NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, 

v.

KARI ANN MANWEILER, Appellant. 

No. 1 CA-CR 15-0175 

 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County

No. S8015CR201400202 

The Honorable Steven F. Conn, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Jillian Francis

Counsel for Appellee 

Mohave County Legal Advocate’s Office, Kingman

By Jill L. Evans 

Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. MANWEILER

Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Patricia K. Norris delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Jon W. Thompson and Judge Maurice Portley joined.

N O R R I S, Judge:

¶1 Kari Ann Manweiler appeals her convictions and sentences 

for possession of dangerous drugs, possession of drug paraphernalia, 

conspiracy to sell dangerous drugs, and two counts of sale of dangerous 

drugs. She argues the superior court improperly admitted prejudicial 

testimony and the prosecutor intentionally deprived her of her right to due 

process and a fair trial by intentionally arguing facts not in evidence. We 

disagree with these arguments and affirm Manweiler’s convictions and 

sentences. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 In a police-controlled buy, an informant purchased about

one-quarter ounce of methamphetamine from Manweiler on February 5, 

2014, and about one-half ounce the following day. On February 7, police 

executed a search warrant at Manweiler’s home in Bullhead City and found 

$210 in marked bills used for the drug buys in her wallet.

¶3 L.M. and A.A. were at Manweiler’s home during the search. 

L.M. told police that Manweiler had just sold her 2.4 grams of 

methamphetamine, and A.A. told police he had purchased an “eight-ball” 

of methamphetamine from Manweiler the night before.1

¶4 At trial, when cross-examining a police corporal in the State’s 

case-in-chief, defense counsel played a recording of the controlled buys. 

The corporal testified he recognized Manweiler’s voice on the recording. 

Defense counsel objected to the corporal’s statement because he was not “a 

speech recognition expert.” The superior court overruled the objection, 

noting defense counsel had asked the corporal to “point out whenever he 

1At trial, however, L.M. and A.A. both denied purchasing the 

methamphetamine from Manweiler; they testified they could not 

remember telling police otherwise. 

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STATE v. MANWEILER

Decision of the Court

hears something.” On redirect, the prosecutor asked the corporal how he 

could be “confident” that he had heard Manweiler’s voice on the recording. 

He answered, “[b]ecause I know Kari. I’ve dealt with her for many years, 

I’ve arrested her numerous times, I have had contacts with her, I’m going 

to estimate a dozen times in the last 8 to 10 years” and had spent “quite 

some time” interviewing her after executing the search warrant.2 

¶5 Defense counsel did not object or ask the superior court to 

strike this testimony, but the following day, after the State rested, defense 

counsel, in “an overabundance of caution,” asked for a mistrial “because of 

the reference to the prior arrests.” The superior court refused to grant a

mistrial, explaining: 

So, if in fact he has had prior contact with the 

defendant, then he is more likely to recognize 

her voice. If he has actually arrested her in the 

past, that would be the type of contact that 

would be likely to involve more interaction than 

a traffic citation, or something like that. So, I 

think the fact that his contact was in the context 

of an arrest would be relevant.

¶6 During the defense case-in-chief, defense counsel questioned 

Manweiler about her past drug use and police contacts. Manweilertestified 

she was an “ex-meth user” and had sold drugs in the past. But, she testified 

she had not sold drugs recently or to the informant, to L.M., or to A.A., and 

any drug paraphernalia found in her home was not hers. She also testified 

she “[didn’t] believe” she had met the corporal before February 7, 2014, and 

had never been arrested before. 

¶7 In the State’s rebuttal case, the prosecutor recalled the 

corporal and asked him about the first time he had contact with Manweiler. 

The corporal responded, “I don't know the exact date. It was approximately 

8 to 10 years ago. . . . We got a call from an adjoining room saying they 

could smell what was methamphetamine either being used or cooked in the 

room next to them.” He said he arrived on the scene and arrested 

Manweiler, but other detectives handled any further investigation. He 

believed the other detectives released Manweiler without booking her. 

