William Lewis, Edward Marks, and Robert Perito

Enhancing International

Civilian Police 

in Peace Operations

Briefly . . .

• In the post–Cold War period, there has been an increase in the number of violent

intra-state conflicts. Consequently, the international community has increased its

focus on international peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction.

• The use of international civilian police (CIVPOL) in peace operations has increased

during this period. Since 1992, the United Nations has authorized more than a dozen

international police missions, while the total authorized strength of CIVPOL forces has

increased to nearly 9,000. During this period, the United States has become the

largest contributor of personnel to CIVPOL missions.

• With the increase in the number of missions and growth in personnel has come a vast

expansion in the roles that CIVPOL is expected to perform. The complexity of peacekeeping operations has led to a need for CIVPOL officers with a wide variety of police

skills, particularly in “executive missions” like Kosovo and East Timor.

• Among the problems resulting from expanded CIVPOL involvement have been a shortage of properly trained and experienced police officers and the lack of adequate logistical support. Providing American police for UN missions has been a particular

challenge, as the United States has no national police force.

• To address the problems with CIVPOL missions, in February 2000, the Clinton administration issued Presidential Decision Directive 71 (PDD-71), which aimed at improving U.S. capacity to conduct CIVPOL operations and to rebuild foreign criminal justice

systems. The directive also called for increased support for the United Nations to

improve its capabilities in these areas. 

• PDD-71 designated the State Department as the “lead agency,” but in the closing

months of the Clinton administration, little was accomplished. Failure to implement

the directive was credited to the absence of sufficient White House involvement, interagency differences, and disruptions caused by the transition to a new administration.

• In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, the Bush administration has not renewed

PDD-71, but the issues raised in the directive have taken on new urgency. In the war

www.usip.org

SPECIAL REPORT

1200 17th Street NW • Washington, DC 20036 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

April 22, 2002

ABOUT THE REPORT

This report provides a summary of the presentations

and discussions from a workshop co-sponsored by

the United States Institute of Peace and the Center

for Strategic International Studies (CSIS) entitled “A

Status Report on International Civilian Police in

Peace Operations.” The workshop took place on

November 20, 2001. It brought together policymakers, practitioners, and academic experts to 

discuss implementation of recommendations 

contained in Presidential Decision Directive 71

(PDD-71) and the Report of the Panel on United

Peace Operations (the Brahimi Commission Report)

for improving the performance of international 

civilian police in peace operations.

The morning-long discussion was structured around

presentations by three panels of senior U.S. 

government and United Nations officials concerned

with directing United Nations civilian police

(CIVPOL) missions. Richard Solomon, 

president of the Institute of Peace, and Joseph

Montville, director of the CSIS Program on 

Preventive Diplomacy, made opening presentations.

The workshop was chaired by Robert Perito, a

senior fellow in the Jennings Randolph Program at

the U.S. Institute of Peace. William Lewis, Ph.D.,

and Ambassador Edward Marks (Ret.) are both

adjunct fellows in the Preventive Diplomacy

Program at CSIS.

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Institute of

Peace, which does not advocate specific policies.

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE

CONTENTS

Introduction 2

Background 3

Presidential Decision Directive 71 4

The Brahimi Report 7

Conclusions 9
on terrorism, CIVPOL can be a valuable tool in establishing the rule of law in postconflict societies and preventing the growth of extremism.

• The United Nations has taken steps to improve its capacity to conduct CIVPOL missions. In August 2000, the UN’s Brahimi Panel called for “a doctrinal shift” in the use

of civilian police and other judicial and human rights specialists to reflect the increasing focus on strengthening the rule of law and respect for human rights.

• CIVPOL reform remains an important issue. It requires continued attention from

administration policymakers, Congress, practitioners, and academics.

Introduction

Since 1989, the United States has been struggling to chart a strategic course through a

profoundly altered post–Cold War international landscape. Patterns of conflict and competition between former adversaries have shifted from an agenda of conflict prevention

to one emphasizing post-conflict reconstruction. The crucible of crisis and instability has

shifted to hitherto marginal regions where ethnic wars, internal disorders, and the collapse of governing institutions now command increased international attention. The horrific events of September 11 provided a dramatic introduction to the new challenges that

confront the United States in this century. 

These challenges include the need for effective new peacekeeping operations in a

variety of settings. The Rule of Law Program at the United States Institute of Peace

launched a Project on Peacekeeping and the Administration of Justice in late 2001 to

develop policy guidance and practical tools for establishing the rule of law in post-conflict societies. Over the course of two years, several project teams will examine such

issues as determining the applicable law, the performance of judicial functions by international military forces, deployment of foreign judicial personnel, establishment of a

transitional prison system, the challenge of terrorism and organized crime in the postconflict setting, war crimes, and the use of local customary approaches to justice. A crucial element of this project is the need to assess and improve the use of international

civilian police (CIVPOL) programs in peacekeeping operations. 

