Making Peace Possible

NO. 156 | February 2020

PEACEWORKS

Afghan Women’s Views

on Violent Extremism and

Aspirations to a Peacemaking Role

By Haseeb Humayoon and Mustafa Basij-Rasikh
NO. 156 | February 2020

Making Peace Possible

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors alone. They do not necessarily reflect the views of

the United States Institute of Peace. An online edition of this and related reports can be found on our website 

(www.usip.org), together with additional information on the subject.

© 2020 by the United States Institute of Peace

United States Institute of Peace

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Washington, DC 20037

Phone: 202.457.1700

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Web: www.usip.org

Peaceworks No. 156. First published 2020.

ISBN: 978-1-60127-790-9

Cover photo: Women attend a meeting of the Consultative Peace Loya Jirga in Kabul 

on May 2, 2019. (Photo by Rahmat Gul/AP)

ABOUT THE REPORT

This report, the result of a study commissioned by USIP’s Asia Center, examines the 

nature and extent of women’s involvement in violent extremism and peacemaking in 

contemporary Afghanistan. In-depth interviews were conducted with 350 respondents 

in seven provinces from June to October 2018. Researchers and analysts at QARA

Group Afghanistan undertook the research design, fieldwork, and data analysis under 

the direction of the authors.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Haseeb Humayoon is the founding partner of QARA Group, an Afghanistan-based 

research, public affairs, and management advisory firm. He has worked with multiple 

domestic and international organizations in Afghanistan on advancing human rights and 

civil liberties and on social and institutional reform. Mustafa Basij-Rasikh is the managing 

partner of QARA Group. Prior to joining QARA in 2015, he worked on a major donor 

effort that sought to enhance the role of Afghan businesses in stabilizing the country.

VIOLENT 

EXTREMISM
USIP.ORG 1

3 Background and Study Methodology

10 Women in the Public Space

15 Violent Extremism and Afghan Women

22 Views on Afghan Women’s Role in Peacemaking

25 Conclusion and Recommendations

Contents
2 PEACEWORKS | NO. 156

Summary

Participation in violence and, conversely, efforts at peacebuilding in Afghanistan 

remain dominated by men. Understanding the role of Afghan women in violent 

extremism and peacemaking today requires reckoning with the polarization between the increasing number of liberal initiatives and the long-standing conservativism in Afghan society, which has traditionally restricted women’s activities to 

the domestic sphere. 

Between these two poles, however, lies a more nuanced, and growing, space 

where women actively contribute to Afghan society beyond the immediate confines of the home or small community. To better understand the changing roles 

of Afghan women today and their contributions to peacebuilding or violent extremism, interviews were conducted with 350 respondents (more than 90 percent women), comprising a mix of urban and rural residents in seven provinces. 

Respondents were queried about activism in their communities, in particular in 

relation to peacemaking and countering violent extremism; their understanding 

of and involvement in extremism or violent extremism; their most frequent means 

of accessing information; and awareness of and participation in organized groups 

active in their areas.

The study found that what constitutes “extremism” varied by province, most likely 

tied to the security and political situation of the area and the profile of the respondents. In Kandahar, for example, several respondents linked extremism to violence and even terror. However, all respondents referred to limited acceptance 

of women’s roles in the public sphere—some citing traditional cultural barriers, 

others family restrictions—as the primary obstacle to greater activism of women 

in pursuit of peacemaking. The need for solidarity among women, especially 

in relation to advocacy for rights and roles, was mentioned as important for 

women’s empowerment in all provinces.

Noting that Afghan women who are not publicly active often have limited access 

to information sources beyond their family and immediate circle, the report’s 

recommendations focus on improving access to information, including through 

online and offline access to women’s groups concerned with peacebuilding; 

depolarizing the information flow; and increasing exposure to women leaders. 
USIP.ORG 3

Contemporary Afghanistan exhibits a complex reality on the situation and influence of women in society. From the Taliban-imposed restrictions to private space, 

the country has moved to a stage where women in Kabul and the provinces are 

harnessing, to varying degrees, newly available opportunities in the domestic and 

even international political arena. This rise began when several women were appointed to high offices in the post-Taliban government—the Interim Administration 

of 2001–2, which featured a female vice chairperson, Sima Samar, and a female 

minister of public health, Sohaila Sediq. There were 160 female delegates at 

the Emergency Loya Jirga that approved the Transitional Authority in 2002. The 

leadership of the Transitional Authority was up for election in the Loya Jirga, and 

Hamid Karzai was challenged by Masooda Jalal, who had served as an aid worker 

before 2001 (and would serve as minister of women’s affairs in Karzai’s presidential cabinet from 2004 to 2006). She received 171 of the 1,555 participant votes. 

Women commissioners also played a notable role in the drafting of the country’s 

current constitution, adopted in 2004, which guaranteed women a minimum of 25 

Orchestra conductor Negin Khpolwak rehearses with Afghanistan’s first all-female symphony in Kabul in February 2017. Khpolwak attended the

Afghanistan National Institute of Music, one of the few schools in which boys and girls share classrooms. (Photo by Rahmat Gul/AP)

Among multiple efforts 

at peacemaking 

during the country’s 

four-decades-long war, 

the current discourse 

by and around women 

on their potential 

contributions to 

ending the war and 

building peace marks 

a clear break from the 

tradition of omission. 

Background and

Study Methodology
4 PEACEWORKS | NO. 156

percent of seats in parliament. The foundations laid 

in these years created space for an increased role 

for women in the country’s present and future, as is 

widely acknowledged.

After the relapse of the country into conflict and the 

intensification of violence in the past decade and a half, 

sustainable peace has once again become the goal of 

most actors involved in the country. Peace offers made 

to the Taliban have given rise to the fear that women’s 

rights may be sacrificed in a bid to end the war. Afghan 

women and their supporters have campaigned not only 

to safeguard women’s rights to education and work 

(among other rights) but also to ensure women’s participation in peace negotiations. In 2019, Afghan women 

politicians and activists faced off against the Taliban on 

the airwaves and around conference tables. 

Efforts at reaching a settlement to the war in the country feature an increasingly vibrant and visible display 

of women’s activism. At the official level, Afghanistan’s 

government and its international partners have sought 

active roles for women in peace processes and initiatives. More recently, concurrent with the official pursuit 

of a political settlement to the war, the pace and volume of women’s activism have increased. The research 

reported here, based on in-depth interviews with 350 

respondents in seven provinces between June and 

October 2018, coincided with senior-level Afghan and 

international policy discussions and initiatives on the 

role of women in peace processes. Most respondents, 

however, did not refer to women’s public activism and 

government initiatives as a way to increase women’s 

participation, choosing instead to discuss the role of 

women in peace within traditional parameters. The 

overarching response to the discussion on women’s 

Female delegates attend the opening ceremony of the Consultative Peace Loya Jirga in Kabul on April 29, 2019. (Photo by Jim Huylebroek/

New York Times)
USIP.ORG 5

role in peace processes was one of acknowledgment 

and enthusiasm, but constrained conceptually by societal limits and unfamiliarity with relevant best practices 

outside Afghanistan. 

Among multiple efforts at peacemaking during the 

country’s four-decades-long war, the current discourse 

by and around women on their potential contributions 

to ending the war and building peace marks a clear 

break from the tradition of omission. Until recently, 

research in the Pashto and Dari languages on Afghan 

women’s roles in violent extremism and peacemaking was scarce. The absence of women from official 

accounts warrants addressing in light of major societal 

changes in Afghanistan.

Additionally, research on women’s participation in 

Afghanistan’s wars, and particularly in mobilizing the 

populace for war, has remained limited to date. The few 

women who have led unofficial groups of armed men in 

recent years, including commanders Bibi-Aisha (known 

as Qumandan Kaftar, of Baghlan Province), Feroza 

(known as Haji Ani, of Helmand Province), and even the 

leadership of the Revolutionary Association of Women of 

Afghanistan, are anomalies, overshadowed by the abundance of male war figures dominating public discourse. 

While Afghan women did feature prominently in the military parades and propaganda campaigns of the Sovietbacked government (1978–92), the mujahideen parties 

implemented a strict social code for the participation of 

women in public life and rarely allowed them to interact with the outside world apart from attending a small 

number of educational institutions.1 Moreover, women 

were rarely identified as a distinct group in need of 

support in pre-2001 Afghanistan. Once they became an 

important target group for aid programs, international 

actors in the field realized how little they knew about 

the roles and perceptions of Afghan women and the 

need for special considerations for female beneficiaries 

of aid programs. As a result, gender-sensitive program 

design and delivery became a routine condition for aid 

programs.2 Some programs were designed to specifically address the needs of women in such areas as 

reproductive health, education, skills development, and 

small-scale income-generating projects.3

Even though Afghan women historically experienced 

severe societal restrictions, it was the policies of the 

Taliban toward women in the years from 1994 to 2001 

that drew international attention. The media in particular were at the forefront of an international campaign 

condemning Taliban practices with respect to Afghan 

women. This increased media attention drove increasing research into the lives of Afghan women.

