U.S. Human Rights

Po l i cy towa rd Africa

B r i e f l y. . .

• U.S. fo re ign policy toward Africa has been one of the most da u nt i ng challenges fo r

p o l ic y ma kers in the past 25 years. Inc o ns i s t e ncy in policy fo r mu l a t ion and implement a t ion has had a corre s p o nd i ngly inc o ns i s t e nt effect on hu man rig hts in the

reg ion. The cases of Rwanda, Ke nya, and South Africa pre s e nt three highly diverse

c o nt exts in which U.S. hu man rig hts policy has had varying de g rees of suc c e s s. 

• The re has been a distinc t ion between cases whe re U.S. diplomacy on behalf of hu ma n

r ig hts has been int e r t w i ned with U.S. efforts to pro mote de mo c ra t ic tra ns i t io ns

( Ke nya and South Africa, for example) and cases whe re hu man rig hts issues were

a ddressed or avoided because they stood starkly on their own (as the case of Rwanda illustra t e s ) .

• In Rwanda, the United States lacked the political will to fo r mulate and coord i nate a

s t rategy that would end the mass killings that plagued the count r y. Dra w i ng upon the

l e s s o ns of Rwanda, could the U.S. go v e r n me nt contribute to the pre v e nt ion of a cata s t ro p h ic fa i l u re in the future ?

• U.S. policy for supporting tra ns i t ion to de mo c racy and pro t e c t i ng hu man rig hts was

clearly articulated in the 1990s but impleme nted on an inc o ns i s t e nt basis, as illust rated by the Ke nyan case. 

• In South Africa, policy objectives re ma i ned relatively cons t a nt (end i ng aparthe id ) ,

but the tools used varied cons ide ra b l y, from cons t r uctive eng a ge me nt in the early

1980s to the imposition of sanc t io ns later in the de c a de. Econo m ic pre s s u re pro v e d

to be a particularly effective tool.

• While the United States has applied a variety of tools such as quiet re p re s e nt a t io ns

of concern, public diploma c y, sanc t io ns, aid packa ge s, and the combina t ion of the s e

mec h a n i s ms to advance its hu man rig hts age nda, it has not applied its policy effectively nor has it always been ex p l icit about what go v e r n me nts must do to protect and

p ro mote hu man rig ht s.

• Fo r mu l a t i ng and impleme nt i ng a stro ng hu man rig hts strategy re q u i res the ability to

meet short- and long-term objectives. Building a solid fo u nda t ion for the pro t e c t io n

w w w. u s i p . o rg

S P E C I A L R E P O R T

1200 17th Street NW • Washington, DC 20036 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

August 9, 2001

AB O U T T H E RE P O R T

T he Hu man Rig hts Impleme nt a t ion Project of the

U.S. Institute of Peace’s Research and Stud ies Prog ram has completed a series of country case studies on Africa. As part of a larger effort to exa m i ne

U.S. fo re ign policy and its impact on hu man rig ht s

a ro u nd the world, the project has critically exa mi ned the efficacy of policy to pro mote hu ma n

r ig hts in Rwanda, Ke nya, and South Africa. The

l e s s o ns learned from these three diverse cases will

be ins t r u me ntal in de t e r m i n i ng how best to fo rmulate and impleme nt U.S. hu man rig hts polic y

mo re ge ne ra l l y. 

Alison Des Forges of Hu man Rig hts Watch, Joel D.

B a r kan of the University of Iowa, and Pa u l i ne H.

B a ker of the Fund for Peace autho red the papers

for the Rwanda, Ke nya, and South Africa case

s t ud ie s, re s p e c t i v e l y. The project assembled dist i ng u i s hed polic y ma ke r s, NGO re p re s e nt a t i v e s,

a c a de m ic s, and other experts to evaluate U.S. policy in these count r ies and to help ide ntify ways in

w h ich U.S. hu man rig hts policy can be impro v e d.

Written by pro g ram of f icer Debra Lia ng - F e nt o n ,

this report draws upon the three papers, and is

i nt e nded to capture the main the mes that

e me rged in the working group sessio ns.

The views ex p ressed in this report do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Institute of

Pea c e, which does not advocate specific policies.

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEAC E

CO N T E N T S

R w a nda 2

Ke ny a 5

South Afric a 7

C o nc l u s io ns and Recomme nda t io ns10
of rig hts by he l p i ng to establish de mo c ra t ic ins t i t u t io ns and the rule of law, and crea t i ng a space for civil society and a free me d ia to flourish safely, are ways in whic h

t he United States can pursue its hu man rig hts go a l s. 

• In order to craft a successful hu man rig hts policy and to impleme nt it effectively, the

United States must recognize that Africa’s policy challenges (as in other parts of the

world) are rooted in its highly dy na m ic and in some cases vio l e nt enviro n me nt. Te nuous political systems, int e r - e t h n ic conflic t s, and hu ma n i t a r ian crises juxtaposed agains t

re s o u rc e - r ich potent ial create the need for both short- and long-term appro a c he s. 

• The United States should articulate and pro mote clear and me a s u rable goals; it mu s t

develop suffic ie nt me a ns with which to carry out these goals; and it must pra c t ice a

f l ex i b l e, well-coord i na t e d, and well-impleme nted strategy in its objective of pro mo ti ng human rig hts in the re g io n .

R wa n d a

B a c k g ro u n d

T he U.S. go v e r n me nt’s unw i l l i ng ness to thwart the 1994 ge no c ide in Rwanda pre s e nt s

o ne of the greatest fo re ign policy fa i l u res in U.S. history, obscuring other fa i l u res and

s uccesses of policy toward Rwanda befo re and after the ge no c ide. Historic a l l y, Rwanda

has been cons ide red unimportant to U.S. polic y ma ke r s, as it has been perceived as a

nat ion with no na t u ral re s o u rces or econo m ic base (the United States had no investme nt

in the country). Fostering econo m ic de v e l o p me nt was the primary focus for U.S. polic ymakers du r i ng the Cold Wa r. Ac c o rd i ng to Alison Des Forge s, Rwanda was re g a rded as an

a l l y, and the strategy was to keep it as such by disbursing small aid packa ge s. The re was

also a perc e p t ion that with econo m ic de v e l o p me nt, the other pro b l e ms, inc l ud i ng ethn ic tensio ns that wra c ked the count r y, mig ht be re s o l v e d. The int e r na t io nal commu n i t y

was ge ne rally satisfied with the stability of the go v e r n me nt of Juvenal Ha b y a r i ma na

( w ho assumed power in a coup in 1973), and so overlooked the systema t ic discriminat ion against the Tutsi minority thro u g hout his tenu re. After the Cold War ende d, the U.S.

gov e r n me nt mo re vigo rously pro moted a de mo c ra t ic system of go v e r n me nt and the

dev e l o p me nt of a robust civil socie t y. It also pro moted tra i n i ng for personnel of the

Nat io nal As s e m b l y, study tours to the United States for leaders of new political partie s,

s e m i nars for journa l i s t s, and support for hu man rig hts and women’s org a n i z a t io ns.