The Center for Strategic International Studies (CSIS) is also concerned with the role

of the United States in promoting the rule of law in post-conflict environments as an

independent actor and as a leader of the international community. Developing a comprehensive approach to the administration of post-conflict justice and figuring out how

to do it in a way that builds local capacity will have a major impact on the overall effectiveness of future peacekeeping operations and on the timetable for military exit strategies. Through its Program on Preventive Diplomacy, CSIS has sponsored a series of

workshops specifically devoted to problems in the administration of justice in general

and civilian policing in particular. 

The war on terrorism in which the United States and its coalition partners are engaged

is intended to prevent future attacks on Western institutions and political freedoms. It also

intensifies the importance of the related questions of peacebuilding and the role of the

administration of justice, particularly how international civilian police might be used to

rehabilitate shattered societies. 

The workshop held on November 20, 2001 was designed to provide “A Status Report on

International Civilian Police Operations” in order to establish a baseline for future study of

CIVPOL missions. Participants addressed the status of U.S. efforts to implement Presidential Decision Directive 71 (PDD-71) on “Strengthening Criminal Justice Systems in Support

of Peace Operations, “ which was issued by President Bill Clinton in February 2000. The

directive was intended to improve U.S. and UN capacity to deploy civilian police missions

and to promote the rule of law in peace operations. Workshop participants were also asked

to evaluate UN efforts to achieve the objectives of the report of the Secretary-General’s

2

ABOUT THE INSTITUTE

The United States Institute of Peace is an 

independent, nonpartisan federal institution 

created by Congress to promote the prevention,

management, and peaceful resolution of international conflicts. Established in 1984, the Institute

meets its congressional mandate through an 

array of programs, including research grants, 

fellowships, professional training, education 

programs from high school through graduate

school, conferences and workshops, library

services, and publications. The Institute’s Board of

Directors is appointed by the President of the

United States and confirmed by the Senate.

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

Chester A. Crocker (Chairman), James R. Schlesinger

Professor of Strategic Studies, School of Foreign Service,

Georgetown University • Seymour Martin Lipset (Vice

Chairman), Hazel Professor of Public Policy, George

Mason University • Betty F. Bumpers, Founder and 

former President, Peace Links, Washington, D.C. 

• Holly J. Burkhalter, Advocacy Director, Physicians for

Human Rights, Washington, D.C. • Marc E. Leland, Esq.,

President, Marc E. Leland & Associates, Arlington, Va. 

• Mora L. McLean, Esq., President, Africa-America Institute, New York, N.Y. • María Otero, President, ACCION

International, Boston, Mass. • Barbara W. Snelling, former State Senator and former Lieutenant Governor, 

Shelburne, Vt. • Harriet Zimmerman, Vice President,

American Israel Public Affairs Committee, Washington, D.C.

MEMBERS EX OFFICIO

Lorne W. Craner, Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor • Douglas J. Feith, Under

Secretary of Defense for Policy • Paul G. Gaffney II, Vice

Admiral, U.S. Navy; President, National Defense University • Richard H. Solomon, President, United States

Institute of Peace (nonvoting)
3

Panel on United Nations Peace Operations chaired by Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi, which

called for far-reaching reforms (Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, New

York: United Nations, 2000, www.un.org/peace/report/peace_operations). Those attending the workshop represented a wide array of backgrounds, including officials from the

administration and Congress as well as academic specialists. The following report contains

a distillation of views put forth at workshop, which was held with the understanding that

remarks could be quoted, but not for attribution.

Background

Beginning with Cambodia in 1992, the UN Security Council determined that traditional

peacekeeping precepts and operational guidelines needed to be adjusted to meet complex emergencies resulting from intra-state conflicts. The failure of governing institutions in a growing number of countries, accompanied by ethnic violence and secessionist

movements, had emerged as a serious threat to international peace and security. In an

effort to ameliorate burgeoning local conflicts, the Security Council authorized the intervention of multinational military forces to restore order and, where appropriate, followon civilian administrations to assist in post-conflict reconstruction of war-torn

communities. In succession, the UN authorized such complex operations for Cambodia,

Angola, Mozambique, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor.

The growing number of such operations generated an expanded need for military

forces and civilian police. That need was reflected in the 60,000 plus multinational military forces deployed in 1995 and in the increasing number of roles played by them.