RECENT RESEARCH ON AFGHAN WOMEN

While there was hardly any public presence of women—

in violence or in peacemaking—during the Taliban reign 

(1996–2001), the plight of Afghan women generated 

interest and acquired strategic significance. This period also revealed the extreme challenge in accessing 

women in Afghanistan. Aid organizations had to look for 

creative ways to design and implement female-focused 

programs. Gender advisers and experts, whose primary 

task was to ensure women benefited from international 

aid without provoking the Taliban, began to enter the 

scene. These experts and a few academics produced 

the first contemporary research on Afghan women.4

 This 

research was exclusively in English, and for the most 

part was not in the public domain. 

During the same period, roughly from 1995 to 2001, 

human rights organizations commissioned research to 

highlight the plight of Afghan women. Their findings 

had one common theme: that women were the primary 

victims of the Taliban’s repressive regime and had no 

role beyond that of victimhood.5 While the absence 

of Afghan women from war and peace was at its most 

extreme during this period, their plight resonated with 

women in power outside Afghanistan, and took on 

major strategic significance. As a 2001 article in the 

Washington Post noted, “The pressure from women’s groups began to have an impact domestically. It 
6 PEACEWORKS | NO. 156

became increasingly clear that U.S. recognition of the 

Taliban . . . would be politically implausible.”6 A campaign run by the Feminist Majority Foundation, “Stop 

Gender Apartheid in Afghanistan,” claims credit for the 

Clinton administration’s decision not to extend diplomatic recognition to the Taliban regime.7

Following the termination of Taliban rule, women 

sought to harness newly available opportunities in 

the political arena. As noted, women were appointed 

to high offices in the Afghan Interim Administration 

(2001–2), scores of female delegates participated in 

the Emergency Loya Jirga in June 2002, a female 

politician challenged Hamid Karzai for leadership of 

the Transitional Authority, and women played a significant role in drafting the 2004 constitution, which 

made important strides in ensuring a minimum level of 

representation in the national parliament. During this 

time, a large quantity of literature was produced on 

women’s status and experiences in Afghanistan and 

women’s efforts to overcome years of marginalization 

by increasing their participation in decision-making 

roles. Almost all the relevant studies are in English 

(and a few other languages), but not Dari or Pashto. 

Some Afghan researchers and research institutions 

that appeared around this time also produced work 

in non-Afghan languages. Nonetheless, by the late 

2000s, a few studies on women’s roles in statebuilding began appearing in Dari and Pashto. For example, 

the 2016 Dari-language position paper of the Afghan 

Women’s Network presented statistics on the number 

of women in Afghanistan’s executive branch, legislature, and judiciary.8

 It also discussed challenges to 

women’s political participation and offered solutions in 

four areas: good governance, the rule of law, peace, 

and aid effectiveness. 

In "Leaving Them to It? Women’s Rights in a 

Transitioning Afghanistan," a 2014 Chatham House 

report published in English, Dari, and Pashto, Torunn 

Wimpelmann suggested that, should external support 

be withdrawn, women must solidify their participation in Afghan politics if they want to preserve the 

gains made in women’s rights.9 Fatima Jaffary’s 2016 

book, Women’s Political Participation in Afghanistan, 

originally in Farsi, covered a range of issues, including challenges to, and the importance of, women’s 

political participation in Afghanistan. Jaffary identified 

increasing democracy, strong governance, and the 

advocacy of international actors as factors essential to 

increasing women’s participation in civic and political 

life.10 In a 2013 paper published in English and Farsi, 

“Women’s Economic Empowerment in Afghanistan, 

2002–2012,” Lena Ganesh, Massouda Kohistani, Rahim 

Azami, and Rebecca L. Miller elucidated policy gaps 

and deep-rooted sociocultural factors that hindered 

women’s economic participation. They argued that if 

these barriers were addressed, women could be more 

empowered, both materially and politically.11 Research 

for this report confirmed this thesis, as respondents 

repeatedly made reference to how the economic empowerment of women increases their ability to have an 

impact on peacemaking.

AFGHAN WOMEN’S RECENT ROLES IN 

VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND PEACEMAKING

With the renewal of peace negotiations with the Taliban 

beginning in 2018, researchers began to pay more 

attention to the role of women in peacemaking and the 

potential implications of a settlement with the Taliban 

for the status of Afghan women. While dozens of opeds and newspaper columns have appeared on the 

subject in local languages, there are very few formal, 

detailed studies in Pashto and Dari on the specific roles 

that Afghan women might play in the peace process. 

With the renewal of peace negotiations with the Taliban beginning in 2018, researchers began to pay 

more attention to the role of women in peacemaking and the potential implications of a settlement with 

the Taliban for the status of Afghan women.
USIP.ORG 7

However, there are multiple advocacy pieces describing women’s marginalization in the peace process.12

A 2017 paper by the Women and Children Legal 

Research Foundation on the challenges facing Afghan 

women’s participation in the peace process and a 2011 

research paper on inclusivity in the peace process by 

a consortium of Afghan civil society organizations—

consisting in large part of marginalized groups—were 

noteworthy attempts to assess the role of women.13

Violent extremism, on the other hand, is a relatively 

new concept, and only in the past few years has the 

role of women in violent extremism received some 

attention. A gap remains in the literature on the participation of women in either propagating or opposing 

extremism, particularly in local languages. The paucity 

of literature on women’s roles in supporting violent 

extremism in Afghanistan in part reflects women’s 

absence from the field. In fact, female politicians and 

rights activists refer positively to the lack of participation by Afghan women in the cycles of violence that 

have engulfed the country, arguing that they have had 

no role in the bloodshed.

In post-2001 Afghanistan, there are at least two anecdotal incidents of women involved in extremist violence, but these incidents appear to be isolated and 

not part of the larger trends of extremist violence in the 

country. The first suicide attack carried out by a woman 

in Afghanistan occurred in June 2010 in the Shegal 

district of Kunar Province.14 The bomber was reported to have been a Pakistani national.15 Nevertheless, 

reports of al-Qaeda and the Taliban forming groups of 

female suicide bombers began emerging.16 In the aftermath of the Kunar attack, analysts such as Matthew P. 

Dearing of the Lexington, Massachusetts-based Center 

for Emerging National Security Affairs argued that a 

major tactical shift toward including women fighters in 

militias was underway. He noted that violent extremists “will also likely find cleavages developed within 

their own ranks that see the inclusion of women in the 

insurgency as dishonorable and outside the realm of 

acceptable jihad.”17 However, since the 2010 attack, 

there has only been one confirmed incident of an 

Afghan female suicide bomber—in Kabul in September 

2012. Responsibility for the attack was claimed by 

Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, then an antigovernment 

group.18 Insofar as there have been no reports of the 

Taliban’s use of female suicide bombers since then, it 

appears that the Taliban chose not to open their ranks 

to female members.

In recent years, there have been media reports of the 

involvement of women at different levels in the activities of the Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K), with women 

among the suspected militants arrested by the Afghan 

security agencies. Released testimony of an arrested 

male IS-K fighter by the National Directorate of Security 

quotes the militant as saying the group lured him to 

travel from Kabul to Nangarhar and join IS-K with the 

promise that he would also get to marry a woman who 

had been introduced to him on the phone.19 It is unclear 

whether the women reported to be in the IS-K ranks 

are of Afghan or foreign origin. Additionally, while these 

anecdotal data points are important, they are too few 

to demonstrate trends. Further research and access 

to official government information will be necessary to 

determine the extent of IS-K’s involvement with or use 

of women in mobilization—such as in the recruitment of 

male fighters—and operations. 

Peacebuilding, on the other hand, boasts a more vibrant 

and visible display of women’s activism. The administrations of Presidents Hamid Karzai (2001–14) and Ashraf 

Ghani (2015–present) have sought roles for women on 

the High Peace Council (HPC), not only in Kabul but also 

in the provinces. The HPC’s Provincial Peace Committees 

(PPCs) were a subnational structure that attempted to 

institutionalize the role of women in the peace process; 

however, their efficacy seems uncertain, as few respondents referenced their work. The number of women represented in the PPCs of the seven provinces covered by 

this research never exceeded 10 percent of interviewees 

in that province. The participation of women in conflict 
8 PEACEWORKS | NO. 156

resolution at the subnational level, though minimal, allows for some representation and inclusion.20

In response to the HPC's launch of its “Women’s Voices 

for Ceasefire and Peace” campaign in 2014, the United 

Nations Development Program's Afghanistan Peace 

and Reintegration Program claimed that more than 

250,000 women signed the petition, which called for 

armed insurgents to agree to a cease-fire and participate in peace talks.21 A number of nongovernmental 

organizations (NGOs) also claimed to have established 

hundreds of women’s peace councils across the 

country. However, none of this study's respondents 

had been part of these councils or mentioned hearing 

about them. Similarly, an initiative called “Mothers for 

Peace” has been championed by the current deputy 

head of the HPC, Habiba Sarabi. While researchers 

for this study encountered documents discussing this 

initiative and periodic program events, respondents 

did not express any familiarity with the effort. A messaging campaign run by the NATO Senior Civilian 

Representative in Afghanistan, “No Peace Without 

Women,” similarly was not mentioned by any of the 

respondents. It is important to note that absence of 

evidence is not evidence of absence: these initiatives 

may have had impact even though they were not able 

to register their existence with respondents and the 

parts of society they represent.

