UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

COMMISSIONERS: 

Stephen G. Burns, Chairman 

Kristine L. Svinicki 

William C. Ostendorff 

Jeff Baran 

 

 ) 

In the Matter of ) 

 ) 

FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ) Docket Nos. 52-040-COL 

 ) and 52-041-COL 

(Turkey Point Units 6 and 7) ) 

 ) 

CLI-16-01 

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 

The City of Miami, Florida, has appealed the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board’s ruling 

in LBP-15-19, in which the Board denied the City’s petition to intervene in this combined license 

proceeding for failure to proffer an admissible contention.1 For the reasons set forth below, the 

City’s appeal is premature, and we therefore deny review at this time. 

 

 

1 City of Miami’s Notice of Appeal of LBP-15-19 (July 2, 2015); Brief in Support of City of 

Miami’s Appeal of LBP-15-19 (July 2, 2015) (Appeal); LBP-15-19, 81 NRC 815 (2015). 
- 2 - 

I. BACKGROUND 

In June 2009, Florida Power & Light Company (FPL) applied for combined licenses for 

two new reactor units—Units 6 and 7—at the Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Station near 

Homestead, Florida.1 The NRC Staff docketed the application and provided an opportunity for 

interested persons to request an adjudicatory hearing by filing a written petition for leave to 

intervene within sixty days.2 The NRC received three intervention petitions, two of which were 

granted, but did not receive a petition from the City of Miami during this time.3 Rather, the City 

filed its intervention petition in April 2015, following the Staff’s publication of the Draft 

Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) for public comment.4

 

1 Florida Power & Light Company; Notice of Receipt and Availability of Application for a 

Combined License, 74 Fed. Reg. 38,477, 38,477 (Aug. 3, 2009). 

2 Florida Power & Light Company; Acceptance for Docketing of an Application for Combined 

License for Turkey Point Units 6 & 7 Nuclear Power Plants, 74 Fed. Reg. 51,621, 51,621 (Oct. 

7, 2009); Florida Power & Light Company, Combined License Application for the Turkey Point 

Units 6 & 7, Notice of Hearing, Opportunity To Petition for Leave To Intervene and Associated 

Order Imposing Procedures for Access to Sensitive Unclassified Non-Safeguards Information 

and Safeguards Information for Contention Preparation, 75 Fed. Reg. 34,777, 34,778 (June 18, 

2010). 

3 Petitions were submitted by Citizens Allied for Safe Energy (CASE), the Village of Pinecrest, 

Florida, and a group consisting of two individuals and two non-profit organizations (Joint 

Intervenors). The Board subsequently granted two of these petitions, admitting two of CASE’s 

contentions and one of Joint Intervenors’ contentions. LBP-11-6, 73 NRC 149, 164-65 (2011). 

The Board denied the Village of Pinecrest’s petition but granted its alternative request to 

participate as an interested local governmental body pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 2.315(c). Id. One 

contention—Joint Intervenors’ Amended Contention 2.1—remains pending before the Board. 

See Order (Granting Motion to Dismiss Joint Intervenors’ Contention 2.1 and CASE Contention 

6 as Moot) (Jan. 26, 2012), at 6-7 (unpublished) (dismissing Contention 2.1 as moot where the 

asserted omission had been cured but observing that Joint Intervenors had already filed a new 

contention challenging the adequacy of the measures taken to cure the omission); LBP-12-4, 75 

NRC 213, 225 (2012) (granting motion for summary disposition of CASE Contention 7); LBP-12-

9, 75 NRC 615, 632 (2012) (admitting amended version of Joint Intervenors’ Contention 2.1); 

Order (Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion for Summary Disposition of Amended 

Contention 2.1) (Aug. 30, 2012), at 10 (unpublished) (August 2012 Order). 