Concomitantly, international organizations, non-govenmental organizations (NGOs),

and bilateral assistance agencies were drawn into these newly mandated missions,

adding immeasurably to their complexity. International intervention during humanitarian emergencies also involved interference by the United Nations in the internal affairs

of member states. Such interventions involved peace enforcement under Chapter VII of

the UN Charter. CIVPOL officers were increasingly involved in these interventions—

initially as advisers, monitors, and instructors, but later in Kosovo and East Timor as

armed law enforcement officers with full executive authority, including the right to use

deadly force. 

The new importance of international civilian police in post-conflict situations raised

a number of troubling issues. Foremost was the need for more CIVPOL in order to cope

with the rapid expansion in the number of missions. Problems resulted from the large

number of untrained police that reported for duty. The United Nations was also unable

to provide adequate logistical support. In response, Presidential Decision Directive 71

(PDD-71) ordered the Departments of State, Justice, and Defense to “undertake a series

of critical enhancements” to improve the professionalism of civilian police and judicial

experts and to provide for their rapid deployment in complex contingencies (“The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Strengthening Criminal Justice Systems in Support of

Peace Operations,” White Paper, Executive Office of the President, Washington, D.C., February 24, 2000).

U.S. problems in participating in CIVPOL missions largely result from the fact that the

United States has no national police force similar to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

Instead, the United States has 18,000 state and local police departments, plus more

than a dozen highly specialized federal law enforcement agencies. President Clinton’s

intention was to strengthen the U.S. capacity to participate in international civilian

police missions and to assist the United Nations to improve its own capabilities. The

PDD’s terms of reference were to: (1) improve the capacity of the U.S. government to

respond to the police and criminal justice aspects of peace operations, (2) improve the

response capacities of the United Nations and other international organizations, and (3)

improve the relevant capacities of other countries. 

The war on terrorism . . . 

intensifies the importance of 

the related questions of

peacebuilding and the role of

the administration of justice.

Developing a comprehensive

approach to the administration

of post-conflict justice . . . will

have a major impact on the

overall effectiveness of future

peacekeeping operations and 

on the timetable for military

exit strategies.
4

Meanwhile, UN secretary general Kofi Annan engaged a panel of experts chaired by

the former Algerian foreign minister, Lakhdar Brahimi, to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the existing UN peacekeeping system and to develop new and fresh approaches to reorganize and strengthen UN operations. The request for the study arose at a time

when the demand for CIVPOL personnel had grown prodigiously, increasing from 3,000

to nearly 9,000 from 1998 to 1999. The Brahimi Report called for the upgrading and

expansion of the Civilian Police Unit in the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations

(DPKO), the addition of judicial and penal experts to its staff, and far-reaching reform

of UN administrative structures and financial procedures for peace operations. 

Presidential Decision Directive 71

Summary

The effort at reorganization and administrative reform with respect to CIVPOL in the U.S.

government was part of a three-stage process that touched on all aspects of U.S.

involvement in peacekeeping and peace operations. PDD-71 was the third in a series of

Clinton administration directives designed to organize the U.S. government’s approach

to international humanitarian emergencies. The others were PDD-25, which dealt with

“Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations,” and PDD-56 on “Managing Complex Contingency Operations.” In the view of the majority of workshop participants, the goals of

PDD-71 have not been met due to bureaucratic lethargy, inter-agency competition, transition to a new administration, and the disinclination of National Security Council (NSC)

staff to assign priority attention to the issue of CIVPOL reform. Although PDD-71 along

with the other Clinton administration peacekeeping directives have been formally terminated, their goals have not been repudiated. Conference participants agreed that the

conditions that led to the drafting of PDD-71 still exist and the challenges of improving both civilian police and judicial assistance still need to be addressed. The events of

September 11 and after have made the original concerns that produced the directives

even more relevant. The White House is now considering updating the Clinton administration’s peacekeeping directives, including PDD-71. 

Implementing the Directive

The problems encountered in implementing PDD-71 were not completely surprising. The

directive had required three years of laborious negotiations among mid-level policy officials who perceived a need for enhancing the U.S. government’s capacity to meet the

growing number of peace operations. The Clinton administration’s experience in peacekeeping had proven painful in Somalia and Haiti. In the former, U.S. forces had been

withdrawn in the aftermath of the deaths of 18 U.S. Army Rangers in Mogadishu in October 1993. Administration wariness about peacekeeping was thereafter manifest during

outbreaks of civil disturbances in Haiti, genocidal warfare in Rwanda, and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia.

According to participants, the greatest shortcoming was the decision by the Clinton

administration to assign the “leadership” for PDD-71 implementation to a single agency,

the Department of State. This step was taken because the NSC was unable to give the

issue the attention it required. Absent NSC oversight, it was perhaps impossible to

expect that one department could resolve the inevitable differences that arose between

agencies with different organizational cultures and institutional priorities, especially

since the objectives of the PDD were broad and ambitious. Although there was some

incremental progress in implementing the directive, there was no breakthrough. One

speaker suggested the need for a “very agitated person” or “Czar” to provide the necessary leadership to reach the goals of the directive. 

