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NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF ENERGY POLICIES— 

SIGNIFICANT ACHIEVEMENTS SINCE THE 1970S 

AND AN EXAMINATION OF U.S. ENERGY POLICIES AND GOALS IN THE COMING DECADES 

HEARING 

BEFORE A

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SPECIAL HEARING 

APRIL 28, 2010—WASHINGTON, DC 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS 

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii, Chairman 

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia 

PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont 

TOM HARKIN, Iowa 

BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland 

HERB KOHL, Wisconsin 

PATTY MURRAY, Washington 

BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

BEN NELSON, Nebraska 

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas 

JON TESTER, Montana 

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania 

THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi 

CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri 

MITCH MCCONNELL, Kentucky 

RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama 

JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire 

ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah 

KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee 

SUSAN COLLINS, Maine 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska 

CHARLES J. HOUY, Staff Director 

BRUCE EVANS, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND WATER DEVELOPMENT

BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota, Chairman 

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia 

PATTY MURRAY, Washington 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

TOM HARKIN, Iowa 

JON TESTER, Montana 

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii (ex officio) 

ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah 

THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi 

MITCH MCCONNELL, Kentucky 

CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri 

KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas 

RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama 

LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

Professional Staff 

DOUG CLAPP

ROGER COCKRELL

FRANZ WUERFMANNSDOBLER

CAROLYN E. APOSTOLOU (Minority) 

TYLER OWENS (Minority) 

LASHAWNDA SMITH (Minority) 

Administrative Support 

MOLLY BARACKMAN-EDER
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Opening Statement of Senator Byron L. Dorgan .................................................. 1 

Statement of Senator George V. Voinovich ........................................................... 5 

Statement of Senator Dianne Feinstein ................................................................ 6 

Statement of Senator Lamar Alexander ................................................................ 7 

Statement of Senator Thad Cochran ...................................................................... 8 

Statement of Hon. Steven Chu, Secretary, Department of Energy ..................... 9 

Prepared Statement ......................................................................................... 12 

Statement of Hon. Philip R. Sharp, President, Resources for the Future .......... 26 

Prepared Statement ......................................................................................... 29 

Assumptions Underlying Policy in the 1970s ........................................................ 29 

The Carbon Challenge ............................................................................................. 32 

Appendix: Relevant Research ................................................................................. 33 

Statement of Robert W. Fri, Past President and Visiting Scholar, Resources 

for the Future ....................................................................................................... 35 

Prepared Statement ......................................................................................... 37 

Reflections on 40 Years of U.S. Energy Policy ...................................................... 37 

Lessons Learned ...................................................................................................... 37 

Looking Ahead ......................................................................................................... 40 

Statement of Dr. Eric P. Loewen, Chief Consulting Engineer, Advanced 

Plants Technology, GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy ............................................... 43 

Prepared Statement ......................................................................................... 45 

Advancing Technology for Nuclear Energy ........................................................... 45 

Overview of the Development of Nuclear Technology .......................................... 45 

Recycling—What is it? ............................................................................................. 47 

Generation IV Reactor—What is it? ....................................................................... 47 

Toward a New GEN IV Policy ................................................................................ 48 

Summary of Recommendations .............................................................................. 48 

(1) 

NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF ENERGY POLICIES—SIGNIFICANT ACHIEVEMENTS SINCE 

THE 1970S AND AN EXAMINATION OF U.S. 

ENERGY POLICIES AND GOALS IN THE 

COMING DECADES 

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 28, 2010 

U.S. SENATE, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND WATER DEVELOPMENT, 

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met at 10:02 a.m., in room SD–124, Dirksen 

Senate Office Building, Hon. Byron L. Dorgan (chairman) presiding. 

Present: Senators Dorgan, Feinstein, Landrieu, Cochran, Alexander, and Voinovich. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BYRON L. DORGAN

Senator DORGAN. We are going to begin the hearing today. We 

have chosen a room in order to demonstrate that America has an 

energy problem. It is a room without adequate heat and without 

adequate lights. I am told that those who know about heat and 

lights are working on the problem, but I think we do need to begin 

on time. 

Mr. Secretary, thank you very much for being here. We appreciate your willingness to testify. 

This hearing is a bit of a different hearing than the normal hearings we have held, and it is to take a broader look, a bigger-picture 

look at our energy future and talk about where we have been and 

where we are heading. We are doing that because we are so engaged in the incrementalism on a lot of public policy, including energy. 

I believe Mr. Fri in his testimony has a chart, or at least a piece 

in his testimony that reminds me of the urgency for us to do this 

as we now look forward to an energy future that we want to try 

to create. His chart says Stops and Starts in Energy Technology 

Policy, and he will describe it in more detail. But he goes back to 

1970, the Nixon policy of a virtually pollution-free car; reinventing 

the car under Carter; the partnership for a new generation of vehicles under Clinton; the freedom car under Bush. That is just in vehicles. In coal, the Synthetic Fuels Corporation in 1979; clean coal 

technology in 1987; the clean coal power initiative, 2001; nuclear 
2 

technology, Clinch River breeder reactor, 1970 to 1983; liquid metal 

reactor, 1989–1994. And the list goes on. 

When you look at these issues, you see that we have different administrations coming in and then we go one way for a while in a 

very significant effort. Then we go another for a while, and we kind 

of zigzag, always moving forward a bit, but never in a very consistent direction that has put America on a path to be where it 

wants to be with respect to a destination. 

I wanted to show just several charts that you probably cannot 

see very well. And this chart you certainly cannot read, and it is 

not intended for you to read. But it is a chart that shows where 

the energy comes from, the source of energy, and on the left-hand 

side, it talks about coal, natural gas, crude oil, nuclear electric 

power, renewable energy, petroleum and then on the right-hand 

side, its use, residential, commercial, industrial, transportation. 

And that gives us a sense as of 2008 at least of where their energy 

is coming from, that is, the source, and how it is being used or who 

needs it. 

The second chart is an interesting chart that goes all the way 

back to the 1850s and describes our energy use. As you can see, 

going all the way back on the left-hand side in the middle of the 

1800s, we basically just burned wood for energy and then began 

using coal, which is the second tranche, and coal became a dominant source of energy, and then began natural gas and oil and 

some renewable up on the top. But it is interesting to see how we 

have changed our energy use in a very significant way in about 150 

years. 
3 

The next chart shows this same phenomenon in graphic form, 

the sources of energy and the growth or the increase in those 

sources of energy. The top line, by the way, is petroleum. The second line is natural gas. The green line is coal. 
4 

The next chart shows research and development by the Federal 

Government, and it shows that energy research and development 

accounts for about 1 percent of Federal research and development 

investment. You will see the bottom tranche is national defense. 

That is a very large portion. Then it is health, then space, and so 

on. 

Energy, while in the late 1970s had somewhat of a resurgence 

in the amount of money spent in research and development, is now 

somewhere around 1 percent, probably just slightly more now as a 

result of what was done in the Economic Recovery Act. 

But here is the reason I wanted to have a bigger-picture hearing. 

The world’s population is growing. We in this country have a prodigious appetite for energy. We use almost a quarter of the world’s 

oil every single day. But we also know that with a growing population in the world, there are going to be hundreds of millions of 

people in China and India that want to find a gas station probably 

once a week or once every couple weeks in the future. So we are 

going to have substantially increased demand for energy, and the 

question is where it is going to come from. 

There are many aspects to the energy policy issues that confront 

us: supply and distribution and the effects of it on our national security and that relates to one piece of this, which is excessive dependence on foreign supplies of oil; and the cost of energy and the 

effects of energy costs on the economy; and then the environmental 

impacts of energy production, climate change, water scarcity, pollution, and so on. 

So all of these play a role in both the development of policies and 

where we get our energy and how we use our energy and what 
5 

kind of destination we would like for energy policy well out into the 

future. 

I had asked some years ago of the Energy Department what are 

you driving us toward in terms of a set of goals and policies well 

out into the future. In other words, where would you want America 

to be in the year 2050 with respect to the use of energy, supply of 

energy, source, and so on? And the answer was, well, you know 

what? We are just struggling to get along in the next 5 years let 

alone the next 40 or 50 years. 

I understand that answer, but I do not think, given where we are 

these days and the challenges we face, it is an acceptable answer. 

Nor do I think it is acceptable to revert back to what Mr. Fri is 

describing in his testimony, you know, 6, 8, or 10 or 15 or 20 different iterations of energy technology policy—let us go this way for 

a while with this emphasis, and then let us turn go this way for 

a while. I know that time and circumstances change, but it seems 

to me not so much as we have seen the different initiatives by different administrations. 

What I am hoping that our country will do and I hope that the 

policy choices and discussions about policies will lead us to is some 

better understanding of what is our destination out there. What 

are we really striving to achieve and what will be the mix of policy 

choices that will allow us to get there. That is the purpose of this 

hearing. I hope I have described it as best I can in a way that you 

might understand it. 

We asked the Secretary to be here as the first witness, I think 

very appropriately. He is a scientist. He runs the Energy Department, has massive amounts of money given the Economic Recovery 

Act and the $36 billion or $37 billion, which someone described as 

the largest energy venture fund on the planet. He has a permanent 

grin as a result of having all that money to invest, and I think the 

actions of this Energy Department and this administration will 

take in many ways will set us on a course that is very important. 

So let me call on my colleagues, if they have any comments at 

the front end. Senator Voinovich? 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR GEORGE V. VOINOVICH

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First, I want to welcome our witnesses today, Dr. Chu and the 

other witnesses. 

I like the fact that this is an assessment of national energy policies, what we have achieved over the last decades and what our 

goals are for the coming decades. The hearing is timely and relevant. One of the most important lessons we have learned about 

national energy policies is that their key to success is ensuring that 

they are comprised of comprehensive solutions, solutions for 

strengthening both our national and economic security. 

I certainly believe we were thinking comprehensively, Mr. Chairman, when we introduced our National Energy Security Act which 

was intended to increase and diversify the supply of domestic energy resources, promote electric and alternative fuel transportation 

and strengthen our energy infrastructure. And I was pleased that 

many of the provisions of our bill were included in the BingamanMurkowski bill that was passed out of the Energy Committee last 
6 

year. As you know, we started in 2003 to start doing something 

about this and finally got a bill in 2005, 2007, now in 2009. 

And I would really hope that in spite of the fact that people are 

conscientiously working on some kind of a climate bill that serious 

consideration be given to the energy bill, which is something on a 

bipartisan basis that I really think we could actually get done in 

this session of the Congress. 

For the last 10 years, I have spent a lot of time as ranking member and chairman of the Environment and Public Works Committee on Nuclear Safety. The goal was to try and create an environment where we could take advantage of nuclear power. I refer 

to nuclear power as a ‘‘three-for.’’ First of all, it is a way of reducing our carbon emissions. Without it, we are not going to be able 

to provide the baseload energy that our country demands, and 

without it, I think we are missing an amazing opportunity to 

strengthen our U.S. manufacturing base and create good-paying 

jobs. It is a part—not the total solution, but it is part of it. 

Although we have seen some gains, a number of formidable challenges to realizing a renaissance remain particularly in the areas 

of regulatory uncertainty, financing, availability of human capital, 

expansion of the domestic supply chain infrastructure, and used 

nuclear fuel management. I believe that solving the challenges are 

paramount to the safe and secure growth of the U.S. energy sector 

as a whole because utilizing nuclear energy is absolutely essential 

if we are going to harmonize the country’s needs for energy security, economic competitiveness, and a healthy environment. 

So in closing, I must say that time is of the essence. You are 

right. The Department has some money through the—what do we 

call that? 

Senator DORGAN. The economic recovery bill. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Yes. And Dr. Chu and his colleagues have 

a wonderful opportunity to send us in a new direction, and I am 

really anxious to hear what your thoughts are about where we 

ought to be going. 

Senator DORGAN. Senator Voinovich, thank you very much. 

Senator Feinstein? 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR DIANNE FEINSTEIN

Senator FEINSTEIN. Well, Mr. Chairman, I am the unhappy Senator from California. And I have written a multitude of letters on 

this subject and the answers have been nonresponsive and unacceptable. So I am going to say a few things. 

Many California companies have applied for DOE loan guarantees under title VII of Energy Policy Act of 2005, which was expanded in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. The Department of Energy simply has not fixed the problems that I believe a commitment was made to fix, and I would like to give a few 

examples. 

Multiple applicants tell me that DOE does not stick to its own 

schedules. Although I wrote to Secretary Chu on October 30 and 

April 6 to raise concerns in this area, there is no evidence of improvement. I am told by my staff that DOE cannot at this time 

identify how many application reviews are behind schedule. 
7 

Point two. Applicants trying to develop solar projects on disturbed private lands, like Abengoa Solar, tell me they are in permitting no man’s land because DOE refuses to initiate a NEPA 

process while the California Energy Commission is aggressively 

permitting. My April 6 letter addressed this. 

Point three. Firms proposing to develop multiple sites on disturbed land, instead of one large plot of public land, inform me 

their applications are being turned down. I wrote to you, Secretary 

Chu, on February 23 to ask that this matter be addressed, but it 

has not. 

Point four. Governor Schwarzenegger’s team reports that DOE 

encouraged Next Light Energy to withdraw its application to build 

a project on disturbed private land in California and focus on its 

project on public land in Nevada. This is inexplicable. I wrote to 

you on November 17 to inform you that this project was one of the 

best in California. 

Point five. Last week I learned that DOE turned down a loan 

guarantee application from Tessera Solar to build an 800-megawatt 

facility in Imperial County where unemployment is currently 27.2 

percent. The project would have drastically lower environmental 

impacts than other projects, as I explained in my August 27 letter 

to you supporting the application. I understand DOE never asked 

the applicant a question—I have heard this from three sources— 

raised a concern or engaged in a dialogue regarding the application 

during 71⁄2 months of review. The reasons given in their rejection 

letter, the applicant tells me, could have been quickly and easily 

resolved by a phone call, but none was made. 

So I use this so that I can get the response from you during my 

question time. But let me say there are a number of very unhappy 

people trying to do positive things in my State. 

Thank you. 

Senator DORGAN. Senator Feinstein, thank you very much. 

Senator Alexander, do you wish to make an opening comment? 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR LAMAR ALEXANDER

Senator ALEXANDER. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Excuse me 

for being late. 

Dr. Chu, it is good to see you. I admire your service and the quality of talent that you have attracted to your Department and your 

independence. I agree with much of what you do. 

The observation that I wanted to make—and then I will save my 

other remarks for questions, Mr. Chairman—is that it seems to me 

that there is an increasing amount of consensus about clean energy 

between the President and the Senate anyway and in a bipartisan 

way. We notice that Senator Dorgan and Senator Merkley and others and I have been working together, for example, on electric vehicles. The administration has taken a number of very important 

steps to encourage electric vehicles. Senator Merkley and I were 

this morning seeing a new FedEx truck that is 100 percent electric. 

FedEx has 40,000 trucks. They just have four of these, but if they 

were to have 40,000, that could make a real dent. I believe that the 

greatest untapped resource in our country probably is the amount 

of electricity we already have at night that is unused. So we have 
8 

bipartisan support on the idea of moving ahead to encourage electric cars and trucks. 

Because of your leadership, Secretary Chu, we have begun to 

make a shift from what I have called a national windmill policy toward a real national energy policy that also includes an emphasis 

on nuclear power, and I look forward to talking with you more 

about that during the questions and answers. So there is more of 

a bipartisan consensus on that. 

The same is true on energy research and development. I think 

all of us on both sides of the aisle see the need for the 500-mile 

electric battery or the photovoltaic cell that is much more efficient. 

So there is agreement on that. 

There is agreement on some offshore drilling. 

And there is agreement on reducing air pollution because the environment goes right along with energy production. And while we 

still do not have agreement on how to deal with carbon, we do have 

agreement; it seems to me, on what to do about mercury, sulfur, 

and nitrous oxide. And a bipartisan group of about 15 of us now 

support a strong clean air bill. 

So my hope would be that we take advantage of this broad consensus on nuclear power, electric cars, offshore drilling, and energy 

research and development, as well as clean air, and move ahead 

with it this year in every way that we can. We still can argue and 

work on the difficult questions about how to deal with carbon, but 

there is no need to stop our efforts to clean up the air and move 

ahead with clean energy until we have a consensus on carbon. It 

took us several years to get it on clean air. It took us several years 

to get it on clean energy. I think it may take us a while longer to 

do it on carbon, even though I think a majority of us recognize that 

there is a real problem there. 

So I welcome you and I welcome your leadership. I look forward 

to talking with you specifically about a new generation of nuclear 

reactors and small modular reactors when my turn comes back 

around. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your courtesy. 

Senator DORGAN. Senator Alexander, thank you very much. 

I wanted to mention that Senator Bennett is not able to be with 

us today, but he had an opportunity to look at the testimony. 

Senator Cochran, do you have a comment? 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR THAD COCHRAN

Senator COCHRAN. Mr. Chairman, I simply want to bring to the 

attention of the subcommittee a question that relates to environmental impact statements and record of decision progress in connection with the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. We have provided 

funds and we have Federal policies on the books now relating to 

the Strategic Petroleum Reserve as a matter of national security 

and economic security for our country in case something happens 

to energy supplies. 

One of the areas being looked at was in the State of Mississippi, 

the Richton salt dome, and there had been funding made available 

to study that and to make a report on the suitability of that area 

and what the intentions of the Department of Energy would be 

with respect to construction. And on your Web site, Mr. Secretary, 
9 

there is a provision explaining that a new site in Richton, Mississippi would be constructed. Existing sites would be expanded as 

well. And we have provided some funds and asked for a report on 

what the intentions were. When would this happen? 

And the fact is apparently nothing has happened. So we are curious to know what the Department of Energy is going to do. Are you 

going to keep the money? What are you going to do? Are you going 

to give it back? Are you going to say that you found things that 

the previous administration overlooked? I am just curious to know 

what is happening. 

Senator DORGAN. Senator Cochran, thank you very much. 

There is an old saying that if you do not care where you are 

going, you will never be lost. And so the question is, where are we 

going? Where are we headed with respect to energy policy? What 

is our destination? 

Mr. Secretary, we are very pleased that you are here to share 

your thoughts with us about that subject, and you may proceed. 

Your entire statement will be made a part of the permanent record. 

STATEMENT OF HON. STEVEN CHU, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF 

ENERGY 

Secretary CHU. Thank you, Chairman Dorgan and members of 

the subcommittee. 

My written statement cannot be read. It is too long. I have some 

brief oral statements that are taken from that, and I want to rush 

through them so we can get to the questions as quickly as possible. 

Senator DORGAN. Mr. Secretary, in addition to not having heat 

or adequate lighting in this room, we apparently have inadequate 

microphones. Maybe if you will just move it away from you that 

would be helpful. 

Secretary CHU. America is highly dependent on oil and our climate is changing as a result of our carbon emissions. In order to 

mitigate the considerable risks to climate change, the world has to 

transition to a sustainable energy future. And America’s future jobs 

and prosperity may well depend on whether we lead or follow in 

this transformation. 

As an example, leaders in China now recognize if the world continues on its current path, climate change will be devastating to 

China and the rest of the world. They also see the economic opportunity that clean energy represents. One company in China, State 

Grid, is investing $88 billion by 2020 in ultra-high voltage transmission lines. These lines will allow China to transmit power from 

the huge wind and solar farms far from the cities. China is also 

building—now under construction—20 nuclear power plants, and it 

is playing to win in this clean energy race. 

For the sake of our economy, our security and our environment, 

America must develop decisive policies that will allow us not only 

to compete in the clean energy race, but to become a leader in providing clean energy technology to the world. And what will be required is nonpartisan leadership and collaboration between Congress and the administration. 