Afghan women’s activism that seeks to influence and 

engage in the peace process has also been supported 

by the country’s first lady, Rula Ghani. Speaking at the 

United States Institute of Peace in Washington, DC, in 

October 2017, she declared, “Women no longer want to 

wait for peace to fall in their lap. . . . They are working 

for it.”22 The first lady’s office also ran the National 

Consensus of Afghan Women on Peace initiative, 

which included media-intensive provincial gatherings of 

women to discuss the role of women in peacemaking.23

These various initiatives indicate a growing activism on 

the part of Afghan women, with a potentially meaningful impact on peacemaking.

The period during which interviews were conducted 

for this report (June–October 2018) coincided with 

senior-level Afghan and international policy discussions on the role of women in peace processes. Most 

interviewees, however, did not touch on women’s 

public activism or government initiatives to increase 

women’s participation, choosing instead to discuss the 

role of women in peacemaking within traditional, largely domestic or community-oriented, parameters. The 

overarching response to the discussion on women’s 

role in peace processes was one of acknowledgment 

and enthusiasm but was constrained conceptually by 

societal limits and lack of familiarity with relevant practices outside Afghanistan.

STUDY DESIGN

To ascertain Afghan women’s roles in violent extremism 

and, conversely, the pursuit of peacemaking, interviews were conducted in seven provinces representing different regions of Afghanistan: Kandahar (south), 

Kabul (center), Nangarhar (east), Kunduz (north), Kunar 

(east), Herat (west), and Badakhshan (northeast). These 

provinces not only provided a broad regional sample, 

they are also ethnically and culturally diverse. Another 

reason for selecting these provinces was the elevated 

presence of nonviolent extremist groups, madrassas, 

and religious influencers. Within each province, two 

districts were selected with attributes similar to those 

generally associated with radicalization: high level 

of corruption, high level of unemployment, and the 

exclusion of women from power. This was due to an 

understanding that women’s role in violent extremism 

is generally invisible in Afghanistan, and, if present anywhere, it would be in areas more targeted by or prone 

to radicalization and extremism. Of the 350 interviewees, twenty-six were men, who were included to help 

capture a potentially different perspective.24

Respondents were engaged through a process of 

snowball sampling, whereby initial contacts suggest new 

contacts for interviews. The snowball sampling method 

was selected because women agreeing to participate 
USIP.ORG 9

in research on violent extremism or countering violent 

extremism in Afghanistan’s context can be considered a 

hidden population, requiring sensitive outreach. There 

is an inherent risk of biases in the use of this sampling 

method, such as community bias (the first identified 

respondent may have an impact on the whole set for the 

area), the researchers’ lack of control over the sample, 

and the nonrandom character of the total sample.

Out of safety concerns, the interviews were conducted almost exclusively in government-controlled areas 

of the seven provinces. The Taliban closely observe 

the movements of strangers in the areas they control, 

and conducting interviews on violent extremism in 

those areas could have been extremely dangerous. 

This skewing of the sample was corrected for as much 

as possible by interviewing people who either lived 

in Taliban-controlled areas or commuted regularly to 

those places. 

The sample included urban and rural residents and 

people who had and had not previously participated 

in research surveys. Therefore, the findings cannot be 

generalized to be representative of all Afghan women. 

Respondents included direct victims of extremist violence (such as people displaced by conflict), students, 

homemakers, employed women, community elders, 

social activists, government officials, and employees 

of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. 

Because of geographic and demographic differences 

among the respondents, the data show distinct trends 

specific to the researched communities, some of which 

are adumbrated in the next section of the report. 

IRAN

TURKMENISTAN

UZBEKISTAN

TAJIKISTAN

PAKISTAN

Nangarhar

Kandahar

Kunduz

Kunar

Kabul

Herat Kabul

Badakhshan

Interview Locations in Afghanistan

Adapted from artwork by Rainer

Lesniewskiparunto/Shutterstock
10 PEACEWORKS | NO. 156

Women in the Public Space

A formal role in either violent extremism or peacemaking assumes a degree of female public presence. 

Respondents frequently answered questions regarding 

women’s roles in both violent extremism and peacemaking by referring to women’s activities and influence 

in the private sphere, such as raising families and 

engaging with their local community. Women’s nonpublic roles and responsibilities are critical components of 

Afghan society but remain difficult to analyze and were 

beyond the scope of this study.

To identify associations that could be broadly indicative of women’s public roles in violent extremism or 

peacemaking, interviewees were asked two questions: 

What groups are active in your community? And, what 

groups in your community are women inclined to associate with or participate in?

Groups and associations frequently mentioned included the government, civil society groups and NGOs, 

and educational institutions, including schools, universities, vocational training centers, and religious training 

circles (see figure 1). However, responses varied widely 

according to location, with, for example, interviewees 

in Herat demonstrating no inclination to list the government as a form of association, whereas in other 

provinces the government was widely identified. Also 

in Herat, religious organizations in general were most 

often cited as influential, possibly reflecting the growing number of religious groups operating in Herat city, 

including Jamiat-e Islah and Daar Ul-Uloms (religious 

education centers) run by clergy, some of whom would 

qualify as extremist. In all provinces there was insignificant mention of violent extremist groups such as the 

Taliban and IS-K, likely because the interviews were 

conducted primarily in government-controlled areas.

Of note, an association with NGOs or with the government was tied to programs that included vocational 

training opportunities that bridge to the domestic 

sphere, such as lessons in gardening, literacy, and 

tailoring. These skills also enable women to earn an income. These economic opportunities offered by one or 

another organization often drove women respondents’ 

association with them, for they declared themselves to 

be direct beneficiaries or knew people who had benefited from the programs.

More generally, higher levels of education, reflecting 

a less entrenched system of patriarchy, allows women to imagine and take on a variety of roles in public 

life, beyond the home. This was especially true in city 

centers where the Taliban had little to no tangible 

presence. But outside commercial hubs such as Kabul 

and Nangarhar or Herat, researchers found growing 

engagement in public space and aspirations for enlarged roles. In Kunar Province’s Assadabad and Khas 

Kunar districts, for example, where the Taliban are a 

distant factor, women stressed education, and specifically becoming a doctor, as a preferred way to engage 

in society. Respondents in Kunar infrequently referenced political organizations when asked about groups 

active in their community or groups they would join. By 

contrast, women respondents in Nangarhar preferred 

an association with the government to all other groups; 

in particular, they were unlikely to join religious groups. 

While the exact reason for a preference for an association with government groups is unclear, it may be that 

the province is perceived as critical to the political base 

of President Ashraf Ghani and that the government has 

made investments in garnering support. For example, 

there have been reports of cash handouts to women 

visiting government-administered health clinics. 
USIP.ORG 11

Figure 1. Groups Women Are Most Likely to Join

Women cited government or educational institutions as groups they would be most inclined to join or associate with, 

though responses varied considerably by location.

Educational institutions 26.0% Religious groups 24.0% Government 14.0% Professional groups 12.0% Political groups 4.0% 

Youth groups 4.0% Economic and business groups 4.0% Don’t know 2.0% Not allowed to join groups by family 2.0% 

Moderate/progressive groups 2.0% No answer 2.0% No group 2.0% Shuras 2.0%

KABUL PROVINCE

HERAT PROVINCE

Religious groups 30.0% Educational institutions 18.0% Peaceful/rights/social groups 14.0% No interest in any group 14.0% 

Do not know 12.0% Political parties 6.0% Economic and business groups 2.0% Not allowed to join groups by family 2.0%

No answer 2.0%

KUNAR PROVINCE

Government 57.5% Civil society/peaceful/rights groups 20.0% Educational institutions 15.0% 

Human rights groups/organizations 5.0% Not allowed to join groups by family 2.5%

NANGARHAR PROVINCE

Government 36.2% Educational institutions 19.2% No interest in any group 10.6% Civil society 8.5% 

Economic and business groups 6.3% NGOs 6.4% Development councils/groups 6.4% Madrassa 2.1% 

“Whatever they like” 2.1% Local shura 2.1%

KUNDUZ PROVINCE

Government 36.4% Religious groups 15.9% Educational institutions 15.9% Peaceful/rights/advocacy groups 13.6%

Taliban 6.8% Civil society 6.8% Local powerholders 2.3% NGOs 2.3%

BADAKHSHAN PROVINCE

Government 22.0% Political parties 19.5% No interest in any group 17.1% Peaceful/civil/rights/social groups 9.8% 

Educational institutions 9.8% NGOs 7.3% Economic and business groups 7.3% Religious groups 4.9% Taliban 2.4%

KANDAHAR PROVINCE

Educational Institutions 32.4% Economic and business groups 10.8% No interest in any group 8.1% Religious groups 8.1% 

Community leader 5.4% Peaceful groups 5.4% Human rights groups 5.4% Not able to contribute to any group 5.4% Government 5.4% 

Vocational training groups 2.7% Profession (medicine) 2.7% Media 2.7% Interested in joining educated people 2.7% NGOs 2.7%
12 PEACEWORKS | NO. 156

Association with violent extremist groups such as the 

Taliban and restrictive religious educational organizations was more at play in provinces such as Kunduz. 