One speaker suggested the 

need for a “very agitated

person” or “Czar” to provide 

the necessary leadership to

reach the goals of [PDD-71].
5

In addition to leadership, achieving the directive’s goals would require the active participation and cooperation of numerous federal and local agencies. This is never easy in

the U.S. government. The specific objectives of PDD-71 indicate the complexity:

1. To establish the State Department as the lead agency for international civilian police

programs and assistance to criminal justice systems in peace operations. 

2. To enhance the capacity to provide American CIVPOL to peace operations, to help

other countries to contribute civilian police, and to provide training and development

assistance for indigenous police. 

3. To create an interagency effort involving State, Justice, and AID to improve U.S.

capacity to assist criminal justice systems in peace operations. 

4. To improve the capacity of the United Nations and regional organizations such as the

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to provide civilian police

and judicial assistance.

Implementation of PDD-71 raised a host of administrative and bureaucratic issues.

The directive clearly envisioned a larger role for the International Criminal Investigative

Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), including training U.S. and foreign police for peace

operations. The future of ICITAP remains an open question. One participant noted that

State and Justice were discussing the future of ICITAP to determine how it might be better used to support civilian police in peace operations. Another participant pointed out

that State and Justice had “expended a lot of energy” debating the future of ICITAP but

little progress was achieved. 

Other bureaucratic problems arose from PDD-71’s explicit recognition that CIVPOL’s

success in establishing law and order in post-conflict societies rested heavily on linking

civilian police operations with associated components of the criminal justice system—

courts, judges, prosecutors, corrections officials, and public defenders. Therefore, the

directive sought to overcome the institutional gap evident in previous peacebuilding

efforts by urging expanded interagency cooperation in establishing the rule of law. 

PDD-71 clearly recognized the need for the United States to provide additional resources

to overcome this problem, both in terms of enhancing U.S. capabilities and the capabilities of the United Nations and other governments. 

Of greater significance is the fact that the U.S. CIVPOL program lacks statutory authorization and is funded on an annual basis. It has little congressional support and has

received limited White House attention. Alone among donor nations, the United States

recruits its CIVPOL contingents through a commercial contractor. Most American CIVPOL are

mid-career officers from state and local police departments who take a leave of absence,

resign, or have recently retired. Earlier in the program, reliance on retired officers had produced highly uneven results. Participants noted recent press reports alleging that Americans

were among CIVPOL officers in Bosnia who frequented brothels and were involved in trafficking in women. A few participants argued that providing police for international missions

was an inherently governmental function and it was inappropriate for the United States to

work through a contractor. Other participants believed there was nothing wrong with using

a commercial contractor, but thought the current system could be made to work better. 

More than one speaker thought the National Guard might provide a model for federalizing police for temporary duty in peace operations. Some suggested using federal

agents, but others replied that this approach had not worked in practice. Others suggested that recruiting police would become even more difficult because of the war

against terrorism. In the wake of September 11, the administration has assigned highest priority to homeland defense as well as to the multi-dimensional efforts against global terrorism. Civilian police resources have been allocated to protection of sites,

surveillance, and apprehension of suspected terrorists. A substantial number of police

officers with Reserve or National Guard affiliations have been mobilized for active duty,

further reducing the manpower available for CIVPOL service.

CIVPOL’s success in establishing

law and order in post-conflict

societies rested heavily on 

linking civilian police operations

with associated components 

of the criminal justice system.

The U.S. CIVPOL program lacks

statutory authorization and is

funded on an annual basis. It

has little congressional support

and has received limited White

House attention. 
6

A major subject of discussion was the issue of granting international civilian police

executive law enforcement authority in peace operations. The purpose of executive missions is to provide an interim police force while an indigenous police force is trained.

Use of international police for this function raises several issues that need to be

addressed: (1) relevant law, (2) use of deadly force, (3) guidelines for Special Police

(constabulary) Units, (4) indigenous police training, (5) transfer of authority to local

police, and (6) relations with the other parts of the criminal justice system. Participants

agreed that the Institute of Peace and CSIS could assist in providing responses to these

questions. Additional thought should be given to the challenge of training local police

in such specialized fields as organized crime, counter-terrorism, border control, and

forensic science. 

The question of applicable law for use by UN Transitional Authorities is noted in both

the Brahimi Report and PDD-71. The former recommends that a panel of international

experts develop an interim criminal code for use in the post-conflict reconstruction period, pending the re-establishment of local rule of law. The latter instructs the relevant

U.S. agencies to “establish an international partnership in judicial, penal, and legal code

development assistance for post-conflict areas.” Participants noted that little progress

has been achieved in implementing these recommendations. As a result, following on

the Brahimi proposals, the Institute’s Project on Peacekeeping and Administration of

Justice has established a team of experts who are developing a universal stand-by criminal code and code of criminal procedures for use in such contingencies. 