4 Combined License Application for Turkey Point Nuclear Plant, Unit Nos. 6 and 7, 80 Fed. Reg. 

12,043 (Mar. 5, 2015). 
- 3 - 

In its petition, the City sought admission of three contentions.5 In Contention 1, the City 

asserted that the DEIS did not identify the source data of various chemical concentrations in the 

plant’s liquid waste streams.6 In Contention 2, the City asserted that the DEIS failed to 

sufficiently evaluate the impact the plant’s radial collector wells—which would pull water from 

the Biscayne aquifer as an alternative water source for non-safety-related system cooling—

would have on the groundwater plume extending outwards from the existing industrial 

wastewater facility serving the Turkey Point facility.7 And in Contention 3, the City claimed the 

DEIS was deficient because it did not address the percentage of water extracted by the plant’s 

radial collector wells that could conceivably come from underneath the industrial wastewater 

facility.8 In the alternative, the City requested to participate in the proceeding as an interested 

local governmental body pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 2.315(c).9

In March, the Board directed that “all petitions for admission of contentions based on 

new information in the DEIS” be filed by April 13, 2015.10 The City filed its petition in apparent 

reliance upon the Board’s order.11 Both the Staff and FPL opposed the City’s petition on the 

 

5 Petition by the City of Miami, Florida, for Leave to Intervene in a Hearing on Florida Power & 

Light Company’s Combined Construction and Operating License Application for Turkey Point 

Units 6 & 7, or in the Alternative, Participate as a Non-Party Local Government (Apr. 13, 2015), 

at 6-11 (Petition). 

6 Id. at 6. 

7 Id. at 8. 

8 Id. at 10-11. 

9 Id. at 12. As relevant here, section 2.315(c) provides that the presiding officer will afford an 

interested local governmental body that has not otherwise been admitted as a party to the 

proceeding a reasonable opportunity to participate in a hearing. 

10 Order (Granting Motion for Additional Time) (Mar. 25, 2015), at 3 (unpublished). The Board’s 

order responded to CASE’s request for an extension of time to file an intervention petition based 

on the DEIS. CASE’s participation in the proceeding was previously terminated. See supra 

note 3. 

11 Petition at 1 (“The filing deadline for contentions concerning the draft EIS is April 13, 2015.”). 
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grounds that it satisfied neither the requirements for filing a hearing request after the deadline 

referenced in 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(c) nor the contention admissibility criteria.12

The Board concluded that the City had established standing, but found that it had not 

submitted an admissible contention. The Board rejected all three proposed contentions on 

timeliness grounds: it found Contention 1 to be “virtually identical” to a previous version of the 

remaining admitted contention in this proceeding (which the Board reformulated to its present 

form in August 2012),13 without any new supporting information.14 The Board rejected 

Contentions 2 and 3 because the City did not demonstrate that the contentions were based 

upon new information materially different from that which was previously available.15 The 

Board, however, granted the City’s unopposed request to participate in the proceeding as an 

 

12 NRC Staff Answer to “Petition by the City of Miami, Florida, for Leave to Intervene in a 

Hearing on Florida Power & Light Company’s Combined Construction and Operating License 

Application for Turkey Point Units 6 & 7, or in the Alternative, Participate as a Non-Party Local 

Government” (May 8, 2015), at 1-2; Florida Power & Light Company’s Answer Opposing City of 

Miami’s Petition to Intervene in a Hearing on Florida Power & Light Company’s Combined 

Construction and Operating License Application for Turkey Points Units 6 & 7 (May 8, 2015), at 

1-2; see 10 C.F.R. §§ 2.309(c), 2.309(f). 

13 See supra note 3. 

14 LBP-15-19, 81 NRC at 822 (citing 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(c)). Compare LBP-12-9, 75 NRC 615, 

629 (2012) (“The [FPL Environmental Report, or ER] is deficient in concluding that the 

environmental impacts from FPL’s proposed deep injection wells will be ‘small’ because the ER 

fails to identify the source data of the chemical concentrations in ER Rev. 3 Table 3.6-2 for 

ethylbenzene, heptachlor, tetrachloroethylene, and toluene. Such information is necessary to 

ensure the accuracy and reliability of those concentrations, so it might reasonably be concluded 

that those chemicals will not adversely impact the groundwater by migrating from the Boulder 