In Kunduz, harassment of women in the workplace, a 

patriarchal society response, was cited as a barrier to 

women joining the workforce.

Of the seven provinces studied, women in Kandahar 

were most heavily affected by patriarchal social norms. 

Respondents listed mullahs, for example, as a resource 

for solving problems, including domestic conflicts. 

However, they also expressed interest in public roles 

in health and education, two spheres where women’s

participation is generally accepted by extremists. 

These roles take women out of the private, domestic 

sphere and into a public space.

This study found that women overall were interested 

in moving beyond the roles a patriarchal society had 

set for them and into more public roles. Economic 

self-improvement, the lighter or heavier presence of 

the Taliban, and stronger or weaker local enforcement of patriarchal norms were factors influencing 

which groups respondents were aware of or would 

consider joining, which can be understood as a readiness to participate in a public sphere larger than the 

home or immediate community—a necessary precondition for activism. Overall, respondents shunned 

associating with radical groups not only out of fear 

but because these groups limited their participation 

in the broader society. 

A desire for more independent decision-making power 

and political representation of women was frequently 

mentioned. Notably, women in government positions 

felt that women had more independence and more 

influence on society than other respondents did. 

The following case studies, focusing on women in 

Herat and Kunduz Provinces, describe the serious role 

religious organizations and educational institutions play 

in supporting or precluding a larger role for women in 

society.

Herat: Association with Jamat-e Tabligh

Karukh district, located in the northeast of Herat 

Province about 50 kilometers (30 miles) from Herat city, 

is an agricultural, rural area. While most respondents in 

this study noted that women are likely to join religious 

groups, this was more prevalent in Karukh district. 

Among the various religious groups operating in the 

district, women most frequently declared an association with Jamat-e Tabligh (JT). JT is a revivalist group 

that emerged in India in the 1920s and spread to other 

Muslim countries, eventually reaching Karukh. JT proclaims apolitical objectives, and the group is perceived 

to be opposed to militancy. However, critics allege that 

some of their activities function as precursors to violent 

extremism, and there are documented cases of violent 

extremists who had JT roots.25 That said, the group 

itself is neither overtly nor covertly engaged in violent 

extremism or militancy. 

Since studying religion is generally believed to be a 

positive activity for women in rural areas, female family 

members are often asked to join JT. Respondents 

noted that JT has female members who instruct 

other women in religious duties and responsibilities. 

Attendees learn verses of the Quran, how to pray, and 

other religious matters. Because praying and correctly 

reciting the Quran give women a more respected position in society, JT appeals most to women who lack 

literacy and the ability to read and pray, and recruits 

them into its activities. Respondents mentioned that 

JT also gives instruction in women’s and men’s rights 

It is no longer necessary to be English literate to go online, given the availability of content in Pashto 

and Farsi. The growing availability and affordability of smartphones, tablets, and data networks are also 

fostering a shift toward obtaining information from online sources.
USIP.ORG 13

(generally privileging men’s rights over women’s), marital relations, and other social issues. 

Respondents noted that JT has affected the behavior of 

male family members toward women, making them restrictive in some cases and respectful in others. Several 

women interviewees considered JT gatherings an effective way to raise awareness of women’s rights among 

men. A married housewife in Karukh, aged forty, said:

Yes, I once went to the gatherings of Jamat-e Tabligh. 

They were talking to each other and I was listening. They 

were talking about ways to reach God and the rights of 

neighbors. As I listened to their words, I cried further and 

further. In Ramadan, Maulawi Sahib had come from the 

city to talk about certain issues. I went to perform morning 

prayer and sat there for two hours just to listen to him. He 

talked about the rights of the husband, the responsibilities 

of having children, and the rights of neighbors.

Kunduz: Ashraf Ul-Madaares

Kunduz Province in northern Afghanistan has been a 

volatile location in recent years. The provincial center 

has fallen into the hands of the Taliban twice since 

2014. A multiethnic province, Kunduz has been a major 

focus of violent extremism and countering violent extremism efforts. 

The country’s biggest madrassa that educates women, Ashraf Ul-Madaares, is in Kunduz city. Women are 

taught religious subjects such as interpretation of the 

Quran and Hadith, preaching, and what is expected of 

women according to Islam. The madrassa education 

is not limited to “Islamic” teachings; it also includes 

discussions of social, religious, and economic topics. 

Ashraf Ul-Madaares is known to propagate a very strict 

set of religious interpretations, including opposition 

to watching television, listening to the radio, or taking photographs. Its students hold strict beliefs about 

acceptable roles for women and have reportedly 

labeled women infidels for working outside the home. 

One of the respondents, who was also featured in 

the Al-Jazeera documentary The Girls of the Taliban, 

described being labeled an “extremist” by the madrassa for comments she made on the rights of women 

to work outside the home. Women students at Ashraf 

Ul-Madaares are instructed that watching television, 

listening to nonreligious songs, attending weddings, 

and other seemingly mundane activities are extremely 

inappropriate for women. 

Despite these strictures, interviewees noted that 

Ashraf Ul-Madaares has increasingly gained influence 

in Kunduz Province, especially among women. Some 

respondents noted that women may be influenced to 

join the madrassa as a result of outreach by current 

students to women in the community.

SOURCES OF INFORMATION 

Association and activism choices are directly tied to the 

information one consumes or works with. Despite the 

prevalent patriarchy, Afghan women are increasingly in 

possession of greater information and means of access 

to information than ever before. Their contribution to 

the information sphere in the country is also growing 

into a major factor shaping perceptions and perspectives inside and outside the country. 

Access to electronic means of information—television, 

radio, and internet-based platforms—is a recent and 

growing development in Afghanistan overall. While 

respondents identified television as the most popular 

medium for getting information (with the exception 

of Kunar Province), online sources were cited as the 

second-most commonly used (see figure 2). Specific 

outlets mentioned by respondents included Facebook, 

YouTube, news websites, and even Wikipedia. Of note 

is the growing localization of all these platforms in 

Afghanistan. It is no longer necessary to be English 

literate to go online, given the availability of content in 

Pashto and Farsi. The growing availability and affordability of smartphones, tablets, and data networks are 

also fostering a shift toward obtaining information from 

online sources.
14 PEACEWORKS | NO. 156

Online

sources 20.9%

Radio 16.6%

Family/friends/

public 9.7%

Government 3.1%

Books and 

newspapers 2.0%

No answer 1.1%

Mullah and madrassa 1.1%

Other 1.4%

While the frequency of use of online sources has 

overtaken radio, the two are about equal as trusted 

sources. In general, the survey found a discrepancy 

between the most often used sources of information 

and the most trusted. For example, in Kunduz Province, 

while 20 percent of respondents mentioned online 

sources as most commonly used, only 4 percent listed 

online sources as the most trusted. It is also telling of 

the shift to more modern sources—television in parts of 

Afghanistan still remains a very new outlet—that while 

respondents in Kunar cited radio twice as often as television as the most commonly used source of information, their trust in televised information was overwhelmingly higher than their trust in information provided 

over the radio. The lower ranking in frequency of 

television may be attributable to difficulty in accessing 

electricity, but may also reflect remnants of what was 

once a widespread cultural and even religious sanction 

against viewing television.

Important also to note is the reference to “public”—

common people—as a source of information, a phenomenon particularly notable in Kunar (and only slightly 

less so in Kandahar). Afghanistan remains a largely oral 

culture, with a history of public square announcements 

and word of mouth being influential ways to disseminate information. However, trust in these public sources 

is lower than their frequency of use. For example, no 

respondent in Herat register trust in “public” sources.

Figure 2. Sources of Information

Although television dominates as a source of information, the availability and affordability of smartphones, tablets, and 

data have facilitated a shift to online sources—even though they are viewed as less trustworthy. 

Family/friends/

public 14.0%

Radio 10.9%

Online sources 10.9%

Government 4.6%

No answer 2.3%

Books and newspapers 1.7%

Mullah and madrassa 1.7%

Other 1.7%

MOST FREQUENT 

SOURCES

MOST TRUSTED 

SOURCES

Television

52.3%

Television

44.0%
USIP.ORG 15

Violent Extremism and 

Afghan Women

To ascertain how respondents understood and viewed 

extremism, options to counter its ideology, and circumstances under which perpetrating violence against 

civilians might be deemed acceptable, interviewees 

were asked the following questions:

• What do you consider to be extremism?

• In your view, why do some people support violent 

extremist groups?

• In your view, what is the most effective way to prevent and counter extremism? Especially, what can 

women do to prevent and counter extremism?

• In your view, how justified is violence against civilians and unarmed people?

It is important to note here that, as previously discussed, the research did not include women currently 

living in areas under Taliban control. The views and 

attitudes of women in these areas are therefore not 

reflected in the following discussion.

UNDERSTANDING OF EXTREMISM 

Across all provinces, “extremism” was seen as carrying 

negative connotations. Violent extremism in particular was seen as a major threat to lives, livelihoods, 

and the well-being of communities and individuals. 