There has also been little progress in the area of civil disorder management during

peace operations. Special Police Units, which are part of the UN police force in Kosovo,

have this capability, but have been used for other purposes. Participants noted the

potential importance of constabulary units in controlling civil unrest and providing area

security. Questions remain about the most appropriate models for such forces, whether

they should be under military or civilian authority and how they should be employed.

The United States has no constabulary forces and any effort to create them would require

congressional action. Participants noted that the National Guard is trained in crowd control techniques and that U.S. Military Police are also capable of dealing with civil disorder. Some participants suggested that additional study might prove productive, since

the Europeans also appear interested in developing this capability. The European Union

has announced plans to create a 5,000-man police force for peacekeeping that would

include a 1,000-man rapid reaction force composed principally of constabulary. 

For its part, the State Department has taken a number of steps to improve the quality and accountability of U.S. CIVPOL. A former senior CIVPOL officer has been hired to

develop a program for expanding outreach and involving the State Department directly

in recruiting active duty police for CIVPOL service. State has produced a recruiting

brochure that has been distributed to police associations and at police conferences.

American CIVPOL participants have been honored in ceremonies, given medals, and sent

letters of thanks and commendation to bolster a sense of pride and professionalism. To

improve accountability, U.S. contingent commanders have been given greater authority

to impose discipline, and a system of performance evaluations has been developed. To

improve responsiveness, State intends to create a “ready roster” of police who have completed a training program and are prepared to depart on short notice. It has already created specific job descriptions for the ready roster. State plans to re-tender the

commercial contract for supporting the U.S. CIVPOL program in 2002. Creation of the

roster will be one responsibility under the new contract.

Meanwhile, State has hired an experienced police training coordinator who is preparing a training course for prospective CIVPOL officers, which will contain an expanded

session on peaceful dispute resolution provided by the Institute of Peace. As an incentive for active duty officers to enroll in this course, State will ensure it is accredited by

the Police Officers Standards and Training (POST) organization so it will help officers

qualify for promotions. State is working with the United Nations and with U.S. allies to

The State Department has 

taken a number of steps to

improve the quality and

accountability of U.S. CIVPOL.

To improve responsiveness, 

State intends to create a 

“ready roster” of police who

have completed a training

program and are prepared to

depart on short notice.
improve their capacity to train and deploy police in peace operations. Foreign police

trainers will be invited to attend the U.S. CIVPOL course to spread the benefits to other

nations, particularly in this hemisphere. 

While much remains to be done, one speaker noted that much of the “low fruit has

been picked” and there have been considerable improvements in the conduct of international police missions over the past decade. The international community has been

less successful, however, in providing assistance to judicial systems during peace operations. Some workshop participants noted that little progress has been registered over

the past two years in establishing a baseline “rule of law” program under the terms of

PDD-71. In reality, there is little agreement within the U.S. government as to a reasonable definition of the term “rule of law.” At one point in mid-2000, more than a dozen

definitions were circulating within Washington. In most instances, they reflected agency

interests as opposed to a comprehensive conceptual definition. According to several

workshop participants, the United States should continue to push for a comprehensive

justice system package for peace operations. As one participant observed, however, a single “cookie cutter” approach would be counter-productive given the diverse environments in which peacekeeping forces might be introduced. 

While PDD-71 was not formally renewed by the Bush administration, several administration representatives noted that the “spirit of PDD-71 lives on” as both an “inspirational document” and as a framework for improving the performance of international

civilian police missions. The conditions that led to the drafting of PDD-71 still obtain

and the needs identified in the directive are recognized by the new administration. Initial experience gained in its implementation has been useful and a cadre of veteran

American CIVPOL officers now exists. The Bush administration has not repudiated the

package of Clinton-era documents concerning the management of complex contingency

operations (PDD-25, 56, and 71). Participants said the administration is now considering whether it would be appropriate to update and reissue these directives. 

The Brahimi Report

Summary

On March 7, 2000, UN secretary general Kofi Annan convened an expert Panel on United Nations Peace Operations to review UN peace and security activities and to present

“a clear set of specific, concrete, and practical recommendations to assist the United

Nations in conducting such activities better in the future” (Secretary General to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council, August 21,

2000, A/55/305-S/2000/809, 1). Former Algerian foreign minister Lakhdar Brahimi

chaired the panel. The Brahimi commission’s report was made public and submitted to

the Security Council and the General Assembly for consideration on August 21, 2000. The

deputy secretary general was tasked to prepare a detailed plan for its implementation.