Several studies have concluded that aggressive deployment and 

evolutionary advances in technology will help us achieve our energy climate goals at an affordable cost. With a robust R&D effort 
10 

and the right policy signals, I believe we can achieve our goals even 

more economically. 

As we have seen many times in history, for example, with catalytic converters, the acid rain program, the phase-out of fluorocarbons, and appliance efficiencies, once a problem is taken away 

from lobbyists and given to scientists and engineers and American 

businesses, it can be solved much more quickly and cheaply than 

anticipated. 

We need a policy framework that emphasizes two parties, policies that will accelerate innovation and policies that will drive the 

private sector investment in clean energy. As stated in a comprehensive report, America’s Energy Future, issued by the National 

Academies recently—and I quote—‘‘Actions taken between now and 

2020 to develop and demonstrate the viability of several key technologies will, to a large extent, determine our Nation’s energy options for many decades to come.’’ 

So here are a few steps that we need to take. 

First, we need to accelerate efforts in energy efficiency, our cleanest and cheapest energy resource, to save money and create jobs. 

The National Academies’ report states that we could save about 30 

percent of the energy used annually in buildings, transportation, 

and industry sectors. This estimate only included those investments which could provide a minimum of a 10 percent return on 

your investment based on net present value. 

Strong efficiency standards and the enforcement of those standards will be of the highest importance. 

And we need new models to overcome barriers, barriers such as 

lack of information and lack of financing, so that you can achieve 

widespread adoption of cost effective home energy efficiency technologies. The administration is working with Congress to establish 

the HOMESTAR program, designed to jump-start our economic recovery by boosting demand for energy efficiency products and installation services. 

Second, we have to develop and deploy cleaner energy technologies for electricity generation. We need to provide market draw 

for renewable energy sources. In a preliminary 2010 report, EIA 

projects that non-hydro renewables will account for more than 10 

percent of electricity sales in 2020 without any additional Federal 

or State policies. And I note that RES proposals often exempt 

smaller generating sources such as a cogeneration plant at a university. It would be not wise to demand that they have a renewable 

portfolio standard, but with those exemptions, that could reduce 

the effective target by several percentage points below the nominal 

target. 

We need to invigorate America’s nuclear power industry. Earlier 

this year, DOE made a conditional commitment to finance the construction of what will be the first nuclear reactor to break ground 

in decades. In fiscal year 2011, the Department is requesting an 

additional $36 billion in loan guarantee authority for nuclear 

power, and with this additional authority, DOE estimates we could 

support six to nine reactors in the next few years. 

The barriers to CCS deployment must be addressed. As America’s Energy Future report says, through a combination of retrofits 
11 

and new plant construction, quote, ‘‘the entire existing coal powered fleet could be replaced by CCS coal power by 2035.’’ 

To help realize the potential of CCS technologies, President 

Obama has established an interagency task force to look at overcoming barriers to the widespread, cost effective deployment of 

CCS within 10 years, with a goal of bringing 5 to 10 commercial 

demonstration projects online by 2016. 

In addition, the Department of Energy is completing an R&D 

road map to further reduce the cost of CCS. 

Third, we need to modernize our electric grid. Smart metering 

technologies can save money for consumers and reduce the need to 

build new power plants to meet peak load requirements. 

Fourth, we need transportation policies and technologies that can 

cut emissions and reduce our dependence on oil. The best nearterm option for reducing dependence on imported petroleum is 

through greater vehicle efficiency. We also need to develop better 

batteries and address the other barriers to electrification of vehicles. Biofuels, particularly advanced biofuels that can be generated 

from agricultural residues can play a significant addition to our 

transportation fuel supply. The National Academies’ study pointed 

out that there are a number of potentially viable technologies 

which can add to our energy security that have negative CO2

equivalent emissions, such as growing plants that grab carbon dioxide out of the air. When you make biofuels, you sequester the excess carbon dioxide. You burn that fuel. The net life cycle cost is 

you have taken net CO2 out of the atmosphere. 

Fifth, we need a sustained commitment to research and development. Only research and development can yield game-changing 

technologies to lower costs, accelerate innovation, and drive new 

American industries. It is imperative that the Government support 

R&D investment, especially at the front end. Through a continued 

commitment in efforts like the DOE’s Energy Innovation Hubs and 

ARPA–E, we can marshal the Nation’s brightest minds to accelerate the development of new technologies. 

All these efforts will be vital to our energy future, but even these 

steps will not be enough in the end. To truly drive changes, we 

need a policy that will guide investments over a generation. We 

need to put a long-term cap on carbon that ratchets down over 

time. Only a cap on carbon will give industry the direction and certainty it needs. 

For example, suppose you operate a utility company and have a 

coal plant that is near the end of its life. A new coal plant will cost 

billions of dollars. If you knew there would be a cost to emitting 

carbon, you would have to think hard about whether the next plant 

should run on coal that captures carbon emissions or gas or nuclear 

power or wind or solar. Eventually there will be a cost, and because 

you do not know when, you limp along with the old plant until you 

know what the costs would be and how they would be structured. 

Industry is asking for certainty. 

PREPARED STATEMENT

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify, for holding this 

hearing. America still has the opportunity to lead the world in a 
12 

1 America’s Energy Future, Summary Edition, 2009, page 26. 

new industrial revolution that we need, but only if we make wise 

choices today. Thank you. 

[The statement follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. STEVEN CHU

Chairman Dorgan, Ranking Member Bennett, and members of the subcommittee, 

thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss our Nation’s energy 

policy. 

We are driven to change our energy habits by several serious challenges. America 

is highly dependent on oil. Our climate is changing as a result of our carbon emissions. In order to mitigate the considerable risks of climate change, the world must 

transition to a sustainable energy future, which will require nothing short of a new 

industrial revolution. America’s future jobs and prosperity may well depend on 

whether we lead or follow in this transformation. 

The leaders in China now recognize that if the world continues on its current 

path, climate change will be devastating to China and to the rest of the world. They 

acknowledge that China’s growth in carbon emissions is environmentally 

unsustainable and are working hard to lessen their emissions growth. They also see 

the economic opportunity that clean energy represents. China is investing $44 billion by 2012 and $88 billion by 2020 in Ultra High Voltage transmission lines. 

These lines will allow China to transmit power from huge wind and solar farms far 

from its cities. While every country’s transmission needs are different, this is a clear 

sign of China’s commitment to developing renewable energy. They also currently 

have 20 nuclear power plants under construction and more construction starts are 

expected soon. China largely missed out on the IT revolution, but it is playing to 

win in the clean energy race. For the sake of our economy, our security, and our 

environment, America must develop decisive policies that will allow us not only to 

compete in this clean energy race, but to become the leader in providing clean energy technology to the world. 

The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act made a down payment on our 

clean energy future, while creating jobs and putting Americans back to work. For 

example, we are on track to double our renewable energy generation capacity by 

2012. 

But for the longer term, we will need a comprehensive energy and climate policy. 

Before becoming Energy Secretary, I was a member, along with three Assistant Secretaries now serving in the Department of Energy, of the National Academies committee that issued a comprehensive and authoritative report, America’s Energy Future. That report stated: ‘‘The United States has never implemented a truly comprehensive set of national policies for obtaining and using energy to meet national 

goals for sustainability, economic prosperity, security, and environmental quality.’’ 1

America’s competitiveness is inseparable from our energy policy. With the right 

policies and a sustained national commitment, we can mobilize America to lead the 

world in the transition to a sustainable energy future and guarantee prosperity for 

ourselves, our children and our grandchildren. What will be required is non-partisan 

leadership and collaboration between Congress and the administration. 

In addition to the America’s Energy Future report, several studies have examined 

the feasibility of achieving President Obama’s 2020 and 2050 greenhouse gas reduction targets, including analyses by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and 

the Energy Information Administration (EIA) of comprehensive energy and climate 

legislation. These studies concluded that aggressive deployment and evolutionary 

advances in technology will help us achieve our goals at an affordable cost. With 

a robust R&D effort and the right policy signals, I believe we will be able to achieve 

our goals even more economically. 

As we have seen many times in history—for example with catalytic converters, 

the Acid Rain Program, the phase-out of chlorofluorocarbons, and appliance efficiencies—once a problem is taken away from the lobbyists and given to the scientists, engineers, and American businesses it can often be solved much more quickly and cheaply than anticipated. For example, while compliance costs for EPA’s acid 

rain program were originally estimated in 1990 to be $750 per ton of sulfur emitted, 

by 1996 the cost was $70 per ton of sulfur. 

Let me be clear, however, that our success is not inevitable. We need a policy 

framework that emphasizes two priorities: policies that will accelerate innovation 

and policies that will drive private sector investment in clean energy. We must harness America’s entrepreneurial spirit and leverage private sector imagination and 
13 

2 America’s Energy Future, Summary Edition, 2009, page 82. 

ingenuity to transform the way we produce and use energy. Part of those policies 

must promote the research and development of key technologies needed in the coming decades without crowding out private investment. As stated in America’s Energy 

Future: ‘‘Actions taken between now and 2020 to develop and demonstrate the viability of several key technologies will, to a large extent, determine the Nation’s energy options for many decades to come.’’ 

Here are a few of the steps we need to take: 

—We Need to Accelerate Efforts in Energy Efficiency—Our Cleanest, Cheapest Energy Resource—to Save Money and Create Jobs.—Energy efficiency and conservation will remain the lowest hanging fruit for reducing carbon emissions for 

the next few decades. The National Academies report states that ‘‘Technology 

exists today, or is expected to be developed over the normal course of business 

between now and 2030 that could save about 30 percent of the energy used annually in the buildings, transportation and industrial sectors. These savings 

could easily repay, with substantial dividends, the investments involved.’’ 2 This 

estimate was based on only those investments that could provide a minimum 

10 percent rate-of-return on investments based on net present value. 

—Strong Efficiency Standards and the Enforcement of Those Standards Will Be 

of the Highest Importance.—For example, the improvement in the efficiency 

of refrigerators alone since the 1970s is responsible for energy savings today 

greater than all non-hydro renewable power generation. During that time, the 

inflation adjusted cost of refrigerators dropped by about one-half while energy 

consumption was simultaneously reduced by more than 75 percent. There are 

many opportunities to make our buildings, vehicles, and appliances more efficient and save money. Appliance standards issued in the last 16 months alone 

will save American consumers more than $250 billion over the next 20 years. —We Need New Models to Overcome Information, Financing and Other Barriers 

to Rapid, Widespread Adoption of Cost-Effective Home Energy Efficiency Technologies.—The administration is working with Congress to establish the 

HOMESTAR program, which has the potential to jumpstart our economic recovery by boosting demand for energy efficiency products and installation 

services. For middle-class families, this program will help them save hundreds of dollars a year in energy costs while improving the comfort and value 

of their most important investment—their homes. In addition, the program 

would help reduce our economy’s dependence on oil and support the development of an energy efficiency services sector in our economy. In addition, DOE 

is also trying new approaches to promoting energy efficiency through our Retrofit Ramp-Up initiative. Communities, governments, private sector companies and non-profit organizations will work together on innovative programs 

to enable retrofits of entire neighborhoods and towns. These programs are expected to save households and businesses about $100 million annually in utility bills, while leveraging private sector resources to create an estimated 

30,000 jobs during the next 3 years. 

We Need to Develop and Deploy Cleaner Technologies for Electricity Generation 

We Need to Provide a ‘‘Market Draw’’ for Renewable Energy Sources.—In April of 

2009, EIA updated its ‘‘reference case’’ to account for the anticipated impacts of the 

Recovery Act. One the most striking changes is a significant increase in renewable 

electricity generation. In the preliminary 2010 report, EIA projects that non-hydro 

renewables will account for more than 10 percent of electricity sales in 2020 without 

any additional Federal or State policies. Implementing new market-based policies, 

such as pricing carbon and a strong national renewable electricity standard can create new demand for renewable energy and its upstream manufacturing activity. I 

note that RES proposals often exempt some smaller generating sources, such as a 

cogeneration plant at a university, which reduces the effective target several percentage points below the nominal target. For example, last April, EIA found that 

a nominal share of 25 percent results in only about 13 percent of electricity coming 

from non-hydroelectric renewable sources in 2025. This 12 point gap is due to exemptions for small retailers, exemptions for hydroelectric facilities, and energy efficiency credits. 

We Need to Reinvigorate America’s Nuclear Power Industry.—Earlier this year, 

DOE made a conditional commitment to finance construction of what will be the 

first nuclear reactor to break ground in the United States in decades. In fiscal year 

2011, the Department is requesting an additional $36 billion in loan guarantee authority for nuclear power. With this authority and the $18.5 billion in existing authority, DOE estimates we could support 6 to 9 new reactors in the next few years. 
14 

3 America’s Energy Future, Summary Edition, 2009, page 51. 4 America’s Energy Future, Summary Edition, 2009, page 71–73 and Figure 2.16. 

We’re also pursuing new technologies, such as Small Modular Reactors, which could 

serve as drop-in replacements at utility sites too small to accommodate the large 

present-day nuclear reactors. We see the possibility of significant new American export opportunities. 

Barriers to CCS Deployment Must Be Addressed.—While CCS technology available 

today is costly, the technical potential for CCS is considerable. As America’s Energy 

Future states: ‘‘Coal-fired plants with carbon capture (CCS) could provide as much 

as 1200 TWh of electricity per year by 2035 through repowering and retrofits of existing plants and as much as 1800 TWh per year by 2035 through new plant construction. In combination, the entire existing coal power fleet could be replaced by 

CCS coal power by 2035.’’ 3 To help realize the potential of CCS technologies, President Obama has established an Interagency Task Force on Carbon Capture and 

Storage, co-chaired by the Department of Energy and the Environmental Protection 

Agency. The task force is looking at overcoming barriers to the widespread, cost-effective deployment of CCS within 10 years, with a goal of bringing 5 to 10 commercial demonstration projects online by 2016. The plan should address any financial, 

economic, technological, legal, institutional, social, or other barriers to deployment. 

In addition, the Department of Energy is completing an R&D roadmap beyond 2016 

to further reduce the costs of carbon capture and sequestration in both coal and gas 

plants. 

We Need to Modernize Our Electric Grid 

Smart Metering Technologies Can Save Money for Consumers and Reduce the 

Need to Build New Power Plants to Meet Peak Load Requirements.—An analysis by 

the Electric Power Research Institute estimates that implementation of smart grid 

technologies could reduce electricity use by more than 4 percent per year by 2030. 

That would mean annual savings in 2030 of more than $20 billion for businesses 

and consumers around the country. 

A Smarter Grid Can Facilitate a More Efficient and Effective Use of Intermittent 

Energy From Renewable Sources Like Solar and Wind Power as Well as Enable 

Plug-in Vehicles to Buy and Sell Power to the Grid at Optimal Times.—We also need 

better batteries to provide grid-scale storage. Modernizing our transmission and energy storage systems is largely still an unsolved problem and an opportunity for 

America’s international leadership in a key technology area. 

We Need Transportation Policies and Technologies That Cut Emissions and Reduce Our Dependence on Oil.—Transforming the transportation sector is one of our 

most difficult tasks. Oil has a very high energy density that makes it a particularly 

good transportation fuel. In order to decrease our dependency on government-controlled oil supplies from the most politically fragile parts of the world, we should 

embark on a three part strategy: —Fuel Efficiency is Critical.—The best near-term option for reducing dependence 

on imported petroleum is through greater vehicle efficiency. The administration 

recently announced vehicle standards that will ultimately require an average 

fuel economy standard of 35.5 mpg in 2016, but we can do even better in subsequent years. The first improvements could come from improved internal combustion engines and from lighter weighting of cars. —We Also Need to Develop Better Batteries and Address Other Barriers to Electrification of Vehicles.—A battery that can last for 5,000 deep discharges and 

has 4–5 times higher storage capacity and lower cost will lead to large scale 

penetration of hybrid electric and all-electric vehicles. 

—Biofuels, Particularly Advanced Biofuels That Can Be Generated From Agricultural Residues, Can Be a Significant Addition to Our Transportation Fuel Supply.—The Renewable Fuels Standard recently put into place requires that 36 

billion gallons of renewable fuel be blended into gasoline by 2022. Of this requirement, 58 percent is to be met by advanced biofuels that achieve at least 

a 50 percent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions over conventional petroleum-based fuel. The National Academies study also pointed out that there are 

a number of potentially viable technologies which can add to our energy security and have negative CO2 equivalent emissions. That is to say, the production 

and use of these fuels will not add to CO2 pollution, but rather have the potential to provide a net removal of CO2 from the atmosphere. All of these technologies require the capture and sequestration of carbon in the fuel making 

process. Plants capture CO2 from the atmosphere, and enough carbon can be 

sequestered to more than compensate for the carbon released when the fuel is 

used.4
15 

We Need a Sustained Commitment to Research and Development.—Only R&D can 

yield game-changing technologies to lower costs, accelerate innovation, and drive 

new American industries and jobs. 

—It is Imperative That Government Support R&D Investment.—Especially at the 

front end when private investments would not recoup the full value of the 

shared social good or when a new technology would displace an embedded way 

of doing business. As the National Economic Council recently stated: ‘‘Certain 

fundamental investments and regulations are necessary to promote the social 

good. This is particularly true in the case of investments for research and development, where knowledge spillovers and other externalities ensure that the private sector will under-invest—especially in the most basic of research.’’ Through 

a continued commitment to efforts like DOE’s Energy Innovation Hubs and 

ARPA–E, we can marshal the Nation’s brightest minds to accelerate the development of new technologies. 

All of these efforts will be vital to our energy future, but even these steps will 

not be enough in the end. To truly drive the changes we need—and create the jobs 

of the future—we need a policy that matches the scale of this problem and that will 

guide investments over a generation: we need to put a long-term cap on carbon that 

ratchets down over time. Only a cap on carbon will give industry the direction and 

certainty it needs. 

For example, suppose you operate a utility company and have an old coal plant 

that is near the end of its life. A new coal plant will cost billions of dollars. If you 

knew there would be a cost to emitting carbon, you would have to think hard about 

whether the next plant should run on coal that captures the carbon emissions, or 

gas, or nuclear power or wind or solar energy. Eventually, there will be a cost, but 

if you didn’t know when, you would try to limp along with the old coal plant until 

you knew what the costs would be and how they would be structured. 

Providing certainty will drive investment and job creation today as well as the 

changes we need in our energy mix over the long term. 

Finally, I want to mention that, as we continue our examination of energy and 

climate policy options, independent and impartial data and analysis, particularly 

from the Energy Information Administration, will become increasingly important. 

EIA provides vital information about where we are and where we are going, and, 

if we are to make sound, data-driven decisions, we must make sure EIA has the 

tools it needs to do this work. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify and for holding this hearing. America still has the opportunity to lead the world in the new industrial revolution that 

we need but only if we make wise choices today. 

Senator DORGAN. Mr. Secretary, thank you very much for that 

analysis. 

Since the oil embargo of 1973–1974, the U.S. Government has 

spent billions on energy research, although as I indicated, it is 

nonetheless a small part of the amount that we spend on research 

in the Federal Government. But we have spent a substantial 

amount to create new energy technologies and reduce vulnerability 

to foreign imports, and yet all these years later, 40 years later, we 

are more dependent on foreign oil for our energy, especially in 

transportation, than we were 40 years ago. 

So what do you anticipate will be our energy supply mix 40 years 

from now, for example, and do you have some optimism that we 

will have a different mix and be less vulnerable and less dependent? I guess, what is the outlook for the mixture of fuels for the 

United States in the next 10, 20, 30 years? 

Secretary CHU. Well, I do have some optimism. I think what happened in the past, particularly in the late 1970s/early 1980s in the 

first of these oil shocks and the long gasoline lines, was that there 

was great energy and enthusiasm to do something about it, but 

when the price of oil went down to $20–$30 a barrel and stayed 

there for a number of years, I think that enthusiasm was depleted. 

