DHS Support Components 

Do Not Have Sufficient 

Processes and Procedures to 

Address Misconduct 

September 26, 2018 

OIG-18-81 
 

 

 

 

DHS OIG HIGHLIGHTS 

DHS Support Components Do Not Have Sufficient 

Processes and Procedures to Address Misconduct 

September 26, 2018 

Why We Did 

This Audit 

This report is part of our 

ongoing department-wide 

audit of conduct and 

discipline to determine 

whether the Department of 

Homeland Security has 

sufficient processes and 

procedures to address 

conduct issues. This report 

presents our findings on DHS 

support components. We 

expect to publish a 

department-wide summary 

report at the conclusion of 

the conduct and discipline 

audit. 

What We 

Recommend 

We made six 

recommendations to ensure 

the consistent and effective 

management of conduct 

issues. 

For Further Information: 

Contact our Office of Public Affairs at 

(202) 981-6000, or email us at 

DHS-OIG.OfficePublicAffairs@oig.dhs.gov 

What We Found 

DHS support components do not have sufficient 

processes and procedures to address 

misconduct. These deficiencies exist because no 

single office or entity is responsible for managing 

and overseeing misconduct issues across support 

components. According to Government 

Accountability Office guidance, it is important for 

agencies to establish organizational structure, 

assign responsibility, and delegate authority, so 

they can achieve their objectives. 

Within the DHS Office of the Chief Human 

Capital Officer, the Human Resources 

Management and Services (HRMS) Employee 

Relations and Performance Management (ER) 

provides advisory services to support component 

supervisors and managers on conduct and 

performance-related issues. However, HRMS ER 

needs programmatic improvements, such as 

guidance and controls that ensure case file 

integrity. The office has had limited oversight and 

accountability for activities related to disciplinary 

actions. A strong system of internal controls 

helps management establish and operate 

activities to oversee and evaluate progress. Until 

DHS assigns program responsibility and 

implements an oversight program, the 

Department cannot provide assurance that the 

support components consistently and effectively 

manage misconduct issues. 

DHS Support Components’ 

Response 

DHS concurred with our recommendations and 

has begun taking corrective actions in response 

to our report. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov 

September 26, 2018 

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Claire M. Grady 

Acting Deputy Secretary 

Department of Homeland Security 

FROM: John V. Kelly 

Senior Official Performing the 

Duties of the Inspector General 

SUBJECT: DHS Support Components Do Not Have Sufficient 

Processes and Procedures to Address Misconduct 

Attached for your action is our final report, DHS Support Components Do Not 

Have Sufficient Processes and Procedures to Address Misconduct. We 

incorporated the formal comments provided by your office. 

The report contains six recommendations aimed at improving DHS support 

components processes and procedures for addressing misconduct. Your office 

concurred with the six recommendations. 

Based on information provided in your response to the draft report, we 

consider all recommendations open and resolved. Once your office has fully 

implemented the recommendations, please submit a formal closeout letter to 

us within 30 days so that we may close the recommendations. The 

memorandum should be accompanied by evidence of completion of agreedupon corrective actions and of the disposition of any monetary amounts. 

Please send your response or closure request OIGAuditsFollowup@oig.dhs.gov. 

Consistent with our responsibility under the Inspector General Act, we will 

provide copies of our report to congressional committees with oversight and 

appropriate responsibility over the Department of Homeland Security. We will 

post the report on our website for public dissemination. 

Please call me with any questions, or your staff may contact 

Sondra McCauley, Acting Assistant Inspector General for Audits, at 

(202) 981-6000. 

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Table of Contents 

Background .................................................................................................... 1 

Results of Audit .............................................................................................. 3 

Improvements Needed in Addressing Misconduct................................... 3 

HRMS ER Needs Programmatic Improvement......................................... 9 

Recommendations......................................................................................... 13 

Appendixes 

Appendix A: Objective, Scope, and Methodology ................................. 18 

Appendix B: Management Comments to the Draft Report ..................... 20 

Appendix C: Office of Audits Major Contributors to This Report ........... 28 

Appendix D: Report Distribution .......................................................... 29 

Abbreviations 

EEO Equal Employment Opportunity 

ER Employee Relations 

GAO Government Accountability Office 

HRMS Human Resources Management and Services 

OCHCO Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer 

OGC Office of General Counsel 

OIG Office of Inspector General 

OPM U.S. Office of Personnel Management 

SES Senior Executive Service 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

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Background 

The mission of the Department of Homeland Security is to safeguard the 

American people, our homeland, and our values. DHS consists of both support 

and operational components that report directly to the Secretary. Operational 

components are responsible for achieving one or more of the Department’s 

mission activities and generally manage their own finances, human resources, 

information technology (IT), procurement, and security programs. 

Support components provide resources, analysis, equipment, research, policy 

development, and other specific assistance to the operational components. 

Similar to the operational components, support components also have 

centralized services for some support functions, such as human resources, IT, 

and personnel security. 