Release of the report was timed to coincide with preparations for the September 6–8 Millennium Summit at UN Headquarters where the assembled world leaders reviewed the

report and, in principle, endorsed its recommendations. The United Nations is now

engaged in a multi-phased process of considering the report’s recommendations, which

call for a wide range of UN operational and institutional reforms. 

CIVPOL Reform

In regard to UN CIVPOL missions, the Brahimi Report recommends a “doctrinal shift” in the

use of civilian police and other judicial and human rights specialists in peace operations

to reflect an increasing focus on strengthening the rule of law and respect for human rights

in post-conflict environments. The panel noted that in contemporary missions CIVPOL are

7

While much remains to be 

done, . . . much of the “low 

fruit has been picked” and

there have been considerable

improvements in the conduct 

of international police missions

over the past decade.

The Brahimi Report recommends

a “doctrinal shift” in the use of

civilian police and other judicial

and human rights specialists in

peace operations to reflect an

increasing focus on strengthening

the rule of law and respect for

human rights.
required to do more than set a good example and to report on the unacceptable behavior

of local police. They are also engaged in police retraining and reform and in executive policing in some missions. In any case, they must work closely with other parts of the justice

system, which creates a need to add judicial and penal experts to the DPKO staff. With

respect to civilian police, the report laid out basic principles concerning their use in peace

operations:

• Effective peacebuilding requires that CIVPOL retrain and restructure local police, not

just “observe and scold”;

• Police are just one of the elements needed to restore public security and rebuild rule

of law in war-torn societies; 

• It is meaningless to give CIVPOL law enforcement authority without also providing a

complete criminal justice system within which they can work;

• Police in transitional civil administration missions need to know up front which law

they are to enforce and need to be trained in that law and its procedures; and

• The pursuit of post-war justice and reconciliation requires the effective teaming of

criminal justice and human rights specialists. 

The report also provided the following recommendations for rapid and effective

deployment of civilian police missions: 

• Member states should establish national pools of serving police officers trained in

accordance with UN guidelines and available for UN service on short notice; 

• Police-contributing states should establish regional partnerships to conduct joint

police training exercises; 

• Similar personnel pools and training partnerships should be established for judicial,

penal, and human rights experts who would form UN “rule of law teams”; 

• Member states should establish a single point of contact responsible for managing

the provision of CIVPOL and related specialties to the United Nations; and

• The United Nations should establish a roster of about 100 civilian police planners and

technical experts for rapid call-up to plan new missions and to serve as initial CIVPOL

leaders and trainers for those missions. 

Structural changes within DPKO were also recommended, specifically upgrading the

CIVPOL Unit to a division headed by a director who was co-equal with the head of the

Military Division in DPKO. This has been done, but the recommendation for creating the

post of assistant secretary general to manage both uniformed divisions was denied by

the UN’s funding committees. Both divisions will now report to under-secretary general

Jean-Marie Guehenno. The report also recommended establishing a criminal justice unit

within DPKO to provide support for rule of law components in the field. 

While the Brahimi Report is comprehensive, one participant pointed out it was

instructive to look at some “roads not taken” by the panel (that is, ideas raised but set

aside for various reasons). One suggestion was to create a standing unit of 500 CIVPOL

officers who would be available for immediate deployment in a peace operation. The idea

was set aside as too costly. Another suggestion was to routinely include Special Police

Units in all CIVPOL missions to ensure appropriate forces for handling civil unrest. This

concept was toned down and the specific reference to Special Units removed. A larger,

standing UN law enforcement reserve for rapid deployment to post-conflict settings was

not considered. Although such a capacity might not invite the same level of political

opposition as a standing international military force, it would need to be big enough to

take over public security duties in post-conflict situations, which would have made it

very costly. 

Under the Secretary General’s Plan for Implementation, the United Nations is now

engaged in a broad-based process to reform the manner in which it conducts peace oper8
ations. According to one participant, the “Brahimi Process” envisages reforms in four

major areas of the UN system:

• Management

• Strategic planning

• Operational planning and deployment 

• Personnel 

Progress has been made in some areas, but other recommendations have encountered

resistance from member states. Immediate benefits for the CIVPOL Division have included a steady increase in the number of staff, approaching the 23 positions recommended in the report. This includes the first adviser on judicial and penal affairs, a recent hire.

