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“Hariri’s visits signal a 

strategic decision that the 

previous status quo of a 

staunchly anti-Syrian government in Lebanon is not tenable 

over the long run, and acknowledge the inherent difficulties 

of leading Lebanon without 

cordial ties with Syria. ”

May 21, 2010 

Lebanon‘s Evolving Relationship with 

Syria: Back to the Future or Turning 

a New Page?

Summary

•	 Lebanon’s outreach to Syria is motivated by significant shifts in the regional political landscape, particularly Syria’s renewed regional and global influence. Lebanese Prime Minister 

Saad Hariri appears to have made a strategic decision that rapprochement with Syria is in 

Lebanon’s best interest, offering the greatest chance for stability and resolution of a number of 

outstanding bilateral issues including greater guarantees for Lebanese sovereignty.

•	 Syria’s renewed influence in Lebanon comes in a variety of forms, but its alliance with 

Hezbollah is the most potent trajectory of its power and influence.

•	 It is too early to determine whether this shift in relations marks a return of Syrian predominance 

in Lebanon, or signals a new page in the bilateral relationship. Much will depend on how Syria 

and Lebanon as well as external players—especially the U.S. and France—contend with the 

inherent challenges and opportunities that accompany evolving Syrian-Lebanese ties.

•	 The establishment of Lebanese-Syrian diplomatic ties presents the United States with an 

important opportunity to help foster normal relations between the neighboring countries, 

particularly the long-sought goal of protecting Lebanese sovereignty. Washington should 

move forward with dispatching an ambassador to Damascus as part of a broader engagement 

with Syria. Establishment of high-level diplomatic channels in Syria will allow the United States 

to leverage its influence more directly and effectively to ensure that Syria moves forward on 

border demarcation with Lebanon and other measures to help bolster Lebanese sovereignty. 

In May 2010, Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri undertook his second visit to Damascus in less 

than six months, underscoring Beirut’s determination to pursue a rapprochement with Syria. 

While last month’s Scud missile crisis catapulted Syria and Lebanon into international headlines 

amidst fears of a new war, the quietly evolving ties between Lebanon and Syria could mark a shift 

in longstanding regional dynamics.1

 These emerging ties reflect the challenges for Lebanon of 

resurgent Syrian influence—most dramatically illustrated by the Scud crisis—but also contain 

inherent opportunities to turn the page and establish normal state-to-state relations. 

Primary Contours of an Evolving Relationship

Several important developments over the past 18 months have defined Lebanon’s changing 

relationship with Syria. In particular, three key events help sketch the contours of these evolving 

Mona Yacoubian

E-mail: myacoubian@usip.org

Phone: 202.429.3868

peaceBrieF33
© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

page 2 • PB 33 • May 21, 2010

Lebanon’s Evolving Relationship with Syria: Back to the Future 

or Turning a New Page?

ties. First, the establishment of diplomatic ties between Lebanon and Syria in late 2008 was a 

historically significant event. It reflected an important, if symbolic, Syrian recognition of Lebanese 

sovereignty following Syria’s longstanding refusal to do so.2 Formal diplomatic ties have led to the 

exchange of ambassadors and opening of embassies and provided an important opportunity to 

establish normal state-to-state relations. 

Prime Minister Hariri’s two visits to Damascus— in May 2010 and December 2009—mark another 

important step in mending relations between the two countries. The visits suggest a determination 

by the Lebanese prime minister to move Lebanon forward on a path of rapprochement with Syria 

in pursuit of national interests. Moreover, Hariri’s visits signal a strategic decision that the previous 

status quo of a staunchly anti-Syrian government in Lebanon is not tenable over the long run and 

acknowledge the inherent difficulties of leading Lebanon without cordial ties with Syria. 

Finally, the March 2010 visit to Damascus by Lebanese Druze leader Walid Jumblatt– often called 

the “weathervane” of Lebanese politics—exemplifies a broader power shift within the Lebanese 

political arena away from those who advocate confrontation with Syria. Jumblatt’s trip completed 

his transformation from one of Syria’s most vociferous critics in Lebanon to a strong advocate of 

warming ties with Damascus. The Druze leader formally pulled out of the anti-Syrian March 14th 

coalition in August 2009. His withdrawal dealt a significant blow to the coalition and perhaps 

presages a reordering of Lebanese politics marked by the eventual obsolescence of the March 

14th and Hezbollah-led March 8th blocs. 