2On recross, defense counsel asked the corporal, “Corporal, 

you’ve never actually arrested my client prior to this incident. Correct?” He

responded, “No. I have.” 

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STATE v. MANWEILER

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¶8 The superior court concluded the best way to handle the 

corporal’s testimony about his prior contacts with Manweiler was to give 

the following limiting instruction: 

Evidence was presented in this case suggesting 

that the defendant has had prior contact with 

law enforcement. Such evidence was not 

presented and may not be considered by you to 

conclude that she is a bad person, or that she is 

disposed to engage in criminal activity. Such 

evidence was presented and may be considered 

by you only for the limited purpose of 

determining whether any such prior contact 

would have enabled the officer to recognize her

voice.

¶9 The jury convicted Manweiler as noted above. See supra ¶ 1. 

DISCUSSION

I. The Corporal’s Testimony 

A. Motion for Mistrial 

¶10 Manweiler argues the superior court abused its discretion in 

denying her motion for a mistrial after it admitted prejudicial testimony

concerning her previous contacts with police. State v. Jones, 197 Ariz. 290, 

304, ¶ 32, 4 P.3d 345, 359 (2000) (reviewing superior court’s denial of a 

motion for mistrial for abuse of discretion). We will only reverse a superior

court's denial of a mistrial if “there is a ‘reasonable probability that the 

verdict would have been different had the [improper] evidence not been 

admitted.’” State v. Dann, 205 Ariz. 557, 570, ¶ 44, 74 P.3d 231, 244 (2003)

(citation omitted). In determining whether to grant a mistrial, a court 

should consider whether the testimony called the jurors’ attention to 

matters they would not be justified in considering in reaching a verdict and 

the probability under the circumstances that the testimony influenced the 

jurors. State v. Bailey, 160 Ariz. 277, 279, 772 P.2d 1130, 1132 (1989). 

¶11 The corporal’s testimony that he knew Manweiler’s voice 

because he had arrested her numerous times in the past called the jurors’ 

attention to matters they would not normally be justified in considering in 

reaching a verdict. Although the evidence might have been minimally 

relevant to prove Manweiler’s identity, and accordingly admissible under 

Arizona Rule of Evidence 404(b), it could have been precluded as unfairly 

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STATE v. MANWEILER

Decision of the Court

prejudicial under Rule 403 had defense counsel timely objected.3 Defense 

counsel, however, did not object or ask the superior court to strike this 

apparently unexpected testimony, and the prosecutor immediately 

followed up by eliciting testimony that the corporal had spent “quite some 

time” interviewing Manweiler after she was arrested for the instant 

offenses. 

¶12 Nevertheless, the record reflects little probability this 

testimony influenced the jury. During the State’s direct examination of the 

corporal in its case-in-chief—which occurred a day before defense counsel 

cross-examined him—the corporal testified without objection that he had 

known Manweiler through police contacts for at least ten years. The 

corporal also testified that during his post-arrest interview of Manweiler, 

she had repeatedly told him she was trying to change her lifestyle and had 

not recently sold methamphetamine. This testimony minimized any unfair 

prejudice the reference to prior arrests might have had on the jury’s 

consideration of the instant offenses. Further, the court’s instruction to the 

jury that evidence of the “prior contact with law enforcement” could not be 

used as evidence that Manweiler “is disposed to engage in criminal 

activity” further limited any unfair prejudice from the reference to 

numerous arrests in the previous decade. Jones, 197 Ariz. at 304, ¶ 32, 4 P.3d 

at 359 (“When the witness unexpectedly volunteers information, the trial 

court must decide whether a remedy short of mistrial will cure the error.”).

¶13 Moreover, the evidence supporting Manweiler’s convictions 

was overwhelming. See supra ¶¶ 2-3. There was little probability that the 

jury’s verdict would have been any different absent this improper 

testimony. The superior court therefore did not abuse its discretion in 

denying a mistrial.