At the same time, gross abuses of hu man rig hts by go v e r n me nt of f ic ials in Rwanda

w e re escalating. The U.S. go v e r n me nt viewed the ethnically based discrimina t ion and

k i l l i ngs as a by-pro duct of the civil war launc hed in 1990, and attempted to address the m

in the Arusha Peace Ac c o rds of 1993. Even while the United States pro moted de mo c rat ic re form, ho w e v e r, Rwandan autho r i t ies committed or fo me nted egre g ious hu ma n

r ig hts abuses inc l ud i ng discrimina t ion against and killing of members of the count r y ’ s

Tutsi mino r i t y. The U.S. fa i l u re to condemn and isolate Ha b y a r i ma na enc o u ra ged an

exp a ns ion of the killing s. Although the re were ample warnings of the ge no c ide from Ja nuary 1994 on, the United States and its allies refused to enlarge and invigo rate the UN

p e a c e ke e p i ng fo rce in Rwanda, UNAMIR (United Na t io ns As s i s t a nce Mission in Rwanda ) ,

to protect Tutsi vic t i ms and disarm Hutu perpetra t o r s. The diploma t ic priority for the

United States was to avoid ano t her peaceke e p i ng fa i l u re like Soma l ia. On April 6, 1994,

t he ge no c ide was launc hed by the Rwandan army and ex t remist political partie s.

Fa i l u re in U.S. Po l i cy

T he re were ma ny fa i l u res in U.S. policy toward Rwanda that contributed to the cont i nued abuse and ultimate ge no c ide. While the United States was not alone in its fa i l u re to

2

AB O U T T H E IN S T I T U T E

T he United States Institute of Peace is an indep e nde nt, nonpartisan fede ral ins t i t u t ion cre a t e d

by Cong ress to pro mote re s e a rch, educ a t ion, and

t ra i n i ng on the pre v e nt ion, ma na ge me nt, and re so l u t ion of int e r na t io nal conflic t s. Established in

1984, the Institute meets its cong re s s io nal ma ndate through an array of pro g ra ms, inc l ud i ng

re s e a rch gra nt s, fellowships, prof e s s io nal tra i n i ng

p ro g ra ms, confere nces and worksho p s, libra r y

s e r v ic e s, public a t io ns, and other educ a t io na l

a c t i v i t ie s. The Institute’s Board of Directors is

a p p o i nted by the Pre s ide nt of the United States

a nd confirmed by the Sena t e.

BOA R D O F DI R E C TO R S

Chester A. Cro c ker ( C h a i r man), Ja mes R. Schlesinge r

P rofessor of Stra t e g ic Stud ie s, School of Fore ign Servic e,

G e o rgetown University • S eymour Martin Lipset ( V ic e

C h a i r man), Hazel Professor of Public Po l ic y, George

Mason University • Betty F. Bumpers, P re s ide nt, Pe a c e

L i n k s, Wa s h i ngton, D.C. • Holly J. Burkhalter, Ad v o -

cacy Dire c t o r, Phy s ic ia ns for Hu man Rig ht s, Wa s h i ng t o n ,

D.C. • M a rc E. Leland, Esq., Pre s ide nt, Ma rc E. Leland &

As s o c ia t e s, Arlington, Va. • M o ra L. McLean, E s q . ,

P re s ide nt, Afric a - A me r ica Ins t i t u t e, New York, N.Y. •

María Otero , P re s ide nt, AC C ION Int e r na t io na l ,

S o me r v i l l e, Ma s s. • B a r b a ra W. Snelling, State Sena t o r

a nd fo r mer Lie u t e na nt Governo r, She l b u r ne, Vt.

• S h i b l ey Te l h a m i , A nwar Sadat Chair for Peace and

D e v e l o p me nt, University of Ma r y l a nd

• Harriet Zimmerman, V ice Pre s ide nt, Ame r ican Is ra e l

P u b l ic Affairs Committee, Wa s h i ngton, D.C.

ME M B E R SE X O F F I C I O

Lorne W. Cra n e r, As s i s t a nt Secretary of State fo r

D e mo c ra c y, Hu man Rig ht s, and Labor • Paul G. Gaffney

II, V ice Adm i ral, U.S. Navy; Pre s ide nt, Na t io nal Defens e

Un i v e r s i t y • Donald H. Rumsfeld, S e c retary of Defense 

• R i c h a rd H. Solomon, P re s ide nt, United States 

I nstitute of Peace (no n v o t i ng)
a ddress the cent ral issue of stopping the killing s, it certainly did not distinguish itself

in its perceived role as a leader in the int e r na t io nal commu n i t y.

• Th ro u g hout the Cold War and long after it ende d, the United States did not re g a rd

p ro t e c t ion of hu man rig hts as a priority in Rwanda. The U.S. go v e r n me nt had an

i nt e rest in bolstering the Rwandan econo my and cont i nued to support the go v e r nment with fo re ign aid, inc l ud i ng assistance to foster de v e l o p me nt and de mo c ra c y

p ro g ra ms. After the UN Special Rapporteur on Summary and Arbitrary Exe c u t io ns conf i r med the find i ngs of the int e r na t io nal commission’s 1993 report corro b o ra t i ng alleg a t io ns of abuses and ma s s a c re s, the United States re duced an aid packa ge that was

des ig nated largely for hu ma n i t a r ian assistanc e, and thre a t e ned to ma ke further cuts.

T he re a s o ns cited for the re duc t ion, ho w e v e r, were poor econo m ic perfo r ma nce and

g ro w i ng war ex p e nd i t u re s, in add i t ion to hu man rig hts vio l a t io ns. Inc l ud i ng econom ic perfo r ma nce and other criteria as re a s o ns for a re duc t ion in aid without clearly unde r s c o r i ng the unacceptability of rig hts abuses sent a mixed sig nal to the

R w a ndan go v e r n me nt .

• In the spring of 1994, the United States and other na t io ns cont i nued to treat the

R w a ndan gov e r n me nt as legitima t e, and did not challenge its rig ht to keep its seat

as a no n p e r ma ne nt member of the UN Security Council. When the United States

refused visas to re p re s e ntatives of the ge no c idal re g i me who wanted to lobby U.S.

off ic ials in Wa s h i ngton, it was do ne quietly and in such high diploma t ic circles that

it had little impact ins ide Rwanda. This sanc t ion was also carried out six weeks after

t he ge no c ide had begun.