Syria’s Phoenix-Like Resurrection

Lebanon’s strategic opening to Damascus is rooted in Syria’s reemergence on the regional and 

global stage from the depths of international isolation from 2005 through 2008. Several important 

events hearkened Syria’s resurgence in Lebanon. First, the May 2008 violence in Beirut—followed 

by the Doha Accord—marked a watershed event in Syria’s turnaround. Following a buildup in 

tension with the Lebanese government, Hezbollah’s overrunning of West Beirut unleashed the 

worst civil violence since Lebanon’s civil war. It led to the Doha Accord which brought a measure 

of stability to Lebanon, but also awarded Hezbollah—Syria’s key ally in Lebanon—an important 

victory by ceding the militant organization veto power in the government. (Hezbollah implicitly 

retains this veto in the current cabinet.)

Syrian-Saudi rapprochement stands as another key development in Syria’s renewed influence 

in Lebanon. Perhaps concerned by Lebanon’s near descent into renewed civil war, Riyadh and 

Damascus embarked on a slow but steady process of reconciliation starting in late 2008. Capped 

by the visits of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to Saudi Arabia and Saudi King Abdullah to Damascus, their rapprochement led to a significant calming of the atmosphere inside Lebanon. The 

reconciliation process continues, and Egypt appears to be warming its relations with Syria as well. 

Syria’s enhanced engagement with Europe, notably France, is among the most important 

milestones in Syria’s reemergence on the global stage. Citing Syria’s “positive role” in Doha, France 

rewarded Damascus by inviting Syrian President Assad to a Euro-Mediterranean summit in July 

2008. Assad’s trip was soon followed by President Sarkozy’s reciprocal visit to Syria. This exchange 

of visits effectively reversed French policy toward Syria which had been deeply opposed to Syria 

during former President Jacques Chirac’s administration.3

 Numerous other high-level visits followed, including Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s visit earlier this month, as well as visits by 

Spanish, British and EU dignitaries, among others.

U.S. engagement with Syria has been another factor propelling Syria’s global resurgence. While 

high-level Congressional visits, including by House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, started in the latter half 
© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

page 3 • PB 33 • May 21, 2010

Lebanon’s Evolving Relationship with Syria: Back to the Future 

or Turning a New Page?

of the Bush administration, the Obama administration’s engagement strategy has focused on Syria 

among other countries. Although still in its early stages, Washington’s engagement of Syria has 

included a series of high-level visits to Damascus, as well as the White House nomination of Robert 

Ford to be ambassador to Syria, following a five-year absence. However, a number of Senate 

Republicans opposed to the engagement policy have placed holds on the nomination, casting the 

nomination in doubt. 

What Lebanon Wants

The establishment of Lebanese-Syrian diplomatic ties provides Lebanon with a critical opportunity 

to transform its relations with Syria by achieving several key goals:

•	 Border demarcation is an essential next step in normalizing ties. While Damascus has 

professed its willingness to move forward, no progress has been made.

•	 Amendment of bilateral agreements and treaties signed during the Syrian hegemony in 

the 1990s is also critical. The agreements—covering numerous spheres—must be amended 

to reflect the end of Syrian hegemony in Lebanon and ideally to capture the inherent synergies of Lebanese-Syrian ties.

•	 Dissolution of the Syrian-Lebanese Higher Council would eliminate a key instrument 

of Syrian control during its occupation of Lebanon. The establishment of diplomatic ties 

renders the council obsolete.

•	 Disarming of Syrian-supported armed Palestinian factions residing outside camps

would help eliminate an important source of instability in Lebanon. 

•	 Lebanese “missing” in Syrian jails must be addressed to close the sad chapter of Lebanon’s 15-year long civil war and subsequent Syrian hegemony. 

Syrian Vectors of Influence

Syria’s relationship with Hezbollah serves as a critical vector of Syrian influence in Lebanon. Hezbollah’s exercise of power and influence in Lebanon—by force of arms, through its political power or 

extensive grassroots networks—somewhat serves as a multiplier of Syrian influence and power 

projection in Lebanon. Their ties are anchored in a quid pro quo relationship of arms for influence. 

Syria serves as the primary conduit and a supplier of arms to Hezbollah, while Hezbollah stands 

as Syria’s chief ally in Lebanon, helping to insure that Syrian interests are protected. The recent 

Scud scandal—while details remain murky—embodies the essence of this alliance. While an 

actual transfer of Scud D missiles into Lebanon has not been confirmed, U.S. officials nonetheless 

underscore their continuing concerns about the qualitative and quantitative increase in weaponry 

funneled to Hezbollah through Syria. 