Zone to the Upper Floridan Aquifer.”), with Petition at 6 (“The [DEIS] is deficient in concluding 

that the environmental impacts from FPL’s proposed deep injection wells will be ‘small’ because 

the [DEIS] fails to identify the source data of the chemical concentrations in [DEIS] Table 3-5 for 

ethylbenzene, helptachlor [sic], tetrachloroethylene, and toluene. Such information is necessary 

to ensure the accuracy and reliability of those concentrations, so it might reasonably be 

concluded that those chemicals will not adversely impact the groundwater by migrating from the 

Boulder Zone to the Upper Floridan Aquifer.”). 

15 LBP-15-19, 81 NRC at 824, 826. The Board also rejected Contentions 2 and 3 for failing to 

raise an issue material to the findings the NRC staff must make, provide adequate support for 

the contention, or demonstrate a genuine dispute with the DEIS, as required by 10 C.F.R. 

§ 2.309(f)(1)(iv), (v), and (vi), respectively. Id. at 825, 826-27. 
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interested local governmental body pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 2.315(c).16 The City’s appeal 

followed. 

II. DISCUSSION

Our procedural rule at 10 C.F.R. § 2.311 provides an interlocutory appeal as of right with 

respect to contention admissibility rulings in two specific circumstances: “(1) upon the denial of a 

petition to intervene and/or request for a hearing, on the question of whether it should have 

been granted; or (2) upon the grant of a petition to intervene and/or request for hearing, on the 

question of whether it should have been wholly denied.”17 If a litigant has been denied 

admission of certain contentions but still has other contentions pending in the proceeding, 

section 2.311 does not provide for immediate interlocutory review of the dismissal of those 

contentions.18 Rather, this appeal as of right is reserved for situations where a petition is denied 

“in its entirety,” therefore having the effect of wholly refusing a petitioner entry into a 

proceeding.19

Although none of the litigants have addressed the matter in their briefs, the 

circumstances here are governed by an earlier precedent that addresses the timing of appeals 

by an interested government.20 In Public Service Co. of New Hampshire, et al. (Seabrook 

 

16 Id. at 827-28. 

17 NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC (Seabrook Station, Unit 1), CLI-13-3, 77 NRC 51, 54 (2013). 

18 Id.; see also Private Fuel Storage L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), 

CLI-00-2, 51 NRC 77, 80 (2000) (stating that such rulings must “abide the end of the case”). 

19 See, e.g., Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 2 and 

3), CLI-08-7, 67 NRC 187, 191 (2008). 

20 We have reviewed Commissioner Baran’s dissent, and it does not change our opinion that 

Seabrook is controlling precedent here. While in its 2004 Part 2 revision, the Commission 

clarified the distinction between the rights and responsibilities of parties and interested 

governments, it did not significantly alter those rights and responsibilities. Changes to 

Adjudicatory Process; Final Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. 2182, 2200-01, 2217, 2223 (Jan. 14, 2004). As 

such, in Seabrook, the Appeal Board considered circumstances similar to the ones before us, 

and its decision appropriately governs here.
- 6 - 

Station, Units 1 and 2), the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board denied interlocutory 

review to Massachusetts, which was granted status as an “interested State” but which 

attempted to appeal the dismissal of particular issues it sought to litigate.21 As the Appeal 

Board recognized, the denial of an interested government’s contentions does not deprive it of 

the right to continue participating in the proceeding.22 Rather, an interested government 

participating under section 2.315(c) is afforded the opportunity to participate on any admitted 

contentions.23 Such a participant may introduce evidence, cross-examine witnesses where 

such cross-examination is permitted, advise the Commission without necessarily taking a 

position on the contention, file proposed findings in proceedings where findings are permitted, 

and petition for review under 10 C.F.R. § 2.341 at the conclusion of the proceeding.24 As such, 

an entity that has been granted participant status as an interested governmental body is not in 

the same position as a prospective intervenor who has been wholly denied admission to a 

proceeding. An interested government has a real and substantial opportunity to litigate admitted 

 

21 ALAB-838, 23 NRC 585, 588-91 (1986) (citing Gulf States Utilities Co. (River Bend Station, 

Units 1 and 2), ALAB-329, 3 NRC 607, 610-11 (1976)). Although the Commission abolished the 

Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Panel in 1991, its decisions still carry precedential 

weight. See Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Palisades Nuclear Plant), CLI-08-19, 68 NRC 

251, 260 n.23 (2008). 