Cooperation has also improved between the staff of the CIVPOL Division and their opposite numbers on the military side of DPKO. Police and rule of law issues are receiving

more serious consideration and there is improved cooperation on the planning for future

missions. The CIVPOL Division has also begun a dialogue with the UN Development Program (UNDP) aimed at incorporating expertise in institution building and project evaluation into police assistance programs. The CIVPOL Division is also working more closely

with the UN Department of Political Affairs, which has a critical role in the planning and

direction of peacekeeping missions. The division is also investigating the possibility of

partnering with research institutes such as U.S. Institute of Peace to look at issues related to police reform. In addition, Finland hosted a workshop for CIVPOL donor countries

on establishing a 100-member Headquarters Unit that could deploy on short notice. This

unit would have the ability to conduct assessments and do strategic planning, plus manage the start-up of a new mission and the initial deployment of CIVPOL personnel. 

Beyond administrative reforms, the CIVPOL Division has changed its thinking concerning the role the United Nations can play in providing assistance to indigenous police

in peace operations. Given the geographic size and institutional scale of possible CIVPOL

missions in Afghanistan, Congo, and Sri Lanka, it is clear these will not be executive police

missions on the model of Kosovo and East Timor. Instead, the CIVPOL Division is considering an approach that one participant described as “advising with leverage.” Under this

concept, CIVPOL officers would go beyond monitoring local police by providing technical

assistance and guidance to senior police officials. Such assistance would be extended in

the context of political understandings with the host government that failure to heed the

advice of UN CIVPOL officers would result in censure or dismissal for local officers. 

Conclusions

As an instrument of U.S. foreign policy and as a tool for post-conflict reconstruction,

CIVPOL has undergone a baptism of trial and error in Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor.

Much useful experience and growth in professional competence have been obtained. This

is true for the U.S. government and the United Nations, as well as a number of other

interested countries. Prior peacebuilding missions have provided “lessons learned” in

pre-crisis planning, conducting operations, donor country coordination, and providing

logistical support. Of supreme importance and codified in the Brahimi Report and in

PDD-71 is the imperative of closely linking and fully integrating CIVPOL with the rest of

the criminal justice system. PDD-71 was intended to provide a baseline for improving the

U.S. CIVPOL program, including resource mobilization, field competency, and international cooperation. It emerged out of the crucible of extensive inter-agency negotiation.

Implementation was hindered, however, by the seeming lack of enthusiasm from the NSC

and contentious “jurisdictional issues” among implementing agencies. The fall 2000

national elections and their aftermath afforded additional opportunity for temporizing

and delay.

The United Nations is now

engaged in a broad-based

process to reform the manner 

in which it conducts peace

operations.

9

Given the geographic size and

institutional scale of possible

CIVPOL missions in Afghanistan,

Congo, and Sri Lanka, it is clear

these will not be executive police

missions on the model of Kosovo

and East Timor.
Since the Bush administration has not renewed PDD-71, it remains in bureaucratic

limbo. There has been modest progress in its implementation and the directive is maintained on “life support” through the determined efforts of mid-level officials at the State

Department. Nevertheless, the concerns that produced PDD-71 and the logic of its

approach remain current and there is hope the directive will be reaffirmed in a general

White House examination of all such directives issued by the previous administration.

PDD-71 calls for leadership within the U.S. government, as well as a leadership role for

the United States in the international community. Achievement of its goals will require

increased awareness in Congress of the potential advantages for U.S. foreign policy interests offered by U.S. participation in CIVPOL missions. Participants suggested that such

increased awareness could be achieved through administration briefings of congressional staff, the General Accounting Office, and media representatives.

This report should be read along with the Institute of Peace’s Special Report entitled

American Civilian Police in UN Peace Operations, published on July 6, 2001. That report

captures lessons learned from CIVPOL veterans and makes recommendations on how to

improve CIVPOL training, management, and operations. It was noted by Senator Ben

Campbell and submitted as part of the record of a hearing held on September 5, 2001

by the congressional Helsinki Commission concerning American police participation in

UN peace operations. The earlier report offers useful insights, which underscore the view

expressed in several CSIS publications, that CIVPOL is too valuable an instrument to function on a hit-and-miss or ad hoc basis. Given its importance, several key elements of an

effective CIVPOL program deserve immediate attention:

1. Executive authority: UN CIVPOL missions, particularly those with executive authority,

require standardized operating procedures for functions ranging from station management to performance guidelines. These procedures should figure prominently in

the pre-training of international police for CIVPOL service.

2. Standardization of basic laws: UN CIVPOL executive missions need a standby code of

basic criminal laws and procedures. The absence of common legal precepts impedes

the integration of international civilian police into a unified force and hampers their

performance, particularly in the early stages of a peace operation.

3. Constabulary forces: Special Police Units can be useful in complex emergencies. Italy,

France, and Spain could be encouraged to provide training centers for European and

other governments willing to organize such units for future peace operations.

4. Recruiting: Resolution of the problem of finding sufficient numbers of qualified police

officers for CIVPOL duty is fundamental to the success of future UN missions. This

applies especially to the United States, where the decentralized nature of the American

police system and the tradition of relying on contractors present special challenges. 