There are new factors now, the rise of developing economies, 

things like that. It is a safe bet to say—although one cannot predict 
16 

the price of oil in the next year or two—over the long term, it is 

a safe bet to say it will be as high or higher than it is today, according to the Energy Information Administration and other private financial predictors. That is one thing. 

The other thing is the growing concern about carbon emissions. 

So to answer your question, what is the mix that I anticipate 40 

or 50 years from today, well, in electricity generation, we are now 

20 percent nuclear, I hope that will, as a minimum, be maintained 

and perhaps be increased to 30 percent or perhaps even higher. 

We will be increasing renewables, but that will take time because we have to concurrently build up the electricity distribution 

and transmission system to handle these variable sources, and 

again, this is going to take decades. 

In terms of transportation fuel, I outlined a three-point strategy 

that does make sense that will get us to, hopefully, greatly decreasing our oil imports. 

The first is efficiency. We have accelerated the energy efficiency 

of cars now to 35 miles a gallon for cars and light trucks. I think 

this is a start. We should continue to accelerate that. 

Regarding biofuels and advanced biofuels in particular, great 

progress in the labs is being made today. So I am very optimistic. 

This will also create great wealth in rural America because in rural 

America, you now have the opportunity not only to raise food crops, 

but you can use your agricultural residues to create value. 

The electrification of vehicles is another one that I think you and 

Senator Alexander and others have mentioned. There has been 

great progress in the last 5 years on batteries. When you start with 

plug-in hybrids and go to electric vehicles that can greatly offload 

the transportation needs for local city and suburban driving. So I 

think with those things, I believe in the next 50 years, we can 

greatly reduce the transportation need for external oil. 

Senator DORGAN. Mr. Secretary, I showed a chart a while ago 

that shows back to 1850 or so, and if we had had an Energy Secretary back then and you had been the Energy Secretary and someone had asked you at this table, what will our energy mix be in 

150 years, of course, you probably would have said, well, we are 

going to probably use a little less wood and a little more coal, based 

on what you see and know then. But obviously energy uses have 

changed, as we have discovered oil and natural gas and used renewables. 

I would like you, as a scientist, to think out about 40–50 years. 

I think you and all of us on the subcommittee are thinking in 

terms of that right side of the chart because that is what we know. 

Yet at Sandia National Laboratory there are some folks working on 

the proposition of getting fuel from thin air, maybe, maybe not, I 

do not know, when somebody says we can create fuel out of thin 

air, I say, well, that is something that I cannot contemplate, but 

maybe scientists do. 

As you think as a scientist out 40 or 50 years beyond just the 

traditional things that we understand and know and think about, 

what do you see? 

Secretary CHU. Well, the fuel out of thin air, thin air plus sunlight, is one of the energy hubs we are proposing, to actually use 

the sunlight energy and directly make transportation fuel. We 
17 

think that has sufficient promise that we had proposed this socalled energy hub to do that. So we are exploring radical departures which we think have a shot. 

Actually I love that graph because it actually shows you what the 

challenge is. If you look at the time it takes to transition from wood 

to coal, coal to oil and gas, it is typically a half a century. We do 

not have that time to transition to a lower-carbon economy. So one 

of the things that in the Department of Energy we are thinking 

very hard about is how do you make that transition in a way that 

can be faster and that speed will also be very helpful in our economic prosperity because if we lead in that transition and develop 

those technologies, this is great for American competitiveness. 

Senator DORGAN. But in many ways, the question is transition 

to what, and we are in a frantic search for what. 

Secretary CHU. So I commend this report, America’s Energy Future, and it calls for—and I agree with this—a diversified supply 

of energy. It does not sound like the right answer is to pick only 

one thing that will solve our problem, because if you look at what 

we have in the United States, we have still abundant sources of 

natural gas, we have oil. We are the third or fourth largest producer of oil in the world. We have great agricultural resources that 

can be used, in part, again including the agricultural residues, to 

make energy as well as food. 

So what I believe has to be done is to create diversity of supply, 

because of what we have been blessed with. But we have some, as 

I mentioned, nuclear technology. We anticipate a renaissance in 

nuclear technology. We anticipate that solar will get better and better, but it is still more expensive, to be quite frank, than fossil fuel 

generation. But it has gone down considerably. 

I still believe it needs about a factor of 4 decrease before people 

put it on their rooftops and in fields without subsidy. And factor 

2 is in the cards. We see that very clearly. But the other factor of 

2 I think needs more R&D and radical R&D that could be gamechanging. And it is the whole cost. It is not just the solar modules. 

So it is not satisfying, but I think bits and pieces are the way 

to go. I go back to energy efficiency, huge, huge gains in energy efficiency. The average cost of decreasing our energy consumption 

and our dependency and the carbon emissions is something like a 

few cents a kilowatt-hour. And in many instances, as I pointed out 

in my testimony, it is actually a money-maker. If an industry says 

I can invest a hunk of change—let us say $1 million—and I get a 

10 percent return on my capital to save energy, now sadly that 

may not be enough for industry because industry might be expecting a 20 percent return on their investment of capital. But if you 

want to save energy, if you want to decrease our carbon emissions, 

if you want to decrease our dependence on importing foreign 

sources of energy, we should think hard about what it will take to 

get industry to make those investments. 

Senator DORGAN. Mr. Secretary, thank you. I have exceeded my 

time. 

I will call on Senators in order of appearance, Senator Voinovich. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First of all, I want to congratulate you on the people that you 

have got working in the nuclear area and also in the area of fossil 
18 

fuels. One of the things that puzzle me is what are we doing to coordinate the effort to get to clean coal technology more rapidly than 

it appears that we are doing. You are talking about building some 

CCS plants in the next several years. We have China building 

them every day or a couple a week. And it seems that the money 

for the technology is spread all over. 

For example, I have introduced the Asian-Pacific Partnership bill 

in the Foreign Relations Committee. It is ready to come out. It creates a separate committee in the Asian-Pacific Partnership that 

deals with clean coal technology and puts in, I think, $200 million 

a year from the United States to match the other countries that 

participate. Senator Rockefeller and I are working on a bill to deal 

with this, and that provides about $20 billion over 10 years. 

You have got money that you are working on. 

And it seems to me that one of the best things that we could possibly do for the United States or internationally would be to come 

up with some concept of where we could create some kind of an 

international DARPA that would move this clean coal technology 

forward rather than the 10 years that MIT says is going to be required. We know darned well that even though The Sierra Club 

and others are shutting down new coal-fired IGCC plants in this 

country, China is building them. India is building them. In fact, 

India said they are going to build the biggest coal-fired plant ever 

in the history of the world. 

And I am just wondering from our point of view and internationally, what thought is being given to China to coordinate all of this 

effort? So we are doing our thing. You talked to the Canadians. 

They are doing their thing. The Brits will tell you we are doing our 

thing. You know, everybody is doing their own thing, and what is 

being done to try to coordinate this? Because I think if we do not 

do it, in terms of greenhouse gas emissions, you can shut everything down here in the United States and we are still not doing 

anything about that. And we know we should be building coal because of our supply. We know the Chinese are buying up coal 

mines all over. So what are we doing to coordinate that effort? 

Secretary CHU. There are a number of coordinations. The Australians have set up a worldwide initiative that we are members 

of. Specifically with China, the President announced—I think it 

was about 6 months ago—a research cooperative where it is $150 

million in three areas: energy efficient buildings, vehicle electrification, and clean coal technologies. So China and the United States 

are putting $25 million apiece into co-developing some clean coal 

technology we can both use. 

I agree with you absolutely that China and India are not going 

to turn their back on coal, and so we have to develop the technologies that can use coal. And the United States, quite frankly, I 

do not believe will turn its back on coal as well. So we do need to 

develop these clean coal technologies. 

Jim Markowsky, who I believe you know, an old friend of mine, 

is a very, very capable person. He and his team put together a road 

map of three or four technologies we think are promising, and we 

are working hard. How do you push these? One way is the retrofitting of existing coal plants. New existing coal plants, the highly 

efficient coal plants will not be shut down. These are multi-billion 
19 

investments, so one has to develop the technologies to retrofit 

those. In addition, the other plants you mentioned, the gasification 

plants, are another technology. And finally, there is something 

where you separate out the oxygen from the nitrogen and you burn 

coal in an oxygen plus CO2 atmosphere. It creates a pure stream 

of carbon dioxide that you can then sequester. So these are three 

primary approaches. We need to look at all three of them because 

of the existing fleet and what might come before. 

Now, Jim Markowsky believes that the IGCCNN will probably be 

less expensive, but we are pushing very hard. The cost is still too 

high, and so although we are piloting things for 2016, there will 

be very valuable lessons learned. We are more ambitious and we 

still want to drive the cost down. So there is coordination. 

I have already talked to my counterparts in Europe. And my 

counterparts are the energy ministers, but in addition, the scientists there. We are beginning to think of how we are going to 

trade notes, not only trade notes, but actually co-invest in pilot 

projects. These pilot projects are not inexpensive. They are pretty 

expensive. So we actually say, okay, we are going to be testing this 

technology, that technology, this technology. And my proposal, 

which has always been met favorably, is to say by co-investing, you 

do not mean necessarily money the way, let us say, we are doing 

with China, but at the very minimum, we actually put engineers, 

when these pilot projects are being done, on the site. So the lessons 

learned are immediately seen and felt by people in other countries. 

So these are some of the things we are trying to do to coordinate 

this and again to accelerate this transition. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you. 

Senator DORGAN. Senator Voinovich, thank you very much. 

Senator Feinstein. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, I gave you my litany of complaints. Let me try to 

ask a couple of generic questions about it. 

What is the Department’s policy with respect to building solar 

and wind on disturbed private lands? 

Secretary CHU. Well, in terms of the loan guarantees, what we 

try to do is evaluate the loan guarantee on several major criteria. 

One of them is the—— 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Is it permitted? 

Secretary CHU. On disturbed private land? 

Senator FEINSTEIN. That is correct. 

Secretary CHU. I believe that should be fine. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. So there is no disincentive in the permitting 

process—— 

Secretary CHU. As far as I know, that is correct. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Well, I am not sure that is correct. So if it 

is correct, I think that is fine, and I am going to hold you to your 

word. 

Secretary CHU. Yes. I mean, I think it would be more appropriate 

in terms of the specifics of your things—— 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Okay, let me give you a specific. Small proposals, close to cities, maybe 30–50 megawatts and multiple sites 

from one person that wants to, let us say, build three sites where 
20 

they have got transmission, where it is easy to do on disturbed private land. 

Secretary CHU. Okay, sorry. 

I would have to look at the specifics of that particular loan because sometimes loans are turned down not for those reasons, but 

they may be turned down for reasons of the financial viability of 

the company, the backing of the company. So it would have to be 

looking at—you know there is no policy that says you cannot do 

that on disturbed private land, absolutely not. But I think in some 

of the instances, I believe—this hearing is not the appropriate time 

to look at specific companies. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Right. Well, I am going to do—— 

Secretary CHU. Right. But I would love to talk to you in private—— 

Senator FEINSTEIN. I agree with that, but I want to get your attention. 

Secretary CHU [continuing]. On the specifics of specific loans regarding the financial issues. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. All right. 

Now, I am going to talk about one company and that is Tessera 

that wanted to build a large facility, 800 megawatts, in Imperial 

County. The technology they are going to use was produced by 

Sandia. Sandia just won an award on that technology. Their application was summarily turned down. Nobody talked to them for 71⁄2

months. Should that be? 

Secretary CHU. Actually, no, but again, no in the sense that if 

there were clarifications and issues of that nature, they should be 

talking with the applicants, clarifications of the application. 

If there were other issues, again if there were sort of balance 

sheet issues, things of that nature, that were giving the loan guarantee program pause, I am not sure whether it is necessary to have 

a discussion with that because that is all black and white. That is 

on paper. But again, I would have to look at the specifics of that 

particular loan. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Well, the point that I am trying to make with 

you is there is a problem with California projects. I do not know 

whether there is a bias. I do not know whether there is a problem 

in the projects. I have written to you. I do not get adequate responses. I would like an opportunity to be able to express this to 

you in another forum if that would be agreeable. 

Secretary CHU. I would love to talk to you about those loans. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Okay. 

Secretary CHU. We believe we have no bias against California. I 

can say that as a Californian. No bias for or against. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Okay. 

I was going to ask you a quick question on the NIF, the National 

Ignition Facility. Many believe it might be a prototype for a fusion 

nuclear powerplant some day, and I gather that the National Academies and the Academy of Engineering are now conducting a study 

on inertial fusion energy to explore the viability of that vision. 

Do you agree that the results of that study could be enhanced if 

the NIF is able to provide the Academies with analysis and testing? 

Secretary CHU. Yes. 
21 

Senator FEINSTEIN. So—— 

Secretary CHU. We have great hopes for NIF. So far as they have 

turned on, that facility has worked very well. We anticipate, although it cannot be predicted with certainty that you could get an 

ignition in a year or two. The technical milestones, as they begin 

to put it through its paces, have been met, and in the last communication I had, they are ahead of schedule. So there is an opportunity, and both the Department of Energy and the National Academies are looking at now saying, okay, it looks like if you do get 

ignition, let us develop a scientific program that can actually explore those areas where it might be possible to develop commercial 

inertial fusion. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. So, in other words, they can participate together with the Academies. 

Secretary CHU. Yes. I think we in the Department of Energy applaud what the Academy is doing because now is the time to start 

thinking about what experiments to do to test the commercial feasibility. 

There are two issues. The major issue is the lasers. Right now 

NIF on a good day can have a couple of shots. Let us say one or 

two shots. In a commercial reactor, you will need 20 a second and 

not have down time. So there is a huge difference. So there are 

numbers of very capable people also looking at whether it is possible to make cost effective lasers that have that degree of reliability. But in the meantime, there are still some fundamental 

issues on how you can make this efficiently. 

And finally, the lessons learned from laser fusion can be also 

used to explore inertial fusion using ions as well. 

So it is a technology I do not anticipate in the next couple of decades will go commercial, but it is like magnetic fusion. It is something that you want to look at because if you do get fusion, it is 

cleaner source of energy, much, much less reactivity issues. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. It is very exciting. I have been to the facility, 

and it is an amazing place. 

Thank you. 

Secretary CHU. Thank you. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. We agree on one thing. Thank you. 

Secretary CHU. I think we agree on more. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Well, I hope so. 

Senator DORGAN. Senator Alexander. 

Senator ALEXANDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The chairman has constructed this hearing around the future of 

energy. Let us talk about the Department of Energy’s future. You 

have a goal to reduce your greenhouse gas emissions from the Department of Energy by 28 percent by 2020 I believe. 

Secretary CHU. Right. 

Senator ALEXANDER. In one of your recent articles in the Wall 

Street Journal on nuclear power, you commented on the interest in 

smaller modular reactors—— 

Secretary CHU. Correct. 

Senator ALEXANDER [continuing]. If I am correct. 

I am told that a single 125-megawatt reactor would help the Department of Energy meet one-half of its greenhouse gas goals by 

2020. Does that sound about right? 
22 

Secretary CHU. That sounds about right. 

Senator ALEXANDER. A 125-megawatt reactor would also be 

about the amount of electricity that the entire Oak Ridge National 

Laboratory and the computers would use. 

What I am leading to is—well, let me ask this. The Navy has 

small reactors, right? I mean, the United States Navy. 

Secretary CHU. Right. 

Senator ALEXANDER. And the United States Navy approves its 

own reactors, right? It does not go through the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission. 

Secretary CHU. Correct. 

Senator ALEXANDER. And do you know if there has ever been an 

accident on a Navy sub or a Navy ship in the 60 years? 

Secretary CHU. Well, there have been accidents, but I do not believe there—— 

Senator ALEXANDER. That has harmed someone? 

Secretary CHU. There certainly have been unfortunate accidents 

on nuclear submarines, but I believe—— 

Senator ALEXANDER. Yes, not the result of the reactor. 

Secretary CHU. Not the result of a nuclear malfunction. 

Senator ALEXANDER. The Navy’s safety record on small nuclear 

reactors is pretty good—— 

Secretary CHU. Correct. 

Senator ALEXANDER [continuing]. Over that period of time. 

I am wondering if your own departmental goals for greenhouse 

gases and the interest in small modular reactors might offer a way 

to accelerate pilot programs to see how they work. I know that in 

Alaska, for example, Senator Murkowski has said that for the last 

10 years a remote community in Alaska has considered the idea of 

a small modular reactor because it has no better way to get electricity. I was thinking of the Oak Ridge example. It might even be 

a reactor operated by the Department of Energy. I was thinking 

there might be a naval base in Hawaii or some other place where 

the Department of the Navy might have a small reactor. 

I am sure that the first three, four, five small reactors would 

have an additional cost to them, a risk cost that is always associated with a startup, but if it were part of a Navy installation or 

part of a Department of Energy greenhouse gas goal or part of 

some other relevant goal—you have got the Tennessee Valley Authority who is interested in this, and they are a Federal utility who 

are supposed to do things for the Nation rather than just for private investors. 

So I am running it through my mind whether, given your interest and that of so many people in smaller, cheaper modular reactors, if maybe a Navy reactor, a Department of Energy reactor, as 

well as a Nuclear Regulatory Commission reactor over the next 5 

or 10 years might not be a wise approach. 

Secretary CHU. Well, Senator, as you know, I am a big fan of 

small modular reactors. I think the economy of scale you get from 

making these very big 1/1.5-gigawatt reactors you can perhaps recover by mass producing the smaller ones. 

When I first became Secretary, I asked Admiral Donnelly whether we can modify a nuclear submarine reactor for this. He smiled 

at me. He laughed and said you cannot afford our nuclear reactors. 
23 

They are very high-performance, very robust reactors. And they 

also work on highly enriched uranium which is something we prefer not to do. 

But let me just say that we are very keen on it. We put it in our 

budget to help build and license two to try to accelerate the development of those reactors. We think it is useful for a wide variety 

of purposes. The Oak Ridge example—you are absolutely right 

about that. In fact, there is a site near Oak Ridge that was designed for a reactor that is waiting and ready to be used. If you 

build, let us say, 100 megawatts or something like that, you can 

size the number of modules to fit the site, to fit the electrical distribution system of that site. Many sites cannot accommodate a 

large 1.5-gigawatt reactor, both for the cooling and for the electricity transmission distribution. 

You also can size it to the finances of the company because if you have a $7 billion or $8 billion thing and your total capitalization 

of the company is on the order of $10 billion or $20 billion, you are 

essentially betting your company on a single reactor, whereas if 

you go to one-third, one-quarter, it satisfies a lot of needs. 

And finally, it is an area where we think the United States can 

be a technological leader. We lost the lead in the large ones over 

the years, especially after we were sending signals that we were 

going to run out the current fleet of nuclear reactors, close them 

down, and that would be it. Now because of the carbon dioxide 

issues, there are a number of people, including many environmentalists, who say now we should bring this back. 

So as we bring this back, small modular reactors are one area 

where we think we can take a technological lead, and it would be 

great for export as well. So there are many, many reasons why we 

want to do this. 

Senator ALEXANDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator DORGAN. Thank you very much. 

Senator Landrieu. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this 

really important, very important hearing. 

And Mr. Secretary, thank you for your leadership. 

I want to follow up, staying on the nuclear theme for just a 

minute. One of the unfortunate changes in U.S. policy over the last 

30 years has been the almost complete abandonment of our nuclear 

program. And I for one and many of my constituents are very 

pleased that it is coming back with your leadership and your determination with President Obama. We hope to reinvigorate the U.S. 

nuclear power since it is a plentiful source of emission-free and carbon-free electricity that this country is going to need. 