Respondents across all provinces defined extremism 

as excess, crossing the limits, or a lack of moderation in 

opinion and action. Their understanding of the meaning of “extremism” likely reflects a literal interpretation 

of the word (ifratiat) used in the question. The word is 

derived from ifrat, or “excess.” An excess of what, however, is not clear, leading to more eclectic definitions. 

Responses ranged from definitions as simple as 

“extremism means crossing the limits. When someone 

crosses the limit, it is extremism” (offered by a twentyyear-old woman, a government employee, in Panjwai, 

Kandahar) to more complex ones that referenced 

Islamist ideology: “Though we can see extremism in 

many different ways, religious extremists believe that 

there are certain red lines and whoever crosses one of 

those red lines, it becomes incumbent to perform jihad 

against them; thus the killing of that person becomes 

halal and legitimate” (offered by a twenty-nine-year-old 

married woman, a government employee, in Herat city). 

Another respondent, a twenty-three-year-old woman 

living in Herat city, noted that the method used to express an idea, even an extreme idea, was what distinguished a moderate position from an extremist one:

The definition I have is that you can keep any ideas that you 

have, but for the propagation of your ideas do not use violence. Extremism, in my opinion, in this society is that these 

groups are trying to impose their ideology through using 

violence against people, and this is extremism. . . . If an 

extreme idea is expressed in words, that is not extremism 

to me. As long as no weapons or physical force is used, it is 

not extremism.

And finally, a twenty-two-year-old man employed by 

the government and living in Faizabad, Badakhshan, 

implicitly characterized the actions of Western countries as extremist:
16 PEACEWORKS | NO. 156

In my view, those who attack the culture of a society are 

extremists. Today in Islamic countries, hundreds, even 

thousands of innocent people are being killed. Those 

who are actively participating in the destruction of their 

[Muslims’] places, those who are funding explosions, those 

who are killing women and children are extremists. 

The different understandings and characterizations 

of extremism trended along provincial lines, most 

likely tied to the general situation in the area and 

the profile of the respondents. In Kandahar, several 

respondents linked extremism to violence, even “terror,” and characterized it as “imposing views through 

the barrel of a gun” (mentioned by six respondents 

from both Kandahar city and Panjwai district). One 

thirty-year-old male resident of Panjwai, a high school 

graduate, described extremism as “[posing a] threat to 

life, forbidding others’ will, eliminating opponents for 

opposing views.” In Herat Province, however, far fewer 

respondents referred to violence in their definition of 

extremism. In Karukh district, the majority of respondents chose “don’t know” when asked about their 

definition of extremism. (It should be noted that most of 

the respondents in Karukh associated with JT.) At Herat 

University, a twenty-one-year-old female student called 

wearing the hijab her definition of extremism, while another twenty-year-old female student—also employed 

as a religion teacher—offered “There is no room for 

extremism in Islam” as her response to the question 

“What is your definition of extremism?” 

VIEWS ON WHY PEOPLE SUPPORT 

VIOLENT EXTREMIST GROUPS

In response to the question, “Why do some people support violent extremist groups?,” respondents 

frequently referenced a lack of “awareness” (agahi in 

Dari, pohana in Pashto). “Awareness” in this context 

denotes an ability to transfer and receive wisdom, with 

undertones of being educated in some way, not necessarily through formal schooling. Lack of awareness, 

or “ignorance” (a widely used word), was considered to 

be a major factor driving people to violent extremism. 

“Ignorance” was also used interchangeably with “lack 

of education.” Educational centers—schools, universities, and madrassas—were seen as the main centers 

for spreading awareness and creating “enlightenment.”

Other factors mentioned as inducing people to join 

violent extremist groups were more pragmatic. They 

ranged from the need to associate and find a purpose, 

to financial incentives, and even the appeal of dispute 

resolution mechanisms. 

VIEWS ON WAYS TO COUNTER 

VIOLENT EXTREMISM

To elicit ways perceived to be effective in countering 

violent extremism, interviewees were asked, “In your 

view, what is the most effective way to prevent and 

counter extremism? Especially, what can women do to 

prevent and counter extremism?”

With the exception of Herat (particularly Karukh district), 

the majority of respondents believed women could 

play a role in countering both nonviolent and violent 

extremism, although more specific discussion of the 

role was regularly limited to inside the family dynamics. In Kunduz in particular, respondents indicated that 

women could create an atmosphere inside the home 

that would constrain the spread of extremism.26 This 

argument is rooted in the strong family bonds still prevalent in Afghan culture, with women playing a defining 

role in maintaining those bonds.

Female activism as described by respondents included 

women “raising their voices”—in other words, utilizing 

the space for freedom of expression by vocal activism in public spaces and on the airwaves (see figure 

3). Other forms of activism identified by respondents 

included launching protests, establishing grassroots 

movements, setting up civil society organizations, and 

engaging in advocacy. “Awareness” was again one of 

the most frequently referenced words. In this context, the term was used to denote reading, acquiring 

knowledge and skills, and expanding one’s horizon 
USIP.ORG 17

to the extent that a person could distinguish between 

good and evil. Respondents believed that to have a 

meaningful impact in reducing society’s risk of violent 

extremism, women needed first to raise the level of 

their own awareness. Then they could work to raise 

the awareness of others as to the detrimental effects of 

violent extremism—such as disruption of families and 

loss of life—on vulnerable individuals and communities.

Respondents were very clear and categorical in the 

use of the word “education” to refer to attendance 

at an educational institution, particularly schools and 

universities. Education could also mean attending the 

training sessions, seminars, and workshops convened 

by the Afghan government and NGOs. The most 

empowered women were considered to be those 

who had achieved high levels of formal education, 

perceived to correlate with higher incomes. However, 

formal education for women and by women was not, 

across the board, particularly highly ranked among 

the attributes useful for women to counter violent 

extremism. Madrassa education was more pervasive 

in Kunduz than in the other six provinces. Those 

attending or teaching in madrassas saw them as a 

front against, rather than helping, the Taliban’s cause. 

And, as was the case in many provinces, respondents 

in Kunduz viewed those waging violence in the name 

of Islam, such as the Taliban and al-Qaeda, as lacking 

knowledge of “real” Islam. Education per se was also 

lower on the list of attributes useful for countering 

violent extremism among the women of Herat, since 

educational opportunities are ample in the province, 

Figure 3. How to Prevent Extremism

On the question of how to prevent and counter extremism, more than half of all responses focused on acquiring an 

education or fostering awareness of the detrimental effects of extremism.

Security and rule of law 3.4%

Don't know 3.1%

Discussion and negotiation 2.6%

Good behavior 1.7%

Nothing works 1.4%

Preventing corruption 0.6%

Social movement 4.6%

Peace and pluralism 3.4%

Education

34.0%

Employment 8.6%

Government control 8.3%

No answer 4.6%

Raising awareness 

23.7%
18 PEACEWORKS | NO. 156

especially in the city of Herat. The nature of the educational institution and the type of education offered 

were considered more important in relation to countering extremism. 

The need for unity and solidarity among women as an 

important step toward women’s collective empowerment was emphasized more in Badakhshan than in 

any other province. Predictably, many respondents 

believed women could use their role as mothers to 

prevent or counter extremism within their families. 

It was mentioned multiple times that mothers can 

influence their children through the “right” upbringing, 

especially if they are already aware of the dangers 

and signs of extremism. The emotional influence of a 

woman as a sister or wife to discourage family members from joining extremist groups was also mentioned. 

The responses highlighting associations (someone’s 

sister or mother) as the basis for discussing the role of 

women in countering violent extremism reaffirm the understanding that respondents of this research treated 

violent extremist actors as mainly men. 

The most surprising finding in Herat was the number of 

respondents who had a bleak outlook on women’s ability to counter violent extremism, and their relative ineffectiveness in doing so. Two-thirds of the respondents 

who believed that women have no influence to counter 

violent extremism came from Karukh district, of whom 

more than 90 percent were barely literate. While there 

are growing opportunities for education and gaining 

literacy across Afghanistan, the availability of opportunities does not imply utilization of those opportunities. 

In Karukh as in many other rural settings, if women are 

allowed by the controlling male members of their family 

to engage in a broader space outside their homes, the 

Students share a textbook during class in one of the overflow tents at Rustam School in Yakawlang, Afghanistan, on May 19, 2019. (Photo by Jim Huylebroek/New York Times)
USIP.ORG 19

likely immediate choice for most is in religious settings, 

such as mosques, madrassas, or religious discussion 

groups. Herat respondents associated violence with 

the Taliban, and they had difficulty imagining circumstances under which women could engage with or 

resist them. This response could have been registered 

in part because the Taliban are an all-male group with 

the harshest rules regarding women.