22 Seabrook, ALAB-838, 23 NRC at 589-90. 

23 10 C.F.R. § 2.315(c); Louisiana Energy Services, L.P. (National Enrichment Facility), 

CLI-04-35, 60 NRC 619, 627 (2004). By the terms of the rule, the interested government must 

(among other things) identify those contentions on which it will participate in advance of any 

hearing held. 

24 10 C.F.R. § 2.315(c). One point warrants further clarification. Among other restrictions on 

participation, section 2.315(c) provides that a participating government may only seek 

Commission review on admitted contentions. As indicated by our holding, we do not view this 

language as restricting the City’s right to appeal the Board’s denial of its proffered contentions 

under section 2.341 once the proceeding is over. Rather, we view this limitation in section 

2.315 as applying only to the City’s participation as an interested local government—it does not 

limit any other rights the City may have independent of that participation. 
- 7 - 

contentions as if they were its own, making interlocutory review of its rejected contentions 

premature.25

Here, none of the City of Miami’s three contentions were admitted, but the Board granted 

its request to participate pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 2.315(c).26 The City does not have an appeal 

as of right under these circumstances.27 We therefore consider the City’s appeal as a petition 

for discretionary interlocutory review under 10 C.F.R. § 2.341(f).28 Such a petition must 

demonstrate that the petitioner seeking interlocutory review faces “immediate and serious 

irreparable impact” which could not be alleviated through a petition for review of the presiding 

officer’s final decision, or that the issue “affects the basic structure of the proceeding in a 

pervasive or unusual manner.”29 We have held repeatedly that routine contention admissibility 

decisions do not constitute serious and irreparable impact or affect the basic structure of a 

proceeding in a pervasive or unusual manner, particularly when avenues for participation 

 

25 Here, while the City’s rejected Contention 1 asserted that the “source data” for chemical 

concentrations of four identified effluents was missing from the DEIS, as an interested local 

governmental body the City will have the opportunity to participate with respect to Joint 

Intervenors’ Amended Contention 2.1, concerning the accuracy and reliability of that source 

data for the same four effluents. Compare Petition at 6, with August 2012 Order at 10. 

26 LBP-15-19, 81 NRC at 828. 

27 To be sure, the City’s assumption that it should file its appeal pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 

§ 2.311(b) is understandable; the Board directed the City to that provision. Id. at 828 (“Miami 

may file an appeal from this Memorandum and Order within twenty-five (25) days of service of 

this decision by filing a notice of appeal and an accompanying supporting brief pursuant to 

10 C.F.R. § 2.311(b).”). Further, the situation presented here—interlocutory appeal of the denial 

of contentions by an entity also granted participant status—is rare in our jurisprudence. In 

circumstances such as this where appeal rights appear unclear, we will take the opportunity to 

clarify the matter. See, e.g., South Texas Project Nuclear Operating Co. (South Texas Project, 

Units 3 and 4), CLI-09-18, 70 NRC 859, 861-62 (2009) (clarifying that a necessary prerequisite 

for a section 2.311 appeal is that the Board first rule fully on an intervention petition). 

28 See, e.g., Pa’ina Hawaii, LLC (Material License Application), CLI-06-18, 64 NRC 1, 4 (2006). 

29 10 C.F.R. § 2.341(f)(2). 
- 8 - 

remain.30 The appeal does not demonstrate circumstances that would cause us to deviate from 

our established practice of requiring a litigant in its position to wait until the conclusion of a 

proceeding to challenge the denial of its contentions. This conclusion reflects our longstanding 

disfavor of interlocutory, piecemeal review of Board rulings, barring extraordinary circumstances 

not present here.31

III. CONCLUSION 

As discussed above, the City of Miami’s appeal does not lie under 10 C.F.R. § 2.311 and 

does not satisfy the criteria for interlocutory review in 10 C.F.R. § 2.341(f)(2). We therefore 

deny review without prejudice. The City may renew its appeal at the end of this proceeding 

pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 2.341(b). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 For the Commission 

 

[NRC Seal] 

 /RA/ __________________________ 

 Annette L. Vietti-Cook 

 Secretary of the Commission 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, 

this 5th day of February, 2016. 

