Third Circuit Task Force 

on the Selection of Class Counsel

Final Report

January 2002
1

 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).

2

 Some commentators refer to “auctions” only as they relate to an auction of a class claim. 

We use the term “auction” here as synonymous with bidding for an appointment as lead

counsel—i.e., where counsel seeking to be named class counsel compete with each other through

a bidding process monitored by a judge. We note that courts have used the term “auction” as we

do, in reference to judicially-controlled bidding for appointment of class counsel. See, e.g., In re

Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 270-71 (3d Cir. 2001) (reviewing “the District Court’s

decision to employ an auction to select lead counsel”). 

3

 15 U.S.C. ' 78u-4(a)(3) (2000).

4 Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. of Philadelphia v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary

Corp., 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973), appeal following remand, 540 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1976); In

re Cendant Corp. Prides Litig., 243 F. 3d 722 ( 3d Cir. 2001); In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264

F.3d 201 (3d Cir. 2001). In 1985, then Chief Judge Ruggiero J. Aldisert convened a Task Force

to study the question of how attorney fees should be awarded in class actions. Its report, Court

1

Third Circuit Task Force Report

Selection of Class Counsel

I. Introduction

A. The Promise and Challenge of Class Actions

Courts have struggled with the challenges of managing class actions. One significant concern

has been selecting appropriate counsel to litigate cases on behalf of the class; another has been the

awarding of fair attorney fees. Courts also review the credentials of the lead plaintiff according to the

standards of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, in particular the requirement that the “representative parties will fairly

and adequately protect the interests of the class.”1 Traditionally the choice of lead plaintiff constituted

the choice of lead counsel, and the court awarded fees to class counsel at the end of the case in light

of the result. Recently two developments have altered the class action landscape: the use of judicial

auctions to select class counsel2

 and the enactment of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act

(“PSLRA”).3

The Third Circuit has been in the vanguard in the management of class actions in both its

jurisprudence and its study.4 In that tradition, Chief Judge Edward R. Becker convened the present
Awarded Attorney Fees, Report of the Third Circuit Task Force, 108 F.R.D. 237 (1985), has

been very influential in the development of the law and procedures for managing attorney fees in

class actions.

5

 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997).

2

Task Force on the Selection of Class Counsel to evaluate the emerging practice of several district

court judges throughout the country of selecting class counsel and setting fees through a bidding or

auction process, and to investigate more generally the problems involved in selection of class

counsel.

The redrafting of Rule 23 in 1966 opened the door more widely to class actions seeking

damages arising from harms to multiple individuals or entities in a variety of contexts. The drafters

recognized that it was inefficient, impractical and often impossible for injured persons with small

claims to bring lawsuits to recover damages, no matter how strong their claims. Justice Ginsburg’s

opinion for the Supreme Court in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor,

5

 cited a Seventh Circuit

decision describing the function of most class actions seeking money damages pursuant to Rule 23

(b)(3):

 The policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the

problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring

a solo action prosecuting his or her rights. A class action solves this problem by

aggregating the relatively paltry potential recoveries into something worth someone's

(usually an attorney's) labor. Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344

(1997).

The drafters also foresaw that, even where damages might be substantial enough to provide an

incentive for litigation, multiple lawsuits raising very similar questions of fact and mixed questions

of fact and law could drain scarce judicial resources and might do no more justice than a single suit

brought on behalf of all who would have the right to file individual actions.

What was thought to be true in 1966 appears to be true today: namely, that the interests of

justice are well served by class actions that vindicate rights that might otherwise go unprotected and

that spare courts the burden of handling numerous lawsuits, some small and some not so small,

arising from a common set of facts. Over the last 35 years, the American legal system has handled

a variety of class actions involving an enormous array of claims. In many situations, the class action

has been successful in identifying public harms, discovering a substantial percentage of likely

victims, making the party responsible for the harm rectify much of the damage caused, and

distributing damages among the injured parties.

B. Funding and Prosecution of Class Actions
6

 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing

Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1987) (describing

and noting the need for economic incentives for plaintiffs’ lawyers in common fund class

actions).

3

Class actions are generated and funded in a number of ways. Some class actions are brought

through the efforts of public interest advocacy groups; these actions usually involve constitutional

and civil rights claims—e.g., school desegregation suits, employment discrimination actions, and

challenges to statutes, regulations and ordinances on free speech grounds. Such groups may be

funded by members, supported by contributors, or both. They may use in-house counsel who are paid

a salary, outside counsel who often receive nothing unless they are successful in bringing suit so that

attorney fees may be sought pursuant to statute, or a combination. The reported decisions and

anecdotal reports of judges and lawyers in these cases suggest that it is relatively rare for there to be

a fight among lawyers for appointment as lead counsel. The motivating force in these cases is

vindication of principle. The prospect of attorney fees may be an incentive—in some cases, an

important one—for groups or lawyers to risk their time and effort on such a case. But, the possibility

that attorney fees might be awarded appears not to be the driving force for either the groups who

bring suit or their lawyers. It is the principle at stake that drives the case. Those who share a belief

in the principle are more likely to assist the litigation than to compete with it.

In other cases, particularly those in which injured parties have suffered a financial injury, the

desire to be made whole may be as strongly held as principles that drive other litigation, but there is

no public interest group or other not-for-profit entity volunteering to seek recourse on behalf of those

who are injured. Instead, the injured find that justice depends on the availability of plaintiffs’ counsel

of sufficient experience, skill, and resources. It is the plaintiffs’ bar, and particularly the plaintiffs’

class action bar, that provides the legal representation that enables large groups of people to vindicate

their right to legal redress for wrongs inflicted upon them.

It does not impugn the service that the plaintiffs’ class action bar provides to note that the

driving force in most cases is the opportunity to share in the plaintiffs’ risk and ultimately in any

reward they may receive. Like most prudent individuals, plaintiffs’ counsel would not seek

involvement in most class action cases, particularly those involving no principle greater than “the

defendant wrongly deprived me of something of value,” unless the financial reward justified the risk

that counsel undertakes. Because they have abilities that could be put to other uses, plaintiffs’

counsel must find something in a class action that signals that it is financially attractive to be class

counsel.6

It is plaintiffs’ counsel who pay the expenses of the lawsuit, and who expect that they will lose

much if not all of their out-of-pocket expenses if they are not ultimately successful in having a court
7Advancing expenses and court costs, the repayment of which are contingent on the

outcome of the litigation, is permitted by Rule 1.8(e), Model Rules of Professional Conduct.

Most states follow that Rule. STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS:

STATUTES AND STANDARDS, pp. 101-07 (2001). (But see New York Code of Professional

Responsibility D.R.5-103(b)(1), codified at 22 N.Y.C.R.R.'1200.22(b)(1), requiring that the

client remain ultimately liable for such expenses). The ABA Ethics 2000 project proposes to add

a comment to the Model Rule stating: “[A] prohibition on a lawyer lending a client court costs

and litigation expenses [is not warranted], because these advances are virtually indistinguishable

from contingent fees and help ensure access to the courts.”

8

 See Jill E. Fisch, Aggregations, Auctions and Other Developments in the Selection of

Lead Counsel Under the PSLRA, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 56 (2001):

Lawyer-driven litigation is not inherently undesirable. The willingness of

plaintiffs' lawyers to investigate potential causes of action, mobilize the plaintiff class,

and bear the costs and risks associated with the suit leads to an increase in enforcement

and provides a valuable contribution to the deterrence of corporate misconduct. Indeed,

by providing suitable financial incentives for these activities, class actions have led to the

evolution of entrepreneurial plaintiffs' lawyers, who play a central role in rendering the

class action a meaningful vehicle for compensating victims and deterring wrongful

conduct.

9

 “The common-fund doctrine ... allows a person who maintains a lawsuit that results in

the creation, preservation, or increase of a fund in which others have a common interest, to be

reimbursed from that fund for litigation expenses incurred.” Court Awarded Attorney Fees,

Report of the Third Circuit Task Force, 108 F.R.D. 237, 241 (1985).

4

certify a class and achieving either a settlement or a litigation victory.7 It is plaintiffs’ counsel who

work to obtain whatever recovery any member of the class who has not opted out of the litigation will

receive.8 The fact that there will be no payment if there is no settlement or trial victory means that

there is greater risk for plaintiffs’ counsel in these class action cases than in cases in which an hourly

rate or flat fee is guaranteed. The quid pro quo for the risk, and for the delay in receiving any

compensation in the best of circumstances, is some kind of risk premium if the case is successful.

C. Perceptions About Common Fund Class Actions

The cases upon which the Task Force has focused are common fund cases. These are cases

in which plaintiffs obtain class action certification and generate a pool of damages by way of

settlement or litigation with one or more defendants. The larger the pool, the more each plaintiff

might receive B depending, of course, on what the lawyers receive from the same pool. The lawyers

expect compensation from the fund for creating it, as well as a risk premium for bearing all of the

financial risks in the litigation.9
10 For example, a study of class actions in four federal districts, conducted by the Federal

Judicial Center, rendered results that “did not show recurring situations where (b)(3) class

actions produced minimal benefits in relation to attorneys’ fees.” The study noted some cases in

which “the settlement produced relatively small payments to the class as well as to attorneys for

the class.” Thomas E. Willging, Laural L. Hooper & Robert J. Niemic, EMPIRICAL STUDY OF

CLASS ACTIONS IN FOUR FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 77 (Federal Judicial Center 1996).

11 See, e.g., In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55

F.3d 768 (3d Cir. 1995), where the original settlement called for class counsel to receive attorney

fees in the amount of $9.5 million, and class members received no more than a $1,000 certificate

towards a GM truck. 

12 It is worth noting that many of the concerns about coupon settlements can be alleviated

by basing counsel fees on the value of coupons actually redeemed, rather than the theoretical

value of coupons awarded. Statement of Brian Wolfman, submitted to the Task Force, at 14-15

(“[B]y tying counsel’s fate to that of their clients, the typical coupon settlement would become a

thing of the past, and only settlements in which the coupon has a cash redemption value or the

settlement includes the participation of a secondary market-maker—in other words, a settlement

that actually broadly benefits the class—would be worth counsel’s efforts.”).

5

The Task Force is well aware that there is a perception among a significant part of the nonlawyer population and even among lawyers and judges that the risk premium is too high in class

action cases and that class action plaintiffs’ lawyers are overcompensated for the work that they do.

This perception is fostered by a belief that class action lawyers receive 25% to 33 % of the recovery

in common fund cases irrespective of how much (or worse, how little) work they do and irrespective

of the quality of their representation.

We make no claim to being able to identify the “right” amount of compensation in particular

cases. But the evidence before us is clear that the perception as to how lawyers in class action cases

are compensated is often distorted. When there is a public reaction to an attorney fee award in a given

case, the public is usually unaware of what the lawyers actually did, what risks they took, what

investment they made, and how important their lawyering was to victory for the class.10

The cases that account to some extent for a negative public view of some plaintiffs’ class

action lawyers are those in which class members receive in a settlement something perceived to be

of little value or even a slap in the face of the plaintiffs B e.g., in a case involving a defective product,

coupons entitling plaintiffs to purchase another product by the same manufacturer at a discount B

while the lawyers seek and obtain what seems to be large sums of cash.11 It is beyond the scope of

the work of this Task Force to identify the most troublesome cases and to comment on the merits of

particular settlements or other dispositions.12 It is sufficient, we think, to note that these cases exist

and have an effect on public and judicial reactions to class actions.
13 Although we are unaware of any scientific study of the matter, the Task Force believes

that most nonlawyers are unaware of many of the risks faced by lawyers who take on and assume

responsibility for class actions. There often is substantial publicity of successful class actions,

and the focus of the publicity will naturally be on the amount of the recovery if it is large. Large

recoveries get public attention, and large recoveries often result in substantial attorneys’ fees that

also attract attention. When class actions are dismissed, the publicity is often sparse or

nonexistent, and the fact that class lawyers are uncompensated is often not understood. Motions

to dismiss on the pleadings are not big news, although they are common in a number of class

action scenarios. 

6

The data that the Task Force has reviewed, however, demonstrates that class action cases are

not always winners, the risks in bringing such actions are often quite real, and the cases that are

dismissed early in litigation may receive less publicity than those that settle with money changing

hands. The larger the sum in a settlement or judgment, the more interest various press entities have

in reporting and commenting on it.13

D. Appointing Counsel and Awarding Reasonable Attorney Fees

For more than a quarter century, lawyers have competed to control common fund financial

recovery class action litigation. Much of the time they work out among themselves a voluntary plan

to allocate responsibility, often referred to as “private ordering.” In other cases, however, judges

must decide who should speak for the plaintiffs and serve as lead counsel. In both scenarios, the

court has the obligation to decide who should represent the plaintiff class, either by reviewing

counsel’s private arrangements or by choosing among competing counsel. The court’s decision may

reward some counsel and disappoint others.

Until the 1990s, the choice of lead counsel in common fund cases was either left to the

plaintiffs’ lawyers to work out voluntarily, subject to the approval of the court (which was likely to

follow), or to a decision by the court based on the court’s judgment as to who could most adequately

represent the class. Two recent innovations concerning appointment of class counsel have created

controversy and gave rise to the appointment of this Task Force.

First, some judges have experimented with conducting an auction as a way of choosing lead

counsel. Simply put, these judges asked lawyers who wanted to serve as lead counsel to submit a bid

as to what they would require by way of fees and expenses. As this Report will demonstrate, bidding

has taken various forms and utilized a number of different measures.
14 Outside of securities cases and the PSLRA, the concept of “lead plaintiff” is a familiar

one. We shall use the term “lead plaintiff” as synonymous with the “most adequate plaintiff” in

discussing securities class actions.

15 Throughout this Report, we cite to the applicable sections of the ABA Model Rules of

Professional Conduct (“Model Rules”). These rules form the basis of the professional rules of

the majority of the states. STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS

STATUTES AND STANDARDS, p. xxiii (2001) (“As of Fall, 1999, more than 40 states and the

District of Colombia had adopted all or a significant portion of the Model Rules.”). In 1997, the

ABA appointed the Ethics 2000 Commission (“Ethics 2000”), to recommend changes and to

update the Model Rules. The recommendations of Ethics 2000 are available at

http://www.abanet.org/cpr/ethics2k.html . Ethics 2000 has submitted its Final Report to the ABA

House of Delegates, which is in the process of considering its recommendations. CONFERENCE

REPORT ABA ANNUAL MEETING, 17 ABA/BNA LAWYERS’ MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL

CONDUCT 492 (August 15, 2001). Whatever the outcome in the ABA House of Delegates, the

states are free to adopt or reject Ethics 2000 recommendations. Those proposals adopted by the

ABA are likely to become the most influential. Pertinent recommendations of Ethics 2000 will

also be referred to in this Report. Several states retain all or parts of the ABA Model Code of

Professional Responsibility (“Model Code”), which was the predecessor to the Model Rules.

Pertinent provisions of the Model Code will be cited in this Report. In 2000, the ALI published

7

Second, Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act in 1995. This Act

created the concept of the “most adequate” plaintiff and envisioned that this lead plaintiff14 would

choose counsel for the class, subject to review by the court. The Act raises a number of questions,

including the degree to which a court should defer to the lead plaintiff’s choice of counsel and

whether a court-sponsored auction is permissible in securities class actions.

As will become evident as we proceed, the Task Force found it impossible to separate three

basic questions: 

1. How to choose lead counsel?

2. How to compensate lead counsel? 

3. When to make the compensation decision? 

The reason these questions are interrelated is that the case for bidding is an argument for reducing

attorney fees and for ex ante as opposed to ex post determination of fees and expenses. Similarly,

one argument for deferring to the lead plaintiff’s choice of counsel in securities class actions is the

assumption that the empowered plaintiff will be willing and able to control attorney fees and

expenses.

The Task Force’s deliberations on the fundamental questions of appointment, fees and timing

were informed by the professional responsibility questions presented by the management of class

actions.15 In class actions, the ordinary assumptions about the attorney-client relationship do not
the RESTATEMENT OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS. A product of 14 years of work, the

Restatement is likely to become influential on many topics. Pertinent provisions of the

Restatement are also included in this Report.

Whatever the specific articulation, the core values comprising the responsibilities of

lawyers are the same. Pertinent to the Task Force’s inquiry, lawyers owe clients duties of loyalty,

dedication, and competence and are prohibited from charging unreasonable fees. (Other core

values include duties of communication and confidentiality, which are not directly implicated

here.)

16 Model Rule 1.3 (Comment 1: AA lawyer should act with commitment and dedication to

the interests of the client and zeal in advocacy upon the client’s behalf.”); Model Code DR6-

101(A)(1)( A lawyer shall not handle a matter “which he knows or should know that he is not

competent to handle . . .”); RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS ' 52 (Comment c

“The lawyer must perform tasks reasonably appropriate to the representation including, where

appropriate, inquiry into the facts, analysis of law, exercise of professional judgment,

communication with the client, rendering of practical and ethical advice, and drafting of

documents.”).

17 Model Rule 1.7 (Comment 1: “Loyalty is an essential element in the lawyer’s

relationship to a client.”); Model Code EC 5-1 (“The professional judgment of a lawyer should

be exercised, within the bounds of the law, solely for the benefit of his client and free of

compromising influences and loyalties. Neither his personal interests, the interests of other

clients, nor the desires of third persons should be permitted to dilute his loyalty to his client.”);

RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS ' 121 (Comment b.@[T]he law seeks to assure

clients that their lawyers will represent them with undivided loyalty. A client is entitled to be

represented by a lawyer whom the client can trust.”).

18 Model Rule 1.1 (“Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill,

thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”); Model Code EC 6-

1 (“Because of his vital role in the legal process, a lawyer should act with competence and

proper care in representing clients.”); RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS ' 52

(Comment b) (the duty of competence is “the skill and knowledge normally possessed by

members of that profession or trade in good standing.”).

8

apply. In other types of litigation, clients may be counted on to manage the litigation, because they

are naturally involved and concerned. Moreover those clients are paying counsels’ bills, either out

of their pockets as the case goes along or out of their recovery at the conclusion of the case. For

those reasons, clients can be expected to act in their own interest to monitor the litigation and to

assess the reasonableness of the lawyers’ fee. Client involvement is the primary means by which the

attorney’s core responsibilities of diligence16, loyalty17, and competence18 are monitored and a

reasonable fee negotiated. This is the structure envisioned by the professional responsibility rules,

which mandate that the attorney communicate the material facts to the client to enable the client to
19 Model Rule 1.4 (b)(“A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary

to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.”); Model Code EC

7-8 ( a lawyer “should exercise his best efforts to insure that decisions of his client are made only

after the client has been informed of relevant considerations.”); RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW

GOVERNING LAWYERS ' 20. 

20 Model Rule 1.2(a) (AA lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the

objectives of representation .. .”); Model Code EC 7-7 ( “In certain areas of legal representation

not affecting the merits of the cause . . . , a lawyer is entitled to make decisions on his own. But

otherwise the authority to make decisions is exclusively that of the client . . .”); RESTATEMENT

OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS '' 21, 22 (permitting the lawyer and client to alter by

agreement the usual allocation of decisionmaking responsibility).

21 Model Rule 1.2(c), Comment 5 (“The client may not be asked to agree to

representation so limited in scope as to violate [the duty to perform competently], or to surrender

the right to terminate the lawyer’s services or the right to settle litigation that the lawyer might

wish to continue.”); Model Code EC 7-7 ( A[I]t is for the client to decide whether he will accept a

settlement offer . . .@).

22 Model Rule 1.5(a) (“A lawyer’s fee shall be reasonable.”); Model Code DR 2-106(A)

& (B) (A lawyer “shall not enter into an agreement for, charge, or collect an illegal or clearly

excessive fee.” A fee is “clearly excessive when, . . . a lawyer of ordinary prudence would be left

with a definite and firm conviction that the fee is in excess of a reasonable fee.”). Ethics 2000

would amend Rule 1.5 to provide that an attorney be precluded from charging unreasonable

amounts for expenses as well as fees. See also ABA Formal Opinion 93-379 (Dec. 6, 1993)

(holding that the Rule 1.5 “reasonableness” standard also applies to expenses).

23 Randall S. Thomas & Robert G. Hansen, Auctioning Class Action and Derivative

Lawsuits: A Critical Analysis, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 423 , 433 (1993) (“Despite the strictures of the

received legal model of the attorney-client relationship, the plaintiffs’ attorney, not the plaintiffs,

9

make informed decisions about the representation19 and provide that it is the client’s decision that

governs the objectives of the representation.20 The general model of client involvement also assures

that the client has the power to hire and fire the lawyer and to make decisions about settlement.21 The

Rules also require attorney fees to be reasonable.22

In class actions, most members of the class do not participate in retaining counsel or in

negotiating the representation arrangements. Class members are usually geographically dispersed.

Ordinarily, class counsel is not even personally acquainted with most members of the class.

Moreover, because the common fund class action is designed to pool a number of small claims, many

members of the class do not know and may not care about the litigation. There are lead plaintiffs in

all class action cases, and theoretically these lead plaintiffs could monitor the performance of their

counsel. But, often a lead plaintiff has only a small stake in the litigation and lacks the resources,

sophistication or interest to engage in monitoring. In these circumstances, the ordinary relationship

between lawyer and client cannot be relied on to safeguard the interests of the class.23
in these actions, controls the conduct of every important aspect of the litigation. . . . Individual

plaintiffs cannot, by themselves, effectively control the agency costs that arise from the attorneyclient relationship in these cases.”).

24 See John C. Coffee, The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness

and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 908 (1987) (observing that

under private ordering, competing groups have sometimes invited other attorneys into the action

in order to secure their vote for lead counsel, and that the result of some private ordering is a

“political compromise,” the price of which is “often both overstaffing and an acceptance of the

10

Counsel for a class is in a unique position. Absent class members are not individual clients.

Thus, the ordinary attorney-client relationship does not exist between each class member and class

counsel. Yet, there clearly is a duty imposed upon class counsel—by the rules of professional

conduct and by Fed. R. Civ. P. 23—to protect the entire class fairly and adequately and to work

diligently to maximize class recovery. 

The goal of all the procedures surrounding the appointment of class counsel and the setting

of fees is to establish appropriate structures and monitoring mechanisms to substitute for the ordinary

attorney-client relationship and to assure performance of the fiduciary responsibilities owed by both

the lawyer and the lead plaintiff to the class. An overriding concern for the Task Force was to

provide recommendations that enhance and support professional behavior by class counsel and that

reduce or minimize conflicts between the interests of class counsel and the interests of the class.

The Task Force has examined the various ways that class action counsel are

selected—voluntary agreements among plaintiffs’ counsel ratified by the court; judicial selection of

lead counsel by the court; judicial deference to an empowered plaintiff’s choice of counsel; and

auctions. We have become increasingly aware that no method of selection is beyond criticism, none

assures the “right” amount of compensation to counsel, none guarantees maximum recovery for class

members, and none eliminates the possibility of conflicts of interest between counsel and the class.

Each of the methods of selection might end up with the best counsel being selected and paid the

fairest price, but none assures this result and there is no readily available mechanism to evaluate the

success or failure of a selection method.

Voluntary agreements among plaintiffs’ counsel with judicial approval may lead to selection

of the best lawyers, and judicial oversight of fee applications at the conclusion of the case may offer

a theoretically perfect opportunity for setting the “right” fee in light of all that has occurred. But,

voluntary agreements among lawyers may create cartel-like groupings that favor some lawyers and

disfavor others on the basis of factors that have little to do with ability or fees, and such agreements

may also result in overstaffing and padded hours. In order to reach a “deal”, lead counsel may have

to “cut in” so many lawyers that the representation of the class becomes inefficient and the ultimate

fee request becomes inflated.24 Judicial selection of lead counsel may reflect a judge’s past
free-riding or marginally competent attorney, whose vote gave him leverage that his ability did

not.”). See also In re Milestone Sci. Sec. Litig., 187 F.R.D. 165, 175 (D.N.J. 1999) (noting that a

“litigation by committee” approach to securities class actions may prove wasteful and harmful to

the class). But see In re Oxford Health Plans, Inc. Sec. Litig, 182 F.R.D. 42, 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)

(noting the benefits of pooling the resources of multiple counsel “in order to support what could

prove to be a costly and time-consuming litigation”).

25 See, e.g., In re Synthroid Marketing Litig., 264 F.3d 712, 719 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Only ex

ante can bargaining occur in the shadow of the litigation's uncertainty; only ex ante can the costs

and benefits of particular systems and risk multipliers be assessed intelligently.”).

26 See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class

Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U.

CHI. L. REV. 1 (1991) (proposing auctions of class action claims); Randall S. Thomas & Robert

G. Hansen, Auctioning Class Action and Derivative Lawsuits: A Critical Analysis, 87 NW. U. L.

REV. 423, 423-24 (1993) (criticizing Miller and Macey proposal as unworkable in practice, and

questionable under the current rules of professional responsibility); Statement of Professor

Samuel Issacharoff, submitted to the Task Force, at 6 (noting that the size of the class claims at

stake render it unlikely that they could be purchased by a plaintiff’s firm, and that the only

realistic prospective bidders would be the defendants or their insurers, leading to the problem “of

the class created through the contrivance of the defendant, rather than through the adversarial

process.”).

11

experience with certain lawyers and may not permit all competitors to compete on an even playing

field. Review of fee applications at the conclusion of the case may be theoretically perfect, but

realistically the judge may be hard-pressed to assess the risks as perceived ex ante, the difficulty of

the case, and the benefits provided by counsel.25 The judge may also have a difficult time

determining the reasonableness of a fee request in the absence of a real adversarial testing after a

settlement has been reached. Judicial deference to the choice of counsel by a sophisticated,

empowered lead plaintiff might result in selection of the best firm on the best conditions, or it might

confirm the politically charged “pay-to-play” regime that is said to exist in some places. A bidding

system might identify lawyers who appear savvy about a case and who are willing to seek less in fees

than other lawyers, but it might instead result in an underestimation or overestimation of the value

of a case ex ante that threatens to impair the lawyer’s incentive and ability to carry the case forward

effectively under the stipulations set forth in the bid.

Some scholars have proposed other mechanisms designed to eliminate or reduce the agency

problem that arises when class action lawyers represent class action plaintiffs, but for each proposed

solution there are major problems. One such proposal is to auction class claims to the highest bidder.

The Task Force finds that proposal to be unworkable in practice.26 An auction of claims would

currently violate rules of professional conduct prohibiting lawyers from having a financial interest
27 See Model Rule 1.8(j) and Model Code DR 5-103(A) (both prohibiting a lawyer from

acquiring a proprietary interest in the cause of action).

28 The Task Force familiarized itself with the literature on auctioning of claims and made

a decision not to discuss in this Report the question whether it thought that auctions of claims

might make sense in certain kinds of cases. As noted in the text, auctioning of claims would

require changes in the law that as yet appear highly unlikely to be made. Indeed, if auctions of

claims were seriously considered by lawmakers, it might well make sense to begin slowly with

auctions of single, as opposed to class, claims. The issues that arise in auctions of claims differ

from those that arise when bidding for lead counsel occurs. This Report will demonstrate that

auctions of lead counsel raise a number of issues that require careful analysis. We chose to

confine ourselves to that analysis and to leave for the future and for others the subject of the

possibility, let alone the desirability, of auctioning class claims.

12

in the client’s claim,27 and would require changes in the law that have not yet garnered support

outside of some academic circles. In view of the thus-far purely academic nature of the debate, the

Task Force focused its attention on the bidding process for lead counsel, which actually has generated

some judicial as well as academic support.28

It is with the view that we operate in an imperfect world that the Task Force presents its

report. We seek neither to identify one way to choose lead counsel in all cases nor to discourage

experimentation in appropriate cases. Our goal is to identify factors that judges, counsel and

plaintiffs might think about as they consider how to choose counsel in common fund class action

cases and how the choice relates to the method of compensating chosen counsel and the timing of the

compensation decision.

II. The Task Force and Its Methodology

Chief Judge Becker established the Task Force on Selection of Class Counsel to evaluate the

emerging practice of several distinguished district court judges throughout the country of selecting

class counsel through a judicially-conducted auction process, as well as the subject of selection of

class counsel in general. In his charge to the Task Force, he stated that while auctions seemed to

result in lower transaction costs and therefore greater benefits to the class, there were many judges

and lawyers who believed that the process was “deeply flawed.” Judge Becker stressed the

importance of assisting courts, especially new judges, in determining how to proceed with

appointment and compensation of counsel in class actions. The Task Force was asked to report its

tentative recommendations at the 2001 Third Circuit Judicial Conference.

Because the problem of appointment of class counsel confronts every federal court in the

country, the Task Force's membership was not limited to judges and attorneys within the Third

Circuit. Indeed, one of the reasons for forming the group was to learn from experience outside the

Third Circuit.
29 The Task Force expresses its thanks to the Federal Judicial Center and its Director,

Judge Fern M. Smith, for the invaluable assistance provided to the work of the Task Force. The

Report prepared for the Task Force by Laural Hooper & Marie Leary, Auctioning the Role of

Class Counsel in Class Action Cases: A Descriptive Study (Federal Judicial Center 2001) (“FJC

Report”), is posted on the Task Force website at www.ca3.uscourts.gov.

