vulnerabilities, and people or factors known to influence decisions.

(2) (U) Target Biases and Predispositions

(3) (U) Adversary Intelligence Organizations. Identify the targeted country’s intelligence organizations, their missions, and their methods and capabilities for covert and clandestine operations. Include collection, 

processing, analysis, and dissemination. Specifically note those organizations most likely to provide intelligence to the targeted decisionmaker 

and those tasked with exposing deception.
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(4) (U) Adversary Counterintelligence Organizations. Describe missions, capabilities, and operations.

(5) (U) Adversary Intelligence-Sharing with Other Countries. Identify other intelligence organizations available to the targeted country, the nature of intelligence exchange, and the potential for using that relationship for the deception.

(6) (U) Other Sources and Related Matters. Identify scientific, technical, diplomatic, or academic contacts that might act as information conduits.

(7) (U) Deception and Denial Activities. Provide an analysis of the targeted country’s use of deception and denial in support of its political and military goals. Identify the target’s deception and denial methods and current deception and denial 

activities.

(8) (U) Target Reaction. Provide an estimate of the target’s reaction if the deception is successful. Also provide likely target reactions if the deception is not successful. Identify whether the adversary would use deception in response. This 

subparagraph provides in-depth information to document the risk assessments presented in Tab C-3-A (Military Deception) and Exhibit C-3-A-3 (Operations).

(9) (U) Third-Party Reaction. Provide an analysis of the impact of the deception on 

allies, neutrals, and potential adversaries and their responses. This subparagraph 

provides in depth information to document the risk assessments presented in Tab 

C-3-A (Military Deception) and Exhibit C-3-A-3 (Operations).

b. (U) Friendly. Provide information on activities by unknowing US forces having an 

impact on the deception. Compare the time necessary to collect, process, report, and 

analyze intelligence (in support of deception) with the plan’s operational timeline. Assess the impact here.

3. (U) Intelligence Requirements

a. (U) Priority Intelligence Requirements. Priority information requirements associated with deception are listed in Attachment A (Priority Intelligence Requirements).

b. (U) Feedback. Assess the intelligence community’s ability to identify and collect 

plan-specific feedback information.

c. (U) Assignment of Intelligence Tasks. Identify organizations to produce plan-specific collection requirements.

(1) (U) Service intelligence agencies and organizations.
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(2) (U) Commander’s intelligence organizations and assets.

(3) (U) Others.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

Name

Rank and Service

Title

ATTACHMENTS:

A–Priority Intelligence Requirements

B–Others as needed

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Marine Corps Planning Process ____________________________________________________________________________ K-49 

SAMPLE FORMAT OF ATTACHMENT A

(PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS) TO

EXHIBIT 2 TO TAB A TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX C

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ATTACHMENT A TO EXHIBIT 2 TO TAB A TO APPENDIX 3 TO 

ANNEX C TO OPERATION ORDER OR PLAN (Number) 

(Operation CODE WORD) (U)

PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS (U)

1. (U) General. Identify requirements, including those of subordinate commanders, for priority intelligence requirements for pre-execution and execution 

phases of the planned deception operation.

2. (U) Before Implementation of the Order or Plan. List questions for which 

answers are needed for further planning and as a basis for decision on plan 

implementation.

3. (U) Upon Implementation of the Order or Plan. List the additional priority 

intelligence requirements and other intelligence requirements that become relevant upon decision to implement the operation plan. (Use additional paragraphs 

if necessary to reflect differing requirements during planned phases of the operation.)

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

Name

Rank and Service

Title
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SAMPLE FORMAT OF APPENDIX 18 

(OPERATIONS OVERLAY) TO ANNEX C

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OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF COMMAND

PLACE OF ISSUE

Date-time group

Message reference number

APPENDIX 18 TO ANNEX C TO OPERATION ORDER OR PLAN (Number) (Operation CODE WORD) (U)

OPERATIONS OVERLAY (U)

Use appropriate register marks and graphics from MCRP 5-12A, Operational

Terms and Graphics, to visually depict desired aspects of the operation. The

basis of the operations overlay is the approved course of action graphics sketch.

It may depict—

 Main effort.

 Supporting effort.

 Reserve.

 Boundaries.

 Fire support coordination measures.

 Assembly areas.

 Lines of departure.

 Other information as dictated by METT-T [mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-time available].

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K-52 _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

SAMPLE FORMAT OF ANNEX D 

(LOGISTICS/COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT)

Logistics is the science of planning and carrying

out the movement and maintenance of forces. It

includes the provision of combat service support

to forces at the tactical level of war as well as the

movement and sustainment of Marine forces at

the operational level of war. Logistics provides

the commander with the means to conduct and

win battles, campaigns, and, ultimately, the war.

Annex D (Logistics/Combat Service Support)

provides direction and guidance to the subordinate commanders and staffs on the provision of

logistics and combat service support in support

of operations described in the OPORD or

OPLAN. The theory and philosophy of logistics

as practiced by the Marine Corps is provided in

MCDP 4, Logistics. Appendix Q of Chairman of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3122.01, Joint

Operation Planning and Execution System

(JOPES) Volume I, (Planning Policies and Procedures), lists pertinent logistic references.

Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 4-11, Tactical-Level Logistics, provides detailed information on combat service support as well as

amplifying instructions on the preparation of

logistic planning documents.

The command and control of logistic and combat

service support organizations, to include command relationships and command and control

support requirements, should be addressed in

annex D. It provides a general discussion of how

the operation will be supported and is fully integrated with other critical concepts, such as

maneuver, fires, and force protection. It requires

only as much depth as is necessary to ensure

understanding of envisioned Logistic combat service support operations by subordinate commanders and staffs. The G-4/S-4 is normally

responsible for the preparation of annex D; however, the LCE should be involved in the planning

process. Phasing and significant anticipated

changes in mission or tasks should be reflected in

the concept of support. Detailed or specialized

information should be provided in other subparagraphs or in appendices of annex D. Discuss or

refer to aviation-specific logistic functions, such

as supply and maintenance, in Appendix 1 (Supply) or in the ACE OPORD or OPLAN.

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ANNEX D TO OPERATION ORDER OR PLAN (Number) (Operation CODE

WORD) (U)

LOGISTICS/COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT (U)
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(U) REFERENCES: Cite references necessary for a complete understanding of this annex.

1. (U) Situation

a. (U) Adversary. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence). Provide available information on 

adversary actions or intent to conduct actions to disrupt or degrade envisioned friendly 

logistic and combat service support operations. Include information on adversary 

capabilities or assets that can augment friendly logistic and combat service support 

operations.

b. (U) Friendly. List supporting logistic or combat service support organizations not 

subordinate to the force and the specific missions and tasks assigned to each.

c. (U) Infrastructure. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence). Provide information on 

existing infrastructure, such as ports, factories, fuel and water sources, and lines of 

communications that can be used to support friendly logistic and combat service 

support operations.

d. (U) Attachments and Detachments. Refer to Annex A (Task Organization). List 

logistic and combat service support units from other Services/nations attached to the 

force. List all Marine Corps logistic and combat service support units detached to 

support other friendly forces.

e. (U) Assumptions. State realistic assumptions and consider the effect of current 

operations on logistic capabilities. Omitted in orders.

f. (U) Resource Availability. Identify significant competing demands for logistic 

resources where expected requirements may exceed resources. Include recommended 

solutions within resource levels available for planning, if any, and reasonably assured 

host nation support.

g. (U) Planning Factors. Refer to and use approved planning factors and formulas, 

except when experience or local conditions dictate otherwise. When deviating from 

planning factors, identify the factors and the reason.

