About the Repor

This report examines the state of women’s leadership in 

Afghanistan. It is based primarily on interviews and focus 

group discussions with more than two hundred academics, 

politicians, entrepreneurs, journalists, teachers, students, and 

civil society activists, as well as Afghan and international 

experts in Kabul between January and March 2015. The 

research is part of a partnership agreement between the 

United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and USAID aimed at 

supporting policy relevant research on Afghanistan, targeting 

national and international policymakers, in particular 

USAID strategies and programs such as PROMOTE.

About the Author

Aarya Nijat, a Harvard graduate, co-runs Duran Research 

& Analysis, a consulting firm based in Kabul. Jennifer 

Murtazashvili is assistant professor of public management 

and international development at the Graduate School of Public 

and International Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh.

2301 Constitution Ave., NW • Washington, DC 20037 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

Special Report 380  Septembe

© 2015 by the United States Institute of Peace. 

All rights reserved.

Content

Introduction 2

Defining Leadership 3

Efforts to Promote Women’s Leadership 5

Recommendations 13

Aarya Nijat and Jennifer Murtazashvili

Women’s Leadership Roles 

in Afghanistan

Summary

• Since 2001, the Afghan government, in partnership with the international community, has 

invested vast resources seeking to ensure the emergence of women as leaders in politics, 

business, and civil society.

• The adaptive leadership framework used in this analysis stresses contextual awareness and 

a leader’s sense of purpose, and views leadership as mobilizing people to tackle collective 

challenges. Authority is only one of many tools leaders have at their disposal.

• Many women have emerged in positions of national significance in politics, business, and 

civil society. However, women’s space for leadership remains limited, donor dependent, and 

primarily urban; interventions aimed at promoting women’s leadership primarily focus on 

raw counts of women in political positions.

• Women are underrepresented in the private sector and have no active role in economic 

production. Insecurity, harassment, immobility, religious extremism, and corruption are 

common. Concepts such as gender equality remain largely misunderstood.

• Women in positions of authority are perceived as symbolic, lack political support, have 

weak decision-making and enforcement power, and lack access to sources of financial and 

human capital. 

• Bottom-up efforts to engage women have led to pressure groups and a culture of democratic advocacy but have also created donor-dependent entities that behave like rentier 

organizations and offer few incentives for widespread social mobilization, which is critical 

in developing enduring leadership.

• Men remain largely disengaged and often alienated from efforts to promote women’s 

leadership, which they associate with physical or sexual attributes rather than intellectual 

capacity. Engagement with religious groups has remained limited to quick fixes.

• Supportive family, credible and relevant female role models, and quality education—including religious knowledge—help generate an enabling environment for women’s leadership.

• Effective support of women’s leadership demands gender-inclusive approaches, creatively 

redefining leadership, facilitating women’s mobility, and strong political will.

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE www.usip.org

SPECIAL REPORT
2 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 380

Introduction

Women’s rights have become symbolic of the fate of Afghanistan. A desire on the part of 

the international community to “rescue” Afghan women from their social, political, and 

economic fate was key to mobilizing global support to topple the Taliban regime in the days 

after September 11, 2001.1 Since 2001, the Afghan government and the international community have invested vast resources seeking to improve the status of women. Chief among 

these were programs to support women leaders in politics, business, and civil society.

This research seeks to understand factors that contribute to the emergence of women 

leaders by identifying and assessing the past decade and a half’s efforts to promote women’s 

leadership. The findings are for the most part based on interviews and focus group discussions with men and women in Kabul. Interviews targeted prominent women in a wide range 

of fields, including politics, business, and civil society, to understand the factors that have 

contributed to their success but also the constraints. Prominent men in the private, public, 

and academic sectors also shared important insights into the trends affecting the emergence 

of women leaders in the public sphere.

Weak institutions and ineffective leadership hinder Afghanistan’s capacity to identify, 

own, and address challenges. Although international support has placed the issue of women’s 

leadership squarely on the domestic political agenda, interviewees indicated that Afghans 

themselves must shape the goals and strategies for the future. Women are an integral part 

of this group of change agents.

Fifteen years ago it would have been unthinkable to consider the wide scope of women 

in positions of national significance across the country and in so many diverse sectors. 

Several women have shattered glass ceilings, emerging outside the scope of conventional 

roles. Women have served as ministers, like Dr. Sima Samar and Dr. Suraya Dalil; provincial 

governors, like Habiba Sarabi; and parliamentarians and senators, like Shukria Barekzai, 

Fawzia Koofi, Sabrina Saqeb, Belquis Roshan, and Dr. Anarkali Honaryar. They have led businesses, like Sima Ghoryani and Roya Mahboob; established civil society organizations, like 

Shinkai Karokhail and Nargis Nehan; run large-scale media operations, like Najiba Ayubi; and 

spearheaded anticorruption campaigns, like Seema Ghani. They have organized nationwide 

voting campaigns, like Wazhma Forough; led large-scale humanitarian assistance organizations, like Fatima Gailani; and served as journalists and artists of national recognition, like 

Shakeela Ibrahimkhel and Aryana Saeed.

In interviews with both men and women, however, the consensus was overwhelming that 

women’s space for leadership remains limited, donor-dependent, and primarily urban. Many 

grassroots organizations—especially in rural areas—remain unknown nationally and lack 

English-language skills usually required to attract donor support. People we spoke with also 

believed that although the intervention since 2001 has promoted opportunities for women’s 

participation in the public sphere, it has also generated conflicts between liberal notions 

of human rights—promoted by the international community and Afghan civil society—and 

existing value systems in the Afghan society represented by religion and custom.2 Promotion of women in such spheres has catapulted women to positions of authority, but at the 

same time left them in a state where they are frequently removed from the realities of most 

men and women, leading to what one women’s rights activist described as a “dual identity 

in several women in leadership roles.” 3

The consensus among research participants was overwhelming that women in the public 

sphere lacked self-confidence and the ability to overcome dilemmas for collective action. 

In the words of one women’s rights activist, “A major limiting factor is that women do not 

connect to each other. Women lack a sense of belonging, have difficult and complicated 

personal lives, and yet do not speak about it, out of fear of loss of face. So they pretend, 

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily 

reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, 

which does not advocate specific policy positions.

To request permission to photocopy or reprint materials, 

e-mail: permissions@usip.org

About the Institut

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, 

nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress. 

Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, 

promote postconflict peacebuilding, and increase conflict 

management tools, capacity, and intellectual capital 

worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others 

with knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct 

involvement in conflict zones around the globe.

