MILITARY 

READINESS

Analysis of 

Maintenance Delays 

Needed to Improve 

Availability of Patriot 

Equipment for 

Training

Report to Congressional Committees

June 2018

GAO-18-447

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-18-447, a report to 

congressional committees

June 2018

MILITARY READINESS

Analysis of Maintenance Delays Needed to Improve 

Availability of Patriot Equipment for Training

What GAO Found

The Army uses reset and recapitalization to extend the life of its Patriot surfaceto-air missile system. The reset process—which is intended to repair recentlydeployed equipment—has often returned equipment to Patriot units late, which 

has affected unit training. GAO found that of the seven Patriot battalions that 

underwent reset from fiscal years 2014 through 2017, only one received its 

equipment within 180 days, in accordance with Army policy (see figure). Patriot 

unit officials told GAO that such delays reduced the time available for unit 

training, creating challenges in meeting training requirements as units prepare 

for their next mission. The Army has identified and analyzed several factors 

affecting reset timeliness, ranging from supply chain issues to transportation. 

However, the Army has not comprehensively analyzed the relative importance of 

these factors. Such an analysis would better position the Army to target its efforts 

effectively to ensure units receive equipment back in a timely manner.

Patriot Equipment Reset Timeliness for Units, Fiscal Years 2014-2017

Notes: Air Defense Artillery (ADA) is used as a designator in the names of Patriot units.

a

Reset of the 2-43 ADA and 4-3 ADA in fiscal years 2016-2017 included concurrent 

upgrades of equipment that added, according to officials, 60 days to their reset periods.

With respect to recapitalization, the Army has decided to recapitalize each 

battalion set of Patriot equipment once every 15 years to support the system’s 

long-term viability through 2048, while recognizing that this approach introduces 

some challenges. The Army would prefer to recapitalize Patriot equipment every 

10 years, but Army officials stated this is not feasible for the following reasons:

• Reducing the amount of equipment for ongoing operational commitments to 

increase the pace of recapitalization is not feasible given current 

commitments and the projected security environment. 

• Buying extra equipment to provide to additional units undergoing 

recapitalization is not feasible because the Army has prioritized replacing the 

Patriot radar to improve its capability to defend against advanced threats. 

Army officials told GAO that the current pace of recapitalization is not optimal 

and could introduce challenges, such as the possibility of equipment failure and 

increased maintenance costs. However, the Army has concluded that the current 

pace is the best path forward.

View GAO-18-447. For more information, 

contact John Pendleton at (202) 512-3489 or 

pendletonj@gao.gov.

Why GAO Did This Study

Patriot is a mobile Army surface-to-air 

missile system deployed worldwide to 

defend critical assets and forces. The 

Army plans to extend the life of Patriot 

equipment until at least 2048 through 

maintaining and modernizing the 

system. To achieve this, the Army 

performs two maintenance processes, 

restoring equipment returning from 

combat back to pre-deployment 

conditions (“reset”) and 

comprehensively overhauling 

("recapitalizing") a portion of its 

equipment annually. 

The conference report accompanying a 

bill for the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 

included a provision that GAO assess 

the Army's Patriot maintenance and 

recapitalization plans to ensure that 

operational needs are met. This report 

(1) evaluates the extent to which the 

Army’s reset process supports the 

timely delivery of Patriot equipment 

back to units; and (2) describes the 

Army’s plans for supporting the longterm viability of the Patriot system 

through recapitalization and any 

challenges associated with its plans. 

GAO analyzed Army guidance and 

equipment and maintenance data; 

interviewed Army officials; and 

assessed the Army’s recapitalization 

plans.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the Army 

conduct an analysis of the primary 

factors affecting the Patriot program’s

reset timeliness to identify their relative 

importance and develop and 

implement appropriate corrective 

actions. The Department of the Army 

concurred with GAO’s 

recommendation.
Page i GAO-18-447 Military Readiness

Letter 1

Background 3

Reset Equipment Is Often Returned Late to Units, and the Army 

Has Not Analyzed the Relative Importance of Factors 

Contributing to the Delays 8

The Army Plans to Recapitalize Patriot Equipment Every 15 

Years, but This Approach Introduces Some Challenges 17

Conclusions 21

Recommendation for Executive Action 21

Agency Comments 21

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 24

Appendix II Comments from the Department of the Army 28

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 30

Tables

Table 1: Summary of the Army’s Reset and Recapitalization 

Processes for the Patriot System 5

Table 2: Factors Affecting Timeliness of Patriot Equipment Reset 11

Figures

Figure 1: Patriot System Major End Items and Their Notional 

Employment 4

Figure 2: Patriot Equipment Reset Timeliness for Units Completed 

in Fiscal Years 2014 through 2017 9

Figure 3: Example of Patriot Equipment Item Fabricated by 

Letterkenny Army Depot 13

Figure 4: Example of Patriot Radar and Its Elements Undergoing 

Maintenance 14

Contents
Page ii GAO-18-447 Military Readiness

Abbreviations

ADA Air Defense Artillery

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be 

necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.
Page 1 GAO-18-447 Military Readiness

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

June 20, 2018

Congressional Committees

The Army’s Patriot surface-to-air missile system was first fielded in the 

early 1980s and has been in high demand, with more than half of the 

Patriot force currently deployed, forward stationed, or prepared to deploy 

on short notice. While there have been upgrades to the system, the age 

of the equipment and high pace of operations create risks that the Army 

attempts to mitigate through maintenance. This maintenance, designed to 

extend the life of the system until at least 2048, includes restoring 

equipment returning from combat back to pre-deployment condition 

(“reset”) and comprehensively overhauling (“recapitalization”) a portion of 

the equipment annually. However, the current global threat environment 

has the potential to further increase demands for the Patriot system and 

result in additional maintenance requirements. The Department of 

Defense’s 2018 National Defense Strategy, for instance, notes the 

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s growing ballistic missile 

capability.1 As we have previously found, with a limited fleet of 15 

battalions, the Army has struggled to keep up with demands, so 

increased operations could be unsustainable.2

We have also previously reported that the Army’s current maintenance 

schedule for the Patriot system presents an elevated risk of equipment 

failure due to the pace of recapitalization and the Army’s fielding plan for 

system upgrades.3 Congress has expressed additional concerns that 

potential delays in modernizing Patriot systems, components, and 

software will amplify these risks as units continue to train, deploy, and 

operate legacy Patriot equipment at a high pace over an extended period. 

The conference report accompanying a bill for the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 included a provision that we 

assess the Army’s Patriot maintenance and recapitalization plans to 

 1

Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United 

States of America (2018).