DHS delegates the administration of discipline to the Chief Human Capital 

Officer, component heads, and component human resources directors, who 

must: 

 develop and administer policy guidance governing the administration of 

disciplinary and adverse actions; 

 ensure policies governing disciplinary and adverse action within the 

components are effectively applied and administered; 

 deliver guidance and advice to managers and supervisors on the 

discipline and adverse actions program; 

 ensure supervisors have the appropriate support; and 

 maintain properly all disciplinary and adverse action case files. 

Within the Management Directorate, the Office of the Chief Human Capital 

Officer (OCHCO), Human Resources Management and Services (HRMS) 

provides human capital services to all support components except the National 

Protection and Programs Directorate and the Federal Law Enforcement 

Training Centers.1 The HRMS Employee Relations and Performance 

Management (ER) branch, among other duties, provides advisory services to 

support component supervisors and managers on conduct and performancerelated issues. Approximately 4,000 of DHS’ more than 240,000 employees 

receive human capital services from HRMS (see figure 1 for the 21 DHS support 

components and sub-components receiving HRMS services). 

1 Even though the Office of Inspector General (OIG) is a component of DHS organizationally, it 

operates independently of DHS. To maintain independence, OCHCO does not oversee or 

provide human capital services to OIG. 

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Figure 1. DHS Support Components Receiving HRMS Services 

HRMS-Serviced Support Components 

and Sub-Components 

Offices of the Secretary/Deputy 

Secretary/Executive Secretary 

Management Directorate 

Office of Legislative Affairs 

Office of Intelligence & Analysis 

Science & Technology Directorate 

Office of Policy Office of Public Affairs 

Office of the General Counsel Privacy Office Office of Health Affairs 

Domestic Nuclear Detection Office 

Office of Intergovernmental Affairs 

Office of the Chief Readiness Support 

Officer 

Office of Operations Coordination Citizenship & Immigration Services 

Ombudsman Office for Civil Rights & Civil Liberties 

Office of the Chief Financial Officer Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer 

Office of the Chief Information Officer Office of the Chief Security Officer Office of the Chief Procurement Officer 

Source: OIG analysis 

All Federal employees are expected to perform in a manner that promotes the 

efficiency of the service and upholds applicable standards of ethical conduct. 

Under Chapter 75 of Title 5, United States Code, Federal agencies can 

discipline employees to address and correct instances of misconduct. Within 

DHS, managers, supervisors, and designees are responsible for assessing the 

conduct of employees and providing assistance, feedback, and corrective 

action. In November 2016, DHS issued Directive 250-09, Discipline and 

Adverse Actions Program, along with implementing instructions. These 

documents establish the Department’s policy and provide guidance for 

administering discipline and adverse actions. 

The U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) defines discipline as measures 

intended to correct misconduct that adversely affects the efficiency of the 

service; and to encourage employee conduct in compliance with the standards 

of conduct, policies, goals, work procedures, and office practices of the agency. 

Adverse actions include suspensions without pay, reductions in grade or pay, 

furloughs of 30 days or less, and removal. 

This report presents our findings on the management of conduct issues by 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

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DHS support components. It is part of our ongoing department-wide audit of 

conduct and discipline, which seeks to determine whether the Department has 

sufficient processes and procedures to address conduct issues. We issued a 

separate report on the Federal Air Marshal Service2 and expect to publish a 

department-wide summary report at the conclusion of the conduct and 

discipline audit. 

Results of Audit 

DHS support components do not have sufficient processes and procedures to 

address misconduct. These deficiencies exist because no single office or entity 

is responsible for managing and overseeing misconduct issues across support 

components. According to Government Accountability Office (GAO) guidance, it 

is important for agencies to establish organizational structure, assign 

responsibility, and delegate authority, so they can achieve their objectives. 

Additionally, HRMS ER needs programmatic improvements, such as 

performance measures, guidance, and controls that ensure the integrity of its 

case files. HRMS has had very limited oversight and accountability for HRMS 

ER’s operational activities related to disciplinary actions. A strong system of 

internal controls helps management establish and operate activities to oversee 

and evaluate progress. Until DHS assigns program responsibility and 

implements an oversight program, the Department cannot provide assurance 

that the support components consistently and effectively manage misconduct 

issues. 

Improvements Needed in Addressing Misconduct 

Support components need to improve their processes and procedures for 

addressing misconduct. Specifically, support components do not: 

 maintain comprehensive data about misconduct allegations; 

 refer misconduct allegations consistently to OIG; 

 provide guidance for supervisors and investigators on handling 

misconduct; and 

 manage misconduct allegations effectively. 

According to GAO guidance, it is important for agencies to establish 

organizational structure, assign responsibility, and delegate authority, so they 

can achieve their objectives.3 Guidance also suggests management properly 

2 The Federal Air Marshal Service Has Sufficient Policies and Procedures for Addressing 

Misconduct, OIG-17-104, September 13, 2017 

3 Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO-14-704G, September 2014 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

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manage and maintain documentation and records so they are readily available 

for examination. 