Board of Dir

Stephen J. Hadley, (Chair), Principal, RiceHadleyGates, LLC, 

Washington, DC • George E. Moose (Vice Chair), Adjunct 

Professor of Practice, The George Washington University, Washington, DC • Judy Ansley, Former Assistant to the President and 

Deputy National Security Advisor under George W. Bush, Washington, DC • Eric Edelman, Hertog Distinguished Practitioner 

in Residence, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International 

Studies, Washington, DC • Joseph Eldridge, University Chaplain 

and Senior Adjunct Professorial Lecturer, School of International 

Service, American University, Washington, DC • Kerry Kennedy, 

President, Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and Human 

Rights, Washington, DC • Ikram U. Khan, President, Quality Care 

Consultants, LLC., Las Vegas, NV • Stephen D. Krasner, Graham 

H. Stuart Professor of International Relations at Stanford 

University, Palo Alto, CA • John A. Lancaster, Former Executive 

Director, International Council on Independent Living, Potsdam, 

NY • Jeremy A. Rabkin, Professor of Law, George Mason 

University, Fairfax, VA • J. Robinson West, Chairman, PFC 

Energy, Washington, DC • Nancy Zirkin, Executive Vice 

President, Leadership Conference on Civil and 

Human Rights, Washington, DC 

Members Ex Offi

John Kerry, Secretary of State • Ashton Carter, Secretary of 

Defense • Gregg F. Martin, Major General, U.S. Army; President, 

National Defense University • Nancy Lindborg, President, 

United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting)
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 380 3

play double roles. Women leaders are incapable of helping themselves. They need saving 

more than anyone.” 4 This inability to engage with one another to foment political and social 

change is reflected in women’s failure to be accessible to each other and the citizens they 

seek to serve. To one female entrepreneur and civil society activist, “accessibility meant 

actively seeking and serving as mentors.” 5 To an anticorruption activist, it meant “forming 

purposeful partnerships.” 6

As we discuss, most efforts to promote women’s leadership in Afghanistan generally 

do so in a technical manner, assuming that the women’s empowerment deficit is an issue 

that can be resolved with fixes such as quotas or training programs. Increasingly, however, 

development practitioners and policymakers have adopted “adaptive” frameworks that 

respond to the needs and goals of society, rather than taking top-down approaches based 

on cookie-cutter models adopted from other countries.7

This research takes such an approach. Instead of measuring leadership in terms of the raw 

number of women in positions of authority, we see it as a purpose-driven tool or activity. 

In doing so, this research differentiates between two key terms: authority and leadership.8

Leadership is the act of mobilizing people, over whom one may or may not have authority, 

to tackle a collective challenge.9 Although some leaders may have authority in public office, 

authority is not a prerequisite for leadership. Similarly, individuals in formal positions of 

authority may not exhibit leadership characteristics. In fact, we found this to be a common 

but unfortunate result of efforts to promote women’s leadership in Afghanistan: women in 

positions of authority with very little capacity to effect meaningful change. Authority is 

just one of many tools leaders can use. The focus on placing women in authority without 

examining their leadership skills may undermine efforts to empower women because women 

who come to positions of authority by virtue of their gender alone cultivate an impression 

that women leaders are tokens in their positions. 

Before analyzing the nature of women’s leadership in Afghanistan, we first offer a definition of leadership—based on an adaptive leadership framework—that allows us to more 

precisely measure its emergence. 

Defining Leadership

Despite efforts to promote women’s leadership, most policy literature and discourse provides 

little guidance as to what constitutes leadership in Afghanistan. Aside from raw counts of 

women in political positions, the number of women advocacy organizations, or the number 

of trainings provided to women, little effort has been undertaken to measure the concept 

of leadership in any meaningful way. Here we define the adaptive leadership framework and 

illustrate why it is an appropriate vehicle to understand the status of women’s empowerment in Afghanistan. If policymakers adopted an adaptive approach to leadership, initiatives 

intended to support women would be more likely to endure because they would most likely 

reflect the will of mobilized groups within society rather than goals of the donor community 

or an individual or group within the government.

What Is Adaptive Leadership?

The adaptive leadership framework, pioneered by Harvard University professors Ronald 

Heifetz and Dean Williams, is useful because it helps us define leadership in ways we can 

measure and offers useful tools for impact analysis. The model has four key characteristics. 

First, it views successful leadership as an activity that involves mobilizing groups. Second, 

it differentiates between leadership and official authority. Third, it stresses the importance 

of contextual awareness. Fourth, to promote mobilization, individual leaders should have 

If policymakers adopted 

an adaptive approach to 

leadership, initiatives intended 

to support women would be 

more likely to endure because 

they would most likely reflect 

the will of mobilized groups 

within society rather than 

goals of the donor community 

or an individual or group 

within the government.
4 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 380

a strong sense of purpose. We elaborate on each of these characteristics in the Afghan 

context. Based on our findings, we believe that an adaptive approach to leadership—one 

that stresses prolonged engagement and mobilization—will be more effective helping the 

women’s movement in Afghanistan achieve sustained results than persisting as a donordependent and largely insular group of organizations focused on pleasing the international 

community instead of mobilizing citizens for effective long-term change.

This framework views leadership as an activity that contributes to improving people’s 

lives through informed mobilization. Rather than as a solitary effort promoted by a single 

individual, we view leadership as a collective process that facilitates the active role of 

individuals and groups in defining problems, identifying solutions, and adapting to change. 

Through this perspective, leadership is a purposeful activity that requires active participants 

rather than silent followers. Leaders do not develop visions, set goals, or define ways forward 

in isolation, but instead serve as a mirror for others, helping individuals prioritize issues and 

mobilizing them to find solutions. Generating participation in the process rather than gaining adherents or followers is the heart of leadership.

A second important component of the framework is that it differentiates between 

authority—formal or informal—and leadership. Authority is an important aspect but not 

necessary for leadership. Figures of authority provide direction—in the form of vision, 

strategy, goals, or techniques—protection from threats, and order by defining individual 

and institutional roles, controlling conflict, and maintaining norms.10 An adaptive leader, 

on the other hand, mobilizes people to question long-lived habits and deeply held beliefs. 

Equating leadership with authority makes it difficult for leadership to be conceived as a 

skill that can be taught and learned. It makes leadership a privileged possession of the elite 

rather than a responsibility that anyone with a stake in an issue can shoulder. It makes 

leadership something one can have rather than an activity that any individual can engage 

in. Afghanistan’s political context offers several examples of sons inheriting their fathers’ 

power perceived as leadership, a pattern that is repeatedly reinforced by social norms as well 

as by government authority.11

Contextual awareness is the third main component of adaptive leadership. In Afghanistan, women leaders must be aware not only of the political context but also of the social 

norms and values in society as these values often shape citizen loyalties. Most informants 

believed that feelings related to these values are strong enough in Afghanistan even to “risk 

committing violence in order to protect the value and honor the loyalty.” 12 Understanding 

people’s loyalty to values is critical in helping leaders build partnerships required to mobilize 

social change.13 Afghan women leaders’ inability to form networks of mutual support can be 

explained on the basis of their inability to read each other’s value loyalties and thus their 

“inability to relate to one another’s perspectives,” as one activist reflected.14

The framework also suggests that most effective leaders mobilize others to engage in 

meaningful change and do not impose it—a process that takes time as well as extended 

engagement. Effective leaders must have patience and a sense of purpose to study the 

context, appreciate its elements, and maintain a broad lens as they engage in their work.15

A fourth and final component of the framework suggests that successful leaders should 

have a clear sense of purpose. Leaders, like everyone else, have stakes in issues, loyalties to 

certain belief systems and value sets, and above all weaknesses and needs. Being observant 

of one’s weaknesses, needs, and trigger points are equally critical to remaining anchored in 

a purpose, because human needs, as legitimate as they are, can also be weaknesses that 

obstruct a clear sense of purpose. The need for power can drive women leaders into believing 

that they can change the world by being appointed to a position of power. For example, as 

one former member of parliment (MP) said, a group of female MPs spent “three years choos-
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 380 5

ing the head of the Commission on Women’s Rights in the Parliament.”16 They spent this 

time because they believed whoever held this position of authority would have tremendous 

power over the women’s rights agenda.