2

GAO, Military Readiness: Personnel Shortfalls and Persistent Operational Demands 

Strain Army Missile Defense Units and Personnel, GAO-18-168SU (Washington, D.C.: 

Oct. 5, 2017).

3

GAO, Patriot Modernization: Oversight Mechanism Needed to Track Progress and 

Provide Accountability, GAO-16-488 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 25, 2016).

Letter
Page 2 GAO-18-447 Military Readiness

ensure that operational needs are met.4 This report (1) evaluates the 

extent to which the Army’s reset process supports the timely delivery of 

Patriot equipment back to units; and (2) describes the Army’s plans for 

supporting the long-term viability of the Patriot system through 

recapitalization and any challenges associated with its plans.

For our first objective, we analyzed Army reset and recapitalization 

processes and collected and analyzed data on the timeliness and quality 

of Army Patriot reset and recapitalization activities from fiscal years 2014 

through 2017. We selected these years to identify any trends in the 

timeliness and quality of the maintenance activities and because this was 

the most recent data available. We assessed the reliability of these data 

by reviewing available documentation and interviewing officials, among 

other things. We found the data to be sufficiently reliable for our 

purposes, to include reporting on battalion-specific reset timeliness and 

the time spent by the depot on correcting quality defects identified during 

internal inspections. We compared the data on reset timeliness against 

Army policy.5 We also interviewed cognizant Army personnel involved in 

the planning and conduct of Patriot reset and recapitalization, as well as 

officials from two Patriot battalions and their higher headquarters that 

recently underwent reset to identify challenges, if any, with respect to 

reset timeliness, such as equipment transfer delays and any effects on 

training. We also evaluated the Army’s processes to identify and correct 

factors causing any reset delays against Army guidance on program 

performance improvement.6

For our second objective, we identified and analyzed—via a review of 

recapitalization schedules, briefings, and other documentation—the 

Army’s current processes and planning for future Patriot recapitalization 

activities, including Army assessments of the feasibility of adjusting the 

pace of recapitalization. We also interviewed, among others, cognizant 

officials from operational units, the Patriot program office, and 

Letterkenny Army Depot (Letterkenny), which conducts Patriot reset and 

recapitalization, to obtain their views on considerations influencing the 

Army’s recapitalization planning and the current and optimal paces of 

 4

H. R. Rep. No. 114-840, at 1261 (2016).

5

Army Regulation 525-29, Army Force Generation (Mar. 14, 2011).

6

Army Regulation 702-11, Army Quality Program (Feb. 25, 2014).
Page 3 GAO-18-447 Military Readiness

recapitalizing Patriot equipment. For more information on our scope and 

methodology, see appendix I.

We conducted this performance audit from June 2017 to June 2018 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

The Patriot weapon system is a mobile Army surface-to-air missile 

system designed to counter tactical ballistic missiles; cruise missiles; and 

other threats such as airplanes, helicopters, and unmanned aerial 

vehicles. The Patriot system was first deployed in the early 1980s; since 

that time, it has received a number of substantial updates to keep pace 

with growing threats. Patriot units are deployed worldwide—in Germany 

and South Korea, for example—in defense of the United States’ and its 

allies’ key national interests, ground forces, and critical assets.

The Army currently has 15 Patriot battalions, all in its active component. 

Each battalion is organized into groups known as fire units, along with a 

headquarters and headquarters battery. Each battalion is controlled by its 

own command and control station and can manage up to six fire units, 

although a battalion is typically deployed with four. A fire unit is made up 

of four basic components: (1) a ground-based radar to detect and track 

targets; (2) launchers; (3) interceptor missiles; and (4) a command, 

control, and communication station. Overall, a fire unit’s equipment 

includes eleven unique major end items, including the radar, the 

launchers, and an electric power plant, among other items.7 Figure 1 

provides a listing of the major end items in a Patriot fire unit (top) along 

with the notional employment of some of these items (bottom).

 7

This report only discusses the maintenance of ground support equipment. As such, 

interceptor missiles are excluded from this report’s scope.

Background

Patriot Weapon System 

and Equipment
Page 4 GAO-18-447 Military Readiness

Figure 1: Patriot System Major End Items and Their Notional Employment

Two of the primary processes the Army utilizes to maintain the Patriot 

system are reset and recapitalization, summarized in Table 1.

Reset and Recapitalization 

Processes
Page 5 GAO-18-447 Military Readiness

Table 1: Summary of the Army’s Reset and Recapitalization Processes for the Patriot System

Reset Recapitalization

Level of work performed Returns equipment to pre-deployment 

condition

Comprehensive rebuild

Timeliness policy for completing work (per equipment set) 180 days 365 days

Does a unit generally receive a set of equipment to use when 

turning in equipment for maintenance?

No Yes

Units eligible for process Only Patriot units returning from 

deployment to U.S. Central Command

All Patriot units

Source: GAO analysis of Army information. | GAO-18-447

The Army’s reset program seeks to bring Patriot equipment returning from 

the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility back to Army standards. 

The reset process seeks to return Patriot equipment to a pre-deployment 

condition in order to prevent Patriot units from having to spend home 

station training funds to keep their equipment functional after returning 

from operations in austere environments for extended periods.8

The Army also relies heavily on recapitalization to restore Patriot 

equipment. A longer and more intensive process than reset, 

recapitalization seeks to restore equipment to what the Army considers a 

“like-new” condition, and according to Army guidance is a “near zero time 

or zero mile” maintenance process.9 The recapitalization process seeks 

to add life to the system, and it provides an opportunity for the Army to 

make incremental modernization upgrades, such as the insertion of new 

software, technology insertions, or replacing obsolete parts. For example, 

 8

Army Regulation 750-1 defines reset as consisting of activities to restore the Army’s 

personnel and equipment to a desired level of combat capability commensurate with 

future missions.

9

According to Army regulation, recapitalization includes, among other things, replacing all 

expendable components, all aged components, reconditioning of structural components, 

and restoring the item to a configuration that allows for technology insertions. See Army 

Regulation 750-1, Army Materiel Maintenance Policy (Aug. 3, 2017).
Page 6 GAO-18-447 Military Readiness

the Army is upgrading the Patriot system to prepare for its integration into 

the Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System.10

As the Army fields this modernized command and control system, the 

Patriot equipment undergoing recapitalization will also change, but the 

Army plans to continue recapitalization to support the Patriot system’s 

mission through 2048. Specifically, the Army expects that the transition to 

the Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System will allow 

it to replace current command and control elements. However, remaining 

end items, such as launchers, would continue to require recapitalization 

through the full life of the system to 2048. If the Integrated Air and Missile 

Defense Battle Command System, which is currently planned for initial 

fielding in 2022, is delayed, program and depot officials expect that they 

can continue to recapitalize current Patriot equipment as long as needed 

to support the Army’s long-term goal. However, Army officials noted that 

delays could require mitigation actions, such as the need to continue 

repairing parts that the Army would otherwise have replaced.