13

The Task Force was co-chaired by Professor Stephen A. Saltzburg of George Washington

University Law School and Gregory P. Joseph, Esq., of New York City. The Task Force was

composed of current and former federal judges; the Chancellor of the Delaware Court of Chancery;

lawyers in varied areas of practice, including plaintiff’s class action, class action defense, and inhouse corporate representation; and an academic who has done significant scholarly work on class

actions. Professor Daniel J. Capra of Fordham Law School served as the Reporter to the Task Force;

Professor Eleanor W. Myers of Temple Law School served as Associate Reporter. Ms. Toby D.

Slawsky, Circuit Executive, Third Circuit Court of Appeals, provided invaluable assistance to the

Task Force. Judith F. Ambler served as Research Assistant. In addition, the work of the Task Force

was aided considerably by research conducted by Laural Hooper and Marie Leary of the Federal

Judicial Center.29

The Task Force formulated a comprehensive list of questions on which it sought and received

public comment. Those questions are as follows: 

1. Auction of class counsel appointment as an alternative to traditional appointment

a. Does auctioning tend to create a better result for class members than traditional

appointment? Or do the lower attorney fees associated with the auctioning cases correspond

to a proportionately lower recovery for the class?

b. The lodestar formula has been criticized for providing an incentive for class counsel

to expend unnecessary hours, sometimes with the permission or even encouragement of the

defendant. Is there any empirical evidence to indicate that such an incentive is operating?

Does auctioning reduce that incentive? Does it instead create a contrary incentive to settle the

claim at the earliest possible opportunity?

c. Why isn’t the judge’s ability to set the fee at the end of the case sufficient to address

all issues that bidding is used to address? 

d. Does the auction process unfairly benefit large firms over small firms?

e. Does the auction process discourage plaintiff’s attorneys from conducting a

thorough pre-complaint investigation? Will lawyers invest money to work up class actions

if there is a significant risk that they will not be selected as counsel for the class?

f. It has been suggested that one benefit of an auction is that it allows firms that have

not previously had the opportunity to serve as lead counsel to do so. Is there any evidence

to indicate that this has happened or are the same firms continually winning the bidding

process?
14

g. Are the costs associated with traditional appointment of class counsel (e.g., ex post

fee determinations) eliminated or reduced by auctioning? 

h. What costs are imposed by auctioning? (e.g., determining the value of the claim ex

ante, scrutinizing bids, etc.)

i. Are the costs associated with auctioning greater or less than those associated with

traditional appointment?

j. How does the timing of the initial counsel selection decision (well prior to Rule 23

certification) affect the propriety or appropriateness of auctioning? Is the judge too invested

in the up-front selection if auctioning is used?

2. Professional responsibility questions

a. Which procedure, auction or traditional appointment, better promotes counsel’s

loyalty to the class by aligning the interests of class counsel with those of the class?

b. Some winning bids have included caps on fees or costs. Do these caps affect

counsel’s independent judgment on behalf of the class?

c. Some winning bids have included a promise not to take a fee if the settlement is

below a certain number. Does this arrangement create a conflict of interest for class counsel?

d. How might the auction procedure be structured to best preserve class counsel’s

independence and loyalty on behalf of the class?

e. Are there other professional responsibility concerns raised specifically by the

auction procedure?

3. Auction procedures and implementation

a. Assuming that auctioning is a viable alternative to traditional appointment, is it

more appropriate in some circumstances than others (e.g., antitrust actions, mass tort actions,

small claimant actions)? Should there be different procedures for different types of cases? Are

there some kinds of cases in which auctioning is never appropriate? For example, if the

contemplated recovery is something other than money (e.g., equitable relief, coupons, ADR),

would an auction procedure be unworkable?

b. What considerations other than price, if any, should the court take into account in

awarding the appointment? Should the court attempt to replicate the considerations that a

client would take into account in addition to price, e.g., experience, financial resources, etc.?

If so, how?

c. How should court and counsel obtain enough information about the claim to

determine its value for bidding purposes?

d. Should a court consider the degree of concentration in the market of class counsel?

Should it be an objective of the bidding process to expand the field of attorneys who serve

as lead counsel?

e. Is there evidence of collusion or incentives to collusion in the auctioning process?

If so, should procedures be employed to prevent collusion? If so, what procedures should be

used?
15

f. What are the advantages or disadvantages of the following features of auction

procedure?

i. Sealed bids;

ii. Disclosure of the terms of the winning bid;

iii. Permitting or prohibiting bids from a consortium of firms;

iv. Caps on expenses;

v. Caps on the fee;

vi. Modification of caps at the time of the fee award;

vii. Structuring the bids, e.g., according to stage of the litigation; 

viii. Use of an X factor, i.e., a figure below which 100% of the amount of

recovery goes to the class;

ix. Use of rising, falling or straight percentages as the basis for auctioning;

x. Permitting certain bidding counsel to have a right to match the best bid;

g. How does the court determine whether the winning bid is “too good”, i.e., such a

“good deal” for the class that it raises a question about counsel’s qualifications or ability to

assess the case?

h. Should the court compensate lawyers who conduct the initial investigation and file

the initial complaint if they do not win the auction?

i. Are any special considerations necessary for “coattail” or “follow-on” class actions?

j. Should the appointment of lead counsel go to a single lawyer or a single law firm?

4. Auctioning of class counsel and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act

a. Is auctioning class counsel consistent with the lead plaintiff provision of the Private

Securities Litigation Reform Act? How much deference should the court give to the

presumptive lead plaintiff’s choice of counsel?

b. If the auction is won by counsel other than one chosen by the lead plaintiff, should

or must the court accommodate the lead plaintiff’s choice of counsel? For example, should

lead plaintiff’s counsel have a right of first refusal on the bid?

5. Suggested procedures for traditional appointment of class counsel

a. What procedures can be suggested for improving the traditional process of

appointing class counsel?

6. Other solutions

a. Can the “empowered plaintiff” rationale of the PSLRA be applied to other kinds

of class actions, so that appointment should be left in the hands of the plaintiff with the

greatest stake in the action?

b. Academics have suggested an auction of claims as opposed to an auction of class

counsel. See, e.g., Macey and Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and
30 All written statements of the witnesses submitted to the Task Force are available on the

Third Circuit website at www.ca3.uscourts.gov. They can be found alphabetically by the name of

the person who submitted the statement. The statements submitted to the Task Force are referred

to throughout this Report as “Statements submitted to the Task Force,” as distinguished from

the actual testimony before the Task Force. The testimony before the Task Force is posted

separately on the Third Circuit website. Citations to “Testimony” throughout this report refer to

testimony at the Task Force hearings. 

16

Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L.

REV. 1 (1991). Is this a viable option? If so, should the defendant be permitted to bid?

7. Related questions

a. Do derivative actions pose special questions for appointment of counsel by the

auction procedure?

b. Does the use of steering committees create any special problems or concerns

respecting the auction procedure?

____________________

The Task Force took three days of testimony from judges, lawyers and academics on the

subject of appointment of class counsel, with an emphasis on the propriety and workability of

auctions and the viability of auctions under the PSLRA. Witnesses at the hearings included federal

judges who have conducted auctions for class counsel; a federal judge who chairs the subcommittee

responsible for preparing the proposed amendments to Rule 23; academics who have published

extensively on class actions generally and on auctions in particular; lawyers who represent

institutional investors; lawyers who represent plaintiffs in class actions; lawyers who represent

defendants in class actions; lawyers who represent public interest organizations; and a researcher for

the Federal Judicial Center with extensive expertise in class actions. Most of these witnesses

supplied written statements for the benefit of the Task Force; a number of non-witnesses supplied

written statements as well.30

The Task Force met formally on six occasions to exchange views and comment on drafts.

Drafts were revised in accordance with the consensus of Task Force members at these meetings. In

its deliberations, the Task Force evaluated the witness statements, testimony at the hearings, the

pertinent case law, academic scholarship, and empirical research on appointment of counsel and fee

awards in class actions. The Task Force also relied heavily on the factual information prepared by

the Federal Judicial Center concerning the cases in which auctions have been used.

A draft of the Task Force report was prepared for discussion at the Third Circuit Judicial

Conference. The draft report was the subject of a lively and enlightening exchange of ideas by three
31 Two of the judges with the most experience with auctioning class counsel, Judge

Milton I. Shadur and Judge Vaughn R. Walker, participated extensively in the Third Circuit

Judicial Conference discussions. Each pointed out perceived failings in the Task Force’s draft

report. Each took the time after the Conference to submit extensive written comments, which

are posted on the Third Circuit web site. Their willingness to engage on the subject, to invest

time to assist us in our effort, and their obvious dedication to and concern for the interests of

individuals and entities who depend on our judicial system for justice is much appreciated. 

While we may disagree in this Final Report with some of their views, we have enormous respect

for the intellectual commitment they have given to our work. Nothing in this Report should be

construed as criticism of any of the auctions that they or any other judge has conducted, or of the

results in any particular case. In the hands of some judges, procedures that might seem

problematic as a general matter work well. The Task Force examined the concept of auctioning

class counsel with an eye to how the auction process would work if used routinely by district

judges. Our goal is to point out the advantages and disadvantages of various selection options in

order to assist judges in making their choice of the option that they believe will work best in

particular cases.

32 Judge Leonard I. Garth invited the Task Force’s attention to the effect of an arbitration

demand by a class member on class action certification and settlement. In re Cendant Corp.

Litig., 2001 WL 487903 (3d Cir. 2001) (Garth, J., dissenting), vacated on grant of rehearing en

banc, June 5, 2001:

Indeed, just recently this Court has announced the formation of a

Task Force on selection of class counsel and has enumerated a

number of issues for the Task Force to consider. I suggest that this

question of arbitration-class certification is one which in my

opinion should assume prominence in the Task Force’s labors.

17

panels of judges, lawyers and academics respectively. The comments received at the Judicial

Conference were most helpful to the Task Force in highlighting possible problems and inaccuracies

in the draft report. In addition, the Task Force invited public comment on the draft report and

received a number of extensive and insightful comments. The Task Force considered all of the

comments made at the Conference and submitted by the public, and made a number of changes to the

draft report in light of those comments. The result is this final report on selection of counsel in class

actions.31

III. Summary and Recommendations

This Report analyzes the bid or auction method of choosing class counsel and contrasts it with

other methods of counsel selection.32 Because the question of appointment of counsel is intimately
The Task Force did not understand that Judge Becker’s charge fairly included this question and

therefore, respectfully, considered it to be outside its jurisdiction.

33 The Task Force, in Section X, supra, provides recommendations for appropriate

procedures to be used in those cases in which an auction might be considered. 

18

tied to the question of fee awards, the Report also analyzes procedures used by courts in awarding

counsel fees in class actions. The Report evaluates the auction process in comparison to more

traditional methods and makes recommendations on best practices for selection of class counsel,

monitoring class litigation, and awarding counsel fees. 

The Task Force unanimously makes the following conclusions and recommendations:

1. Auctioning class counsel represents a creative and energetic innovation, and

the Task Force hesitates to restrict the use of new initiatives at such an early stage of

their development. However, the risks and complications associated with a judiciallycontrolled auction counsel against its use except under certain limited circumstances

described in greater detail in this Report.

2. The paradigmatic case in which an auction might be considered is one in which

the defendants’ liability appears clear (often as the result of a governmental investigation

or an admission of the defendants); the damages appear to be both very large and

collectible (thus ensuring a significant number of competing bids); and the lead plaintiff

is not a sophisticated litigant that has already retained counsel of its choice through a

reasonable, arm’s-length process.33 Even in a seemingly paradigmatic case, however,

there still remains uncertainty based on the limited record before the Task Force that

the auction process will maximize net class recovery and ensure the best representation

for the class. It has yet to be established that the auction process will save judicial time

and resources, given the dictates of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23 and the emerging case law holding

that the use of an auction ex ante does not relieve the court of its duty ex post to review

the reasonableness of fees sought by class counsel. 

3. The traditional methods of selecting class counsel, with significant reliance on

private ordering, are preferable to auctions in most class action cases. In using those

traditional methods, however, the court must guard against overstaffing by lawyer

groups.

4. Auctions are inconsistent with the goal of the PSLRA, which is to assure that

the “most adequate” plaintiff will choose counsel and negotiate a reasonable fee. The
19

PSLRA mandates that class actions are to be client-driven, not court-driven. To the

extent that an auction is even permissible under the PSLRA, it should be conducted only

if the lead plaintiff’s choice of counsel, or process in choosing counsel, is so infirm as to

rebut the presumption that the plaintiff is “most adequate” under the statute, and then

only if the alternative candidates for the “most adequate plaintiff” are not willing or able

to engage in a meaningful search for and negotiation with counsel. 

5. Although some ex ante guidance to class counsel is desirable, Rule 23 ultimately

requires the court to examine the fairness of the fees requested by counsel at the

conclusion of the case. Thus, at best the benefits of auctions appear speculative, except

that they might over time provide the courts with an additional source of data for

determining what fees are reasonable in class actions. A percentage fee, tailored to the

realities of the particular case, remains superior to any other means of determining a

reasonable fee for class counsel. In setting a percentage fee, the court should avoid rigid

adherence to a “benchmark.”

6. Courts should require public institutional investors seeking appointment as

lead plaintiffs to disclose whether chosen counsel has made contributions to the

campaign of any public officials who have authority or substantial influence over the

institutional decisionmaker.

IV. Problems Arising From Appointment of Counsel In Common Fund Class

Actions 

A. Traditional Methods of Appointment and Awarding of Fees

The common fund class action can alter the traditional attorney-client relationship, in which

an individual client has a sufficient stake in the outcome to choose counsel, agree to compensation,

and monitor counsel’s conduct. Where the traditional client controls are absent, courts are left to

oversee appointment of the lead plaintiff and lead counsel and compensation of class counsel. The

Judge has a continuing obligation under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23 to assure that counsel can and does

adequately represent the class, and that counsel fees are reasonable. 

In deciding on appointment, courts in class actions have traditionally exercised case-by-case

discretion, often relying on competing counsel to work out an arrangement, also known as private
34 The Delaware Courts rely heavily on private ordering. A description of that process is

set forth in the Statements of R. Franklin Balotti and Joseph Rosenthal, submitted to the Task

Force. See also TCW Technology Limited Partnership v. Intermedia Communications, Inc., 2000

WL 1654504 (Del.Ch.) (“Traditionally, the Court of Chancery has allowed counsel representing

individual, class or derivative plaintiffs to engage in a type of private ordering, that is, to

coordinate prosecution of the litigation and to propose the most efficient means of

consolidation.”). Many federal courts have recognized a preference for private ordering as well.

See, e.g., In re Continental Illinois Securities Litig., 572 F. Supp. 931, 935 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (“In

the event a class is certified, I would prefer to designate counsel who are nominated by

plaintiffs’ attorneys. I therefore suggest that plaintiffs' counsel confer together with a view

toward submitting a proposed roster that will be no larger than necessary to provide effective

representation . . .”).

35 The Third Circuit has described the lodestar method as follows:

A court determines an attorney's lodestar award by multiplying the number of hours he or

she reasonably worked on a client's case by a reasonable hourly billing rate for such

services given the geographical area, the nature of the services provided, and the

experience of the lawyer.

Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Corp., 223 F.3d 190, 195 n.1 (3d Cir. 2000).

36 The Third Circuit has stated “that the percentage of recovery method “resembles a

contingent fee in that it awards counsel a variable percentage of the amount recovered for the

class.” In re General Motors Trucks, 55 F.3d 768, 819 n.38 (3d Cir. 1995).

37 See Goldberger v. Integrated Resources, 209 F.3d 43, 48 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting that

the lodestar creates “a temptation for lawyers to run up the number of hours for which they

could be paid.”) See also Howard M. Downs, Federal Class Actions: Diminished Protection for

the Class and the Case for Reform, 73 NEB. L. REV. 646, 667 (1994) (noting that under the

lodestar method attorneys can “pad their hours and otherwise engage in unethical activities to

enhance their fees”); Kirchoff v. Flynn, 786 F.2d 320, 324 (7th Cir. 1986) (observing that the

20

ordering 34 Where counsel cannot agree, or where courts have raised substantial questions about the

way that private ordering has worked out in a particular case, courts have then engaged in a

qualitative analysis to choose counsel, framed by the experience, knowledge and discretion of the

particular judge. 

In deciding on fees, courts have traditionally considered a fee application at the end of the

class action. Two different formulas have been used: lodestar35 and percentage of recovery.36 Both

methods have encountered criticism. 

The lodestar method requires a calculation of the hours spent in conducting the litigation,

multiplied by an appropriate hourly rate, and adjusted, if appropriate, by a multiplier factor for quality

and risk. The lodestar approach is problematic because it encourages the expenditure of hours, and

so can lead to class lawyers running up the bill.37 The lodestar also may create incentives for counsel
lodestar method creates an incentive to run up hours). 

38 Court Awarded Attorney Fees, Report of the Third Circuit Task Force, 108 F. R. D.

237, 248 (1985) (the lodestar approach “creates a disincentive for the early settlement of cases”

because of the emphasis on hours worked; “there appears to be a conscious, or perhaps

unconscious, desire to keep the litigation alive despite a reasonable prospect of settlement, to

maximize the number of hours to be included in computing the lodestar.”). See also Goldberger

v. Integrated Resources, 209 F.3d 43, 48 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting that the lodestar “created an

unanticipated disincentive to early settlements.”); Statement of Professor Arthur Miller,

submitted to the Task Force, at 3 (“The lodestar method also can create unfortunate incentives

for a plaintiff’s lawyer to engage in unnecessary work to prolong the litigation in an effort to

justify a larger fee, which, of course, causes inefficiency, inhibits settlement, and misaligns the

interests of counsel and class.”). 

39 See, e.g., Goldberger v. Integrated Resources, 209 F.3d 43, 48 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting

that the “primary source of dissatisfaction” with the lodestar “was that it resurrected the ghost of

Ebenezer Scrooge, compelling district courts to engage in a gimlet-eyed review of

 line-item fee audits” resulting in “an inevitable waste of judicial resources”); Skelton v. General

Motors, 860 F.2d 250, 258 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting the administrative difficulties imposed by the

lodestar method). See also Court Awarded Attorney Fees, Report of the Third Circuit Task

Force, 108 F.R.D. at 246 (criticizing lodestar approach as unduly burdensome on the judiciary).

40 See Thomas E. Willging, Laural L. Hooper & Robert J. Niemic, EMPIRICAL STUDY OF

CLASS ACTIONS IN FOUR FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS at 71 (Federal Judicial Center 1996) (noting

the problem of using a percentage of recovery method that is not case-sensitive). See also Martha

Pacold, Attorneys' Fees in Class Actions Governed by Fee-Shifting Statutes, 68 U. CHI. L. REV.

1007, 1021 (2001) (“In the 1970s, many courts began to view the percentage method as

problematic because it generated windfalls for attorneys in cases with exceptionally large funds.

Some courts avoided this problem by reducing the percentage awarded. However, this exposed

the method to criticism as unprincipled.”).

41 See, e.g., Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Corp., 223 F. 3d 190, 196 (3d Cir. 2000),

which remanded a percentage fee award for redetermination by the District Court because the fee

21

to postpone an early settlement that would favor the class, in order to bill more hours.38 Thus, the

lodestar does not necessarily align the interests of counsel with the interests of the class. Finally, a

court using the lodestar method must expend valuable judicial time and resources to undertake a

detailed review of expense sheets and billing records, because the judge will have to determine

whether the hours claimed were reasonable in relation to the action.39

The percentage of recovery method has received its share of criticism as well—at least when

applied by courts in an automatic fashion. If courts simply apply a “standard” percentage no matter

what, they risk awarding windfall recoveries to lawyers in some cases and denying reasonable

compensation in others.40 If applied in a by-rote fashion, the percentage of recovery method can

justly be criticized as arbitrary.41 It has also been argued that percentage fee awards may create
opinion was too “cursory and conclusory” to be adequately reviewed. See also In re Quintus

Securities Litigation, 148 F. Supp. 2d 967, 974 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (criticizing the automatic

award of a “benchmark” percentage).

42 In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litig., 197 F.R.D. 71, 77 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Statement

of Arlin M. Adams, submitted to the Task Force, at 10 (noting that percentage of recovery

method may create incentives for counsel to “cut corners”; lawyers “may settle too early, because

they may prefer to spend relatively few hours (and thus maximize the amount they are paid per

hour), rather than spend more time and increase the plaintiff’s recovery.”).

43 Statement of Arlin M. Adams, submitted to the Task Force, at 4 (when fees are

determined at the end of the action, “the adversary process breaks down, because defendants are

eager to settle the case and those in the class often lack the incentive or means to mount a serious

challenge to an award of fees.”); Statement of Professor Joseph A. Grundfest, submitted to the

Task Force, at 7 (“The defendant could care less about the size of the fee because the defendant’s

obligation to fund the pool is fixed by the settlement, and a lower fee award therefore would not

provide any benefit to the defendant. . . . The absent class members are rationally apathetic and

have no cause to object.”); Statement of Brian Wolfman, submitted to the Task Force, at 17

(“Indeed, class counsel often negotiate ‘clear sailing’ arrangements, where the defendant agrees

not to contest a fee up to a certain amount, the very purpose of which is to eliminate an adversary

contest regarding fees.”).

44 The first judge to utilize an auction was Judge Vaughn R. Walker in In re Oracle

Securities Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688, 698 (N.D. Cal. 1990).

22

incentives for counsel to settle early, when working to obtain a higher settlement or going to trial

would cost more than counsel is likely to recover in a percentage, even if the overall recovery after

a later settlement or trial might be more advantageous to the class.42

A more general complaint about the traditional method of determining fees in class actions

is that there is sometimes no adversarial testing of counsel’s fee submission. In a common fund case,

the defendant has little incentive to contest the award because the fee will come from the amount the

defendant has already agreed to pay.43 So unless a class objector appears to contest the fee request,

the judge does not have the benefit of an adversary’s views. 

B. The Auction Innovation

Frustrated with the difficulties of lodestar and percentage of recovery methods utilized at the

end of the case, some courts have begun to experiment with an auction method of selecting class

counsel relatively early in the case.44 Under the auction method, firms seeking appointment as lead

counsel submit bids to the court proposing a fee structure for conducting the litigation. The court

uses the bids, and any other information it considers relevant, to select lead counsel. Lead counsel
45 See In re Oracle Securities Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688, 693 n.12 (N.D. Cal. 1990)

(explaining that the use of an auction would “make use of the mechanisms of a competitive

market”).

46 See, e.g. In re Cendant Corp. Prides Litig., 243 F.3d 722, 735 n.18 (3d Cir. 2001) (AA

preliminary bidding process cannot replace subsequent analysis . . . [T]he circumstances and

progression of every case are different, and these unique factors must be taken into account by

district courts awarding attorney’s fees. Therefore, though the result of a bidding process may be

of use to a district court in awarding fees at the end of the case, it cannot supplant post settlement

analysis to determine a reasonable fee.”) 

4715 U.S.C.' 78u-4(a)(3)(B).

48In re Razorfish, Inc. Securities Litig., 143 F. Supp. 2d 304, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)

(finding that under the PSLRA the primary focus is on choosing the lead plaintiff and then

deferring to that plaintiff’s choice of counsel).

23

is awarded to the qualified firm submitting the best bid. By selecting a “winning” bid, the court

simultaneously selects lead counsel and determines counsel's fee. 

Courts have resorted to auctions for at least two reasons. First, an auction has been thought

to be an effective way to replicate the market process by which a client chooses and negotiates a fee

agreement with counsel outside the class action context.45 Second, some judges conducting an

auction have found it to be a device that helps to assure those judges that the fiduciary obligations

of lead plaintiffs are fulfilled. 

There are substantial questions raised by the auction process, however, including whether the

class is best served by selecting the counsel who offers the lowest bid (even if the court includes

qualitative factors in its determination); whether a court can replicate a client’s choice without

becoming unduly involved in the selection and negotiation process; and whether a meaningful fee

agreement can be reached in advance of the case, when the judge remains bound under Rule 23 to

review the fee at the end of the case.46 Additionally, there are substantial legal questions whether the

auction procedure is consistent with the PSLRA, which requires the court to appoint as lead plaintiff

the “most adequate plaintiff,”47 who is presumed to be the person or group with the largest financial

stake, and to permit that lead plaintiff to select counsel, subject to court approval.48

C. Professional Responsibility Concerns

Professional responsibility concerns are at the heart of the issues surrounding the selection

of class counsel, in an auction or otherwise. Ordinarily, the fiduciary relationship between client and
49 Model Rule 1.7(b) (AA lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that

client may be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to . . . a third person or . . . a

lawyer’s own interests.”).

50 Model Rule 1.1 (“A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.”).

51 Model Rule 1.3. (“A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in

representing a client.”). Lawyers also owe clients duties of communication (Model Rule 1.4) and

confidentiality (Model Rule 1.6).

52 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING '2.1 (3d ed.

2001) (observing that the Model Rules reverse the common reference to the “lawyer-client”

relationship, referring instead to the “client-lawyer” relationship to emphasize the primacy of the

client’s interests).

53 Model Rule 1.14: “When a client’s ability to make adequately considered decisions . . . 

is impaired, . . . the lawyer shall as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer

relationship with the client.”; RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, ' 24.

54 Model Rule 1.14; RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, ' 24(4).

55 Jill E. Fisch, Aggregation, Auctions, and Other Developments in the Selection of Lead

Counsel under the PSLRA, 64 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 71-72 (“Although the group [of

plaintiffs] may have a large financial interest in the aggregate, the small individual stakes reduce

the likelihood that group members will participate actively in the litigation process.”); Randall

S. Thomas & Robert G. Hansen, Auctioning Class Action and Derivative Lawsuits: A Critical

Analysis, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 423, 433 (1993) (“Our analysis of the agency costs inherent in class

action . . . lawsuits conflicts with the received legal model of the attorney-client relationship.

This model presumes that the attorney is the agent of the client. Under the legal profession’s

ethical rules, the attorney has a duty to advance the client’s interest to the furthest extent

permissible. Clients are to keep watch over their attorneys using monitoring devices, bonding

mechanisms, and incentive structures. . . . Despite the strictures of the received legal model of

the attorney-client relationship, the plaintiffs’ attorney, not the plaintiffs, in these actions

controls the conduct of every important aspect of the litigation.”); Jonathan R. Macey &

24

lawyer is the method by which the lawyer’s loyalty,49 competence,50 and dedication51 to the client’s

cause are assured. “The relationship between lawyer and client is at the core of the law of lawyering.

. . . Although it is true that lawyers owe duties to third persons who are not clients, to courts and other

tribunals, and to the legal system and the law generally, the most basic duties run to clients.”52 There

is a preference for client-centered relationships even when clients are not fully capable of assuming

the client role because of competence or other disabilities.53 Moreover, where a client is not

competent and it is in the client’s best interest, lawyers are encouraged to see that a client

representative is appointed.54

In class action litigation, it is widely acknowledged that plaintiffs’ generally small financial

stakes, wide dispersion, disorganization, inadequate knowledge and lack of interest often combine

to make the ordinary presumptions about client-monitored litigation unrealistic.55
Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation:

Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 20 (1991) (noting

that class counsel operates essentially unregulated by clients); RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW

GOVERNING LAWYERS ' 14 Comment f. (“Members of the class often lack the incentive or

knowledge to monitor the performance of class representatives.”).

56 Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183, 1183

(1982). See also In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201 at 254 (3d Cir. 2001): 

Lawyers operate under ethical rules that require them to serve only their clients’

interests. When a representation involves a single client, the ability to select,

retain, and monitor counsel gives clients reason to be confident that their lawyers

will live up to this obligation. The power to select counsel lets clients choose

lawyers with whom they are comfortable and in whose ability and integrity they

have confidence. . . . Most of the safeguards we have described vanish in the

class action context, where “the client” is a sizeable, often far-flung group.

Logistical and coordination problems invariably preclude class members from

meeting and agreeing on anything, and, at all events, most class members

generally lack the economic incentive or sophistication to take an active role.

57 See generally Model Rule 1.7 and Model Rule 5.2(a) (“A lawyer is bound by the rules

of professional conduct notwithstanding that the lawyer acted at the direction of another

person.”); Greenfield v. Villager Industries, Inc., 483 F.2d 824, 832 (3d Cir. 1973) (“[I]n

addition to the normal obligations of an officer of the court, and as counsel to parties to the

litigation, class action counsel possess, in a very real sense, fiduciary obligations to those not

before the court.”).

25

A fundamental premise of American adjudicative structures is that clients, not their counsel,

define litigation objectives. Thus [the professional responsibility rules] emphasize that an

attorney must defer to the client’s wishes on matters affecting the merits of legal action.

However, by presupposing an individual client with clearly identifiable views, these codes

elide a frequent and fundamental difficulty in class action proceedings. In many such cases,

the lawyer represents an aggregation of litigants with unstable, inchoate, or conflicting

preferences. The more diffuse and divided the class, the greater the problems in defining its

objectives.56

In the absence of the usual attorney-client relationship, alternative structures and methods for

managing class actions have developed. Traditionally, class counsel’s professionalism has been left

to the lawyers’ own commitment to professional obligations,57 with court oversight over the
58

 In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201 at 255 (3d Cir. 2001) (in the absence of

effective client oversight and because there are inherent conflicts of interest between counsel and

the class, the court is traditionally the agent designated to oversee the relationship between

counsel and the class.).