Support Components Do Not Have Comprehensive Allegation Data 

Due to the various approaches the support components use to track 

misconduct allegations, we could not identify the total number of misconduct 

allegations made by or against support component employees. We identified 

eight support components that receive or identify misconduct allegations on 

behalf of the 21 support components and sub-components that HRMS services. 

However, three of the eight offices do not formally track all misconduct 

allegations. Table 1 lists the eight components, their activities, and whether 

they monitor allegations in systems designed to track or manage other issues, 

such as security cases and IT incidents. 

Additionally, HRMS ER only tracks allegations that result in disciplinary 

action. This further limited our ability to review and assess how support 

components received, reviewed, referred, documented, and closed misconduct 

allegations. Without comprehensive allegation data, DHS management cannot 

effectively monitor and oversee support components’ efforts to address 

misconduct issues. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Table 1: Support Component Activities Related to Misconduct Allegations 

Component 

OCHCO HRMS ER 

Activities 

Responds to requests from supervisors to 

assist with misconduct allegations. 

Systems Used 

Internal case 

management database 

Office of Chief Security 

Officer, Personnel Security 

Division 

Receives allegations related to potential 

security incidents. 

Integrated Security 

Management System 

DHS Office of General 

Counsel, Ethics Division 

Receives questions and allegations related 

to ethics violations. 

None 

DHS Office of General 

Counsel, Personnel / 

Employment Law Division 

Provides counsel on all adverse actions; 

can receive misconduct allegations directly; 

provides assistance on conducting 

investigations. 

None 

Office of the Chief 

Information Officer, Office 

of Information Technology 

Services, Risk Management 

Division 

Conducts monitoring and analysis of 

computer usage by employees and provides 

security awareness. 

Request Tracker 

(internal database) and 

DHS Enterprise 

Operations Center 

Portal 

Office of Privacy May receive reports related to privacy 

incidents from a variety of sources. 

DHS Enterprise 

Operations Center 

Portal 

Chief Financial Officer for 

Support Component offices 

 Travel Card Program 

 Purchase Card 

Program 

Performs reviews, post-payment audits, 

and external audits on selected charge card 

transactions. 

Intellilink 

Office of Civil Rights and 

Civil Liberties / Equal 

Employment Office 

Processes informal and formal Equal 

Employment Opportunity (EEO) 

complaints, as well as other non-statutory 

discrimination complaints and complaints 

of harassment, separate and apart from 

EEO complaints. 

iComplaint System 

Source: OIG Analysis 

Inconsistent Referrals of Misconduct Allegations to OIG 

Support components do not consistently refer misconduct allegations to OIG as 

required. Because no formal referral process exists, and not all support 

components maintain relevant data, we could not verify the proper referral of 

misconduct allegations to OIG. 

DHS Management Directive 0810.1, The Office of Inspector General, requires 

that DHS components immediately refer the following categories of allegations 

to OIG: 

 all allegations of criminal misconduct against a DHS employee; 

 all allegations of misconduct against employees at the GS-15 level, GM15 level, or higher; 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

 all allegations of serious, noncriminal misconduct against a law 

enforcement officer; 

 all instances of discharge of a firearm that result in death or personal 

injury; 

 all allegations of fraud by contractors, grantees, or other individuals or 

entities receiving DHS funds or otherwise engaged in the operation of 

DHS programs or operations; and 

 all allegations of visa fraud by DHS employees working in the visa 

issuance process. 

Unlike some DHS operational components, support components do not have a 

single office or entity responsible for receiving, reviewing, documenting, and 

referring misconduct allegations. Several support components that receive 

allegations or identify misconduct have no formal process to ensure allegations 

are properly referred to OIG. In particular, HRMS ER staff acknowledged they 

were not aware of support component referral processes. They also said within 

HRMS ER there is no way to ensure allegations are properly referred. 

Because no formal referral process exists, and not all support components 

maintain relevant data, we could not verify whether support components’ 

properly refer misconduct allegations to OIG. Instead, we obtained HRMS ER 

disciplinary case data. HRMS ER’s database only captures misconduct 

allegations that result in disciplinary and adverse actions; it does not capture 

the universe of allegations received by HRMS ER staff. It also does not track 

any fact-finding or investigative information, including referrals to other offices. 

Due to these deficiencies, we conducted a limited assessment of GS-15 

disciplinary and adverse action cases from 2012 through June 2016. We found 

that HRMS did not refer 54 out of 66 cases of GS-15 misconduct (82 percent) 

to OIG, all of which were subject to mandatory referral under Management 

Directive 0810.1. 

Additionally, we were unable to conduct any assessment of the proper referral 

of Senior Executive Service (SES) misconduct allegations. This was because 

HRMS ER staff acknowledged they do not collect or retain data on SES 

misconduct cases and could not locate any SES case files for us to review when 

requested. 