Aside from the degree of work performed, the recapitalization and reset 

processes differ in several other key ways. For instance, the Army 

generally provides units undergoing recapitalization with another set of 

Patriot equipment in a one-for-one exchange. In contrast, units 

undergoing reset receive the same set of equipment back after work is 

completed and are not provided other equipment while the unit’s 

equipment undergoes reset at the depot. Additionally, the target length for 

each process differs; the Army aims to recapitalize one battalion’s worth 

of equipment each year, while reset work is expected to be completed in 

180 days to meet the timelines of the Army’s process to prepare units for 

potential deployment. Letterkenny Army Depot primarily conducts the 

maintenance work for both of these efforts under the management of 

 10The Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System is the Army’s 

modernized battle command and control system. This system will integrate Patriot radar 

and launchers into a command and control framework that will also control other ballistic 

missile defense assets. We previously reported on Patriot modernization to prepare for 

this modern battle command and control system, finding that the Army recognizes it is 

incurring some added risk of equipment failure given its recapitalization pace. See GAO, 

Patriot Modernization: Oversight Mechanism Needed to Track Progress and Provide 

Accountability, GAO-16-488 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 25, 2016). 
Page 7 GAO-18-447 Military Readiness

Army Materiel Command and via coordination with the Patriot program 

office.11

Patriot units are in high demand. As we found in October 2017, the Army 

believes its Patriot force is operating at capacity given a consistently high 

pace of operations, and Army studies have found that any additional 

operational demands and potential wartime demands would exceed 

current capacity.12 We also found that the Army was planning to increase 

the capacity of its Patriot force in two ways: first, by fielding five small 

detachments in fiscal year 2018 that would provide the ability to deploy a 

Patriot battery without a full battalion-level command and control element, 

and second, by increasing the size of an existing test detachment in order 

to relieve the Patriot battalion currently assigned to conduct testing for 

Patriot modernization efforts of that mission.13 The Army intends for the 

test detachment to begin supporting Patriot modernization test events 

starting in the second quarter of fiscal year 2019.

From fiscal years 2014 through 2017, Patriot equipment across the force 

was reported to be fully mission capable at least 90 percent of the time on 

average, in accordance with the Army’s goal, as established in Army 

regulation.14 These fully mission capable rates continue an overall trend 

since 2009, which a 2014 Army assessment of Patriot readiness 

 11Some Patriot equipment maintenance, such as for trucks, is managed by U.S. Army 

Tank-automotive and Armaments Command. This review focused on the equipment items 

maintained by Letterkenny Army Depot for Army Aviation and Missile Command because 

this is where the majority of maintenance for the system takes place.

12GAO-18-168SU.

13As of May 2018, Army officials stated that these detachments have not yet added 

capacity as intended because the additional personnel needed to fill the positions have 

not yet arrived to these detachments. Army officials also told us that the test battalion will 

be used to support modernization efforts for Patriot, as well as other air defense 

capabilities.

14The Army defines Fully Mission Capable as a status condition where fully operational 

equipment or systems are safe and correctly configured as designated by the U.S. Army. 

Equipment is fully mission capable when it can perform all of its combat missions without 

endangering the lives of crew or operators. For the Army’s readiness goal, see Army 

Regulation 700-138, Army Logistics Readiness and Sustainability (Feb. 26, 2004).

Patriot Demands and 

Equipment Mission 

Capable Rates
Page 8 GAO-18-447 Military Readiness

attributed to the recapitalization program.15 Specifically, this assessment 

noted that the worldwide average for Patriot unit fully mission capable 

levels was above 90 percent, and that units that underwent 

recapitalization consistently experienced positive spikes in readiness. 

Further, this assessment highlighted the importance of the Army’s reset 

program, noting that it must be sustained because deployed Patriot units 

are subjected to the highest pace of operations in the Patriot force.

During the period we reviewed, the Army often did not return reset 

equipment to units in accordance with the timelines established in Army 

regulation, which affected unit training. Although the Army has identified 

several factors that caused delays in returning equipment to units and 

monitors these factors, it has not assessed their relative importance.

From fiscal years 2014 through 2017, the Army often did not return reset 

equipment to units in accordance with the timelines established in the 

Army’s keystone regulation governing its process to build ready forces.16

This regulation establishes phases through which a unit passes as it 

prepares for a potential deployment. The first of these, the reset phase, 

begins when a majority of the unit’s personnel have returned from 

deployment and must last a minimum of 180 days. At the conclusion of 

the 180 days, the unit enters the train/ready phase, at which point it may 

be deployed again, and needs to have its equipment back in order to do 

so. Because of this standard, the Army must return a unit’s equipment 

from reset within 180 days from the start of the unit’s reset phase. From 

fiscal years 2014 through 2017, the Army reset seven battalions and for 

 15The Army conducted an assessment of Patriot readiness in 2014, which found that from 

2009 to 2014 the overall Patriot system maintained fully mission capable rates above the 

Army’s established goal, with an average across the force of 92.8 percent during that fiveyear period. See Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill Capability Development 

and Integration Directorate Memorandum, Worldwide Assessment of Patriot Radar 

Operational Readiness (Nov. 25, 2014).

16Army Regulation 525-29.

Reset Equipment Is 

Often Returned Late 

to Units, and the 

Army Has Not 

Analyzed the Relative 

Importance of Factors 

Contributing to the 

Delays

The Army Often Returns 

Reset Equipment to 

Patriot Units Late, Which 

Affects Training
Page 9 GAO-18-447 Military Readiness

six of these battalions the Army did not return all of the units’ equipment 

within 180 days. Two of these battalions—the 2-43 Air Defense Artillery 

and 4-3 Air Defense Artillery—experienced delays that were deliberately 

planned. Specifically, Army officials told us that the installation of system 

upgrades for these battalions extended the overall reset timeline by 60 

days. One official stated that this was requested and approved, and 

explained that if the upgrades had been installed separately after 

equipment had been reset, it would have taken 4 months to conduct the 

work.17 However, as shown in figure 2, of the remaining five Patriot units 

that completed reset during the period we reviewed, only one received all 

of its returned equipment within 180 days.