The Task Force notes that class actions are not the only situations in which judges are

called on to oversee counsel’s fidelity to clients. Cases in which the client is a trustee or fiduciary,

guardianships over infants or the mentally incompetent, bankruptcy and the purchase of legal

services by governmental units to litigate on behalf of the public are other situations in which the

court is called on to be the primary monitor of counsel’s activity and fee. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD &

W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING, ' 8.7 (3d ed. 2001) (“In several recurring

situations, courts increase the rigor of their scrutiny. . . . When the lawyer’s client is a trustee or

other fiduciary, for example, the fee that the client pays will be charged against the estate or other

res that is the subject of the proceedings and thus will effectively be borne by the beneficiary. . . .

On this rationale, heightened scrutiny of the reasonableness of attorneys fees is routine in trust

and estate administration, guardianships over infants and the mentally incompetent, as well as in

bankruptcy proceedings. . . . Class action litigation provides another example of ‘built-in’

enhanced scrutiny of attorney fees.”). Accordingly, judges are called on to develop methods and

procedures to safeguard client interests in a variety of situations, in addition to the class action

cases that are the focus of this Report.

59 In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litig., 197 F.R.D. 71, 75 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (A[T]he class

action mechanism is not free of problems, foremost among them for purposes of this case,

difficulties in obtaining counsel who will manage the case efficiently and effectively on behalf of

the class and the mismatch of economic incentives between the plaintiff class and its attorney.”);

Statement of Prof. Samuel Issacharoff, submitted to the Task Force, at 3 (“[T]he central issue is

therefore the determination of which manner of selecting and compensating class counsel best

attracts skillful lawyers and then best structures the incentives for faithful representation of the

class.”)

26

prosecution of the action and the lawyer’s fee.58 Recently, the judicial auction process was devised,

in part, to compensate for the absence of a meaningful client- lawyer relationship in certain types of

class actions, and in an attempt to assure that the lead plaintiff’s fiduciary obligations to the class are

fulfilled. In essence, the auction process substitutes a judge-centered process for the traditional clientcentered process. The question that the Task Force considered is whether this extensive judicial

involvement, at the outset of the case, creates more problems than it solves. 

The ethical concerns at the heart of judicial auctions involve the lawyer’s duty of loyalty to

the class,59 and the relationship between that duty and the setting of reasonable attorney fees.

Lawyers are not permitted to represent clients if there is a material limitation on their responsibilities
60 A Comment to Model Rule 1.5 states: “A [fee] agreement may not be made whose

terms might induce the lawyer improperly to curtail services for a client or perform them in a

way contrary to a client's interest.” This Comment recognizes the possibility that fee agreements

may influence the lawyer's loyalty to a client.

61 See In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 254-55 (3d Cir. 2001) (A[A] rational

self-interested client seeks to maximize net recovery; he or she wants the representation to

terminate when his or her gross recovery minus his or her counsel’s fee is the largest. In contrast,

at least in theory and often in practice, a rational self-interested lawyer looks to maximize his or

her net fee, and thus wants the representation to end at the moment when the difference between

his or her net fee and costs . . . is greatest. These two points rarely converge. As a result there is

often a conflict between the economic interests of clients and their lawyers, and this fact creates

reason to fear that class counsel will be highly imperfect agents for the class.”).

62 Model Rule 1.5(a); Model Code DR2-106(A)&(B). 

63 Under the recommendations by the ABA’s Ethics 2000 Commission, Model Rule 1.5

would be amended to preclude lawyers from charging an unreasonable amount for expenses as

well as fees. See also ABA Formal Opinion. 93-379 (Dec. 6, 1993) (holding that the Rule 1.5

“reasonableness” standard also applies to expenses). 

64 Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class

Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U.

27

to their clients arising from their own personal or financial interests.60 The size of potential fees in

class actions and the absence of meaningful client oversight combine to present particular conflict

of interest concerns in class actions, that may not arise in traditional attorney-client relationships.61

The Model Rules of Professional Conduct, like its predecessor the Model Code, requires that

attorney fees be reasonable.62 Among the factors to be considered in determining reasonableness are:

the time, labor and skill required; the novelty and difficulty of the work; fees customarily charged for

similar services; the amount involved and the results obtained; the experience, reputation and ability

of the lawyer, and whether the fee is fixed or contingent.63

Judicial auctions were devised in part to foster greater loyalty by counsel to the class and to

award reasonable fees, by setting fees up front and creating structures that were intended to maximize

attorney incentives to work faithfully and diligently, while minimizing the conflicts which

characterized the alternatives. A central question for the Task Force was whether judicial auctions,

in fact, reduced the potential conflicts between the class and counsel or whether they exchanged one

set of potential conflicts for another.

While the professional rules center on client relationships, they also presuppose that lawyers

retain core fiduciary obligations, which exist outside client control. The attorney-client relationship

is premised on general agency principles, which require the agent’s fidelity to the principal’s interest,

particularly in situations where the principal may be unable to monitor the agent’s conduct.64 Many
CHI. L. REV. 1, 20 (1991) (describing the agency problems presented by class actions.)

65RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, Ch. 2, Introductory Note (“A lawyer

is an agent, to whom clients entrust matters, property, and information, which may be of great

importance and sensitivity, and whose work is usually not subject to detailed client supervision

because of its complexity. Because those characteristics of the client-lawyer relationship make

clients vulnerable to harm, and because of the importance to the legal system of faithful

representation, the law stated [in the Restatement] provides a number of safeguards for clients

beyond those generally provided to principals.”).

66 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING, '8.6, pp. 8-15

(3d ed. 2001) (“This focus on procedural requirements [in Model Rule 1.5], however, should not

obscure the fact that contingent fee agreements must also satisfy the threshold substantive

requirement of reasonableness.”); RESTATEMENT OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS ' 34 (“A lawyer

may not charge a fee that is larger than is reasonable in the circumstances. . . .”)

67 Model Rule 1.5(d) prohibits contingent fees in criminal and domestic relations matters.

RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS '35 is similar. 

68 Model Rule 1.7, the general rule governing loyalty and conflicts of interest, provides

that a lawyer may not seek a client’s consent for a representation that may materially limit the

lawyer’s responsibilities to that client unless “the lawyer reasonably believes the representation

will not be adversely affected.” Model Rule 1.7(b)(2). Ethics 2000 proposed a change in the

form of this Rule but not its substance. A new comment to Rule 1.7 is proposed which elaborates

on the idea of non-consentable conflicts of interest: “The proposed Rule makes clear that in

certain situations a conflict may not be waived by the client. That is, the representation may not

go forward even with the client's consent. . . . This standard is set forth in a separate paragraph,

both to reflect the separate steps required in analyzing conflicts (i.e., first identify potentially

impermissible conflicts, then determine if the representation is permissible with the client's

consent) and to highlight the fact that not all conflicts are consentable;” RESTATEMENT OF THE

LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS ' 122 (2)(c) (“Notwithstanding the informed consent of each

affected client or former client, a lawyer may not represent a client if . . . in the circumstances, it

is not reasonably likely that the lawyer will be able to provide adequate representation to one or

more of the clients.”).

69 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS ' 122, Comment g (iv) and ' 128

d(iii). See generally, Lazy Oil v. Witco, 166 F. 3d 581, 588 (3d Cir. 1999) (suggesting that a

28

of the Rules require adherence to professional obligation irrespective of the client’s ability to monitor

the lawyer’s behavior and even in situations where the client might be willing to consent to a

modification of the obligation.65 Thus, clients may not consent to the payment of unreasonable fees66

or contingency fees in certain situations,67 nor may clients consent to representation by a single

lawyer in all situations.68 In class actions, for example, lawyers may be not be able to represent all

class members, if the interests of some class members diverge materially from others, even though

the class representatives may consent.69
strict reading of the conflict of interest rules in class actions should be tempered, because the

very nature of a class action is to combine many divergent interests.).

70 Testimony of Lawrence A. Sucharow, June 1, 2001, p. 138-39 (“ I only know that in

all my years of practice, I have understood what a fiduciary duty is, and I tried to carry that out. .

. I believe that most, the vast majority of counsel and courts understand what fiduciary duties are

and carry them out in connection with class actions.”); Testimony of H. Laddie Montague, June

1, 2001 p. 153-154 (“There is a real feeling of doing good and when we get into cases, we really

take up the [cudgels] for the principals. . . . Is it a case that will redress a wrong that otherwise

might not be made?”); Statement of Horace Schow II, submitted to the Task Force, at 3 (“Legal

services are not a commodity. The quality of counsel, their reputation and experience in the field,

knowledge of [the client], and their openness to negotiating with us on a fee structure

appropriate to the case as we assess it at the outset, are all factors to be considered together [

when retaining counsel]”.).

71 Statement of Sherrie R. Savett, submitted to the Task Force, at 9 (“Experience,

resources, and other factors such as accessability, demeanor, reputation, etc. are all elements that

an individual client takes into consideration in selecting an attorney. It is exceptionally difficult

for a court to take these factors into consideration when conducting an auction. One cannot

29

The professional responsibility rules acknowledge that the complexity and technical nature

of lawyers’ work may preclude effective client monitoring, even in non-class action settings. Lawyers

nevertheless retain core responsibilities to be faithful and dedicated fiduciaries to client interests.

Ultimately clients must rely on the character and integrity of their lawyers to fulfill those

responsibilities. The Task Force notes that many witnesses referred to the professionalism of

individual lawyers as important to a client’s choice of counsel, and others emphasized the motivation

of lawyers to achieve good results for clients regardless of their own interests.70

It is important that whatever approach is taken to selection and compensation of class counsel,

there must be judicial review. Rule 23 requires, and logic supports, a review at the conclusion of a

case—at a minimum to examine whether counsel met fiduciary obligations and performed at the level

expected when the case began. Even if one concludes that an ex ante bidding process is

advantageous, it is difficult to believe in the class action context that one would abolish a final look

at the attorneys’ work at the conclusion of the case. Professionalism is assumed, but there are failures

in class actions as in every other part of life. Thus, the Task Force assumed that lawyers would meet

professional standards , but that there could be failures and that there must be a final review in class

actions by the court. Also the class, as well as counsel, will feel more satisfied if there is closure

through a court order on the question of fees.

In its deliberations, the Task Force evaluated alternative structures for managing class actions

with the goal of encouraging a lawyer’s adherence to professional obligations. Its recommendations

on judicial auctions arise, in part, from a perception that the auction procedure is not well-suited to

appraising the intangible quality of lawyer professionalism.71 The Task Force concluded that
easily quantify an unquantifiable element.”)

72 Testimony of Prof. Arthur R. Miller, June 1, 2001, p. 196 ( “I love judicial discretion.

I know some judges on the courts of appeal . .. . want to rein that discretion in but I think one of

the beauties of the Unites States district judge is his or her discretion.”); Testimony of Hon.

Louis C. Bechtle, June 1, 2001, p. 121 (“I don’t agree totally with Judge Kaplan’s assertion that

a percentage [attorney’s fee recovery] is out of the air. Percentages come from years and years of

experience and history in these cases.”). 

73 131 F.R.D. 688 (N.D. Cal. 1990); 132 F.R.D. 538 (N.D. Cal. 1990); 136 F.R.D. 639

(N.D. Cal 1991).

30

procedures that enhanced client control and emphasized the experience, wisdom and judgment of the

bench were generally superior to judicially-controlled auctions.72

V. The Auction Cases

A. Courts Using the Auction Process

The idea of an auction process was first raised and employed by Judge Vaughn R. Walker in

In re Oracle Securities Litigation.73 As of September, 2001, according to research conducted by the
74 See Laural L. Hooper & Marie Leary, Auctioning the Role of Class Counsel in Class

Action Cases: A Descriptive Study (Federal Judicial Center 2001). The auction cases cited and

analyzed by the FJC are: In re Oracle Securities. Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688 (N.D. Cal. 1990)); In re

Wells Fargo Securities. Litig., 157 F.R.D. 467 (N.D. Cal. 1994); In re Amino Acid Lysine

Antitrust Litig., 918 F. Supp 1190 (N.D. Ill. 1996); In re California Micro Devices Securities

Litig., 168 F.R.D. 257 (N.D. Cal. 1996); In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 182 F.R.D. 144 (D.N.J.

1998), rev=d, 264 F.3d 201 (3d Cir. 2001); In re Network Assocs. Inc., Securities Litig., 76 F.

Supp. 2d 1017 (N.D. Cal. 1999); Sherleigh Assocs. LLC v. Windmere-Durable Holdings, Inc.,

184 F.R.D. 688 (S.D. Fla. 1999); In re Lucent Techs. Inc. Securities. Litig., 194 F.R.D. 137

(D.N.J. 2000); In re Bank One Shareholders Class Actions, 96 F. Supp. 2d 780 (N.D. Ill. 2000);

Wenderhold v. Cylink Corp., 188 F.R.D. 577 (N.D. Cal. 1999); In re Auction Houses Antitrust

Litig., 197 F.R.D. 71 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); In re Quintus Securities Litig., 148 F. Supp.2d 967, 986-

87 (N.D. Cal. 2001); In re Commtouch Software Ltd. Securities Litig., No. 01-C-00719, Order

Re Lead Plaintiff Selection and Class Counsel Selection (N.D. Cal. June 27, 2001); In re

Comdisco Securities Litig., 141 F. Supp. 2d 951 (N.D. Ill. 2001). The Judges who have used the

auction procedure are: Judge Vaughn R. Walker, Northern District of California (five cases);

Judge Milton I. Shadur, Northern District of Illinois (three cases); Judge William H. Alsup,

Northern District of California (two cases); Judge Alfred J. Lechner, Jr., District of New Jersey

(twice in In re Lucent); Judge William A. Walls, District of New Jersey (one case); Judge Joan

A. Lenard, Southern District of Florida (one case); and Judge Lewis A. Kaplan, Southern

District of New York (one case). The Report by the Federal Judicial Center, supra, lists and

provides details on all of the cases in which an auction process has been used to date. 

The FJC Report indicates that the number of cases in which courts considered conducting

an auction but rejected the idea “remains unknown.” FJC Report, at 4. Fred B. Burnside, in

“Go Pick a Client—And Other Tales of Woe Resulting From the Selection of Class Counsel by

Court-Ordered Competitive Bidding (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Task Force),

states that after the Oracle decision “the overwhelming majority of courts have not adopted

competitive bidding” and cites the following cases in which bidding was considered but rejected:

Cooperman v. Powell, No. 91-37-FR, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4941, at*4-*5 (D. Or.); Davis v.

Coopers & Lybrand, No. 90-C-7173, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10384, at *12-*13 (N.D. Ill.); In

re In-Store Advertising Securities. Litig., Civ. No. 90-5594 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); In re Computer

Assocs. Int'l, Inc. Securities. Litig., No. CV-90-2394, et al. (E.D.N.Y. 1990); In re Software

Toolworks, Inc. Securities Litig., Master File No. CA 90-3191-FMS (N.D. Cal. 1990); Sutton v.

MarchFirst, Inc., 00-C-6676 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 7, 2001) (minute order provides for counsel to

submit fee agreement to court, but implicitly rejects earlier suggestion of defendants to adopt

competitive bidding by not doing so); In re AT&T Corp. Sec. Litig., Civ. No. 00-5364 (GEB)

(D.N.J. Jan. 29, 2001) (appointing the New Hampshire Group as lead plaintiff over defendant's

suggestion of competitive bidding); Rosenberg v. Nationsbanc Montgomery Sec. Inc., No. C-98-

31

Federal Judicial Center, only seven federal judges had utilized auctions in a total of 14 cases.74 Thus
20956 RMW (N.D. Cal. 1998) (appointing lead counsel without resorting to bidding despite the

request in prior pleadings of one group of plaintiffs to auction off lead counsel position); In re

IBP, Inc. Securities Litig., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7898 (D. S.D.); In re Diamond Multimedia

Sys. Securities Litig., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21558 (N.D. Cal.); In re Aronson v. McKesson

HBOC, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 1146 (N.D. Cal. 1999); Sakhrani v. Brightpoint, 78 F. Supp. 2d

845, 854 (S.D. Ind. 1999) (rejecting the suggestion for an open competition for lead counsel

because “the court is satisfied based on prior submissions that the two proposed lead firms can

represent a proposed class effectively”); In re Critical Path Sec. Litig., CV-01-0551 (WHO),

156 F. Supp. 2d 1102 (N.D. Cal. 2001); In re Calico Commerce, 01-CV-3221, Hearing

Transcript at 11-17 (S.D. N.Y. June 12, 2001).

75 See Jill E. Fisch, Aggregations, Auctions and Other Developments in the Selection of

Lead Counsel Under the PSLRA, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 82 (2001) (“Lead counsel

auctions remain a work in progress. Judicial experience with the auction process is limited, and

few cases utilizing an auction have progressed to a stage in which it is possible to evaluate the

result.”); Statement of Guy Miller Struve on behalf of the Association of the Bar of the City of

New York, submitted to the Task Force, at 2 (“The limited base of knowledge cautions us that

reaching definitive conclusions at this early juncture is a hazardous endeavor.”).

76 See FJC Report, at 15 (“We found the most common reason judges gave for employing

bidding was to foster competition among counsel by replicating the private marketplace for legal

services.”).

77 Testimony of Judge Vaughn R. Walker, March 16, 2001, pp. 38 et seq.

78 See, e.g., In re Amino Acid Lysine Antitrust Litig., 918 F. Supp. 1190, 1194 (N.D. Ill.

1996) (noting that the “difficulty comes when a lawyer who is not of one’s choosing is foisted on

one, as is inevitable in the class action context.”).

79 See, e.g. In re Bank One Shareholders Class Actions, 96 F. Supp. 2d 780, 785 (N.D.

Ill. 2000) (“[T]hat [auction] procedure is superior to any alternatives that the caselaw or other

authorities have entertained.”).

32

it is fair to state that the method of auctioning class counsel is at the experimental stage.75

As the FJC Report indicates, the judges who have employed auctioning have ordinarily done

so in an attempt to replicate through competition the market that usually exists when a client outside

the class action context chooses a lawyer.76 In some cases, the court has seemed to believe that

private ordering has not worked out and that counsel were actively competing before the court for

the appointment.77 In other cases, it appears that the court believed that counsel was controlling the

prospective class plaintiff rather than the other way around, a phenomenon that might be in conflict

with the fiduciary obligation of the lead plaintiff to select a diligent and effective class counsel.78

And in still others, courts seem to have gravitated toward auctions simply because they believed that

they represent a better and more efficient process than traditional appointment.79
80 In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litigation, 197 F.R.D. 71 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 

81 Testimony of Judge Lewis A. Kaplan, June 1, 2001, pp. 66 et seq.

82 See, e.g., In re Quintus Securities Litig., 148 F. Supp.2d 967, 986-7 (N.D. Cal. 2001).

83 In re Amino Acid Lysine Antitrust Litig., 918 F. Supp. 1190 (N.D. Ill. 1996); In re Bank 

One Shareholders Class Actions, 96 F. Supp. 2d 780, 785 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (“any bidding

constraints that this Court (not having more than threshold knowledge of the litigation and its

prospects) might have imposed on the outside in the form of mandated structural limitations

would necessarily have generated corresponding limitations on the exercise of imagination by

bidding counsel in devising proposals that they thought would provide the maximum benefit to

the class.”).

33

 In In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litigation,80 Judge Lewis A. Kaplan, in addition to

expressing dissatisfaction with the results of lawyer-driven litigation, relied on positive indicators

existing in the case that in his view justified an auction. Judge Kaplan identified the following factors

as supporting an auction under the circumstances: 

1. A highly publicized government investigation had led to the filing of complaints

so that no private firm was required to ferret out wrongdoing.

2. The publicity had attracted a large number of able plaintiffs’ attorneys so the court

was reasonably confident that there would be a critical mass of bidding counsel.

3. A significant amount of information was already available to prove both the

defendants’ liability and the amount of damages to the class.

4. Judge Kaplan had already become familiar with the case and therefore could assess

the settlement value of the claim without substantial up-front court costs, and without an

appearance that he was prejudging the merits in his evaluation of bids.81

As discussed below, the Task Force believes that the circumstances found in Auction Houses

include some of the paradigm conditions in which the benefits of an auction process might outweigh

its costs.

B. Auction Procedures

Judges have differed in the procedures they employ in conducting an auction. For example,

Judge Walker required bids to be structured so that counsel set forth a number of bids that would take

effect at certain points in time in the litigation and at certain points of recovery.82 Judge Kaplan

structured the bidding in the Auction House cases to require the bidders to submit a single number,

an “X” factor, below which counsel would receive no fee at all. In contrast, Judge Shadur did not

structure the bidding process, believing that any attempt to impose a structure would stifle the

creativity of counsel in forming their bids.83

Beyond the general question of structure, courts using auctions have encountered a number

of procedural questions. Some of them are:
84 See FJC Report, at 60 (“In all of the bidding cases, the court required the bids to be

submitted under seal and the court kept the bids under seal at least until the bids were evaluated

and the winning bidder was chosen or the bids were rejected.”).

85 See, e.g., In re California Micro Devices Securities Litig., 168 F.R.D. 257, 259-60

(N.D. Cal. 1996); In re Amino Acid Lysine Antitrust Litig., 918 F. Supp. 1190, 1192, 1201 (N.D.

Ill. 1996); In re Bank One Shareholders Class Actions, 96 F. Supp.2d 780, 782, 785 (N.D. Ill.

2000); In re Wells Fargo Securities Litig., 157 F.R.D. 467, 468 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 

86 See In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litig., 197 F.R.D. 71, 80 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) ( “If

disclosed to defendants, the fee [arrangement] also can lead defendants to exploit the disjuncture

of interests between the plaintiffs’ and their counsel by making a firm settlement offer in the

amount that would exactly maximize counsel=s fee, even if defense counsel otherwise would be

prepared to go higher.”).

87 260 F.3d 183, 193 (3d Cir. 2001).

34

! Sealed Bids. All courts have required bids to be made under seal.84 But some district courts

have ordered the bids to be unsealed when class counsel is appointed, reasoning that members

of the class have the right to be apprised of the process of appointment of counsel.85 The

judges in Auction Houses and Cendant kept the bids sealed until the case was concluded. The

rationale for sealing the bidding process is to prevent defendants from obtaining an unfair

advantage by knowing the winning bidder’s fee arrangement.86 A defendant who knows

precisely what the plaintiffs’ counsel has at stake at a particular point in the litigation might

be able to pressure counsel into a settlement that maximizes the attorney’s recovery but is

unfair to the class. 

The problem with sealing the bids, however, is that the bids can be considered judicial

records that are presumptively public. Moreover, sealing the bids denies information not only

to the defendants, but also to the class members. The recent opinion in In re Cendant Corp.,

87

raises substantial questions about the use of sealed bids in auctions. The Cendant Court held

that “in deciding to seal the bids, the District Court failed to recognize that the bids were

judicial records, subject to the common law presumption of public access. As a result, the

District Court failed to articulate the necessary findings to override the presumption of access

when issuing the confidentiality order.” The Court’s most serious concern was that the sealing

of the bids prevented members of the class from obtaining essential information about the

class action. The Cendant Court noted that the “only stage at which class members can

exercise effective control is in the selection of class counsel. Throwing a veil of secrecy over

the selection process deprives class members of that opportunity.” Accordingly, the Court

declared that in a class action there is “a strong presumption that the bids and the in camera

proceeding would be part of an open process, accessible to the public.” The Cendant Court

strongly suggested that no circumstances could be found that would outweigh the public right

of access to the bidding process. At a minimum, if the bidding process is to be sealed, the
88 See, e.g., In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 259 (3d Cir. 2001) (expressing the

concern that “because auctions do not award the attorneys who discover legal violations, they

may reduce lawyers’ incentives to seek out and disclose illegality (because unless they are

selected as lead counsel, they may not be compensated for the time they spend doing so)”).

89 See, e.g., In re Bank One Shareholders Class Action, 916 F. Supp. 2d 780, 789-90 n.13

(N.D. Ill. 2000).

90 In re Amino Acid Lysine Antitrust Litigation, 918 F. Supp. at 1198-99 (N.D. Ill. 1996)

(class counsel chosen who would not receive a percentage of any recovery in excess of $25

million).

91 In re Quintus Securities Litig., 148 F. Supp.2d 967, 986 (N.D. Cal. 2001).

92 In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litig., 197 F.R.D. 71, 80 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).

93 See, e.g. In re Oracle Securities Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688, 690 (N.D. Cal. 1990); In re

Amino Acid Lysine Antitrust Litig., 918 F. Supp. at 1992, n.7 (N.D. Ill. 1996). Judge Shadur

testified that he permits lawyers who have jointly filed a complaint (other than jointly with a

common liaison counsel) to prepare a joint bid. Testimony of Judge Shadur, March 16, 2001, pp.

10 & 94.

94 In re Lucent Technologies, Inc. Securities Litig., 194 F.R.D. 137, 156-57 (D. N.J.

2000) (preventing joint bids “is necessary to protect the interests of the proposed class.”).

35

district court following Cendant must find and articulate specifically the “compelling

countervailing interests” that authorize the closure of that process.

! Compensation of Lawyers Who Do Not Win the Bidding Process but Who Contributed to the

Action Being Brought. Some courts have been concerned about firms that do significant

preliminary work on the class claim and then lose the auction. If such firms are not

compensated, it might deter lawyers from engaging in this important work in the future, for

fear of a deadweight loss.88 Some judges have provided specifically for an award for counsel

who loses the auction but contributed meaningfully to the investigation and preparation of

the action.89

! Caps on Attorney Fees or Expenses. Some judges have awarded lead counsel status to

lawyers who have submitted a bid with a cap on their recoveries of attorney fees90 or

expenses.91 Others express concern that such caps may create disincentives for plaintiffs’

counsel to litigate the case beyond the levels of maximum fee or expense reimbursement.92

! Joint Bidding. Most judges have prohibited law firms from forming bidding consortia.93 The

concern appears to be that consortia will drive down the number of bidders and fail to

produce a competitive auction.94 It should be noted, though, that joint bidding may well be

a way for smaller firms to compete in the auction process, and so may increase rather than

decrease competition.
95 See, e.g., In re Oracle Securities Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688, 697 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (“Each

firm submitting an application shall certify to the court that its compensation proposal was

prepared independently and that no part thereof was revealed to any other bidder prior to filing

with the court.”).

96 See, e.g. In re Quintus Securities Litig., 148 F. Supp. 2d 967, 977 (N.D. Cal. 2001).

97 HERBERT B. NEWBERG & ALBERT CONTE, 3 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS ' 14.03 (3d

ed. Supp. Dec. 2000).

98 In re Comdisco Securities Litig., 150 F. Supp. 2d 943, 951-52 (N.D. Ill. 2001).

99 Andrew K. Niebler, In Search of Bargained-For Fees for Class Action Plaintiffs’

Lawyers: The Promise and Pitfalls of Auctioning the Position of Lead Counsel, 54 BUS. LAW

763, 802 (1999) (discussing the advantages of increasing percentages). See also Statement of

Professor John C. Coffee, submitted to the Task Force, at 4-5 (arguing for modestly increasing

percentages).

100Laural L. Hooper & Marie Leary, Auctioning the Role of Class Counsel in Class Action

Cases: A Descriptive Study (Federal Judicial Center 2001)

36

! Limits on Collusion. Judges have generally imposed limitations on discussions and

negotiations between bidding firms, because they believe such collusion would be

anticompetitive, resulting in less attractive bids for the class.95 Certainly, collusion on prices

is inconsistent with the very idea of an auction. However, the fact that trial judges must

monitor the auction process for collusion is just another indicator of the extent of judicial

management required to conduct an auction for class counsel.

! Increasing or Declining Percentages of Recovery. Most courts have expressed a preference

for declining percentages as the amount of recovery increases.96 Many believe that a large

recovery may simply reflect a large class or unusually high damages, rather than a particularly

noteworthy effort by counsel.97 Judge Shadur has prohibited law firms from submitting bids

in which percentages increase as the amount of recovery increases.98 Others have argued that

a modestly increasing percentage provides the best match between the lawyer’s interest and

the interest of the class in maximizing recovery.99

C. Factual Findings Regarding Cases in Which an Auction Was Employed

The Federal Judicial Center has conducted an in-depth review of the cases in which class

counsel was appointed through auction.100 The findings of the FJC can be summarized as follows:

1. The number of bidding cases is too few to draw any conclusions about whether the

auction procedure has resulted in a net benefit to the class, as compared to traditional methods

of appointment.
37

2. The auction process has only been used in securities (12 cases) and antitrust (two

cases) class actions.

3. The number of bids received in the auction cases ranges from two to twenty-one.

4. Eight of the cases in which auctions were employed have settled as of September

1, 2001, and most of the settlements were between $25 million and $50 million.

5. Attorney fees awarded in the auction cases were “generally less than the reported

percentages in other class actions in the respective circuits.”

6. Judges experienced with auctions report the following circumstances that make

certain types of cases better candidates for auctions than others: 

a. the defendant has clearly accepted or stipulated liability;

b. information is available from a criminal investigation;

c. substantial information about the case is publicly known;

d. the case is clearly defined;

e. multiple cases are consolidated in one jurisdiction;

f. there is a strong potential for a very large recovery;

g. the defendant is able to pay for any recovery;

h. there is a single class that is well-defined;

i. there are a number of qualified firms who will be bidding; and

j. the case is a common fund class action.