Syria also projects influence through its other allies in Lebanon, including Amal, the other main 

Shiite group in Lebanon, Christian leaders General Michel Aoun and Suleiman Franjieh, and a 

smattering of like-minded political forces in the country. 

Damascus exploits other instruments of power as well. While Syria has withdrawn militarily, 

it maintains a well-oiled intelligence apparatus in Lebanon which it can use to foster control. 

Syria also resorts to intimidation tactics and other forms of pressure. The Syrians have reportedly 

pressured Prime Minister Hariri to silence critics of Syria in his Future Party and used similar tactics 

on other politicians and media outlets to cease criticism of Syria. The net impact of these tactics 

may result in a chilling effect on Lebanon’s otherwise vibrant political culture. Finally, Syria relies 
© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

United States 

Institute of Peace

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About This Brief

Following a regional tour with 

stops in Saudi Arabia, Syria, and 

Turkey, Lebanese Prime Minister 

Saad Hariri will travel to the United 

States on May 24, when he is 

slated to meet with President 

Barack Obama in Washington 

and later visit New York where he 

will address the United Nations 

Security Council, currently chaired 

by Lebanon. This Peace Brief 

was written by Mona Yacoubian, 

director of the U.S. Institute of 

Peace’s Lebanon Working Group 

and special adviser to the Muslim 

World Initiative, and is adapted 

from her remarks at a recent panel 

discussion sponsored by the 

Middle East Institute. The views 

expressed here are not necessarily 

those of USIP, which does not 

advocate specific policies.

USIP provides the analysis, training and 

tools that prevent and end conflicts, 

promotes stability and professionalizes 

the field of peacebuilding.

For media inquiries, contact the office 

of Public Affairs and Communications, 

202.429.4725

on longstanding economic and social ties to ground its influence. While sometimes vectors for 

corruption, these relations can also serve as legitimate channels for trade and economic activity.

Back to the Future or Turning a New Page?

The future direction of Lebanese-Syrian ties is uncertain. Relations today stand at an important 

crossroads that lead in two different directions: a return to some form of Syrian domination or 

a newly defined relationship that places the two states on more equal footing. One scenario 

suggests a path “back to the future”—essentially a return to the status quo ante before Syria’s 

military withdrawal in 2005. While an actual return of the Syrian military to Lebanon is unlikely, a 

reassertion of significant Syrian control via various vectors would inhibit the emergence of a free 

and sovereign Lebanon. An alternate scenario envisions turning a new page for Lebanese-Syrian 

relations. This reformed relationship would be characterized by a clearly delineated border, mutual 

respect for sovereignty, and robust economic and trade relations.

While fears of a return to Syrian control in Lebanon are well founded, this scenario is not a forgone conclusion. The establishment of diplomatic relations represents a powerful, albeit symbolic, 

step toward a healthy bilateral relationship. The hard work of diplomacy could yield important 

results that help reform bilateral relations and accrue important benefits to both sides, moving 

both countries forward. This nascent rapprochement holds the potential for turning the page and 

ushering in a new era in Lebanese-Syrian relations. Building trust, discerning where important 

complementarities exist and exploiting the numerous possibilities for economic growth on both 

sides of the border will be essential. 

The Lebanese, however, cannot do this alone. Constructive engagement on these issues by the 

West, particularly the United States and France, is essential. U.S. engagement with Syria is important in this regard and normalized Syrian-Lebanese relations should top the list of U.S. priorities. 

Returning a U.S. ambassador to Damascus is a necessary first step. Having an ambassador in 

Damascus to lobby on Lebanon’s behalf and to push for critical steps such as border demarcation 

will be important. The United States has an important opportunity to help ensure against Lebanon’s future relations with Syria being an instance of “back to the future,” and to instead help the 

two countries to turn a new page.

Endnotes

1. While details remain murky, Syria stood accused of possibly transferring advance Scud missiles 

to the militant Shiite organization Hezbollah in Lebanon.

2. After World War I, with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, France gained mandatory power 

over Greater Syria, carving Lebanon out of the former Ottoman province. Until the establishment 

of diplomatic ties in 2008, Syria had not recognized Lebanese sovereignty.

3. President Chirac distanced France from Syria following the February 2005 assassination of 

former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and suspicions of possible Syrian involvement.

Lebanon’s Evolving Relationship with Syria: Back to the Future 

or Turning a New Page? page 4 • PB 33 • May 21, 2010