2. (U) Mission. Provide the command’s mission from the base order.

3. (U) Execution

a. (U) Concept of Logistics and Combat Service Support. State the concept for 

logistics and combat service support operations necessary to implement the order or 

plan. Describe how the logistic and combat service support assets will be organized 

and positioned to execute the mission. The concept may include planned employment 

of other Service and nation logistic and combat service support forces, host nation 

support logistic capabilities, or operation of the lines of communications.
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b. (U) Tasks

(1) (U) Assign logistic and combat service support responsibilities to subordinate 

logistic organizations.

(2) (U) Identify and assign responsibility for logistics and combat service support 

required from other commands, Services, or nations.

(3) (U) Identify and assign responsibility for logistics and combat service support 

required for forces assigned or attached from other commands, Services, or nations.

(4) (U) Identify and assign responsibility for logistics and combat service 

support required for Marine Corps forces assigned or attached to other commands, 

Services, or nations.

(5) (U) Assign responsibilities to support joint boards and committees, such as 

transportation and procurement, and other Services or nations providing services.

4. (U) Administration and Logistics

a. (U) Logistics and Combat Service Support

(1) (U) Supply. Refer to Appendix 7 (Supply). Summarize the following, in coordination with supporting commanders and Service component commanders, if different from standard planning factors. Place detailed discussions in the appendices 

and listings of supply depots, terminals, and lines of communications in tabs or the 

appropriate appendices.

(a) (U) Distribution and Allocation

1 (U) Purpose, location, and projected displacement of main and alternate supply depots or points and supporting terminals and ports to be used

or considered.

2 (U) Prepositioned logistic resource allocation.

3 (U) Existing terminals and lines of communications and the known or

estimated throughput capability. Indicate the time-phased expansion necessary to support the plan.

(b) (U) Level of Supply

1 (U) Indicate the time-phased operating and safety levels required to

support the plan.

2 (U) Indicate the prepositioned war reserve materiel requirements to

support the time-phased deployments pending resupply.
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3 (U) Specify significant special arrangements required for materiel

support beyond normal supply procedures.

4 (U) Indicate anticipated shortfalls.

5 (U) Indicate common user logistic supply support responsibilities and

arrangements.

(c) (U) Salvage. Provide instructions for and identify the logistic impact of 

the collection, classification, and disposition of salvage.

(d) (U) Captured Adversary Materiel. Provide instructions for the collection, 

classification, and disposition of adversary materiel. See Annex B (Intelligence) for further guidance. See Appendix 10 to Annex B (Intelligence) for 

specific instructions for the disposition of captured adversary cryptographic 

equipment.

(e) (U) Local Acquisition of Supplies and Services. See Joint Publication 4-01, 

Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System, and the current version 

of Department of Defense Instruction 1100.22, Policy and Procedures for 

Determining Workforce Mix.

1 (U) Identify acquisition of goods and services in the following categories:

a (U) The general categories of materiel and services that are available and contemplated as a supplement to regular sources.

b (U) Those that may be used as emergency acquisition sources.

2 (U) Make a statement concerning the dependability of the local acquisition or labor source in each of the aforementioned categories and the

joint or Service element that will obtain or manage these resources.

3 (U) State that all essential contractor services, to include new and

existing contracts, have been reviewed to determine which services will

be essential to OPLAN execution. Make a statement concerning the

existence of contingency plans to ensure the continuation of these

essential services.

(f) (U) Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants. Refer to Appendix 1 (Petroleum, 

Oils, and Lubricants Supply).

(2) (U) External Support. Refer to Appendix 11 (External Support). Provide 

the required planning information including type and quantity of support and 
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instructions where inter-Service and cross-Service arrangements for common supply and service support are appropriate.

(a) (U) Summarize major support arrangements that are presently in effect or 

that will be executed in support of the plan.

(b) (U) Include significant inter-Service and cross-Service support arrangements. Refer to appropriate annexes or appendices.

(c) (U) Include foreign and host nation support.

(3) (U) Maintenance

(a) (U) General. Refer to Appendix 12 (Maintenance).

(b) (U) Specific Guidance

1 (U) Include sufficient detail to determine the requirements for maintenance facilities needed to support the plan.

2 (U) Indicate the level of maintenance to be performed and where it is

to occur, including host nation or contractor facilities, if applicable.

(4) (U) Transportation

(a) (U) General. Refer to Appendix 4 (Mobility and Transportation). Provide 

general planning or execution guidance to subordinate and supporting organizations to facilitate transportation of the force and its sustainment. This can 

include movement and use priorities.

(b) (U) Mobility Support Force and Movement Feasibility Analysis. Provide 

an estimate of the mobility support and movement feasibility of the plan. 

Include in the analysis any appropriate remarks affecting mobility and transportation tasks. Consider the availability of adequate lift resources for movements of personnel and equipment, airfield reception capabilities, seaport and 

aerial port terminal capabilities, and port throughput capabilities. Also, consider any features that will adversely affect movement operations, such as the 

effect of deployment or employment of forces and materiel on airfield ramp 

space (to include possible host nation support).

(5) (U) General Engineering Support Plan. Refer to Appendix 13 (General Engineering). State the rationale if Appendix 5 (Civil Engineering Support Plan) is not 

prepared. Indicate the general engineering support activities applicable to the basic 

operation order or plan and the policies for providing these services.

(6) (U) Health Services. Refer to Appendix 9 (Health Services).
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(7) (U) Services. Refer to Appendix 8 (Services).

(8) (U) Mortuary Affairs. Refer to Appendix 2 (Mortuary Affairs) or, if not used, 

indicate the mortuary affairs activities applicable to the operation order or plan and 

policy for providing these affairs.

(9) (U) Ammunition. Refer to Appendix 6 (Nonnuclear Ammunition) or if not 

used, discuss any critical ammunition issues that may affect the ability of the force 

to accomplish the mission.

(10) (U) Aviation Logistic Support. Refer to Appendix 10 (Aviation Logistic Support) or Annex D (Logistics/Combat Service Support) of the aviation combat element operation order or plan. Critical aviation logistic and combat service support 

issues may be discussed if they affect the ability of the force to accomplish the mission.

(11) (U) Operational Security Planning Guidance for Logistics. Refer to Tab C 

(Operations Security) to Appendix 3 (Information Operations) to Annex C (Operations). Provide comprehensive operations security planning guidance for planning, preparing, and executing logistic and combat service support activities. At a 

minimum, address base, facility, installation, logistic stocks, physical, and line of 

communications security. Provide guidance to ensure that logistic and combat service support activities promote essential secrecy for operational intentions, capabilities that will be committed to specific missions, and current preparatory 

operational activities.

b. (U) Administration. Include general administrative guidance to support logistic 

and combat service support operations for the basic operation order or plan. If reports 

are required, specify formats for preparation, time, methods, and classification of submission.

5. (U) Command and Signal

a. (U) Command Relationships. Refer to Annex J (Command Relationships) for command relationships external to logistic units. Provide support relationships.

b. (U) Communications System. Refer to Annex K (Combat Information Systems) 

for detailed communications and information systems requirements. Provide a general 

statement of the scope and type of communications required.
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ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

Name

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Title

appendices:

1–Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants Supply

2–Mortuary Affairs

3–Sustainability Analysis

4–Mobility and Transportation

5–Civil Engineering Support Plan

6–Nonnuclear Ammunition

7–Supply

8–Services

9–Health Services

10–Aviation Logistic Support (Normally provided in the aviation combat element

plan or order.)