7. Interviews with a small number of experienced judges who use traditional methods

of appointing counsel and awarding a fee in class actions revealed that these judges generally

have not experienced substantial problems in selecting counsel or awarding a fee.
101 Testimony of Judge Vaughn R. Walker, Judge Milton I. Shadur, Judge William A.

Walls, March 16, 2001; Testimony of Judge Lewis A. Kaplan, Professor Joseph A. Grundfest,

Andrew T. Berry, Richard B. Drubel, June 1, 2001.

102 Testimony of Judge Walker, March 16, p. 39-40, Statement of Richard B. Drubel,

submitted to the Task Force, at 5.

103 Statement of Professor Joseph A. Grundfest, submitted to the Task Force, at 6-7

(relying on Todd S. Foster, Denise M. Martin, Vinita M. Juneja and Frederick C. Dunbar,

Trends in Securities Litigation and the Impact of PSLRA (August 1999)). Professor Grundfest

cautions that the data indicating lower fees in auction cases must be “interpreted with caution”

because the data comes from a small sample of auction cases.

104 John C. Coffee, The PSLRA and Auctions, N.Y.L.J., May 17, 2001, p.5.

38

VI. Asserted Benefits of the Auction Method

The Task Force heard from several judges, lawyers and academics who enthusiastically

endorsed the benefits of judicial auctioning of class counsel in appropriate cases.101 The following

benefits are frequently cited:

! Benefits to the Class From Lower Attorney Fees: It appears that the percentage of the

recovery awarded to counsel in the auction cases is often less than that awarded by traditional

methods.102 Professor Joseph A. Grundfest relies on research to conclude that fees in

securities fraud litigation in the 1990's averaged approximately 30% of gross settlements, and

ranged from 25 to 33%. By contrast, in auction cases and cases involving “hard bargaining

by a competent named plaintiff,” awards range from 7% to 21.2%.103 Likewise, Professor

John C, Coffee reported that it is reasonable to assume that “a series of antitrust class action

auctions demonstrated that qualified counsel would generally offer to represent the class for

fee awards in the 10-15% range,”104 whereas in the two antitrust class actions in which

counsel was appointed by auction the fee percentage has been in the single digits. Auction

proponents argue that lower fees result in more settlement assets going to benefit the class

members.

! Judicial Economy: The judges who have used auctioning contend that there is less

expenditure of judicial resources, compared to the ex post assessments of attorney fees

required for fee awards in cases of traditional appointment.

! Eliminates “Race to the Courthouse”: Although rewarding the first lawyer to file an action

with the designation of lead counsel may incentivize counsel to ferret out wrongdoing, it can

also lead to hasty filing, superficial complaints, and the selection of counsel who may have
105 See Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform: Lessons From Securities Litigation, 39 ARIZ.

L. REV. 533, 538 (1997) (noting that traditional appointments that rely on a race to the

courthouse provide a poor proxy for quality of counsel).

106 Statement of Arlin M. Adams, submitted to the Task Force, at 16 (appointment of lead

counsel on the basis of first to file “does not reflect market forces in any meaningful way. If

anything, it reflects which firm is best able to put together a complaint with a minimum of

investigation and research. The auction method avoids rewarding such behavior.”). 

This argument assumes, of course, that appointment other than through an auction will

always be based on a “first to file” principle. As discussed later in this Report, appointment of

class counsel through “traditional” methods should not mean an automatic appointment based on

the first to file. 

107 In re Oracle Securities Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688, 692 (N.D. Cal. 1990). See also In re

Synthroid Marketing Litig., 264 F.3d 712, 718-21 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that an attorney fee in

a class action should be set as the market would set it before the representation, and noting that

an auction is one means of determining an ex ante fee).

108 In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litig., 197 F.R.D. 71, 82 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).

109 Statement of Richard B. Drubel, submitted to the Task Force, at 8; Testimony of

Andrew T. Berry, June 1, 2001, pp. 36-37.

39

fortuitously found a client, rather than the most qualified counsel.105 The auction approach

avoids the “race to the courthouse” method of appointment.106

! Ex ante Fee Determination: When private parties retain counsel for non-class actions, they

set the fee at the outset of the representation. The auction attempts to replicate this process.

Setting fees in this manner is said to avoid an indeterminate ex post assessment of fees. “It

is inherently illogical for lawyers to undertake litigation on the basis of the risks and rewards

they perceive at the beginning, yet be compensated on the basis of the risks and rewards the

court perceives at the end of the litigation.”107

! Aligning Incentives of Counsel With the Best Interests of the Class: Those who favor auctions

contend that the auction allows the judge to structure a fee arrangement at the outset of the

case that best aligns the interests of counsel and the class, thereby assuring counsel’s loyalty

and dedication to class interests.108

! Competition: Auction proponents champion competition as a healthy process by which to

obtain legal services. They contend that an auction provides a market test for the cost of

lawyer’s services, and that it leads counsel to “sharpen” their bids, by cutting unnecessary

expenses, reducing fee expectations, or developing innovative litigation strategies in order

to make the best bid. All of these modifications are said to inure to the benefit of the class.109
110 See, e.g., Torrisi v. Tucson Elec. Power Co., 8 F.3d 1370, 1376 (9th Cir. 1993)

(recognizing a “benchmark” percentage recovery of 25% for attorney fees in class actions). For a

criticism of “benchmark” fee awards, see Statement of Brian Wolfman, submitted to the Task

Force, at 11 (“Starting from the market rate for contingency fee lawyers in individual cases . . . 

and tweaking the numbers a bit, while doing nothing to evaluate the actual risks of class

litigation, does not reflect the market in which the class action is actually operating. As a result,

the benchmark ‘market’ rates for class actions, accepted over and over again by the courts, were

established tautologically, with courts simply looking to other courts that have engaged in the

identical exercise.”).

111 See In re Synthroid Marketing Litig., 264 F.3d 712, 720-21 (7th Cir. 2001) (“The

judicial opinions from auction cases are helpful [to courts determining fees ex post] because

they provide detailed analysis of the market rate for attorneys facing different levels of risk.

Forcing firms to bid at least approximates a market,” and “a court can examine the bids and the

results to see what levels of compensation attorneys are willing to accept in competition.”); In

re Comdisco Securities Litig., 150 F. Supp. 2d 943, 951 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (noting the possibility

“that at some future point the increased use of bidding for legal representation will itself have

generated enough evidence of the propriety of a new set of ‘norms’ at much lower percentages”). 

112 Statement of Arlin M. Adams, submitted to the Task Force, at 7.

113 Statement of Professor John C. Coffee, submitted to the Task Force, at 2. See also

Statement of Professor Joseph A. Grundfest, submitted to the Task Force, at 8 (arguing that

“market check procedures are attracting talented counsel who traditionally did not represent

plaintiff classes but who are now willing to represent the class at lower fees (see, e.g., the Boies,

Schiller & Flexner bid in the Auction Houses litigation)”).

40

! Database: There is undeniably some difficulty in determining appropriate attorney fees at

the conclusion of a class action. Auction proponents argue that the use of auctions can supply

a database that can be used to assess what is a reasonable “benchmark” for attorney fees in

class actions. They assert that there is an existing “benchmark” of something in the

neighborhood of 25%, and contend that this figure is arbitrary and without an empirical basis

in the market.110 In their view, the use of auctions over a period of time will provide a more

accurate benchmark that can be used by courts employing more traditional methods of

appointing counsel.111

! Increasing the Pool of Qualified Lawyers: An auction assertedly places all lawyers vying for

the position of lead counsel on an even playing field, depending upon the extent to which

judges incorporate qualitative selection criteria into their auctions. It is possible that auctions

may create opportunities for new lawyers to litigate class actions.112 As Professor Coffee puts

it, “[n]ew entrants can enter the field through competitive bidding in auctions, whereas they

would be unlikely to win elections as class counsel if the selection were resolved by the vote

of participating counsel.”113
114 Statements and testimony from of Professor Elliott J. Weiss, Professor Jill E Fisch,

Arlin M. Adams Professor John C. Coffee, Professor Samuel Issacharoff, Edward Labaton,

Joseph Rosenthal, Stephen A. Sheller, Howard A. Specter, Sherrie R. Savett, Michael D.

Fishbein, Stuart H. Savett, Keith Johnson, Professor Arthur R. Miller, Arthur M. Kaplan,

Lawrence Sucharow, Horace Schow II, H. Laddie Montague, Jr., Catherine E. LaMarr, Lorna

Goodman, Stuart M. Grant/Jay W. Eisenhofer, Howard I. Langer, Leonard Barrack, and F.

Franklin Balotti. All submitted to the Task Force.

115 See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Aggregations, Auctions and Other Developments in the

Selection of Lead Counsel Under the PSLRA, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53 (2001); Jonathan

R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative

Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1991)

(criticizing auction of lead counsel as providing disincentives to effective representation);

Developments in the Law, The Paths of Civil Litigation, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1827, 1829 (2000)

(arguing that auctioning of counsel “tends to exacerbate rather than resolve the problems

inherent in the judicial regulation of plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees”). 

116 We recognize that the term “maximum net recovery” is somewhat slippery. It might

appear, for example, that an attorney fee of 20% rather than 15% in a given case would lower the

maximum net recovery to the class. Yet, this is not necessarily so. If attorney fees of 20% are

available, counsel may, for example, assume the risk of pursuing a difficult secondary or tertiary

defendant. If fees are limited to 15%, this may not occur. Assuming that liability is established

and damages awarded against additional defendants, the overall class recovery may increase as a

result of a greater percentage of recovery for class counsel. We have recognized throughout this

41

VII. The Case Against Auctions

A majority of the witnesses who testified before the Task Force concluded that the asserted

benefits of an auction are, at least at this early stage, unproven and that whatever benefits might exist

are either outweighed by the risks and costs of an auction or are available in only a limited range of

cases.114 Most of the scholarship is to the same effect.115 The experience of the Task Force members

is consistent with this testimony and scholarship. 

The major contention of auction proponents is that auctions replicate the market and result

in savings to the class due to lower counsel fees. Based on the empirical evidence, witness testimony,

legal scholarship, and the collective experience of its members, the Task Force is unpersuaded. The

Task Force rejects this central assertion on several grounds:

! Auctions May Not Maximize Net Recovery: The goal of appointment should be to maximize

the net recovery to the class and to provide fair compensation to the lawyer, not to obtain the

lowest attorney fee.116 The lawyer who charges a higher fee may earn a proportionately
Report that there is a risk factor to be considered when attorney fees are assessed, and it is

therefore important that the maximum net recovery concept not ignore the risk assumed by

counsel. Our conception of maximum net recovery is one that takes into account the risk

incurred by counsel. It would be neither fair nor reasonable to assume that as an attorney's fees

rise, a class recovery shrinks. Rising attorney fees may cause an overall increase in the potential

class recovery.

117 See Statement of Professor Samuel Issacharoff, submitted to the Task Force, at 5 (“A

smaller percentage [attorney fee] may make the class worse off if the underlying corpus is

reduced because of lawyer incompetence or because of incentives not to maximize the amount to

be sought in the class action.”).

118 Statement of Professor Samuel Issacharoff, submitted to the Task Force, at 4.

119 See Statement of Professor Arthur Miller, submitted to the Task Force, at 15 (“the real

issue is not whether a particular fee regime will give class members a larger percentage share of

the common fund recovery, but whether it will maximize the net recovery class members actually

receive.”)

120 Statement of Professor Arthur Miller, submitted to the Task Force, at 16. See also

Statement of Professor Jill E. Fisch, submitted to the Task Force, at 1-2, noting that the case for

auctions maximizing class recovery remains unproven:

Current experience with auctions is limited, and many existing cases involved flawed

auction designs or limited competition. The absence of comparable control groups makes

it impossible to identify the extent to which auctions reduce legal fees or, more

problematically, whether any fee savings are the result of reduced attorney effort, poor

attorney quality, or both. . . . As a result, empirical analysis cannot readily address the

effect of auctions on the net recovery to the plaintiff class.

42

higher recovery for the class than the lawyer who charges a lesser fee.117 The auction process

fails to take into account the possibility that a higher bidder may have factored in more

resources to be put into the action, or is simply a higher quality firm, thereby increasing the

possibility of a higher net class recovery. “The lowest percentage bidder may simply be

lawyers with lesser overhead, lesser ambition, or volume discounters.”118 While some auctions

have probably resulted in lower fees than would have been awarded otherwise, engaging in

an auction is no guarantee that class recovery will be maximized.119 This is because the

auction system is more likely to reward those attorneys who can bid the lowest by expending

the least in prosecution of the class action. The Task Force agrees with Professor Arthur

Miller’s conclusion that “questing after the ‘lowest bid’ and preoccupation with the class’

share, or worrying about the occasional ‘windfall’ may be penny-wise and pound-foolish, and

not in the best interest of the class members.”120

! Non-auction Cases Have Resulted In Fee Awards Below Traditional Benchmarks: The

conclusion that auctions result in lower fees is based on the assumption that fees awarded in
121 See, e.g., In re Cendant Corp. Prides Litig., 243 F.3d 722, 737 (3d Cir. 2001) (listing

12 recent cases in which the fees were substantially less than 25 -30% of the settlement); In re

Dreyfus Aggressive Growth Mutual Fund Litigation, 2001 WL 709262 at *4 (S.D.N.Y. )

(finding 30% of a common fund award to be “at the far end” of reasonableness for securities

class actions, and awarding attorney fees amounting to 15% of the fund); Goldberger v.

Integrated Resources, Inc., 209 F.3d 43, 52 (2d Cir. 2000) (affirming a fee award of 4% of the

class recovery and rejecting counsel’s objections to the fee as a substantial departure from the

25% “benchmark” in the profession); Varljen v. H.J. Myers & Co., 2000 WL 1683656, at *5

(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (awarding attorney fees of 20% of class recovery); In re Fine Host Corp.

Securities Litig., 2000 WL 33116538 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2000) (awarding attorney fees

amounting to 17.5% of the class recovery). See also In re Comdisco Securities Litig., 150 F.

Supp. 2d 943, 947 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (arguing that Cendant Corp. Prides table of cases “undercuts

severely” the idea that 25-30% is the normal benchmark). In Goldberger, supra, the Second

Circuit observed that the asserted 25% “benchmark” reflected a contingency risk that was

unlikely to be present in every securities fraud lass action. 209 F.3d at 51-52. The Court held

that a 25% fee would be unreasonably high in the absence of a significant risk of non-recovery in

the specific case.

122 243 F.3d 722 (3d Cir. 2001). 

123 264 F.3d 201 (3d Cir. 2001).

43

the traditional manner generally adhere to a 25-33% benchmark. But this assumption, if ever

accurate, is probably no longer correct—especially in the kind of large recovery cases in

which auctions have been used. In large recovery cases, percentage recoveries in traditional

appointment class actions have often been well below 25%.121

! Auctions Do Not Guarantee Reasonable Fees: Appointing counsel through an auction is no

guarantee of a reasonable fee. The Third Circuit’s recent decision in In re Cendant Corp.

Prides Litigation122 is an example of a fee awarded through an auction that was considered

too high by traditional Rule 23 standards of review. The Court there remanded for

redetermination a fee award, set by auction, that was by the court’s calculation 7.3% of the

fund. Cendant Prides is another indication that there is no longer a “benchmark” of 25-33%

for post-hoc review of attorney fees in class action cases. 

Moreover, some evidence indicates that auctions can result in higher fees than could

be obtained by a well-financed, empowered lead plaintiff in the market. In In re Cendant

Corp. Litigation,

123 the bid chosen by the court through auction provided for a fee award that

was $76 million higher than the result produced under the retainer agreement entered into

between the institutional lead plaintiff and counsel.

! Auctions May Not Result In a Net Saving of Judicial Resources: Structuring an appropriate

auction process and carefully evaluating the bids requires a significant expenditure of judicial
124 Statement of Judge Vaughn R. Walker, submitted to the Task Force, at 11. 

125 Statement of Sherrie R. Savett, submitted to the Task Force, at 5-6 (arguing that the

court “is likely to bear more costs” in an auction “as it must evaluate fee and expense proposals

from a potentially unlimited number of plaintiff’s firms”). See also Statement of Professor

Arthur Miller, submitted to the Task Force, at 21 (“Evaluating each bid is a time consuming and

highly subjective matter, and requires the court—in the absence of a developed record—to make

numerous assessments and assumptions that may (or may not) be correct, and that may (or may

not) ultimately have to be reconsidered at the end of the case. . . . One must ask whether one of

the system’s most precious and limited resources—judicial time—is better expended in running

competitive bidding regimes or devoted to other, more judicial, matters.”).

126 See, e.g., In re Comdisco Securities Litig., 150 F. Supp. 2d 943, 951 (N.D.Ill. 2001)

(holding open the possibility that the winning bid could be adjusted in light of developments

unforeseen at the time of bidding).

127 It is not clear to what extent the judges who have conducted auctions engage in the

same ex post review of fees as judges who selected counsel by other methods. The key question

is whether the judge should B in fairness to both counsel and the class B be satisfied at the end of

the case that the fee is reasonable. If so, the auction procedure may add a layer of costs without

providing much benefit at the end of the case.

44

time and resources. As Judge Walker acknowledged in discussing the duties of a class

representative: “Selecting between different law firms and proposals can be expensive, time

consuming and even a difficult process.”124 Thus, an auction process merely shifts some of

the judicial costs of fee assessment from the end to the beginning of the case. Indeed, the

costs of fee assessment ex ante are likely to be substantial, as the court will be required to

evaluate a number of bids, whereas with traditional appointments the court must only evaluate

the reasonableness of the lead counsel’s fee request.125

Uncertainties in bidding due to imperfect information will often require judges at the

end of the case to deal with situations that were not anticipated at the time of bidding.

Several judges have explicitly left open the possibility of revisiting the fee at the end of the

case if it turned out that the fee arrangement awarded ex ante would undercompensate

counsel.126 While such an ex post assessment may be necessary to provide a fair fee, this very

need to assess the fee after the fact reduces whatever asserted advantage exists in an ex ante

award of fees by way of auction. A judge who is assessing changed circumstances after the

fact is really engaged in the same kind of analysis as a judge awarding fees after a traditional

appointment.127

Even if the action proceeds as envisioned at the time of bidding, the auction will

probably save the court little time in the way of ex post assessment of attorney fees. This is

because Rule 23 requires courts to review the reasonableness of attorney fees at the end of

the case. A court’s approval of a fee through auction at the beginning of the case does not
128

 In re Cendant Corp. Prides Litig., 243 F.3d 722, 735, n. 18 (3d Cir. 2001). The Third

Circuit has also held that a fee set in an auction is entitled to no special deference in determining

whether it is a reasonable award at the conclusion of the action. See In re Cendant Corp. Litig.,

264 F.3d 201, 282-83 (3d Cir. 2001). 

 

129 See Letter from Professor John Leubsdorf to the Task Force, May 30, 2001 (on file

with the Task Force) (“It seems to me that, in most instances, an auction is not a desirable way

to select the lawyers who will do most for their clients. It tends to select the cheapest but not

necessarily the best counsel, and may also result in a fee structure that will not provide incentives

for optimal performance.”).

45

satisfy that obligation. In this regard, the Third Circuit has found that “though the result of

a bidding process may be of use to a district court in awarding fees at the end of the case, it

cannot supplant post-settlement analysis to determine a reasonable fee.”128 Thus, the

auctioning process does not do away with an ex post assessment. At best, what is gained is

an additional point of reference for determining the reasonableness of an ex post fee award.

____________________

In sum, the asserted benefit to the class of the auction procedure is at this point speculative.

Balanced against the dubious benefit are the risks and costs of the auction process. The Task Force

has determined that these risks and costs are substantial enough to caution against the use of auctions

except in limited circumstances, as specified below. What follows is a discussion of some of the

negative effects created by auctions of class counsel:

! Risk That Low Fee Will Lead to Low Quality Representation: The auction method could

encourage firms to submit unduly low bids in order to win the position of class counsel.

Underbidding can result in lawyers cutting corners or settling too early in order to maintain

a profit margin.129 Where the winning firm’s bid is too low--as it will often be due to the

pressures of competitive bidding and the imperfect information available at the time of the

auction—the firm will have a conflict of interest. Its own interest in securing reasonable

compensation for time spent will be in conflict with its duty to vigorously prosecute the case

to maximize the class recovery.

It could be argued that lawyers who submit the low bid in an auction will have an

ethical obligation to perform on behalf of the class even though their monetary incentive

might be to cut corners or sell out the class. Moreover, lawyers have a reputation to keep. Can

we not rely on the ethical standards of lawyers, and their interest in maintaining a reputation,
130 Statement of Professor Lucian Bebchuck, submitted to the Task Force, at 9.

131 See Bruce Hay, Contingent Fees and Agency Costs, 25 J. LEG. STUD. 503, 513 (1996)

(optimal contingent fee, providing the best incentive to the lawyer and maximum return to the

client, is generally above the level that a bidding process would produce).

Judge Walker contends in a written submission to the Task Force (available on the Task

Force website) that any problem with attorney performance after winning an auction is

controlled by the fact that lawyers who lose the bidding will monitor the performance of the

successful bidder and will be in a position to object to a fee application. The Task Force could

find no evidence, however, that this monitoring by losing bidders actually occurs. It is in fact

counterintuitive. Losing bidders drop from a case. It is difficult to imagine why they would

invest time and resources in monitoring the counsel who has won and will receive fees. When we

contrast auctions with private ordering, we note that in private ordering there may be lead 

counsel and other counsel sharing certain responsibilities. Although shared responsibilities raises

a concern about overstaffing, it provides an opportunity for firms to monitor each other and an

incentive to do so -- after all, there is nothing to share if the class does not prevail and too little

to share if the recovery is not all it should be. 

132 Statement of Brian Wolfman, submitted to the Task Force, at 3-4:

My chief concern is that in many, and probably most, cases, the putative

46

to overcome whatever negative incentives might arise from an auction? The answer is given

by Professor Bebchuk:

To be sure, ethical constraints (and reputational considerations) would ensure by

themselves that counsel would make the investment needed to satisfy what is required

by professional ethics and reputational concerns. But it would often be desirable to

have counsel make investments substantially above the floor established by ethical

and reputational constraints. And given that counsel is likely to be best informed

about the cost-benefit calculus for such additional investments, a substantial degree

of counsel discretion in this matter is inevitable. It follows that to encourage counsel

to make investments in the wide range above the floor established by ethics and

reputation, the incentives provided to counsel by the fee schedule are highly

important.130

Unfortunately, the bidding process will often result in the lowest bidder having negative

financial incentives, contrary to the interest of the class in maximizing recovery.131

! Risk That Litigation Uncertainty Will Distort the Bids: Counsel may be unable to make a

realistic prediction about the value of the case at the time of bidding, which obviously must

be conducted in the early stages of the litigation.132 Lack of information about the case, and
plaintiffs’ lawyer simply does not have the information to participate sensibly in a prelitigation auction. . . . [M]any key points of law and fact are in substantial doubt at the

outset of the case (or even half way into it), and only gradually come into focus as the

litigation matures. Some of the unknowns are:

(1) the legal viability of one or more of the key claims for relief;

(2) facts that might prove necessary or important to establish a viable legal claim

(indeed in some cases, the “historical” facts themselves are still developing);

(3) whether the case can be maintained as a class action, or whether instead the

case cannot be maintained at all or can be maintained only individually or in some

other form of aggregated litigation;

(4) key facts bearing on the amount of damages suffered by the class (assuming

liability);

(5) the financial ability of the defendant to withstand full liability, or, rather,

whether recovery is possible only on a “limited fund” basis, in bankruptcy, or

must be sought, in whole or in part, from other parties not believed to be

principally responsible;

(6) the form of relief (for instance, cases in which money damages initially are

sought, but, as the litigation develops, only injunctive relief, ADR, or some other

form of relief is viable);

(7) the size of the class, and perhaps more important, the approximate number of

class members likely to be eligible for relief on account of the defendant’s alleged

misconduct;

(8) the potential for intra-class conflict, and the resulting need for sub-classes

requiring separate sub-class counsel.

133 A number of experienced counsel testified that it is all but impossible to predict the

outcome of a class action as of the time that an auction would have to be conducted. See, e.g., 

Statement of Michael D. Fishbein, submitted to the Task Force, at 1-2 (“Even where the

objective facts known to counsel at the outset of litigation make it appear as though a lawsuit is a

‘slam dunk’, such cases will frequently be unsuccessful because of unknown facts subsequently

unearthed in discovery, unforeseen changes in the existing science, changes and variations in the

application of law, or even the peculiarities of a given judge or jury.”). See also the Statements

of Sherrie R. Savett and John Innelli, both submitted to the Task Force. 

The Task Force notes that in the cases in which bidding has been conducted, judges have

not permitted any type of preliminary discovery to assist the bidders in forming their bids. See

FJC Report, at 33 (“None of the bidding cases give any indication that the judge permitted any

type of preliminary discovery by any of the bidders to assist them with the proposals prior to the

commencement of the initial bidding period. Discovery either had not yet commenced in the

47

the unpredictability of class action litigation generally, may significantly distort the bidding

process and result in bids that are unduly low.133
case, or, if it had, once the court requested bids, discovery in the case was stayed.”).

134 Professor Fisch describes the “winner’s curse” as follows:

Where bidders bid for an item of unknown value, an auction model known as the

common value model, the successful bidder is the one who estimates the value of the

item at the highest level. Because this bidder will have made an estimate that is higher

than any other bidder, and because the bidders are acting without full information about

the outcome of the litigation, the winning bidder will therefore face the risk of

overpayment, or the “winner's curse” problem. The possibility of overpayment causes

rational bidders to discount for that risk and can lead to inefficient, rather than

competitive, prices.

Jill E. Fisch, Aggregations, Auctions and Other Developments in the Selection of Lead Counsel

Under the PSLRA, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 89 (2001).

135 Professor John Coffee explained the “winner’s curse” in the context of the actual bids

in In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litig., supra. John C. Coffee, Untangling the “‘Auction

Houses’ Aftermath, N.Y. L. J., Nov. 30, 2000, p. 1. In that case, the judge required counsel to

state an X factor below which they would not receive a fee; above that amount, counsel would

take 25% of the recovery. The X factor of the winning bid was more than twice as high as the

next bid. Had the value of the class action turned out to be well below the X factor, it would

have created a conflict of interest between counsel and the class, because counsel would have

had the incentive to settle the case at the earliest opportunity, even though more effort might

result in a higher settlement (though below the X factor). Moreover the large disparity in bids 

suggested the possibility that the winning bid might have been too high in light of what was

known at the time.

 Professor Coffee has stated that the Auction Houses case indicates that the “winner’s

curse” problem “does have real world analogues.” Statement of John C. Coffee, submitted to the

Task Force, at 6. In contrast, Richard B. Drubel, who submitted the winning bid in Auction

Houses, contends that the disparity in bids was not the result of a “winner’s curse” but rather was

due to the fact that the winning bidder had a reputation as an excellent litigation firm, willing to

take a case to trial. Therefore, the claim had a higher value to his firm than to competing firms

48

Another aspect of uncertainty is identified by economics scholars as the “winner’s

curse” which arises when the value of the auctioned item is not easy to determine.134 In that

situation, in order to win, the firm seeking the appointment must make a better bid than the

economically optimum bid. If designated class counsel discover that they have bid too

optimistically (that is, they have set their fee too low), they will have a conflict of interest in

prosecuting the case, either settling too soon and for too little or refusing to settle at a level

that will best serve the class, if the fee in that settlement range is not in their favor.135 As
who might not have the same reputation. Statement of Richard B. Drubel, submitted to the Task

Force, at 2. 

136 Statement of Professor Samuel Issacharoff, submitted to the Task Force, at 4.

137 Statement of Andrew Niebler, submitted to the Task Force, at 2-4.

138 Professor Fisch elaborates on the difficult if not impossible task for a court evaluating

auction bids for appointment of class counsel:

The court must determine the likely recovery and predict the process by which that

recovery will be achieved. The court must then evaluate each bid against those

predictions to determine how the proposed structure will affect counsel's ability to

achieve the predicted outcome. The auction requires the court to make these predictions

at the outset of the case, before discovery reveals the facts and before motion practice

uncovers the legal issues. Accordingly, the court has extremely limited information on

the probability, amount, and range of possible recovery.

Professor Fisch contrasts this ex ante assessment of optimal fees to the ex post approach used

with traditional appointment of class counsel:

In contrast, if the court decides on the appropriate fee award at the conclusion of the case,

the court can assess the amount and the quality of counsel’s work effort. Moreover,

although the court may not have complete information on the merits of the case,

particularly if the case is resolved by settlement, the court is likely to have a better sense

of the strength of the case and the degree of risk associated with the litigation. Most

important, by reserving its determination of the appropriate fee award until the

49

Professor Issacharoff has noted, lawyers who win an auction by bidding too low “are likely

to be unwilling to invest greatly in the prosecution of the claim, particularly at the all

important investigatory stage.”136 Conversely, some bidders may raise their fee proposal in

order to avoid the winner’s curse. This could lead to a fee proposal that is too high to

maximize class recovery. 