• In the mo nt hs pre c e d i ng and thro u g hout the ge no c ide, U.S. pre s s u re was ne v e r

s t ro ng or cons i s t e nt enough to contribute to end i ng the killing s, nor did the Un i t e d

States support int e r na t io nal military ins t r u me nts suffic ie nt to suppress the ge no c ide.

With a few exc e p t io ns, the re was no stro ng conde m na t ion or mo ral leadership that

c h a l l e nged the actio ns taken by the Rwandan go v e r n me nt .

• In the wake of the UN peaceke e p i ng debacle and U.S. military losses in Soma l ia six

mont hs befo re the Rwandan ge no c ide, the United States stro ngly opposed the ma i nt e na nce of UN peacekeepers in Rwanda du r i ng the ge no c ide.

• The United States also failed to eng a ge in vigo rous econo m ic and diploma t ic pre ss u re against the ge no c idal re g i me. The Fre nch go v e r n me nt actively supported the

reg i me militarily.

• The United States and its allies did not act on their oblig a t io ns, as parties of the

G e neva Convent ion, to pre v e nt the ge no c ide and punish the perpetra t o r s. The White

House fo r b a de the use of the term “ge no c ide” in discussing Rwanda. 

• The Executive and Legislative bra nc hes of go v e r n me nt are heavily influenced by the

U.S. public, and the public did not speak out against the ina c t ion of the U.S. go ve r n me nt. The int e r na t io nal hu man rig hts and hu ma n i t a r ian groups and the me d ia ,

while re p o r t i ng on the ge no c ide, did not suffic ie ntly animate a large popular cons t i t u e nc y.

• The re was a fa i l u re to pro mote hu man rig hts and the rule of law from the gro u nd up

in Rwanda. The primary me a ns by which the United States int e nded to bring about

c h a nge was through econo m ic de v e l o p me nt and de mo c racy pro g ra ms that did no t

s u f f ic ie ntly inc o r p o rate hu man rig hts or justice compone nt s.

• Rw a nda was not important econo m ically or stra t e g ically to the United States,

t he re fo re ma k i ng it unlikely that an int e r v e nt ion would be carried out in times of

c r i s i s.

In sum, the U.S. go v e r n me nt lacked political will to fo r mulate and impleme nt a serio u s

p o l icy to pre v e nt or halt ge no c ide in Rwanda .

3

The United States did not

reg a rd protection of human

rights as a priority in Rwa n d a .

The U.S. government had an

i n t e rest in bolstering the 

R wandan economy and

continued to support the

g overnment with fo reign 

aid, including assistance to 

foster development and 

d e m o c ra cy pro g ra m s.

The United States and its allies

did not act on their obligations,

as parties of the Geneva

C o n vention, to prevent the

genocide and punish the 

p e r p e t ra to r s.
Challenges to Po l i cy Implementa t i o n

T he Rwandan ge no c ide was a test for U.S. polic y ma ke r s, and they failed to act comme ns u rately with the enormity of the crisis. It was an ex t ra o rd i nary challenge to whic h

t he U.S. go v e r n me nt re s p o nded with “business as usual.” Addre s s i ng and me e t i ng immed iate challenges are essent ial in the successful impleme nt a t ion of an effective hu ma n

r ig hts polic y. 

Political Will. In the pre - ge no c ide phase of the Rwandan crisis, the United States go ve r n me nt pro moted econo m ic de v e l o p me nt and de mo c racy pro g ra ms, but ins u f f ic ie nt

f u nd i ng was allocated toward their impleme nt a t ion. Cons e q u e nt l y, these pro g ra ms were

not impleme nted effectively or cons i s t e ntly enough to ma ke a sig n i f ic a nt differe nce on

t he gro u nd in Rwanda. By cont rast in the post-ge no c ide perio d, the U.S. go v e r n me nt was

o ne of the big gest supporters of the Int e r na t io nal Criminal Tr i b u nal for Rwanda, and it

has de ma nded accountability for perpetrators of the killing s. The U.S. go v e r n me nt has

also contributed nearly $20 million to jud ic ial and police systems since the end of the

geno c ide. In add i t ion, it has pro v ided aid and tra i n i ng to Rwandan military courts, cont r i b u t i ng to the improved func t io n i ng of investig a t io ns and pro s e c u t io ns of abuses.

Unfo r t u na t e l y, because of its ina de q uate re s p o nse to the ge no c ide, the U.S. go v e r n me nt

has been re l uc t a nt to criticize the Tutsi go v e r n me nt that took power once the ge no c ide

was over and failed to pre s s u re the re g i me to end its killing of una r med Hutu, both in

R w a nda and in ne ig h b o r i ng Congo .

U.S. policy in Rwanda befo re, du r i ng, and after the ge no c ide was not info r med by the

h igh cost of ina c t ion. This fa i l u re also had a cataclysmic impact on the ent i re re g io n .

T he int e r na t io nal community’s tolera nce of the ge no c idal re g i me’s cont rol of ma s s i v e

ref u gee camps in ne ig h b o r i ng Congo was a key factor in the Rwandan go v e r n me nt’s invas ion of Congo and the outbreak of armed conflict involving a number of African states.

Non-State Ac t o r s. T he me d ia covera ge of the ge no c ide, particularly in its early weeks,

attributed the vio l e nce to civil war or to historic ethnic hatre d. Both premises were

w ro ng, and contributed to a sense of futility amo ng the U.S. public and polic y ma ke r s.

A related problem was what is re f e r red to as “c o m p a s s ion fa t igue syndro me.” By the

t i me Rwanda came along, the re was little ene rgy for its pro b l e ms. For this and other re as o ns, the NGO (no n - go v e r n me ntal org a n i z a t ion) community and other actors failed to

raise suffic ie nt levels of aware ne s s. Cons e q u e nt l y, Cong ress did not hear from its cons t i t u e nt s, and the re was little political impetus to take quick and effective actio n .

International Ac t o r s. As an int e r na t io nal leader and a party to the Geneva Convent io n ,

t he United States should have been an active partic i p a nt, not an impedime nt, in effo r t s

to rouse the United Na t io ns and its age nc ies to re s p o nd vigo rously to the ge no c ide and

e nc o u ra ge its allies to do the same. While the U.S. go v e r n me nt failed to re s p o nd to the

geno c ide in Rwanda, so too did other go v e r n me nt s, most notably Fra nce and Belgium.

In add i t ion, the UN system either misint e r p reted or ig no red the true na t u re of the ge noc ide, re nde r i ng an early int e r v e nt ion unlike l y. 

U.S. hu man rig hts policy will inc re a s i ngly need to rely on bro a der mu l t i l a t e ral effo r t s

in pursuing its objectives. Wo r k i ng with other go v e r n me nts would pro v ide greater cre dibility and influence in achie v i ng these go a l s. In add i t ion, working mu l t i l a t e rally could

p o t e nt ially re duce the hu man and mo netary costs of int e r v e nt ion. 