11–External Support

12–Maintenance

13–General Engineering

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Marine Corps Planning Process ____________________________________________________________________________ K-59 

SAMPLE FORMAT OF

ANNEX J (COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS)

Command relationships are the interrelated

responsibilities between commanders and the

authority of commanders in the chain of command. Unity of effort is, in large part, achieved

through the application of a flexible range of

command relationships. The joint force commander exercises command during joint operations according to the provisions of JP 1, Doctrine

for the Armed Forces of the United States; JP 3-0,

Joint Operations; MCDP 1-0; and MCWP 3-40.8,

Marine Corps Componency. These publications

describe possible command relationships between

the joint force commander, the Marine Corps

component commander, the MAGTF commander,

and subordinate commanders of assigned or

attached Marine forces. This annex discusses—

 Requirements to coordinate support between

forces in the same or adjacent areas according

to JP 1 and the common HHQ OPORD or

OPLAN.

 Planning for succession of command and

change of command location (alternate command and control procedures). Refer to Paragraph 5 (Command and Signal) of the OPORD

or OPLAN or Annex K (Combat Information

Systems).

 DOD Directive 3025.14, Protection and Evacuation of US Citizens and Designated Aliens in

Danger Areas Abroad, as amended by changes

1 and 2, delineates the responsibilities for protection of US citizens abroad. In support of this

directive, give special attention to cooperation

and coordination between US diplomatic and

military activities during periods of tension and

hostilities.

 Command relationships between the US Information Agency and the US Armed Forces in

the conduct of psychological operations.

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ANNEX J TO OPERATION ORDER OR PLAN (Number) (Operation CODE

WORD) (U) 

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS (U)

(U) REFERENCES: List documents that provide necessary guidance on the 

command relationships of forces concerned.
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1. (U) General

a. (U) Purpose. To establish the relationships between—

(1) (U) Combatant commands.

(2) (U) International commands and organizations.

(3) (U) Commander, US forces country.

(4) (U) Service and functional component commanders.

(5) (U) Major subordinate commanders.

(6) (U) Coordinating authorities.

(7) (U) Other subordinate military activities.

(8) (U) US diplomatic missions.

(9) (U) Government departments or agencies that support the operations.

(10) (U) Forces and agencies of other nations.

b. (U) Scope. Specify the scope and applicability of the command relationships established in this annex for specific military operations or functions within an assigned 

geographic area; or for specific military operations or functions not limited to a geographic area and the times or circumstances when the relationships become effective.

2. (U) Command Lines

a. (U) Service and Functional Components. Indicate the command lines to Service 

and functional components of the force and to subordinate elements, as appropriate.

b. (U) Other Subordinate Commands. Indicate the established command lines to subordinate commanders for conducting this operation and the conditions under which 

forces will be transferred to their operational control.

c. (U) Augmentation Forces. Indicate the purpose, time, and approximate duration of 

the attachment and the degree of authority over and responsibility for the augmentation forces.

d. (U) Alternate Procedures. Discuss procedures for succession of command and 

change of command location (alternate command and control procedures).

3. (U) Support and Coordination Relationships
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a. (U) Supporting Military Forces. Indicate established relationships with military 

organizations operating in support of the originating command.

b. (U) Coordinating Authorities. As necessary, assign a commander or another person 

the responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities.

c. (U) Supporting Agencies. Indicate the relationships between the elements of the 

force and any supporting agencies, such as United States Information Agency. (Refer 

to other annexes or appendices, as appropriate.)

d. (U) Inter-Service Support Arrangements. Refer to Annex D (Logistics/Combat 

Service Support), subparagraph 2b(7), Inter-Service Logistic Support.

e. (U) Coordination with Diplomatic Agencies. Indicate any requirement for coordination with chiefs of US diplomatic missions that is not included elsewhere in the plan 

and note who is responsible for such coordination.

4. (U) Relationships with International and Foreign Commands and Organizations. Indicate established command arrangements or relations with international commands and 

organizations, foreign military commands, or guerrilla organizations. Also indicate the 

conditions under which such relations would become effective.

5. (U) Planning Relationships. Specify established relationships between military commands for developing supporting plans. Include any requirements for coordination with 

other-nation commands and nonmilitary agencies.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

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Rank and Service

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APPENDIX:

1–Command Relationships Diagram

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K-62 _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

SAMPLE FORMAT OF APPENDIX 1 

(COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS DIAGRAM) TO ANNEX J

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX J TO OPERATION ORDER OR PLAN (Number)

(Operation CODE WORD) (U)

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS DIAGRAM (U)

This appendix graphically portrays the command relationships. Show all 

specific relationships, such as operational control, tactical control, or administrative control.

JTF-BLUELAND

USPACOM

ARFOR-B

(3d ARMY)

15th MEU

I MEF

OPCON

ADCON JFPOCC-B

NAVFOR-B

(7th FLEET) MARFOR-B JSOTF-B

AFFOR-B

(7th AIR FORCE/

JFACC/AADC/ACA

President/

Secretary

of Defense

1st MARINE

DIVISION (REIN)

3d MARINE

DIVISION (-)(REIN)

MARINE

LOGISTICS

GROUP

SPMAGTF-B

(For duration of

amphibious operation only)

3d MARINE

AIRCRAFT WING

MEF

RESERVE

REAR AREA

COMMANDER

TACTICAL

COMBAT FORCE

AGTF-B

duration of

operation on

OPC

ON

JF

AFFOR-

(7th AIR FO

ACC/A
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K-64 _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

SAMPLE FORMAT OF

ANNEX V (INTERAGENCY COORDINATION)

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ANNEX V TO OPERATION ORDER OR PLAN (Number) (Operation CODE 

WORD) (U)

INTERAGENCY COORDINATION (U)

(U) REFERENCES: List documents that provide necessary guidance to this annex.

1. (U) Situation

a. (U) General

(1) (U) Statement. This annex provides military and interagency planners with a brief synopsis of the major elements of this plan and the necessary coordination and interaction between the command and the

interagency while preparing for and during the plan’s execution. It is 

based on planning factors and estimates available at the time of preparation and is subject to modification based on the actual conditions or situation existing at the time of execution.

(2) (U) Politico-Military Situation. Summarize the politico-military situation that would establish the preconditions under which this plan might 

be executed. At a minimum, identify the US national security objectives 

and interests served by this plan and the interagency capabilities needed 

to return to normalcy or to establish a new normalcy.

(3) (U) Policy Coordination. Identify what coordination and support requirements might be necessary to initiate interagency planning.

(4) (U) Planning and Execution Coordination. Describe the proposed 

concept for interagency coordination during both planning and execution 
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to ensure unity of effort and appropriate deconfliction. Outline how the process 

supports the operation.

b. (U) Assumptions. List key assumptions that might impact or influence interagency 

planning.

c. (U) Legal Considerations. List any legal considerations that may affect interagency 

participation.

2. (U) Mission. Provide the command’s mission from the base order.

3. (U) Execution.

a. (U) Concept of Operations. Outline the primary objectives and desired effects of 

each phase. Describe the concept for interagency coordination and how it supports the 

concept of military operations. Outline the commander’s interagency coordination for 

each phase and what resources, capabilities, and liaison from other US Government 

agencies can support each of these objectives. Comment on the desirability and feasibility of intergovernmental organization/nongovernmental organization participation 

in the operation. Identify the resources or capabilities from the interagency that will 

support each of these objectives and comment on the desirability and level of nongovernmental participation in the operation.