Support Components Need Guidance on Managing Misconduct Issues 

Support components lack the necessary process and guidance to manage 

misconduct issues. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

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No Supervisory Guidance 

Support component supervisors and managers have not been provided with 

guidance on how to address and correct misconduct. According to the DHS 

Discipline and Adverse Actions Program Instruction (the Instruction), HRMS is 

responsible for, among other duties, providing personnel administration 

guidance and advice to all managers and supervisors on the rights and 

responsibilities covered in the Instruction. 

When asked about suggested improvements in the disciplinary process, several 

supervisors cited the need for disciplinary guidance. According to OPM’s 

Disciplinary Best Practices and Advisory Guidelines under the No Fear Act, 

disciplinary policy and other written disciplinary guidance communicate the 

agency’s expectations with respect to correcting misconduct and taking 

disciplinary action when appropriate. Providing instruction on selecting an 

appropriate penalty is a critical part of any disciplinary policy or guidance 

because the application of appropriate penalties discourages behavior that 

undermines the efficiency of the civil service, while ensuring consistency of 

penalty selection. 

No Investigative Process or Guidance 

Support components do not have an investigative process or guidance. 

Although HRMS ER reportedly refers allegations to approximately four offices 

for investigation, there is no guidance or defined process related to conducting 

misconduct investigations. Support components need a formalized process and 

guidance that includes elements such as: 

 defining roles and responsibilities of the fact-finding or 

investigative office; 

 selecting and appointing individuals responsible for conducting an 

investigation; 

 requiring investigative reports and documentation; and 

 establishing a timeframe for completion. 

According to OPM, fact-finders should be impartial parties who gather facts 

and compile all relevant evidence that informs management’s next steps in 

choosing an appropriate course of action. OPM’s guidance for fact-finders4 

states that the quality of fact-finding is a key factor in determining whether a 

4 OPM Basic Employee Relations: Your Accountability as a Supervisor or Manager, Lesson 5 - 

Guidance for Fact-Finders Conducting Administrative Inquiries. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

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formal disciplinary action is taken and whether it is supportable if grieved or 

appealed by the employee. 

Former HRMS ER staff said that they conducted fact-finding and made 

determinations, but their internal procedures do not capture how they are to 

perform these activities. Similarly, the DHS Office of General Counsel (OGC) 

stated that if a subject matter expert office is not needed, OGC will advise 

supervisors on how to conduct their investigations, as necessary. Investigative 

guidance could ensure support component supervisors and other investigative 

officials conduct complete investigations that achieve the necessary objectives. 

During our discussions about the lack of investigative guidance, several HRMS 

officials acknowledged the importance of an investigative and fact-finding 

process. In February 2018, HRMS provided a draft management inquiry 

handbook that is reportedly under review by OGC. The draft handbook 

recommends each component establish and train primary and secondary 

management inquiry officials to conduct inquiries for allegations that OIG 

declines. 

Support Components Lack a Defined Process for Managing Misconduct 

Allegations 

Support components lack objectives, roles and responsibilities, and standard 

processes to consistently and collaboratively manage misconduct allegations. 

We identified a number of other support components, aside from HRMS ER, 

involved with receiving and managing misconduct allegations (see table 1). 

Some of these offices have their own procedures or follow national standards 

aligned with their mission for identifying misconduct or responding to 

misconduct allegations and managing discipline.5 

Support components engage in some activities related to conduct and 

discipline; however, they lack defined expectations and objectives, roles and 

responsibilities, and standard processes necessary to consistently and 

collaboratively manage misconduct allegations. Several support components 

admitted that they neither consult with HRMS ER for informally resolved 

misconduct, nor do they always notify the employee’s supervisor. For example, 

several interviewees at offices other than HRMS ER indicated that when they 

discover an instance such as IT misuse or off-duty misconduct, they handle it 

directly and informally with the employee. Furthermore, some components 

5 Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information, 

December 2005 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

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were not aware that their activities might ultimately impact the disciplinary 

process. 

HRMS ER staff acknowledged they were not aware that certain support 

components were involved in handling conduct and discipline issues. For 

instance, before our audit began, HRMS ER staff were unaware that rather 

than the Chief Financial Officer, Office of Financial Operations having sole 

responsibility for identifying government credit card misuse, most support 

components have this responsibility. The DHS directive, Discipline and Adverse 

Actions Program,6 mandates consultation with employee relations staff prior to 

taking informal or formal disciplinary action. HRMS ER staff acknowledged our 

concern that due to the range of uncoordinated activities across support 

components, we were unable to fully assess the effectiveness of how DHS 

handles misconduct allegations. 

The deficiencies identified, such as inconsistent allegation referrals within the 

support components and to OIG, exist because no single office or entity is 

responsible for managing and overseeing misconduct issues across the support 

components. Instead, the management of misconduct across the support 

components is decentralized and lacks coordinated, collaborative efforts. 