Lessons Learned

Early ide nt i f ic a t ion of the costs of action or ina c t ion must be ma de in order to de t e rm i ne how best to impleme nt polic y. In the case of Rwanda, despite advanced warning

of the disaster that was to occur, the cont ext of Soma l ia and the speed with which the

ge no c ide unfo l ded unde r m i ned the political will for an appro p r iate re s p o ns e.

T he period leading up to the ge no c ide was critical in sig na l i ng to the perpetrators that

mass killings would be tolera t e d. U.S. of f ic ials did not raise issues of accountability with

4

The Rwandan genocide was a

test for U.S. policy m a k e r s, and

t h ey failed to act commens u rately with the enormity of

the crisis. It was an ex t rao rdinary challenge to which the

U.S. government re s p o n d e d

with “business as usual.”

U.S. policy in Rwanda befo re,

during, and after the genocide

was not informed by the high

cost of inaction. This fa i l u re

also had a cataclysmic impact

on the entire region. 
Hab y a r i ma na du r i ng his visit to Wa s h i ngton in October 1993. (Nor did the United States

raise the issue of justice for ethnically based killings in ne ig h b o r i ng Burundi at the end

of 1993 and in early 1994.) Impunity for slaughter in both these count r ies sent the signal to Rwandan ex t remists that they could quite literally get away with mu rde r.

On the other hand, befo re the end of the ge no c ide, the United States ackno w l e dge d

that ho l d i ng accountable those re s p o nsible for committing the killings was one of the

s u rest ways of stopping the slaught e r. Since then, the United States has stro ngly supported the Int e r na t io nal Criminal Tr i b u nal for Rwanda (ICTR). The U.S. go v e r n me nt

a c k no w l e dges the gravity of the killings and was the leading fo rce for the cre a t ion of

t he ICTR. The United States has been the ICTR’s leading supporter. The United States

has also contributed to Rwandan jud ic ial and police systems, although they cont i nue to

suffer ina de q ua c ie s.

U.S. policy weaknesses in Rwanda have raised ma ny questio ns about int e r v e nt ion in

a country that holds no imme d iate econo m ic or stra t e g ic priority for the United States,

a nd yet the re is a compelling need to end ex t re me vio l e nc e. Given the above, re c o mmenda t io ns on post-fa i l u re re s p o nses can be ma de to improve policy impleme nt a t io n ,

a nd may shed lig ht on polic ies that would help avoid a potent ial catastro p he in the pre -

fai l u re stage. 

• Private and public diplomacy must be used in tandem by the U.S. go v e r n me nt to

exert pre s s u re on abusive go v e r n me nt s.

• Private and public ex p re s s io ns of concern about hu man rig hts abuses must be ex p l icitly artic u l a t e d.

• Pu b l ic conde m na t ion of abuses must be backed by accountability for those who commit the m .

• U.S. support of de mo c racy pro g ra ms is valuable but is not a substitute for diploma tic and other initiatives to deter ethnic killing s. The United States and its allies can

p ro v ide inc e ntives but must not neglect negative pre s s u re s. 

• The United States should bring to bear econo m ic, diploma t ic, and political pre s s u re

c o m me ns u rate with the crime to deter perpetrators from committing crimes agains t

hu ma n i t y.

• The cons e q u e nces of ina c t ion for the ent i re re g ion must also be taken into account .

T he int e r na t io nal community’s fa i l u re to address the ge no c ide destabilized the ent i re

G reat Lakes re g ion and contributed to the massive re f u gee flows of the war. 

Ke nya

B a c k g ro u n d

U.S. fore ign policy in Ke nya has largely been info r med by the comfortable re l a t io ns h i p

both count r ies have enjoyed since Ke nya’s inde p e nde nce in 1963. Thro u g hout the Cold

War and imme d iately after, Ke nya was a loyal ally of the United States, and as such was

rew a rded by large aid packa ges and substant ial military assistance especially du r i ng the

1970s and 1980s. Ke nya was viewed as the key to re g io nal stability and de v e l o p me nt ,

a country with a competent civil servic e, an ade q uate jud ic ial system, and suffic ie nt

i n f ra s t r uc t u re. Ke nya’s cent ral ge o g ra p h ic location on the African cont i ne nt and re l a t i v e

a b s e nce of egre g ious hu man rig hts abuses prior to the mid-1980s were both re a s o ns fo r

t he United States to enc o u ra ge a frie ndly re l a t io nship. 

By the second half of the 1980s, ho w e v e r, the int e r nal situa t ion took a severe turn

for the worse under the leadership of Pre s ide nt Daniel arap Moi. Moi’s corrupt “ne o - p a tr i mo n ial state” was the major cause of Ke nya’s steady political and econo m ic do w nw a rd

5

U.S. policy weaknesses in 

R wanda have raised many 

questions about intervention 

in a country that holds no

immediate economic or

s t rategic priority for the 

United Sta t e s, and yet there 

is a compelling need to end 

ext reme violence. 
s p i ral. Hu man rig hts vio l a t io ns inc re a s e d, election irre g u l a r i t ies eme rge d, and local ins t it u t io ns, particularly the civil servic e, were severely da ma ge d. Ac c o rd i ng to Joel Barka n ,

despite kno w l e dge about escalating hu man rig hts abuses, the U.S. go v e r n me nt did no t

p u b l icly ex p ress concern du r i ng the Reagan adm i n i s t ra t io n .

C h a ng i ng U.S. prio r i t ies as a result of the end of the Cold War bro u g ht differe nt

emphases to policy in Ke nya. Support for de mo c ra t i z a t ion was the primary U.S. fo re ig n

p o l icy objective. It was viewed as the key to hu man rig hts pro t e c t ion. 

Shifts and Inconsistencies in U.S. Po l i cy

U.S. policy in Ke nya reflects a clear example of hu man rig hts conc e r ns being subord inated to other objectives. Ke nya’s stra t e g ic importance du r i ng the Cold War me a nt that

t he United States was re l uc t a nt to raise conc e r ns about hu man rig hts vio l a t io ns. But

t he re were shifts in policy with the end of the Cold War that affected how the Un i t e d

States appro a c hed the question of hu man rig hts in Ke ny a .

• Despite gro w i ng aware ness of hu man rig hts vio l a t io ns in the 1980s, the United States

d id not voice public conc e r ns, nor did it speak out against inc re a s i ng corruption and

t he steady drift into autho r i t a r ian rule.

• Ac c o rd i ng to Joel Barkan, U.S. policy changed dra ma t ically after the end of the Cold

War, to support local de ma nds for multiparty electio ns and an end to autho r i t a r ia n

r u l e. U.S. conc e r ns for hu man rig hts issues were addressed in conjunc t ion with its

support for de mo c ra t i z a t ion. The two issues became a single effort for U.S. polic yma ke r s.