Figure 2: Patriot Equipment Reset Timeliness for Units Completed in Fiscal Years 

2014 through 2017

Notes: Air Defense Artillery (ADA) is used as a designator in the names of Patriot units.

a

Reset of the 2-43 ADA and 4-3 ADA in fiscal years 2016-2017 included concurrent upgrades of 

equipment that added, according to officials, 60 days to their reset periods.

 17Modernization upgrades include obsolete parts replacement as well as installation of 

touch-enabled flat-screen panels to replace old Cathode Ray Tube displays. 
Page 10 GAO-18-447 Military Readiness

Patriot battalion officials we interviewed told us that delays in the receipt 

of reset equipment forced them to modify their scheduling and execution 

of required collective training. For example, one battalion commander we 

spoke with said that without equipment his battalion could not effectively 

train for some collective tasks, such as exercises that require moving the 

system. Additionally, leadership from two battalions we spoke with told us 

that the late return of reset equipment compressed the training time 

available for them to conduct field exercises. This can create 

unnecessary challenges in meeting Army training requirements as units 

progress through the Army’s process for building ready units. Specifically, 

according to the Army’s force generation guidance, a unit is expected to 

be ready to redeploy on day 181 after returning from its last deployment 

to its home station.18 As one battalion commander described, the 

collective-level training that units conduct during these shortened 

windows is “sufficient, but not optimal.”

Patriot units have utilized a series of actions to mitigate the impact of 

delays in equipment receipt after maintenance, but such mitigation 

actions are sometimes not feasible or optimal. For example, Patriot unit 

officials told us that the Army shares equipment between battalions that 

are collocated on the same installation, but at different points in the 

readiness building timeline. Specifically, when one battalion turns in 

equipment for reset, certain pieces of equipment from another battalion 

on the same installation, if available, might be borrowed to conduct 

training. Battalion officials noted, however, that this measure may not 

always be feasible. Leadership from two Patriot battalions, for example, 

cited instances where their units were unable to train during their reset 

periods and could not borrow equipment from other battalions located on 

the same installation because those battalions were deployed. In addition, 

units use simulators to conduct individual-level training to give personnel 

experience with new system upgrades, though Patriot brigade officials 

noted this is a stopgap measure while units are without equipment and 

does not allow for collective training. Lastly, Patriot units can—once 

delayed equipment arrives or via borrowing equipment—conduct some 

collective training for extended hours (i.e. during evenings) each day 

while at their home station, but a battalion official noted that doing so is 

also not optimal for unit morale.

 18Army Regulation 525-29.
Page 11 GAO-18-447 Military Readiness

Battalion commanders we spoke with told us that their units were 

sufficiently trained and ready to deploy, despite the delays in the return of 

the equipment to the units. However, a memorandum from a brigade 

commander noted that given the high pace of operations, it is important 

that units receive their equipment in a timely manner to enable them to 

complete training for their next deployment, as delays can create a 

notable impact on crew and collective training.19 The late return of reset 

equipment could therefore have a detrimental impact on units’ ability to 

conduct training to meet assigned missions.

The Army has identified several factors affecting the timeliness of Patriot 

maintenance as shown in table 2.

Table 2: Factors Affecting Timeliness of Patriot Equipment Reset

Factor Description

Preventive maintenance Lack of unit leadership emphasis on preventive 

maintenance can result in additional depot work 

Unexpected damage Unreported damage to equipment results in 

unexpected depot work tasks

Supply chain challenges Depot experiences challenges in obtaining needed 

repair parts

Depot quality controls Internal depot quality controls identify depot work or 

parts deficiencies that require additional time to correct

Equipment transportation Time equipment spends in transportation to and from 

the depot reduces available time for depot work

Source: GAO analysis of Army information. | GAO-18-447

Some of the factors affecting timeliness, as identified by Army officials, 

are directly within the control of Letterkenny, where reset is conducted, 

and some are not. Specifically, Army officials stated that U.S. 

Transportation Command and the Defense Logistics Agency also have 

responsibilities related to some of the factors that can affect timeliness, 

such as the transport of equipment and availability of parts, respectively. 

These factors are discussed in more detail below.

 19In a previous report on Department of Defense readiness issues, we noted that, 

according to the Army, one of the greatest challenges inhibiting readiness recovery is 

difficulty maintaining collective training proficiency in its core competencies due to a lack 

of personnel depth and experience. See GAO-16-841. 

The Army Has Identified 

Factors Affecting 

Maintenance Timeliness
Page 12 GAO-18-447 Military Readiness

• Preventive maintenance. According to Army officials and Army 

documentation, the unit leadership of some deployed Patriot 

battalions do not emphasize preventive maintenance. As a result, 

equipment may not be properly maintained to Army standards and 

can create additional work tasks for depot personnel when they 

receive it, such as conducting additional or more detailed inspections.

• Unexpected damage. Army officials cited some instances where 

equipment sent to the depot arrives in worse than expected condition, 

either due to damage incurred during transport or because unit 

personnel did not accurately report the condition of the equipment 

prior to turning it in. For example, in December 2017 Letterkenny 

officials documented that a battalion’s missile launcher was returned 

to the depot with unexpected severe corrosion on power cables, and 

certain equipment items, such as generators, were completely 

inoperable. Officials cited another instance where a radar was 

pressure-washed prior to its return to the depot, causing extensive 

damage. These kinds of unexpected conditions result in greater repair 

work than anticipated for depot employees.

• Supply chain challenges. Officials at Letterkenny told us that their 

forecasts for parts orders have not been consistently met via Army 

and Department of Defense supply chain processes, but that the 

depot was taking steps to improve its own forecasting.20 An official 

also noted that problems can arise if sole-source suppliers for critical 

parts go out of business, or if they have to order parts that are no 

longer regularly produced by vendors due to obsolescence.21 Patriot 

program office officials provided an example of a radio that is part of 

the Patriot system and is no longer in production, and noted that the 

program office was working with Army headquarters officials to 

identify a solution.

 20Letterkenny officials stated that the depot is in the early stages of adopting cost and 

schedule performance index metrics, which they believe have the potential to improve the 

depot’s forecasting and better inform program manager decision making. We have 

previously reported on Army supply planning and made recommendations for the 

Department of Defense to adopt cost and planning metrics. See GAO-16-450, Defense 

Inventory: Further Analysis and Enhanced Metrics Could Improve Service Supply and 

Depot Operations (Washington, D.C.: June 9, 2016).