(1) (U) Commander’s Intent. Describe the commander’s intent and optimal level 

of involvement by other US Government agencies for each phase. Be sure to identify the desired end state for each phase and list the anticipated desired actions of 

the major US Government agencies to support these end states.

(2) (U) Major Areas of US Government Interagency Response. Define the areas of 

requested action and responsibility from US Government agencies, intergovernmental organizations, and nongovernmental organizations based on the concept of 

operations.

(3) (U) Level of Integration. Describe the level of integration envisioned between 

the military, US Government agencies, and intergovernmental organizations/nongovernmental organizations as operations transition between phases.

b. (U) Tasks and Milestones. Identify the foreseen tasks and required milestones necessary before handing off responsibilities to civilian authorities.

c. (U) Coordinating Instructions. Include general instructions applicable to 

other US Government agencies and intergovernmental organizations/nongovernmental organizations.
K-66 _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

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4. (U) Administration and Logistics. Provide concept for furnishing administrative and 

logistic support to US Government agencies and intergovernmental organizations/nongovernmental organizations participating in the operation. Include the following:

a. (U) Personnel and personal property accounting.

b. (U) Availability of security and force protection.

c. (U) Availability of medical care.

d. (U) Availability of transportation assets in theater and in the host nation.

e. (U) Availability of all classes of supply.

f. (U) Availability of maintenance support for vehicles, administrative, and 

support equipment.

g. (U) Use of office administrative equipment and personnel.

h. (U) Availability and use of communications assets.

5. (U) Command and Control. Identify any unique command relationships established for 

the purposes of interagency coordination, such as a joint interagency coordination group 

or interagency coordination directorate. Describe the proposed organizational relationship 

and chain of responsibility between the commander and other US Government agencies 

and intergovernmental organizations.

a. (U) US Government. Identify the chain of authority for US Government agencies.

b. (U) Intergovernmental Organizations. Identify the expected chain of authority for 

intergovernmental organizations should they become involved.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

Name

Rank and Service

Title
Marine Corps Planning Process ____________________________________________________________________________ K-67 

Page number

CLASSIFICATION

CLASSIFICATION

APPENDICES:

As required. Could include detailed information on key interagency, intergovernmental

organization and nongovernmental organization stakeholders, such as mission, current and

planned programs, locations, point of contact information, or assessments.

OFFICIAL:

s/

Name

Rank and Service

Title
Page number

CLASSIFICATION

K-68 _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

SAMPLE FORMAT OF ANNEX X (EXECUTION CHECKLIST)

Annex X (Execution Checklist) provides a

convenient and useful listing of key events and

tasks that must be conducted by the force to

accomplish the mission. The execution checklist

allows subordinate commands and supporting and

adjacent forces to coordinate their actions and

maintain situational awareness. Only critical

events and tasks requiring participation by

multiple organizations should be included in the

execution checklist. Events and tasks should be

listed in the order of envisioned execution.

CLASSIFICATION

Copy no. ____ of ____ copies

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF COMMAND

PLACE OF ISSUE

Date-time group

Message reference number

ANNEX X TO OPERATION ORDER OR PLAN (Number) (Operation CODE 

WORD) (U)

EXECUTION CHECKLIST (U)

(U) Emphasize, primarily for headquarters and agencies external to the originating command, the actions that each must take to ensure the coordinated initiation of the operation. Additional information could include communications

nets, brevity codes, reporting requirements, maneuver control measures, decision points, named areas of interest, tactical areas of interest, and any fragmentary orders in support of a branch plan.
Marine Corps Planning Process ____________________________________________________________________________ K-69 

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CLASSIFICATION

Action Headquarters or Agency Timing Conditions

Electronic warfare attack 

selected NOG C2 nodes.

3d

 MAW Phase I through phase II. 102d and 103dAarmored 

Brigades and 401st and 

402d

 Artillery Regiments 

unable to pass information 

to NOG COC. 

Isolate MEF battlespace 

from reinforcement from the 

south.

3d

 MAW D-day – D + 2, phase II. Units larger than battalion 

unable to move north. 

Main attack. 1st MARDIV D + 2, phase II, stage A. Orangeland reconnaissance screen destroyed, 

first echelon engaged.

Supporting attack. 3d MARDIV D + 2–hour, phase II. Shaping operations completed, initial barriers 

breached, Phaseline Green 

reached.

Establishment of forward 

CSSA.

1st MLG D + 4, phase II, stage A. 4 DOS of required classes 

of supply on hand.

Link up with Blueland forces 

in Tealton.

3d MARDIV Phase II, stage B. Physical link up at battalion 

level.

Defeat of the 102d and 103d

Armored Brigades.

1st MAW Phase II, stage B. 102d and 103d Armored Brigades unable to conduct 

operations at battalion or 

higher level.

Opening of SPOD/APOD at 

Gray City (FRAGO 3 for 

branch plan CONDOR 

applies).

1st MLG On order phase II, stage B. SPOD/APOD able to handle throughput of 3 DOS 

per day.

Link up with SPMAGTF-B in 

vicinity of Gray City.

3d MARDIV On order phase II, stage B. Physical link up at the battalion level.

Pursuit operations to 

destroy withdrawing enemy 

forces.

3d MAW Phase III. NOG unable to conduct 

operations at battalion or 

higher level.

Restoration of the border. 1st MARDIV; 3d

 MARDIV Phase III. NOG units larger than platoon size unable to cross 

the border, reconnaissance 

screen in place, and border 

posts turned over to 

Blueland authorities.
K-70 _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

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ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

Name

Rank and Service

Title

OFFICIAL:

s/

Name

Rank and Service

Title
GLOSSARY

SECTION I. ACRONYMS

ACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . aviation combat element

ARG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .amphibious ready group

ASCOPE . . . . . . . . .areas, structures, capabilities,

organizations, people, and events

CAP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . crisis action planning

CAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . crisis action team

CCIR . . . . . . . . commander’s critical information

requirements

CJCSM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual

COA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . course of action

COG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . center of gravity

COIN. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . counterinsurgency

CONOPS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . concept of operations

CSS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . combat service support

DOD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Department of Defense

FRAGO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .fragmentary order

G-1 . . . . . . . . . . assistant chief of staff, personnel

G-2 . . . . . . . . assistant chief of staff, intelligence

G-3 . . . . . . . . . assistant chief of staff, operations

G-4 . . . . . . . . . . . assistant chief of staff, logistics

G-5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . assistant chief of staff, plans

G-6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . assistant chief of staff,

communications system

GCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ground combat element

HHQ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . higher headquarters

HPT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .high-payoff target

HVT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . high-value target

IGO . . . . . . . . . . . intergovernmental organization

IPB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . intelligence preparation

of the battlespace

JOPES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Joint Operation Planning

and Execution System

JP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . joint publication

LCE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . logistics combat element

LOO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . line of operations

MAGTF . . . . . . . . . Marine air-ground task force

MARDIV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine division

MCDP . . . . . . Marine Corps doctrinal publication

MCOO . . . . modified combined obstacle overlay

MCPP . . . . . . . . . Marine Corps planning process

MCWP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine Corps 

warfighting publication

MEF . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine expeditionary force

METT-T . . . . . . . . . . . . . mission, enemy, terrain

and weather, troops and

support available-time available

MEU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine expeditionary unit

MSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . .major subordinate element