In contrast, respondents in Kandahar (more than 95 

percent of whom were women) overwhelmingly believed women could play a meaningful role in countering violent extremism. But they had to be educated first 

in order to have the capacity to take action. Women in 

Kandahar face restricted mobility outside their homes, 

which has affected their ability to attend schools and 

universities. While multiple respondents in Herat 

spoke of reading clubs, women in Kunar told stories of 

young girls reporting their fathers to the Afghanistan 

Independent Human Rights Commission for not allowing them to continue their education, and women 

in Nangarhar boasted about their work in NGOs, few 

female respondents in Kandahar mentioned an opportunity to work outside the home. Respondents stated 

that educational institutions gave them the best chance 

of having a formal role in society, which could in turn 

allow for impact. This may partly explain the emphasis 

on employment as offering the only avenue for women to have influence. Some Kandahar respondents 

expressed hopelessness and disappointment: “Women 

are powerless. Your questions . . . have little to do with 

our reality,” concluded a university-educated interviewee, a sixty-eight-year-old female, who is married and 

works in the private sector in Kandahar city.

In Kabul, much as in Herat, education was not viewed 

by the all-female respondent group as a prerequisite for women to have efficacy in countering violent 

extremism. Women in Kabul were more concerned with 

practical actions to prevent violent extremism, such 

as the establishment of civil society organizations or 

changing school and university curricula (as opposed 

to merely sitting in a classroom).

Kunar was the only province where a large proportion 

of the respondents (more than 90 percent of whom 

were women) complained about “old” traditions that 

are making women’s lives difficult; some even mentioned the need to abandon certain traditions, such 

as early marriage, to increase women’s participation 

in countering violent extremism. Notably, women in 

Kunar launched a campaign to advocate for including 

the Taliban in the peace process. In the summer of 

2017, dozens of women in eastern Afghanistan, primarily Kunar Province, reportedly came together and 

declared they were forming a delegation to send to the 

Taliban to ask them to cease violence in their areas. 

This effort caught the attention of the special representative of the secretary general of the United Nations 

for Afghanistan, who called it an act of “an incredible 

amount of courage.”27

Even though Kunar is in a remote area, and parts of it 

have experienced some of the fiercest clashes between the Taliban and American forces, many NGOs 

are still active and provide some employment opportunities for women. Women also work for government 

institutions, and respondents observed that there are 

even female judges in Kunar. While nascent progress 

on female political and economic participation is evident, the women of Kunar still believe they need more 

education and awareness “to change old traditions into 

new ones,” as a thirty-five-year-old woman from Khas 

Kunar put it. Women in Nangarhar enjoy relatively easy 

access to educational institutions and therefore are 

looking at other ways of countering extremism and violent extremism—namely, by raising awareness among 

both women and men. “We have to resist extremism 

by any means,” opined a twenty-three-year-old single 

woman interviewed in Jalalabad.
20 PEACEWORKS | NO. 156

Badakhshan

Herat

Kabul

Kandahar

Kunar

Kunduz

Nangarhar

Badakhshan

Herat

Kabul

Kandahar

Kunar

Kunduz

Nangarhar

Badakhshan

Herat

Kabul

Kandahar

Kunar

Kunduz

Nangarhar

Each bar represents 100% of the responses for each province. The larger rectangles represent the distribution of responses for all respondents in the seven provinces.

JUSTIFICATION OF VIOLENCE FOR CHANGE IN GOVERNMENT POLICY

JUSTIFICATION OF VIOLENCE FOR RELIGIOUS VALUES 

JUSTIFICATION OF VIOLENCE FOR SELF-DEFENCE

 Yes No answer No

Figure 4. Attitudes toward the Use of Violence against Civilians
USIP.ORG 21

VIEWS ON THE USE OF VIOLENCE 

AGAINST UNARMED CIVILIANS

To understand respondents’ views on the use of 

violence, interviewees were first asked whether or 

not violence against unarmed civilians could ever be 

justified, which resulted in a resounding “no” response 

across all seven provinces. The initial “no” response 

was then tested by a number of subquestions. The first 

subquestion specified violence directed first against 

the individual interviewed, then against her or his 

family, and finally against the respondent’s community. 

This gradual refinement of the question revealed that 

the initial response might not have been absolute in all 

cases. The second subquestion examined the impact 

of beliefs, and was aimed at finding out whether the 

respondent would consider using violence in defense 

of the sanctity and honor of his or her religion. The majority of respondents asserted they would refrain from 

using violence and would engage in a discussion if 

they felt their beliefs were threatened. In a few instances, the respondents said they would prefer inaction 

(“silence”) to a violent act. However, some respondents 

answered that violence would be justified to prove the 

truth of their religion. In response to the third subquestion, which asked respondents if the use of violence 

was justified to challenge or change state policies, very 

few said it would be—and then only as a last resort. 

(See figure 4 for province-by-province responses for 

each of these questions.)

It is important to recall that more than 90 percent of the 

respondents were women, and women’s role in perpetrating antistate violence in Afghanistan is profoundly 

limited. In addition, the respondents were mainly from 

areas controlled by the state. Nevertheless, the findings 

do provide interesting insights into justifications for the 

use of violence against civilians. The responses were 

especially provocative because in many cases, respondents had been in real-life situations that aligned with the 

scenario presented in the subquestion. Many respondents expressed altruism when talking about themselves 

and said they would give their lives to save innocent 

civilians. However, they found it difficult to accept the 

same fate for a family member. Interestingly, those who 

said they would not use violence regardless of what befell their families had the least education. Respondents 

with higher levels of education, such as university graduates, were more likely to justify the use of violence to 

save the lives of their loved ones.

The subquestion on violence directed against the 

respondent’s community was challenged in some 

regions, particularly the north and northeastern provinces of Kunduz and Badakhshan, on the grounds that 

it could inflame ethnic discrimination. In Kunduz, the 

ethnic dimension of violence is discernible, with some 

respondents attempting to gloss over ethnic divisions 

by resorting to the language of harmony and reconciliation and others blaming one or another ethnicity 

outright for the violent conflict. 
22 PEACEWORKS | NO. 156

Views on Afghan Women’s 

Role in Peacemaking

One of the most famous images from the June 2018 

cease-fire in Afghanistan depicted a young woman activist from the restive province of Nangarhar. Muqadasa 

Ahmadzai, who ran in the parliamentary elections of 

October 2018, traveled to Taliban-controlled areas 

on the second day of the cease-fire. The photograph 

shows her interacting with Taliban fighters while 

dressed in veiled attire, although not conforming fully 

to the Taliban’s restrictions. In one hand she holds 

the Taliban banner, in the other the flag of the Islamic 

Republic of Afghanistan. In a powerful way, Ahmadzai 

was making a case for inclusion—of both women and 

the Taliban—and for an active public role for women in 

the peace process, a role that was previously hardly 

imagined let alone visualized and exhibited. 

One of the aims of this study was to determine how an active role for women in peacemaking has been imagined, 

and to assess aspirations for such a role. To understand 

women’s current and potential roles in peacemaking and 

countering violent extremism in Afghanistan, interviewers 

asked direct and indirect questions to identify role models, 

current peacemaking activities (and opinions about women’s involvement in peacemaking), barriers to be overcome, and the kind of support required. 

ROLE MODELS FOR WOMEN’S 

ACTIVISM AROUND PEACEMAKING

The question about role models was often met with generic answers, although they varied across provinces. 

Family members featured prominently as role models 

in Herat, followed by religious role models, such as figures from the history of Islam. In Kandahar, Kunar, and 

Nangarhar, in addition to family members and historical 

religious figures, both local and international political 

leaders and writers were cited. In these three provinces respondents also chose to answer descriptively 

as opposed to naming individuals, often specifying 

character traits, such as honesty, hard work, and having 

a positive impact on society, as crucial characteristics 

required of a role model.

CURRENT PEACEMAKING ACTIVITIES

When asked about steps women have taken to prevent 

or counter violence in their communities, respondents in 

Herat city pointed to reducing domestic violence as the 

first step toward preventing violence in the community. 

Respondents in Herat also listed increasing awareness, 

promoting advocacy for women, undergoing vocational 

training, attending educational seminars, and participating in social and political initiatives as steps they had taken to prevent and counter violence in their communities. 

In Nangarhar, Kandahar, and Kunar Provinces, raising 

awareness and acquiring an education (or educating 

others) were mentioned repeatedly as ways to counter 

violent extremism. In Kunar Province, several respondents also mentioned participating on community councils as important to preventing and countering violence.

In light of the still limited public role for women in 

Afghanistan, respondents’ conservative vision of the 

role of women as peacemakers is not surprising. Literate 

female respondents across all seven provinces cited 

as their contributions to peace their education-related 

activities and jobs held outside the home. They believed 

they were already contributing to reducing violence and 
USIP.ORG 23

supporting the peace process through their broader 

involvement in society. To them, the mere act of going 

to school or university was an important step toward 

freeing society of extremism and preventing violence, as 

becoming educated was understood to be a means to 

counter patriarchy and oppose restrictive social norms, 

as well as a way to acquire skills and knowledge that 

could allow for an impactful social role.

SHOULD WOMEN BE INVOLVED IN 

PEACEMAKING IN THEIR COMMUNITIES?

All respondents were asked whether they believed women can or should be involved in promoting nonviolence 

in their communities. The question elicited a resoundingly positive response. There was no shortage of enthusiasm on the part of the women interviewed: they want 

women—themselves included—to play a meaningful role 

in the peace process. Frustration with the high costs of 

violence borne by women was a common theme among 

respondents and articulated as justification for involvement in peacemaking. Some respondents even lamented the government’s inability or lack of political will to 

give women a greater role in the peace process. 