21 We have previously recommended that the Department of Defense should develop a 

mechanism to ensure that program offices obtain information from contractors on single 

source of supply risk. See GAO-17-768, Defense Supply Chain: DOD Needs Complete 

Information on Single Sources of Supply to Proactively Manage the Risks (Washington, 

D.C.: Sept. 28, 2017).
Page 13 GAO-18-447 Military Readiness

The Army uses a series of measures to mitigate parts availability issues, 

such as having the depot utilize its own equipment to fabricate some 

items on short notice (see fig. 3) and, according to Army officials, by 

taking parts from incoming equipment and using them for equipment 

nearing completion of maintenance. Additionally, in July 2017, the depot 

received permission to purchase critical “long-lead” parts for specific 

Patriot items in advance of anticipated need, although, according to 

officials, as a general rule and practice, the depot is not allowed to 

purchase items without funding in place.22 Letterkenny officials told us 

that in cases where they are unable to acquire critical parts, or lack the 

funds to do so, delays can occur.

Figure 3: Example of Patriot Equipment Item Fabricated by Letterkenny Army Depot

• Depot quality controls. Time spent remedying maintenance errors and 

quality defects—such as incorrect assemblies, defective parts, or 

improper painting during depot operations—may contribute to the 

depot’s timeliness challenges.23 Army officials stressed that the 

Patriot system is complex, and certain maintenance tasks can be 

challenging because it can be difficult to isolate equipment faults. For 

 22Letterkenny officials told us that to accomplish this they must ensure funds are available 

to purchase these parts when necessary.

23GAO previously reported in February 2017 on some of the Army depots’ challenges and 

efforts to implement process improvements to better meet production schedules. See 

GAO-17-82R, Depot Maintenance: Executed Workload and Maintenance Operations at 

DOD Depots (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3, 2017). 
Page 14 GAO-18-447 Military Readiness

example, the Patriot radar system is composed of thousands of 

elements (see fig. 4), which, according to officials, requires extensive 

testing to ensure that each element is operational. Depot officials told 

us that their processes are designed to ensure that finished products 

meet operational standards, and that doing so sometimes takes 

longer than expected. Letterkenny uses a series of metrics and 

reporting methods, such as internal tracking of defects and surveys 

and reports from customers, to monitor, document, and correct quality 

defects during the Patriot maintenance process to ensure that any 

maintenance errors or defects are identified before the equipment is 

returned to units.

Figure 4: Example of Patriot Radar and Its Elements Undergoing Maintenance

However, quality defects that may affect timeliness can still arise. Each 

fiscal year Letterkenny establishes a target for hours spent at the depot 

correcting quality defects that arise during maintenance, which are then 

tracked and used as indicators of the overall quality of the maintenance 

process.24 As tracked by the depot, the monthly time spent correcting 

quality defects varied, when averaged across each year. Specifically, the 

average in fiscal year 2015 was below the depot’s set target, but the 

averages in fiscal years 2014, 2016, and 2017 exceeded the targets. For 

example, the time spent correcting quality defects ranged from 846 hours 

 24While tracked by Letterkenny, this data is maintained separately from overall depot 

timeliness data.
Page 15 GAO-18-447 Military Readiness

a month in fiscal year 2016 to 1,242 hours a month in fiscal year 2017, 

above those years’ monthly target of 800 hours.

• Equipment transportation. Transportation time is included in the 180-

day policy for returning equipment from reset to Patriot units, and it 

often takes a significant amount of time before equipment is 

transported to the depot from theater. As such, according to Army 

documentation, the depot can be left with only 120 days to complete 

reset work before it has to return equipment back to units if it is to 

meet the 180-day policy. According to Army documentation, to 

mitigate this issue the Army airlifts a number of critical Patriot 

equipment items, such as radars, from theater to the depot so that 

reset work can begin earlier on these items. Additionally, unit officials 

and a program official involved in planning for the Army’s reset 

process noted that equipment items are sent back from the depot as 

soon as reset work is completed; the depot does not wait until the 

entire unit equipment set is complete. However, as shown previously 

in figure 2, these kinds of mitigation actions with respect to 

transportation have not been sufficient in ensuring that units receive 

all of their equipment back within the 180 days allowed by policy.

Although the Army monitors the factors that have affected maintenance 

timeliness, it has not conducted an analysis to identify their relative 

importance. According to Army documents and officials we interviewed, 

the Army monitors and uses a number of processes to identify, discuss, 

and select mitigation actions for factors affecting maintenance timeliness, 

such as:

• Quarterly working group meetings of Patriot stakeholders. The Army 

monitors maintenance timeliness via a quarterly working group, which 

includes representatives from key Army Patriot stakeholder 

organizations such as Training and Doctrine Command, Aviation and 

Missile Command, Letterkenny, and Patriot unit higher command 

headquarters. Any timeliness issues discussed at such meetings, 

such as potential training impacts and transportation delays, are 

conveyed to units afterwards.

• Letterkenny weekly production meetings. Letterkenny command staff 

hold weekly production meetings to discuss various issues affecting 

maintenance production, identify potential factors that could delay 

depot work, and select mitigation measures against such factors.

• Army Materiel Command oversight of Letterkenny production. Army 

Materiel Command monitors and tracks Letterkenny’s actual and 

Army Monitors Factors 

Affecting Maintenance 

Timeliness, but Has Not 

Conducted an Analysis of 

Their Relative Importance
Page 16 GAO-18-447 Military Readiness

projected maintenance performance against the scheduled 

completion dates for Patriot maintenance projects, and depot officials 

internally review the depot’s performance for each Patriot equipment 

item each week before submitting the results to Army commands 

monthly.

Although Army officials are aware of challenges in returning reset 

equipment to Patriot units within the 180-day policy and have taken some 

steps to minimize these impacts, they could not quantify how much each 

of the factors affecting timeliness contributes to delays in completing 

maintenance and returning equipment to units. Moreover, based on our 

discussions with different stakeholders associated with the sustainment of 

the Patriot system, there are different perceptions as to the degree to 

which the various factors contributed to delays in completing maintenance 

and returning reset equipment to units. For example, during our meetings, 

depot officials indicated that supply chain issues were the primary 

timeliness challenge. In contrast, a senior program office official and unit 

officials emphasized the importance of transportation of equipment and its 

effects on timeliness. In addition, Letterkenny and Army stakeholders told 

us that while they work to identify and correct issues as they arise through 

the processes described above, their efforts to remedy these issues are 

conducted in isolation from one another and not compiled and compared 

to enable the Army to identify their relative importance in terms of each 

factor’s effect on timeliness.