5. Judicial and penal systems: Police are only one part of the “judicial triad” of police,

courts, and prisons. There is a need to design judicial and penal system “packages”

to deploy with CIVPOL at the beginning of a peace operation. Rapid establishment of

the rule of law is essential to preventing the emergence of “spoilers” (corrupt nationalist politicians with links to organized crime and secret security services) who

obstruct the peace process. 

The events of September 11 have posed a number of serious challenges related to

homeland defense and the war against terrorism. An imaginative and effective American

CIVPOL program can play a role in the success of both of these efforts. Effective crisis

management and post-conflict reconstruction, of which effective civilian policing is a

major component, can help close the “security gap” in peace operations and prevent 

“failed states” from becoming breeding grounds for extremists and havens for terrorist

organizations. This potential should be fully explored by the U.S. government and the

United Nations.

10

Effective crisis management and

post-conflict reconstruction, of

which effective civilian policing

is a major component, can help

close the “security gap” in

peace operations and prevent

“failed states” from becoming

breeding grounds for extremists.

CIVPOL is too valuable an

instrument to function on a hitand-miss or ad hoc basis.
11

Participants

Anthony Banbury

National Security Council

Office of Democracy, Human Rights, 

and International Operations

Richard Boudreau

General Accounting Office

Eva Buzsa

National Democratic Institute of 

International Affairs

Charles Call

U.S. Institute of Peace

Don Daniel

Brooke Darby

Department of State

Bureau of International Narcotics 

and Law Enforcement Affairs

Beth DeGrasse

Peace through Law Education Fund

William Durch

Stimson Center

Michael Dziedzic

U.S. Institute of Peace

Patricia Weiss Fagen

Georgetown University

Scott Feil

Association of the U.S. Army

Peter Gantz

Partnership for Effective Peacekeeping

David Hodgkinson

Department of Justice

Melinda Hoffsteter

Tulane University

Center for Disaster Management and

Humanitarian Assistance

Rhoda Horried

General Accounting Office

Katie Jennings

Council on Foreign Relations

Thomas Johnson

U.S. AID

Rich Kauzlarich

U.S. Institute of Peace

Steve Krasner

Department of State

Office of Policy Planning

Neil Kritz

U.S. Institute of Peace

Krishna Kumar

U.S. AID

Jeremy Latimer

General Accounting Office

Sara Lechtenberg-Kasten

Institute for Defense Analyses

William Lewis

CSIS

Martin Lidy

Institute for Defense Analyses

Edward Marks

CSIS

Gary Matthews

Katie McDonald

DFI International

Johanna Mendelson Forman

Association of the U.S. Army

Joseph Montville

Center for Strategic International Studies

Mark Morehouse

Office of Congressman Jim Kolbe

(Arizona)

Curtis Morris

U.S. Institute of Peace

Sasa Nikolic

UNHCR

Steve Otto

Department of State

Bureau of International Narcotics 

and Law Enforcement Affairs

Robert Perito

U.S. Institute of Peace

Colette Rausch

U.S. Institute of Peace

Addison Ricks

General Accounting Office

Eric Scheye

UN CIVPOL Division

Adam Seigel

Northrop Grumman Analysis Center

Richard Solomon

U.S. Institute of Peace

Jane Stromseth

Georgetown University Law Center

Juan Tapia-Videla

General Accounting Office

Matthew Vaccaro

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Office of Peacekeeping Affairs

Martina Vandenberg

Human Rights Watch

Eve Weisberg

General Accounting Office

George Ward

U.S. Institute of Peace

Jay Wise

RAND Corporation
Of Related Interest

Many other publications from the United States Institute of Peace address issues that

relate directly to civilian police or peace operations.

Recent Institute reports include:

American Civilian Police in UN Peace Operations (Special Report, July 2001)

Training U.S. Army Officers for Peace Operations: Lessons from Bosnia (Special Report,

October 1999)

To obtain an Institute report (available free of charge), write United States Institute of

Peace, 1200 17th Street NW, Suite 200, Washington, DC 20036-3011; call (202) 429-

3832; fax (202) 429-6063; or e-mail: usip_requests@usip.org.

Recent books from USIP Press include:

Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict, edited by Chester A.

Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (2001)

Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques, edited by I. William Zartman and J. Lewis Rasmussen (1997)

Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes, edited by

Neil J. Kritz (3 vols., 1995)

For book sales and order information, call 800-868-8064 (U.S. toll-free only) or 703-661-

1590, or fax 703-661-1501.

For more information, see our website

(www.usip.org), which has an online

edition of this report containing links

to related websites, as well as additional information on the topic.

SPECIAL REPORT 85

United States 

Institute of Peace

1200 17th Street NW

Washington, DC 20036