Without identifying responsibility for managing and overseeing support 

component efforts related to misconduct issues, DHS cannot ensure the 

consistent and effective management of such issues. 

HRMS ER Needs Programmatic Improvement 

HRMS ER faces several programmatic challenges. The office does not have 

defined expectations or objectives for its mission; its database lacks privacy 

compliance assessments or documentation; internal procedures fail to provide 

sufficient guidance to ensure organizational knowledge retention and 

consistency; and internal controls are inadequate to ensure the integrity of its 

support component disciplinary case files. HRMS ER officials said that HRMS 

leadership provided limited oversight and accountability for their disciplinary 

activities. HRMS ER shortcomings significantly impact its ability to provide 

effective, accurate, and consistent misconduct and discipline services to 

support components. 

Internal control guidance recommends management establish and operate 

monitoring activities to oversee and evaluate progress. It also suggests 

6 DHS Management Directive No. 250-09, Discipline and Adverse Actions Program, November 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

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documenting controls to provide a means to retain organizational knowledge 

and mitigate the risk of having that knowledge limited to a few personnel. 

HRMS ER Lacks Defined Objectives and Performance Measures 

HRMS ER lacks defined expectations or objectives for its mission, and has no 

performance measures to monitor its efforts. Furthermore, although HRMS 

established service-level agreements in November 2014 with the offices it 

services, the employee relations section on the agreements was blank. The 

established service-level agreement states that it is intended to: 

 outline the services offered and procedures between HRMS and the 

support components; 

 quantify and measure service-level expectations; 

 outline potential methods used to measure the quality of services 

provided; 

 define mutual requirements and expectations for critical processes for 

overall performance; 

 strengthen communication between HRMS and the support components; 

and 

 provide a means to resolve conflicts. 

An HRMS ER intranet site lists four responsibilities for HRMS ER, including 

providing advisory services to supervisors and managers on conduct and 

performance-related issues. When asked to provide operational documents that 

defined its performance expectations, HRMS ER officials said those did not 

exist. HRMS ER officials also said that they have no performance measures and 

were unsure what measures would look like to monitor their performance. 

In September 2017, HRMS implemented a signed, updated service-level 

agreement to include employee relations, which provides some broad 

timeframes and responsibilities for its customers. Nevertheless, HRMS still 

needs to define its own internal performance expectations and specific 

measures to improve its monitoring. 

HRMS ER Must Comply with DHS Privacy Requirements 

During our review of its disciplinary cases, HRMS ER was using a database 

that the DHS Privacy Office had not approved. The database collected and 

retained records on employees, including social security numbers and 

disciplinary decisions. According to DHS guidance, offices using any system 

that collects, uses, maintains, or disseminates social security numbers and 

other personally identifiable information should prepare or update a Privacy 

Threshold Analysis that the DHS Privacy Office reviews. HRMS ER had not 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

conducted any required privacy compliance assessments or documentation, 

and could not ensure that sufficient security controls are in place to mitigate 

the risk of inappropriate or unauthorized disclosure of data, including social 

security numbers. 

HRMS submitted a Privacy Threshold Assessment in fall 2017 and, as of March 

2018, was working with the DHS Privacy Office to modify and obtain approval 

for its use of this database. 

HRMS ER Standard Operating Procedures Are Inadequate 

HRMS ER standard operating procedures lack the necessary guidance to 

ensure consistent operations and retention of organizational knowledge. The 

HRMS ER procedures are used to carry out organizational responsibilities and 

day-to-day duties; however, they do not include: 

 reviewing and documenting employee allegations; 

 determining how and when to conduct fact-finding or investigations, 

such as assigning the case to a support component for investigation; 

 determining how to select disciplinary and adverse actions, including the 

review of comparable cases prior to proposing penalties; 

 selecting and assigning officials who will propose and decide disciplinary 

actions; 

 monitoring of the issuance and implementation of disciplinary and 

adverse actions; or 

 establishing documentation and database input requirements. 

Additionally, HRMS ER lacks standard operating procedures related to 

collective bargaining agreements. HRMS ER does not have a process to ensure 

that, for instance, unions receive notice during disciplinary actions if required 

by collective bargaining agreements. 

Federal requirements also include maintaining specific records for adverse 

actions, such as the decision and the employee’s written reply. HRMS ER 

procedures do not include any guidance on what type of records it should 

maintain to ensure the integrity of DHS disciplinary case files. 

HRMS Critical Staffing Turnover 

During this audit, the team observed critical staffing turnover in the 

organization. HRMS ER’s limited internal procedures create a significant risk to 

the entity and DHS, particularly during periods of high staff turnover. At the 

start of the audit, HRMS ER staff included the Employee Relations and 

Performance Management Branch Chief and three ER Specialists. Each ER 

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specialist served a specific set of support components. By the conclusion of our 

fieldwork, all staff except for one ER specialist we engaged with had reportedly 

left HRMS ER. Improving HRMS ER internal procedures is critical to ensuring 

consistent operations and retaining institutional knowledge. 