Although aware of the challenges of returning equipment to units in a 

timely manner, the Army has not comprehensively analyzed the relative 

importance of the various factors identified above that affect Patriot 

maintenance timeliness. Army Regulation 702-11 states that fact-based 

decision-making and the use of performance information to foster 

continuous improvement are essential activities of quality management 

and assurance.25 Specifically, activities supporting logistics missions 

should engage in continued review, evaluation, and improvement. This 

regulation further states that Army Material Command, as the manager of 

the Army’s quality program, should conduct performance reviews and 

assist other applicable organizations in developing corrective action 

plans, such as establishing protocols to mitigate risks and prevent 

recurrence of issues when nonconforming performance is identified. 

Although not required by Army regulation, one means of doing this is 

through conducting comprehensive analysis, such as comparing the 

 25Army Regulation 702-11, Army Quality Program (Feb. 25, 2014).
Page 17 GAO-18-447 Military Readiness

relative importance of factors affecting performance in order to target 

improvement efforts.

A comprehensive analysis to identify the relative importance of factors 

could better position the Army to fully understand current and historic 

issues affecting its ability to complete Patriot equipment maintenance in a 

timely manner. Such an understanding would better inform corrective 

actions than isolated efforts and would position the Army to determine 

where best to target its efforts in order to ensure units receive equipment 

back in a timely manner to conduct training.

The Army has decided to recapitalize each battalion set of Patriot 

equipment once every 15 years, while recognizing that this approach 

introduces some challenges to upgrading and supporting the system’s 

readiness to meet its assigned missions through 2048. While the Army 

would prefer to recapitalize Patriot equipment every 10 years, the Army 

has reviewed two options for recapitalizing Patriot equipment more 

frequently and determined that these options are not feasible. According 

to Army documentation, the Army plans to continue sustaining and 

upgrading Patriot equipment to meet its long-term goal—which is to keep 

the system viable through 2048—by, for example, improving system 

reliability and enhancing its warfighting capabilities. The Army considers 

recapitalization a key program to achieve this goal. Specifically, in its 

2014 readiness assessment of the Patriot force, the Army concluded that 

recapitalization is the single most important program with respect to 

keeping Patriot equipment viable and sustainable.26 Officials from multiple 

Army organizations also told us that the age of the Patriot system makes 

replacement of expendable and aged components and insertion of new 

technology during recapitalization important to Patriot sustainment, 

readiness, and its ability to meet emerging threats.

While the Army has emphasized the importance of recapitalization in 

achieving its long-term goals for the Patriot system, the Army is not 

planning to adjust its recapitalization pace in the near term, as of March 

2018. According to Army documentation, recapitalizing equipment every 

 26Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill Capability Development and Integration 

Directorate Memorandum. Worldwide Assessment of Patriot Radar Operational 

Readiness (Nov. 25, 2014).

The Army Plans to 

Recapitalize Patriot 

Equipment Every 15 

Years, but This 

Approach Introduces 

Some Challenges
Page 18 GAO-18-447 Military Readiness

10 years would maintain the equipment at the Army’s desired condition.27

However, the Army’s near-term schedule for recapitalization in fiscal 

years 2018 through 2022 and its long-term notional schedule for 

recapitalization of Patriot equipment through fiscal year 2031 both outline 

cycling one battalion per year through recapitalization. With 15 Patriot 

battalions, the pace of one battalion per year does not restore the 

equipment to its desired condition every 10 years.

According to Army Patriot officials, there are two main options for the 

Army to increase the pace of recapitalization, but each of these options 

poses challenges. These two options are:

• Reduce the amount of equipment available for ongoing commitments 

and recapitalize it at the depot. Officials told us that one way the Army 

could increase the pace of recapitalization would be to reduce the 

amount of equipment available for ongoing commitments, but that this 

is not feasible given the current high pace of operations. Further, the 

Army does not anticipate that operational requirements will lessen 

under the projected security environment. The near-term schedule 

assumes that ongoing operational commitments will not change and is 

designed to synchronize recapitalization with currently scheduled 

operational deployments and training. Army officials responsible for 

coordinating the near-term schedule told us that the near-term 

schedule has little flexibility given the Army’s limited force structure of 

15 battalions, and program and depot officials stated that if the Army 

were to recapitalize more than one battalion per year, the pool of 

battalions available to meet these current commitments would 

decrease.28

• Procure additional equipment to provide to units turning in equipment 

for recapitalization. Army officials said that the Army could buy extra 

equipment to provide to additional units turning in their equipment for 

recapitalization if the Army wanted to accelerate the recapitalization 

pace. At the current pace of recapitalization, the Army has sufficient 

 27Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology 

Memorandum. Implementation of Economic Useful Life (Apr. 22, 2012); Army Fires Center 

of Excellence and Fort Sill Capability Development and Integration Directorate 

Memorandum, Worldwide Assessment of Patriot Radar Operational Readiness.

28Additionally, adding another Patriot battalion to the Army’s inventory may not enable 

accelerating the pace of recapitalization. Specifically, officials told us that requirements 

could increase given the current geopolitical and threat environment, and as such, any 

additional battalions added to the Army’s inventory would likely be deployed to meet 

operational requirements.
Page 19 GAO-18-447 Military Readiness

quantities of major equipment items to ensure that as a Patriot 

battalion turns in equipment for recapitalization it receives recently 

recapitalized equipment back on a one-to-one basis and thus is 

generally not without equipment. This process prevents removing 

Patriot battalions from operational rotations during the recapitalization 

period. However, officials stated that if the Army were to adjust the 

pace to recapitalize more than the current one battalion per year, it 

would require buying more equipment to ensure that any additional 

units undergoing recapitalization would not be left without equipment. 

Army documents indicate that the Army has assessed whether to 

acquire additional equipment to enable an accelerated pace of 

recapitalization. However, an official with responsibility for the Patriot 

capability and senior Army headquarters officials with responsibility for 

Patriot resourcing and planning told us that the Army instead has 

prioritized developing a replacement for the Patriot radar. This 

replacement radar is expected to address capability needs related to 

radar reliability and range to better defend against advanced threats.29

Army documentation indicates that this replacement radar is expected 

to reach initial operational capability in fiscal year 2025.

If the Army decided to reduce the amount of equipment available for 

ongoing commitments or buy more equipment, then the Army would also 

need to make additional investments in depot resources to support 

accelerating the pace of recapitalization. According to Army documents 

and officials we interviewed, these include personnel, facilities, and 

equipment. However, there are a number of challenges related to putting 

these resources in place.