 

30 See, e.g., Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), 

CLI-12-13, 75 NRC 681, 688 (2012); South Texas Project Nuclear Operating Co. (South Texas 

Project, Units 3 and 4), CLI-10-16, 71 NRC 486, 491 (2010) (citing Crow Butte Resources, Inc. 

(In Situ Leach Facility, Crawford, Nebraska), CLI-09-9, 69 NRC 331, 365 (2009)); Indian Point, 

CLI-08-7, 67 NRC at 192. 

31 Seabrook, CLI-13-3, 77 NRC at 54. We may also exercise our inherent supervisory authority 

over adjudications to review on our own motion an issue not otherwise properly before us on 

appeal in sufficiently significant circumstances. See, e.g., Northern States Power Co. (Prairie 

Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-10-27, 72 NRC 481, 489 (2010); Entergy 

Nuclear Generation Co. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-07-1, 65 NRC 1, 4-5 

(2007). We decline to do so here; the Board’s contention admissibility ruling does not present 

an issue that merits such review. Id.
Commissioner Baran, Dissenting:

I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion, which relies on the Atomic Safety and 

Licensing Appeal Board’s decision in Seabrook.

1 Since 1986, when Seabrook was decided, the 

Commission has clarified that participation as a § 2.315(c) interested participant and as a 

§ 2.309 party are not equivalent. Therefore, a core rationale for the holding in Seabrook—that a 

decision to deny a petition for § 2.309 party status but grant a petition for § 2.315(c) interested 

participant status does “‘nothing to affect the [entity’s] status in the proceeding’”2—is no longer 

valid. In the interest of procedural fairness, an appeal of such a decision should not be treated 

as a petition for discretionary interlocutory review under § 2.341(f). Instead, such an appeal 

should be treated as an appeal as of right under § 2.311(c). Like any other person denied 

§ 2.309 party status, states, local governments, and tribes should be permitted to bring an 

appeal as of right under § 2.311(c). In my view, the Commission should issue an order 

recognizing that Seabrook is no longer applicable and addressing the merits of the City of 

Miami’s appeal. 

The Appeal Board in Seabrook relied on its 1976 decision in River Bend, which stated

that “[t]he sole practical consequence of [denying the State of Louisiana’s participation to 

intervene but granting its request to participate as an interested state] was that the scope of the 

health and safety hearing would not be further broadened to encompass the additional issues 

which the State sought to inject into it.”3 Accordingly, the Appeal Board in Seabrook found that, 

 

1 Public Service Co. of New Hampshire, et al. (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-838, 23 

NRC 585 (1986). 

2 Id. at 591 (quoting Gulf States Utilities Co. (River Bend Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-329, 3 

NRC 607, 610-11 (1976)). 

3 River Bend, ALAB-329, 3 NRC at 611. 
- 2 - 

despite denial of the Attorney General of Massachusetts’ sole contention, his “right to participate 

fully in this proceeding remains wholly unaffected.”4

In NRC’s 2004 rulemaking to revise 10 C.F.R. Part 2, the Commission explained the 

distinction between a § 2.315(c) interested participant and a § 2.309 party: 

