The Honorable Jerry W. Cavaneau, United States Magistrate

1

Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas, to whom this case was

referred for final disposition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

___________

No. 96-2253

___________

Ruth A. Kisling, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Arkansas.

Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner *

of the Social Security *

Administration, *

*

Appellee. *

___________

 Submitted: December 9, 1996

 Filed: February 5, 1997

___________

Before WOLLMAN, BRIGHT, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

___________

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

Ruth A. Kisling appeals from the district court's order affirming

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the decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration,

denying her claim for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits. We

affirm.

I.

Kisling filed for benefits on January 15, 1993, claiming disability

due to arthritis, bronchitis, and asthma. At her hearing before an

administrative law judge (ALJ), Kisling testified to arthritis pain,

bronchitis, asthma, and bad nerves. She also stated that she often became

depressed and angry. 
 Dysthymia is a mood disorder characterized by a depressed

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feeling and loss of interest or pleasure in one's usual activities

that persists for more than two years but is not severe enough to

meet the criteria for major depression. Richard Sloane, The

Sloane-Dorland Annotated Medical-Legal Dictionary 204 (1992 Supp.).

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The ALJ found that Kisling suffered from bronchitis and dysthymia .

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Analyzing Kisling's claim under the framework outlined in 20 C.F.R. §§

416.920 and 416.920a, the ALJ found that while these impairments were

severe, they did not meet the requirements for listed impairments. The ALJ

concluded that Kisling retained the residual functional capacity to perform

her past relevant work as a shirt factory worker, and therefore denied

benefits. 

The Appeals Council denied Kisling's request for review. The

district court granted summary judgment for the Commissioner. On appeal,

Kisling argues that the Commissioner's decision was not supported by

substantial evidence, that the ALJ's credibility determinations were

erroneous, and that the ALJ failed to consider the combined effect of her

impairments on her ability to perform her past relevant work.

II.

 Our review on appeal is limited to determining whether the

Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence on the record

as a whole. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Comstock v. Chater, 91 F.3d 1143, 1145

(8th Cir. 1996); Johnson v. Chater, 87 F.3d 1015, 1017 (8th Cir. 1996).

"Substantial evidence is that which a reasonable mind would find as

adequate to support the Commissioner's decision." Comstock, 91 F.3d at

1145; see Johnson, 87 F.3d at 1017. 

The record clearly supports the Commissioner's determination that

Kisling's physical impairments do not inhibit her ability to perform her

past relevant work. The medical evidence does not show
 Kisling alleges that the ALJ breached his duty to adequately 3

develop the record. See Mitchell v. Shalala, 25 F.3d 712, 714 (8th

Cir. 1994). The record itself, however, is sufficiently developed;

the documents and testimony simply fail to support Kisling's

claims. 

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that Kisling suffers from arthritis or from any other afflictions that

might impair her ability to work. Medical records do confirm that Kisling

suffers from chronic, and occasionally acute bronchitis, but there is no

evidence that her pulmonary function is significantly compromised, and no

physician has ever restricted her activities because of her pulmonary

status. Moreover, there is no evidence in the record showing that

Kisling's pulmonary condition would inhibit her ability to work as a shirt

factory worker.3

Furthermore, the medical records show that Kisling's respiratory

problems are related to her smoking habit. Although her physicians

repeatedly recommended that she curb her smoking, Kisling did not heed this

advice. Impairments that are controllable or amenable to treatment do not

support a finding of disability, and "[f]ailure to follow a prescribed

course of remedial treatment without good reason is grounds for denying an

application for benefits." Roth v. Shalala, 45 F.3d 279, 282 (8th Cir.

1995); see 20 C.F.R. § 416.930(b).

The record also supports the Commissioner's determination that

Kisling's mental condition does not impair her capacity to perform her past

relevant work. Kisling's treating psychiatrist, Dr. Gary Tharp, noted on

December 19, 1992, that her dysthymia was in remission. In reports dated

May 8, 1993 and July 10, 1993, Tharp did note that Kisling exhibited

schizoid avoidance features. In two subsequent reports dated August 28,

1993 and October 30, 1993, however, Tharp does not mention any such

features. Moreover, in the July 10th, August 28th, and October 30th

reports, Tharp described Kisling as alert and oriented, in a good mood,

maintaining a normal speech pattern, exhibiting appropriate
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reactions, and presenting no evidence of psychosis or suicidal or homicidal

thoughts. 

We also find that the ALJ properly assessed the credibility of

Kisling and her sister and was justified in discounting their testimony

regarding Kisling's subjective complaints of pain. The ALJ based his

credibility assessment on specific inconsistencies between Kisling's

complaints and the record as a whole, as required by Polaski v. Heckler,

739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir. 1984). He noted the absence of medical

evidence supporting Kisling's subjective complaints of pain, a factor that

supports the discounting of such complaints. See Comstock, 91 F.3d at

1147. He also relied on the fact that Kisling was not on any pain

medication, which we have held "is `inconsistent with subjective complaints

of disabling pain.'" Johnson, 87 F.3d at 1017 (quoting Haynes v. Shalala,

26 F.3d 812, 814 (8th Cir. 1994)). The ALJ additionally noted that Kisling

took care of her own daily personal needs, and that no physician had

instructed her to limit herself in any capacity. Finally, he cited the

opinion of Kisling's therapist that Kisling's motivation to work was

suspect. These enumerated findings support the ALJ's decision to discount

Kisling's subjective complaints of pain. See Polaski, 739 F.2d at 1322.

Likewise, because Kisling's sister merely stated that Kisling's testimony

was true and not exaggerated, the ALJ was justified in discrediting her

testimony as well. See Brown v. Chater, 87 F.3d 963, 966 (8th Cir. 1996)

(ALJ may disbelieve witness's testimony due to suspect nature).

Finally, contrary to Kisling's assertion, we find that the ALJ

properly considered the combined effect of Kisling's impairments. See 20

C.F.R. § 416.923; Weikert v. Sullivan, 977 F.2d 1249, 1251 (8th Cir. 1992).

Overall, the evidence in the record supports the Commissioner's conclusion

that Kisling's impairments did not inhibit her ability to perform her past

relevant work. 
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The judgment is affirmed.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.