• Personnel. Army documentation shows and depot officials stated that 

they would likely hire contractors to meet workload demands and the 

depot could add shifts if the Army decided to adjust the pace of 

recapitalization to what it considers an optimal pace. Depot officials 

also told us they would try to hire contractors with some Patriot 

experience and place them alongside more experienced personnel in 

order to preserve work quality, as they have done in response to 

previous surges in reset work. However, the Army recognizes that 

Letterkenny faces challenges in expanding its workforce due to a 

limited pool of available workers in the area around the depot. 

 29A senior Army headquarters official responsible for Patriot planning told us that the Army 

has already begun discussions to procure sufficient quantities of the planned replacement 

for the Patriot radar to facilitate increasing the pace of Patriot recapitalization once the 

replacement is fielded. 
Page 20 GAO-18-447 Military Readiness

Developing skilled Patriot maintenance personnel is also difficult. An 

Army study of the organic industrial base found that 11 of the 15 most 

critical personnel positions at Letterkenny are directly associated with 

Patriot maintenance and officials noted that, due to the complexity of 

the system, it can take up to 5 years for Patriot maintenance 

personnel to become proficient.30

• Facilities and equipment. Depot officials stated that if the Army 

decided to adjust the pace of recapitalization to what it considers 

optimal, they would likely need to review, among other things, the 

tools, equipment, and facilities needed to support such an adjustment, 

as well as supply availability. They also told us that Letterkenny 

already has proposed expanding its facilities to meet projected future 

work, and the depot has planned for the plant equipment it will need to 

continue maintaining the Patriot system as upgrades are incorporated. 

However, they noted that it takes a full year to recapitalize the Patriot 

radar, including 3 months of testing, and that Letterkenny has one of 

only two radar test sites. Given the time required and the single test 

site, if the Army wanted to recapitalize more than one battalion a year, 

program officials stated that current conditions probably would not 

support doing so.

Continuing the current pace of recapitalization could introduce other 

challenges in meeting the Army’s long-term goals for the Patriot system, 

and Army officials stated they are aware of these challenges. Specifically, 

Army documentation shows, and Army officials told us, that the current 

pace is not optimal and that it could introduce the possibility of equipment 

failure as specific items remain in use past the Army’s desired timeframe 

for recapitalizing equipment every 10 years. Additionally, depot officials 

told us that their biggest concern with continuing recapitalization at its 

current pace is that there may be increased costs to conduct 

recapitalization due to the system’s increasing age. As an example, they 

stated that there may be increased corrosion issues, adding that they 

have already seen a significant deterioration in the condition of some 

trailers. Also, the Army’s decision to continue recapitalizing equipment 

every 15 years instead of every 10 years provides fewer opportunities to 

conduct modernization, which is often done in conjunction with 

recapitalization. Program officials stated that modernizing the system is 

important because upgrades reduce the number of items that can fail, 

 30Army Materiel Command, Army Materiel Command’s Industrial Base Baseline 

Assessment Program Organic Industrial Base Workforce Fragility and Criticality 

Assessment (September 2015).
Page 21 GAO-18-447 Military Readiness

thereby making field maintenance easier. Moreover, officials from one 

Patriot brigade stated that their main concern with respect to Patriot is 

that additional operational commitments could potentially slow 

modernization progress and affect the Army’s capability to meet threats, 

particularly since the capabilities and sophistication of enemy threats 

continue to increase.

The Army has reviewed its options and the associated challenges related 

to increasing the pace of recapitalization and has decided the best path 

forward based on its review is to continue recapitalizing Patriot battalion 

equipment sets once every 15 years. However, this pace of 

recapitalization includes some risk—as identified by Army officials—and 

will likely create challenges in meeting the Army’s long-term goals for the 

system.

Maintaining good equipment condition is particularly important given the 

current high pace of operations for Patriot units, as well as the potential 

for a further increase in operational requirements. However, the Army’s 

reset process has often delivered equipment to units late, affecting units’

ability to schedule and execute training as they prepare for their next 

mission. The Army is aware of the challenges in completing maintenance 

and returning reset equipment to units, and has identified several factors 

that contribute to delays, but has not analyzed how much each of the 

factors contribute to delays. Unless the Army conducts a comprehensive 

analysis of the relative importance of the factors affecting Patriot reset 

timeliness and develops and implements appropriate corrective actions to 

address the results of the analysis, it will not be positioned to target its 

efforts most effectively to take corrective actions.

We recommend that the Secretary of the Army ensure that Army Materiel 

Command, in coordination with its subordinate and other Army 

organizations as appropriate, conducts a comprehensive analysis of the 

primary factors affecting timeliness to identify their relative importance in 

the Army’s Patriot reset program and develops and implements 

appropriate corrective actions. (Recommendation 1)

In written comments on a draft of this report, the Department of the Army

concurred with our recommendation. The department stated that it is 

taking steps to address the recommendation, noting that it will continue 

analysis between Army Materiel Command, Headquarters Department of 

Conclusions

Recommendation for 

Executive Action

Agency Comments
Page 22 GAO-18-447 Military Readiness

the Army, and the Patriot program office to identify and address factors 

that may affect reset timeliness. The Department of the Army’s comments 

are reprinted in their entirety in appendix II. The department also provided 

technical comments, which we incorporated into the report as 

appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of the Army. In 

addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at 

http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to 

this report are listed in appendix III.

John H. Pendleton, Director

Defense Capabilities and Management
Page 23 GAO-18-447 Military Readiness

List of Committees

The Honorable John McCain

Chairman

The Honorable Jack Reed

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Richard Shelby

Chairman

The Honorable Dick Durbin

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Mac Thornberry

Chairman

The Honorable Adam Smith

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable Kay Granger

Chairwoman

The Honorable Pete Visclosky

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 24 GAO-18-447 Military Readiness

To evaluate the extent to which the Army’s reset process supports the 

timely delivery of Patriot equipment back to units, we analyzed Army 

documents concerning recapitalization and reset activities. This included 

analysis of, among other things, documents describing the processes for 

Patriot battalion equipment transfers to and from Letterkenny Army Depot 

(Letterkenny), depot activities to recapitalize and reset equipment, and 

testing to ensure the equipment’s proper operation. We also reviewed, 

among other documents, Army guidance on Patriot equipment status 

reporting, reset, materiel maintenance, and on ensuring the quality of 

Army programs; as well as planning schedules and documents on 

backorders and critical items. We evaluated the Army’s processes to 

identify and correct factors causing any reset delays against Army 

guidance on program performance improvement.1

Additionally, we analyzed data provided by the Army on Patriot equipment 

fully mission capable rates and the timeliness of Army Patriot reset 

activities from fiscal years 2014 through 2017—the most recent data 

available—to identify any trends. Specifically, we analyzed Patriot unit 

fully mission capable data as recorded by Army Aviation and Missile 

Command G-3 (Readiness) based on data submitted by Patriot 

operational units.2 We analyzed it to corroborate statements regarding 

equipment readiness and the quality of maintenance work made by 

program and operational unit officials and to compare against the Army’s 

goal for fully mission capable rates. To determine depot timeliness, we 

analyzed aggregate monthly data provided by the Army on Letterkenny’s 

timeliness in completing Patriot maintenance activities against 

performance schedules. We also analyzed Patriot battalion-specific Army 

data on reset timeliness in order to determine the frequency with which 

Letterkenny met the reset timeliness policy.3 Finally, we reviewed Army 

data on the time spent re-working and re-inspecting equipment with 

quality deficiencies found during internal inspections at Letterkenny in 

order to inform our assessment of the potential effects of addressing 

quality deficiencies on depot timeliness.