So Senator Voinovich has been a tremendous leader in this area. 

The former chair of the Energy Committee, Pete Domenici, helped 

to lead this effort. 

I wanted to ask just a question, though, about something that 

may be a small blockage in our move forward. The President’s 

budget this year requested an additional $36 billion for nuclear 

loan guarantees, as you are aware. It is my understanding, however, that there are two nuclear projects that are ready to go kind 

of neck in neck. Both show a lot of promise, but unfortunately, the 

budget may be insufficient. 
24 

Is that your understanding that the budget is currently insufficient to support both, and if so, what is your recommendation? 

Secretary CHU. That is my understanding. $8.3 billion was used at the Vogel site for two reactors. We have roughly $12.3 billion 

and some change left. There are two. There is possibly even a third 

application not immediately ready to go, but it could be done before 

the 2011 budget. We feel that if you allow that both of them have 

the opportunity to build, we would need, in addition to the $12.3 

billion—$12.5 billion—I forget the exact number—an additional $4 

billion. There is a third reactor that we are looking at. If you want 

to capture all three, that would be an additional $9 billion. 

Senator LANDRIEU. So basically for almost $50 billion—$50 million—is it billion? 

Secretary CHU. Well, okay, so here—— 

Senator LANDRIEU. Well, I know it is billion, but it is only 1 percent that it would score. So actually for a $50 million appropriation, we could potentially leverage those three projects. Am I doing 

that correctly? 

Secretary CHU. I think it is $9 billion in authority. So $90 million 

would get the three projects, so we would have a total of five. 

Senator LANDRIEU. So it would be $90 million. I said $50 million. 

It would be $90 million. Okay. 

You know, Mr. Chairman and Senator Voinovich, I really think 

that this is something specific that we should look at. I mean, for 

a relatively small additional investment, we could really leverage 

the culmination of many years of work to actually get these 

projects built and underway. I just wanted to mention it because 

I think it is very significant. And as a member of the Appropriations Committee, I will be working closely with you to see what we 

can do. 

Second, let me ask this. We have spent a lot of time both in this 

subcommittee and others focused on also increasing demand for 

new kinds of vehicles, which is very important as we try to put a 

climate bill together, as you know. And we want vehicles that can 

run on reduced carbon emissions, both kind of new engines, electric 

engines, et cetera and hybrid. 

But in the meantime, as we are building the technology to do 

that, we also have some innovative projects. DOE has been looking 

at some of them. One of them happens to be in Louisiana, but we 

are not the only one. It is a car that runs a much more highly efficient conventional internal combustion engine that will get more 

than double the current capacity. 

Could you comment on just the general kind of conventional but 

highly efficient vehicles? Do you think that there is a place for 

them as a bridge vehicle so we can move our country to actually 

carbon-free emission vehicles? 

Secretary CHU. Yes. In fact, I briefly mentioned in my testimony 

today that the immediate way we reduce our dependency on foreign 

oil is to drive toward efficiency, and it is efficiency in commercial 

internal combustion engines. There is now being developed a clean 

generation of diesel, small diesels, that can even satisfy California 

pollution air standards, a lighter weighting, better rolling resistance on the tires. Even though it is not dramatic—it is not going 

to a plug-in hybrid, all-electric vehicle—the market penetration 
25 

could be must faster because until we get batteries that can last 

15 years of deep dischargers that are reduced in present cost, the 

forecasters are not saying that this is going to be truly significant. 

Now, I applaud what companies like GM and their Chevy Volt 

are doing. I think those are great things. The Nissan Leaf, all these 

things are wonderful. But the low-brow internal combustion engine—if you make it 10 percent more efficient, it affects all of them. 

If you get better tires, it affects everything immediately. If you get 

better, you know, lighter weighing materials, those things go immediately into the entire fleet. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Well, that is very good to know—my time is 

up—because we have a project that will meet those guidelines, as 

you know, and we are excited about the possibility. 

Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator DORGAN. Senator Landrieu, thank you very much. 

Mr. Secretary, thank you very much for appearing here today. I 

hope you will be available if we wish to submit some written questions to be able to respond to them. But we appreciate your leadership and the work. As several of my colleagues have indicated, I 

think you have put together a very strong team at the Department 

of Energy, and we appreciate the work of all of them. 

Secretary CHU. And could I make one last—— 

Senator DORGAN. Yes, of course. 

Secretary CHU. In response to the intent of this hearing, we are 

developing a road map master plan. It will be heavily influenced 

by this very authoritative report, America’s Energy Future. This 

plan is not just a laundry list but timelines of what we think can 

happen in the years and folding in the economics. 

So we are busily working with the team that we now have in the 

Department of Energy—it is an extraordinary bunch of individuals. 

Just as an example, there are five members now in our team that 

are either members of the National Academy of Engineering or National Academy of Science, which is unusual. One of them, a member of the National Academy of Engineering, also has 25 years of 

industrial experience. He worked in a power company. He built 

coal plants. So in addition to being—so they are not all academic 

scholars—this is Jim Markowsky—and people who have founded 

many companies. So we have a team we think that can perhaps 

start to lay a rational road map that, as you say, does not lunge 

here and there, but perhaps can give us ideas on formulating a 

comprehensive energy policy. 

Senator DORGAN. Well, I have a copy of the summary edition of 

America’s Energy Future here. It is a great menu of all of the 

things that have been discussed here and much, much more. So I 

am encouraged by your report. 

Secretary CHU. Thank you. 

Senator DORGAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. We appreciate your being here. 

Next we will call on the second panel: the Honorable Phil Sharp, 

President of the Resources for the Future in Washington, DC; Mr. 

Robert Fri, who is the Past President and Visiting Scholar, Resources for the Future, Washington, DC; and Dr. Eric Loewen, who 

is the Chief Consulting Engineer, Advanced Plants Technology, at 

the GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy facility, Canonsburg, Pennsylvania. 
26 

Mr. Sharp, I have had the pleasure of serving with you a long, 

long time ago in the U.S. House of Representatives and have long, 

long admired your work both there and since you have left the U.S. 

House. But welcome to you and to Mr. Fri and Mr. Loewen. 

We will begin, Mr. Sharp, with you. As I indicated, all of the testimony will be part of the permanent record in its entirety, and we 

will ask the witnesses to summarize. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF HON. PHILIP R. SHARP, PRESIDENT, RESOURCES FOR 

THE FUTURE 

Mr. SHARP. Well, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for inviting me. It is an honor to be here. You folks have played an incredible role for years. You personally have and are going to be gone, 

unfortunately, from this chamber—and dealing with energy questions. So I am not sure how much of what I have to say will be 

new to you, but I think some of the things it is important for us 

to look back and remember as we try to figure out where to go in 

the future. 

First, let me just quickly say I must say these are strictly my 

own views, not those of the scholars at Resources for the Future. 

I deserve any blame or credit and do not hold it against our hardnosed scholars who are quite independent. 

I was asked to give something of an historical perspective since 

now I am part of history, and basically let me suggest a couple 

things. 

We are at a time of incredible change in our energy markets and, 

indeed, in our energy policy as well. And I think it is important to 

recognize this, and it is something that you and others are focused 

on. This is not a pattern of usual work if you are trying to make 

investments, if you are trying to figure out where the future is. 

Our markets have gone through, in several years, a radical 

change in prices, obviously in oil, but also even in natural gas, beginning earlier in the decade. And those price shifts, as they did 

in past history, have had profound impacts on how investors behave, on how consumers behave, and on how Government operates 

in terms of policy. Indeed, if there is anything that is clear from 

the experience of the operations of Congress in 2005, 2007, and in 

the stimulus package is that we have significantly expanded the 

Government’s role and its intervention in our energy markets. By 

the way, this is happening around the world. And that is a radical 

change that is, frankly, akin to what many of us went through in 

the 1970s. 

Compared to the 1970s—and I do not want to stay focused on 

them and live in them too much, but it is important to recognize 

that today we have incredible technological and even fuel options 

that were not readily available or on the horizon. They were a glint 

in somebody’s eyes. This subcommittee and others made major investments over those years, as did the private sector, that in fact 

have put before us these options that several of you folks have 

mentioned this morning. 

But the question becomes why they did not get into the marketplace. And of course, Secretary Chu in two sentences answered the 

question essentially, and that is, once oil prices dropped in 1986, 

simply the investments fell flat. Many people lost money in the 
27 

market, and indeed, what policies had been adopted in terms of investments from the Federal Government certainly did not look wise 

and many of them, obviously, were repealed or failed. 

Let me just mention a couple of the assumptions that were very 

broadly held in industry, Government, and academia when we were 

engaged in a lot of policymaking in the 1970s because I think one 

of the hardest things we struggle with, as you think about a 50- 

year period, is we frankly have great difficulty getting it right and 

knowing where the world is going to be, which I think suggests to 

you having a robust set of policies and a robust marketplace are 

the only approach to hedging against this intellectual as well as 

economic and political uncertainty. 

But let me quickly mention them. They are outlined here and 

you will not be surprised. 

But it was widely believed that we would see major disruptions 

and we were at risk for disruption in the oil supply since we had 

been disrupted in 1973. We drove to try to cut imports through additional production, through CAFE standards. We drove to prepare 

for emergencies with the Strategic Petroleum Reserve and even the 

crazy thought that we might be able to ration gasoline again in this 

country. But our experience since then, frankly, has been that this 

global oil market has been quite robust and resilient. And while we 

have had disturbances we do not like, the fact is it has delivered 

the oil even with military action in the Middle East, even with political turmoil in Venezuela and Nigeria and other places that at 

times in the past we would have thought would have been devastating to us. 

That does not mean because we have had this good experience, 

we are not still at risk, however. And as we know today, there are 

possibilities for major military or terrorist activities that could significantly disrupt and probably create lengthy disruptions in oil 

supplies which would have a major impact on the world economy 

and probably would lead to significant political and social instability in any number of governments. 

The second assumption was that whether it got disrupted or not, 

we would see oil prices continue to rise. The real argument was 

how fast and how far they would go. Widely accepted, so major private investments were made. Major public investments were made 

in technologies, in efficiencies and alternative fuels that we thought 

would quickly come into being cost effective in the marketplace. 

But of course, that 1986 drop and persistent drop in prices just totally undermined that. 

I only want to say in pricing one of the biggest mistakes made 

in the 1970s that is now, I think, deep in people’s knowledge was 

when we had price controls on the oil system—by the way, on the 

gas system too. That was a profound mistake that even when we 

had these radical price increases in 2006 and 2007, we did not see 

anyone on Capitol Hill advocating price controls. And so I think we 

probably learned our lesson from that. 

But my point here is the obvious one that everybody knows. 

Major shifts in the price of oil still can have major impacts to either enhance the policy you are trying to get across or to undercut 

it. And that is something we, frankly, do not have an effective tool 
28 

in my view to deal with unless you are willing to tax oil in a persistent manner to keep it at a certain price level. 

The third assumption that was often involved was the domestic 

gas supply was in decline naturally in the United States. Of course, 

we find getting rid of the oil price controls, opening to Canada, we 

had plenty of gas. Then we thought we were in shortage again, and 

you folks in 2005 and 2007—the prevailing assumption was we 

needed to have LNG because now we see we have more supply, although there is a great deal of uncertainty of how much, what its 

impact is on transportation, like will it undermine the electric car, 

will it not, what it will do in the electric power field. The point is 

that is another of the uncertainties we face, although that is a positive uncertainty in the sense that we have that. 

Let me just say, to wrap up on the carbon challenge, which is 

the longer-term, most profound complication that we face. Even 

though much is happening, as we know, you folks are engaged in 

a discussion of what should be the architecture or the framework 

of policy going forward to constrain emissions. And we have two 

broad strategies before us: try to set up a pricing on carbon either 

through cap and trade or tax or a combination; or we have under 

the Clean Air Act somebody may be able to figure out another 

strategy, but at the moment those are the two broad strategies. 

Nearly every analyst and economist believes that, depending on 

the details, the much smarter strategy from a cost effective way for 

this country is to go with some kind of pricing of carbon because 

in the end I think there are three things that we want to keep just 

in front of us as we go ahead with some kind of profound move to 

change the system for carbon or for oil security. 

And that is, one, what the Secretary said, what is the central 

point of the American energy future that you just held up is you 

must go for a portfolio. We do not know for sure which things will 

really work out to what extent. So have a portfolio of fuels, a portfolio of energy efficiency technologies. 

Two, have serious independent review periodically, perhaps every 

4 or 5 years, of whether these policies are really paying off. Are 

they cost effective? Is the problem still what we thought it was? 

PREPARED STATEMENT

And three and finally, which is I think a prevailing view today, 

is wherever possible capitalize on the competitive marketplace to 

help drive the policy we need. The Government will have to do 

things, and it is doing things. But it must, every time it can, leave 

the possibility for the innovation, the drive, the incentive, and I 

think we are most likely to have a better energy future in that 

way. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

[The statement follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. PHILIP R. SHARP

Chairman Dorgan, thank you for the opportunity to be here today. For the record, 

I am president of Resources for the Future (RFF), a 58-year-old research institution 

based in Washington, DC that focuses on energy, environmental, and natural resource issues. RFF neither lobbies nor takes institutional positions on specific legislative or regulatory proposals. 
29 

I emphasize that my views today are my own, and not those of Resources for the 

Future. I have included in an appendix, however, some related key studies and 

forthcoming research from RFF. 

In the last few years, U.S. energy markets and energy policies have undergone 

incredible change. Ahead, we face more significant developments and uncertainties. 

Markets have seen radical price swings. World oil prices began rising above $40 

per barrel in 2004, reached an extreme peak of $137 in July 2008, and fell back 

to a low of $34.00 in January 2009. Today, prices hover above $80. Natural gas 

prices in this decade made similarly radical shifts. 

Rising prices energized both markets and politics. Investors, consumers, and Government policy changed in significant ways. New attention has been given to efficiency and to alternatives to oil and natural gas—much as we witnessed in the 

1970s. 

Government efforts to influence energy markets dramatically increased with the 

landmark energy legislation of 2005 and 2007 and the stimulus package of 2009. 

A host of mandates, regulations, and subsidies have been adopted to influence investor and consumer behavior. A variety of goals is cited for various interventions: 

oil security, protection of the economy, and environmental urgency, especially with 

regard to climate change. Congress, of course, is currently grappling with major initiatives embodied in the House-passed Waxman-Markey bill and the proposals 

under construction in the Senate. 

These policy actions represent a level of market intervention not seen since the 

1970s. 

From the mid-1980s to early in this decade, market liberalization was the prevailing view. The most significant policy initiatives were the efforts in the 1990s to 

restructure the electric industry to bring competition into those markets, often misnamed ‘‘deregulation.’’ There were only a few significant Federal market interventions such as adoption of the production tax credit for renewables and the advancement of appliance efficiency standards. The Clean Air Act amendments of 1990, of 

course, imposed significant requirements on energy industries entailing major investments, but generally the changes were achieved at less cost than previously advertised. This was especially the case with the Acid Rain Program, which imposed 

a cap-and-trade system on electric utilities. 

Compared to the 1970s, we now have available many technologies and techniques 

that are already changing our energy systems or have the potential to do so. This 

is in no small part due to past private and public investment in technology development, heavily pushed in the 1970s by the allure of rising energy prices and Government policies—technologies that did not make it into our markets after world oil 

prices dropped in 1986 and Government incentives were either repealed or became 

irrelevant. 

During that time the Nation also was embarking on serious environmental regulation that had major effects on industry and consumer behavior. Today we are focusing on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, which will have a profound effect, over 

time, on the production, distribution, and use of energy. 

ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING POLICY IN THE 1970S

Oil crises in 1973 and 1979 generated intense public focus on energy markets and 

policy. During that decade a number of widely held assumptions about our energy 

future influenced much of the policy that was adopted; indeed there was also much 

private investment driven by the same assumptions. Some have relevance for today. 

1970s Assumption—Oil Supply Disruptions Likely.—It was widely expected that 

oil supplies from the Middle East were vulnerable to periodic disruption, creating 

major costs for our modern economies and potential security issues for the West, especially vis a ́ vis the Soviet Union. 

Presidents of both parties made it a high priority to achieve ‘‘oil independence.’’ 

A host of policies were adopted that presumably would cut oil imports. Most knowledgeable people understood such a goal to be very challenging, requiring a transformation of energy markets that would be costly at least in the near term, though 

public rhetoric often made the path sound cheap and easy. 

Major public investments were made in research, development, and even deployment of technology to push the use of domestic coal, gas, oil, and nuclear power and 

also advance solar, wind, geothermal, ethanol, and other longer-term possibilities. 

Fuel economy standards (CAFE) were adopted in 1975 as the primary measure 

to cut gasoline consumption. Though strongly advocated by policy wonks and by 

President Carter, a major gasoline tax increase was not imposed. 

Emergency preparedness also became a major policy focus. The Strategic Petroleum Reserve was created but took years to fill with crude oil. This program has 
30 

been sustained for decades but we still have not achieved a clear consensus on when 

we should use the reserve. 

Among other emergency measures was a plan for rationing gasoline. Billions of 

coupons were printed but later torched in the 1980s. At the time, many of us doubted we could successfully manage such a system, the likes of which had last been 

tried during World War II in a far smaller market. 

The ‘‘oil crises’’ generated widespread public outrage and intensely volatile politics 

in Washington. In 1979, the shortage of gasoline and the long lines at filling stations ignited public fury, sparking a few instances of serious social disorder. In 

areas facing shortage, States adopted restrictions, allowing cars to be filled only 

every other day depending on the odd or even last number on license plates. 

It is critical to note that Federal policy at the time—price and allocation controls—almost certainly contributed to the regional gasoline shortages. 

Our experience since the 1970s with respect to disruptions has been far more sanguine that expected. The global oil market has been far more resilient than predicted in the face of military actions in the Middle East and political and social turmoil that limited production from other key suppliers such as Nigeria and Venezuela. 

Oil dependency remains a serious security issue for the United States. Ahead, of 

course, the possibility remains that a terrorist or military attack on critical oil facilities in the Middle East and elsewhere could create major and lengthy disruptions 

with great economic cost and potentially significant consequences for political and 

social stability in many countries. 

1970’s Assumption—Oil Prices Would Rise.—It was widely believed that world oil 

prices would continue to rise in the years ahead. Disruptions in oil supply immediately translate into price spikes, but even in the absence of disruptions, oil prices 

were expected to rise, though there were major differences of opinion about how far 

and how fast. Some believed OPEC could and would push them higher; others believed global production would ‘‘peak’’ in the foreseeable future. 

Such an assumption about the future meant there were big opportunities for private investment in alternatives to conventional oil and provided justification for 

many of the Government’s investments in the commercialization of unconventional 

fuels, which became the focus of the Government’s $88 billion Synthetic Fuels Corporation. 

The radical drop in oil prices in 1986 shattered this assumption, killing all kinds 

of private investments, and pulling the rug out from under claims about the costeffectiveness of various Government policies, many of which were repealed or went 

dormant. Today, the Great Plains coal gasification project is one of the few survivors 

from that era. 

Many observers have long cited the Synthetic Fuels Corporation and other such 

policies as major failures. Clearly they did not produce the intended results, though 

a few defenders argue the Government failed to stick it out. Given the major role 

oil prices play, it seems highly unlikely the goals could have been met without dramatically increasing oil costs either through taxation or regulation. 

But, we should also recognize that some of the technology choices on the horizon 

today were advanced through past Government investment. Public research and investment have contributed to today’s new shale gas supplies; to the variety of transportation fuel and technology options, such as plug-in hybrids and fuel cells; to 

breakthroughs in lighting efficiency; to advanced designs in windmills and nuclear 

power plants; and to smart grid technologies and more. 

It is important to say a word about Government efforts to directly control prices. 