! Difficulty of Comparing Bids: Competing bids are often difficult for the court to compare.137

One bid might be better at a certain point of recovery and another bid might be better at a

different point. That is, there are “crossover” points where a bid that was higher than another

now becomes lower than another. For example, consider the intentionally oversimplified

hypothetical of two competing bids: Bid 1 proposes a fee recovery of 5% of the first $10

million and 25% of anything over that; Bid 2 proposes a fee recovery of 7% of the first $10

million and 10% of anything over that. Bid 1 is better if the value of the claim is less than $10

million; but at some point just above a recovery of $10 million, there is a crossover point at

which Bid 2 becomes the lower bid. Because it is hard to assess the value of a claim at the

outset of the action, it is similarly hard to assess which bid is optimal.138 Where crossover
conclusion of the case, the court can address many of the incentive problems previously

identified.

Jill E. Fisch, Aggregations, Auctions and Other Developments in the Selection of Lead Counsel

Under the PSLRA, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 88-89 (2001).

139 Statement of Arlin M. Adams, submitted to the Task Force, at 21 (“a problem in

analyzing and comparing bids is that doing so may require the court to make some assumptions

about the likely outcome of the case. . . . Aside from the dangers of speculating (on the record)

about the court’s view of the difficulty of litigating the claims involved and the length of time the

court expects it to take to reach settlement, such assumptions may insert a degree of subjectivity

into the analysis of the bids.”).

140 See Statement of Lorna Goodman, submitted to the Task Force, at 6-7 (noting that the

district court in Cendant rejected what turned out to be the lowest bid by assuming that class

recovery would be far less than $1 billion; the recovery in Cendant turned out to be $3 billion).

141 See, e.g., In re Quintus Securities Litig., 148 F. Supp. 2d 967 (N.D. Cal. 2001); In re

Oracle Securities Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688 (N.D.Cal. 1990); In re Amino Acid Lysine Antitrust

Litig., 918 F.Supp. 1190 (N.D. Ill. 1996); In re Bank One Shareholders Class Actions, 96

F.Supp. 2d 780 (N.D Ill. 2000). 

50

points exist, a court will be required to make difficult assumptions about the likely outcome

of the case.139 There is a serious risk that the court will make a wrong prediction about the

case and actually award lead counsel on the basis of a bid that is less optimal for the class.140

The difficulty of assessing bids is even greater if the bids factor in both the time-stage of the

litigation and the amount of recovery (e.g., 10% of the first million with rising percentages,

if the case is settled before trial, 15% of the first million with declining percentages if the case

proceeds to judgment.). In those situations, the judge comparing the bids is really comparing

apples and oranges, and the risk of erroneous assessment of the bids will increase. These

crossover point evaluation problems have arisen in many of the auction cases.141

Evaluation of competing bids is somewhat less of a problem where the court provides

a single-factor structure for bidding, such as the X factor structure employed in In re Auction

Houses Antitrust Litigation—in which bidders submitted a single number, below which they

would receive no fee and above which they would receive 25%. The X factor is nevertheless

problematic, because the court must estimate the value of the claim early in the litigation to

determine which bid will best serve the class.

Comparing bids will also be difficult in another sense. How does the court know

whether the winning bid is too good? At the outset of the case it will often be difficult if not

impossible to determine whether a bid is so low that it virtually guarantees inadequate or
142 Statement of Arlin M. Adams, submitted to the Task Force, at 17.

143 See, FJC Report at 53 (“Although each judge who has employed some type of auction

procedure to select class counsel emphasized and evaluates certain factors differently when

comparing bids and selecting the winning bidder, all judges said they weighed both price

considerations and qualitative factors when comparing the bids.”). See also In re Synthroid

Marketing Litig., 264 F.3d 712, 720 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Judges don't look for the lowest bid; they

look for the best bid—just as any private individual would do in selecting a law firm, an

advertising firm, or a construction company. Bidding law firms provide the judge with firm

profiles, testimonials of former clients, predictions of expected recovery, fee proposals, and

arguments on why their firm provides good value. The judge in turn acts as an agent for the

class, selecting the firm that seems likely to generate the highest recovery net of attorneys’

fees.”).

144 Jill E. Fisch, Aggregations, Auctions and Other Developments in the Selection of

Lead Counsel Under the PSLRA, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 82-83 (2001) (“For bids to

provide the court with an objective basis on which to distinguish among counsel, the court's

determination must focus primarily on price.”). See also Statement of Professor Arthur R.

Miller, submitted to the Task Force, at 20-21:

Although auctions may create the appearance of objectivity to an unsophisticated

observer (as the “lodestar” methodology once gave the appearance of mathematical

precision), in reality virtually every element of a class counsel auction is subjective. For

example, a court’s perception of a bidding firm’s quality, experience, resources,

willingness to litigate . . . all have substantial subjective elements. Similarly, determining

what weight to give to the varying perceived strengths and weaknesses of different law

firms and competences in various substantive contexts is inherently subjective. . . .

In addition . . . price is not necessarily objective. To the contrary, to the extent

that auction advocates have supported the use of fee grids . . . or “caps” or other variable

structures, determining what bid is “lowest” is dependent on a court’s subjective ex ante

perception of a range of factors. These include the likely value of the case, the likelihood

that a case will settle early or late, and on and on. 

51

conflicted representation of the class. As Arlin Adams puts it: “It is not clear how a court

would be able to tell whether a bid was >too good to be true’ or simply very competitive.”142

! Inability To Eliminate Subjective Evaluations: The courts that have conducted auctions have

recognized that price cannot be the sole factor in awarding class counsel; there must be some

quality control as well.143 Yet if the court takes into account anything other than price to

choose among competing bids, it enters into the same kind of subjective determinations as

occur under the traditional method of appointing class counsel.144 Courts conducting auctions

have considered such non-price factors as quality of counsel, experience, resources, and
145 See, e.g., In re Lucent Technologies Securities Litig., 194 F.R.D. 137, 157 (D.N.J.

2000) (“Each bidding firm is required to submit a declaration of matters such as: the firm’s

experience in securities class action litigation; the qualifications of the firm to perform the work

required; whether the firm will post a completion bond; a description of malpractice insurance

for the firm and for each lawyer working on the case; a demonstration of familiarity with the

case, including a specification of the probability of recovery and its possible range.”). 

 

146 Statement of Arlin M. Adams, submitted to the Task Force, at 20 (“depending on the

importance given certain factors by some judges but not others, the auction method may be

applied in as subjective a manner as the lodestar method or an adjustment to a percentage

method.”).

147 See Attachment to the Statement of State of Wisconsin Investment Board, submitted to

the Task Force (setting forth quality-based standards for selection of class counsel).

148 The fact that no court has relied or suggested that it would be wise to rely on the low

bid irrespective of who makes it also suggests that the claim that auctions may open the door to

new entrants in the class action field is probably overstated. New entrants who make extremely

low bids may raise eyebrows, and may fail the “experience” prong of any analysis. The fact is

that in auctions as in other methods of selecting class counsel, judges will probably be wary of

entrusting the responsibility of representing large numbers of class members to lawyers without

much experience in class action cases.

149 Statements of Arlin M. Adams at 1, H. Laddie Montague, Jr. at 5, and Arthur M.

Kaplan at 5, all submitted to the Task Force. See also Jill E. Fisch, Aggregations, Auctions and

Other Developments in the Selection of Lead Counsel Under the PSLRA, 64 LAW & CONTEMP.

PROBS. 53, 93-94 (2001):

In addition to the practical issues presented by the auction structure, a selection process

that disregards differences in the competing firms' early efforts creates undesirable

incentives with respect to future litigation. The public interest is served by lawyers who

carefully conduct investigations prior to filing a complaint. . . . Investigation, however,

52

willingness to litigate.145 Once the court begins to evaluate those factors, little may be gained

by resorting to an auction.146 Moreover, the quality-based standards used by courts conducting

auctions are quite similar to the submissions that institutional lead plaintiffs require from

firms competing to be counsel in securities class actions under the PSLRA.147 Thus, it is

difficult to see what advantage an auction would have over the private retention of lead

counsel by a sophisticated and well-financed lead plaintiff.148

! Disincentive To Investigate Claims: The auction process reduces the incentive for plaintiffs’

firms to investigate potential claims, because the investigating firm must consider the risk of

losing the bidding process and having to internalize its up-front expenses.149 As Professor
is costly, and a lawyer's investigatory efforts are penalized if they can be appropriated by

a low-bidding latecomer. Under the auction model, the firms that perform work early in

a case face a risk that they will not be compensated; firms that do no initial work preserve

lower cost structures that give them an advantage in the auction. 

150 Statement of Professor John C. Coffee, submitted to the Task Force, at 3. 

151In re Bank One Shareholders Class Actions, 96 F. Supp. 2d 780 (N.D. Ill. 2000)

(promising compensation to counsel who had prepared the consolidated class action). The SEC

supports the position that firms that do valuable work in investigating securities claims should be

separately compensated if they are not chosen as lead counsel. Memorandum of the Securities

and Exchange Commission, Amicus Curiae, at 9 n.5, In re Milestone Scientific Securities Litig.,

183 F.R.D. 404 (D.N. J. 1998).

152 Statement of Arlin M. Adams, submitted to the Task Force, at 23 (“even if counsel are

compensated for their time in investigating, the incentive may not be great enough to encourage

attorneys to pursue such early investigation.”).

153 Statement of Sherrie R. Savett, submitted to the Task Force, at 5 (“The auction process

gives plaintiff’s attorneys an incentive to sit back and let others do all of the work, so as to

swoop in at the last minute and submit a bid. An auction process discourages the filing of initial

complaints, but encourages the filing of duplicative or copycat complaints where most of the

work has already been performed by others.”). But see Statement of Richard B. Drubel,

submitted to the Task Force, at 6 (arguing that claim jumping is not necessarily bad because the

investigating lawyer “may be a great investigator but an inexperienced or inept trial lawyer”).

Mr. Drubel’s proposed solution is “to reward the finder separately for his work in some fashion,

but to auction the position of lead counsel to the firm that can get the most value to the class.”

154 In re Wells Fargo Securities Litig., 157 F.R.D. 467 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (three bids); In re

Comdisco Securities Litig., 150 F. Supp. 2d 143 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (three bids; the court notes the

decrease in number of qualified bidders in other cases); In re California Micro Devices

Securities Litig., 168 F.R.D. 257 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (two bids); Wenderhold v. Cylink Corp., 191

53

Coffee has stated, auctions Ado not reward the original attorney who undertook search costs

to discover a violation of law; hence, an auction system implies a reduced incentive for

private attorney generals to seek out violations of law.”150 Even if the court ultimately

decides to compensate losing firms for early contributions to the case,151 the ex ante risk of

noncompensation may deter efforts that might be beneficial to the class.152 In the view of the

Task Force, it is not enough to promise a firm compensation for prefiling investigation when

that compensation would come from a fund that does not yet, and may never, exist and which

counsel will no longer have any role in attempting to create. Moreover, the possibility that

up-front investigation costs may not be compensated creates the incentive for free-riding or

“claim-jumping.”153

! Shortage of Qualified Bidders: Experience has shown that the bidding process can lead to a

shortage of qualified firms submitting bids.154 The Task Force notes that the preparation of
F.R.D. 600 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (one bid; after the court rejected the bid and reopened the bidding,

the court received three bids). See Jill E. Fisch, Aggregations, Auctions and Other

Developments in the Selection of Lead Counsel Under the PSLRA, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.

53, 90 (2001):

Several of the cases in which courts have used auctions suggest that the risk of limited

bidder participation is real. For example, only four firms submitted bids in the Oracle

auction, and Judge Walker had to conduct two rounds of bidding to obtain a total of three

bids in Cylink. The auction in In re California Micro Devices Securities Litigation, 

resulted in only two bids, although seventeen firms had previously entered appearances

representing members of the plaintiff class. Even the auction conducted in In re Amino

Acid Lysine Antitrust Litigation resulted in the submission of only eight bids, despite the

fact that approximately thirty-eight firms had entered an appearance prior to the court's

decision to use an auction. 

155 Statement of Arlin M. Adams, submitted to the Task Force, at 26 (“When confronted

with a complex bidding process at the outset, particularly where the use of the auction method is

still relatively novel, some firms may decide that the opportunity cost to them of analyzing the

case sufficiently to put together a winning bid is too great, and they may choose to pursue other

cases in non-auction jurisdictions instead.”).

Notably, courts have often required the bid to be structured in relation to certain

mileposts in the litigation, and many of these mileposts are unlikely to be reached. For example,

it is quite unlikely that a class action will be resolved after a trial or on appeal. As Professor

Fisch puts it: “By including a variety of marginally relevant contingencies, litigation milepost

grids increase the cost of bid preparation and complicate the task of bid comparison.” Statement

of Professor Jill E. Fisch, submitted to the Task Force, at 3. 

156 But see Statement of Richard B. Drubel, submitted to the Task Force, at 8. Mr. Drubel

does not see a problem with an auction so long as there is more than one qualified bidder:

One benefit of an auction is to drive each participant to compete against the others for the

54

a bid can be costly. A bidding firm must investigate the case as thoroughly as possible and

predict the expected recovery, as well as the cost associated with each possible recovery,

including necessary staffing, in order to propose a rational bid structure. In the absence of

careful investigation, a firm exposes itself to the risk that it will be burdened with an unduly

low bid if it wins the auction. Moreover, courts conducting auctions have often required

extensive submissions such as a description of the case and quality assurances, and the

preparation of these materials can require significant cost and effort—all expended with the

risk of zero recovery. Confronted with the substantial cost of preparing a bid and the risk that

such preparation will be a deadweight loss, some firms have decided that participation in the

auction process is simply not worth it.155 The incentive to take part in an auction is especially

diminished if the value of a case is difficult to assess at the outset.156
benefit of the class. Unless a bidder is assured in advance that no one else will bid, that

competitive discipline will still exist—and the class will still reap the benefits—whether

there is one bidder or twenty. 

157 Jill E. Fisch, Aggregations, Auctions and Other Developments in the Selection of

Lead Counsel Under the PSLRA, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 84-85 (2001). See also

Andrew K. Niebler, In Search of Bargained-For Fees for Class Action Plaintiffs' Lawyers: The

Promise and Pitfalls of Auctioning the Position of Lead Counsel, 54 BUS. LAW. 763, 777-78

(1999) (discussing the “lemons” problem in the context of auction of class counsel).

158 In re Cendant Corp. Prides Litig., 243 F.3d 722, 734 (3d Cir. 2001).

159 In re Comdisco Securities Litig., 150 F. Supp. 2d 943, 947 (N.D.Ill. 2001).

160 See Statement of Professor Samuel Issacharoff, submitted to the Task Force, at 3 n. 2

(“If the auction process is to have any effect, there must be a quasi-contractual expectation that

the auction will indeed set the expected terms governing the retention and compensation of class

counsel”; this premise has been “called into question” by Cendant Prides).

55

More importantly, the auction process itself may lead firms of higher quality to forego

any attempt to represent the class. Higher quality firms usually cannot compete with lower

quality firms on the basis of price, making it likely that those firms will drop out of an auction

they cannot win, rather than incur the deadweight cost of participation in the auction. This

means that even if there are enough “qualified” bidders to support an auction, the bidders are

more likely to be minimally than highly qualified. As Professor Fisch notes, the auction

process “creates a potential ‘lemons’ problem, in which lower quality lawyers are

disproportionately represented in the pool of bidding firms.”157

In Comdisco, Judge Shadur provided another explanation for the shortage of bidders.

The Third Circuit’s Cendant Corp. Prides decision158 may be a disincentive to prospective

bidders, because it requires the court to make an ex post assessment of the reasonableness of

a fee, even if it was awarded by auction. Judge Shadur persuasively argues that Cendant

Prides has “placed bidders in a no-win situation, in which if they prove successful in

becoming lead counsel the terms of their successful bids would set a ceiling on fees, while

on the downside they would be subject to ex post second guessing by the court’s utilization

of a lodestar comparison as a benchmark.”159 The threat of stringent ex post review of the fee

accordingly diminishes the pool of bidders and, more broadly, imposes a substantial reason

for rejecting auctions as a practical matter, because a major reason for conducting an auction

is to establish a relatively certain fee ex ante. At the very least, the use of the auction process

is problematic in jurisdictions following the Cendant Prides analysis.160

! Risk of Discouraging Prospective Lead Plaintiffs: Auctions or the possibility of an auction

may discourage qualified lead plaintiffs from coming forward to spend time and resources to

find and negotiate with counsel. Prospective plaintiffs will have to take account of the risk
161 Statements of Keith Johnson at 5, Catherine E. LaMarr at 3-4, Horace Schow at 4-5,

and Lorna Goodman at 5-6, all submitted to the Task Force.

162 See, e.g. In Re Bank One Shareholders Class Actions, 96 F. Supp. 2d 780, 785 (N.D.

Ill. 2000) (“[V]ariation . . . among the several proposals will necessitate some . . . assumptions

by the Court about the potential class recovery in the process of comparing bids.”); Statement of

Professor Elliott Weiss, submitted to the Task Force, at 3 (“A court often will not be able to

evaluate competing bids without pre-judging aspects of the case before it.”).

163 Statement of Howard Langer, submitted to the Task Force, at 1 (arguing that the

auction process “creates an appearance of impropriety or bias.”). The Task Force is aware that

judges are often called upon to make rulings that could influence their view of a case. For

example, a judge could rule a confession invalid and preside over a trial at which the confession

was excluded despite knowing its contents. We assume that judges are able to set aside matters

that they know but are not permitted to consider. The issue is not, however, whether any

possible influence on a judge’s decision should be avoided at all costs. Rather, the question is

whether certain procedures create too great a risk that judicial neutrality could be compromised

or that an appearance of partiality could be raised. 

56

that they may be deprived of their choice of counsel or their preferred fee arrangements.

Every representative of institutional plaintiffs who testified before the Task Force emphasized

that auctions interfered with their ability to take an active and meaningful role in the class

action. They uniformly counseled against shotgun marriages of a lead plaintiff with counsel

whom it did not choose.161

! Risk of Compromising Judicial Impartiality: Auctions often require a preliminary look at the

merits, as there may be no other way to assess whether the bids are realistic or which

crossover points, if any, are relevant. This preliminary assessment by the court may appear

to constitute a prejudgment of the merits, in tension with the court’s role as an impartial

adjudicator at the settlement stage and at trial.162 Moreover, there is a possibility that the

court will be seen as having become invested in its initial assessment of the case and in its

choice of counsel.163 There are legitimate concerns that after an auction, a court may be

perceived as making good on the value of the franchise that it has sold. The Task Force agrees

with Professor Fisch that despite the best intentions, a court conducting an auction runs a risk:

By casting the court as auctioneer and referee, lead counsel auctions also threaten the

court's neutrality. First . . . in evaluating the auction bids, the court must form an

opinion on the merits of the case and the predicted recovery. This opinion, formed

without the benefit of discovery or any submission by the defendant, may influence

the court's subsequent evaluation of a motion or a proposed settlement. Second, the

court's selection of counsel, which includes a determination that counsel is qualified

and has made a reasonable evaluation of the case, may create an unintentional bias

that the defendant cannot overcome. Indeed, having conducted an auction, the court
164 Jill E. Fisch, Aggregations, Auctions and Other Developments in the Selection of

Lead Counsel Under the PSLRA, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 95 (2001). See also Statement

of Guy Miller Struve on behalf of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, submitted

to the Task Force, at 6 (“Our most serious concern with an auction procedure is the impact it

may have on the role of the court as neutral arbiter.”).

165 Statement of Arthur M. Kaplan, submitted to the Task Force, at 3 (contending that the

auction procedure “encourages cozy communications between well-connected plaintiffs’ counsel

and defense counsel” with the potential for “sweetheart deals in which a winning bid is based

upon information available only to the bidder favored by defense counsel”).

166 During the bidding in In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litigation, Judge Kaplan became

aware that certain bidding counsel had engaged in settlement discussions with defendants and

had obtained information from defendants to aid in those discussions. Judge Kaplan ordered the

information to be made available to all bidders. In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litig., 197 F.R.D.

71, 74 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).

167 Statement of Michael D. Fishbein, submitted to the Task Force, at 3 (“In virtually

every case we know of where the auction approach has been used, there are rumors that the

successful bid was predicated on an undisclosed prior agreement with defendants concerning

settlement. Regardless of whether these rumors ever have any validity, there is no question that

they undermine confidence in the legal process.”).

57

may be particularly unwilling to terminate the case in a manner that would preclude

class counsel from recovering a reasonable fee. Third, judicial control over the

selection of counsel makes counsel accountable to the court, not to the class. This

control may allow institutional factors, such as judicial interest in docket control, to

influence litigation decision-making.164

! Risk of Perpetuating an Impression of Windfalls To Lawyers: Auctions may perpetuate an

impression of windfalls to lawyers. If an auction is to work as most proponents want, the key

is to decide ex ante what the attorney fees will be if there is a recovery. The problem, as seen

in Cendant Prides, is that what seems reasonable at the outset of a case may seem totally

unreasonable at the end. Rule 23 requires an ex post review of fees in part to assure that the

best interest of the class is served. If that ex post view trumps whatever the ex ante view was,

an auction has served little purpose. But, if the ex post view defers too much to the ex ante

approved bid, the appearance of a windfall to lawyers may be exacerbated by the auction

process.

! Risk of Collusion Between Defense Counsel and Certain Bidders: Auctions create the

potential for collusion between the defendant and bidding counsel.165 The defendant may give

information to its “chosen” counsel on its willingness to settle and the settlement range.166

This inside information could improve counsel’s chance to submit the winning bid; and this

might lead to sweetheart settlements that promote counsel’s fee at the expense of the class.167
168 See Statement of Keith Johnson, submitted to the Task Force, at 4, discussing the

considerations that institutional investors take into account in selecting lead counsel in class

actions:

Fee levels are one of the most significant factors considered in the selection process.

However, they are not the only factor. Experience, claim analysis, investigation results,

client responsiveness, reputation, and trial capabilities are among the other factors that

might be taken into consideration.

See also Statements of Lorna Goodman at 7, and Stuart M. Grant and Jay Eisenhofer at 4-5,

submitted to the Task Force.

169 When a sophisticated investor B an institutional investor who is the most qualified

plaintiff under the PSLRA, for example B assumes the role of lead plaintiff and has a substantial

interest in the outcome of a case, the negotiations over fees ex ante may be closer to the typical

case where a client hires a lawyer and agrees to a fee. There is no bar, however, to the

institutional investor and the lawyer agreeing that they will reexamine the fee agreement as the

case progresses and when it ends to see whether the assumptions made going into the case were

valid. The problem in class actions in which there is no lead plaintiff with sufficient interest and

ability to negotiate a fee is that the unknowns in a class action may be far more substantial than

in a single plaintiff case. This makes reliance on an ex post appraisal more important.

170 See Jill E. Fisch, Aggregations, Auctions and Other Developments in the Selection of

Lead Counsel Under the PSLRA, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 83 (2001):

Clients in the market for legal services do not choose their lawyer based solely on price. 

Indeed, the depth of the market for legal services, with its wide variation in billing rates,

demonstrates the importance of non-price considerations. As in many markets, lawyer

price and quality are often directly related. Those lawyers who offer higher quality legal

services are able to command a higher price for their services. Less qualified lawyers

58

___________

Conclusion On Costs and Benefits of the Auction Process

In addition to the substantial concerns addressed above, the Task Force concludes that

auctions generally fail in their basic stated purpose of replicating the private market for legal services.

Auctions do not in fact replicate the market in which clients choose counsel outside the class action

context. When parties choose counsel for themselves, cost is only one of many factors that drive their

decision.168 Auctions replete with structure, matrices, crossover points and the like are nothing like

an arm’s-length negotiation between a client and counsel.169 More importantly, the auction’s

predominant focus on price in no way approximates a client’s market search for counsel.170
charge a lower price. Lawyer quality is an important component of the selection process

because a higher quality lawyer maximizes the client's expected recovery by increasing

the likelihood of recovery, the amount of recovery, or both.

See also Statement of Arlin M. Adams, submitted to the Task Force, at 21, n.8 (“some clients are

willing to pay more even for marginally better representation, and class action plaintiffs should

not be assumed to be any different.”).

171 Statement of Professor Lucian Bebchuck , submitted to the Task Force, at 6.

172 Statement of Professor Jill E. Fisch, submitted to the Task Force, at 8, reporting

research indicating that 

institutional investors have adopted a variety of procedures for the selection of counsel,

59

The experience of the Task Force members is deep and broad enough to embrace a few

situations in which they or other counsel were retained largely on the basis of the fee that they agreed

to charge. But our experience is that in almost all instances the fee is only one of a number of factors

that clients consider when choosing counsel. Other factors often dominate the decision-making

process. Those factors include but are not limited to reputation, experience, firm resources,

particularized competence, prior track record in similar matters, personal qualities, pre-existing

lawyer-client relationship, relationship of counsel to other parties and their lawyers, and commitment

to a prompt resolution of a matter. The auction process focuses primarily on bids, with much less

attention to the other qualities that ordinary clients typically seek in their counsel.

It is true, as discussed above, that courts conducting auctions emulate the market in a limited

sense by restricting participation in bidding to those firms that pass a threshold of qualification. But

it is one thing to eliminate unqualified candidates and it is another to replicate the goal of a client in

the market, which is to choose the most qualified counsel who will obtain the best result at the fairest

price. As Professor Bebchuck notes, “eliminating unqualified candidates still does not give as much

weight to quality considerations as an informed client or informed lead plaintiff would be likely to

do. An informed client or lead plaintiff would also attach weight to differences among . . . candidates

that fall within the substantial range above the threshold of minimal qualification.”171

The truth is that no judicially controlled selection process will replicate the market process

because judges conducting an auction will have great difficulty in capturing all of the qualities that

clients consider in choosing counsel. In the real world, some clients may ask lawyers to engage in a

“beauty contest” and may set the rules for the contest so that all counsel are addressing the same

issues in a prescribed way. Other clients may prefer to have the competing lawyers choose the issues

to be addressed, the order to present them, and the mode of presentation. Either way, the client has

in mind the particular factors of greatest relative importance to it in selecting counsel: it knows what

it is looking for.172 In auction cases, a single judge chooses one or the other approach, but does so
all of which involve a high level of competition. Institutions actively invite a range of

firms to compete for the lead counsel position by obtaining recommendations, circulating

requests for proposals, and, in some cases, retaining a law firm specifically to assist in the

process of selecting class counsel. . . . Following the identification of these firms,

institutions conduct a rigorous evaluation process utilizing both quality and price criteria.

Institutions report checking references, reviewing performance in comparable cases, and

reviewing writing samples. Institutions typically conduct beauty contests akin to those

used by corporate clients B –face to face meetings in which they evaluate familiarity with

the case, general legal expertise, and proposed litigation strategy. Institutions report

placing a premium on firm style and client relationship issues, stressing the importance of

selecting a firm that is willing to engage in joint decisionmaking and regular reporting. 

173 Statement of Arthur M. Kaplan, submitted to the Task Force, at 1 (observing that

“auction procedures sharply deviate from the way sophisticated private litigants select their

counsel in high-stakes litigation” and that “sophisticated private litigants evaluate quality first”

with fee negotiation “usually the final step, explored only with the final candidate or a few

candidates”).

174 See Statement of Judge Shadur, commenting on Draft Task Force Report, posted on

Task Force website, at 2. 

60

without any information as to what a typical member or most members of the class would deem of

greatest relative significance in making the choice of counsel. This helps explain why an auction

approach will not replicate the market; it will replicate only one judge's assumption about what would

occur between a client seeking to retain a lawyer from among a group of available lawyers.173

Some argue that auctions are an effective means of assuring that the lead plaintiff will fulfill

its fiduciary obligation to retain effective counsel for the class.174 Yet it is in part precisely because

we hold lead plaintiffs to that fiduciary duty that, on balance, we conclude that auctions are a highly

imperfect device. The lead plaintiff has the fiduciary obligation not to retain the cheapest qualified

counsel, but rather to obtain the qualified counsel that is best able to obtain a maximum net recovery

for the class. 

There is, moreover, a fundamental tension between the notion of the lead plaintiff as a

fiduciary to the class and judicial intervention, in the first instance, in the selection of class counsel.

The Task Force is well aware that there are many different types of lead plaintiffs, from sophisticated

institutions with a great deal at stake that have painstakingly selected their own counsel, to solitary

individuals with little at stake who have effectively been recruited by prospective counsel. Not all

selections of class counsel are entitled to the same deference. Where, however, a lead plaintiff has

engaged in a responsible process leading to its selection and retention of class counsel, fully honoring

its fiduciary duties of good faith, reasonableness and loyalty to the class in that effort, its choice of

counsel should not be supplanted by the judicial intrusion of an auction. Even where the lead

plaintiff has not undertaken a rigorous, independent process for the selection of lead counsel, the

Task Force believes that the court's review of all relevant factors bearing on counsel's ability to
175 See cases cited in note 121, supra, indicating substantial downward departures from a

supposed “benchmark.”

176 Statement of Professor Arthur E. Miller, submitted to the Task Force, at 16.

177 Several members of the Task Force were prepared to conclude that auctions are never

appropriate. Ultimately the Task Force was persuaded by the testimony of many witnesses who

urged that courts be encouraged to innovate and find creative solutions to these important issues.