B. Rebuttal Testimony

¶14 Manweiler also argues the superior court should not have 

allowed the corporal to rebut her testimony that she had never been 

arrested and did not believe that she had ever met the corporal before by 

detailing his first contact with her. Manweiler did not object to this 

testimony or renew her request for a mistrial on the basis of this testimony, 

3We reject the State’s argument that defense counsel invited 

the corporal’s testimony that he had arrested Manweiler numerous times 

by challenging his qualifications to recognize her voice. See State v. Lucero, 

223 Ariz. 129, 136, ¶ 20, 220 P.3d 249, 256 (App. 2009) (“A party . . . invites 

prejudicial testimony by being the first party to elicit the testimony.”)

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STATE v. MANWEILER

Decision of the Court

and thus we review for fundamental, prejudicial error. See State v. 

Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 567-68, ¶ 19-20, 115 P.3d 601, 607-08 (2005). 

¶15 The corporal’s testimony directly rebutted Manweiler’s

testimony that she had never been arrested by nor met the corporal before.4

And, Manweiler had at this point already testified to being an “ex-meth 

user,” and in the final instructions, the superior court instructed the jury to 

consider the evidence only for limited purposes. See supra ¶ 8. On this 

record, the superior court’s failure to strike this testimony was not 

fundamental, prejudicial error. 

II. Prosecutorial Misconduct

¶16 Manweiler argues the prosecutor intentionally deprived her 

of her right to due process and a fair trial by arguing facts not in evidence. 

Specifically, Manweiler argues the corporal testified in rebuttal he had had 

“only one contact with her prior to the arrest in this case in an unrecorded 

arrest 8 years prior,” but in rebuttal closing argument the prosecutor stated 

the corporal had testified he had had many prior contacts with Manweiler. 

¶17 Prosecutorial misconduct “is not merely the result of legal 

error, negligence, mistake, or insignificant impropriety, but, taken as a 

whole, amounts to intentional conduct which the prosecutor knows to be 

improper and prejudicial and which he pursues for any improper purpose 

with indifference to a significant resulting danger of mistrial.” State v. 

Aguilar, 217 Ariz. 235, 238-39, ¶ 11, 172 P.3d 423, 426-27 (App. 2007)

(quotation omitted). Because Manweiler failed to object at trial, she bears 

the burden of demonstrating prosecutorial misconduct and fundamental,

prejudicial error. See Henderson, 210 Ariz. at 567-68, ¶¶ 19-20, 115 P.3d at 

607-08. 

¶18 The record does not support Manweiler’s argument. Her 

argument relies on the State’s question to the corporal about “the first time

that you had contact with Kari Manweiler.” See supra ¶ 7. In his closing, 

defense counsel mistakenly argued the corporal testified that before her 

current arrest the corporal last heard Manweiler’s voice eight years earlier. 

4Manweiler also argues for the first time on appeal that the 

State violated Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 15.1(b)(7) by failing to 

disclose before trial the arrest as a “prior act[]” that it intended to use to 

prove identity at trial. The record demonstrates, however, that the State 

had not intended to elicit any testimony on the prior contacts, and warned 

defense counsel after the State rested that if defense counsel opened the 

door further, the State would elicit the details of this arrest. 

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STATE v. MANWEILER

Decision of the Court

Defense counsel then argued, “I don’t see how it’s possible for most of us 

to recognize somebody’s voice after not hearing it for eight years.”

¶19 As discussed, the corporal testified he had had multiple 

contacts with Manweiler over the years. See supra ¶ 4. Accordingly, in 

rebuttal closing, the prosecutor argued: 

[The corporal] did not testify the last time he 

heard Kari Manweiler’s voice was eight years 

ago. He testified that’s when he arrested the 

defendant. When he clarified, he said he had 

several contacts with her. He said that he 

conducted those interviews with her February 

7th of 2014, that those took several minutes of 

time. They were lengthy. He spoke to her on 

scene, he spoke to her twice at the police station, 

and he’s reviewed those tapes to write reports, 

he’s heard her voice; and sitting in court, being 

asked to listen to the video, he heard her voice 

because it’s different than [L.M.]. 

The prosecutor’s argument was therefore a fair summary of the evidence

and was not improper. 

CONCLUSION

¶20 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Manweiler’s convictions 

and sentences.

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