N-2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Navy component 

intelligence staff officer

NAI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . named area of interest

NGO . . . . . . . . . . .nongovernmental organization

OEF. . . . . . . . . . . . Operation Enduring Freedom

OIF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Operation Iraqi Freedom

OPLAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .operation plan

OPORD. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . operation order

OPT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . operational planning team

R&S . . . . . . . . . reconnaissance and surveillance

R2P2 . . . . . . . . . rapid response planning process

rein . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . reinforced

RFI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . request for information

ROC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . rehearsal of concept

S-2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . intelligence officer

S-3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . operations officer

S-4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .logistics officer

SME . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . subject matter expert

SOP . . . . . . . . . . . . .standing operating procedure
Glossary-2 _______________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

TAI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . target area of interest

TCAPF . . . . . . . . . . . tactical conflict assessment

and planning framework

TRAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .tactical recovery of 

aircraft and personnel

US . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . United States

USG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . United States Government

WARNORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . warning order
Marine Corps Planning Process ______________________________________________________________________ Glossary-3 

SECTION II. DEFINITIONS

acceptability—The joint operation plan review

criterion for assessing whether the contemplated

course of action is proportional and worth the

cost in personnel, equipment, materiel, time

involved, or position; is consistent with the law of

war; and is militarily and politically supportable.

(JP 1-02)

adversary—A party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which

the use of force may be envisaged. (JP 1-02)

adversary template—A model based on an

adversary’s known or postulated preferred methods of operation illustrating the disposition and

activity of adversary forces and assets conducting a particular operation unconstrained by the

impact of the operational environment. (JP 1-02)

A model that portrays the adversary’s frontage

depths, echelon spacing, and force composition

as well as the disposition of adversary combat,

combat support, and combat service support units

for a given operation. It portrays how the adversary would like to fight if unconstrained by the

operational environment. (MCRP 5-12C.)

area of influence—A geographical area wherein

a commander is directly capable of influencing

operations by maneuver or fire support systems

normally under the commander’s command or

control. (JP 1-02)

area of interest—That area of concern to the

commander, including the area of influence, areas

adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory to the objectives of current or planned operations. This area also includes areas occupied by

enemy forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission. (JP 1-02)

area of operations—An operational area defined

by the joint force commander for land and maritime forces. Areas of operation do not typically

encompass the entire operational area of the joint

force commander, but should be large enough for

component commanders to accomplish their

missions and protect their forces. (JP 1-02)

assumption—A supposition on the current situation or a presupposition on the future course of

events, either or both assumed to be true in the

absence of positive proof, necessary to enable the

commander in the process of planning to

complete an estimate of the situation and make a

decision on the course of action. (JP 1-02)

avenue of approach—An air or ground route of

an attacking force of a given size leading to its

objective or to key terrain in its path. (JP 1-02)

battlespace—1. All aspects of air, surface,

subsurface, land, space, and electromagnetic

spectrum which encompass the area of influence

and area of interest. (MCRP 5-12C part 1 of a 2-

part definition) 

branch—The contingency options built into the

base plan. A branch is used for changing the

mission, orientation, or direction of movement of

a force to aid success of the operation based on

anticipated events, opportunities, or disruptions

caused by adversary actions and reactions. See

sequel. (JP 1-02)

campaign—A series of related military operations aimed at achieving a strategic or operational objectives within a given time and space.

(JP 1-02)

center of gravity—The source of power that

provides moral or physical strength, freedom of

action, or will to act. Also called COG.(JP 1-02)

collection plan—A plan for collecting information from all available sources to meet intelligence requirements and for transforming those

requirements into orders and requests to appropriate agencies. (JP 1-02)

commander’s critical information requirement—An information requirement identified by
Glossary-4 _______________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

the commander as being critical to facilitating

timely decisionmaking. The two key elements are

friendly force information requirements and

priority intelligence requirements. (JP 1-02)

Information regarding the adversary and friendly

activities and the environment identified by the

commander as critical to maintaining situational

awareness, planning future activities, and facilitating timely decisionmaking. The three primary

subcategories are: priority intelligence requirements, friendly force information requirements,

and essential elements of friendly information.

(MCRP 5-12C)

commander’s estimate of the situation—A

process of reasoning by which a commander

considers all the circumstances affecting the military situation and arrives at a decision as to a

course of action to be taken to accomplish the

mission. A commander’s estimate, which considers a military situation so far in the future as to

require major assumptions, is called a

commander’s long-range estimate of the situation. (JP 1-02)

commander’s intent—A concise expression of

the purpose of the operation and the desired end

state. It may also include the commander’s

assessment of the adversary commander’s intent

and an assessment of where and how much risk is

acceptable during the operation. (JP 1-02) A

commanders clear, concise articulation of the

purpose(s) behind one or more tasks assigned to a

subordinate. It is one of two parts of every

mission statement which guides the exercise of

initiative in the absence of instructions. (MCRP

5-12C) 

concept of operations—A verbal or graphic

statement that clearly and concisely expresses

what the joint force commander intends to

accomplish and how it will be done using available resources. The concept is designed to give an

overall picture of the operation. Also called

CONOPS. (JP 1-02)

concept plan—In the context of joint operation

planning level 3 planning detail, an operation

plan in an abbreviated format that may require

considerable expansion or alteration to convert it

into a complete operation plan or operation order.

(JP 1-02)

contingency—A situation requiring military

operations in response to natural disasters, terrorists, subversives, or as otherwise directed by

appropriate authority to protect US interests. (JP

1-02)

contingency planning—The Joint Operation

Planning and Execution System planning activities that occur in noncrisis situations. The Joint

Planning and Execution Community uses contingency planning to develop operation plans for a

broad range of contingencies based on requirements identified in the Contingency Planning

Guidance, Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, or

other planning directive. Contingency planning

underpins and facilitates the transition to crisis

action planning. (JP 5-0)

crisis action planning—One of the two types of

joint operation planning. The Joint Operation

Planning and Execution System process involving the time-sensitive development of joint operation plans and operati on orders for the

deployment, employment, and sustainment of

assigned and allocated forces and resources in

response to an imminent crisis. Crisis action planning is based on the actual circumstances that

exist at the time planning occurs. (JP 1-02)

critical thinking—Purposeful and reflective

judgment about what to believe or what to do in

response to observations, experience, verbal or

written expressions, or arguments. (This term and

its definition are proposed for inclusion in the

next edition of MCRP 5-12C.) 

critical vulnerability—An aspect of a critical

requirement which is deficient or vulnerable to

direct or indirect attack that will create decisive

or significant effects. (JP 1-02) An aspect of a

center of gravity that, if exploited, will do the

most significant damage to an adversary’s ability
Marine Corps Planning Process ______________________________________________________________________ Glossary-5 

to resist. A vulnerability cannot be critical unless

it undermines a key strength. (MCRP 5-12C) 

D-day—The unnamed day on which a particular

operation commences or is to commence. (JP 1-

02, from times)

decision point—An event, area, or point in the

battlespace where and when the friendly

commander will make a critical decision. (MCRP

5-12C)

decision support template—A combined intelligence and operations graphic based on the results

of wargaming. The decision support template

depicts decision points, timelines associated with

movement of forces and the flow of the operation, and other key items of information required

to execute a specific friendly course of action. (JP

1-02) A staff product initially used in the wargaming process which graphically represents the

decision points and projected situations and indicates when, where, and under what conditions a

decision is most likely to be required to initiate a

specific activity (such as a branch or sequel) or an

event (such as lifting or shifting of fires). (MCRP

5-12C)

design—The conception and articulation of a

framework for solving a problem. (This term and

its definition are proposed for inclusion in the

next edition of MCRP 5-12C.)