A majority of respondents, however, chose to discuss 

the role of women in peacemaking within the bounds of 

the family structure. A number of them pointed to the importance of women as agents of peace within their families. There was particular emphasis on the role of women as mothers and on the centrality of mothers to raising 

peaceful children and stopping their sons from engaging 

in violence. This associational role for women was most 

prevalent among the male respondents. As one fortyseven-year-old married man, a government employee in 

Watapur, Kunar Province, told the interviewers:

A woman is a mother, she is a sister, and a woman’s lap is 

the first school. For example, if a woman starts a campaign 

for peace from her home, if she starts public awareness in 

her home, her words have influence on her husband, sons, 

and daughters; they have influence on everyone. They 

[women] have already started a peace movement.

Similarly, when asked whether they believed that women can and should be involved in promoting peace in 

their community, respondents in Herat overwhelmingly 

stressed the role of women in raising children and their 

decisive role in whether their children would grow up 

to be peacemakers or extremists.

There were, however, notable interprovincial differences as to the nature of women’s roles in peacemaking. 

Notably, respondents in Kandahar focused on their role 

at the family level, whereas respondents in Nangarhar 

emphasized civil society activism and formal roles in the 

peace process. This contrast between Kandahar and 

other provinces was reinforced by responses to questions about groups women were likely to join. Kandahari 

women emphasized the need for peace so that women 

could start leaving the house to get educated. 

In Kandahar, Nangarhar, and Kunar, respondents 

highlighted the role of women in public office and 

social activities as a positive contribution. All respondents said yes when asked whether women should be 

involved in promoting peace and countering violence. 

However, some qualified their responses by stating 

that women should work with the support and assistance of men, in particular when it related to improving 

women’s access to public spaces. It is often easier for 

women to operate in spaces previously untouched by 

women activists if they have supportive male counterparts. The required “support,” if broken down into 

tangible actions, could be as simple as men not being 

restrictive of women’s movement and engagement in 

public spaces to men offering services and resources. 

In nonliberal settings, even urban ones, it is not unusual 

for some women activists to work while having a male 

family member accompany them; the presence of the 

man is perceived to allow greater space for activism. 

So prevalent is this perception that even a recent minister of women’s affairs who had hired a family member 

in her office through extraordinary use of her executive 

power and was accused of nepotism explained that 

she did so in order to create more space for her work. 
24 PEACEWORKS | NO. 156

Respondents in Herat observed that women were 

sometimes included symbolically in events or organizations, which allowed officials to highlight their participation without actually engaging the female perspective.

BARRIERS TO WOMEN’S 

PARTICIPATION IN PEACEMAKING

Respondents were also asked about barriers in their 

communities that prevent women from playing an 

active role in peacemaking. Barriers were identified in 

all provinces, with variations depending on whether 

the woman respondent had a public life (studying or 

working outside the home) or not. The usual barriers 

of lack of security and stringent social norms featured 

prominently in responses, with illiteracy also noted by 

a majority of respondents. Harassment on the streets 

was mentioned by some of the respondents. In one 

form or another, all respondents referred to the limited 

acceptance of public roles for women—citing traditional cultural barriers or other family restrictions—as the 

primary obstacle to greater female activism around 

peacemaking. If the challenge of insecurity can be 

effectively dealt with through progress in peacemaking, 

and a culture more accepting of women’s activism is 

encouraged, Afghanistan will benefit from harnessing 

the enthusiasm and influence of women in a way unprecedented in Afghan society. 

KINDS OF SUPPORT NEEDED BY 

WOMEN TO COMBAT VIOLENCE

When asked what practical support they thought would 

help them and the women of their communities play 

a more effective role in combating violence, respondents in Herat named giving women opportunities to 

participate in decision-making processes, educational 

and capacity-building initiatives, awareness raising, and 

employment opportunities. Some of these support requests seemed to be the result of existing international 

support and initiatives. A more in-depth and innovative 

needs assessment is required to spur more critical 

thinking around women’s roles in peacemaking. This 

could potentially include highlighting success stories 

and best practices for women’s involvement in peacemaking in related situations outside Afghanistan.

Respondents in Kunar, Kandahar, and Nangarhar 

Provinces pointed to the need for more educational 

and employment opportunities for women and a greater societal acceptance of women’s roles in the public 

sphere. In Badakhshan more so than in any other province, linkages were apparent between peacemaking 

and formal structures such as Afghanistan's High Peace 

Council and the government. This distinction may be 

due to the relative literacy of the interviewees as well 

as to such factors as the vocal contributions of the 

province’s two female members of parliament, Fauzia 

Koofi and Nilofar Ibrahmi, to the national debate on critical issues. The majority of respondents in Badakhshan, 

however, were critical of the way women have been 

brought into formal peacemaking processes so far. As 

one woman in Faizabad city, a thirty-five-year-old government employee, saw it, the female members of the 

HPC are merely functioning in a symbolic role.

If the challenge of insecurity can be effectively dealt with through progress in peacemaking, and a 

culture more accepting of women’s activism is encouraged, Afghanistan will benefit from harnessing the 

enthusiasm and influence of women in a way unprecedented in Afghan society.
USIP.ORG 25

Conclusion and 

Recommendations

Participating in acts of violence and, conversely, working in pursuit of peace in Afghanistan continue to be 

activities dominated by men, with women beginning to 

make inroads into the latter. In fact, women’s roles are 

changing quickly, as underscored by their aspirations 

for greater participation in the public space and their 

growing visibility in a largely restrictive society. In all 

seven provinces surveyed, women are questioning patriarchal norms. The women interviewed for this report 

also expressed an overwhelming aversion to resorting 

to violence under any circumstance, including under 

threat of harm to their families. Moreover, women generally did not desire a role in extremist groups because 

these groups limited their roles to the domestic sphere.

Women outside Afghanistan’s urban centers, but also 

in certain cities such as Herat and Kunduz, are more 

likely to join religious groups than political groups 

because of the multitude of religious groups and the 

ease of access to them, the role of religion in determining the status of a woman in society, and the lack of 

capability or incentives for political parties to engage 

women. The growth of modern media and technology 

in Afghanistan is expanding the roster of sources of 

information available to women, with the majority of 

respondents declaring electronic sources of information as their main sources. This shift from traditional 

to digital sources of information opens the door to 

both opportunities and threats, largely dependent on 

which form of content is packaged and presented to 

the newly digitally connected women of Afghanistan. 

The permeation of digital access to information is also 

breaking restrictive barriers by enabling direct access 

to information and expression even in places where 

previously male-imposed checkpoints persisted. 

Interviewees viewed the role of women in peace processes with enthusiasm, but also noted that such participation was constrained conceptually by broader social 

restrictions on women and a lack of familiarity with best 

practices that could be tailored to Afghanistan. Female 

social activism around peacemaking is understood as 

women “raising their voices,” but it also includes launching protests, establishing grassroots movements, setting 

up civil society organizations, and conducting advocacy. 

More specifically, the practice of Afghan women sitting 

across from violent extremist groups—the Taliban in particular—at conferences and negotiations is an increasingly acknowledged, crucial element of any macro- or 

micro-level effort to counter violent extremism. 

As noted throughout the report, economic empowerment and other activities designed to increase women’s influence in their community can be valuable to 

countering violent extremism and encouraging more 

active participation in peacebuilding. 

Key to encouraging and enabling greater female activism in efforts to counter violent extremism is facilitating access to formal education, as well as providing 

avenues for group interaction and collective initiatives. 

To this end, it is important to utilize technology to help 

overcome limits imposed by the patriarchy and to 

provide greater security for women activists. Targeted, 

application-based education and content sharing will 

help. More focused, longer-term initiatives that enable 
26 PEACEWORKS | NO. 156

women and men to access and utilize technology, in 

particular smartphones and tablets, can create the 

space within which interactions and ideas flow and initiatives form. While the inclusion of men is essential to any 

effort to address patriarchy and reshape norms, values, 

roles, and expectations, to get there it is necessary to 

overcome the current constraints through the creative 

use of technology that enables women to engage more. 

Simple efforts, such as creating and fostering online and 

offline community groups to work in the peacemaking 

and peacebuilding arena, may be most effective as 

first steps. Such communities can be created through 

moderated groups on Facebook and other social media 

platforms, and facilitated discussions on women in 

peacemaking and peacebuilding in traditional and nontraditional spaces where women actively gather.

There is a need for the development and dissemination of accessible content in local languages on peacemaking, peacebuilding, and moderation, especially 

content specific to roles in the Afghan peace process. 

This content may be presented in audio or video form 

and ideally would substitute for some of the media 

content currently broadcast that is disconnected from 

Afghanistan’s context, such as Turkish and Indian TV 

shows. Also to be encouraged is the active sourcing 

and placing of women’s perspectives in televised and 

other media-based discussions related to both violent extremism and peacemaking. Within this content 

development and engagement effort, it is important to 

factor in women who are caught on the violent extremist side or who live in areas restricted by violent 

extremist groups. The idea of creating formal and informal opportunities for women on the countering violent 

extremism side to engage with women associated with 

violent extremist actors could help enlarge this space. 