• With the re newed emphasis on de mo c ra t i z a t ion pro g ra ms, the re was mo re focus on

s u p p o r t i ng electio ns than on hu man rig hts pro t e c t io ns.

• In the early 1990s, the int e r na t io nal do nor commu n i t y, inc l ud i ng the United States,

s u s p e nded mo re than $350 million in “quick disbursing” aid to the Ke nyan go v e r nment to mark its disapproval of corruption and the lack of political re fo r m .

• From 1989 to 1993, the U.S. ambassador to Ke nya publicly and vigo rously pro mo t e d

human rig hts and de mo c ra c y. Though his outspoken de nu nc ia t ion of abuses ro i l e d

a nd discomfited some within the U.S. Departme nt of State, it did no ne t he l e s s

e m b o l den Ke nyan de mo c rats and hu man rig hts activists.

• While the U.S. go v e r n me nt pressed for political space for the opposition, it overe s t imated the Ke nyan elites’ capacity to work toge t her in fo r m i ng a cons o l idated oppos i t ion to the Moi go v e r n me nt. 

• T he United States unde re s t i mated Moi’s ability to manipulate the political enviro n me nt .

Challenges to U.S. Po l i cy

U.S. pro mo t ion of hu man rig hts in Ke nya was fitful—alterna t i ng between public criticism of abuses and accommo da t ion. U.S. polic y ma kers have irregularly voiced conc e r n

for the support for de mo c ra t i z a t ion, but the re has been much varia t ion in how these conc e r ns have been tra nslated into a cohe re nt hu man rig hts polic y. This holds true not only

in the case of Ke nya, but in other count r ies as well. During the 1980s, the United States’s

p r i mary int e rest in Ke nya was to keep it as a close ally. This pre c l uded any public dialogue about the pro t e c t ion of hu man rig hts or de mo c ra t i z a t io n .

T he series of chiefs of mission in Ke nya from 1986 to 1999 also had very differe nt

p o l icy prio r i t ie s, which contributed to the inc o ns i s t e ncy in U.S. hu man rig hts and

de mo c ra t i z a t ion polic ie s.

In add i t ion, the re has been a tens ion between short-term econo m ic growth and long -

term de mo c racy building in Ke nya. Short-term ma c ro e c o no m ic successes often worke d

a g a i nst long-term political change. The Moi re g i me re ma i ns adept at ge ne ra t i ng large l y

6

Changing U.S. priorities as a

result of the end of the Cold Wa r

b rought different emphases to

p o l i cy in Ke nya. Support fo r

d e m o c ratization was the primary

U.S. fo reign policy objective. It

was viewed as the key to human

rights protection. 

U.S. promotion of human rights

in Kenya was fitful—alternating

b e t ween public criticism of 

abuses and accommodation. 
c o s me t ic changes to re i n fo rce its legitima c y, and access to he a l t hy aid packa ges has

i m p e ded the path to political change.

G e t t i ng the rig ht info r ma t ion and working effectively with opposition groups on the

g ro u nd and those re p re s e nt i ng the next ge ne ra t ion of political leaders are some of the

b ig gest challenges to effective policy impleme nt a t ion. 

Lessons Learned

An effective U.S. hu man rig hts policy toward Ke nya must be one in which the cohe re nt

a nd cons i s t e nt artic u l a t ion of hu man rig ht s, accountability of abuses, pro t e c t ion of civil

s o c ie t y, and the advanc e me nt of de mo c racy are pursued. Ad he re nce to a long-term pers p e c t i v e, while me e t i ng short-term go a l s, is essent ial in ens u r i ng that hu man rig hts will

be protected and that de mo c ra t ic ins t i t u t io ns take firm root. 

T he United States was and still is the key int e r na t io nal actor in Ke nya. As such, the

United States has a re s p o nsibility to take a stro ng position on hu man rig hts and de mo crac y, and enc o u ra ge its allies to follow suit. In add i t ion, coord i na t i ng efforts with like -

m i nded na t io ns stre ng t he ns the impact of U.S. efforts toward building a hu man rig ht s

p rotective re g i me and bolstering de mo c ra t ic re form globally.

U l t i ma t e l y, while the United States can pro v ide valuable support, both political and

f i na nc ial, to the process of de mo c ra t i z a t ion in Ke nya, the process is and re ma i ns one

that is inhe re ntly driven by int e r nal events and led by int e r nal actors.

South Africa

B a c k g ro u n d

South Africa is often perceived by U.S. policy elites as one of the success stories of U.S.

fore ign polic y. The abolition of aparthe id, the first de mo c ra t ic election in 1994 of Ne l s o n

Ma ndela to the pre s ide nc y, the new cons t i t u t ion gua ra nt e e i ng basic hu man rig hts for all

of South Africa’s people, and the establishme nt of the Truth and Reconc i l ia t ion Commiss ion, whose primary purpose is to investigate abuses committed du r i ng the aparthe id

reg i me, all re p re s e nt examples of the impact of U.S. hu man rig hts policy when implemented effectively. Or do they? U.S. hu man rig hts policy in South Africa has been at time s

c o nt ro v e r s ial, and while much credit is due to ma ny who influenced and impleme nted this

p o l ic y, the success of South Africa cannot be attributed to a cohe re nt, well-de s ig ne d, or

w e l l - executed Ame r ic a n - c rafted polic y, but ra t her to the people of South Africa. 

Ac c o rd i ng to Pa u l i ne Bake r, South Africa’s success can be attributed to a long struggle amo ng differe nt cons t i t u e nc ie s, int e rest groups (both within and outside of South

A f r ica), and U.S. and int e r na t io nal go v e r n me nt age nc ies over go a l s, prio r i t ie s, and polic y. The issue of aparthe id touc hed basic Ame r ican values, and the ens u i ng politic a l

activism in the United States contributed to a mo re robust hu man rig hts polic y. The

debate was divisive in the United States, ho w e v e r, and helped to strain the re l a t io ns h i p

between the Executive and Legislative bra nc hes of go v e r n me nt. It contributed to partisan wra ng l i ng and exacerbated race re l a t io ns in the United States. Ant i - a p a r t he id activity at state and local go v e r n me nt levels set a pre c e de nt for challeng i ng Executive bra nc h

c o nt rol of fo re ign policy that cont i nues to this da y.

Positive effects of U.S. policy toward South Africa inc l ude educ a t i ng the Ame r ic a n

p u b l ic, re a f f i r m i ng the mo ral tenets of U.S. fo re ign polic y, ra i s i ng the visibility of Afric a ,

a nd shifting the fo re ign policy focus from econo m ics to hu man rig hts conc e r ns. Bake r

cites three sets of goals for U.S. policy in the 1980s:

1 . G e o p o l i t i c a l : C o ntain communism; roll back the Soviet influence in Marxist states;

c o nt i nue access to critical mine rals and the Cape Sea route; and open a new chapter

of U.S.–South African re l a t io ns based on shared stra t e g ic int e re s t s.