How Is Leadership Commonly Perceived?

Most of those we spoke with saw leadership in binary terms, believing that to be a leader an 

individual had to have a formal position of authority. In this view, authority should be used 

to command followers rather than mobilize them toward a common goal. Most thought that 

formal positions of power were what produce leadership. In the words of a student at Kabul 

University, “Authority is a prerequisite for leadership.” 17 Research participants were familiar 

with the term leader, but often used it to describe people holding formal positions of power. 

They repeatedly used phrases such as “jihadi leaders,” “civil society leaders,” “women leaders,” or “religious leaders,” often referring to individuals with formal offices in respective 

sectors, where the authority was either formally granted by virtue of an official appointment 

or informally gathered through followership.

Reflecting long-standing social norms that privilege men and have historically barred 

women’s access to prominent positions, conversations with students, journalists, imams, 

and members of political parties typically saw men as most qualified to serve as leaders. 

Women—who often lack access to sources of power, such as wealth, education, followership, 

political capital, or social status—were seldom associated with authority or leadership. This 

situation is compounded by the fact that international organizations and donors contribute 

to this perception by largely relying on male hires for senior leadership positions. The exceptions were those women who had official appointments in government.

Others defined leadership as a set of personal characteristics, such as the capacity to 

influence and persuade. Persuasive skills reflected in leaders’ “power of oration” or “charisma” were among the factors influencing their choice of an ideal leader. Although women 

were not seen as masters of persuasion, their oration skills received commendation by many 

male informants. For example, a university student said, “I can’t think of a man who speaks 

as well as Shukria Barekzai; she clearly is a great leader.” 18

Both men and women described women’s presence in the public sphere as largely 

symbolic. The consensus among interviewees was that many women who hold positions 

of authority are not able to lead because they have little or no political support, weak 

decision-making and enforcement power, and little or no access to sources of both financial 

and human capital. However, while fulfilling the functions of authority necessitates these 

essential elements, leadership requires credibility. Lack of connection to and understanding 

of the Afghan social context by women appointed in positions of authority for cosmetic 

purposes further delegitimizes women’s role in people’s eyes.

Efforts to Promote Women’s Leadership

Most efforts to promote women’s leadership in Afghanistan relied on top-down programs 

implemented by the Afghan government in partnership with the international community. 

Most of these programs focus on placing women in positions of political authority, but do 

not usually emphasize the kinds of leadership skills required to navigate a challenging social 

terrain and develop consensus on issues. We found that such strategies tend to isolate 

women in these positions rather than enable them to mobilize those with common interests. 

Some efforts have been made to mobilize women from the bottom up, but frequently such 

programs engage individual leaders or organizations rather than create the opportunity for 

the kinds of broad societal conversations that might generate enduring social change.

The consensus among interviewees 

was that many women who hold 

positions of authority are not 

able to lead because they have 

little or no political support, weak 

decision-making and enforcement 

power, and little or no access 

to sources of both financial 

and human capital. 
6 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 380

Government and International Community

Some of the most visible interventions to promote women leadership since 2001 emerged from 

top-down efforts, such as the creation of the Ministry of Women’s Affairs (MoWA) in 2002 and 

gender units within each ministry in 2004, the appointment of women in executive positions, 

and quotas for elected office at national and subnational levels. The assumption behind such 

efforts, though disputed by some Afghan women organizations who do not see the ministry as 

an effective and useful vehicle, was that women in formal positions of power would represent 

women’s perspectives, promote issues important to women, and serve as inspirational role 

models for society.

The assumption behind these top-down strategies equates leadership with the authority to 

impose change. In the case of the MoWA, an anthropologist who conducted ethnographic fieldwork 

in the ministry over the course of several years, made similar conclusions in 2012, finding that the 

institution reflected a “top-down modernization model.” 19 MoWA’s existence has had “symbolic 

value” and, some of the research informants believed, has “helped keep [the] women’s agenda alive 

in domestic politics.” 20 Most informants, however, believed the establishment of the ministry had 

less to do with the cause of promoting women’s leadership and more with, in the words of an institutional development expert, “appeasing the international community as an intentional buffer.”21

At the domestic level, one former Afghan minister explained, the “appointment of MoWA’s senior 

management has largely been driven by interests of major financial players.”22 This has resulted in 

appointments who lacked technical and professional credibility and thus did not meet the basic 

foundational assumption behind top-down efforts to promote women’s leadership.

According to heads of these gender units, these units became marginalized within their 

ministries. Their activities became limited to token efforts as “organizing gifts ceremonies 

on International Women’s Day or Mother’s Day.” 23 Heads of gender units interviewed for this 

research complained of their inability to make themselves heard in their respective ministries, 

even in socially sensitive cases of “sexual molestation or harassment of female staff by senior 

directors,” underlining the limits of female authority in Afghan society even when holding official positions.24 They described a lack of “political will of senior officials, budgetary support, 

and decision-making role in particular with regards to recruitments, and even access to office 

space and equipment.”25 In response to the realization of this ineffectiveness, the Afghan 

government has decided to move ahead with a structural or technical reform, granting gender 

units increased executive power with a change in grade—from grade 3 to grade 2—per civil 

service norms.26 This move, unfortunately, only addresses the authority dynamics of the role 

without focusing on the leadership aspects of these offices.

Despite protests by religious clerics, the National Unity Government has fulfilled its promise 

to appoint one female justice to the Supreme Court and four female ministers to the cabinet 

(although the appointment of the female justice was rejected by the National Assembly).27 The 

impact of such appointments—and their ability to mobilize both women and men behind a 

common cause—remains to be assessed.28

Although women are in positions of authority at the national level, for the status of women 

to change in Afghanistan women must be empowered throughout the bureaucracy. Women’s 

leadership in the civil service is crucial, because the civil service and subnational governance 

are the face of the state to communities at the local level. Women serving in the civil service 

are closer to citizens, both men and women, who must be engaged for social change to take 

place. Unfortunately, women remain vastly underrepresented in the Afghan civil service.29

A 2013 USAID gender analysis of subnational governance, for example, found that “women 

are a small minority of the civil service at the SNG [subnational government] level, typically 

employed in menial positions such as cleaners or guards.” 30 Furthermore, sexual harassment 

remains “a serious hindrance to recruiting and retaining female staff.” 31

Although women are in positions 

of authority at the national 

level, for the status of women to 

change in Afghanistan women 

must be empowered throughout 

the bureaucracy. Women’s 

leadership in the civil service is 

crucial, because the civil service 

and subnational governance 

are the face of the state to 

communities at the local level.
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 380 7