end state—The set of required conditions that

defines achievement of the commander’s objectives. (JP 1-02)

event template—A guide for collection planning. The event template depicts the named area

of interest where activity, or its lack of activity,

will indicate which course of action the adversary has adopted. (JP 1-02) A model against

which adversary activity can be recorded and

compared. It represents a sequential projection of

events that relate to space and time on the battlefield and indicate the enemy’s ability to adopt a

particular course of action. It is a guide for

collection and reconnaissance and surveillance

planning. (MCRP 5-12C)

feasibility—The joint operation plan review

criterion for assessing whether the assigned

mission can be accomplished by using available

resources within the time contemplated by the

plan. (JP 1-02)

fragmentary order—An abbreviated form of an

operation order issued as needed after an operation order to change or modify that order or to

execute a branch or sequel to that order. Also

called FRAGO. (JP 1-02)

friendly force information requirement—

Information the commander needs about friendly

forces in order to develop plans and make effective decisions. Depending upon the circumstances, information on unit location,

composition, readiness, personnel status, and

logistics status could become a friendly force

information requirement. (MCRP 5-12C)

H-hour—The specific hour on D-day at which a

particular operation commences. (JP 1-02, from

times)

high-payoff target—A target whose loss to the

adversary will significantly contribute to the

success of the friendly course of action. Highpayoff targets are those high-value targets that

must be acquired and successfully attacked for

the success of the friendly commander’s mission.

Also called HPT. (JP 1-02) 

high-value target—A target the adversary

commander requires for the successful completion of the mission. The loss of high-value targets

would be expected to seriously degrade important adversary functions throughout the friendly

commander’s area of interest. Also called HVT.

(JP 1-02) 

intelligence preparation of the battlespace—

The analytical methodologies employed by the
Glossary-6 _______________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

Services or joint force component commands to

reduce uncertainties concerning the enemy, environment, time, and terrain. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace supports the individual

operations of the joint force component

commands. (JP 1-02) The systematic, continuous

process of analyzing the threat and environment

in a specific geographic area. Also called IPB.

(MCRP 5-12C)

line of operations—1. A logical line that

connects actions on nodes and/or decisive points

related in time and purpose with an objective(s).

2. A physical line that defines the interior or exterior orientation of the force in relation to the

adversary or that connects actions on nodes and/

or decisive points related in time and space to an

objective(s). Also called LOO. (JP 1-02)

main effort—The designated subordinate unit

whose mission at a given point in time is most

critical to overall mission success. It is usually

weighted with the preponderance of combat

power and is directed against a center of gravity

through a critical vulnerability. (MCRP 5-12C)

Marine Corps Planning Process—A six-step

methodology which helps organize the thought

processes of the commander and staff throughout

the planning and execution of military operations. It focuses on the mission and the threat and

is based on the Marine Corps philosophy of

maneuver warfare. It capitalizes on the principle

of unity of command and supports the establishment and maintenance of tempo. The six steps

consist of problem framing, course of action

development, course of action analysis, comparison/decision, orders development, and transition.

Also called MCPP. Note: Tenets of the MCPP

include top-down planning, single-battle concept,

and integrated planning. (MCRP 5-12C)

mission—1. The task, together with the purpose,

that clearly indicates the action to be taken and

the reason therefore. 2. In common usage, especially when applied to lower military units, a duty

assigned to an individual or unit; a task. 3. The

dispatching of one or more aircraft to accomplish

one particular task. (JP 1-02) 

named area of interest—A point or area along a

particular avenue of approach through which

enemy activity is expected to occur. Activity or

lack of activity within a named area of interest

will help to confirm or deny a particular adversary course of action. Also called NAI. (MCRP

5-12C)

operational planning team—A group built

around the future operations section which integrates the staff representatives and resources. The

operational planning team may have representatives or augmentation from each of the standard

staff sections, the six warfighting functions, staff

liaisons, and/or subject matter experts. Also

called OPT. (MCRP 5-12C)

operation order—A directive issued by a

commander to subordinate commanders for the

purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of

an operation. Also called OPORD. (JP 1-02)

operation plan—Any plan for the conduct of

military operations prepared in response to actual

and potential contingencies. 2. In the context of

joint operation planning level planning detail, a

complete and detailed joint plan containing a full

description of the concept of operations, all

annexes applicable to the plan, and a time-phased

force and deployment data. It identifies the

specific forces, functional support, and resources

required to execute the plan and provide closure

estimates for their flow into the theater. Also

called OPLAN. (JP 1-02)

outline plan—A preliminary plan which outlines

the salient features or principles of a course of

action prior to the initiation of detailed planning.

(JP 1-02)

planning order—A planning directive that

provides essential planning guidance and directs

the initiation of execution planning before the

directing authority approves a military course of

action. (JP 1-02)
Marine Corps Planning Process ______________________________________________________________________ Glossary-7 

priority intelligence requirements—An intelligence requirement, stated as a priority for intelligence support, that the commander and staff need

to understand the adversary or the operational

environment. (JP 1-02) An intelligence requirement associated with a decision that will critically

affect the overall success of the command’s

mission. (MCRP 5-12C)

rear area—For any particular command, the area

extending forward from its rear boundary to the

rear of the area assigned to the next lower level of

command. This area is provided primarily for the

performance of support functions. (JP 1-02) An

area provided primarily for the performance of

combat service support functions. (MCRP 5-12C) 

risk—1. Probability and severity of loss linked to

hazards. (JP 1-02 part 1 of a 2 part definition) 

sequel—In a campaign, a major operation that

follows the current major operation. In a single

major operation, a sequel is the next phase. Plans

for a sequel are based on the possible outcomes

(success, stalemate, or defeat) associated with the

current operation. See branch. (JP 1-02) 

situational awareness—Knowledge and understanding of the current situation which promotes

timely, relevant, and accurate assessment of

friendly, enemy, and other operations within the

battlespace in order to facilitate decisionmaking.

An informational perspective and skill that foster

an ability to determine quickly the context and

relevance of events that are unfolding. (MCRP 5-

12C) 

situational understanding—The product of

applying analysis and judgment to relevant information to determine the relationship among the

mission variables (mission, adversary, terrain,

and weather, troops and support available-time

available) to facilitate decisionmaking. (MCRP 5-

12C)

situation template—A depiction of assumed

adversary dispositions, based on that adversary’s preferred method of operations and the

impact of the operational environment if the

adversary should adopt a particular course of

action. (JP 1-02) A series of projections that

portray, based on adversary doctrine, the most

probable disposition and location of enemy

forces within constraints imposed by weather

and terrain. (MCRP 5-12C)

spot report—A concise narrative report of essential information covering events or conditions

that may have an immediate and significant effect

on current planning and operations that is

afforded the most expeditious means of transmission consistent with requisite security. Note: In

reconnaissance and surveillance usage, spot

report is not to be used. (JP 1-02)

supporting effort—Designated subordinate

unit(s) whose mission is designed to directly

contribute to the success of the main effort.