Early in the 1970s price controls on domestic oil had been imposed as part of an 

economy wide anti-inflation program of wage and price controls; the controls were 

retained on the oil sector when the larger program lost credibility and was ended. 

Such controls proved to be counterproductive to reducing oil imports. They deterred conservation and discouraged domestic production, and, further, they disrupted the internal shipment of fuels to consumers seen in the gasoline lines of 

1979. We appear to have learned the lesson of such failure. During the recent runup in oil prices, there were no political leaders calling for price controls. 

So, Where Will World Oil Prices Head?—That is one of the most significant uncertainties that will shape our future energy markets. In general, many observers believe that as the world economy rebounds there will be upward pressures on price. 

Some analyst are even certain that we could face a major market upheaval; they 

expect us to reach ‘‘peak’’ production in the near future—a view that is not yet the 

conventional wisdom. And of course, there is the possibility that prices will fall back 

to lower levels. Only a couple of years ago, a major forecaster claimed that market 

fundamentals meant the markets would settle somewhere above $40 a barrel. 
31 

Despite major domestic and international efforts by industry, government, and 

academia to collect and analyze data, given the scale and nature of the global oil 

markets, we have difficulty answering with a high degree of certainty some of the 

most basic questions: How large are the reserves? What is the global level of production and consumption at any given moment? And, when are prices likely to radically 

shift? 

1970s Assumption—Domestic Natural Gas Supply Would Decline.—For several 

decades prior to the 1970s, the Federal Government had been regulating well-head 

prices for gas sold into the interstate market. As a result, segregated markets had 

developed for ‘‘intrastate’’ gas in the producing States and adequacy of supply ultimately became a problem for much of the country beyond those States. Indeed, the 

big interstate pipelines were required to develop curtailment plans to establish 

which customers could be shut out during shortages. 

In 1978, the National Gas Policy Act was adopted after ferocious political fighting. 

It was a complicated, but in the end effective, transition out of the bifurcated markets. Prices were deregulated for new supplies. (Old gas supplies were finally deregulated in 1989, without controversy.) 

In 1978, the Fuel Use Act also was passed to block the burning of natural gas 

as a boiler fuel, especially when used in generating electricity, thus reserving it for 

preferred uses such as household heating, industrial processing, and chemical feedstock. When the supply assumption was shattered by a more favorable supply picture, the act was repealed. 

At the same time, Canada was moving away from the ‘‘nationalistic’’ policies it 

had adopted during the 1970s energy crises and became a major supplier for the 

United States. 

With gas deregulation and imports from Canada, supplies became readily available. Indeed, there was much talk about the ‘‘gas bubble’’ and argument over when 

it might break. 

Over the last 40 years, we have witnessed several changes in the conventional 

wisdom about the availability of domestic natural gas. 

In the 1990s, there was a major build-out of new gas-fired electric power plants. 

When gas prices unexpectedly rose significantly after the turn of the century, new 

concerns about supply availability arose. 

Indeed, the prevailing assumption during consideration of the legislation in 2005 

and 2007 was that we needed to accelerate the building of liquefied natural gas terminals to bring in foreign gas and resurrect plans for an expensive pipeline to bring 

natural gas from the Prudhoe Bay in Alaska down to the lower 48. (In the 1970s 

a major, but ultimately unsuccessful effort, was made to stimulate building of the 

line. Special regulatory incentives were adopted and a treaty was signed with Canada to facilitate construction.) 

In only the last year or two, a whole new wisdom has emerged with the demonstration that we can economically extract gas from shale. We are only beginning 

to sort out just how large this supply may prove; how environmental regulation, especially with respect to water, may affect its availability; and what impact such supplies may have on fuel choices for electric generation and for transportation. Unless 

this new wisdom is short-lived, it will certainly reshape the thinking of energy investors and policymakers. Depending on policy choices, this new supply has the potential for making our path to decarbonization easier and cheaper over the next few 

decades. 

1970s Assumption—Economic Growth is Dependent on Growth in Energy Supply.—This assumption was widely held, though vigorously contested at the time. 

There had been a pattern of one-to-one growth in the United States—meaning a 1 

percent growth in GDP was accompanied by 1 percent growth in energy supply. For 

many that meant that expanding supply was the most important policy need. Others pointed to experience in Europe and Japan which suggested economic growth 

was not so rigidly connected to energy supply. There was almost a pitched battle 

between two camps: those believing we should conserve our way out of the crisis 

and those determined to produce our way out. 

Our experience since that time demonstrates the fallacy of this assumption. The 

energy intensity of our economy has significantly declined because of major efficiency gains and because the character of the economy has been shifting away from 

industrial production toward services and the newer digital opportunities. 

Among the efficiency initiatives of the 1970s, two in particular endured for several 

decades: CAFE in the auto sector and the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act 

(PURPA) in the electric sector. 

While there has long been argument over the cost-effectiveness of the fuel-economy standards compared to other policy choices, it is generally accepted that our 
32 

oil use and therefore our oil imports would be higher today had we not had such 

a policy. Of course, now the standards are being redesigned and tightened. 

PURPA, another part of the 1978 Carter Energy Act, required electric utilities, 

when adding generation, to buy power from cogeneration facilities and small renewable sources, when the cost estimates did not exceed new conventional generation, 

a determination made by each State. Today, we are still trying to encourage greater 

acceptance of combined heat and power systems for which Congress recently added 

incentives. 

PURPA also sought to encourage States to reexamine how they regulated prices 

with a view toward achieving more efficient end use. In recent years, the Federal 

Energy Regulatory Commission and several States have tried a number of pricing 

formulations to encourage peak shaving and more persistent end-use conservation. 

The fuller story of the 1970s includes a number of other efficiency policies such 

as tax credits for home insulation and weatherization for the poor. 

Today there is far wider agreement that we still have considerable potential for 

efficiency gains that can reduce oil dependency, reduce carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, and contribute to a competitive 21st century economy. 

Many studies have identified cost-effective possibilities throughout our economy, 

but we have learned over the years that there are many barriers to achieving such 

gains. Consequently, a number of policies have been put in place and are under consideration now in Congress: performance standards, tax incentives, Government 

purchase policies, public information systems, and so on. As we adopt regulation, 

however, we should not lose sight of the power of price to help drive innovation, 

speed the adoption of efficiency technologies, and change our habits. 

Today, the digital revolution is empowering us to manage energy use in our 

homes, businesses, commercial buildings—in every aspect of our economy—with 

real-time knowledge about how much energy we are using, its changing costs, and 

how our usage compares to best practices. Much of this ‘‘management’’ can be automated to reduce the decisionmaking burden many consumers want to avoid. Several 

years ago, the Electric Power Research Institute tagged this possibility as ‘‘prices 

to devices.’’ Digitalization is improving the efficiency of the energy industry itself. 

‘‘Smart grid’’ is all about operating the electric grid more efficiently and reliably as 

well as empowering customers to more efficiently manage their needs. 

Modernizing our technology not only should help us meet our energy needs and 

reduce our carbon emissions, it is likely to prove essential for a modern, competitive 

economy. But, with digitalization, of course, comes the new challenge of cyber security. 

THE CARBON CHALLENGE

We are now grappling with how we should change and indeed, transform, our energy system to deal with global warming over decades ahead. Significantly cutting 

emissions of GHGs is a daunting challenge—global in scope, reaching deep into our 

economy, and requiring a long-term focus. 

In the United States and elsewhere there are major public and private efforts underway to change the way we produce and use energy. Many incentives have been 

put in place to advance energy efficiency, renewables and lower-carbon fuels, and 

to develop potentially critical technologies such as carbon capture and storage and 

advanced nuclear reactors. 

Currently under consideration are options for how to restrict GHG emissions, especially CO2. A number of countries have adopted regulatory policies, as have several American States. The hard challenge is to design a policy framework or architecture which will hold up over many years and change our economy in the most 

cost-effective way. 

At this time, we appear to have a choice between two broad strategies: (1) put 

a rising price on carbon, or (2) regulate emitters of carbon under the current provisions of the Clean Air Act. Pricing carbon, of course, can be accomplished either by 

adopting a tax that rises over time or adopting a cap on emissions with allowance 

trading—or some combination of the two. Either strategy—pricing carbon or regulating emitters—can put us on a path to cut emissions; both will spur some level 

of technological innovation. 

Most economists and many policy analysts, however, believe the pricing option is 

superior in terms of finding the least-costly emissions reductions and providing incentives for continuous technological innovation. 

Of course, in judging either strategy it is critical to know the details where the 

devil and angels reside. In pursuing such a long-term challenge requiring persistent 

policy, there are a few, perhaps obvious, lessons from our previous experience. 
33 

—We should pursue a portfolio of fuels and technologies—indeed, a portfolio of 

policies. This is a basic conclusion of multiple studies by multiple groups. Do 

not put all our eggs in a few baskets, as the saying goes. 

—We should periodically conduct major assessments of the effectiveness of our 

policies—perhaps every 4 or 5 years. Such evaluation should not only be done 

inside the Government, but also independently of the Government. This subcommittee and other congressional committees, naturally, will need to continue 

their critical oversight role. 

—And, whenever possible in policymaking, we should capitalize on the dynamism 

competitive markets can provide in meeting our policy goals. 

APPENDIX: RELEVANT RESEARCH

Forthcoming Study—Toward a New National Energy Policy—Assessing the Options 

Early this summer, Resources for the Future (RFF) will be presenting findings 

from its study entitled Toward a New National Energy Policy—Assessing the Options, funded by the George Kaiser Family Foundation. The main study report is 

designed to offer a thorough evaluation of the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of 

a variety of energy policy alternatives, in order to provide decisionmakers with a 

clear basis on which to develop an overarching national energy policy that deals 

with the twin challenges of oil security and climate change. 

In particular, the study uses the Department of Energy’s National Energy Modeling System to examine and score on an ‘‘apples-to-apples’’ basis a variety of policies designed to spur reductions in oil consumption and greenhouse gas emissions 

in the United States. The report is being developed in collaboration with the National Energy Policy Institute (NEPI), and draws on several technical and background papers commissioned by RFF and NEPI. 

Each technical paper focuses on a type of policy investigated in the study, including: 

—Transportation policies such as fuel taxes, fuel economy standards, and 

feebates, as well as an emphasis on liquefied natural gas-fueled heavy trucks; 

—Policies to promote deployment of hybrid, plug-in hybrid, and electric vehicles; 

—Energy efficiency policies, such as building codes and subsidies versus financing 

of geothermal heat pumps; 

—Carbon pricing policies (both cap-and-trade systems and carbon taxes); 

—Policies such as clean energy portfolio standards that mandate electricity generation from renewables and other lower-carbon sources; and 

—Policies (loan guarantees) to spur expansion of nuclear power generation. 

(Some of the above policies are examined with and without newly expanded resources of natural gas.) 

The report launch is currently scheduled for late June 2010, at which point a comprehensive Executive Summary will also be available. 

Recent RFF Research on Energy and Climate 

Recent RFF research addresses a number of questions central to the development 

of climate and energy policy. Topics include: 

Options for Regulating Greenhouse Gases Through the Clean Air Act 

Greenhouse Gas Regulation under the Clean Air Act: Structure, Effects, and Implications of a Knowable Pathway, Nathan Richardson, Arthur G. Fraas, Dallas 

Burtraw RFF Discussion Paper 10–23, April 2010 

The Economic Impacts on U.S. Industries From Placing a Price on Carbon 

Impact of Carbon Price Policies on U.S. Industry, Mun Ho, Richard D. 

Morgenstern, and Jhih-Shyang Shih RFF DP 08–37, December 2008 

The Regional and Distributional Impacts of Different Allowance Allocation Approaches 

The Incidence of U.S. Climate Policy: Alternative Uses of Revenues from a Capand-Trade Auction, Dallas Burtraw, Richard Sweeney, Margaret A. Walls RFF DP 

09–17–REV, June 2009 

The Relative Merits of a Carbon Tax Versus a Cap-and-Trade Approach 

Should the Obama Administration Implement a CO2 Tax? Ian W.H. Parry, RFF 

IB 09–09, April 2009 

The Impact of a Price Collar on Greenhouse Gas Emissions and the Costs of 

Climate Policy 

A Symmetric Safety Valve, Dallas Burtraw, Karen Palmer, and Danny Kahn RFF 

DP 09–06, February 2009 
34 

Alternative Approaches to Cost Containment in a Cap-and-Trade System Harrison 

Fell, Richard D. Morgenstern, RFF DP 09–14, April 2009 

The Economic and Legal Implications of Different Approaches to Protecting 

Energy-intensive, Trade-sensitive U.S. Industries Under a U.S. Carbon 

Policy 

Comparing Policies to Combat Emissions Leakage: Border Tax Adjustments 

versus Rebates, Carolyn Fischer and Alan Fox, RFF DP 09–02, February 2009 

The Long-term Effect of Newly Increased U.S. Natural Gas Supplies on Carbon Emissions 

Natural Gas: A Bridge to a Low-Carbon Future? Stephen P.A. Brown, Alan J. 

Krupnick, Margaret A. Walls RFF IB 09–11, December 2009 

The Potential Role of Tropical Forests as a Source of Offsets 

Forest Carbon Index: The Geography of Forests in Climate Solutions, Adrian 

Deveny, Janet Nackoney, Nigel Purvis, Mykola Gusti, Raymond J. Kopp, Erin 

Myers Madeira, Andrew R. Stevenson, Georg Kindermann, Molly K. Macauley, Michael Obersteiner, RFF Report, December 2009 

The Effects of Cellulosic Fuel Mandates on U.S. Timber Markets 

The Implications of Increased Use of Wood for Biofuel Production, Roger A. Sedjo, 

Brent L. Sohngen, RFF IB 09–04, June 2009 

The Cost-Effectiveness of Energy Electricity Efficiency Programs 

Cost-Effectiveness of Electricity Energy Efficiency Programs, Toshi Arimura, Richard G. Newell, Karen L. Palmer, RFF DP 09–48, November 2009 

Other Relevant Studies 

Published Studies: 

Council on Foreign Relations. 2006. National Security Consequences of U.S. Oil 

Dependency. Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations. www.cfr.org/content/ 

publications/attachments/EnergyTFR.pdf 

Deutch, John and Ernest Moniz, co-chairs. 2003. The Future of Nuclear Power. 

Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. http://web.mit.edu/ 

nuclearpower/pdf/nuclearpower-summary.pdf 

Deutch, John and Ernest Moniz, co-chairs. 2007. The Future of Coal. Cambridge, 

MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. http://web.mit.edu/coal/ 

ThelFutureloflCoal.pdf 

National Commission on Energy Policy. 2004. Ending the Energy Stalemate. 

Washington, DC: National Commission on Energy Policy. http://bipartisanpolicy.org/ 

library/report/ending-energy-stalemate. NOTE.—A number of other topical studies 

are available on the NCEP Web site. 

National Petroleum Council. 2007. Hard Truths: Facing the Hard Truths About 

Energy. Washington, DC: National Petroleum Council. http:// 

www.npchardtruthsreport.org/ 

National Research Council. 2009. America’s Energy Future: Technology and 

Transformation. Washington, DC: National Academies Press. http:// 

sites.nationalacademies.org/Energy/index.htm 

Revis James, Richard Richels, Geoff Blanford and Steve Gehl. 2007. The Power 

to Reduce CO2 Emissions: The Full Portfolio. Palo Alto, CA: Electric Power Research 

Institute. MERGE/PRISM analysis available at http://mydocs.epri.com/docs/public/ 

000000000001019563.pdf 

Forthcoming Studies: 

Deutch, John, Chair. The Future of Solar Energy. Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts 

Institute of Technology. http://web.mit.edu/mitei/news/spotlights/solar-future.html 

Kazimi, Mujid and Ernest Moniz, co-chairs. The Future of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle. 

Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. http://web.mit.edu/canes/research/fuelcycle.html 

The National Academies. America’s Climate Choices. http:// 

americasclimatechoices.org/ 

Senator DORGAN. Mr. Sharp, thank you very much. 

Mr. Fri, you may proceed. 
35 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT W. FRI, PAST PRESIDENT AND VISITING 

SCHOLAR, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE 

Mr. FRI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is really a pleasure and 

an opportunity to appear before you today. 

And what I would like to do is spend the next few minutes summarizing my full statement and focusing on the role of technology 

change in the energy policy portfolio. In doing so, I am going to 

draw extensively on a number of National Research Council studies 

in which I have participated happily, including America’s Energy 

Future. But the views I express are, of course, my own. 

We all know that from the time of the first OPEC oil embargo 

nearly 40 years ago, the United States has looked to technology for 

solutions to its energy problems. In fact, the first Government reports to recommend an energy research and development agenda 

appeared within a few weeks of that 1973 event. 

But despite this evergreen promise of technology solutions, today’s energy system is not very much different from the one that 

we had 40 years ago. It still relies on fossil energy, and the transportation sector is still dominated by the use of petroleum. 

Now, the system has become considerably cleaner and more efficient over the past 40 years, and Federal energy R&D has made 

a positive, although modest, contribution to this evolutionary 

change in the system. But the record is uneven. A 2001 study by 

the National Research Council of DOE’s applied research programs 

showed that a very few, inexpensive programs produced large economic benefits while some very expensive demonstration programs 

produced no benefit at all. 

Well, although the record of the last 40 years, therefore, may 

leave something to be desired, I think it has taught us several valuable lessons about what the Government can do to accelerate 

technology change, and I would like to focus on how that might 

happen. 

Now, perhaps the most important lesson is that unless the Nation responds affirmatively and aggressively to the challenges of 

energy security and climate change, the energy system of the future will look a lot like the energy system of today. It will be cleaner, again, probably more efficient, but fossil fuels, as Phil Sharp 

has just pointed out, will continue to be convenient and markets 

will work and will still rely pretty much on the same fuels we have 

today. 

And, Mr. Chairman, if you look at that wonderful chart you had 

of the transitions from coal to oil and so forth and ask why those 

transitions took place, it was not because we preferred coal over 

wood or oil over coal. It is because we like cars better than horses. 

There was a societal reason driving change in the system. And that 

societal reason today that could drive fundamental change is going 

to look a lot like climate change and energy security. 

But more of the same is not destiny because technology is capable of making this fundamental change, as the Secretary pointed 

out in referring to the America’s Energy Future study. So the potential is there to make the change. The challenge of doing so is 

immense, and so the key question is, what can the Government do 

to accelerate technology change in the energy system? And building 
36 

on the lessons of the past, four strategies seem to me to be particularly important. 

First, as I have already said and others have said, align private 

incentives with public goals. Innovation, which is what we are talking about here, is a complex function of the private sector and, as 

such, innovation works best when it is economically rewarded in 

private markets. And experience strongly suggests that rewarding 

private sector activity that also produces a public good is the most 

powerful strategy for technology change, and I seriously doubt that 

an overhaul of the energy system will take place without such a reward. 

Second, it is important to support purpose-driven, fundamental 

research. Virtually all authorities agree that funding fundamental 

research is an appropriate function of government, but beyond that, 

it is essential for driving technology change because it sets the 

table for innovation in the private sector in ways that we cannot 

really predict. But the research needs to be focused on basic problems which, if solved, would create fundamental change in the energy system. For example, the development of artificial photosynthesis would revolutionize the capture and storage of solar energy, 

and it seems to me that Secretary Chu’s new ideas for organizing 

the research program at DOE are pointed very much in that direction. 

Third, limit the applied research programs to overcoming welldefined market barriers. Unlike basic research, DOE’s applied research program, that is, its fossil, efficiency, renewable, and nuclear programs, focuses on fairly well defined technologies. And experience suggests that in designing programs of applied research, 

the Government should observe two prerequisites. First, there 

must be a reasonable chance of adoption in the existing private 

market, and second, the Government intervention should focus 

tightly on removing well-defined barriers in the way of getting to 

that market. And that is evidence drawn from the National Research Council study where we looked back at 40 or so of these programs, and that is what characterized success. 