The 2004 Afghan Constitution introduced a 25 percent quota for women’s representation in 

parliament (reduced to 20 percent in 2013), which automatically generated a cadre of women 

in elected office at national and subnational levels. That women’s vote in the parliament carries equal weight has the potential for effecting top-down change through legislation. However, a former Afghan MP and civil society activist thought that the “ethnic, religious, political, 

and financial loyalties of female members of parliament limited their capacity to promote 

women’s cause.” 32 Because it did so, it weakened their sense of purpose in exercising leadership in their role as legislators, resulting in relatively little success in bringing their issues into 

the legislative agenda.33 In some instances, women MPs are forced into providing lip service 

for male agendas, whether in response to implicit threats or explicit acts of microphones being 

turned off.34 Such sentiments are consistent with other cross-national research that has found 

the employing female quotas do not alter gender compositions of legislatures.35

The international community has played an important role supporting top-down efforts 

to promote women’s leadership. Despite important investments, informants felt that donor 

efforts were most noticeable and targeted at triggering change in urban areas. Although 

many informants were grateful for the support of the international community, they also 

criticized donors for inconsistency in their stance on women empowerment, which was 

reflected in what a prominent woman politician described as “fixation with the Taliban 

and tendency to ignore Taliban-like mentality prevalent in most groups in power.” 36 For 

example, although the international community associates Afghanistan’s most serious cases 

of gender-based political violence as occurring under the Taliban, such behavior was also 

common among the warlord groups and political parties supported by the United States 

during the 1980s and early 1990s.37

Several informants believed that the top-down approach the international community 

promoted failed to generate broader sustained social change—especially in areas outside 

Kabul—because the donors engaged only a few prominent groups, leading to perceptions 

of favoritism and selective engagement. Most informants believed that this limited engagement was in large part related to donor travel constraints and thus an inability to support 

or monitor organizations in rural areas. Others felt that the international community was 

satisfied to surround itself with those who would docilely accept grants without challenging 

international strategies. Such a sentiment was echoed by a Kabul-based international expert 

on women’s leadership, who acknowledged that “we [members of the donor community] are 

aware of the perception that lesser known organizations receive less support.” 38

“Donors are obsessed,” the same expert observed, “with putting more women in senior 

positions in the government, civil society, or businesses, as reflected in leadership capacitybuilding programs, including the upcoming USAID program PROMOTE.” 39 Trainings, often 

tailored along this perception, encourage a drive for gaining power by persuading followers to 

buy into the leader’s preconceived vision, a pattern also evident in civil society organizations’ 

leadership training curricula.40 But authority-driven models in contexts like Afghanistan are 

not enough to generate social change on their own. Instead, in such environments, it is more 

appropriate to think of leadership as a sustained effort by a group of individuals rather than 

assuming that individuals, by virtue of their authority position, will be able to drive consensus 

to foment change. Many of those interviewed for this research believed that the focus on 

quotas and appointments of women to positions of authority undermined the ability of these 

women to lead. The explanation was simple: Women became disconnected from the population they sought to serve and frequently got caught up in webs of government corruption.

Corruption is a major impediment for the emergence of leadership in the public sector. 

When it is widespread, both women and men in the public sector find it difficult to be credible, 

gain people’s trust, and mobilize them to participate in a collective intervention for change—
8 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 380

one of the primary purposes of leadership. As one young woman in a senior position in the 

government revealed, “I think our new generation is committed, but survival in the system 

often comes at the cost of loss of commitment and clinging to power only.” 41 This situation 

by definition leaves neither space nor energy for initiating people-focused, participatory processes of change. Systemic corruption encourages narrow focus on individual interests at the 

cost of a collective sense of shared value that a leader must carry and reflect.

The sentiment that women’s role in the government is symbolic, lacks credibility in 

people’s eyes, and is not backed by the political will of the senior government leadership 

was one of the major trends that emerged from interviews and focus group discussions. 

Several women who have served in senior government positions or are serving in ministries 

confirmed this perception with regret. Prominent women interviewed for this research confirmed reports of systemic harassment or even violence against women in the government. 

As one of them told us, “I am often advised to expect harassment, conspiracy, character 

assassination, and be ready to face them, which I have, even physical attempts at hurting 

me.” 42 This pattern compels most of the few women in senior positions to focus on survival in the system rather than making a difference. As a result, as an Afghan legal expert 

explained, women executives are “unable to embody the values they claim to represent” 

and are reduced to mere symbols in others’ eyes, including men.43 Given that most female 

appointments do not target key service delivery institutions, women’s role in those positions 

remains irrelevant to the needs of most people and is thus dispensable.

Civil Society, Media, and the Private Sector

Women’s role in the burgeoning Afghan civil society, in the words of a senior Afghan sociologist, has contributed to “valuable visibility and the existence of the discourse of equality, at 

least in urban areas.” 44 According to a former MP and civil society activist, women leaders 

in this sector have been a “pressure group,” keeping a check on government policies and 

calling for immediate action in certain cases such as the Presidential Executive Order on 

the Elimination of Violence Against Women Law (EVAW).45 Women’s active participation, 

predominantly in the civil society sector, has over time helped “institutionalize a culture of 

protest and advocacy in the traditional Afghan context which prohibits women’s loud voice 

in public.” 46 This is also evident from a review of the frequency of women-led or womeninitiated protests over the past fourteen years. Women-led civil society organizations have 

played a significant role in encouraging women’s civic and political participation through 

nationwide voting campaigns, resulting in a substantial number of women voters showing up 

at the ballot boxes. Heads of women’s organizations gave the credit of these achievements 

to moments of unity, saying that women leaders have had “valuable achievements and have 

found legitimate relevance to people’s aspirations where they have stood together.” 47

Efforts to promote women’s leadership have placed hopes on the emergence of strong civil 

society organizations that can mobilize women. For example, during the 2014 presidential 

campaign, the Afghan Women’s Network, one of the largest women-focused civil society 

groups in the country, drafted a six point petition and had it signed by Abdullah Abdullah and 

Ashraf Ghani.48 This move confirmed the tendency of women’s organizations to focus more 

on convincing figures of authority rather than on mobilizing from within.49 However, this 

trend—believing that only individuals in positions of formal authority have the power to bring 

change—neglects the role of the public in shaping change. It puts the onus of responsibility 

on individuals in positions of power, instead, betraying the original collective identity and 

drive of the civil society sector. The rentier nature of civil society organizations, rooted in 

their financial dependence on the donor community, contributes to the trend by emphasizing 

top-down accountability at the cost of bottom-up engagement with society.

Women-led civil society 

organizations have played a 

significant role in encouraging 

women’s civic and political 

participation through 

nationwide voting campaigns, 

resulting in a substantial 

number of women voters 

showing up at the ballot boxes.
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 380 9

Despite protests by the Ulema Council, the government has continued to facilitate provision of space for female faces in the Afghan media—both as newsreaders and in the broadcast 

of female performances (artists, singers, and so on).50 However, a prominent Afghan female 

journalist in a focus group discussion suggested that such protests by conservative elements 

in society continue to harm the role of women in the media, as they are usually depicted in 

“nonserious roles or used as pleasant objects to increase viewership.” 51 She believed that it 

is difficult to find women as anchors of popular prime time political talk shows, a reflection of the “social mindset dominant in the media circles that considers women incapable 

of conducting political analysis or creating serious analytical content.”52 Female journalists 

often face threats of violence when reporting on women’s issues, and the support structure 

within media organizations remains limited.