(MCRP 5-12C)

supporting plan—An operation plan prepared

by a supporting commander, a subordinate

commander, or an agency to satisfy the requests

or requirements of the supported commander’s

plan. (JP 1-02) 

synchronization matrix—A format for the staff

to record the results of wargaming and synchronize the course of action across time, space, and

purpose in relation to an adversary course of

action. (MCRP 5-12C)

target—1. An entity or object considered for

possible engagement or other action. 2. In intelligence usage, a country, area, installation, agency,

or person against which intelligence operations

are directed. 3. An area designated and numbered

for future firing. 4. In gunfire support usage, an

impact burst that hits the target. (JP 1-02)

target area of interest—The geographical area

where high-value targets can be acquired and

engaged by friendly forces. Not all target areas of

interest will form part of the friendly course of

action; only target areas of interest associated

with high priority targets are of interest to the
Glossary-8 _______________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

staff. These areas are identified during staff planning and wargaming. Target areas of interest

differ from engagement areas in degree. Engagement areas plan for the use of all available weapons; target areas of interest might be engaged by

a single weapon. Also called TAI. (JP 1-02) 

targeting—The process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate

response to them, considering operational

requirements and capabilities. (JP 1-02) 

war game—A simulation, by whatever means, of

a military operation involving two or more

opposing forces, using rules, data, and procedures designed to depict an actual or assumed

real life situation. (JP 1-02)

wargaming—A step-by-step process of action,

reaction, and counteraction for visualizing the

execution of each friendly course of action in

relation to adversary courses of action and reactions. It explores the possible branches and

sequels to the primary plan resulting in a final

plan and decision points for critical actions. (The

modification is proposed for inclusion in the next

edition of MCRP 5-12C.)

warning order—1. A preliminary notice of an

order or action that is to follow. 2. A planning

directive that initiates the development and evaluation of military courses of action by a supported

commander and requests that the supported

commander submit a commander’s estimate. 3. A

planning directive that describes the situation,

allocates forces and resources, establishes

command relationships, provides other initial

planning guidance, and initiates subordinate unit

mission planning. Also called WARNORD. (JP

1-02)
REFERENCES

Department of Defense Issuances

Department of Defense Directive (DODD)

3025.14 Protection and Evacuation of US Citizens and Designated Aliens in Danger Areas Abroad

w/changes 1 and 2 

Department of Defense Instruction (DODI)

1100.22 Policy and Procedures for Determining Workforce Mix

Military Standard (MIL-STD)

2525C Department of Defense Interface Standard: Common Warfighting Symbology

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI)

3211.01_ Joint Policy for Military Deception

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM)

3122.01_ Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I, (Planning Policies and 

Procedures)

3122.03_ Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume II, (Planning Formats and 

Guidance)

Joint Publications (JPs)

1 Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States

1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms

3-0 Joint Operations

3-08 Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination during Joint Operations (Volumes I and II)

3-13.4 Military Deception

4-01 Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System

5-0 Joint Operation Planning 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Standardization Agreement (STANAG)

2014 NATO Formats for Orders and Designation of Timing, Locations, and Boundaries

Army Field Manual (FM)

3-07 Stability Operations
References-2 ____________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 5-1

Marine Corps Publications

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications (MCDPs)

1 Warfighting

1-0 Marine Corps Operations

1-2 Campaigning

4 Logistics

5 Planning

Marine Corps Order (MCO)

P3000.18_ Marine Corps Planner’s Manual w/ ch 1 

Marine Corps Reference Publications (MCRPs)

5-12A Operational Terms and Graphics w/change 1

5-12C Marine Corps Supplement to the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and 

Associated Terms

2-3A Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield/Battlespace

Marine Corps Warfighting Publications (MCWPs)

3-40.8 Marine Corps Componency

4-11 Tactical-Level Logistics

3-33.5 Counterinsurgency

Miscellaneous Marine Corps Publications

MAGTF Staff Training Program (MSTP) Pamphlet 5-0.2, Operational Planning Team Leaders Guide

Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA)1540-002-95, Generic Intelligence Requirements 

Handbook (GIRH)

Miscellaneous Publications

Boyd, John R., Destruction and Creation, an essay from A Discourse on Winning and Losing, 1976.

Commander in Chief, Far East Message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 23 July 1950.

Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction. 2009. United States Institute of Peace. United 

States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute. Washington, D.C.

Heinl, Robert Debs, Jr., Col., USMC, Retired, Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations (Annapolis, 

MD: United States Naval Institute, 1966)

Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. (New York: The Viking Press, 1983)

Patton, George S., Jr., Gen, US Army. War As I Knew It. (New York, Boston: Houghton Mifflin 

Company, 1947)

Montgomery, Bernard (Viscount Montgomery of Alamein). Memoirs. (New York: The World Publishing 

Company, 1958)

Tsouras, Peter G., Warriors’ Words: A Quotation Book, (London, England: Arms and Armour Press, 

1992) 
Classification. As appropriate, centered at

the top and bottom of the page.

HEADING

Changes from Oral Orders. Used when

oral orders regarding this operation

have been previously issued. Enclosed in

parentheses. Example: “(No change from

oral orders except paragraphs 3b and 3f.)”

Omitted in plans. Omitted in orders when

no oral orders have been issued.

Title. Numbered consecutively for a

calendar year. Two or more issued on

the same day are given consecutive

numbers. Joint operation plan or order is

so designated. Code name, if any, as

shown.

References. Documents, such as maps,

charts, photomaps, or SOPs, necessary

for understanding must be available to

recipients. Entry is always included (use

“References: None” when applicable).

Map entries include series number,

country, sheet names or numbers, edition,

and scale.

BODY

Time Zone. If same for the place of issue

and execution and will be the same

throughout execution, then entry may be

omitted. If time zone is different in area of

execution, which frequently occurs in

amphibious or air-transported operations,

then state when indicated time zone

becomes effective.

Task Organization. May be shown in the

following ways:

1. As an unnumbered entry before

paragraph 1 (Situation). Used when the

entire command of issuing headquarters

is organized into task organizations for a

particular operation and task organizations

are too complicated to be shown using

other methods.

2. If there is no change to previous task

organization, show “No Change.”

3. Under the proper subparagraph of

paragraph 3; simplest and, therefore,

preferred method in continuing the ground

combat situation. Show “No Change”

except paragraph 3b...”

4. As an annex when lengthy; e.g.,

division or higher. Used in amphibious

operations. Permits early dissemination

and assists concurrent planning. Also used

where planning precedes operation by a

considerable period of time.

In numbers 1 and 4 above, the organization

of the issuing headquarters, including

service and administrative groupings that

will perform normal functions, is the first

entry. Following that, each task grouping

that is to receive a tactical mission is shown

in the sequence in which the missions are

assigned in paragraph 3.

General. For plans only: describe the

general politico-military environment that

would establish the probable preconditions

for execution of the plan.

Battlespace. The higher commander’s area

of operations and the command’s areas of

interest, influence, and operations

described by the physical area and forces

of concern.

Enemy Forces. Show enemy information

vital to the entire command or likely to

affect the accomplishment of mission. May

refer to intelligence annex, operation

overlay (if enemy information is shown),

or intelligence summaries. Contains

disposition, intent, objectives,

vulnerabilities, centers of gravity, and COAs.

Friendly Forces. Information on own forces

having bearing on operation (higher,

adjacent, and supporting). Artillery listed

as first supporting unit and then others are

listed alphabetically. May reference annex

operation overlay.

Paragraph 4. Logistic and personnel

information and instructions for the

operation. Usually refers to appropriate

annexes. 

Paragraph 5. Instructions to establish and

maintain command and signal procedures.

1. Command Relationships. Used when in

a large operation or when relationships are

unusual. Otherwise omitted. 

2. Command Posts and Headquarters.

May reference operations overlay for

locations.

3. Succession to Command. Designates

the succession of command for the

operation.