See, e. g., Testimony of Judge Vaughn R. Walker at 52, and Judge William A. Walls at 155,

March 16, 2001; Testimony of Elizabeth Cabraser at 74, May 5, 2001; and Testimony of 

Professor Joseph A. Grundfest at 210, June 1, 2001. See also Statement of Brian Wolfman, 

submitted to the Task Force, at 3 (“In money damages actions where the alleged cause of action

is well established and the amount of potential damages is well understood at the outset, an

auction may produce a better deal for the class than the prevailing method of retrospective fee

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represent the class is usually preferable to initiation of an auction process, with all of its uncertainties

and costs. Moreover, since an auction, to be effective, will usually be conducted prior to class

certification, it is difficult to see how the sometimes extensive proceedings entailed in an auction

could do other than invest the court in the selection of class counsel prior to the time that the defense

has had an opportunity to raise Rule 23 concerns.

VIII. Should Auctions Be Used? If So, In What Kinds of Cases?

A. Task Force Recommendation

As stated above, the auction alternative is in an experimental stage. The Task Force is

sympathetic to any attempt to fairly maximize class recovery and to make the process of appointing

counsel and awarding fees more efficient. However, for the reasons expressed in this Report, the

Task Force is skeptical of auctions. We believe that class recovery generally can be maximized more

effectively by using the traditional methods of appointing counsel: private ordering where that is

possible, court selection on the basis of quality of counsel if private ordering is not workable, and

court control over the fee award in all cases. Any argument that traditional methods lead to higher

fees for counsel is countered by the fact that the court has the discretion to depart from any perceived

benchmark in awarding fees, as the circumstances require—and as many courts have done.175 All in

all, counsel has a greater incentive to litigate the case with diligence and vigor if the fee is dependent

on the court’s rigorous assessment of actual performance, as opposed to the sometimes negative

incentives that a low bidder will have after winning an auction.176

Despite its reservations, the Task Force is not prepared at this early stage to conclude that a

court should never have the discretion to conduct an auction.177 The Task Force therefore concludes
determination.”). The Task Force was also persuaded by the thoughtful comments of judges and

others at the Third Circuit Judicial Conference, who urged the Task Force not to discourage

potentially useful judicial innovation.

178 Statement of Thomas Willging of the Federal Judicial Center, at 2 (noting that the

cases in which judges have found bidding to be appropriate are “few and distinct.”).

179 We also believe that the experience of institutional investors in setting attorney fees in

class actions can be useful to judges when they consider an award of attorneys’ fees in other

class actions. 

180 The FJC Report, at 88, indicates that the seven judges who have conducted auctions

reported a number of characteristics that made certain types of cases better candidates for

auctions than others. Those characteristics are:

clearly accepted or stipulated liability; information from a criminal investigation; publicly

known details about the case; clearly defined case; multiple cases consolidated in one

jurisdiction; existence of a well-defined class; multiple firms competing for lead counsel

position; and common fund cases.

181 Statement of Arlin M. Adams, submitted to the Task Force, at 29 (“the auction

procedure may be a viable option only in limited situations, where not much pre-filing

investigation is necessary, the amount of expected damages is relatively easy for participating

firms to estimate, and the expected recovery, media attention, or other circumstances are present

that will ensure an adequate number of qualified auction participants.”). Of course, more

experience with auctions in the cases we identify as appropriate candidates might lead to a

conclusion that the class of cases in which auctions might be useful should be expanded or

contracted.

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that auctions might be considered, within the court’s discretion, in certain limited situations.178 Some

factors that are pertinent to whether an auction might be used are set forth below.

The Task Force believes that in the limited class of cases in which we identify auctions as

potentially useful there is an opportunity for experimentation and for generating data regarding what

fees are reasonable in class actions. This data gathered pursuant to auctions could be useful to federal

judges who conduct ex post review of attorneys’ fees.179

B. Relevant Factors

Based on the existing auction cases and the extensive testimony and academic commentary

on the subject, the Task Force recommends that a court entertaining the possibility of an auction

should consider the factors set forth immediately below.180 In evaluating these factors, the court

should proceed from the premise that auctions are appropriate only in a limited number of cases.181
182 Statement of Leonard Barrack, submitted to the Task Force, at 5 (“auctions should be

undertaken only in cases where the court can, at a minimum: (a) reasonably anticipate that

numerous, competent law firms will seek appointment as class counsel; (b) reasonably evaluate

the likelihood of a recovery for the class; and (c) reasonably foresee a very substantial

recovery.”).

183 As discussed in Section X, infra, auctions are not viable in PSLRA actions unless the

“most adequate” plaintiff provisions fail to produce a lead plaintiff with the interest, resources

and expertise to select and negotiate with counsel. The factors that follow in the Text are

pertinent to whether to conduct an auction in PSLRA cases, after the court has already found

that the “most adequate” plaintiff provisions will not result in a proper choice of counsel. 

184 Statement of Guy Miller Struve on behalf of the Association of the Bar of the City of

New York, submitted to the Task Force, at 23 (“An auction procedure would be unworkable in

cases where injunctive relief is likely to be the sole or major form of relief or where the form of

likely relief is unclear.”).

185 Testimony of Paul Reingold at 126, and Professor Judith Resnik at 121, March 16,

2001; Testimony of Professor Samuel Issacharoff at 63, Elizabeth Cabraser at 70, Michael

Fishbein at 75, and Joseph Rosenthal at 117, May 5, 2001; and Testimony of Hon. Lewis A.

Kaplan at 73-74, and R. Franklin Balotti 24, June 1, 2001.

186 Statement of Leonard Barrack, submitted to the Task Force, at 6 (“Where the court and

counsel cannot make a realistic assessment in advance of the potential liability of the defendants,

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Thus, auctions should be an exception to the rule that qualified counsel can be selected either by

private ordering or by judicial selection of qualified counsel and that a reasonable fee is to be

awarded by the court at the end of the case.182 The Task Force concludes that the following factors

are relevant to whether an auction might be considered as an option:183

! Whether the Case Is a Common Fund Class Action. Auctions should be used only in cases

where the outcome would be a cash fund, rather than structural relief, ADR, etc., and only in

cases where counsel would not be called on to provide extensive counseling and other

services to individual plaintiffs. For class actions not involving common funds it is difficult

even to conceptualize a market of competing lawyers that can be structured by auction.184

! Whether the Case Involves Mass Torts. The Task Force recommends that auctions not be

considered for mass tort class actions.185 The outcome of these actions, especially the amount

of recovery, is notoriously hard to predict; and the less predictable the action, the more

difficult it is to value and the more likely the auction will be erratic. Another aspect of

unpredictability is the distinct possibility that mass tort actions will be broken down into

subclasses at some point. All of these uncertainties militate against the use of an auction.

! Whether Liability Is In Doubt. The greater the uncertainty about liability, the less appropriate

it is to use an auction.186 It will be difficult to align incentives between counsel and the class
the level of potential damages or any likely recovery, counsel would be bidding ‘blind’ and the

court would have no way to gauge whether bids were realistic in terms of providing the proper

incentives to class counsel.”).

187 See Howard M. Erichson, Coattail Class Actions: Reflections on Microsoft, Tobacco,

and the Mixing of Public and Private Lawyering in Mass Litigation, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1

(2000), for a discussion of the phenomenon of private class actions riding the coattails of

successful government prosecutions. See also Statement of Professor Arthur Miller, submitted

to the Task Force, at 24-25 (noting that some experimentation with auctions may be justified

“when the auction is on the heels of the initiation of a government action”; in these

circumstances, “(a) there may be sufficient public knowledge of pertinent underlying facts at the

beginning of the private civil action for the court to make a more informed assessment of the

relative merits of competing bids . . . and (b) there is less risk that independent investigations

into wrongful conduct by members of the plaintiffs’ bar would be discouraged by an auction . .

.”); Statement of Professor Samuel Issacharoff, submitted to the Task Force, at 6:

If the principal drawback of an auction is the underincentive to investigate and ferret out

wrongdoing prior to filing, that failing will be least pronounced in cases in which the

elements of liability are relatively clear independent of pre-filing investigation. This is

most likely to be the case when private enforcement follows some form of independent

public disclosure of wrongdoing—as for example when regulatory submissions or

governmental criminal prosecution expose the basis for the subsequent civil recovery

action. 

64

if the winning bid is based on a litigation scenario that is not realistic. If counsel has made

a winning bid that turns out to be too low, it may lead to an underinvestment of time and

resources. On the other hand, if counsel has bid too high a fee in relation to the outcome, it

may lead to a windfall fee at the expense of the class, exactly what auctions were designed

to counteract.

Another downside of disputed liability in relation to an auction is that the judge will

have to make evaluative judgments about the case in order to determine which of the

competing bids will result in the lowest reasonable fee. To the extent that preliminary

evaluative judgments are required, the court suffers the appearance that it is prejudging the

merits in the course of conducting the auction. The possibility of an appearance of partiality

counsels strongly against using the auction process in cases where the judge must delve into

disputed facts in advance of the case. 

In contrast, if liability is clear, such as in a “coattail” class action in which the

government has already obtained an admission or adjudication of wrongdoing, the auction

alternative will be more viable.187
188 See FJC Report, at 29 (“In almost all of the cases where class counsel was chosen

from a competitive bidding process, the judge decided very early on in the life of the litigation

that he or she would solicit bids. Class counsel was usually chosen before any dispositive

motions were decided, prior to addressing Rule 23 certification issues, but after the appointment

of the lead plaintiff in post-PSLRA securities cases.”).

189 Statement of Brian Wolfman, submitted to the Task Force, at 4 (noting that uncertainty

over class certification will negatively affect bidding).

190 Statement of Brian Wolfman, submitted to the Task Force, at 4 (cautioning against the

use of auctions when 1) the number of class members entitled to relief is in doubt, and 2) the

potential exists for intra-class conflict).

191 A proposed amendment to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 would add a new subdivision (g),

providing criteria for appointment of counsel. Among the factors that the court “must consider”

are “(ii) the work counsel has done in identifying or investigating potential claims in this case.”

The Task Force agrees that prefiling investigation is a relevant factor in appointment of counsel.

65

! Whether It Will Be Easy To Estimate and Collect a Large Amount of Damages. As stated

above, the greater the uncertainty at the beginning of a case, the more likely that an auction

will fail to result in the best outcome for the class and the more likely it is that the judge will

be appearing to prejudge the case. It is entirely possible that liability may be relatively certain,

and yet damages difficult to predict. The Task Force concludes that uncertainty as to damages

is just as problematic for an auction as is uncertainty on the merits.

! Whether the Size of the Class Or Class Certification Is In Doubt. For auctions to be useful,

they must be conducted at an early point in the case; otherwise substantial deadweight costs

will have been expended by lawyers who end up on the losing end of the bidding. This means

that an auction ordinarily will have to be conducted well before the class is certified.188 It is

obviously inefficient to conduct an auction if the court is doubtful about granting class

certification.189 Moreover, if the size of the class is indeterminate at the time of the auction,

the bidding process will be skewed because lawyers will find it difficult or impossible to

value the class claim. Thus, if the number of class members likely to be eligible for relief is

in doubt, this cuts against conducting an auction. Similarly, if there is a possibility of intraclass conflict, leading to the further possibility of creation of sub-classes, this cuts against

conducting an auction because of the difficulty that lawyers and judges will have in valuing

the class claim for bidding purposes.190

! Whether the Action Involves Significant Prefiling Investigation By Private Lawyers. When

significant preliminary work has been done, the auction or prospect of an auction creates

disincentives for counsel to continue with that work. Indeed, the prospect that an auction will

deprive a firm of a class action may discourage firms from incurring search costs in the first

instance. This would have an unfortunate effect on the private attorney general function of

plaintiffs’ lawyers.191
There is nothing inconsistent in also concluding that the existence of significant prefiling

investigation counsels against the use of an auction to appoint counsel.

192 Testimony of Professor Jill E. Fisch at 110, March 16, 2001 (describing efforts of

institutional investors to develop selection and monitoring procedures for lead counsel in class

actions.). See also Statement of Arlin M. Adams, submitted to the Task Force, at 25-26 (“where

a strong plaintiff with a sufficient stake in the litigation emerges, . . . there may be no need for

the court to act as a surrogate for the plaintiff class. In such situations, it may be more desirable

to allow the ordinary atttorney-client relationship to govern the arrangements to the extent

possible.”); Statement of Guy Miller Struve on behalf of the Association of the Bar of the City of

New York, submitted to the Task Force, at 5 (“In situations where there is no client with a

sufficient stake in the litigation, resources or knowledge of the market for legal services, auctions

may provide a means of reaching a fee arrangement similar to that which a client with such a

stake, resources and knowledge might achieve.”).

193 Statement of Professor John C. Coffee, submitted to the Task Force, at 9. Professor

Coffee suggests that the minimum number of qualified bidders should be six. The Task Force

believes that, while there may be merit in this suggestion, imposing any strict minimum is in the

last analysis arbitrary, and that this should be left to the discretion of the court. A fixed limit

may be particularly problematic if, as the Task Force recommends infra, consortium bidding is

allowed.

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! Whether There Is a Lead Plaintiff That Is Able and Willing To Enter Into a Good Faith

Search For and Fee Negotiation With Counsel. There is no need for a court to be heavily

involved in creating a market through an artificial structure if an experienced plaintiff with

substantial resources is capable and willing to enter into a competitive search for, and fee

negotiation with, qualified counsel.192

! Whether It Is Likely That the Court Will Receive a Significant Number of Bids From

Qualified Bidders. Setting a minimum number of bidders is arbitrary; but the fact is that an

auction with only a handful of bidders does not come close to replicating a market search for

counsel, which is the very reason for conducting the auction.193

! Whether Lead Counsel Is Contested Or the Choice Is Otherwise Unclear Under Traditional

Criteria. The Task Force concludes that in cases where there is only one lead plaintiff and

counsel before the court, and that counsel is qualified under the standards of Rule 23 to

prosecute the action, it is not sensible to incur the expense and uncertainty of an auction. In

that situation, the court should satisfy itself that counsel is qualified. Any concern that the fee

arrangement may result in excessive fees can be handled by providing advance warnings

about limitations that will be observed in a final review of the fee request, and appropriate ex

post review. The Task Force further concludes that even when private ordering has failed,
194 Statement of Sherrie R. Savett, submitted to the Task Force, at 2 (“To the extent

defendants are aware of a predetermined fee structure, that too presents an element of danger for

the class, as any settlement proposals will be designed to appeal to class counsel=s interests rather

than the class’s interests.”).

195 In re Cendant Corp., 260 F.3d 183 (3d Cir. 2001).

196 260 F.3d at 197 (3d Cir. 2001) (emphasis added).

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traditional criteria for appointing class counsel are preferable, in most cases, to the use of an

auction.

IX. Suggested Procedures To Be Employed If the Auction Method Is To Be Used

If the court in its discretion is convinced that circumstances exist that support an auction for

class counsel, it will have to consider what procedures to employ in administering the auction.

Generally speaking, courts have taken two approaches to auctions. Some courts have essentially

opened up the process to all bidders in an unstructured fashion. Others have required that the bids

be structured in certain detailed ways. 

After reviewing the practices employed by the courts, the Task Force makes the following

recommendations concerning procedures to be used by a court conducting an auction for class

counsel:

! Sealed Bids: As a policy, sealed bids make sense. If the defendant knows about the terms of

the winning bid, it will be aware of class counsel’s financial incentives. The defendant could

then structure its litigation tactics in a way that could hurt the class—for example by offering

a settlement at a certain point, knowing that counsel’s fee percentage will go down after that

point.194 Thus, sealed bids would seem to be a prerequisite for the integrity of any auction.

The problem, however, is that bids are judicial documents entitled to a presumption of public

access. The court in Cendant195 indicated that the presumption of public disclosure runs

especially high where the “public” includes the very class members whose lawyer is being

chosen by the court. But the right of public access is not limited to class members. The

sealing order in Cendant was invalidated because it “prevented many class plaintiffs and

defendants from accessing the bids for lead counsel.”196

The Task Force concludes that it is essential to distinguish between (1) access by class

members and access by the defendants, and (2) access during the bidding process and access

thereafter. The Task Force believes that the court should have the authority to enter a
197 In re Cendant Corp., 260 F.3d at 196 (3d Cir. 2001).

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protective order barring access by the defendants to the bids. Courts frequently see, for

example, arguably privileged materials in camera, and opposing parties are not allowed to

see them unless and until the court rules on their status. The mere fact that they are court

documents once submitted to the court should not be dispositive.

The Task Force therefore disagrees with the result in the Cendant sealing opinion, to

the extent it fails to recognize the importance of protecting bidding information from

defendants. If an auction is to be conducted, the integrity of the process requires that bids

remain sealed from the defendants until the litigation is concluded. The Task Force also

concludes that if the bidding process is to be effective, all bids must be sealed from any public

disclosure during the time that the bids are being submitted. If, however, class members have

a legitimate interest in seeing the winning bid after the court has received the last bid, there

is no reason, in the Task Force’s view, why they should not be afforded access to it, under an

appropriate protective order and without disclosure to the defendant, so that the class

members can have a meaningful voice in the selection process. Finally, the fee arrangement

should be disclosed publicly at the time of any fee application or in connection with any

proposed settlement, because at that time there is no risk that the defendant will use the

bidding information as part of a litigation strategy. 

The Task Force recognizes, however, that under the Third Circuit’s decision in

Cendant, the sealing of bids at any point is problematic and may be prohibited; at a minimum

the case means that there is a heavy presumption against sealing that can only be overcome

through application of a stringent balancing test, under which the dangers of disclosure of the

bids clearly outweigh the interest in public disclosure. Moreover, even if sealing is permitted

initially, the Cendant Court made clear that “the sealing order must be lifted at the earliest

possible moment when the reasons for sealing no longer obtain.”197 Of course if governing

law requires unimpeded access to the bids, the defendant will be aware of the bids and this

is just one more reason for the court to favor traditional methods of appointment over an

auction.

The Cendant opinion on sealing raises a question that has largely been ignored in

decided cases: namely, should a defendant know the precise terms of plaintiffs'

counsel's representation? In a traditional case, the defendant does not inquire into the

financial relationship between a plaintiff client and an attorney. In most class action

cases, there is no need for an inquiry because the fees are not fixed until the close of

a case. Under the PSLRA as well as in the auction context, where fees are set ex ante,

there is a trade-off between sealing to protect against the defendant obtaining an

advantage and public disclosure to assure that the members of the class are fully heard

on the question of fees. If sealing is to be preferred, then the presumption in favor of
198 The question whether a fee arrangement should be publicly disclosed has been lurking

since the 1985 Third Circuit Task Force Report. That Report recommended that consideration be

given to setting a percentage fee by some kind of bargaining at the outset of a case. That Report

was silent, however, as to whether the fee arrangement would be disclosed to the class and to the

defendant, and if so, when disclosure would take place.

199 See also In re Lucent Techs. Securities Litig., 194 F.R.D. 137, 157 (D.N.J. 2000)

(stating that joint proposals will not be considered); Sherleigh Assocs. v. Windmere-Durable

Holdings, Inc., 186 F.R.D. 669, 670 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (rejecting consortium bid).

200 Judge Shadur has indicated that he believes that, if counsel has filed a class action

complaint, he or she has represented a capability of prosecuting the class action alone and thus

should be barred from joining with other counsel to submit a consortium bid. Although there is

logic behind this approach, the Task Force observes that it can create a problem for firms. Even

judges who have used bidding do not do so in all class action cases. If a judge decides to

require bidding after one or more complaints are filed in a case, a firm that was willing to be lead

counsel and to submit to ex post review of a fee application must now decide how much of a risk

it is willing to take regarding fees ex ante. It would not be surprising that a firm willing to

assume a class counsel role in a traditional case might be reluctant to engage in bidding without

sharing the risk with other firms.

201 Statement of Leonard Barrack, submitted to the Task Force, at 16 (in class actions,

“defendants are typically represented by highly regarded lawyers who defend such cases

vigorously”; if plaintiffs’ firms can submit joint bids, they will be able to “put a structure in

69

a winning bid may well be weaker when the bid is challenged by members of a class

who are not privy to the specifics of the bid until a settlement is proposed. If public

disclosure is to be preferred, the presumption in favor of a winning bid might be

somewhat stronger.198

• Consortium Bids: Judges Walker and Shadur have generally prevented firms from submitting

a joint bid, although Judge Shadur has permitted counsel who have jointly filed a complaint

to bid together.199 The rationale for such a ban has not been fully discussed, but it appears

that the Judges are concerned that if law firms form coalitions, there will be too few

competitive bids.200

The Task Force opposes any limitation on consortium bids. If the idea of an auction

is to replicate the market, and firms wish to and are permitted to band together in the market,

then it is inconsistent for the court to ban such a practice when conducting an auction.

Moreover, if firms are permitted to pool assets and thereby spread the risk, it is actually more

rather than less likely that they will enter the bidding process and make strong bids. Firms

large and small might well find it necessary to pool their resources in order to counteract a

vigorous and well-funded defendant.201 The Task Force also notes that small firms can be
place to prosecute the action fully and underwrite the costs for the action”). 

202 Statement of Sherrie R. Savett, submitted to the Task Force, at 11 (“allowing a

consortium of firms to bid allows smaller firms to play an active role in cases in which they

might otherwise feel too uncomfortable to submit a singular bid. Smaller firms would have an

opportunity to take advantage of economies of scale.”).

203 See FJC Report at 32-34 for a complete discussion of the guidelines for qualitative

submissions used by the courts that have conducted auctions.

The Task Force notes the difficulty of requiring counsel to provide an assessment of the

case at the early stage in which an auction is conducted. As stated previously, the likelihood of

success of a class action is often notoriously difficult to predict. Moreover, counsel has an

incentive to put the case in the best light at this point, in order to convince the court of the merits

of the case. But in doing so counsel might understate the risk involved.

70

disadvantaged if they are not permitted to join with other firms to bid.202 As to the concern

that the formation of consortia will result in too few bids: if the resulting number of bidders

is too small, the court simply should not hold an auction. 

! Quality Control: As stated above, the lowest bidder is not necessarily the best counsel for the

class. Some courts have attempted to impose quality standards on counsel taking part in the

bidding process. Judge Walker has required the following submissions:

A. A description of the background and experience of the firm and who would be

working in the action.

B. Specific qualifications of the firm to complete the work necessary.

C. Willingness to post a completion bond or other monetary assurance of

performance.

D. A statement concerning malpractice insurance coverage.

E. A description of how expenses are to be covered.

F. An assessment of the case.203

The Task Force notes that these are basically the same factors that the courts use to

determine whether counsel is qualified in cases of traditional appointment of class counsel,

and there is every reason to commend them for use in an auction—recognizing that the

asserted “objectivity” of the auction process will of necessity be compromised.
204 This problem is compounded if the defendant has access to the bid prior to the

conclusion of the litigation.

205 Testimony of John Innelli, pp. 54 et seq., June 1, 2001.

206 Statement of Sherrie R. Savett, submitted to the Task Force, at 7 (“The expense of

litigation is something that is not entirely within plaintiff’s counsel=s control. Much depends on

how the defendants decide to litigate and spend money. It is important for the defendants to

71

! Fee Caps: Judge Shadur has approved the use of fee caps as part of the bidding process and

appears to have used them with considerable success. The Task Force concludes, however,

that as a general matter fee caps are problematic because counsel who receives a settlement

offer at or near the cap has little incentive to continue with the action, even if pressing the

matter further would benefit the class.204 Fee caps may therefore create conflicts of interest

between class counsel and the class. Judge Shadur has responded to this concern by holding

open the possibility that he would consider awarding counsel fees above the cap in particular

cases. But as stated previously, the need to revisit the fee could skew the bidding process,

for example, by encouraging a firm to bid an artificially low cap in the hope that the judge

will lift it in ex post review. At the very least the possibility of an award beyond the cap adds

another level of unpredictability to the bidding process. On the other hand, if the ex post

lifting of fee caps becomes a routine practice, as the law may, indeed, require in order for

counsel to obtain a reasonable fee, the Task Force questions whether an auction with a fee cap

provides an advantage over traditional ex post review. 

The practical problem with pre-set fee caps is that no bidding firm will be working exclusively

on the auctioned case, and no case goes entirely as expected. If the auctioned case takes an

unexpected turn and becomes more problematic and less lucrative than envisaged when the bid was

made, there will be a very real incentive for counsel to divert attention and resources to other matters

and not to take the potentially embarrassing step of returning to the auctioning court and requesting

relief from the cap.

! Caps On Expenses: Like fee caps, expense caps are subject to criticism for creating negative

incentives for class counsel. Counsel operating near the cap may have an incentive to refrain

from taking steps necessary to maximize recovery if those steps entail costs that bring

expenses near or above the cap. This could lead to a settlement that is not in the best interests

of the class. Expense caps may also create a disincentive to incur extraordinary expenses,

even when those expenses may benefit the class.205 Moreover, if the defense is aware of the

existence of an expense cap (which is certainly a possibility in jurisdictions prohibiting the

sealing of bids), the defense will have an incentive to run up the expenses of plaintiff's

counsel towards the cap. This situation may create a powerful limitation on counsel's

dedication to and advancement of the case.206 There is some evidence that cases have settled
know that they will not have the luxury of spending plaintiffs to death. If defendants believe that

litigation expenses are capped . . . they will be tempted to spend more, so as to force plaintiff’s

counsel to reach the point at which they are no longer comfortable spending money which

cannot possibly be reimbursed.”).

207 Jill E. Fisch, Aggregations, Auctions and Other Developments in the Selection of

Lead Counsel Under the PSLRA, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 86 (2001) (noting that in

Oracle, “the case settled precisely at the point at which class counsel hit the cap on expenses”).

208 The Task Force questions whether most plaintiffs in the marketplace for legal services

would prefer expense caps. Task Force members have experience in cases in which clients

indicate that they want a budget for expenses, but in most cases there are opportunities for

counsel and the client to discuss whether the budget should be exceeded. The problem with

bidding is that expense caps are likely to viewed as “hard” caps by counsel. It would be

possible, of course, for the court to entertain motions to increase the cap as a case progresses. 

But, such motions would involve the judge even more in the plaintiffs’ case in ways that might

compromise the appearance of neutrality.

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at or just under the expense cap.207 The Task Force concludes that caps on expenses should

not be used or mandated as part of a bid in an auction.208

! Structured Bids By Time Points In the Litigation and/or By Amount of Recovery: Bids can

be structured in various ways, such as by requiring bidders to state their fee as a flat

percentage of the recovery, or as a percentage of the recovery for particular time periods,

litigation events, or dollar ranges. Judge Shadur refuses to impose any structure on bids. His

rationale is that it would stifle the creativity of the bidding lawyers. Yet if the bids are

completely unstructured, the court may find it difficult to compare the bids to determine

which is best and at what point. On the other hand, if courts employ excessive structure, the

question becomes how such a structure could ever purport to emulate a market process for

selecting counsel. At this experimental stage in the use of auctions, the Task Force takes no

position on whether it is preferable for bids to be structured by the court.

! Use of an X Factor: The X factor used by Judge Kaplan with apparent success in Auction

Houses cannot be accused of over-structuring the bidding process. All that is required from

the bidders is a single number, below which the bidder will receive no fee, and above which

the bidder will receive a flat percentage. It also avoids the possibility that the winning bidder

will settle quickly and cheaply, because this would only serve to limit or even eliminate the

lawyer’s fee. But the X factor can be accused of providing bad incentives in some

cases—especially if the value of the case turns out to be near or below the X factor.
209 Statement of Guy Miller Struve on behalf of the Association of the Bar of the City of

New York, submitted to the Task Force, at 5-6 (“if, in a case in which an auction is based on a

bid of a dollar amount below which counsel will receive no fee, it becomes apparent that the

recovery will not reach the dollar amount, counsel=s incentive may be to resolve the case, even if

the interest of the class would be to obtain a larger recovery (though still lower than the dollar

amount of the bid).”).

210 Statement of Professor John C. Coffee, submitted to the Task Force, at 10 (“The truth

is that most fee formulas can create conflicts, but these conflicts are exacerbated when radical

discontinuities are built into the fee formula (such as the ‘zero-percent-up-to-the-bid-level-and25% thereafter’ formula used by Judge Kaplan.)”).

211 In re Synthroid Marketing Litig., 264 F.3d 712, 721 (7th Cir. 2001) (declining

percentage fee structures “create declining marginal returns to legal work, ensuring that at some

point attorneys’ opportunity cost will exceed the benefits of pushing for a larger recovery, even

though extra work could benefit the client”); Statements of Professor John C. Coffee at 5-6 and

Andrew K. Niebler at 5, submitted to the Task Force; Statement of Howard A. Specter,

submitted to the Task Force, at 6 (increasing percentages give counsel the incentive to pursue

“the difficult to obtain ‘last dollars’ that might be obtained in settlement or trial”).

212 The Task Force notes that a lawyer who uses an increasing percentage is not violating

any standards of professional responsibility. See ABA Formal Opinion 94-389 (Dec. 5, 1994)

(stating that a contingent fee percentage may increase with the amount of recovery, “since

everyone would agree that it is the last dollars, not the first dollars, of recovery that require the

greatest effort and/or ability on the part of the lawyer”).