Interviewees were particularly critical of what they believed to be the government’s inadequate attention to facilitating women’s role in the private sector. An Afghan businessman 

believed that “the government has not done much to facilitate women’s role in businesses. 

Whatever that is there today, is primarily due to the efforts of the private sector itself.”53

This sentiment was ironic because instead of viewing markets as bottom-up or independent 

entities, most respondents attributed the weak role of women in business to weak government policy. Such a sentiment was surprising because, at the same time, many were critical 

of the government’s weak capacity and reputation for predation.

Although the Afghanistan Chamber of Commerce and Industries (ACCI) 2014 annual report 

speaks of support for women’s engagement in businesses, the overall challenges of the sector, 

such as insecurity restricting women’s mobility and lack of infrastructure, are serious impediments. Furthermore, many women noted lack of access to financing and difficulties accessing 

cash to create small business. An Afghan entrepreneur and businesswoman noted that Afghan 

businesswomen themselves did not have tools to self-organize because they “lack strong professional networks of support within private sector circles” that are mostly male dominated, 

another major obstacle.54 Furthermore, corruption in customs, contracts, and loans makes it 

difficult for women to lead in the sector.55 Lack of self-organized networks of women in businesses, and inability to build strong linkages with institutions like the ACCI, has resulted in 

lack of strategic cooperation and information sharing within these networks, leading in turn to 

women’s weak and donor-dependent presence.56 Businesswomen consequently face financial 

constraints and are not taken seriously in the business world.57

Many interviewees felt that women remained significantly underrepresented in the production industry. This trend becomes evident in a review of the limited literature on women’s 

economic empowerment: Most focus on the employability of women or their entrepreneurial 

skills, but all take the perspective of the service industry rather than the production industry.58 In the words of an Afghan businesswoman, “Saffron production might be the only 

good example” of female presence in the production industry in Afghanistan.59 Continued 

emphasis on increasing the numbers of women in the service industry may continue to keep 

women out of the economic production cycle or at best as its “passive contributors,” as one 

Afghan sociologist believed. An international expert on women’s leadership working in Kabul 

expressed concern regarding the upcoming large-scale five-year USAID program PROMOTE.60

Major components of the program, she said, are likely to “add to the number of women 

working in government, civil society, or businesses” as opposed to women in production.61

Women’s passive economic role limits their capacity to emerge as leaders in the family, which 

Afghan sociologists believe is the “foundational building block of Afghan society and the 

starting point of the practice of leadership for women and men.” 62

Trends were not much different among civil society organizations. Some women’s rights 

organizations participating in focus group discussions believed that “civil society groups 
10 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 380

have managed to raise their voice.” 63 Others found the civil society collective to be “irrelevant to youth,” a sentiment also echoed by students and young journalists.64 As a result, 

as an Afghan legal expert suggested, “educational institutions are becoming centers of 

religious extremism, a pattern of thought that does not carry favorable views of women’s 

agency to lead.” 65 In the absence of focused interventions aimed at engaging men, religious 

actors, and customary institutions, bridging this gap of irrelevance remains a challenge.

Engaging Men, Religion, and Custom

Adaptive leadership posits that enduring social change is more likely to emerge when a wide 

group of stakeholders are engaged on an issue. Engaging other stakeholders involves understanding their perspective as legitimate players rather than as ill-intended enemies of the cause. For 

this reason, efforts to promote women’s leadership without engaging men are likely to struggle.

The vast majority of resources aimed at improving the role of women have been targeted 

at women, not men. Most focus group discussions spoke specifically to the predominant 

perception of women as victims and second-class citizens in relation to men.

A perception that the international community was disproportionately supporting women 

led many male informants to believe that men had received inadequate attention. For example, 

an imam believed that this perceived disproportionate targeting contributed to “feelings of 

inequality and inadequacy among men.” 66 A 2013 USAID gender analysis illustrated similar 

findings, indicating that men generally did not believe their female counterparts had any 

struggles in their professional work.67 Male project managers interviewed echoed similar sentiments and believed that “women had a privileged position in government and society as a 

result of the trainings, quotas, and other preferential treatment mechanisms.”68 Although this 

notion is not particularly credible, it comes during a time of significant social, political, and 

economic change for Afghan men as well, which might suggest why antipathy toward women 

could be so virulent.

Taking stock of such sentiments among men, the Afghan Human Rights and Democracy 

Organization recently argued that the only way to tackle women’s problems is to engage with 

men. Specifically, they believe that it is family dynamics, where women have little decisionmaking authority, that keep them marginalized.69 It is in the family environment where women 

are subject to “persistent violence and abusive behavior.” 70 This domestic culture spills over into 

the public world, where women are subject to persistent harassment.71

Insecurity and harassment inhibit women’s mobility and justify family restrictions. As 

an Afghan entrepreneur and civil society activist explained, “Women leaders have less 

information about Afghan society; their access is limited; they can’t travel to Afghanistan’s 

provinces, districts, and villages, as men can; they cannot sit down next to a shopkeeper 

and hear him out.” 72 In the words of female students, “Men harass us, but we can’t tell our 

family for fear of more restrictions. So we keep quiet and tolerate it.” 73

Surprisingly, we found little direct correlation between marriage and women’s perceptions 

that they had a safer space for personal growth or social contribution in the public sphere. 

Several factors contribute to society’s alienating attitude toward women, gender segregation at 

educational institutions being one of them. Mainstream media’s content adds fuel to this fire by 

broadcasting programs that strengthen and further institutionalize alienating opinions about 

women’s role. Some university students believed that “popular shows on Tolo, Khurshid, or 1TV, 

such as Lahza ba Lahza, Dam ba Dam and Shabkhand, contribute to objectification of women 

and provide extremists with an excuse to speak against women’s role in media.” 74

Social norms informed by narrow misinterpretation of religion restrict women’s access to 

society. Ashraf ul Madares, a madrassah in Kunduz province housing more than six thousand 

female students, promotes religious extremism and a Taliban style set of rules restricting 
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 380 11

radio, television, photography, celebrations of teacher’s day or mother’s day, new year, or 

women’s work outside the household.75 Women activists of the Jamiat-e Eslah, the Afghan 

association inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood, protested against the EVAW law in 2013, 

“condemning the freedoms envisaged in the law as a plot by the West to strip Muslim women 

of their Islamic dignity.” 76

Interviewees, both men and women, voiced concern that the Afghan religious establishment is somehow complicit in violence against women and poses a barrier to women’s personal 

security outside the house. This is because many Afghan men use religious justifications for 

their desire to isolate women—a practice that seems to have evolved from social norms in 

Afghanistan rather than religious scripture. Although a predominant view among interviewees 

was the need to have women religious scholars with capacity to accurately interpret religious 

text, respondents warned of the consequences of making religious scholars the messenger in 

every field. Following the horrifying murder of Farkhunda, mullahs in Kabul called for a ban 

on civil society activities.77 The murder also demonstrated widespread lack of compassion and 

tolerance fostered by religious instruction that indoctrinates youth with an interpretation of 

Islam that fosters narrow-mindedness.78

Meaningful engagement with religious groups, as Palwasha Kakar argues, can be effective 

only with patience and constructive effort to build trust and a sense of ownership. Reflecting on past efforts, she emphasizes that quick fixes—in which traditional leaders were given 

documents developed by human rights organizations—were perceived as an attempt to place 

Islamic ideas into a foreign human rights framework rather than as real consultation.79

Enablers of Women’s Leadership

Interviews and focus group discussions not only allowed us to understand the effectiveness of efforts to promote women’s leadership but also factors that help generate effective 

women leaders in Afghanistan. The very personal and biographical nature of the interviews—especially among the prominent women—shed enormous insights into what they 

believed helped explain their rise to eminence.