This effort could take the shape of nonmedia events involving women of public stature and activism engaging 

women who are in the violent extremist orbit. 

As the space and need for countering violent extremism activism grow, attention should be given to enhancing the visibility of leading activists in the peacemaking arena so as to inspire and invite imagination. 

Developing greater knowledge of comparative case 

studies in other countries, and highlighting inspiration 

from relevant situations where women have played 

influential and effective roles in steering communities 

away from extremism and toward peace, are essential for impact. It is also essential to depolarize the 

flow of information and recognition of challenges and 

resolutions from the current urban versus rural setting to a more interactive engagement between the 

two spheres. This will require bridging the urban-rural 

gap and initiating engagements in urban settings for 

activists from rural areas while also encouraging urban 

activists to reach out directly to rural Afghanistan.
USIP.ORG 27

Notes

The authors would like to thank the multidisciplinary team of researchers and analysts who worked on this project. Research 

design and preliminary analysis was led by Malaiz Daud, a doctoral candidate at the Free University of Berlin. Researchers Agila 

Sharifi, Batool Askari, Zelgai Hatif, Zarakhsha Dyana, Hajar Hussaini, Belquis Sayed, Sadia Sayeed, Heela Durkhanai (Kandahar), 

Nafisa Ghanizada (Kunduz), Latifa Azimi (Kunar), Sayera Rahimi (Kunar), Latifa Atayee (Kabul), Shamima Ahadi (Kabul), Halina Ghiyasi 

(Badakhshan), Sima Sultani (Kabul), Parveen Puran (Herat), Mohammad Yar Yar (Kandahar), Ezatullah Omaid (Kandahar) were instrumental in the data collection effort. Analysts Shapoor Hameed and Daud Jalal managed the data cleaning and processing effort.

1. Anne Sweetser, “Afghan Nomad Refugees in Pakistan,” Cultural Survival, March 1984, www.culturalsurvival.org/publications

/cultural-survival-quarterly/afghan-nomad-refugees-pakistan. 

2. Valentine M. Moghadam, “Building Human Resources and Women’s Capabilities in Afghanistan: A Retrospect and Prospects,” 

World Development 22, no. 6 (1994): 859–87.

3. For examples, see: UNESCO, “Refugee Education: More Afghan Girls in School,” www.unesco.org/education/educprog

/emergency/casestudy/pakistan.htm.

4. See Barnett R. Rubin, “Women and Pipelines: Afghanistan’s Proxy Wars,” International Affairs 73, no. 2 (April 1997): 283–96, 

https://doi.org/10.2307/2623829.

5. For example, see Catiorna Palmer, “The Taliban’s War on Women,” The Lancet 352, no. 9,129 (August 29, 1998): 734, https://doi.org

/10.1016/S0140-6736(05)60848-3.

6. Mary Pat Flaherty, David B. Ottaway, and James V. Grimaldi, “How Afghanistan Went Unlisted as Terrorist Sponsor,” Washington 

Post, November 5, 2001, www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2001/11/05/how-afghanistan-went-unlisted-as-terrorist

-sponsor/903bfb89-5877-4e48-87c6-4d76d906fbac.

7. Beth Henary, “Women v. the Taliban,” Weekly Standard (London), October 7, 2001. 

8. Afghan Women’s Network, “Afghan Women Voices” [in Farsi], September 2016, www.acbar.org/upload/1477455516979.pdf.

9. Torunn Wimpelmann, “Leaving Them to It? Women’s Rights in Transitioning Afghanistan,” Afghanistan: Opportunity in Crisis 

Series no. 5 (Briefing), Royal Institute of International Affairs, May 2014, www.chathamhouse.org/publication/leaving-them

-it-women-s-rights-transitioning-afghanistan.

10. Fatima Jaffary, Women’s Political Participation in Afghanistan (Kabul: Gharjistan University Press, 2016). 

11. Lena Ganesh et al., “Women’s Economic Empowerment in Afghanistan, 2002–2012: Situational Analysis,” Afghanistan Research 

and Evaluation Unit, August 2013, www.areu.org.af/publication/1313.

12. See United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), “Afghan Civil Society Present Road Maps for Peace to Presidential 

Candidates” [in Dari], press release, June 14, 2014, https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/presser_-_civil_society_dari.pdf.

13. Women and Children Legal Rights Foundation, “Political Narrative of Women of Afghanistan Regarding Peace, Security and 

Political Participation,” 2017; UNAMA, “People’s Dialogue about Peace: Laying Foundation of an Inclusive Peace Process” [in 

Pashto], December 5, 2011, https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/peoples_dialogue_final_pashtu.pdf.

14. Mathew P. Dearing, “Female Suicide Bombers, the New Threat in Afghanistan,” Small Wars Journal, July 2010, www.smallwars

journal.com/blog/female-suicide-bombers-the-new-threat-in-afghanistan.

15. Hasht-e-Subh (8AM), “Formation of Female Suicide Bombers Group in Afghanistan and Pakistan” [in Farsi], January 23, 2010, 

www.8am.af/j8am/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=16619:1389-10-13-04-09-59.

16. Hasht-e-Subh (8AM), ”Formation of Female Suicide Bombers Group.”

17. Dearing, “Female Suicide Bombers.”

18. Tom A. Peter, “Female Suicide Bomber Kills Foreigners in Kabul in Response to Video,” Christian Science Monitor, September 18, 2012, 

www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2012/0918/Female-suicide-bomber-kills-foreigners-in-Kabul-in-response-to-video.

19. 1TVNews, “NDS Arrests a 26 People Daesh Group in Kabul,” September 18, 2018, www.facebook.com/1TVNewsAF/videos

/692849437780970.
28 PEACEWORKS | NO. 156

20. Provincial Directors of Women’s Affairs (DoWA) gain automatic membership in the Provincial Peace Committees of their respective provinces. The numbers indicated include the DoWAs. 

21. See United Nations Development Program, “Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program (UNDP Support): Project Completion 

Report,” April 2017, www.undp.org/content/dam/afghanistan/img/demgov/aprp/APRP-finalreport.pdf. The project closure report is 

exceedingly positive about the results the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program produced. These results could not be 

independently verified by this study, however.

22. Belquis Ahmadi, “Afghan Women Step Up in National, Local Taliban Talks,” United States Institute of Peace, October 25, 2017, 

www.usip.org/publications/2017/10/afghan-women-step-local-national-taliban-talks.

23. Government of Afghanistan, Office of the Chief of Staff, “National Program for Women’s National Consensus on Peace 

Convened in Khost” [in Dari], April 2018, https://ocs.gov.af/dr/news_details/608. 

24. A total of twenty women per district were interviewed in fourteen districts (280 respondents), and “key informant” interviews 

were conducted in district and provincial centers. Researchers were able to complete all interviews, with some hurdles in 

Kunduz Province and in Kalakaan district of Kabul Province. In Kalakaan, local security officials restricted the researchers and 

asked for extensive government authorizations well beyond that required by the scope of the research.

25. Pew Research Center, Religion & Public Life, “Jamat e Tabligh,” September 15, 2010, www.pewforum.org/2010/09/15/muslim

-networks-and-movements-in-western-europe-tablighi-jamaat.

26. This could be in reference to the cordial versus confrontational inside traditional family cultures in Afghanistan. Cultural norms 

often dictate segregation of even the family space, with the adult men spending their time separate from women even inside 

the homes. Expression and exhibition of familial affection is also not universal within most Afghan families, and the reference to 

creating the right atmosphere may be about the need to institute more cordiality. Beyond the intimate family arrangements, this 

reference could refer to the use of emotional bonds to dissuade from destructive actions. 

27. Tadamichi Yamamoto, “Afghanistan’s Peace Weavers,” Pajhwok Afghan News, September 13, 2017, www.pajhwok.com/en

/opinions/afghanistan%E2%80%99s-peace-weavers.
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Making Peace Possible

NO. 156 | February 2020

Participation in violence and, conversely, efforts at peacebuilding in Afghanistan have 

historically been dominated by men. Today, the country exhibits a growing space in which 

women actively contribute to society beyond the immediate confines of the home and 

their local community. Based on interviews with 350 respondents—more than 90 percent 

women—in a mix of urban and rural communities across seven provinces, this report sought 

to understand and explain the emerging role of Afghan women in countering (or supporting) 

violent extremism and in working for peace. Among the many key findings is a widespread 

belief that limited acceptance of women’s roles in the public sphere continues to be the 

primary obstacle to greater activism of women in pursuit of peacemaking.

• The India-Pakistan Rivalry in Afghanistan by Zachary Constantino (Special 

Report, January 2020)

• Understanding Pakistan’s Deradicalization Programming by Arsla Jawaid 

(Special Report, January 2020)

• The Challenges for Social Movements in Post-Mugabe Zimbabwe by Gladys 

Kudzaishe Hlatywayo and Charles Mangongera (Special Report, January 2020)

• Displacement and the Vulnerability to Mobilize for Violence: Evidence from 

Afghanistan by Sadaf Lakhani and Rahmatullah Amiri (Peaceworks, January 2020)

• Strategic Implications of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor by James 

Schwemlein (Special Report, December 2019)

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