Insufficient Internal Controls for Disciplinary Case Documentation 

HRMS ER case files do not have sufficient internal controls to preserve the 

integrity of the disciplinary case files. We were not successful in locating a 

number of disciplinary case files, including any paper or electronic files for 

SES-specific disciplinary cases. 

HRMS ER’s internal controls do not sufficiently ensure the preservation of 

disciplinary and adverse action case files. First, when we asked to see all SES 

cases since 2014, the HRMS ER supervisor was unable to locate any SES case 

information in the organization’s database or in paper files. Next, we attempted 

to conduct a review of 25 HRMS ER completed disciplinary cases. Initially on 

the day of our review, we could not locate 11 of 25 case files. With assistance 

from an outgoing ER specialist, we located two more case files. The ER 

specialist explained that five cases were noted as canceled in the HRMS ER 

database, but copies of canceled files are not retained. We were unable to 

locate or account for the remaining four files. Lastly, we attempted to review 

five GS-15 employee case files, but could only find two of the five requested 

files. 

When asked whether the database or the paper files provide a complete view of 

a disciplinary case, ER specialists said they would rely on a physical file for a 

complete record. Both ER specialists agreed that their HRMS ER database is 

not a complete record since fields are often left blank. They believed physical 

files were always complete and internally audited for that reason. Following our 

case file review and discussion of findings, HRMS reported having a manager 

review 60 open cases and developed a checklist for case files, which it provided 

to us. 

These HRMS ER shortcomings occurred because of limited oversight and 

accountability for activities related to disciplinary actions. For example, HRMS 

ER officials said HRMS management did not have regularly scheduled 

management meetings that would have provided insight into their activities. 

Additionally, the lack of guidance in HRMS ER’s internal procedures on how to 

properly maintain disciplinary case file documentation contributed to this 

deficiency. Limited oversight and accountability, combined with insufficient 

internal procedures, impedes HRMS ER’s ability to effectively, accurately, and 

consistently manage misconduct and discipline. 

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Conclusion 

DHS support components need better processes and procedures to address 

misconduct. Without centralized responsibility for managing or overseeing 

misconduct issues, support components have no way to understand the 

volume of allegations or ensure that allegations are properly vetted, managed, 

or resolved. Additionally, without defined expectations, objectives, and 

performance measures, senior management cannot monitor and evaluate the 

effectiveness of HRMS ER’s efforts. Turnover in critical staff compounds these 

issues and creates significant risks for the organization. 

Recommendations 

Recommendation 1: We recommend the Under Secretary for Management 

assign responsibility for the management and oversight of all misconduct 

allegations across support components and evaluate the best method to ensure 

that items a through g are completed: 

a) establish and implement a centralized oversight process for misconduct 

allegations; 

b) determine which support components identify or receive misconduct 

allegations; 

c) provide written guidance and training on the handling of misconduct 

allegations; 

d) develop a formal mechanism to communicate and collaborate regularly 

about misconduct allegations; 

e) establish a comprehensive system of record or database to manage and 

track allegations of misconduct; 

f)	 develop and implement a misconduct investigative process, including 

implementing and issuing written guidance on how to conduct 

misconduct allegation investigations; and 

g) develop and implement procedures for receiving and referring allegations 

to OIG. 

Recommendation 2: We recommend the Chief Human Capital Officer ensure 

that Human Resources Management and Services provides supervisors and 

managers with written guidance on correcting misconduct, including the steps 

necessary to initiate informal and formal disciplinary action. 

Recommendation 3: We recommend the Chief Human Capital Officer require 

Human Resources Management and Services to develop and implement 

employee relations objectives and performance measures, and establish an 

oversight mechanism to assess and monitor Human Resources Management 

and Services Employee Relations program operations. 

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Recommendation 4: We recommend the Chief Human Capital Officer 

continue to work with the DHS Privacy Office to ensure that the Human 

Resources Management and Services Employee Relations database complies 

with all applicable privacy requirements. 

Recommendation 5: We recommend the Chief Human Capital Officer direct 

Human Resources Management and Services Employee Relations to revise its 

standard operating procedures to capture key processes and allow for 

replication and consistency in handling disciplinary and adverse actions. 

Recommendation 6: We recommend the Chief Human Capital Officer direct 

Human Resources Management and Services Employee Relations to develop 

control measures to ensure accountability and preserve the integrity of all 

prior, current, and future disciplinary and adverse action case files. 

DHS Comments and OIG Analysis 

The Department concurred with our recommendations and provided comments 

to the draft report. A summary of DHS’ management comments and our 

analysis follows. We included a copy of these comments in their entirety in 

appendix B. 