4. Signal. Usually references annex K and

other communication publications, such as

SOP or communications-electronics

operating instructions. Includes instructions

or restrictions or pyrotechnic signals.

5. Use additional subparagraphs to show

location and time of opening

communication centers, recognition and

identification instructions, code words and

names, and liaison.

Annexes. Appended to and form a portion

of the completed plan/order. They pertain

to a particular concept, subject, or

coordination aspect too voluminous, of

insufficient general interest, or in irregular

form, such as overlays, graphs, or tables,

for the body of the plan/order. Contributes

to the brevity and clarity of the parent

document. The sequence and lettering

must not change. Annexes may be omitted

when not required. Annexes are designated

by capital letter, amplified where necessary

by appendices to annexes, tabs to

appendices, and enclosures to tabs.

To satisfy JOPs format requirements,

titles of paragraphs and subparagraphs

must remain as shown in this example.

HEADING

Copy number. Assigned by issuing

headquarters to each copy. Log maintained

of specific copies issued to addressees. 

Official Designation of Command. Use

code name if required for security. 

Place of Issue. May be code name, postal

designator, or geographic location

(including map coordinates). Always

capitalized. 

OPERATION PLAN/ORDER FORMAT

CLASSIFICATION

(No change from oral orders)

Copy no.__ of __ copies

I MEF

GREENTOWN, BLUELAND

17 Apr 2010

ABD–1

OPERATION ORDER 0002-10 (OPERATION SHARP SWORD) (U)

BASIC ORDER (U)

(U) TIME ZONE: Zulu

(U) TASK ORGANIZATION. Annex A. 

2. (U) Mission. On order, I MEF, as the main effort, conducts offensive operations

to defeat enemy forces in zone in order to restore the Blueland border. Be prepared

to continue offensive operations into Orangeland to destroy remaining Orangeland

offensive military capabilities. 

1. (U) Situation

 a. (U) General. With the failure of deterrence, Blueland forces crossed the

 Orangeland border and have been successful in their initial battles.

 b. (U) Battlespace. See appendix 18 to annex C.

 c. (U) Enemy Forces. See appendix B and current intelligence summaries.

 d. (U) Friendly Forces.

 e. (U) Attachments and Detachments

3. (U) Execution.

 a. (U) Commander’s Intent.

 b. (U) Concept of Operations. This operation will be conducted in three phases.

 c. (U) Tasks

 (1) (U) 1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN)

 (2) (U) 3d MARINE DIVISION (-) (REIN)

 (3) (U) 3d MARINE AIRCRAFT WING

 (4) (U) 1st FORCE SERVICE SUPPORT (-) (REIN)

 (5) (U) SPECIAL PURPOSE MAGTF-B

 (6) (U) REAR AREA COMMANDER

 d. (U) MEF Reserve

 e. (U) Commander’s Critical Information Requirements

 f. (U) Coordinating Instructions

(U) REFERENCES:

 (a) Maps and Charts: Series ONC, sheet G-2 (ORANGELAND, BLUELAND),

 edition 12 

 (b) USCINCPAC Planning Directive, 27 March 2010

Date/Time. Day, month, and year order is

signed, issued, and becomes effective,

unless specified otherwise in paragraph 3f

(Coordinating Instructions.) 

Message Reference Number. Allows

acknowledgment in the clear. Assigned by

originator. Consists of letters, numbers, or

a combination. It has no connection with

the message center numbering system.

Annexes issued separately are assigned

different numbers. 

BODY

Paragraph 2. Clear, concise statement of

the tasks and purpose of the operation.

State the who, what, when, where, why,

and as much of the how as necessary. No

subparagraphs. Always stated here even if

shown on the operation overlay or map.

Commander’s Intent. Commander’s

personal statement of the purpose of the

operation. 

Concept of Operations. A summary

statement of how the operation will be

accomplished. Amplifies paragraph 2. May

be shown graphically or published as an

appendix to annex C. Specific unit

designations are not used. 

Tasks to Subordinate Elements.

1. Each unit, organic or attached, or

tactical grouping that is executing a tactical

task is assigned a separate numbered

subparagraph. All tactical tasks must be

listed in the body of the basic orders. 

2. List tasks for major subordinate elements

as follows:

 Offensive Order: Ground combat units

 (infantry first followed by artillery and

 combat support units numerically or

 alphabetically), aviation combat units or

 elements (aircraft units, combat support,

 combat service support), combat service

 support units or elements.

 Defensive Order: Units or elements

 closest to the enemy are listed first.

 Ground and aviation combat units in the

 forward defense area are then listed in

 numerical order followed by other units

 alphabetically.

3. Each tactical task assignment may first

show the assets (attached or in support)

available to the unit or element for the

operation. Then tasks are enumerated.

4. Priority must be stated if missions are

multiple and priority of accomplishment is

desired.

5. If all instructions to the unit are shown

on the operations overlay, list the unit after

the proper subparagraph number and

reference operation overlay appendix. 

Commander’s Critical Information

Requirements. Identify information the

commander has deemed critical to

maintaining his/her situational awareness,

planning future activities, and assisting in

timely and informed decisionmaking. 

Coordinating Instructions. Final

subparagraph in paragraph 3. Contains

instructions common to two or more units,

coordinating details and control measures

applicable to the command as a whole,

and time or conditions when plan is to be

executed. Refers to annexes or references

for coordinating details when appropriate.

Communications instructions shown in

paragraph 5 only. 

ENDING

Acknowledgment Instructions. Included in

every order and separately issued portions.

Ensures that recipients receive and

understand the order. 

Signature. Original signed by the

commander or chief of staff/executive

officer.

1. Original signed by commander.

 Name

 Rank, USMC

 Commander

2. Original signed by chief of

staff/executive officer.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL NAME

 Name

 Rank, USMC

 Title

 

Authenticated by G/S-3 when commander’s

or executive officer’s signature is on the

original only; G/S-3 authentication appears

on all other copies. 

4. (U) Administration and Logistics

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

OFFICIAL:

s/

M.B. TWINING

Colonel, USMC

AC/S G-3

Page number

CLASSIFICATION

Annexes:

A–Task Organization

B–Intelligence

C–Operations

D–Logistics

E–Personnel

F–Public Affairs

G–Civil-Military Operations

H–Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations

J–Command Relationships

K–Combat Information Systems

L–Environmental Considerations

M–Geospatial Information and Services

N–Space Operations

P–Host Nations Support

Q–Medical Services

S–Special Technical Operations

U–Information Management

V–Interagency Coordination

W–Aviation Operations

X–Execution Checklist

Z–Distribution

GENERAL C. THOMAS

Lieutenant General, USMC

Commanding

5. (U) Command and Signal

 a. (U) Command Relationships. See Annex J (Command Relationships).

 b. (U) Command Posts and Headquarters

 c. (U) Succession to Command

 d. (U) Signal. See Annex K (Combat Information Systems).
To Our Readers

Changes: Readers of this publication are encouraged to submit suggestions and

changes to Doctrine Control Branch via e-mail: doctrine@usmc.mil. 

Suggestions and changes must include the following information:

• Location of change

Publication number and title

Current page number

Paragraph number (if applicable)

Line number

Figure or table number (if applicable)

• Nature of change

Addition/deletion of text

Proposed new text

Additional copies: If this publication is not an electronic only distribution, a printed

copy may be obtained from Marine Corps Logistics Base, Albany, GA 31704-5001, 

by following the instructions in MCBul 5600, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications

Status. An electronic copy may be obtained from the United States Marine Corps

Doctrine web page:

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