[T]he Commission intended to maintain the distinction between a 

State, local governmental body, or Indian Tribe participating as 

parties under § 2.309, versus their participation in a hearing as an 

“interested” State, local governmental body or Indian Tribe under 

§ 2.315(c).... A State, local governmental body or Indian Tribe 

admitted as a party is entitled to the rights and bears the 

responsibilities of a full party, including the ability to engage in 

discovery, initiate motions, and take positions on the merits. By 

contrast, an “interested” State, local governmental body or Indian 

Tribe may participate in a hearing by filing testimony, briefs, and 

interrogating witnesses if parties are permitted by the rules to 

cross-examine witnesses, as provided in § 2.315(c). However, 

such participation is dependent on the existence of a hearing 

independent of the interested State, local governmental body or 

Indian Tribe participation, and such participation ends when the 

hearing is terminated.5

This statement makes clear, contrary to the analysis of the Appeal Board in Seabrook, that the 

participation of a § 2.315(c) interested participant is distinct from that of a § 2.309 party. 

Embedded in the legal question of whether the City is entitled to an immediate appeal as 

of right with respect to the denial of its petition to intervene as a full-fledged party is a policy 

question of whether it is fair to treat a state, local government, or tribe differently than every 

other entity that is denied party status. Notably, the City petitioned to intervene as a § 2.309 

party and, then only if that petition were denied, to participate as a § 2.315(c) interested 

participant. Thus, when faced with the mutually exclusive options of § 2.309 party status or 

§ 2.315(c) interested participant status, the City made its preference for § 2.309 party status 

 

4 Seabrook, ALAB-838, 23 NRC at 591. 

5 Changes to the Adjudicatory Process; Final Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. 2182, 2200-01 (Jan. 14, 2004). 
- 3 - 

clear.6 In the interest of procedural fairness, we should decide on the City’s appeal of the 

Board’s denial of that petition now—which would, if granted, afford the City a different set of 

rights and responsibilities in the proceeding—rather than wait until the end of the proceeding to 

consider the issue. The City should not have to wait an undetermined and possibly lengthy 

amount of time before receiving a ruling on the Board’s decision. 

The only argument against treating the City’s appeal as a § 2.311(c) petition for 

interlocutory review as of right is a concern that it could undermine the interlocutory appeal rule. 

I do not see this as a realistic problem. Interlocutory appeals of Board decisions in which an 

entity is denied party status but granted interested participant status are rare. In fact, these 

circumstances appear to have arisen only three times in the agency’s history: in 1976, 1986, 

and here.7 There is no plausible risk that providing states, local governments, and tribes an 

interlocutory appeal as of right in these unusual circumstances will open the flood gates to a 

wave of interlocutory appeals. Furthermore, if we endorse the Seabrook approach of denying 

states, local governments, and tribes an immediate appeal as of right of the complete denial of 

their hearing requests, they could easily bypass the ruling to obtain both immediate review and 

interested participant status if that appeal is unsuccessful. Avoiding the Seabrook restriction 

would simply require the state, local government, or tribe to petition to intervene as a § 2.309 

party and not petition, in the alternative, to intervene as a § 2.315(c) interested participant. If 

the Board wholly denied the entity’s § 2.309 petition to intervene, the entity could seek review 

under § 2.311(c). If that appeal failed, the entity could then request § 2.315(c) interested 

participant status, having already obtained immediate interlocutory review of the denial of its 

 

6 The Commission decided in Louisiana Energy Services, L.P. (National Enrichment Facility), 

CLI-04-35, 60 NRC 619 (2004), that, as used in § 2.315(c), the phrase “that has not been 

admitted as a party under § 2.309” means that an entity cannot be admitted as an interested 

participant under § 2.315(c) if it is already admitted as a party under § 2.309. 

7 See Seabrook, ALAB-838, 23 NRC at 591 (quoting River Bend, ALAB-329, 3 NRC at 610-11). 
- 4 - 

petition to intervene as a party. The rarity of these particular circumstances and the ease with 

which a state, locality, or tribe could bypass the Seabrook restriction weigh in favor of allowing 

an interlocutory appeal as of right in circumstances such as these. 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

In the Matter of ) 

 ) 

FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ) Docket Nos. 52-040 and 52-041-COL 

 (Juno Beach, Florida) ) 

 ) 

(Turkey Point, Units 6 & 7) ) 