We assessed the reliability of these data by reviewing available system 

documentation, such as user manuals and data dictionaries for each of 

 1

Army Regulation 702-11, Army Quality Program (Feb. 25, 2014).

2

For guidance governing the reporting of Patriot unit readiness data, see Army Regulation 

700-138, Army Logistics Readiness and Sustainability (Feb. 26, 2004).

3

Army Regulation 525-29, Army Force Generation (Mar. 14, 2011).

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 25 GAO-18-447 Military Readiness

the automated information systems from which the respective data were 

drawn. We manually checked the data for obvious errors and missing or 

outlier values. We administered data reliability questionnaires to officials 

familiar with the data systems and assessed their responses and answers 

to follow-up questions, and we interviewed cognizant officials about their 

data management practices and use of the data. Based on these steps, 

we found these data to be sufficiently reliable for our purposes, to include 

providing fiscal years 2014 through 2017 Patriot equipment fully mission 

capable rates, battalion-specific reset timeliness, and the time spent by 

the depot on correcting quality defects identified during internal 

inspections.

To describe the Army’s plans for supporting the long-term viability of the 

Patriot system through recapitalization and any challenges associated 

with its plans, we analyzed Army regulations, guidance, and planning 

documents, as well as Army studies. These included, among others, the 

Army’s recapitalization management policy; Army documents proposing 

and approving a recapitalization program for Patriot; Army studies of its 

depot workforce, worldwide Patriot equipment readiness, and Patriot 

operational demands in relation to available assets; and Army guidance 

on materiel maintenance and useful equipment life.4 We also analyzed, 

among other documents, the Army’s near-term schedule synchronizing 

Patriot recapitalization, reset, incremental modernization, training, and 

deployment schedules for fiscal years 2018 through 2022 and a long-term 

notional schedule for the recapitalization of Patriot equipment, by 

battalion set, through 2031. We also reviewed depot equipment and 

personnel planning documents and the Patriot life-cycle management 

plan, among other planning documents.

For both objectives, we interviewed cognizant Army personnel involved in 

the planning and conduct of Patriot recapitalization and reset. We visited 

Letterkenny to speak with officials and observe the facilities and the 

conduct of Patriot maintenance activities. In addition, we interviewed 

officials with responsibility for Patriot funding; for monitoring Patriot unit 

readiness; as well as officials from two Patriot battalions that recently 

 4

For example, see Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill Capability Development 

and Integration Directorate Memorandum, Worldwide Assessment of Patriot Radar 

Operational Readiness, (Nov. 25, 2014); Army Regulation 750-1, Army Materiel 

Maintenance Policy (Aug. 3, 2017); Department of the Army Memorandum, Army 

Recapitalization Management Policy (Apr. 11, 2001); Office of the Assistant Secretary of 

the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology Memorandum. Implementation of 

Economic Useful Life (Apr. 22, 2012). We did not assess the validity of the Army’s studies.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 26 GAO-18-447 Military Readiness

underwent reset and their brigade headquarters; and one Patriot battalion 

that recently underwent recapitalization and its brigade headquarters to 

identify challenges, if any, with respect to these maintenance processes, 

such as any training or equipment transfer delays or maintenance 

deficiencies.5 The list of the organizations and offices we interviewed 

during the course of our review is below.

• Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and 

Technology

• Acquisition Policy and Logistics Group

• Program Executive Office, Missiles and Space, Redstone 

Arsenal, Huntsville, Alabama

• Lower Tier Project Office, Redstone Arsenal, Huntsville, 

Alabama

• Headquarters, Department of the Army

• G-3, Readiness Directorate

• G-4, Logistics Maintenance Directorate: G-44 (M) Maintenance 

Sustainment Division

• G-4, 3/5/7, Current Operations and Strategic Readiness Division

• G-8, Programs and Priorities, Fires Division

• Army Materiel Command

• Army Aviation and Missile Life Cycle Management Command, 

Redstone Arsenal, Huntsville, Alabama

• Army Aviation and Missile Command Logistics Center,

Redstone Arsenal, Huntsville, Alabama

• Letterkenny Army Depot, Chambersburg, Pennsylvania

• Army Forces Command

• 32nd Army Air and Missile Defense Command, Fort Bliss, Texas

• 11th Air Defense Artillery Brigade, Fort Bliss, Texas

• 3-43 Air Defense Artillery Battalion, 11th Air Defense Artillery 

Brigade, Fort Bliss, Texas

 5

The information we collected from operational unit officials was not generalizable across 

the Patriot force.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 27 GAO-18-447 Military Readiness

• 31st Air Defense Artillery Brigade, Fort Sill, Oklahoma

• 3-2 Air Defense Artillery Battalion, 31st Air Defense Artillery 

Brigade, Fort Sill, Oklahoma

• 4-3 Air Defense Artillery Battalion, 31st Air Defense Artillery 

Brigade, Fort Sill, Oklahoma

• U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

• Fires Center of Excellence, Fort Sill, Oklahoma

• Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager – Army Air 

and Missile Defense Command, Fort Sill, Oklahoma

We conducted this performance audit from June 2017 to June 2018 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of the Army

Page 28 GAO-18-447 Military Readiness

Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of the Army
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of the Army

Page 29 GAO-18-447 Military Readiness
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Error! No text of specified style in document.

Page 30 GAO-18-447 Military Readiness

John H. Pendleton, (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, individuals who made key 

contributions to this report include Kevin O’Neill, Assistant Director; Jason 

Blake, Vincent Buquicchio, Clarice Ransom, Michael Silver, Erik WilkinsMcKee, and Matthew Young.

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(102120)
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