213 See Statement of State of Wisconsin Investment Board, submitted to the Task Force, at

4 (“SWIB has not used a descending fee schedule out of concern that it might operate to impose

73

Fundamentally the X factor raises the same concerns as a fee cap.209 The problem with both

fee caps and base dollar amounts is that they involve recovery ranges for which counsel

would receive a 0% fee, leading to perverse incentives and conflicts of interest. For this

reason, an X factor should not be used.210

! Increasing Or Declining Percentages: Judge Shadur argues that the use of increasing

percentages creates an unconscionable windfall for class counsel. Others criticize declining

percentages and argue that slightly increasing percentages provide a proper incentive,

encouraging counsel to maximize the total recovery.211 The Task Force is aware from its own

experience that different clients prefer different approaches, and that either increasing or

declining percentages may reasonably be used. The Task Force believes that these are

questions that should be left to the market, especially since the court retains its power and

obligation to review the fee at the end of the case for reasonableness, even in auction cases.

We conclude that a firm should not be disqualified from bidding simply because it proposes

increasing (or declining) percentages.212 Such a categorical disqualification is inconsistent

with the market process that the auction purports to emulate.213
an artificial cap on lead counsel=s incentives at the point where the fee percentage starts to

decline. The last dollars are usually the hardest to obtain and lead counsel should be duly

incentivized to get them.”).

214 See FJC Report, at 31 (noting that only Judge Shadur has limited the bidding to

attorneys of record in the action).

215 See FJC Report, n. 136 (relating a telephone conversation with Judge Shadur).

216 See In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litig. 197 F.R.D. 71, 74 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), where

the court found that interim lead counsel had engaged in settlement discussions with the

defendants and had obtained information regarding potential damages. Judge Kaplan made this

information available to all of the bidding firms. He explained that the release of this information

was necessary to level the playing field, as well as to improve the quality of the bids.

217 See Statement of Professor Elliott Weiss, submitted to the Task Force, at 6 (suggesting

the use of a special master). 

74

! Open Bidding: In most auction cases, the bidding has been opened to any interested counsel.

Even counsel without a class member as a client have been invited to participate.214 The Task

Force concludes that such an open bidding process should not be used, despite the advantage

in potentially increasing the number of bidders. While class actions stretch traditional notions

of the lawyer-client relationship, the Task Force is not prepared to abandon the idea that a

lawyer who seeks to represent a class should have a client who is a member of that class.

Moreover, as Judge Shadur has noted, bidding should not be open to the world because this

creates the risk of bidding by lawyers with no knowledge of the case.215

! Information Parity: If information has been imparted by the defendant to one or more of the

bidders, it should be made available to all.216 Otherwise the defendants may be able to

engineer their own choice of counsel by providing one bidder inside information about the

value of the case. 

! Timing: If auctions are to be used, they should be employed at the earliest possible

opportunity, and that will usually be well before the court certifies the class. Otherwise some

firms might expend resources in order to advance the case and obtain a traditional

appointment, only to be surprised by the court’s decision to hold an auction.

! Administration of Auction By Someone Other Than the Presiding Judge: The Task Force is

aware that the auctions to date have been conducted by the judge presiding over the case

without apparent problems. As a matter of prudence, however, we believe that the judge who

orders the auction should at least consider having someone else, e.g., a magistrate judge,

administer the auction and appoint lead counsel.217 If someone other than the sitting judge

runs the auction, it will tend to reduce the concerns about the presiding judge prejudging the

merits or otherwise becoming invested in the selection of class counsel before any Rule 23
218 15 U.S.C. ' 78u-4.

219 H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-369, at 35 (1995). See also Berger v. Compaq Computer

Corp., 257 F.3d 475, 484 (5th Cir., 2001) (noting that under the PSLRA, “[c]lass action lawsuits

are intended to serve as a vehicle for capable, committed advocates to pursue the goals of the

class members through counsel, not for capable, committed counsel to pursue their own goals

through those class members”). 

220 “[T]he court shall adopt a presumption that the most adequate plaintiff . . . is the

person or group of persons that . . . has the largest financial interest in the relief sought by the

class [and who] otherwise satisfies the requirements of Rule 23 . . .” 15 U.S.C. ' 78u4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I).

75

motions have been heard. Moreover, the risk of ex parte argument through the bidding

process will be minimized.

We note, however, that there are practical problems with the notion of separation. The

presiding judge must review attorney fees at the end of a case, even if there is an auction at the

beginning. Unless the judicial officer who conducts the auction places everything, including his or

her view of the case, on the record at the outset, the presiding judge may not know what assumptions

were made and why the judicial officer conducting the auction approved the winning bid. There may

be a disconnect between the assumptions of the judicial officer conducting the auction ex ante and

the presiding judge who looks at the case ex post. To the extent that a presumption, whether slight

or more robust, may arise in an auction case that the ex ante bid is reasonable, that presumption may

be undermined by the separation of judicial roles. This is certainly a concern that the presiding judge

should take into account in deciding whether to get involved in an auction. Another factor to be

considered is that appointment of a different judicial officer may result in delay of the proceedings.

X. Auctioning Class Counsel In Actions Subject to the PSLRA

A. Description and Analysis of the Statute

The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995218 was designed to remedy the perceived

problem that securities class actions were being brought and controlled by lawyers rather than class

plaintiffs.219 The PSLRA adopts the model of a “client-driven” class action, in contrast to the “courtdriven” auction model. The Act seeks to maintain the traditional client-lawyer relationship by

adopting a presumption that the plaintiff with the largest financial stake in the litigation who is

willing to serve as lead plaintiff is the “most adequate” plaintiff and should be appointed as lead

plaintiff for the class.220 With respect to choice of class counsel, the Act provides that “[t]he most
221 15 U. S. C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(v).

222 See the discussion of the legislative history in In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d

201, 261-62 (3d Cir. 2001).

223 H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-369 at 32 (1995). See also Jill E. Fisch, Aggregations,

Auctions and Other Developments in the Selection of Lead Counsel Under the PSLRA, 64 LAW

& CONTEMP. PROBS. 53 (2001) (“The statute reflects the expectation that the lead plaintiff,

presumptively the investor with the largest financial interest in the litigation, will oversee the

conduct of the case and monitor the decisions of class counsel.”)

224 H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-369 at 37 (1995).

225 Statement of Professor Jill E. Fisch, submitted to the Task Force, at 9 (the PSLRA

formalizes the “empowered lead plaintiff position”). The concept of empowered plaintiffs in

securities actions was first raised by Professors Elliott J. Weiss and John S. Beckerman, in Let

the Money Do the Monitoring: How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in

Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L. J. 2053 (1995). This article provided the conceptual basis

for the PSLRA. See In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 262 (3d Cir. 2001) (PSLRA lead

plaintiff provisions are “unquestionably based on Weiss and Beckerman’s proposal.”).

226 15 U. S.C. ' 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(II).

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adequate plaintiff shall, subject to the approval of the court, select and retain counsel to represent the

class.”221 Congress intended, by these provisions, to direct courts to designate a lead plaintiff who

would have the resources and the incentive to choose capable counsel, monitor class counsel’s

performance and negotiate a reasonable fee.222 The legislative history emphasizes that the Act is

“intended to increase the likelihood that parties with significant holdings in issuers, whose interests

are more strongly aligned with the class of shareholders, will participate in the litigation and exercise

control over the selection and action of plaintiff’s counsel.”223 Congress wanted to “encourage

institutional investors to take a more active role in securities class action lawsuits [which] would

ultimately benefit shareholders and assist courts by improving the quality of representation.”224 The

PSLRA establishes what has been referred to as an “empowered plaintiff” model—identifying a

sophisticated plaintiff with substantial resources and a large economic stake in the action, and

allowing that plaintiff to appoint counsel and negotiate a reasonable fee.225

The PSLRA provides that the presumption of adequacy resulting from the largest financial

stake may be rebutted only upon proof that the designated most adequate plaintiff “will not fairly and

adequately protect the interests of the class; or is subject to unique defenses.”226 The Act further

provides that total attorney fees and expenses awarded by the court “shall not exceed a reasonable

percentage of the amount of any damages . . . actually paid to the class.”

Read as a whole, the Act appears to contemplate that the judge will be more active at the

outset of a case in investigating the qualifications and procedures utilized by the lead plaintiff in

selecting counsel, initiating the litigation and negotiating a fee, and less active in directly overseeing
227 The Task Force notes that there is nothing explicit in the statutory language of the

PSLRA that requires the “most adequate” plaintiff to negotiate a fee with counsel in advance of

the action. However, the statute clearly envisions that the empowered plaintiff will monitor and

control counsel for the benefit of the class, and negotiation of the fee is a critical component of

this monitoring. See Elliott Weiss & John Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How

Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J.

2053, 2105 (1995) (arguing that the court should defer to the most adequate plaintiff’s discretion

in negotiating and setting attorney fees, and noting that courts “might well feel confident in

assuming that a fee arrangement an institutional investor had negotiated with its lawyers before

initiating a class action maximized those lawyers’ incentives to represent diligently the class’s

interests, reflected the deal a fully informed client would negotiate, and thus was presumptively

reasonable.”); In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 265 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that in

deciding whether the movant with the largest losses satisfies the typicality and adequacy

requirements of the PSLRA and Rule 23, the Court should “inquire whether the movant has

demonstrated a willingness and ability to select competent class counsel and to negotiate a

reasonable retainer agreement with that counsel”). Moreover, institutional investors are unlikely

to become involved as lead plaintiffs unless they are given the opportunity to negotiate a fee with

counsel. See Statements of Counsel for institutional investors, Keith Johnson at 2, Lorna B.

Goodman at 1, Horace Schow II at 5, and Catherine LaMarr at 1, all submitted to the Task

Force, indicating that the major incentive for participation by institutional plaintiffs is the

opportunity to negotiate a counsel fee for the benefit of the class. Thus, to the extent the PSLRA

is designed to encourage the participation of institutional investors, it implicitly establishes a

regime in which the most adequate plaintiff will negotiate a fee with counsel; and this will

usually occur at the beginning of the case. See Weiss & Beckerman, supra, at 2107 (“The

change we propose also will place institutional investors in a position to negotiate fee

arrangements with plaintiffs' lawyers before class actions are initiated.”).

228 In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 182 F.R.D. 144, 148 (D.N.J. 1998). See also Jill E. Fisch, 

Aggregations, Auctions and Other Developments in the Selection of Lead Counsel Under the

77

the choice of counsel and the fee arrangement.227 It also contemplates that the judge will be active

in reviewing the proposed fee and expenses at the end of the case. By contrast, the auction cases seem

to emphasize the judge’s active involvement at the beginning of the case in selecting counsel and

setting fees, and less active involvement in the final review.

B. Politics and the PSLRA

Recently, public institutions such as pension funds have served as lead plaintiffs in securities

class actions. In several cases, their designation as lead plaintiff has been contested by parties

claiming that the institutional plaintiff’s appointment of counsel has been driven by political

contributions rather than by concern about finding the best counsel for the class.228 Charges have
PSLRA, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 79 (2001) (arguing that “allegations that institutional

investors will select a law firm on the basis of political contributions undermine judicial

willingness to trust the lead plaintiff's retention decision”).

229 See In re Cendant Corp. Litig. 264 F.3d 201, 270 n.49 (3d Cir. 2001):

The concern is that an informal quid pro quo could develop in which law firms

specializing in securities class actions would contribute to the campaign coffers of the

elected officials who oversee these funds, and that, in exchange (and in the hopes of

getting more contributions), those officials would use their control over the funds to

select those firms to serve as lead counsel for cases in which the funds are the lead

plaintiff. In such a situation, there would also be reason to fear that the lead plaintiff

would be complacent and unwilling to object to an excessive fee request, thus defeating

the Reform Act’s goal of lead plaintiff-controlled, rather than lead counsel-controlled,

litigation.

See also Statement of Professor John C. Coffee, submitted to the Task Force, at 2 (noting that

“the increasing prevalence of public pension funds as lead plaintiffs in securities class actions

raises the danger that political contributions to the elected public official who in many states and

municipalities determines the policies of the pension fund may determine the choice of

counsel.”).

230 Testimony of Keith Johnson at 49, May 5, 2001; Testimony of Horace Schow II at 98,

Lorna Goodman at 81-82, and Catherine LaMarr, at 98 et seq., June 1, 2001.

231 Testimony of Horace Schow II at 92, 98, June 1, 2001.

232 Testimony of Catherine LaMarr at. 99, June 1, 2001; CONN. GEN. STAT. ' 1-84 (2001).

78

been made that class counsel has been appointed as a payback for significant campaign contributions

to those officials responsible for choosing counsel.229 Pay-to-play allegations obviously undermine

the confidence that might otherwise be reposed in these institutions to choose the best counsel and

strike a hard bargain with counsel on behalf of the class.

Most of the lawyers representing public institutional investors who testified before the Task

Force acknowledged that pay-to-play might be a concern in the actions of some public institutional

investors. However, all of the witnesses testified that precautions had been taken to insulate their

particular institutional processes from such influence.230 For example, the Trustees of the State of

Florida Pension Fund Retirement System have delegated the decision to choose counsel to the

Executive Director of the Fund (a non-elected official) to attempt to insulate the decision from

political pressure.231 And in Connecticut there is legislation making it illegal to contract with the

office of the State Treasurer if someone has contributed to the Treasurer’s political campaign.232

The Task Force notes that in February 2000, the ABA amended the Model Rules of

Professional Conduct to add Rule 7.6, which makes it a disciplinary violation for a lawyer or law firm

to accept a “governmental legal engagement” if the lawyer or firm has made or solicited political
233 See STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND

STANDARDS 400 (2001).

234 Whatever the effect of the current language of Model Rule 7.6, the states are free

toadopt their own versions of that Rule that would meet the concerns regarding pay-to-play in

PSLRA cases. It is clear that the ABA was concerned about the same issues that concern judges

in this area. See Comment 1 to Model Rule 7.6 (“[W]hen lawyers make or solicit political

contributions in order to obtain an engagement for legal work awarded by a government agency,

or to obtain an appointment by a judge, the public may legitimately question whether the lawyers

engaged to perform the work are selected on the basis of competence and merit. In such

circumstances, the integrity of the profession is undermined.”).

79

contributions for the purpose of being considered for that appointment.233 Accordingly, in addition

to protections that the institutions may impose on themselves, it may be increasingly common for

lawyers to be required by disciplinary rules to eliminate pay-to-play.

The change in the Model Rules may not be as helpful as it might seem, however, in the

context of class actions. The question will arise whether “a governmental legal engagement” occurs

when a governmental litigant recommends a law firm for approval by the court as class counsel. The

fact that the governmental litigant may reach an agreement on counsel fees is not dispositive, because

the court will have to approve the fees. After all, counsel is counsel for the class (not the

governmental litigant) and must be deemed adequate by the court. Thus, it may be that Rule 7.6 will

have little, if any, effect on private securities class actions. Moreover, even if Rule 7.6 were to apply

to such actions, it is unlikely that a campaign contribution can ever be tied directly to any particular

appointment of counsel. So even if it applies, the Rule may lack teeth in the securities class action

context. 234

Another question that arises is, where does political pressure come from in the particular

jurisdiction? A pension fund may appear to be apolitical, but may in fact be subject to influence by

the Governor or another political figure. It will not always be possible for a court to know how much

pressure is exerted on the selection of counsel by political figures and what the reasons for the

pressure are. Thus, the possibility of collusion between institutional investors and chosen counsel

remains of concern to the Task Force and warrants some skepticism about the contention that the

“empowered plaintiff” model results in a more careful, neutral selection process.

C. Case Law On PSLRA and Auctions

Cases following enactment of the PSLRA are not uniform in analyzing the relationship

between class counsel auctions and the lead plaintiff provisions of the PSLRA. The reaction has
235 143 F. Supp. 2d 304, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).

236 See also In re Microstrategy Inc. Securities Litig., 110 F. Supp. 2d 427, 437-8 (E.D.

Va. 2000) (rejecting the use of auctions under the PSLRA, noting that “the lead plaintiff's duty is

to ‘select and retain counsel to represent the class’” and that “while plaintiff’s selection of lead

counsel is ‘subject to the approval of the court,’ approval should not be based on whether

plaintiff's chosen counsel promises to charge a cheaper fee than anyone else.”). 

237 96 F. Supp. 2d 780 (N.D. Ill. 2000).

238 141 F. Supp. 2d 951 (N.D.Ill. 2001).

239 Testimony of Hon. Milton I. Shadur, p. 18, March 16, 2001.

240 In re Bank One Shareholders Class Actions, 96 F. Supp. 2d 780, 784 (N.D. Ill. 2000).

80

ranged from a total prohibition of auctions to a view that the auction process is perfectly consistent

with the PSLRA.

In In re Razorfish, Inc. Securities Litigation,

235 Judge Rakoff declared that auctioning class

counsel was not “remotely consistent with the Reform Act.” In his view, the PSLRA requires the trial

court to put its primary focus on the selection of the lead plaintiff, not on the selection of counsel.

Judge Rakoff recognized that in selecting the lead plaintiff, the court would have to review the fee

arrangements and qualifications of lead counsel to gauge the plaintiff’s ability to represent the class

adequately. He also recognized that the court could make a “modest intervention” to ensure that the

fee arrangement between the lead plaintiff and chosen counsel was reasonable. But he concluded

that the court could not force a choice of counsel on the lead plaintiff. As the Razorfish Court put

it, the court’s power under the PSLRA to disapprove the lead plaintiff’s choice of counsel “cannot

be transmogrified into a right to arrange a shotgun marriage between strangers.”236

Other courts have tried various approaches to reconcile auctions with the PSLRA. For

example, in In re Bank One Shareholders Class Actions,237 and In re Comdisco Securities

Litigation,

238 Judge Shadur held that the statutory presumption of “most adequate plaintiff” would

be overcome if the lead plaintiff chose a firm that did not submit the best bid for the class and refused

to take the qualified firm that did submit the best bid. Judge Shadur’s ruling explicitly permitted the

lead plaintiff to work with both its preferred counsel and the court’s designated counsel, as long as

the court’s designated lead counsel performed lead counsel’s functions and the fee arrangements were

those approved in the auction. Judge Shadur’s approach does not result in the lead plaintiff being

forced to work with counsel against its will. Rather, it would result in the designation of another lead

plaintiff as “most adequate” if the original lead plaintiff refused to work with the court-approved

counsel.239 Judge Shadur reasoned that “if the presumptive lead plaintiffs were to insist on their class

counsel handling the action on the hypothesized materially less favorable contractual basis, that

insistence would effectively rebut the presumption that the putative class representatives, despite the

amounts that they have at stake personally, were indeed the ‘most adequate plaintiffs’. . .”240
241 148 F. Supp. 2d 967 (N.D. Cal. 2001).

242 See In re Network Associates, Inc., Securities Litig., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1033-34

(N.D. Cal. 1999) (prospective lead plaintiff is not “most adequate” under the PSLRA where it

refuses to negotiate fee arrangements with the law firm it selected). But see In re Comdisco

Securities Litig., 150 F. Supp. 2d 943, 947 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (rejecting the idea that a prospective

lead plaintiff will perform a market-based search for counsel on the ground that it is “hardly

reasonable to expect any plaintiff, on the speculative prospect of acting for a class, to engage on

his, her or its own in the kind of comprehensive and studied beauty contest required to search out

a cadre of law firms ready, willing and able to act as class counsel and to ascertain which of

those firms is prepared to do so on the terms most favorable to the entire class”). The Court in

Comdisco concluded that “a neutrally conducted and confidential competitive bidding process

under the auspices of the court affords the best means—in fact, it would seem the only

means—to derive that necessary information, so that the class gets the best available

combination of highly competent representation at the least cost.”

243 Jason Hoppin, Attorneys Getting the Silent Treatment, THE RECORDER, June 19, 2001,

at 1.

244 182 F.R.D. 144, 149 (D.N.J. 1998).

245 264 F.3d 201, 276 (3d Cir. 2001).

246 In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d at 276 (3d Cir. 2001).

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In In re Quintus Securities Litigation 241 Judge Walker took a somewhat different view in an

attempt to reconcile auctions and the PSLRA. Under his interpretation, the PSLRA did not alter the

traditional Rule 23 requirement that the lead plaintiff must “fairly and adequately protect the interests

of the class.” This Rule 23 requirement would be met if the lead plaintiff could show that it had

conducted a market search for counsel and reached a fee agreement through arm’s-length negotiation.

However, if the lead plaintiff had not engaged in a competitive search for counsel and a real

negotiation of the fee, the court would not approve the lead plaintiff’s choice and the court, pursuant

to its fiduciary obligation to protect the class, could conduct an auction. Therefore, under Judge

Walker’s reasoning, an auction would be consistent with the PSLRA if it appeared that the lead

plaintiff did not enter into a true market search and negotiation in choosing counsel.242 In Quintus,

the court’s selection of lead counsel was imposed on its designated lead plaintiff, who actively

resisted dealing with the court’s designated counsel.243

In In re Cendant Corp. Litigation,

244 Judge Walls took yet another approach. He permitted

counsel for the court-designated lead plaintiff the opportunity to match the terms of the auction

winner. If lead plaintiff’s counsel agreed to those terms, it would be designated lead counsel. If not,

the lowest qualified bidder would be selected as lead counsel, even over the objection of the lead

plaintiff. But the Third Circuit rejected this approach as inconsistent with the language and goals of

the PSLRA.245 The Court noted that the PSLRA is based on the premise that a sophisticated lead

plaintiff with a large stake in the action “would likely do a better job than courts at selecting,

retaining, and monitoring counsel.”246 It observed that the PSLRA specifically states that the lead
247 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(v).

248 In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d at 275-76 (3d Cir. 2001).

82

plaintiff has the power to “select and retain” lead counsel, and the lead plaintiff’s choice of counsel

is “subject to the approval of the court.”247 It also reasoned that the statutory term “approval” cannot

be stretched in the ordinary case to mean that the court can actually override the lead plaintiff’s

selection by appointing counsel through an auction; a court appointing counsel through an auction

is doing something more than simply “approving” or “disapproving” the lead plaintiff’s’ choice.

Such a court is actually engaging in the “select and retain” function that the PSLRA delegates to the

lead plaintiff. The Cendant Court concluded that Judge Shadur’s reading of the PSLRA (i.e., that the

lead plaintiff is not “adequate” if it does not accept the counsel that made the best bid in an auction)

would give the court the basic right to select and retain counsel, even though that right is explicitly

granted in the first instance to the lead plaintiff under the terms of the PSLRA. The Cendant Court

concluded that the PSLRA

evidences a strong presumption in favor of approving a properly-selected lead plaintiff’s

decisions as to counsel selection and counsel retention. When a properly-appointed lead

plaintiff asks the court to approve its choice of lead counsel and of a retainer agreement, the

question is not whether the court believes that the lead plaintiff could have made a better

choice or gotten a better deal. Such a standard would eviscerate the Reform Act’s underlying

assumption that, at least in the typical case, a properly selected lead plaintiff is likely to do

as good or better job than the court at these tasks. Because of this, we think that the court’s

inquiry is appropriately limited to whether the lead plaintiff’s selection and agreement with

counsel are reasonable on their own terms.248

The Cendant Court did not completely rule out the use of auctions in PSLRA cases. It noted that

there might be an unusual circumstance in which the putative lead plaintiff’s choice of counsel or

negotiation of a fee agreement is inadequate—either because counsel is unqualified or the agreement

with counsel was not the result of meaningful negotiation. If the putative lead plaintiff has

“repeatedly undertaken a flawed process of selecting and retaining lead counsel,” this would

overcome the PSLRA’s “most adequate” presumption; but even this default would not in itself

justify resort to an auction. Rather it would justify selecting a new lead plaintiff to undertake a

search for counsel. But what happens if none of the potential lead plaintiffs could do the job of

selecting counsel and negotiating a reasonable fee agreement? For this extremely unusual situation,

the Cendant Court observed that an auction might be a possibility—but even then, the court is not

required to conduct an auction:

[I]t is possible that the court could conclude that, perhaps due to the nature of the case at

hand, none of the possible lead plaintiffs is capable of fulfilling the model contemplated by

the Reform Act, i.e., a sophisticated investor who has suffered sizeable losses and can be

counted on to serve the interests of the class in an aggressive manner. In such a situation, it
249 In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d at 277 (3d Cir. 2001).

250 In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d at 277 (3d Cir. 2001). Applying these standards

to the facts, the Cendant Court found that the district court had abused its discretion in ordering

an auction. There was nothing to indicate that the putative lead plaintiff had failed to conduct a

good faith search for counsel or had failed to negotiate a reasonable fee agreement. Thus, the

lead plaintiff had not defaulted on or abused its power granted by the PSLRA to “select and

retain” counsel. The district court’s desire to hold down attorney fees by “simulating” the market

was not a sufficient reason to conduct an auction because it “would apply in every case, and thus

cannot be enough to justify a procedure that we have concluded may be used only rarely.” 264

F.3d at 278. 

251 Chief Judge Becker carefully instructed the Task Force that it should feel free to

disagree with any opinion of the Third Circuit, since his goal in appointing the Task Force was

to have a report that would be national in scope and emphasis. The Chief Judge also indicated

that the Task Force should not hesitate to make recommendations for statutory changes--in the

PSLRA or other statutes--if it thought them desirable. It was the Task Force's decision not to

take a position on legal issues like the interpretation of the PSLRA. That the courts may differ

amongst themselves does not mean that we are equipped to provide the only correct answer. We

have confined ourselves to taking a position on how judges should consider auctions under the

PSLRA if they have the option to do so (either because the statute, properly interpreted, now

authorizes it, or were Congress to amend the statute to provide any necessary authorization). 

83

would be permissible for a court to conclude that its obligation to protect the interests of the

plaintiff class makes it necessary for the court to assume direct control over counsel selection

and counsel retention, and, were the court to so conclude, an auction would be one

permissible means by which the court could select and retain counsel on behalf of the class.249

The Cendant Court emphasized that the role of auctions in PSLRA cases was limited to unusual

cases:

We stress, however, that it is not sufficient justification for an auction in a case governed by

the Reform Act that the court prefers a process of counsel selection or counsel retention that

it, rather than the lead plaintiff, controls, nor is it enough that the court thinks that an auction

is an inherently superior mechanism for determining a reasonable fee.250

D. Analysis of Case Law On PSLRA and Auctions

The Task Force has considered the various interpretations of the PSLRA as it relates to

auctions. The Task Force declines to provide a “legal opinion” on the proper reading of the statute.251
Readers of this report will find that our recommendations are consistent with the legal

interpretation of the PSLRA set forth in Chief Judge Becker's opinion in Cendant, discussed

immediately above. The Chairs of the Task Force and the drafters of this Report wish to

emphasize that each of the recommendations contained in this Report was voted on and adopted

in June 2001, well before the Cendant opinion was released on August 28, 2001. We are

comforted by the fact that the Cendant panel's analysis of the statute is similar to ours, but we

can state categorically that our recommendations would be the same even if the panel had taken a

more favorable view of auctions under the PSLRA.

Judge Ambro was appointed to the Task Force before he was randomly selected to serve

on the panel hearing the appeal in Cendant. He recognized early on that there could be an

appearance problem if he participated in Task Force discussions regarding the PSLRA given his

status as one of the panel members hearing a part of the Cendant litigation. Thus, he recused

himself from any Task Force discussion of the PSLRA, as well as any presentation at the Task

Force hearings on these matters. Judge Ambro did not know what the Task Force decided to

recommend until a draft version of this Report was circulated to him as well as the other Task

Force members in September 2001, after the date of the Cendant opinion. Judge Ambro took

great pains to avoid any discussion that could conceivably be linked -- even by inference -- to

issues that were before the Third Circuit. In doing so, he not only demonstrated an acute sense of

judicial propriety, but reaffirmed for the other Task Force members that neither the Chief Judge

who appointed the Task Force nor any other member of the Third Circuit sought to influence the

decisionmaking of the Task Force on any issue.

252 See 15 U.S.C. ' 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(II). 

84

We note, however, that until the dispute among the courts over the viability of auctions is resolved

by Congress or the Supreme Court, the use of auctions in PSLRA cases threatens to absorb time and

expense in what may prove ultimately to be an empty exercise.

A further problem is that when the court intervenes to conduct an auction, this is done at a

time when the “most adequate plaintiff” is being selected; and during this time, the defense is barred

by statute from having any voice in the appointment issues.252 If an auction is conducted in a PSLRA

case the defendant may find it difficult to raise a meaningful challenge not only to the lead plaintiff

but also to the court’s selection of plaintiffs’ counsel at the necessarily later time the Rule 23 class

certification issue comes before the court. So the use of an auction in PSLRA cases threatens to

disentitle not only the lead plaintiff but the defendant as well. 

The Task Force also notes that some of the alternatives chosen by the courts create certain

practical and conceptual problems that warrant consideration. For example, the right of first refusal

utilized by the district court in Cendant is likely to have a negative effect on the bidding incentives
253 See In re Bank One Shareholders Class Actions, No. 00-C-880, Transcript of

Proceedings Before Judge Shadur, statements by Judge Shadur (the right of first refusal “is the

best way to get an automatic depressing effect on bidders. Certainly fewer people are going to be

prepared to bid seriously if they know they can lose out even if they turn out to have submitted

the best offer”).

254 Statement of Professor John C. Coffee, submitted to the Task Force, at 9 (right of first

refusal “tells all future bidders that they are not participating in a true auction.”).