 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that copies of the COMMISSION MEMORANDUM AND ORDER (CLI-16-01), have 

been served upon the following persons by Electronic Information Exchange. 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Office of Commission Appellate Adjudication 

Mail Stop: O-7H4 

Washington, DC 20555-0001 

ocaamail@nrc.gov

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel 

Mail Stop: T-3 F23 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Washington, DC 20555-0001 

E. Roy Hawkens 

Administrative Judge, Chair 

roy.hawkens@nrc.gov

Dr. Michael F. Kennedy 

Administrative Judge 

michael.kennedy@nrc.gov

Dr. William C. Burnett 

Administrative Judge 

william.burnett2@nrc.gov

Nicole Pepperl, Law Clerk, ASLBP 

Nicole.Pepperl@nrc.gov

Jennifer E. Scro, Law Clerk, ASLBP 

Jennifer.Scro@nrc.gov

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Office of the Secretary of the Commission 

Mail Stop: O-16C1 

Washington, DC 20555-0001 

hearingdocket@nrc.gov

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Office of the General Counsel 

Mail Stop: O-15 D21 

Washington, DC 20555-0001 

Sara Kirkwood, Esq. 

sara.kirkwood@nrc.gov

Patrick Moulding, Esq. 

patrick.moulding@nrc.gov

Sarah Price, Esq. 

sarah.price@nrc.gov

Michael Spencer, Esq. 

michael.spencer@nrc.gov

Robert Weisman, Esq. 

robert.weisman@nrc.gov

Christina England, Esq. 

christina.england@nrc.gov

Anthony C. Wilson, Esq. 

anthony.wilson@nrc.gov

OGC Mail Center: Members of this office 

have received a copy of this filing by EIE 

service. 
Turkey Point, Units 6 and 7, Docket Nos. 52-040 and 52-041-COL 

COMMISSION MEMORANDUM AND ORDER (CLI-16-01)

2 

Florida Power & Light Company 

700 Universe Blvd. 

Juno Beach, Florida 33408 

Nextera Energy Resources 

William Blair, Esq. 

william.blair@fpl.com

Florida Power & Light Company 

801 Pennsylvania Ave. NW Suite 220 

Washington, DC 20004 

Steven C. Hamrick, Esq. 

steven.hamrick@fpl.com

Pillsbury, Winthrop, Shaw, Pittman, LLP 

1200 Seventeenth Street, N.W. 

Washington, DC 20036-3006 

Kimberly Harshaw, Esq. 

kimberly.harshaw@pillsburylaw.com

Michael G. Lepre, Esq. 

michael.lepre@pillsburylaw.com

John H. O’Neill, Esq. 

john.oneill@pillsburylaw.com

David R. Lewis, Esq. 

david.lewis@pillsburylaw.com

Timothy J. V. Walsh, Esq. 

timothy.walsh@pillsburylaw.com

Counsel for Mark Oncavage, Dan Kipnis, 

Southern Alliance for Clean Energy (SACE), 

 and National Parks Conservation Association 

Everglades Law Center, Inc. 

3305 College Avenue 

Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33314 

Jason Totoiu, Esq. 

jason@evergladeslaw.org

Counsel for Mark Oncavage, Dan Kipnis, 

Southern Alliance for Clean Energy (SACE), 

 and National Parks Conservation 

Association 

Turner Environmental Law Clinic 

Emory University School of Law 

1301 Clifton Rd. SE 

Atlanta, GA 30322 

Mindy Goldstein, Esq. 

magolds@emory.edu

Counsel for the Village of Pinecrest 

Nabors, Giblin & Nickerson, P.A. 

1500 Mahan Drive, Suite 200 

Tallahassee, FL 32308 

William C. Garner, Esq. 

bgarner@ngn-tally.com

Gregory T. Stewart, Esq. 

gstewart@ngnlaw.com

Matthew Haber 

Assistant City Attorney 

The City of Miami 

444 SW 2nd Avenue 

Miami, FL 33130 

mshaber@miamigov.com

 

[Original signed by R. Giitter ] 

 Office of the Secretary of the Commission 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, 

this 5th day of February, 2016