DHS Response to Recommendation #1: Concur. According to DHS, the 

Under Secretary for Management will assign responsibility to HRMS ER, as the 

primary office to receive and refer misconduct allegations. DHS named seven 

support components that identify or receive misconduct allegations. According 

to DHS, HRMS ER will coordinate with stakeholders to develop a 

comprehensive written guidance and training schedule for the handling of 

misconduct allegations. DHS added that HRMS ER is leading stakeholder 

coordination, with extensive coordination with OGC. For formal communication 

and collaboration, the HRMS Executive Director attends a monthly staff 

meeting and provides a status of all actions; DHS will integrate collaboration 

into this monthly meeting. Additionally, DHS anticipated development of a 

recurring communication plan within the next 120 days. 

To manage and track allegations, DHS noted that OCHCO anticipates delivery 

of the Employee Relations Case Management Tracking System by June 30, 

2019. The Office of the Chief Security Officer will be the responsible 

investigative entity, and will develop and implement a misconduct investigative 

process by June 30, 2019. Lastly, DHS stated that the HRMS ER Office will 

develop procedures for receiving and referring allegations to the OIG. Estimated 

Completion Date: June 30, 2019. 

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OIG Analysis: DHS’ proposed actions meet the intent of the recommendation. 

We consider the recommendation resolved and open. The recommendation will 

remain open until we receive documentation showing DHS implemented all 

actions described. 

DHS Response to Recommendation #2: Concur. According to DHS, HRMS 

ER staff provides quarterly Human Resources Essentials training to DHS 

Headquarters supervisors, and customer-specific training upon request. DHS 

stated that HRMS will publish an updated standard operating procedure to 

provide more detailed and up-to-date written guidance on correcting 

misconduct, including the steps necessary to initiate informal and formal 

disciplinary action. Additionally, HRMS is developing a one-day supervisors 

"refresher" course on disciplinary and adverse actions. Estimated Completion 

Date: June 30, 2019. 

OIG Analysis: DHS’ proposed actions meet the intent of the recommendation. 

We consider the recommendation resolved and open. The recommendation will 

remain open until DHS provides the updated standard operating procedure 

and refresher course syllabus and schedule. 

DHS Response to Recommendation #3: Concur. According to DHS, 

oversight and monitoring of HRMS ER program operations now includes weekly 

HRMS ER leadership meetings, which include all ER specialists. Additionally, 

the implementation of the Employee Relations Case Management Tracking 

System will allow for the creation of various reports and allow for tracking of 

program operations. 

DHS also noted that in November 2017, HRMS ER staff and the OGC Personnel 

and Employment Law Division established a quarterly meeting to ensure open 

communication and strengthened collaboration specific to Headquarters 

disciplinary and adverse actions. In October 2017, the Deputy Under Secretary 

of Management requested that the HRMS Executive Director provide updates 

during a monthly staff meeting. 

In September 2017, HRMS published and disseminated the HRMS Service 

Expectations and Goals to ER staff, which established actions, timeframes, and 

responsible parties for disciplinary and adverse actions. HRMS ER will define 

and put in place its own internal performance expectations and specific 

measures to improve its monitoring of HRMS ER program operations. 

Furthermore, the HRMS ER supervisor will have measurable goals and will 

ensure the fiscal year 2019 Performance Plans for ER specialists address 

specific and measurable performance requirements. Estimated Completion 

Date: October 31, 2018. 

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OIG Analysis: We consider DHS’ actions responsive to the recommendation. 

We consider this recommendation resolved and open. It will remain open until 

DHS provides documentation of the actions described. 

DHS Response to Recommendation #4: Concur. On April 20, 2018, the DHS 

Privacy Office approved a Privacy Threshold Assessment for the HRMS ER 

database and provided documentation of the assessment. Additionally, OCHCO 

is actively seeking a department-wide automated, retrievable case management 

system for employee and labor relations. Estimated Completion Date: June 30, 

2019. 

OIG Analysis: We consider DHS’ actions responsive to the intent of this 

recommendation. This recommendation is resolved and will remain open 

pending documentation that OCHCO implemented a case management system 

for employee relations. 

DHS Response to Recommendation #5: Concur. HRMS plans to publish an 

updated standard operating procedure providing more detailed and up-to-date 

written guidance on correcting misconduct, including the steps necessary to 

initiate informal and formal disciplinary action. Expected Completion Date: 

June 30, 2019. 

OIG Analysis: We consider DHS’ actions responsive to the intent of this 

recommendation. We consider this recommendation resolved and open. The 

recommendation will remain open until DHS provides an approved copy of the 

updated standard operating procedures. 

DHS Response to Recommendation #6: Concur. DHS identified numerous 

actions it plans to take and has taken to address this recommendation. HRMS 

plans to publish an updated standard operating procedure providing more 

detailed and up-to-date written guidance on correcting misconduct, including 

the steps necessary to initiate informal and formal disciplinary action. HRMS is 

developing a one-day supervisors "refresher" course on disciplinary and 

adverse actions. HRMS ER leadership established weekly management 

meetings with ER specialists to review case files. HRMS ER and OGC staff 

began quarterly meetings in November 2017 to strengthen collaboration on 

disciplinary and adverse action. By October 31, 2018, HRMS ER will implement 

performance expectations and measures to improve monitoring program 

operations. Finally, OCHCO is researching and actively seeking a departmentwide automated case management system. Expected Completion Date: June 

30, 2019. 