7

Ad h e rence to a long-term

p e r s p e c t i ve, while meeting

short-term goals, is essential 

in ensuring that human rights

will be protected and that

d e m o c ratic institutions ta k e

firm root. 

The issue of apartheid to u c h e d

basic American va l u e s, and the

ensuing political activism in 

the United States contributed

to a more robust human rights

p o l i cy.

Pos i t i ve effects of U.S. policy

towa rd South Africa include educating the American public, re a ffirming the moral tenets of U.S.

foreign policy, raising the visibility of Africa, and shifting the

foreign policy focus from e c o n o mics to human rights concerns.
2 . Regional: I nde p e nde nce of Na m i b ia from South African cont rol was a top prio r i t y, as

it was linked to the re moval of Cuban troops from Ango l a .

3 . Human rights: T he United States was willing to work with South Africa on ge o p o l i t ical and re g io nal goals if the re was a gra dual do me s t ic change. It urged an end to

a p a r t he id, but initially without any pre s s u re. In pra c t ic e, hu man rig hts was the lowest of the three prio r i t ies at the beginning of the Reagan adm i n i s t ra t io n .

U.S. policy du r i ng the Reagan adm i n i s t ra t ion evolved dra ma t ically from cons t r uc t i v e

e ng a ge me nt (the of f ic ial policy of of f e r i ng conc rete inc e ntives to Pre t o r ia) to a “hy b r id

p o l icy” in which both inc e ntives and sanc t io ns were invoked to pro mote hu man rig ht s.

T he re a f t e r, the passage of the Compre he nsive Ant i - A p a r t he id Act (CAAA) in 1986 ma r ke d

a new phase in U.S.–South Africa re l a t io ns. This legislation inc l uded mo re aid, sanc t io ns,

an opening to black leade r s, ex t e nsive re p o r t i ng re q u i re me nt s, and a “ro a dmap” of cond i t io ns that would allow the lifting of sanc t io ns. Pre s ide nt Reagan vetoed the CAAA, but

t he veto was overridden by both houses of Cong re s s, despite the Republican majority in

t he Sena t e. Ac c o rd i ng to Bake r, this was a tre me ndous defeat for the adm i n i s t ra t ion, and

mar ked the shift that put Cong ress at the center of the policy pro c e s s.

Successful Aspects of U.S. Human Rights Po l i cy

T he fall of aparthe id and tra ns i t ion to de mo c racy were due to a combina t ion of fa c t o r s

that were influenced by U.S. polic y, but not solely re l ia nt on the m .

• U.S. policy was largely reactive to events in South Africa, but it had an impact. U.S.

p o l icy was de s ig ned to stre ng t hen ant i - a p a r t he id fo rces as they took the lead, and

t hen to stre ng t hen ne go t ia t io ns as they pro c e e de d.

• The Soviets allowed re g io nal diplomacy to move fo r w a rd as they sought coopera t io n

with the West near the end of the Cold Wa r. Ac c o rd i ng to Bake r, after Na m i b ia became

i nde p e nde nt (and after the fall of the Berlin Wall), the Soviet threat dissolved in the

eyes of the South Afric a ns, diminishing the appre he ns ion of communist ex p a ns io n .

This me a nt that black rig hts had to be looked at not me rely as a foil for commu n i s t

exp a ns ion, but as a legitimate de ma nd. 

• In South Africa and the United States, public activism played a critical ro l e.

• A visible and viable opposition existed (the African Na t io nal Cong ress), and an alterna t i v e

f u t u re was plausible.

• U.S. public support for the CAAA was wide s p re a d.

• Rifts opened within the ex i s t i ng power struc t u re.

• Ame r ican econo m ic and cultural sanc t io ns did not totally isolate South Africa. Altho u g h

t he law imposed selected econo m ic sanc t io ns, it also cont a i ned positive me a s u re s,

i nc l ud i ng scho l a r s h i p s, legal assistanc e, wide ned political eng a ge me nt with South

A f r ican black political partie s, and support of de mo c ra t ic org a n i z a t io ns in civil socie t y.

It allowed U.S. companies alre a dy in South Africa to cont i nue opera t i ng, pro h i b i t i ng

only new investme nt. U.S. firms were re q u i red to apply fair labor standa rds based on

t he Sullivan Principles (established by the Revere nd Leon Sullivan to enc o u ra ge comp a n ies to support econo m ic, social, and political justice in South Africa). Aid was prov ided for black-owned busine s s e s. U.S. tra de with South Africa cont i nu e d, especially in

s t ra t e g ic mine ra l s.

• The CAAA pro v ided a “ro a dmap” to lift sanc t io ns. As an inc e ntive for change, the legi s l a t ion set out “doable” goals aimed at cre a t i ng a level playing field to pro mo t e

nego t ia t io ns. Sanc t io ns terminated automa t ically when the go v e r n me nt freed political prisone r s, ended the state of eme rge nc y, repealed oppressive and discrimina t o r y

race laws, legalized proscribed political partie s, and agreed to enter into good fa i t h

nego t ia t io ns with truly re p re s e ntative members of the black population. 

8

U.S. firms we re re q u i red to apply

fair labor sta n d a rds based on the

S u l l i van Principles (esta b l i s h e d

by the Reve rend Leon Sullivan to

e n c o u rage companies to support

e c o n o m i c, social, and political

justice in South Africa).
• South Africa was not a collapsed state. Ins t i t u t io ns stayed intact, though they were

g ra dually tra ns fo r med after the abolition of aparthe id. Pa r l ia me ntary tra d i t io ns and

t he rule of law were adopted by the new post-aparthe id re g i me. This established a

fou nda t ion for accountability and did not fo rce South Africa to build de mo c racy fro m

t he gro u nd up. 

• Sa nc t io ns contributed to the change of attitudes in South Africa’s white minority popu l a t ion, which perceived that cont i nued sanc t io ns would ero de its econo m ic status permane nt l y. In add i t ion, South African whites, in partic u l a r, were conc e r ned about othe r

non - e c o no m ic sanc t io ns, such as re s t r ic t io ns on sports, travel, and cultural activitie s. 

• Over an ex t e nded perio d, television covera ge showed ima ges of South African go ve r n me nt security fo rces brutalizing ant i - a p a r t he id activists. This fueled public de b a t e

in the United States, and stre ng t he ned mass popular support for Ame r ican sanc t io ns

a g a i nst the re g i me.