Finally, invest with great care in technologies that do not yet 

have markets. In the past, Government energy research programs 

have invested pretty heavily in such technologies, the synthetic 

fuels program of the late 1970s, for example. Often the costs are 

high and the record of success is poor. Now, that is not to say the 

Government should avoid investing in insurance policies, only that 

it should do so with its eyes open. And Secretary Chu pointed out 

that the America’s Energy Future study strongly recommends that 

moving ahead to demonstrate new nuclear technology and carbon 

capture and storage by 2020 is really important. We should do 

that. It is going to be expensive. It is possible that some of that 

money will not prove to be successful, but nevertheless important 

to do, and I fully support that recommendation. 

PREPARED STATEMENT

Well, that is a very brief overview of a complex topic, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to your questions. Thank you. 

[The statement follows:] 
37 

1 At http://www.epa.gov/airtrends/sulfur.html. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT W. FRI

REFLECTIONS ON 40 YEARS OF U.S. ENERGY POLICY

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the invitation to testify today about my reflections 

on the last 40 years of energy policy and my assessment of the implications of that 

history for future policy. It’s a large question and I want to focus my comments on 

one important part of it—technological change. 

From the time of the first OPEC oil embargo nearly 40 years ago, the United 

States has looked to technology for solutions to its energy problems. Indeed, the first 

Government reports to recommend an energy research and development agenda appeared within weeks of that 1973 event. In 1975, President Ford established the Energy Research and Development Administration, pulling together energy research 

programs scattered across the Federal landscape. In late 1977, ERDA became part 

of the new Department of Energy. And today, energy R&D remains a major element 

of DOE’s mission, and of the administration’s energy policy. 

But despite the evergreen promise of technology solutions, the history of Federal 

energy R&D has been full of twists and turns in both program goals and management philosophy. President Nixon opted for energy independence. President Carter 

created the first National Energy Plan and with it, the Synthetic Fuels Corporation. 

Presidents Reagan and Bush preferred a more modest effort focused on 

precompetitive research and avoided large demonstration programs altogether. 

President Clinton favored efficiency and renewable energy programs, while reducing 

the nuclear budget at DOE to near zero. The second President Bush attempted to 

reverse some of the Clinton priorities, and laid management emphasis on achieving 

tangible results from Federal R&D. At the National Academies’ Summit on America’s Energy Future in 2008, Senator Jeff Bingaman summarized in the attached 

image these stops and starts of energy technology policy over this period. 

Although this record leaves a lot be to desired, I believe it has taught us several 

valuable lessons. Today I’d like to focus on the lessons that seem to me to be most 

important, and then on what they can tell us about how the Federal Government 

might approach energy technology policy in the future. In doing so, I will rely on 

several National Research Council reports in which I’ve participated over the last 

dozen years. While these reports are exceedingly valuable sources, I should stress 

that the views I will express are my own. 

LESSONS LEARNED

First, energy security and a clean environment are the overarching goals for energy policy, and hence for energy R&D. There are other desirable attributes of the 

energy system, such as reliability and affordability, but the private sector has substantial regulatory and economic incentives to provide them. But energy security 

and environmental goals dominate energy policy in two crucial ways. First, they are 

public goods, hard for the private sector to provide and so appropriate subjects for 

public policy. And second, unlike the more modest goals like affordability, meeting 

these overarching goals may well require a total overhaul of the energy system. 

Energy security and a stable climate share another important characteristic. It’s 

easy to see what needs to be done to meet them, but hard to decide how much to 

do. Thus, energy technology enhances energy security largely reducing the economy’s dependence on oil the economy from all sources. Similarly, limiting future climate change requires greatly reducing the emission of carbon dioxide from the energy system. These strategies are clear and their costs are real. On the other hand, 

it’s very hard to calculate the benefits of greater energy security or a more stable 

climate. As a result, policy makers face a difficult choice in balancing fairly certain 

costs against uncertain risks in deciding how to much oil or carbon dioxide to carve 

out of the system. 

I dwell on this policy dilemma because it’s easy to fall into the trap of doing nothing while waiting for science to provide some kind of optimal level of action. Waiting 

is not a strategy, and as I’ll mention next, we’ve been doing a lot of waiting around 

when it comes to energy policy. 

Second, today’s energy system is cleaner and more efficient, but not fundamentally different, from the one we had 40 years ago. The Clean Air Act has driven a 

significant improvement in air quality associated with energy system emissions. For 

example, EPA reports 1 that between 1980 and 2008 national average atmospheric 

concentrations of sulfur dioxide has decreased by 71 percent, of nitrogen dioxide by 

46 percent, and of ozone by 25 percent. Concentrations of particulate matter (PM10) 

declined 31 percent between 1990 and 2008, while concentrations of the smaller 
38 

2Despite this considerable progress, more remains to be done. A 2009 NRC report, The Hidden Costs of Energy, evaluates the damages from air pollution in the electric and transportation 

sectors caused by remaining pollution. 3Measured as quadrillion Btu of energy used per 2005 dollars of GDP; see http:// 

www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/mer/pdf/pages/sec1l16.pdf. 4See http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/aer/pdf/pages/sec1l9.pdf. 5See http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/aer/pdf/pages/sec2l10.pdf. 6 National Research Council, Energy Research at DOE: Was It Worth It? Energy Efficiency 

and Fossil Energy Research 1978 to 2000, 2001. The summary benefit cost assessment on which 

this section is based is found at p. 6 of the report. 

PM2.5 particles dropped 19 percent between 2000 and 2008. These reductions were 

achieved despite an economy that more than doubled in size.2

The story on energy efficiency is similarly positive. EIA reports that the energy 

intensity of the U.S. economy 3 declined by 51 percent between 1973 and 2008, a 

substantial fraction of which can be attributed to improvements in energy efficiency 

(the balance is attributable to a structural economic shift from a manufacturing 

base of activities to a services base). The improvement was most dramatic in the 

consumption of petroleum and natural gas, where the intensity of these fuels 

dropped by 60 percent. Oil use alone fell by the same amount, arguably enhancing 

energy security by reducing national dependence on oil. The intensity of fuels connected with electricity use (coal, nuclear, renewables) fell less—by nearly 23 percent 

between 1973 and 2008, and by 31 percent from its peak in 1983. 

But if the energy system has become cleaner and more efficient over the past 40 

years, it is not much different. Importantly, the system still depends almost entirely 

on fossil fuels. In 1973, fossil fuels accounted for almost 93 percent of energy use 

in the United States.4 By 2008, this fraction had dropped to 84 percent. However, 

the growth of nuclear power accounts for the entire decline. During this same period, the near monopoly of petroleum fuel in the transportation sector changed hardly at all, from 96 percent in 1973 to 94.5 percent in 2008.5

An important corollary to this continuing reliance on fossil fuels is that the basic 

technology of energy production and use has not changed much in 40 years. The internal combustion engine and the fossil fuel powerplant still dominate the system. 

That these technologies produce considerably fewer air pollutants is a tribute to increased efficiency and post-combustion clean-up devices, not to the deployment of a 

fundamentally cleaner way of making energy. 

Third, Federal energy R&D has made a positive but modest contribution to changing the energy system. Since the consolidation of energy research into a single agency during the Ford administration DOE has been responsible for most of the Government energy R&D program. Between 1978 and 2009, DOE budgets added up to 

well over $100 billion on energy R&D (2000$). And since Government polices—from 

R&D cost-sharing to environmental regulation to tax incentives—strongly influence 

the allocation of private investment in energy R&D, the Federal Government has 

probably been the single largest force in U.S. energy R&D expenditures since 1978. 

This despite the fact that, adjusted for inflation, the total level of DOE-sponsored 

energy R&D sponsored in 2010 is one-half of what it was in 1980. 

But what has this expenditure achieved? In 2001 the National Research Council 

published one of the few independent evaluations of the results produced by some 

of these R&D programs.6 The review was limited to DOE’s energy efficiency and fossil energy programs, and looked back at the benefits and costs of those programs 

over the first 25 years of DOE’s existence. The net result of this evaluation indicated 

that DOE had made positive contributions to the changes in the energy system. In 

particular, the aggregate economic and environmental benefits attributable to these 

DOE programs exceeded the Government’s total costs by a factor of more than two. 

But this broad conclusion obscures a more complex dynamic. To paraphrase the 

study’s conclusions: 

—Almost all the benefits came from four programs—three that introduced new 

energy efficiency technology to large consumer markets (more efficient fluorescent light ballasts, more efficient windows, and more efficient refrigerators), and 

one that resulted in a major reduction in damages from NOX emissions through 

the use of low NOX burners and selective catalytic reduction. It is worth noting 

that the total Federal cost of the three efficiency programs was only $12 million, 

although they produced $30 billion in economic benefits. 

—The large realized benefits accrued in areas where significant market barriers 

existed. For example, the building market is fragmented and not conducive to 

innovation in energy efficiency. And the NOX reduction produces an environmental benefit that private markets cannot easily capture. Public funding would 

be expected to have considerable leverage in removing these barriers. 
39 

7For a summary of this research see, for example, Robert W. Fri, The Role of Knowledge: 

Technological Innovation in the Energy System, The Energy Journal, Vol.24:4. 8 E.S. Rubin, ‘‘The Government Role in Technology Innovation: Lessons for the Climate 

Change Policy Agenda,’’ Proceedings of the 10th Biennial Conference on Transportation Energy 

and Environmental Policy, Institute of Transportation Studies, University of California, Davis, 

Davis CA. 

—Other programs produced important but smaller benefits. In all such cases, 

however, the report observed that DOE participation took advantage of private 

sector activity to realize an additional public benefit. In other words, getting the 

public benefit depended on the existence of a private market for the underlying 

technology. (In the case of NOX controls, that market was established by the 

Clean Air Act and subsequent Federal requirements for NOX controls on all new 

power plants.) 

—In contrast, Government attempts to force introduction of new technologies for 

which there is no private market have rarely been successful. In this connection, the NRC study pointed especially to the large synthetic fuels demonstration programs that the Government undertook in the 1970s and early 1980s, 

but which produced no tangible benefit. 

A number of technological advances in the energy system did in fact take place 

between 1978 and 2000, but the private sector was the principal source of technological innovation. The NRC study selected 23 of the most important innovations in 

fossil energy and energy efficiency during this period and determined the level of 

DOE contribution to their development. In only three cases was DOE research the 

dominant factor, while in 13 cases DOE’s influence was absent or minimal. In the 

remaining 7 cases, DOE made an influential but not dominant contribution. 

Finally, Innovation is More Than RDD&D.—From the beginning, it was understood that Government energy R&D had to develop products that would meet public 

policy goals by succeeding in the marketplace. This imperative thus raised the issue 

of how to design a Government program that would lead to private sector commercialization of new technology that had a public benefit. To resolve that issue, we 

needed a model of the commercialization process we wanted to influence. 

At the outset, we picked the wrong model (I say ‘‘we’’ because I helped get it 

wrong). We borrowed from the Defense Department and NASA the standard model 

for Government product development—Research, Development, and Demonstration—and added a third ‘‘D’’—Deployment. Unfortunately, the linear RDD&D model 

has had staying power, and indeed still sometimes appears in DOE’s program designs. But it’s not the right model. 

A more useful model is the innovation process that routinely takes place in the 

private sector, because that is the process that DOE research needs to influence. 

Studies of this model 7 show that the innovation process is not neatly linear but 

messy; it is incremental, integrative, and cumulative. Innovators tend to take small, 

incremental steps to minimize the already considerable risk they are assuming in 

trying to develop a new product. They integrate ideas from a variety of sources, assembling them into an innovative product. And over time, these incremental steps 

cumulate into major—even disruptive—changes in technology. An excellent example 

of how this process has worked in the energy system is the introduction of the 

aeroderivative turbine for electricity generation. The basic technology was developed 

for defense programs to power aircraft, then borrowed from the aerospace industry, 

and ultimately adapted to electric generation applications to become a very energy 

efficient powerplant. The improved technology was so successful that for a time it 

dominated investments in new powerplants. And although this final result may 

have seemed like breakthrough technology, it was really a borrowed idea integrated 

into the energy system and improved incrementally over time. 

It is also useful to see this innovation step as a part of a broader process of technological change. Rubin 8 describes the change process in four steps—invention, innovation, adoption, and diffusion. Invention involves the generation of the new scientific and technological ideas that set the table for innovation. The adoption step 

carries an innovative product into the marketplace. Diffusion happens as the product expands its markets, importantly due to learning than reduces costs and improves performance. Finally, it’s important to note that both the innovation step and 

the whole change process are intensely recursive. Feedback loops and trial-and-error 

abound in this world until the innovator finally ‘‘gets it right’’ or loses his shirt. 

LOOKING AHEAD

Against this background, what can we say about the future of the Federal energy 

R&D programs? Addressing this key issue posed by this subcommittee—requires answering four questions. 
40 

9 National Research Council, America’s Energy Future: Technology and Transformation, 2009. 

In the AEF study, potential is defined as the maximum deployment of a technology with an aggressive (but not crash) program, and in the absence of any barriers to deployment. 

Should the Energy System Change in a Fundamental Way?—As noted earlier, the 

existing energy system is cleaner and more efficient, but not really different, from 

the one that existed in 1973. Looking forward, however, taking energy security and 

climate change seriously would mean decarbonizing the energy system and drastically cutting the Nation’s dependence on oil. And that, of course, would require a 

wholesale change in the existing energy system. 

As noted in the first lesson discussed above, the benefits of limiting climate impacts and enhancing energy security are real, but hard to pin down. The costs of 

a wholesale change in the energy system are real and potentially large. While economists have tried to quantify these values, unfortunately, science can’t provide a 

clear balancing of the benefits and costs. Deciding how much climate change and 

how much oil use is acceptable are thus both crucial judgment calls. 

My own view is that the benefits are real and potentially much larger than the 

costs of change. If I’m right, we should be planning for a major change in the energy 

system. If not, continuing the incremental improvements that have characterized 

the last 40 years is probably good enough and we will simply accept and adapt to 

whatever future climate change and oil price shocks may occur. 

What Will the Future Energy System Look Like?—Unless the Nation responds aggressively to the challenges of energy security and climate change, the energy system of the future will look very much like the one of today. It will be cleaner as 

environmental regulations continue to tighten, and increasingly efficient as old capital stock turns over. But electricity will continue to be produced mostly by burning 

fossil fuels, and most light duty vehicles will continue to rely on gasoline. Renewable 

sources of electricity, alternative transportation fuels, and electric vehicles—pure or 

hybrid—will slowly gain market share. However, using fossil fuels will continue to 

be convenient and relatively cheap, so a fundamental change in the energy system 

is unlikely for a long time to come. 

But more of the same is not destiny, for technology is capable of a fundamental 

change if we decide we want one. A recent NRC study, America’s Energy Future 

(AEF), assessed the potential 9 of available (or nearly available) technology to 

change the energy system. Its key conclusions were: 

—Efficiency measures can reduce energy consumption by 15 percent by 2020 and 

by another 15 percent by 2030. These reductions would more than offset the 

projected increase in energy consumption in the EIA 2007 reference case. 

—Renewable energy sources, coal or natural gas-fired powerplants with carbon 

capture and storage, and new nuclear power could completely replace the existing electric power production system by 2035. 

—Substantial opportunities to reduce fuel use in transportation exist, but liquid 

fuels made from biomass or coal have a limited potential to displace oil before 

2035. Further reduction of oil use will require a new generation of vehicles, 

probably powered with electricity or hydrogen. 

While this technical potential is impressive, optimism about actually realizing it 

should be guarded. A multitude of market imperfections, regulatory obstacles, and 

behavioral barriers stand in the way of reaching anything like the full potential. In 

addition, while AEF judged that carbon capture and storage and new nuclear technologies could be deployed in large quantity after 2020, it also noted that both technologies need first to be proved in the United States at commercial scale before attracting significant private investment—and we are only beginning to take the steps 

necessary for this purpose. 

Finally, even if the technical potential reported in AEF were to be reached, the 

energy system would still depend largely on old technology, especially for electricity 

production. Moreover, AEF concludes that the cost of electricity would rise with any 

of the new production technologies. And new technology to reduce oil consumption 

in the transportation sector would be required, as noted earlier. For all these reasons, it seems likely that technologies that are yet to be invented must enter the 

energy system by 2035, and certainly beyond, if we are to have truly clean, efficient, 

and affordable energy system. 

What can Government do to Accelerate Technological Change in the Energy System?—As discussed earlier, the experience of the last 40 years has provided a clearer picture of how Government policy can accelerate technological change in the private sector. Building on this experience, four strategies seem to me to be especially 

important in crafting this policy. 

Align Private Incentives With Public Goals.—Innovation is a complex function of 

the private sector and as such innovation works best when it’s economically re-
41 

warded in private markets. Indeed, experience strongly suggests that rewarding private sector activity that also produces a public good is the most powerful strategy 

for technological change. I seriously doubt that an overhaul of the energy system 

will take place without such a reward. 

Both price signals and regulation can provide the necessary incentive. A price signal is usually more directly linked to the desired outcome (increasing the price of 

carbon directly affects CO2 production, for example) and, if applied economy-wide, 

engages the maximum range of innovative activity. Regulation can also have a potent effect, as has been the case with refrigerator efficiency and light duty vehicles, 

but runs the danger of unintended side effects. Arguably, efficiency standards for 

light duty vehicles both substantially reduced fuel consumption for the target vehicles, but also helped to induce a vast market for unregulated trucks posing as sports 

utility vehicles. 

Fund Purpose-driven Basic Research.—Virtually all authorities agree that funding 

basic research is an appropriate function of Government, and it is an essential one 

for changing the energy system for two reasons. As noted above, we need wholly 

new technologies create an energy system that is affordable and effective, particularly in reducing oil consumption. In addition, because innovation is an integrative 

process, it needs a robust menu of scientific and technological research on which to 

draw. Basic research thus sets the table for innovation in ways that cannot be predicted. 

But this research needs to be plausibly connected to desired outcomes for the energy system. Broadly speaking, this connection can be made in two ways. One is 

to focus research on problems which, if solved, would create fundamental changes 

in our energy options. For example, artificial photosynthesis could revolutionize the 

capture and storage of solar energy. Similarly, basic advances in catalysis could 

greatly increase the attractiveness of carbon capture, especially if it promoted the 

retrofit of existing power plants. The second general approach is to encourage the 

application of diverse disciplines to energy problems. Both genomic engineering and 

nanotechnology could make important contributions to energy, although neither was 

developed with energy in mind. 

Focus Applied Research to Overcoming Well-defined Market Barriers.—Unlike 

basic research, DOE’s applied research (its fossil, efficiency, renewable, and nuclear 

programs) focuses on fairly well-defined technologies. In some cases, such technologies have a reasonable chance of market success if they meet attainable technical and commercial goals. 

If a technology has a reasonable chance of market adoption, and if its adoption 

would also help achieve a public policy goal, then the Government has an interest 

in its success. Energy efficiency technologies often combine these attributes, for example. The NRC retrospective study noted earlier provides persuasive evidence that 

Government support of such technologies can be very effective if it is directed toward removing a well-defined barrier standing between the technology and the marketplace. The barrier may be a technical problem that an innovator is unable to 

solve, or it may be a problem of market structure. Many barriers to efficiency technologies are of the latter type. 

In short, while designing programs of applied research is as much art as science, 

Government policy should observe two prerequisites. First, there must be a reasonable chance of adoption in an existing market. And second, the Government intervention should focus sharply on removing well-defined barriers in the way of getting 

to that market. 