In Afghan society, power and authority are typically the dominion of men. In the words 

of a human rights advocate, “Society perceives women as citizens with secondary status, 

at times even as things.” 80 Changing this social mindset may take a long time. An alternative frame of leadership that facilitates women’s space to exercise leadership beyond the 

limitations of access to authority may hold more immediate promise. “We need creativity 

when it comes to women’s leadership, otherwise, there is a lot going on that is seen as more 

important than promoting women’s leadership.” 81

Supportive Family

In the words of a former Afghan MP, “Women’s safe space for growth starts with a supportive 

family.” 82 A woman leader’s family members, both male and female, are key to her capacity 

to step out, explore, learn, and play a useful role in her field. Becoming a woman leader does 

not necessarily mean women should be women’s rights activists. “We need women leaders in 

every field, so we should encourage our children to get education in the fields that they love 

and become leaders in those sectors. We need women leaders in the air force, in medicine, 

in engineering, or in teaching.” 83

Family support however extends beyond affairs at home to include facilitating women’s 

safe space outside the household. It is an internationally recognized principle, as articulated 

by an international gender analyst, that “women’s mobility depends on their capacity to 

safely move from point A to B, which can be facilitated through a women supportive transport system and harassment free society, workplace, and educational institutions.” 84 Families 
12 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 380

play a critical role in shaping social attitudes women face once they step out. A journalist 

participating in the focus group discussion explained that he will not allow his younger sister 

to work outside because “women get harassed in offices or on the streets.” 85 This concern 

emerged repeatedly, indicating the widespread nature of this problem but also highlighting 

society’s inability to own and collectively address it. Given that children’s early years determine most of their character, the family environment at home plays a key role in shaping how 

boys and girls treat themselves and each other, both at home and in public.

Women Role Models

Promoting women’s leadership through government will be most effective if capable women 

are appointed to senior decision-making positions through a credible process that ensures 

their legitimacy in the eyes of the public. The national unity government’s manner of picking 

women for senior posts, in particular the two candidates who did not receive a vote of confidence from the parliament, visibly “lacked credibility and thus delegitimized those women,” 

an Afghan media observer pointed out.86 An international development expert believed 

that the only way to “normalize women’s leadership roles is for women to have legitimacy 

and an authorizing environment that protects that mandate—that is, through political 

will, provision of adequate resources, and implementation capacity.” 87 Without these, the 

appointment of women to senior positions is merely symbolic. Women’s having a legitimate 

leadership role in government, an Afghan international policy expert suggested, would help 

build “a strong state, the prerequisite for any and all that must be achieved in Afghanistan, 

including enforcing women’s right to inheritance and property ownership.” 88

Interviewees believed that a strong contributing factor to expanded women’s leadership 

could emerge when the population relies on women’s services and products for their daily 

needs. This, they emphasized, could open the doors to women’s positions in government and 

private-sector service delivery agencies. As several activists and prominent women pointed 

out, appointing women to key service delivery institutions, such as health, education, higher 

education, judiciary, and the security sector, has the potential to offer women a legitimate 

platform to exercise leadership and serve as role models, provided political will supports 

them and enough resources and capability (that is, the power to decide and enforce) are 

at their disposal. Such a measure would also give women a strong voice that neither the 

government nor the private sector and media can ignore.

Another important measure is active mentorship. A female entrepreneur and activist 

believed that taking time out to “mentor and actively seek mentors is critical for women 

leaders, which can also help in fostering sisterhood and making leadership accessible as 

opposed to the current common pattern of inaccessibility.” 89 It is critical, however, as an 

Afghan leadership coach pointed out, to have and promote “role model women leaders for 

all layers of society, because today’s women on positions of national significance belong to 

a certain class, and thus lack relevance to a majority of young women who search for ideals 

and role models as they grow.” 90

Education

Consensus was strong that access to education and higher education is the first step in building women’s agency for leadership. However, respondents warned of the danger of relying on 

quantity at the cost of quality of education. One activist suggested that “while having more 

institutions of higher education and continued increase of women’s access to higher education 

can be effective, mindset change will not happen without curriculum reform.” 91 This view was 

seconded: “The challenge in training programs like PROMOTE’s Women in Leadership is that it 

starts in the middle and faces the, in some cases impossible, task of helping people unlearn in 

Interviewees believed that a 

strong contributing factor to 

expanded women’s leadership 

could emerge when the 

population relies on women’s 

services and products for their 

daily needs. This...could open 

the doors to women’s positions 

in government and privatesector service delivery agencies. 
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 380 13

order to learn new concepts.” 92 Participants believed that curriculum reform must also cover 

centers of religious education because “the religion that our children learn today is the religion 

of mullahs, not the religion of Prophet Muhammad.” 93

Recommendations

Leadership development programs need to adopt a gender-inclusive approach and engage 

with men and women. Leadership must be studied, understood, exercised, and promoted as 

an activity distinct from authority, and one beyond any formal position of power, because 

the current authority-driven social definition of leadership significantly excludes women. 

Leadership development programs must stress contextual awareness and leader’s sense of 

purpose, promote leadership as an act of mobilizing people to tackle a collective challenge, 

and stress authority as one of many tools leaders may use.

At an individual level, women aspiring to exercise leadership roles need to learn and 

practice self-confidence, actively seek mentors and be mentors for other women, wisely pick 

their fights by prioritizing, practice stepping back to see and listen to the bigger picture, 

and actively build alliances and networks of support.

Afghan media should project positive and encouraging images of credible women leaders, not only by developing profiles of women leaders in politics, business, and civil society 

but also by embodying their value in media programs, reflected in the increased role of 

women in serious political analysis programs.

Civil society organizations, through an informed and collaborative effort with the international community, should aim at transitioning their mutual relations from one defined 

by total dependence on the donor community to one characterized by interdependence and 

thus increased emphasis on bottom-up accountability.

Civil society organizations and the Afghan government should join hands in tapping 

women’s social, political, and economic potential. To expand women’s space for social and 

economic contributions and to engage them as part of the work force, civil society organizations and the government education curriculum should inform the younger generation that 

women’s work at home counts as work. This would help support equality-based social change 

and facilitate building a foundation for gender equality beginning in families. This effort 

should be complemented by a social discourse led by civil society organizations, including 

the media, on equal opportunity for Afghan citizens.