Misconceptions about Sanctions Po l i cy

T he successful applic a t ion of sanc t io ns was one of the most powerful ins t r u me nts the

U.S. go v e r n me nt employed to help unde r m i ne the aparthe id re g i me. They had an import a nt impact not only on the white South African go v e r n me nt, but on the South Afric a n

p o p u l a t ion as well. Sanc t io ns and the threat of sanc t io ns were symbolic of the int e r nat io nal community’s int o l e ra nce for discriminatory and fre q u e ntly brutal behavior of the

white South African re g i me. They were also symbolically important to the libera t io n

mov e me nt in South Africa, who then saw the United States mo re clearly alig ned with the

black ma j o r i t y. The re are a number of misconc e p t io ns, ho w e v e r, about the use of sanct io ns that re q u i re clarific a t io n .

• Misconception 1: Sanctions were multilateral. T he Compre he nsive Ant i - A p a r t he id Ac t

had the greatest impact of all int e r na t io nal sanc t io ns enacted by law. It was unilate rally imposed by the U.S. Cong re s s, not by the United Na t io ns. 

• Misconception 2: Sanctions were the only U.S. human rights policy tool. O t her tools,

s uch as innovative aid pro g ra ms, diploma c y, and outreach to the opposition and civil

s o c iety contributed to the ultimate objective of end i ng aparthe id.

• Misconception 3: Sanctions were designed to isolate South Africa. S a nc t io ns were ma i nly int e nded to pre s s u re the white re g i me to ne go t iate with the black majority for full

demo c racy and hu man rig ht s. They were not int e nded to isolate the country totally,

cause a vio l e nt upheaval, or overturn the go v e r n me nt. Sanc t io ns were used in comb i na t ion with a broad eng a ge me nt strategy with South African black leaders and the

South African people. Mo re o v e r, eng a ge me nt with the South African go v e r n me nt cont i nued diploma t ic a l l y, fo l l o w i ng a short period of stra i ned re l a t io ns. The United States

re s u med working with Pre t o r ia on important re g io nal security issues, suc c e s s f u l l y

o b t a i n i ng the linked agre e me nt by which South Africa gra nted inde p e nde nce to

Nam i b ia and Cuba withdrew its troops from Ango l a .

Lessons Learned

T he South Africa campaign is the single greatest example of a popular, na t io nw ide mo v ement, inc l ud i ng support from Republican and Demo c ra t ic legislators alike, ra l l y i ng for a

human rig hts policy to override other U.S. policy int e re s t s. This was a mo v e me nt that,

over time, completely reversed U.S. polic y, shifting from “c o ns t r uctive eng a ge me nt” and

q u iet diplomacy to conc rete pre s s u re and open criticism of the aparthe id go v e r n me nt, plus

a id to no n - v io l e nt opposition groups working toward de mo c ra t i z a t ion. Coalitio ns and

a l l ia nces were fo r med across sectoral borders and partisan line s, balanced legislation was

e na c t e d, and the private sector also became involved in the effort to push for change.

9

The South Africa campaign is 

the single greatest example of a

p o p u l a r, nationwide move m e n t

. . . rallying for a human rights

p o l i cy to override other U.S. 

p o l i cy intere s t s.

The successful application 

of sanctions was one of the

most powerful instruments 

the U.S. government employe d

to help undermine the

apartheid re g i m e. 
I ndee d, a year befo re cong re s s io nal sanc t io ns were ena c t e d, the private sector sent a

s t ro ng mes s a ge of its own when Ame r ican banks led creditors to call in go v e r n me nt loans,

a blow to the South African econo my, which de p e nded heavily on capital imports. The

i m p l e me nt a t ion of U.S. policy toward South Africa, ho w e v e r, did not occur overnig ht. It

evolved over a long period and with heated de b a t e, both in the do me s t ic and int e r nat io nal are na s.

T he case of South Africa has shown that a successful hu man rig hts policy must inc o rp o rate a packa ge of ins t r u me nts that is both punitive and re w a rd i ng. This is not eno u g h ,

how e v e r, for a hu man rig hts strategy to suc c e e d. Other factors must be pre s e nt to

s t re ng t hen the like l i hood of a successful polic y.

• The re must be a capable state that is able to withs t a nd the pre s s u res of a tra ns i t io n ,

with competent and de d icated leaders who can deliver their cons t i t u e nc ies (by standi ng up to militants who mig ht want to play the role of spoiler, for example) whe n

c o m p romises are ma de.

• Key state ins t i t u t io ns, particularly the civil servic e, the polic e, the justice system, and

t he military, must be re s i l ie nt and inde p e nde nt. They must be able to participate in

power sharing while re ma i n i ng loyal to a legitimately elected go v e r n me nt .

• The United States must have an unde r s t a nd i ng of what motivates elites. In South

A f r ica, both black and white elites cared about a stro ng econo my, which was vital to

e ns u re white econo m ic well being and black econo m ic growth. He nc e, smart sanct io ns made a differe nc e. Elites elsewhe re may not re g a rd sanc t io ns as affecting the m

p e r s o nally or care about how their own people suffer.

• Sa nc t io ns and inc e ntives must work toge t he r, be ma na ged care f u l l y, and be timed to

be in sync with int e r nal event s.

• In pursuing a policy of eng a ge me nt with an autho r i t a r ian go v e r n me nt, the Un i t e d

States must have stro ngly articulated hu man rig hts goals if such a policy is to gain

popular support do me s t ic a l l y.

• A l t hough the re are limits on its influenc e, the business community can be an import a nt actor in the pro mo t ion of hu man rig hts go a l s. It can do this by conduc t i ng its own

a f fairs in ways that are cons i s t e nt with hu man rig hts principles; by influenc i ng the go ve r n me nt, when possible; by pro t e c t i ng basic fre e do ms (for exa m p l e, free mo v e me nt of

l a b o r, fre e dom of info r ma t ion, free associa t ion, free assembly, and free press); and by

p ro t e c t i ng its own econo m ic int e rests by pro mo t i ng the rule of law and open socie t ie s. 

Conclusions and Recommendations

U.S. hu man rig hts policy in Africa has been mixed in terms of scope, applic a t ion, and

o u t c o me. In the three cases that the Hu man Rig hts Impleme nt a t ion Project has exa mi ne d, the United States has impleme nted a host of varied polic ies with differing re s u l t s.

What does this mean for U.S. fo re ign policy and its impact on hu man rig hts in the

reg ion? What are some of the key cro s s - c u t t i ng issues that de t e r m i ne effective implement a t ion of hu man rig hts policy? Below is a list of policy optio ns that are not only

a p p l icable to Africa, but to other re g io ns as well.

• Define realistic goals. U.S. polic y ma kers must put fo r w a rd a cons i s t e nt and clearly

def i ned strategy for me e t i ng hu man rig hts go a l s. These objectives, ho w e v e r, must be

re a l i s t ic in me e t i ng both short- and long-term policy aims. Defining hu man rig ht s

objectives in re a l i s t ic terms will help to ens u re that short-term objectives are compatible with long-term hu man rig hts go a l s. 