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OIG Analysis: We consider DHS’ actions responsive to the intent of this 

recommendation. This recommendation is resolved and will remain open until 

DHS provides documentation that it implemented described actions. 

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Appendix A 

Objective, Scope, and Methodology 

The DHS Office of Inspector General was established by the Homeland Security 

Act of 2002 (Public Law 107−296) by amendment to the Inspector General Act of 

1978. 

We included DHS support components in our ongoing department-wide audit 

of conduct and discipline, the objective of which is to determine whether DHS 

has sufficient processes and procedures to address conduct issues. 

We interviewed DHS officials from the Offices of Chief Financial Officer; Chief 

Human Capital Officer; Information Officer; Security Officer; General Counsel; 

Privacy Office; and the Office of Civil Rights and Liberties. We judgmentally 

selected supervisors from the Science and Technology Directorate; Office of 

Intelligence and Analysis; and Office of the Chief Procurement Officer. 

Collectively, we met with more than 30 supervisors to obtain their perceptions, 

experiences, and understanding of conduct and discipline. 

We reviewed relevant DHS policies and procedures for handling conduct issues, 

including: 

 DHS Management Directive 0810.1, The Office of the Inspector General; 

 DHS Management Directive No. 250-09, Discipline and Adverse Actions 

Program; 

 DHS Instruction No. 250-09-001, Discipline and Adverse Actions 

Program; and 

 OCHCO HRMS ER standard operating procedures. 

We also reviewed Federal laws, guidance, and reports, including: 

 Merit System Protection Board’s Prohibited Personnel Practices: Employee 

Perceptions; 

 The Merit System Principles: Guiding the Fair and Effective Management of 

the Federal Workforce; 

 Alternative Discipline: Creative Solutions for Agencies to Effectively 

Address Employee Misconduct; 

 OPM’s Disciplinary Best Practices and Advisory Guidelines Under the No 

Fear Act; 

 OPM HR University’s training module Basic Employee Relations: Your 

Accountability as a Supervisor or Manager. 

We used GAO’s Standards for Internal Controls for guidance, including the 

following specific sections explaining management’s responsibilities: 

 Establish expectations of competence for personnel. 

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	 Set objectives to achieve the entity’s mission, strategic plan, and goals 

and requirements of applicable laws and regulations. 

	 Define objectives so they are understood, including what is to be 

achieved, who is to achieve it, how it will be achieved, and the time 

frames for achievement. 

	 Develop overall responsibilities and maintain documentation of its 

internal control system, capable of being monitored and evaluated by the 

entity. 

	 Document policies for each unit, specifying the unit’s respective 

responsibility for operational process objectives and related risks, and 

provide a means to retain organizational knowledge and mitigate the risk 

of limiting knowledge to only a few personnel. 

We judgmentally selected 25 disciplinary case files to determine whether HRMS 

ER followed Federal and DHS requirements and policy. 

We conducted this performance audit between March 2016 and February 2018 

pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and according to 

generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require 

that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to 

provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based upon our 

audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based upon our audit objectives. 

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Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

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Appendix C 

Office of Audits Major Contributors to This Report 

Lisa Vonder Haar, Director 

Christy Haynes, Director 

Anne Mattingly, Audit Manager 

Michael Staver, Audit Manager 

Heidi Einsweiler, Analyst in Charge 

Philip Emswiler, Analyst in Charge 

Tessa Clement, Analyst 

Jeanette Hyatt, Auditor 

Kathleen Hyland, Auditor 

Nancy Pergolizzi, Auditor 

Kendra Starkus, Analyst 

Ellen Gallagher, Communications Analyst 

Kevin Dolloson, Communications Analyst 

Nick Jathar, Independent Referencer 

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Appendix D 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security 

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff 

General Counsel 

Executive Secretary 

Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Policy 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs 

Chief Human Capital Officer 

Executive Director, Human Resources Management and Services, OCHCO 

Office of Management and Budget 

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS OIG Budget Examiner 

Congress 

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees 

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Additional Information and Copies 

To view this and any of our other reports, please visit our website at: 

www.oig.dhs.gov. 

For further information or questions, please contact Office of Inspector General 

Public Affairs at: DHS-OIG.OfficePublicAffairs@oig.dhs.gov. 

Follow us on Twitter at: @dhsoig. 

OIG Hotline 

To report fraud, waste, or abuse, visit our website at www.oig.dhs.gov and click 

on the red "Hotline" tab. If you cannot access our website, call our hotline at 

(800) 323-8603, fax our hotline at (202) 254-4297, or write to us at: 

Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General, Mail Stop 0305 

Attention: Hotline 

245 Murray Drive, SW 

Washington, DC 20528-0305