The Afghan government must develop a zero-tolerance policy toward harassment in the 

workplace and in educational institutions in order to promote and encourage harassment 

free public spaces. Creative reform of the national transport system would make women’s 

movement safer and encourage a supportive family environment.

To extend women’s empowerment to rural areas, civil society organizations need to seriously engage with religious groups and thought leaders. Relatedly, the international community 

needs to understand that religious thought will continue to be a more important organizing 

and legitimizing principle for the people of Afghanistan than UN resolutions and declarations. 

Such engagement must move beyond lip service and quick fixes to more sustained engagement and dialogue with men generally as well as with religious and traditional leaders.

Donors need to continue to support Afghanistan’s potential for women’s meaningful role 

in social, economic, and political spheres. This would entail backing efforts that lead to 

the wider presence of women in the civil service, diversifying its support from civil society 

organizations, and helping the Afghan government tap into women’s potential for economic 

agency and make them foundational to generating revenue in the country.

To extend women’s empowerment 

to rural areas, civil society 

organizations need to seriously 

engage with religious groups and 

thought leaders.
14 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 380

Notes

1. Elaheh Rostami Povey, “Women in Afghanistan: Passive Victims of the Borqa or Active Social Participants?” 

Development in Practice 13, no. 2–3 (2003): 266–77; Lila Abu-Lughod, “Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving? 

Anthropological Reflections on Cultural Relativism and Its Others,” American Anthropologist 104, no. 3 (2002): 

783–90.

2. President Ghani’s speech on International Women’s Day illustrates the tension between these two value sets: 

“Our society does not stand against international values. If our women always stress on international values for 

women, they will face opposition in our society. We need to fundamentally solidify women’s role from within our 

culture and civilization.” See http://president.gov.af/en/news/speech-by-president-ghani-on-the-occasion-ofinternational-womens-day. 

3. Afghan women’s rights activist, Kabul, February 2015.

4. Women’s rights activist, Kabul, February 2015.

5. Civil society activist and entrepreneur, Kabul, February 2015.

6. Anticorruption activist, Kabul, February 2015.

7. Matt Andrews, The Limits of Institutional Reform in Development (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013); 

Matt Andrews, “Good Government Means Different Things in Different Countries,” Governance 23, no. 1 (January 

2010): 7–35, doi:10.1111/j.1468-0491.2009.01465.x; Lant Pritchett, Michael Woolcock, and Matt Andrews, 

“Capability Traps? The Mechanisms of Persistent Implementation Failure” (Working Paper 254, Center for Global 

Development, June 2011), http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/handle/123456789/31376; Lant Pritchett and 

Michael Woolcock, “Solutions When the Solution is the Problem: Arraying the Disarray in Development,” World 

Development 32, no. 2 (2004): 191–212; Dennis A. Rondinelli, Development Projects as Policy Experiments: An 

Adaptive Approach to Development Administration, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 1993).

8. Ronald Heifetz, “Debate: Leadership and Authority,” Public Money & Management 31, no. 5 (2011): 305–08, doi

:10.1080/09540962.2011.598333.

9. Ibid., 306.

10. Heifetz, Leadership Without Easy Answers (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), chapter 6.

11. See Renee Montagne, “Growing Up an Afghan Warlord’s Son,” NPR, June 4, 2013, www.npr.

org/2013/06/04/188566788/growing-up-an-afghan-warlords-son. 

12. Sociologist, Kabul, January 2015.

13. Ronald Heifetz, Alexander Grashow, and Marty Linsky, The Practice of Adaptive Leadership: Tools and Tactics for 

Changing Your Organization and the World (Boston, MA: Harvard Business Press, 2009), chapter 6.

14. Politician and social activist, Kabul, February 2015.

15. Dean Williams, Real Leadership: Helping People and Organizations Face their Toughest Challenges (San Francisco: 

Berrett-Koehler, 2005), chapter 2. 

16. Former member of Parliament, Kabul, February 2015.

17. Students of Kabul University, Kabul, January 2015.

18. Students of Gawharshaad University, Kabul, February 2015.

19. Julie Billaud, “The Making of Modern Afghanistan: Reconstruction, Transnational Governance and Gender Politics 

in the New Islamic Republic,” Anthropology of the Middle East 7, no. 1 (2012): 18.

20. Civil society and women’s rights activist, Kabul, February 2015; former MP and civil society activist, Kabul, March 

2015.

21. International institutional reform specialist, Kabul, January 2015.

22. Former cabinet minister, Kabul, January 2015.

23. Heads of gender units, MoWA, Kabul, March 2015.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

26. According to the Afghan civil service norms, director generals are grade 1 positions, directors are grade 2, and 

officers are grade 3. 

27. Mirwais Harooni, “Afghan Clerics Protest Nomination of First Woman to Supreme Court,” Reuters, June 18, 2015, 

www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/18/us-afghanistan-court-idUSKBN0OY1EK20150618.

28. Afghanistan Analysts Network, “Finally Towards a Complete Afghan Cabinet? The Next 16 Minister Nominees and 

Their Bios (amended),” March 24, 2015, www.afghanistan-analysts.org/finally-a-complete-afghan-cabinet-thenext-16-minister-nominees-and-their-biographies/.

29. Women make up less than 1 percent of the Afghan National Police and only 10 percent of judges. Amy Calfas, 

“Supporting Afghan Women in the 2014 Transition,” Peace Brief no. 184 (Washington, DC: United States Institute 

of Peace, 2015), 4, www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PB184-Supporting-Afghan-Women-in-the-2014-Transition.

pdf. Since 2001, only one female provincial governor, two female mayors (at district level), and one female district 

governor were appointed at the subnational level. One of the two mayors did not return from an exposure trip. 

The only female mayor [Nili] no longer serves in the position. 

30. Checchi and Company Consulting, “Gender Analysis: Sub-National Governance” (Washington, DC: U.S. Agency for 

International Development, October 2013), 1.

31. Ibid.; Mujib Mashal, “How Afghanistan Is Beginning to Deal with Workplace Sexual Harassment,” Time, March 

29, 2013, http://world.time.com/2013/03/29/how-afghanistan-is-beginning-to-deal-with-workplace-sexualharassment/.

32. Former MP and civil society activist, Kabul, February 2015.

33. Anna Wordsworth, “A Matter of Interests: Gender and the Politics of Presence in Afghanistan’s Wolesi Jirga” (Kabul: 

Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2007), 2.

34. Emma Graham-Harrison, “Fawzia Koofi: ‘The Leadership Turns Off Our Microphones When We Speak,’” Guardian, 

February 9, 2014, www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/feb/09/fawzia-koofi-afghanistan-mp-turn-off-microphones.
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 380 15

35. Melanie M. Hughes, “Intersectionality, Quotas, and Minority Women’s Political Representation Worldwide,” 

American Political Science Review 105, no. 3 (August 2011): 604–20, doi:10.1017/S0003055411000293.