• Articulate human rights policy in a clear and consistent manner. Hu man rig ht s, while

often stated as being a top priority for polic y ma ke r s, must be balanced against othe r

1 0

U.S. human rights policy in Africa

has been mixed in terms of scope,

application, and outc o m e.

Sanctions and incentives must

work tog e t h e r, be managed

c a re f u l l y, and be timed to be in

sync with internal eve n t s.
objectives and int e re s t s. In order to ma i ntain credibility and influence on the effective pro mo t ion of hu man rig ht s, the U.S. go v e r n me nt must speak out cons i s t e nt l y

about its hu man rig hts conc e r ns and objectives in tandem with other policy go a l s.

Human rig hts goals need not be subord i nated by other so-called “c o m p e t i ng” int e re s t s. The United States must also speak with one voice on its hu man rig hts go a l s,

w h ich re q u i res coord i na t ion amo ng U.S. age nc ies and greater cons e nsus between the

Legislative and Executive bra nc hes of go v e r n me nt .

• Use an effective package of tools. A combina t ion of ins t r u me nts must be de s ig ned to

have the greatest impact on a target count r y. Us i ng public and private diplomacy and

s a nc t io ns and inc e ntives in the rig ht combina t ion will lend the United States mo re

f l exibility in pro mo t i ng hu man rig hts go a l s. Enc o u ra g i ng de mo c racy and rule of law

p ro g ra ms and supporting local actors on the gro u nd are also effective tools in buildi ng a strong base on which to enc o u ra ge the pro t e c t ion of rig ht s.

• Consider the regional context. T he effective impleme nt a t ion of U.S. hu man rig hts policy re q u i res an acute unde r s t a nd i ng of the re g io nal cont ext. A long-term strategy to

human rig hts pro mo t ion will be the most successful me a ns by which to achieve adhe re nc e. This will re q u i re the stre ng t he n i ng of ins t i t u t io ns on the gro u nd, and the political will to carry out a long-term policy objective.

• Calculate proper timing. D e t e r m i n i ng when to impleme nt policy is a challenge for any

p o l ic y ma ke r. Careful assessme nt of what is happening on the gro u nd and in the re g io n

is critical—it is important to get the rig ht info r ma t ion and assess it properly in orde r

to have the greatest impact. This will re q u i re an ade q uate and well-tra i ned U.S. pre se nce on the gro u nd that will reach out to a wide swath of socie t y. It will also re q u i re

c o o rd i na t ion amo ng U.S. age nc ies in Wa s h i ngton and the embassy in count r y. 

• Work with non-state actors—the media, non-governmental organizations, and the private

s e c t o r. T he United States must learn to work mo re effectively in country with the me d ia

a nd the NGO community in building a do me s t ic cons e nsus on its hu man rig hts object i v e s. It must help to create an open space for the me d ia on the gro u nd to dissemina t e

i n fo r ma t ion about hu man rig hts abuses. As was the case in South Africa, the busine s s

sector has the potent ial to be an ex t re mely influent ial actor in the pro mo t ion of hu ma n

r ig ht s. 

• Work in a multilateral setting. T he United States must work mo re effectively with othe r

l i ke - m i nded count r ies in enc o u ra g i ng the enfo rc e me nt of int e r na t io nally re c o g n i z e d

human rig hts standa rd s. Pa r t icularly in the case of Africa, the United States sho u l d

work with count r ies in the re g ion to help bring about peace processes to end the ethn ic conflicts that curre ntly plague so ma ny count r ie s, support re l ief pro g ra ms that

a ddress fa m i ne - s t r ic ken are a s, and build infra s t r uc t u re—all of which will enhanc e

hu man rig hts pro t e c t io ns.

• Balance short- and long-term objectives. E s t a b l i s h i ng a human rig hts protective re g i me

t a kes persevera nce and commitme nt not only on the part of the country in questio n ,

but on the part of U.S. polic y ma kers as well. At the same time, short-term polic y

res p o nses are necessary to end imme d iate hu man rig hts abuses. Sustaining a long -

range hu man rig hts policy objective while ma na g i ng imme d iate hu man rig hts vio l at io ns will have lasting impact on the target count r y. In add i t ion, ens u r i ng that

o n - t he - g ro u nd ins t i t u t io ns are viable and stable is important in setting the fo u ndat ion for sustaining the pro t e c t ion of hu man rig ht s. 

1 1

Using public and private 

d i p l o m a cy and sanctions and

i n c e n t i ves in the right combination will lend the United Sta t e s

m o re flexibility in pro m o t i n g

human rights goals.

S u s taining a long-range human

rights policy objective while

managing immediate human

rights violations will have

lasting impact on the ta rg e t

c o u n t r y.
Human Rights Implementation Pro j e c t

In 1999, the U.S. Institute of Peace’s Research and Stud ies Pro g ram launc hed a new init iative on hu man rig hts impleme nt a t ion. This project seeks to critically exa m i ne hu ma n

r ig hts polic ies impleme nted by the U.S. go v e r n me nt in order to ide ntify ways these polic ies mig ht be impro v e d. 

T he Hu man Rig hts Impleme nt a t ion Project is ex p l o r i ng the fo l l o w i ng questio ns :

• What role do hu man rig hts issues play in the fo r mu l a t ion of U.S. fo re ign polic y ?

• How successful or uns uccessful has the U.S. go v e r n me nt been in impro v i ng hu ma n

r ig hts pra c t ices abro a d ?

• What are the key challenges to impleme nt i ng an effective hu man rig hts polic y ?

• What roles have the Executive Bra nch, the Cong re s s, other go v e r n me ntal age nc ie s,

a nd the no n - go v e r n me ntal and business commu n i t ies played in pro mo t i ng hu ma n

r ig ht s ?

• How can polic y ma kers maximize their impact on hu man rig hts pro t e c t ion and promo t io n ?

T he Institute is ex p l o r i ng these broad questio ns from the vant a ge point of a no n p a rtisan, cong re s s io nally funded ins t i t u t ion committed to ex p a nd i ng the unde r s t a nd i ng of

i nt e r na t io nal conflict and the me a ns to pre v e nt, ma na ge, and resolve it.

For mo re info r ma t ion on this topic, see

our web site (www. u s i p . o rg), which has

an online edition of this report cont a i ni ng links to related web sites, as well as

a dd i t io nal info r ma t ion on the subject.

To learn mo re about the Hu man Rig ht s

I m p l e me nt a t ion Project, cont a c t

p ro g ram of f icer Debra Lia ng - F e nton at

(202) 429-3822 or de b ra @ u s i p . o rg .

SP E C I A L RE P O R T 7 3

United States 

Institute of Pe a c e

1200 17th Street NW

Was h i ngton, DC 20036