Invest With Great Care in Technologies That Do Not Yet Have Markets.—In the 

past, Government energy research programs have invested heavily in such technologies—the synthetic fuels program of the late 1970s, for example. The rationale 

for these investments is usually that, although not competitive now, the technology 

in question will be needed in the future to meet public policy goals. Unfortunately, 

such programs usually don’t work out very well. The market turns out not to materialize, or if it does, it addresses the problem in ways that Government programs 

did not foresee. Thus, the crash of oil prices in the 1980s—and not the synthetic 

fuels program—solved the looming oil crisis of the late 1970s. Similarly, reductions 

in SOX emissions required by the Clean Air Act amendments of 1990 were achieved 

initially by transporting low sulfur coal to eastern power plants, not by flue gas 

desulfurization technology that almost all policy analysts assumed. 

This is not to say, of course, that Government should never invest in insurance 

policies, only that it should do so with its eyes open. In particular, the record of success is poor, and so the risk of loss is high. A current example will illustrate the 

nature of the risk. Both carbon capture and storage and evolutionary nuclear technology need demonstration at commercial scale before attracting significant private 

sector investment. But the market for both depends in a major way on Government 
42 

policy that aggressively promotes decarbonization of electricity production. So the 

policy question is: in the absence of Government policy to control carbon, should 

Government invest in demonstrating CCS and evolutionary nuclear technology? 

I advocate an aggressive Government demonstration program, fully understanding 

that the result may be money wasted. But because I think that the Nation is likely 

to have an aggressive carbon policy in the next few years, then CCS and nuclear 

could have a major market and play an important role in meeting climate objectives. 

However, both are large and expensive technologies at commercial scale, and their 

demonstration will take several years to produce the commercial experience that 

would give confidence to investors. As a result, waiting to conduct the demonstration until our climate policy is decided would only delay getting started on the challenge of reducing domestic carbon dioxide emissions. On balance, therefore, it seems 

prudent to me to move urgently to demonstrate these technologies in the hope that 

one or both proves to be a winner in a world of carbon dioxide control. That world 

may not happen, and commercial experience with one or both technologies may 

prove to be disappointing, but in this case the risk seems worth it. 

What are the Main New Challenges for Research?—I’m confident that the scientists and technologists can craft a research agenda that expands basic research 

and that focuses applied research on specific market barriers. Indeed, Secretary Chu 

and his team have already introduced organizational innovations that seem to me 

to be very much in the right direction. So in concluding my testimony, I’d like to 

raise two issues from the social sciences that strike me as crucial to the success of 

technology change going forward. 

First, we need to know more about household energy use and consumer behavior. 

Household decisions directly determine 40 percent of total energy use and another 

30 percent indirectly. But household decisions are not always made on the sole basis 

of economic rationality. Energy efficiency programs famously fall short of the level 

of adoption that so-called rational behavior suggests should be the case. Therefore, 

it seems to me that behavioral science research may be as important as technology 

R&D in promoting the use of energy efficiency. 

Second, it’s clear that any program to change in a fundamental way the composition of the national energy system requires a sustained effort over a long period of 

time. The history of Government energy R&D, however, is one of twists and turns 

in goals and philosophy. Designing an energy R&D portfolio that maintains a reasonable degree of continuity over several decades is an extraordinary governance 

challenge, but one that needs to be addressed if the Nation is to see real results 

from its substantial investment. 
43 

Senator DORGAN. Mr. Fri, thank you very much. 

Finally, we will hear from Dr. Eric Loewen, Dr. Loewen. 

STATEMENT OF DR. ERIC P. LOEWEN, CHIEF CONSULTING ENGINEER, 

ADVANCED PLANTS TECHNOLOGY, GE HITACHI NUCLEAR ENERGY 

Dr. LOEWEN. Mr. Chairman, Senator Alexander, my name is Eric 

Loewen, chief consulting engineer for advanced plants at GE 

Hitachi Nuclear Energy. Thank you for the opportunity to testify 

before you today to share with you a vision for a cleaner, more secure energy future for America. 

Headquartered in Wilmington, North Carolina GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy is a world-class enterprise dedicated to serving the 

nuclear industry with over 100 years of combined experience, and 

our nuclear alliance with Hitachi is recognized as a world leader 

for boiling water reactors. 

Today let us talk about American innovation for a solution to 

three challenges that face this country: used nuclear fuel; excess 

weapons material; and clean energy. U.S. innovation has always 

led this industry. 

In 1954, Congress removed barriers to nuclear energy development, allowing for the commercialization of U.S. light water reactors which became the world standard. For the next 50 years, U.S.- 

developed technologies underpinned more than 300 plants in over 

30 countries around the world. 

The next great opportunity for the U.S.-developed technology is 

the GEN IV reactor. The GEN IV reactor that I am most familiar 

with is the PRISM, a sodium-cooled reactor under development 

since 1981. The PRISM is America’s sodium-cooled reactor developed jointly by nine U.S. companies under the leadership of General Electric. PRISM is the only active small modular reactor design that has been reviewed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The reactor can generate electricity. It can consume weaponsgrade material and recycle used nuclear fuel. 

Let me explain the vision for recycling under the context of the 

three R’s: repository, reprocessing or recycling. 

The repository, which many people think of as Yucca Mountain, 

was envisioned to store today’s used nuclear fuel for 1 million 

years. 

The reprocessing option is widely used today in the United Kingdom and in France and soon in Japan. It is a process that extracts 

plutonium from used nuclear fuel with an aqueous-acid system and 

organic solvents. The recovered plutonium is made into fuel for 

water-cooled reactors. The wastes, fission products, and 

transuranics are incorporated into a glass requiring safe storage for 

10,000 years. 

Finally, recycling simply put, turns waste into watts. This is an 

American technology we seek to commercialize from our Nation’s 

national laboratories. The process recovers uranium and 

transuranics used in a molten salt bath, which become fuel in a sodium-cooled reactor. The wastes, just the fission products, are incorporated into a rock and a piece of metal requiring safe storage 

for 300 to 500 years. No pure plutonium is extracted. Therefore, 

proliferation risks are greatly reduced. 
44 

Earlier this year, President Obama directed Secretary Chu to establish a blue ribbon commission to make recommendations for 

used nuclear fuel. GE Hitachi has requested an opportunity to engage the commission to discuss the benefits of recycling, as we are 

doing today with the subcommittee. We believe that recycling is a 

credible alternative to Yucca Mountain that deserves serious consideration by Congress and the commission. 

And some of the benefits of recycling are: first, it reduces the required storage time of wastes from greater than 1 million years to 

hundreds of years; second, the used nuclear fuel can generate the 

U.S. electricity needs for the next 100 years; and third, if you add 

in the U.S. inventory of depleted uranium, you can meet the electricity needs of the United States for close to 1,000 years. 

While GEH believes that PRISM is an excellent technology, we 

acknowledge that it is not the only technology and we encourage 

Congress and the commission to embrace the concept of recycling 

rather than a particular technology. GEH supports establishing recycling projects in regions where the reactors stand and where consumers have paid into the Nuclear Waste Fund. 

GEH believes that in order to sustain a long-term development 

of full recycling, the United States must learn from the United 

Kingdom, France, and Japan regarding best practices from reprocessing. But we must also stand on our own to develop full-recycling 

technology and the following will reduce the risks to get there. 

First, we should competitively award industry-led licensing 

projects for the sodium-cooled reactors. 

Second, reenergize the domestic manufacturing base by competitively awarding the manufacture and siting of two sodium recycling 

reactor vessels to support that licensing effort. 

And third, allow for the use of sodium-cooled recycling reactors 

to use weapons-grade materials to generate electricity. 

Our current challenges of finding a waste solution and disposing 

of weapons-grade materials calls for policymakers to take a fresh 

look at how to fast-track the building of a sodium-cooled recycling 

reactor to leap frog out allies leading to a transformational full recycling approach. 

PREPARED STATEMENT

That is our vision for the future. 

That concludes my remarks and I would be pleased to answer 

any questions, Mr. Chairman. 

[The statement follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. ERIC P. LOEWEN

ADVANCING TECHNOLOGY FOR NUCLEAR ENERGY

Mr. Chairman, Senator Alexander, and members of the subcommittee, I am Eric 

Loewen, Chief Consulting Engineer of Advanced Plants at GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. As you look at energy policy over the past 40 years, I have been asked to help you look forward— 

to look at the next generation of nuclear technology—the technology that will help 

the United States achieve energy independence, create new jobs and move toward 

a low carbon future. 

Headquartered in Wilmington, North Carolina, GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy (GEH) 

is a world-class enterprise with a highly skilled workforce and global infrastructure 

dedicated to serving the nuclear industry. We are proud of our record of accomplishments that spans more than five decades; our nuclear alliance is recognized as the 
45 

world’s foremost developer of boiling water reactors, robust fuel cycle products and 

highly valued nuclear plant services. Combining deep-rooted experience with fresh 

insight, we provide light water plant operators with responsive reactor services to 

support safe, efficient and reliable operation. 

The Nation has already begun to witness the success of the recent Federal polices 

designed to bring about a renaissance of the nuclear industry in the United States. 

Today, with the incentives of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 in effect, the design and 

even some basic construction have begun on the next generation of light water reactors in the United States. Public support for clean, reliable nuclear energy is at 

record high levels. We have an opportunity to increase the percentage of electricity 

produced by nuclear plants above the current 20 percent. 

My testimony today will give you an overview of how nuclear technology has developed over the past 40 years, the current state of technology in the United States 

and the rest of the world, and perspectives on where the technology might go in the 

40 years to come. 

OVERVIEW OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY

U.S. leadership in nuclear energy started in 1951 at the National Reactor Test 

Station near Arco, Idaho. This sodium-cooled reactor produced enough electricity to 

light four light bulbs. Interestingly, a study done for President Harry Truman in 

1952 made a ‘‘relatively pessimistic’’ assessment of nuclear power and actually 

called for research instead in solar energy. President Eisenhower’s call for ‘‘Atoms 

for Peace’’ 1 year later, however, led to the initial indication that the Federal Government would be a strong partner in the development of civilian nuclear energy. 

The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 removed barriers to nuclear energy development by 

the private sector. The stated purpose of the 1954 Act was to encourage widespread 

participation in the development and utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, although nuclear materials remained under Government control. The new 

law for the first time permitted private industry to build and operate nuclear plants 

on their own initiative, and not just as Government contractors. GE, the first company to take advantage of this opportunity, built a reactor in Vallecitos, CA—the 

first commercially funded reactor in the United States. to provide power to the grid. 

In 1955, an early concept of a boiling water reactor developed by Argonne National Laboratory powered a city—Arco, ID—the first such use of nuclear power in 

the world. This U.S. technical leadership lead to the first generation of commercial 

nuclear power plants (GEN I), some of which are still in operation. The world’s first 

commercial nuclear power plant opened in England in 1956; the first plant in the 

United States came a year later in Pennsylvania. Availability of adequate funding 

to provide compensation in the very unlikely event of a nuclear or radiological incident was addressed through the passage of the Price-Anderson Act in 1957. 

GE commercialized Argonne’s concept of the boiling water reactor by first building 

a small commercial reactor at our GE facility in Vallecitos, CA, followed by the larger commercial boiling water reactors at the Dresden unit in Illinois, the KRB unit 

in Europe and the Tsuruga plant in Japan. GE management proceeded in the confident expectation that it could develop the Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) technology 

and have a commercially competitive product by the 1960s. 

The construction of Generation II reactors followed in the early 1960s and represent the 104 nuclear power plants operating in the United States today. Of the 

GEN II reactors in the United States today, 34 percent are BWR designs and 66 

percent are pressurized water reactors (PWR). The power output of U.S. GEN II reactors ranges from 482 to 1,300 MWe. In the early 1960s, these were built as ‘‘turnkey projects’’ to overcome the reluctance of utilities to assume the uncertain risk of 

building nuclear plants. By the mid 1960s, the industry had evolved to the point 

where architect engineers and constructors contracted directly with owners and 

turnkey plants were no longer offered. 

During the 1960s, U.S. light water reactor (both BWR and PWR) technology also 

became established in the world nuclear market, with large orders in Western Europe and Japan. The light-water reactor became the world’s technology standard, 

outstripping the British gas-cooled reactor and Canadian heavy-water reactor technologies by wide margins. 

From the construction and operating experience of the GEN II reactors, design 

improvements were made by industry, and the U.S. Government improved the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s licensing processes. The Energy Policy Act of 1992 

authorized the one step licensing process known better in the industry as ‘‘Part 52.’’ 

GE submitted its GEN III design, the Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR) 

to the NRC in 1987 and received design certification in 1997. To date, no certified 

GEN III reactor has yet been built in the United States. There are currently four 
46 

ABWRs operating in Japan and work will soon be complete on construction of two 

additional ABWRs in Japan and two in Taiwan. 

The year 1992 was the high water mark for U.S. nuclear power plant installed 

capacity. The technical successes were enormous. We now have in operation nuclear 

power plants with a generating capacity greater than the total U.S. electrical capacity installed in 1940, and the plants have a superb safety record. The technical 

issues that the industry has been able to resolve are far greater than those that 

remain to be solved. Yet no new plants were started. Why? One significant reason 

is the substantial financial risks due to the large capital investment required and 

uncertainties about cost and schedule on new reactor designs. 

The Energy Policy Act of 2005 responded to these financial risks by authorizing 

loan guarantees for carbon free technologies such as nuclear power plants, tax incentives for first movers, and risk insurance during the construction phase. This 

promise of these policies became reality when President Obama announced in February that the Department of Energy has offered conditional commitments for a 

total of $8.33 billion in loan guarantees for the construction and operation of two 

new nuclear reactors at a plant in Burke, Georgia. This project is expected to be 

the first new nuclear power plant to break ground in the United States in nearly 

three decades. 

It is important to note that, despite the fact that the United States has not built 

any new plants in recent years, U.S.-developed light-water reactor technology has 

become the world standard. Japan, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Sweden, and 

Switzerland have all adopted our light-water reactor design for their nuclear programs. 

GEH submitted the next advancement in technology its GEN III∂ design, the 

economic simplified boiling water reactor (ESBWR), to the NRC for design certification under part 52 in 2005, and is expecting final certification in September 2011. 

This effort was supported by the DOE Nuclear Energy Office through the Nuclear 

Power 2010 program. 

Looking forward to the next generation of nuclear plant design, in 2000, the 

United States organized the world technical community to look at GEN IV reactors 

in order to improve safety, and address waste issues, and reduce cost and proliferation concerns. This international effort screened over 100 different reactor concepts 

to identify 6 plausible designs for continued study. Three of the six GEN IV reactor 

concepts could be used for nuclear fuel recycling. 

RECYCLING—WHAT IS IT?

The next area for U.S. innovative leadership in nuclear energy is the commercialization of full-recycling technology. 

There are three basic options for used fuel management: the 3 Rs—Repository, 

Reprocessing or Recycling. Let me provide an overview of each: 

Repository.—Underground storage for used nuclear fuel from the GEN I and GEN 

II fleet, where it needs to be stored for at least 1,000,000 years. 

Reprocessing.—Takes GEN I and GEN II used nuclear fuel for the separation of 

plutonium using an aqueous-acid system and organic solvents. The recovered plutonium is used in GEN II reactors. The wastes, fission products and high-heat-load 

transuranics (also known as actinides) are incorporated into glass requiring safe 

storage for at least 10,000 years. Reprocessing is done currently in the U.K. and 

France, and soon will be in Japan. 

Recycling.—Takes GEN I–GEN III used nuclear fuel and separates the usable 

uranium and transuranics using a molten salt bath and electricity. The recovered 

uranium and transuranics are then used as fuel for GEN IV reactors, thereby generating electricity from nuclear waste. The remaining fission products wastes are 

placed into a rock (ceramic) and chunk of metal (a metallic alloy of Zr or Fe) requiring safe storage for just a few hundred years. Because no pure plutonium is extracted, the proliferation risks are eliminated. The United States uses a form of this 

approach currently in treating spent fuel at the Idaho National Laboratory. We call 

this process ‘‘full-recycling.’’ 

GE and now GEH have supported investigation of the full-recycling approach initially called the Integral Fast Reactor concept, which was funded under DOE’s Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor program for 10 years and by the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership for the past 3 years. What does it take to recycle? A Generation 

IV reactor. 

GENERATION IV REACTOR—WHAT IS IT?

Perhaps the greatest promise of the next generation reactor is the ability to recycle used fuel from today’s light water reactors. 
47 

The GEN IV reactor that I am most familiar with is the PRISM, a Sodium Fast 

Reactor or ‘‘SFR’’ under development since 1981. The PRISM is America’s sodiumcooled reactor, developed jointly by nine U.S. companies under the leadership of GE. 

The reactor recycles used nuclear fuel, generates electricity and incorporates the lessons learned from the development of earlier reactors. 

Following is a brief overview of how the technology works. First, the recycled elements (uranium and transuranics) from today’s light water reactors are fabricated 

into a metallic reactor fuel, which is submerged in liquid sodium. During operation 

the recycled material fissions (i.e. splits in half) releases energy, and is removed by 

the flow of sodium and ultimately turned into electricity. The unique element in this 

recycling reactor is the sodium coolant, which allows nuclear interactions at higher 

energies so that full-recycling can occur. This cannot occur in a water-cooled GEN 

II or GEN III reactor where nuclear reactions occur at lower energies. 

The sodium-cooled GEN IV reactor is designed with passive safety features. These 

include passive reactor shutdown, passive shutdown heat removal (requires no 

human or automatic systems), and passive reactor cavity cooling (improves safety 

and reduces cost). The sodium-cooled GEN IV reactor supports a sustainable and 

flexible fuel cycle to consume transuranic elements within the fuel as it generates 

electricity. 

Key milestones and attributes associated with this technology include: 

—EBR–II is a sodium test reactor with 30 years of successful operation at the Argonne National Laboratory, which provides a significant base of technical data; 

—The Energy Policy Act of 1992 authorized the building of a sodium-cooled recycling reactor; 

—The 2002 DOE GEN IV Roadmap rated the sodium-cooled reactor ahead of the 

other five GEN IV concepts; 

—Most recently the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, with four industrial 

teams including GEH, all agreed that a sodium-cooled reactor was needed to 

fully recycle all the transuranics in used nuclear fuel; 

—A GEN IV sodium-cooled reactor vessel can be fabricated in the United States 

today; and 

—This technology uses small modular reactors suitable for smaller electrical 

grids. 

Earlier this year, President Obama directed the Secretary of Energy to establish 

the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future to make recommendations for developing a safe, long-term solution to managing the Nation’s used nuclear fuel and nuclear waste. The highly respected members of the Commission have 

already started their work and will provide a final report to the President within 

the next 2 years. GEH has requested an opportunity to engage with the Commission 

to discuss the benefits of full-recycling and the establishment of recycling centers. 

Some of the benefits of recycling that we will outline include: 

—Reducing the required storage time of used nuclear fuel by over 99.99 percent, 

from greater than 1 million years to several hundred years; 

—Using the current U.S. inventory of 60,000 metric tons of used nuclear fuel to 

meet the electricity generation demands of the United States for over 100 years 

if recycled within a high energy GEN IV reactor (using 2008 U.S. electricity 

generation data); and 

—Using the U.S. inventory of depleted uranium that is discarded during the enrichment process that has the potential to meet the electricity generation demands of the United States for over 900 years if recycled within a sodiumcooled GEN IV reactor (using 2008 U.S. electricity generation data). 

While GEH believes the PRISM is an excellent technology, we acknowledge that 

it is not the only technology and will encourage the Commission to embrace the concept of recycling rather than endorse a particular technology. GEH supports establishing advanced recycling centers in the regions where the reactors stand and 

where consumers have paid into the Nuclear Waste Fund. 