36. Woman politician and social worker, Kabul, February 2015.

37. See Deniz Kandiyoti, “Old Dilemmas or New Challenges? The Politics of Gender and Reconstruction in 

Afghanistan,” Development and Change 38, no. 2 (2007): 169–99.

38. International expert on women’s leadership, Kabul, February 2015.

39. Ibid.

40. The New Afghanistan Women Association, “Educational Guideline: Leadership, Advocacy and Networking for 

Educated Women” (Kabul: NAWA Publications, 2014).

41. Female government executive, Kabul, February 2015.

42. Ibid.

43. Civil society activist and legal expert, Kabul, February 2015.

44. Sociologist, Kabul, January 2015.

45. Former MP and civil society activist, Kabul, March 2015.

46. Sociologist, Kabul, January 2015.

47. Women’s rights organizations, Afghan Women’s Network (AWN), Kabul, March 2015; conversation with 

international women’s equality expert, March 2015.

48. AWN, “Afghan Women’s Six Point Petition to the Front-Runners of the 2014 Presidential Election,” 2014; Human 

Rights Watch, “Human Rights Watch Letter on Protecting and Promoting Human Rights in Afghanistan,” 

September 25, 2014.

49. “President Karzai was better. He used to listen to us. We could meet him any time. President Ghani is a different 

person and is hard to convince.” Afghan women’s rights activist and lobbyist, Kabul, February 2015.

50. Mirwais Harooni, “Afghanistan’s Karzai Backs Clerics’ Demand For Media Crackdown,” Reuters, April 24, 2013, 

http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/04/24/afghanistan-television-karzai-media-idINDEE93N05O20130424; Abdul 

Waheed Wafa and Carlotta Gall, “Afghan Ministry Bans the Broadcast of 5 Foreign Soap Operas,” New York Times, 

April 22, 2008, www.nytimes.com/2008/04/22/world/asia/22soaps.html?_r=0. 

51. Female journalist, Kabul, January 2015.

52. Journalists, NAI, Kabul, February 2015.

53. Entrepreneur and businessman, Kabul, January 2015.

54. Ibid.; World Bank, Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, Gender Stock Taking, 2014.

55. Anne Simmons-Benton, Jessica Heinzelman, and Jill Sackett, “Economic Empowerment Strategies for Afghan 

Women” (Washington, DC: USAID, 2012), http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnady804.pdf; Afghanistan Chamber of 

Commerce and Industries, “Business Climate Survey Report,” 2014.

56. Of the three hundred businesses run by women interviewed as part of this survey, 90 percent did not have any 

partnerships. Building Markets, Afghan Women’s Economic Participation, 2013; Benton, Heinzelman, and Sackett, 

“Economic Empowerment.” Of the same three hundred businesses, almost half did business with the international 

community and only 13 percent engaged in businesses with the Afghan government. 

57. Building Markets, Afghan Women.

58. Benton, Heinzelman, and Sackett, “Economic Empowerment.”

59. Businesswoman, Herat, February 2015.

60. See USAID PROMOTE Fact Sheet, www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/Promote-Managing-for-Results-English-02-

18-2015.pdf.

61. International expert on women’s leadership, Kabul, February 2015.

62. Sociologist, academic, and poet, Kabul, January 2015.

63. Women’s rights organizations, AWN, Kabul, March 2015.

64. Women’s rights activist, Kabul, March 2015.

65. Legal expert, Kabul, February 2015

66. Imams, Kabul, February 2015

67. Checchi, “Gender Analysis,” 6.

68. Provincial program managers of an international organization, Kabul, January 2015

69. Afghanistan Human Rights and Democracy Organization, “Women in the Eyes of Men: Tackling the Structural 

Roots of Women’s Problems in Afghanistan” (Kabul, 2015), 6, https://socialwellbeing.files.wordpress.

com/2015/02/summary-women-in-the-eyes-of-men-report-eng.pdf.

70. Ibid.

71. Ibid., 7.

72. Entrepreneur and civil society activist, Kabul, February 2015.

73. Students of Kardan and Gawharshaad University, Kabul, February 2015.

74. Students of Gawharshaad University, Kabul, February 2015.

75. Malyar Sadiq Azad, “Girls in Black with Radical Views in Northern Afghanistan,” BBC Persian, February 28, 2014, 

http://www.bbc.com/persian/afghanistan/2014/02/140228_k05_fundamentalism_girl_are_growing; “The Girls 

of the Taliban,” Aljazeera, December 24, 2014, www.aljazeera.com/programmes/specialseries/2014/12/girlstaliban-2014121716718177928.html. 

76. Borhan Osman, “Beyond Jihad and Traditionalism: Afghanistan’s New Generation of Islamic Activists,” 

Afghanistan Analysts Network, June 2015, www.afghanistan-analysts.org/publication/aan-papers/betweenjihad-and-traditionalism-afghanistans-new-generation-of-islamic-activists/. 
77. Joseph Goldstein, “Woman Killed in Kabul Transformed from Pariah to Martyr,” New York Times, March 29, 2015, 

www.nytimes.com/2015/03/30/world/asia/farkhunda-woman-killed-in-kabul-transformed-from-pariah-to-martyr.

html?_r=0; “Dissident Clerics in Kabul: The Government Should Not Prevent Civil Society,” BBC Persian, March 26, 

2015, www.bbc.co.uk/persian/afghanistan/2015/03/150326_mar_kabul_mullah_protests. 

78. Helena Malikyar, “Farkhunda’s Murder Reveals a Nation That Has Changed,” Aljazeera, March 23, 2015, www.

aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/03/farkhunda-murder-reveals-nation-changed-150323081503908.html. 

79. Palwasha L. Kakar, “Engaging Afghan Religious Leaders for Women’s Rights,” Peace Brief no. 175 (Washington, DC: 

U.S. Institute of Peace, 2014), www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PB175_Engaging_Afghan_Religious_Leaders_

for_Women%27s_Rights.pdf.

80. Human rights organizations, Kabul, March 2015.

81. Sociologist and analyst, Kabul, January 2015.

82. Former MP and civil society activist, Kabul, February 2015.

83. Ibid.

84. International gender expert, March 2015.

85. Journalists, NAI, Kabul, March, 2015.

86. Media expert, Kabul, February 2015.

87. International development expert, March 2015.

88. International relations expert, Kabul, February 2015.

89. Civil society activist and entrepreneur, Kabul, February 2015.

90. Civil society activist and leadership coach, Kabul, February 2015.

91. Human rights activist, Kabul, January 2015.

92. International expert on women’s leadership, Kabul, February 2015.

93. Members of a political party, Kabul, March 2015.

ISBN: 978-1-60127-308-6

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Of Related Interest

• Supporting Afghan Women in the 2014 Transition by Amy Calfas (Peace Brief, February 2015)

• Women’s Access to Justice in Afghanistan by Erica Gaston and Tim Luccaro (Peaceworks, 

July 2014)

• Engaging Afghan Religious Leaders for Women’s Rights by Palwasha L. Kakar (Peace Brief, 

June 2014)

• Sharia and Women’s Rights in Afghanistan by Anastasiya Hozyainova (Special Report, May 

2014)