TOWARD A NEW GEN IV POLICY

GE has worked with the U.S. Government to develop civilian nuclear power technology since the beginning of the U.S. nuclear program. There was extraordinary 

creativity in fashioning novel arrangements to meet the demands of nuclear development; Congress established the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, and industry 

established standards and professional societies such as the American Nuclear Society to support those standards. These Government/private sector approaches represented triumphs of pragmatism over ideology and of substance over form. 

Over the past decade, Congress has been responsive and creative in supporting 

the national laboratories and universities as they investigate the sustainable nu-
48 

clear fuel cycle. This focus on education and research has played a significant role 

in the large increase of graduates in nuclear related fields, and must continue so 

that the industry is prepared for the future. 

Our current challenges (waste solutions and plutonium disposition) and opportunities for low carbon electricity call for policymakers to take a fresh look at how to 

fast track the building of sodium-cooled recycling reactors. 

GEH believes that in order to sustain long-term development of full-recycling, the 

United States must learn from our foreign allies (U.K., France, and Japan) regarding best practices from the modified open fuel cycle approach (reprocessing). But we 

must also stand on our own in support of an even more innovative full-recycling 

technology. 

It is critical to recognize that the United States is falling behind in developing 

innovative nuclear technologies. China and India are in the process of building sodium-cooled GEN IV reactors, which are expected to be the drivers in their development of sustainable nuclear fuel cycles. Without a similar long-term policy, the 

United States can expect to place third, at best in the near future. 

Before I conclude my remarks, I want to shift gears a little and mention an additional innovative nuclear technology that GEH is pursuing in the United StatesGlobal Laser Enrichment. This new method of enriching uranium for peaceful purposes is being developed in the United States under strict oversight by the NRC and 

the Department of Energy. If the testing of the GLE technology continues to return 

the positive results we have seen thus far, we will soon build the first commercial 

facility in Wilmington, NC, adding hundreds of high paying jobs and providing our 

U.S. customers with a competitively priced, domestic supply of enriched fuel for 

their power plants. 

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

The advanced nuclear power technology developed at GEH is a vital part of GE’s 

clean energy portfolio. The world needs the innovative energy technology solutions 

America has to offer, and America needs them too. 

Safe, reliable base-load electricity generated without producing greenhouse gas 

emissions is needed to meet the heavy demands of industrial and residential users. 

Congress and the public have endorsed the expansion of nuclear power in the 

United States, understanding the energy independence and job growth potential of 

this low-carbon power generation technology. The helpful provisions in the Energy 

Policy Act of 2005, including loan guarantees have helped set the stage for a nuclear 

power renaissance. 

We must continue the great tradition of the Government and private sectors 

working in partnership to enable nuclear energy to grow. Our recommendations for 

this subcommittee for investments in an abundant and responsible long-term energy 

supply, for weapons plutonium disposition and for addressing used nuclear fuel 

using full-recycling are to support: 

—Competitively awarded industry-led licensing project(s) for sodium-cooled recycling reactor(s). 

—Reenergize the domestic manufacturing and sodium research and development 

base by competitively awarding the manufacture and siting of two GEN IV sodium recycling reactor vessels to support the licensing project. 

—Expand the weapons disposition program to include converting weapons material into fuel for disposition in a sodium-cooled recycling reactor. 

—Funding the President’s budget request for the nuclear energy programs including an additional $36 billion in loan guarantees, Reactor Concepts R&D, Fuel 

Cycle R&D and the Nuclear Energy Enabling Technology program. 

The Nation faces a choice today: should we continue down the same path that we 

have been on for the last 30 years with a repository-only solution, should we take 

the path of our allies and adopt reprocessing, or should we lead nuclear innovation 

with full-recycling? By building a sodium-cooled recycling project, we can lead the 

transformation to full-recycling, use a previously untapped energy source, and provide another path for weapons plutonium disposition. 

Thank you. This concludes my formal statement. I would be pleased to answer 

any questions you may have at this time. 

Senator DORGAN. Dr. Loewen, thank you very much. 

Mr. Sharp, first of all, I appreciate your testimony. I think there 

is an understanding that much of what we need to do requires additional funding, research, and commitment to have a consistent 

scientific inquiry in a range of areas. For example, decarbonizing 
49 

the use of coal, it is pretty clear to me we are going to continue 

to use coal in this country’s future, but we need to use it differently 

and will. But to get to that point, we are going to need to make 

investments. 

How do you think that is going to progress? There is a big group 

down at the White House starting yesterday trying to figure out 

how you cut back spending and find additional revenues to reduce 

the budget deficit. So this is not a very easy time in which to accomplish that which you believe need to be done. 

Mr. SHARP. Well, what you raise is the problem of how to get 

persistent policy, and of course, our past experience is it is up and 

down and that means we do not advance in a number of ways. 

Let me just first back up. Just investing in research does not 

guarantee the product comes out, but we still need to do this, especially on carbon capture and storage because of the critical role of 

coal. Obviously, if you turn to a system of cap and trade, you have 

some additional possibilities for funding because you are generating in the private market value which is in the allowances, for 

example, that can be used to fund this because I think one of the 

things—all these initiatives taken in 2005 and 2007 and in the 

stimulus package—any of them based on appropriations are bound 

to run into severe pressure on them in the next 3 to 5 years because of the deficit. I do not see any other way you folks can manage that. That does not mean they are all abandoned, but this has 

been the historic problem. 

So one of the virtues of the carbon tax, which is difficult to sell 

I realize, or the cap and trade system is that they at least generate 

either in the private sector or in the public sector some kind of 

value that can be directed toward these goals. 

Senator DORGAN. Without having a long discussion about it, 

those who are working on climate change in the Senate breathlessly announced that cap and trade is dead. So whatever the alternative may or may not be. I personally believe there should be a 

price on carbon, and I would support a carbon fee. I think we 

should cap carbon and price carbon. I understand that, but I do not 

support cap and trade and would not. 

Mr. SHARP. Well, I understand that announcement, Senator, but 

I might just say my impression of the Kerry-Graham-Lieberman is 

that while they are not any longer supporting an economy-wide cap 

and trade system, that they have something with a different name 

called the ‘‘cap on the electric utilities sector,’’ which is where we 

had the experience of SO2. It has the same function. 

Senator DORGAN. You are right, of course. I was simply describing what their announcement was. 

Mr. SHARP. Right. 

Senator DORGAN. You are absolutely correct that in that area, it 

is cap and trade. 

Mr. Fri, you indicated in your testimony that with respect to the 

research that is being done in energy and has been done now for 

some while from the Ford administration forward, that almost all 

of the benefits from this research came from four programs. You 

talk about the total Federal cost of the three efficiency programs 

being $12 million and producing $30 billion in economic benefits. 

What that implies, without saying it, is a lot of the research, of 
50 

course, does not amount to anything, and some of the research and 

perhaps some of the research that is the least costly research can 

provide huge benefits. 

Is it not the case that, in terms of finding a way to make fuel 

from thin air, as we described earlier, or trying to find the right 

way to decarbonize coal—we held a hearing on beneficial use of 

carbon, which I am very interested in—in order to reach these 

areas and find some positive conclusions to research, you are going 

to have to, perhaps, go down a lot of blind alleys? Therefore, a lot 

of that money will not be effectively spent, but that is just the nature of research. Is it not? 

Mr. SHARP. It is the nature of research, of course, and you cannot 

expect everything to be a winner, much less a home run like those 

little efficiency programs. But looking at those three programs, as 

I suggested in my testimony, tells you something about what you 

should look for when you are planning research, and in those three 

cases, there was a clear private market for more efficient refrigerators, for low-emissivity windows, and electronic ballasts to fluorescent light bulbs. Those were the three programs, plenty of private market out there. There was in each case a fairly specific market barrier, not even a technology barrier that needed to be removed that would let the private market move that new technology 

to market. And that is the lesson I think you need to draw in terms 

of planning and funding research, is to be disciplined about the two 

crucial questions. If you are successful, is there likely to be a market and what barrier can be removed by Federal action that will 

allow the private sector to get that technology to market? Now, 

even with those rules, you are not going to win every one, but I 

think you can avoid some of the blind allies. 

Senator DORGAN. Mr. Loewen, your testimony is exclusively 

about nuclear energy, and that has been a part of what we have 

done, although we have not built new plants for a long, long while. 

I think everyone concedes—you described the President’s comments—and myself and others concede that nuclear power is going 

to be a part of our future and we are going to see additional plants 

built. 

The concept of this hearing is a broader look at what aspirations 

we have for an energy mix and the development of additional energy sources, given that nuclear is going to be a part of that. Have 

you done work and studies in other areas? Do you have some comments about the larger energy mix going forward 20, 40, 50 years 

from now? 

Dr. LOEWEN. Yes. Senator Dorgan, my role is as a Chief Engineer for a company that sells nuclear powerplants. I work for a 

larger company that also sells a wide portfolio of energy products. 

And our chairman, Mr. Immelt, came to Washington, DC in 2005 

and announced the ecoimagination project, and that has really 

started our company to look at green energy sources across the 

spectrum of our suite of technologies. 

The reason why I drilled down so far in the details on this particular nuclear technology is that it is using a completely different 

source of energy input than we have from our current nuclear 

power plants. And that is where I see with your chart up there 

with the wood piles and all these different pictures depicting how 
51 

we changed, you could have a picture where you are using all those 

canisters that are in Oak Ridge, Tennessee and Portsmouth, Ohio 

and Paducah, Kentucky of the depleted uranium, and that becomes 

an energy source. So that was where I was trying to provide the 

committee kind of that broader look, that this is an energy source 

that we have not tapped into yet. 

Senator DORGAN. I want to ask Senator Alexander to inquire further. 

As I said, I am very interested in beneficial use of carbon because, Mr. Sharp, you and Mr. Fri both described the need to restrain carbon. I think most everyone understands that now. Tell 

me your assessment of the promise of beneficial use of carbon. 

We know in North Dakota, you can put CO2 down into an oil well 

and enhance oil recovery. But there are a lot of other breathless 

ideas out there that are trying to demonstrate at scale a solution 

for the beneficial use of carbon, actually bringing the price of carbon down to near zero if they find the right beneficial use. What 

is your assessment of that? 

Mr. SHARP. Well, I am the wrong person to ask. I honestly do not 

know. 

Obviously, enhanced oil recovery is a known operational thing, 

but that will never use the large quantities that we need to sequester. But I certainly think it is well worth us spending some incentive money on finding out in the research area whether some of 

these things can pan out. 

Again, one of the biggest questions for all of these kind of things 

that we face is the scale of what we are ultimately talking about 

is gigantic, whether it is in oil, gas, electricity, or whatever. And 

when we talk about these things, the important reason to go multiple ways on these technologies is precisely because few of them 

end up being able to scale up to do what we need. 

So I do not have an answer on this. Maybe Bob Fri has a—— 

Senator DORGAN. We had a scientist from Sandia testify at one 

of our hearings, and she said, change your mind set a little bit, 

which I thought was interesting. We think of carbon as a problem. 

Think of carbon as a product and how would you use the product, 

a very different approach for a scientist. 

Mr. Fri. 

Mr. FRI. That is right. There are certainly a lot of great ideas out 

there about ways of using carbon in an agricultural setting and 

others that would make it a valuable resource and we ought to explore those. 

But Phil Sharp is right. The portfolio that we are dealing with 

has two dimensions, maybe more. But one is scale. If we cannot ultimately scale something up to a point where it makes a substantial difference in a very large energy system, then it can be of some 

help, but we really do need the scale. And the other is timing in 

the sense there are some things we know how to do now and if we 

are serious about particularly climate change, we really need to 

start doing them. 

And there are a lot of very good ideas about what we might be 

able to do in the future, and we need to pick the ones of those that 

are going to be game-changers. Some of the uses of carbon that 
52 

have been suggested do have the scale properties and could be 

game-changers and I think are worth support. 

Mr. SHARP. Senator, if I just add a note. Part of this goes to how 

effective different kinds of policies are. You folks have a responsibility—you have done it—of investing in these kinds of technologies. But going back to Mr. Fri’s articulation of the need for 

market incentives, if you put in place in this country a carbon constraint policy, that is likely in and of itself to at least produce in 

the marketplace a number of incentives which tell somebody at 

Sandia and everywhere else you build it and they will come because if it works, we will be sucking it into the marketplace. It will 

not stay on the shelf. 

Senator DORGAN. Thank you very much. 

Senator Alexander. 

Senator ALEXANDER. Mr. Chairman, this has been a very interesting hearing. 

Mr. Fri, as I understood your comments, you are saying every 

now and then we ought to review what we are doing in research 

and make sure it is appropriate. 

And then we were talking a little bit. The Senator and Mr. Sharp 

were talking about, well, where we are going to get the money for 

this research. 

To make this topical, I think Secretary Salazar is going to announce today that the Federal Government is going to approve the 

Cape Wind project which has put wind the size of Manhattan Island in Nantucket Sound. 

Mr. Fri, if you were persuaded that the Energy Information Administration figures show that our subsidies for wind today are 25 

times as much per megawatt hour as subsidies for all other forms 

of electricity combined and that to produce 20 percent of our electricity from wind would cost taxpayers $170 billion over 10 years, 

would you think that a wiser use of some of that money might be 

for research into other areas such as advanced batteries or photovoltaic cells or the carbon capture ideas that we were talking 

about? 

Mr. FRI. I suppose the short answer is yes, to some extent. I 

think that the wind experience has actually been a success story 

with a lesson associated with it. The success story is we do now 

have some considerable amount of wind capacity in the United 

States. It is a promising technology which is, even without the production tax credit, becoming economically competitive in certain regions. 

The lesson goes back to something Mr. Sharp was saying and 

that is we tended to have a production tax credit one year and then 

not the next year and then back again. And that kind of jerking 

the system around does not lead to an efficient use of resources. It 

is better in my judgment to moderate the level of resource commitment and be more consistent about doing it each and every year 

until you get the job done. 

Senator ALEXANDER. It produces 1.3 percent of our electricity, and it is going to cost us—we have already committed $30 billion 

to it. 

Mr. Sharp, I noticed the President has appointed you to the Nuclear Security Commission which is a very distinguished group of 
53 

people. I am very pleased with what he has done there with the 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

I was doing some quick math in my head. And you know that 

I have been at your forum talking about the renewable energy 

sprawl, and we have had a lot of talk about scale today. The Cape 

Wind project would cover an area the size of Manhattan Island. It 

would produce about one-tenth the amount of electricity that one 

reactor would on 1 square mile, and the reactor electricity would 

be more reliable at a cheaper cost and cost taxpayers a lot less. Is 

that an appropriate thing to consider as we go forward? 

Mr. SHARP. Well, I certainly think that is one of the factors that 

will and should be considered as we go forward. I would simply 

say, as you can appreciate, that I personally believe we need and 

should have more nuclear power, especially if we are confronting 

the climate change issue. But I think the larger energy picture requires a broad mix, and so we want to be careful not just to say 

we only will go with this one, but not with that one. 

However, if I can resort to your previous question, I do think ultimately over time, when we decide to subsidize an infant industry, 

we must have an exit strategy, and there has got to be a point at 

which we are as consumers confronted with what the real costs are. 

Now, I think in the developmental stage, there is a justification 

for the Government, just as I think on the nuclear power for testing out these new reactors—what we are really testing is whether 

the regulatory system and the construction process and the management of it can be done in an effective and timely manner— 

should have loan guarantees for the Government to do that, but 

not for loan guarantees forever for nuclear, any more than a subsidy forever on wind. 

Senator ALEXANDER. And if we have an interest in low carbon 

energy production, would it not make more sense to have a low-carbon energy standard rather than a renewable energy standard that 

picks and chooses particular forms? 

Mr. SHARP. Yes. 

Senator ALEXANDER. Mr. Fri, do you agree with that? 

Mr. FRI. Yes. Whether it is by regulatory means or economic incentive means, the broader the application, the more people you get 

trying to innovate, the more success you are going to have in showing up with something that really works. 

Senator ALEXANDER. Thank you. 

And Mr. Chairman, if I could ask Mr. Loewen just one question 

in my time, thank you for coming today. 

The President talked in his State of the Union Address about a 

new generation of nuclear reactors, and he may have been talking 

about more of the same kind we already build. But as we talk 

about the 500-mile battery for an electric car and cutting the cost 

of photovoltaic cells by a factor of 4, we should also be talking 

about how do we do a better job of recycling used nuclear fuel in 

a way that reduces its mass, makes it easier to store, and does not 

isolate plutonium. The reactor on which you are working is one 

that does that. How soon do you think that reactor could be commercially available in the United States? 

Dr. LOEWEN. Thank you, Senator Alexander. That is a question 

that I have been asked a lot. 
54 

Senator ALEXANDER. Probably by people in your own company. 

Dr. LOEWEN. Yes, on the second day of employment. 

The initiatives that I outlined in both my written and oral testimony are not really about the technology. It is not really about the 

cost. It is about gaining that sort of confidence to reduce the risk. 

So broadly, our vision is how we reduce that risk. So that is where 

we see starting a licensing process now, tomorrow. And in that context, now we harness the intellectual capital of our universities and 

our national laboratories. So in that licensing process, when a vendor like General Electric submits it to the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission, that is open and transparent, and when we get questions for additional information, some of those questions would be 

more appropriate for the national laboratory to answer or a researcher at a university. Then those get fed back so that then we 

feel comfortable about this technology, with that license in hand, 

then I can come before this subcommittee and say this is how much 

it is going to cost because it is a difficult thing to do right now with 

the licensing risk. 

Then the other one is let us build a reactor vessel that is a test 

stand. It does not need a license. It gets filled with water. We put 

that at a university. We put another one at a national laboratory 

and fill that full of sodium, and that becomes a place that we can 

get some of the answers that we need in the licensing process. 

So to answer your question simply, sir, we could start tomorrow 

with those incremental steps to gain that confidence so that we can 

bring this technology forward. 

Senator ALEXANDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator DORGAN. Senator Alexander, thank you very much. 

Let me just say again I support some additional nuclear energy 

in this country, and my hope is that my colleagues and others will 

support finding ways to get clean, less expensive energy where the 

sun shines and the wind blows. That, it seems to me, will be an 

inexhaustible source of cheap, clean energy in the future, provided 

that we bring to bear on that our best scientific minds. We have 

made a lot of progress in wind energy, I might say. 

But I think we have really disserved wind energy and some others with what we have done on the production tax credit. Consider 

what we did with oil. I think it was 1916 we said to people, you 

want to look for oil and gas in this country, God bless you. That 

is what this country wants you to do, and we are going to put in 

place significant tax incentives for you to do that, very significant, 

permanent, long-term tax incentives. That is what we said to those 

who looked for oil and gas, and I have supported most of that. 

In 1992, we said to people who want to produce wind energy that 

we are going to put together a production tax credit. We will let 

it expire three or four times over the next 20–30 years. We will extend it six times, short-term, stutter, start, and stop. I mean, you 

want to shut off investments in something that is promising, that 

is a quick way to do it. 

I happen to think that we ought to pick some of these areas— 

nuclear would be fine, as well as wind and solar—and say here is 

where America is headed. Here is what we aspire to achieve for the 

next decade. Count on it. Believe in it. Invest in it. 
55 

Now, Europe, taking a look at solar and wind energy, has a 

much longer commitment, but also has a commitment that diminishes as the technologies improve and there is less need for the incentives. 

So we can and should be much smarter in a wide range of these 

areas. Yes, nuclear, but also wind and solar and renewables as 

well. 

CONCLUSION OF HEARING

So this has been, I think, a very interesting hearing. We appreciate the work all three of you are doing and appreciate your testimony today. 

This hearing is recessed. 

[Whereupon, at 11:58 a.m., Wednesday, April 28, the hearing 

was concluded, and the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene 

subject to the call of the Chair.] 

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