255 Statement of Professor Lucian Bebchuk, submitted to the Task Force, at 18 (“Having

the selection of lead counsel done by competitive bidding would take away the decision from the

lead plaintiff. The selection would be done by the court, based on the court’s judgment as to

which of the qualified bidders have made the lowest bid. By leaving the lead plaintiff with little

say in the selection of lead counsel, competitive bidding would greatly diminish the role of the

lead plaintiff.”)

Even a right of first refusal clashes with the empowered plantiff model of the PSLRA. 

See In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 277-78 (3d Cir. 2001) (the right of first refusal is

given to counsel, not the plaintiff, thus undermining the concept of client control; moreover,

under a right of first refusal the lead plaintiff’s ability to retain counsel is conditioned by fee

terms set by the court).

256 Statement of Professor Lucian Bebchuk, submitted to the Task Force, at 19-20:

Since the lead plaintiff is not compensated, the incentive to become an effective

and active lead plaintiff in the interest of the class—of the type contemplated by the

PSLRA—must arise from the combination of (i) having a substantial stake and (ii)

expecting that becoming a lead plaintiff would enable having a significant influence of

the conduct of the litigation. Clearly, if a selected lead plaintiff could not expect to

influence the litigation by selecting the lead counsel and subsequently working with the

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in the auction.253 It certainly means that the lead plaintiff’s choice of counsel has no incentive to

place a competitive bid, because it would only create a possibility that the bid would be lower than

the one that counsel could otherwise match. Thus, the right of first refusal results in at least one less

bidder and a less competitive auction. It also skews the incentives of other counsel.254 To win the

auction, counsel would have to submit a bid so low that it would be unattractive to the lead plaintiff’s

counsel to match—the obvious risk is that such a bid will be too low to benefit the class, thereby

creating a conflict of interest between counsel and the class.

More generally, replacing the lead plaintiff’s choice of counsel through an auction is in

tension with the empowered plaintiff model of the PSLRA.255 Auctions may deter appropriate

plaintiffs such as institutional investors from even seeking the role of lead plaintiff, due to the risk

that they will have to work with counsel they did not select and the probability that they will not be

able to control counsel that is selected by the court.256 Professor Elliot J. Weiss, co-author of the
lead counsel of the lead plaintiff’s choice, then the incentive to become lead plaintiff

would very much decrease even for a shareholder with a significant stake.

257 Elliot J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How

Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L. J.

2053 (1995).

258 Statement of Professor Elliott J. Weiss, submitted to the Task Force, at 4. See also

John C. Coffee, The PSLRA and Auctions, N.Y.L.J., May 17, 2001, at 5. 

259See, e.g., Declaration of Roger Pugh, Assistant Corporation Counsel, City of New

York, In re Cendant Corp. Litigation (May 30, 2000) (“There are few benefits to be gained from

serving as lead plaintiff for institutional investors . . . For a public pension fund, such

designation requires a significant commitment of time and resources, not the least of which is

responding to extensive discovery propounded by defendants. In taking away the lead plaintiffs’

right to choose its own counsel as well as their ability to negotiate attorneys’ fees to maximize

recovery for the class, the auction procedure virtually nullified the City Pension Funds’ incentive

to serve as lead plaintiff.”) Accord: Statement of Keith Johnson, Chief Legal Counsel, State of

Wisconsin Investment Board, at 2-5; Statement of Horace Schow, General Counsel, Florida

State Board of Administration, at 3 (stating that his client has opted out of class actions rather

than be forced to be represented by counsel it did not choose), Statement of Catherine E.

LaMarr, General Counsel, Office of the Connecticut State Treasurer, at 3 (comparing lead

plaintiff experiences where client had chosen counsel to those where court had designated

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article that formed the basis for the lead plaintiff provisions of the PSLRA,257 supplied the following

written testimony to the Task Force:

[I]f courts insist in overriding institutional investor-lead plaintiff’s selection and/or retention

of counsel, in situations where lead plaintiffs have acted carefully and responsibly, they will

discourage qualified institutions from volunteering to serve as lead plaintiffs in the future. .

. I have had occasion to discuss the lead plaintiff provisions and the possibility of acting as

lead plaintiffs with numerous institutional investors. Almost all approach that possibility with

considerable trepidation. Their major incentive for getting involved is the prospect that their

involvement will translate into a higher net recovery for the institution and the class, through

the institution’s (1) selection of counsel . . . ; (2) monitoring counsel’s conduct of the

litigation; and (3) negotiation of fee arrangements that . . . protect the class against fees that

represent a windfall....

258

Representatives of institutional investors appearing before the Task Force fully supported these

conclusions. They stated that institutional investors would not assume the burdens of the lead

plaintiff unless those efforts were justified by increased control over the litigation, which would result

in tangible benefits for the institution. They emphasized the amount of work involved in serving as

lead plaintiff, not only the burden of selecting and negotiating a fee with counsel and monitoring the

litigation, but also the burden of responding to extensive discovery.259 Representatives of the lead
counsel.), all submitted to the Task Force.

260 Statement of Lorna Goodman on behalf of the City of New York, submitted to the

Task Force, at 5. See also Jill E. Fisch, Aggregations, Auctions and Other Developments in the

Selection of Lead Counsel Under the PSLRA, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 92 (2001) (“The

lead plaintiff cannot be expected to develop a close working relationship with a lawyer appointed

by the court. Nor can the lead plaintiff be expected to monitor court-appointed counsel

effectively, absent control over counsel's compensation in the case at bar and the potential for

repeat business in comparable cases.”).

261 Statement of Lorna Goodman on behalf of the City of New York at 2-5; Statement of

Keith Johnson, Chief Legal Counsel, State of Wisconsin Investment Board, at 2-5, both

submitted to the Task Force. 

262 Statement of Catherine E. LaMarr, submitted to the Task Force, at 5 (“Sensitive to

diversity issues and interested in expanding the base of available counsel, Connecticut has in fact

already selected a diverse group of counsel in its selection process. An auction process is likely

to eliminate opportunities for diversity in the selection of counsel.”).

263 See In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 220 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting that fee

awarded by auction was $76 million higher than the fee agreed to between the lead plaintiff and

chosen counsel). 

87

plaintiff in Cendant emphasized that the right of first refusal utilized in that case “irretrievably

damaged” the working relationship that had been established between lawyer and client, ceding

“ownership” of the case to the court.260

Another disincentive to institutional involvement imposed by auctions stems from the obvious

fact that a plaintiff’s choice of counsel is only partly based on price. Institutional client

representatives identified the following factors that influenced their choice of counsel in class actions:

experience, claims analysis, litigation strategy, investigation results, client responsiveness, reputation,

trial capabilities, character, and compatibility.261 Few of these considerations are likely to be factored

meaningfully into the judge’s choice of counsel by way of auction—and to the extent such factors

are considered by the judge, the asserted market-based advantages of an auction are thereby

diminished, making an auction look quite like the selection process that the institutional investor used

in the first place. In addition, institutional investors may have an interest in promoting diversity as

a factor in the selection of counsel; this interest would surely be frustrated by use of an auction.262

Nor are the significant disadvantages of an auction in securities class actions necessarily offset

by lower fees. For example, lead plaintiff representatives in In re Cendant Corp. showed that the fee

arrangement that it had reached with lead counsel was more beneficial to the class than the one

selected for the class by the court after an auction.263

E. Task Force Determination On Auctions Under the PSLRA
264 Jill E. Fisch, Aggregations, Auctions and Other Developments in the Selection of

Lead Counsel Under the PSLRA, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 94 (2001) (“Selection of

counsel is a business decision, and courts are poorly suited to make business decisions.”).

Professor Elliot Weiss suggested that the presumption in favor of a lead plaintiff’s choice

of counsel should not be as strong as the business judgment rule presumption. Statement of

Professor Elliot Weiss, submitted to the Task Force, at 3-5. The Task Force believes that there is

sufficient flexibility in the application of the business judgment rule that courts will develop a

framework for review that will accord appropriate deference to lead plaintiffs while still carefully

scrutinizing the process, alert for political considerations or other factors that might lead to doubt

regarding the quality or appropriateness of plaintiff’s choice. See In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264

F.3d 201, 270, n. 49 (3d Cir. 2001) (even under the deference required by the PSLRA, a court

should find the lead plaintiff inadequate if counsel was appointed as a result of campaign

contributions).

265 See Statement of Keith Johnson, submitted to the Task Force, at 5-6 (for lead plaintiffs

to fulfill the role contemplated for them by the PSLRA, the courts must “defer to counsel

selection decisions made by lead plaintiffs where a reasonable, client-controlled process was

used to obtain competent representation at a fair price, much like the courts defer to decisions of

corporate boards under the Business Judgment Rule.”).

266 See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 n.66 (Del. 2000) (“Due care in the

decisionmaking context is process due care only. . . [The business judgment rule] is a

presumption that in making a business decision the directors . . . acted on an informed basis, in

good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the

corporation. Thus, the directors’ decisions will be respected by the courts unless the directors are

interested or lack independence . . . do not act in good faith . . . or reach their decision by a

grossly negligent process.”).

88

The PSLRA requires that the most adequate plaintiff’s choice of counsel is entitled to

deference if it is the result of a careful and independent process. This is the essence of the clientdriven litigation model established by the PSLRA. The Task Force concludes that once the court has

identified the “most adequate” plaintiff under the terms of the Act, that party’s choice of counsel

should be reviewed with the deference given to any other business decision.264 The Task Force

recommends that scrutiny akin to the business judgment rule, ordinarily applied in the context of

corporate board decisions, should be applied to the lead plaintiff’s choice of counsel and to the fee

arrangements.265

As is the case under the business judgment rule, the reviewing court evaluating the lead

plaintiff’s choice of counsel should look at the process by which the lead plaintiff appointed counsel

and reached a fee agreement.266 If that process appears to be independent, well-informed, and

conducted in good faith, with no indication of self-dealing or personal aggrandizement, the court
267 See Statement of Stuart M. Grant and Jay W. Eisenhofer, submitted to the Task Force,

at 5 (“The court should review the lead plaintiff’s choice of counsel applying the tenets of the

business judgment rule. When applied to lead plaintiff’s counsel selection, the business

judgment rule would create a presumption that the decision will be left undisturbed as long as it

was made in good faith and on an informed basis. The selection can be judged to have been

made in good faith if the process leading up to it was fair and free of nepotism (i.e., choosing

counsel based on familial or political relationships). The lead plaintiff will have met its duty to

act in an informed manner if it has followed a process of selection with the earmarks of the

beauty contest—testing what the market of lawyers skilled in that practice will bear.”).

268 See “Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae in Support

of Appellants on the Issues Specified,” In re Cendant Corp. Litig. (3d Cir. 2001) at 3-5 (“The

court should not itself conduct an auction unless it has evaluated the lead plaintiff’s own

selection and retention of counsel, has particular concerns about the lead plaintiff’s own

selection and retention of counsel, has particular concerns about the lead plaintiff or its efforts,

and, if feasible, has directed it to undertake a proper competitive selection process. It is not

sufficient that the court merely prefers a process that it, rather than the lead plaintiff controls, or

assumes that an auction is inherently superior to a negotiated agreement.”). See also Statement of

Catherine E. LaMarr, submitted to the Task Force, at 5 (“significant consideration should be

given to institutional plaintiffs that have taken the time to negotiate fees and gain sufficient

comfort with the style of the counsel selected” and “the presumption should be that the

institutional investor has a sufficient level of sophistication in these matters to effectively select

appropriate and competent counsel to serve the needs of the class.”). Compare Raftery v.

Mercury Fin. Co., 1997 WL 529553, at *2 (N.D. Ill.) (finding the putative lead plaintiff

inadequate where the fee agreement reached with counsel called for a 1/3 fee that was “not the

result of hard bargaining”).

269 See In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 276 (3d Cir. 2001) (“the ultimate

inquiry is always whether the lead plaintiff’s choices were the result of a good faith selection and

negotiation process and were arrived at via meaningful arm’s-length bargaining.”); In re Quintus

Securities Litig., 201 F.R.D. 475, 490-91 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (refusing to appoint as lead plaintiff a

movant who had made no attempt to negotiate “anything close to a competitive fee” and who

provided “no specifics” about the process by which the movant had selected counsel).

89

should ordinarily honor it, even if it might prefer the plaintiff to have made a different choice or

employed a different selection process.267 Even if the plaintiff has not employed a formal competitive

process in the choice of counsel, this does not necessarily mean that the presumptive lead plaintiff’s

choice should be rejected.268 The question is whether the plaintiff has employed a reasonable

process, and has acted in good faith, with independence, and without violation of its duty of loyalty

to the class.269

The determination of whether the lead plaintiff has exercised independent judgment should

focus in part on the possibility, previously discussed, of political contributions improperly

influencing the choice of counsel. The Task Force agrees with the statement in In re Cendant Corp.
270 264 F.3d 201, 269 (3d Cir. 2001).

271 “Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission as amicus curiae in Support of

Appellants on the Issues Specified, (December, 2000),” at 18-19, citing with approval Professor

Joseph Grundfest’s declaration in In re McKesson HBOC Inc. Sec. Litig., 97 F. Supp. 2d 993

(N.D. Cal. 1999). 

272 The court clearly has the authority to require the putative lead plaintiff to provide

information concerning its process of selection of counsel, given the fact that the court must

approve the choice of counsel under the terms of the PSLRA. See 15 U.S.C. ' 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(v). 

90

Litigation,270 “that actual proof of pay-to-play would constitute strong (and quite probably

dispositive) evidence” that the most adequate plaintiff presumption has been rebutted. A plaintiff that

chooses counsel on the basis of political contributions, rather than traditional considerations such as

the quality and expertise of counsel, is not providing adequate representation to the class.

In order to protect against the possibility that pay-to-play has tainted the process, the Task

Force recommends that courts require public institutional investors seeking appointment as lead

plaintiffs to disclose whether chosen counsel has made contributions to the campaign of any public

official who has direct authority over institutional decisionmaking. If such contributions have been

made, the court should require a showing that the choice of counsel was not affected by any campaign

contribution. 

In making the determination of whether lead counsel has used an appropriate process in

choosing counsel and negotiating a fee, the court may consider posing questions substantially similar

to those outlined in the SEC’s brief in In re Cendant Corp:

271

What procedures did the lead plaintiff follow to identify a reasonable number of

counsel with the skill and ability necessary to represent the class in the pending matter?

What procedures did the lead plaintiff follow in inviting competent counsel to

compete for the right to represent the class?

What procedures did the lead plaintiff follow to negotiate a fee and expense

reimbursement arrangement that promotes the best interests of the class?

On what basis can the lead plaintiff reasonably conclude that it has canvassed and

actively negotiated with a sufficient number of counsel and obtained the counsel that is likely

to obtain the highest net recovery to the class?

Did the lead plaintiff make inquiries into the full set of relationships between

proposed lead counsel and the lead plaintiff and other members of the class, and did the lead

plaintiff reasonably conclude either that there are no such relationships or that they did not

adversely affect the exercise of the plaintiff’s or counsel’s fiduciary obligations to the class?272
273 15 U.S.C. ' 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(v).

274 15 U.S.C. ' 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii). See In re Cendant Corp. Litig. 264 F.3d 201, 265-66

(3d Cir. 2001) (stating that a court might find the putative lead plaintiff inadequate under the

PSLRA if the plaintiff “lacked legal experience or sophistication, intended to select as lead

counsel a firm that was plainly incapable of undertaking the representation, or had negotiated a

clearly unreasonable fee agreement with its chosen counsel”).

275 Statement of Lawrence Sucharow, submitted to the Task Force, at 6 (“If the lead

plaintiff is, as Congress intended, to take a meaningful and active role in the supervision of lead

counsel and the progress of the litigation, the attorney-client relationship must be voluntary and

based on the client’s evaluation of the competency of its counsel, the resources that counsel can

bring to bear on the matters at issue in the litigation, and feeling of respect for and confidence in

that counsel=s judgment. The Court . . . should not make a shotgun marriage of a relationship as

sensitive as one of attorney-client.”).

276 See In re Commtouch Software Ltd. Securities Litig., No. C 01-00719, Order re Lead

Plaintiff Selection and Class Counsel Selection (N.D. Cal. June 27, 2001) (the plaintiff with the

greatest economic loss was an individual with limited English skills, who resided in Israel, and

no alternative lead plaintiff appeared capable of conducting a market search for counsel;

consequently, the court ordered the lead plaintiff to conduct an auction and established

procedures for the lead plaintiff to follow). The Task Force notes that ordering the lead plaintiff

to conduct an auction is a less intrusive alternative to a court-conducted auction, given the clear

91

In evaluating the responses to these questions, the court must of course consider whether the lead

plaintiff’s chosen counsel is qualified to prosecute the action. If counsel is simply unqualified to

prosecute the class action (e.g., counsel is inexperienced in class actions or clearly lacks resources),

then the court must refuse to approve the arrangements, business judgment rule notwithstanding. In

such an unusual circumstance, the court may direct the plaintiff to find and negotiate with different

counsel;273 but there is also a possibility that the court would find that the plaintiff’s choice of

unqualified counsel renders that plaintiff “inadequate” under the terms of the PSLRA, and so the next

“most adequate” plaintiff would be designated as lead plaintiff.274 In neither circumstance, however,

should the court simply impose its own counsel, by way of auction, against the lead plaintiff’s

wishes.275 Appointing a new lead plaintiff with the resources, experience and interest to conduct a

search for counsel and an arm’s-length negotiation of the fee is vastly preferable to imposing a

dysfunctional attorney-client relationship on the class.

The Task Force acknowledges that a case might arise in which the putative lead plaintiff has

failed to conduct an adequate search for qualified counsel, and no other party has stepped up with the

resources, experience and interest to conduct a true market search for and negotiation with counsel,

i.e., a sophisticated investor who has suffered substantial economic loss. In these very limited

circumstances, the Task Force does not rule out the possibility that the court may designate a “most

adequate plaintiff”—as is required under the statute—and yet find it appropriate to employ either an

auction or a traditional appointment process that would be used in non-PSLRA cases.276 But an
preference in the PSLRA for client-driven litigation. 

277 See In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 277 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting that “it is

possible that the court could conclude that, perhaps due to the nature of the case at hand, none of

the possible lead plaintiffs is capable of fulfilling the model contemplated by the Reform Act”; in

such an unusual case, “it would be permissible for a court to conclude that its obligation to

protect the interests of the plaintiff class makes it necessary for the court to assume direct control

over counsel selection and, if the court were so to conclude, an auction would be one permissible

means by which the court could select and retain counsel on behalf of the class”; however, it is

not enough “that the court thinks that an auction is an inherently superior mechanism for

determining a reasonable fee”).

278 In re Cendant Corp. Prides Litig., 243 F.3d 722, 730-31 (3d Cir. 2001). 

279 The Task Force notes that much of the concern in the cases is over the concept of

“aggregation.” Several courts have held that the financial losses of unrelated class members

cannot be aggregated in determining the “most adequate” plaintiff(s) under the PSLRA. See,

e.g., In re Network Associates Securities Litig., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1022 (N.D. Cal. 1999)

(rejecting aggregation of unrelated plaintiffs and discussing case law); Sakhrani v. Brightpoint,

Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 845, 847 (S.D. Ind. 1999) (rejecting aggregation of unrelated plaintiffs;

appointing a single investor as lead plaintiff). The suspicion of these courts appears to be that

aggregation is a device for lawyer-generated groups to take over the class action, contrary to the

client-driven model of the PSLRA. In re Donkenny, Inc., Securities Litig., 171 F.R.D. 156, 157-

58 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (allowing aggregation of unrelated interests would foster lawyer-driven

rather than client-driven litigation, contrary to the premise of the PSLRA). 

The Task Force notes that while some attempts to aggregate interests appear to be lawyer92

auction is not appropriate simply because the court disagrees with the plaintiff’s choice of counsel

or thinks that an auction will result in selection of a counsel who will agree to a lower fee.277

The Task Force notes that besides its obligation under the PSLRA to review the process of

selection and negotiation and the qualifications of counsel at the outset of the case, the court remains

obligated under Rule 23 to review the reasonableness of the fee at the end of the case.278 This

process—a deferential review of the plaintiff’s appointment decision, a review to determine whether

counsel is qualified, and an ex post review of the fee for reasonableness—should be sufficient to

assure the fairest net recovery for the class.

In many PSLRA cases, the identification of the most adequate plaintiff under the statutory

criteria will be straightforward. Sometimes, however, there are competing factions on the question

of which plaintiff or set of plaintiffs has suffered the greatest loss and is therefore most adequate.

Competition for the “most adequate” label has been the subject of some litigation, but the questions

presented in most such cases relate to amount of loss and relatedness of proposed group members,

not choice of counsel.279 The Task Force believes that if parties are competing for the “most
driven, others appear to be client-driven. For example, a number of sophisticated investors might

form a coalition in order to obtain greater bargaining power and control over chosen counsel. As

a practical matter, aggregation on this level might still be problematic because the aggregated

plaintiffs may have different interests, different management styles, and different decisionmaking

processes that could result in conflict. However, it is possible that in certain cases aggregation of

empowered plaintiffs may be useful in monitoring counsel and the litigation. Thus, courts would

further the intent of the PSLRA by rejecting lawyer-driven aggregation, while being more

tolerant of client-driven aggregation. See, e.g., In re Tyco International, Ltd. Securities Litig.,

2000 WL 1513772, at *4 (D.N.H.) (determining that “the appointment of a group of three

substantial shareholders as lead plaintiffs is consistent with the language and purpose of the

PSLRA” and noting that “[w]hile a group comprised of many small shareholders might be

unwieldy and lack the proper incentive to serve as an effective lead plaintiff, a group that

consists of a small number of large shareholders should be capable of managing this litigation

and providing direction to class counsel.”). Compare In re Razorfish, Inc., Securities Litig., 143

F. Supp. 2d 304, 307-308 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (rejecting as lead plaintiff a group that “was simply

an artifice cobbled together for the obvious purpose of creating a large enough grouping of

investors to qualify as ‘lead plaintiff,’ which can then select the equally artificial grouping of

counsel as ‘lead counsel’”). The Court in Cendant took the view consistent with that of the Task

Force, declaring that lawyer-driven aggregation would render a lead plaintiff “inadequate” under

the terms of the PSLRA, but that aggregation of unrelated interests could be permissible if clientdriven. See In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 268 (3d Cir. 2001) (finding no error in

appointing a group as lead plaintiff where there was no indication that the group “was artificially

created by its lawyers” and “no obvious reason to doubt that its members could operate

effectively as a single unit”). 

For a full discussion of the cases dealing with aggregation, and an argument that

permitting aggregation compromises the principles of the PSLRA, see Jill E. Fisch, 

Aggregations, Auctions and Other Developments in the Selection of Lead Counsel Under the

PSLRA, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53 (2001).

93

adequate” plaintiff designation, the court should first determine which of the contestants is most

adequate under the statutory criteria. Then the court should review that party’s choice of counsel and

fee arrangement subject to the same standards and with the same deference as in other PSLRA cases.

The Task Force recommendations are made in light of the obvious tension between the

PSLRA model of client-driven litigation and the auction model of court-controlled choice of counsel.

We conclude that to the extent that an auction is even permissible under the PSLRA, it should only

be considered if the lead plaintiff’s choice of counsel, or process in choosing counsel and arriving

at a fee, is so infirm as to rebut the presumption that the plaintiff is “most adequate” under the statute,

and even then only if the alternative candidates for the “most adequate plaintiff” do not appear

willing or able to engage in a meaningful search for and negotiation with counsel. 
280 Jay Eisenhofer & Cynthia Calder, Fee Auctions: Are Courts Selling out the Class to

the Lowest Bidder? THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, March 30, 2001, at 5. See also Testimony of

Lorna Goodman at 223, June 1, 2001 (counsel fees negotiated as lead plaintiff ranged from 3-4%

to 15% of the recovery); Testimony of Keith Johnson at 12, May 5, 2001 (fees negotiated as

lead plaintiff were in the range of 15-20% of the recovery). 

281 If a prospective plaintiff has the other qualities discussed in this paragraph, the amount

of the loss might be probative of the plaintiff’s motive and interest in monitoring the litigation.

94

Finally, even if an auction is a possible option because of unusual circumstances in a PSLRA

case, it is clear that an auction is only one option. Private ordering and traditional appointment will

also be an option in those unusual circumstances in which the lead plaintiff provisions of the PSLRA

will not generate an appropriate process for selection of and negotiation with counsel. As discussed

in Section VIII,supra, traditional methods of appointment are ordinarily superior to auctions in most

cases.

XI. Application of the “Most Adequate” Plaintiff Model Outside PSLRA Cases

The “most adequate” plaintiff notion established in the PSLRA is still quite new. At this

point, the Task Force declines to recommend that the PSLRA model be extended to the appointment

of counsel in other kinds of class actions, such as antitrust cases. While there is some anecdotal

evidence that the model can work well and result in lower attorney fees,280 the model is not only

largely unproven but also in tension with a fundamental premise animating the class action

proceeding—namely, that the class action is designed to aggregate claims that are individually too

small to support litigation by any single class member. In the experience of the Task Force, it is the

exceptional class action (not the rule) to find a lead plaintiff who has suffered a loss that would

financially support an individual suit, yet who prefers to prosecute a class action, taking on fiduciary

duties to others and incurring the delay and expense of all the attendant procedures. The Task Force

also believes that, to the extent those plaintiffs exist, defining the party with the largest loss as the

“most adequate plaintiff” is too narrow. The party who lost the most is not by that fact always the best

party to control the case and control the lawyers. 

The Task Force recommends that in non-securities cases the amount of loss should be no

more than a factor in determining the lead plaintiff.281 The prospective lead plaintiff should also be

evaluated as to whether the party has the sophistication, experience, and incentive to monitor counsel

and negotiate a reasonable fee. In making that determination, the Court should evaluate the actual

relationship between prospective counsel and plaintiff to determine: 1) whether the party has

exercised control over the litigation to date; 2) whether the party has experience in managing

litigation; 3) whether the party has experience in acting as a fiduciary; 4) any pre-existing lawyerclient relationship, including in prior class actions; and 5) whether the party has the financial
282 See Testimony of Professor Joseph A. Grundfest at 173, June 1, 2001 (the court

should evaluate whether the plaintiff “has the ability to fend for himself.”).

283 See TCW Technology Limited Partnership v. Intermedia Communications Inc., 2000

WL 1654504, at *3 (Del. Ch.):

Traditionally, the Court of Chancery has allowed counsel representing individual, class

or derivative plaintiffs to engage in a type of private ordering, that is, to coordinate

prosecution of the litigation and to propose the most efficient means of consolidation. 

Over the past ten years, members of the Court of Chancery have been asked, with

increasing frequency, to become involved in the sometimes unseemly internecine

struggles within the plaintiffs' bar over the power to control, direct and (one suspects)

ultimately settle shareholder lawsuits filed in this jurisdiction. In every single instance

that I am able to recall, this Court has resisted being drawn into such disputes. In every

95

resources and time to commit to managing the litigation.282 In other words, the concept of an

empowered plaintiff—one with the resources, experience and interest to seek out qualified counsel,

negotiate a fee, and monitor counsel’s efforts—should be distinguished from the single-factor “most

adequate” plaintiff as that term is defined in PSLRA cases. If the court, applying the factors set forth

immediately above, determines in a non-PSLRA case that the putative lead plaintiff is “empowered”

in this broader sense, and has engaged in a good faith search for qualified counsel and has negotiated

an arm’s-length fee with that counsel, then the decisions of that plaintiff should be subject to

deference by analogy to the business judgment rule.

It is, of course, quite likely that in most class actions outside the securities context there will

be no plaintiff that approximates the institutional investor in PSLRA cases. The more common

scenario is that the class will be comprised of a large number of claimants with small individual

losses. In these circumstances, the empowered plaintiff model has no relevance. This does not by

any means lead to the conclusion, however, that in the absence of an empowered plaintiff the court

should conduct an auction to appoint class counsel. As discussed throughout this Report, the Task

Force has concluded that auctions are generally an inferior way of appointing a counsel who will

maximize class recovery. 

XII. Description and Analysis of Criteria Used In Traditional Appointment of

Class Counsel

Case law and experience indicates that the dominant scenario for appointing class counsel is

deference to private ordering. The Task Force believes that there is generally no reason to hold an

auction when the court is presented with qualified counsel who has been chosen through private

ordering.283
instance, the plaintiffs' bar has been able to work out a consolidation compromise. It may

have been imperfect, but the compromise has always seemed, in the end, to accommodate

reasonably the interests of all the parties and the Court.

See also HERBERT B. NEWBERG & ALBERT CONTE, 2 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 9.35 at 9-

95 (3d ed. 1992) (“the court should always encourage the parties themselves to agree on lead

counsel, while imposing its own choice only in extraordinary circumstances.”).

284 See In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Products Liability Litig., 55

F.3d 768, 819-22 (3d Cir.1995) (noting, in a case involving private ordering, that the court has a

fiduciary obligation under Rule 23 to assure that counsel is adequate and that the fee is

reasonable).

285 Statement of Elizabeth Cabraser, submitted to the Task Force, at 4 (“In serving as a

fiduciary for the class, the court must, at a minimum, look at the qualifications of counsel. If the

court abdicates this duty and does nothing to ensure that counsel for the class are, at the very

least, qualified and adequate, there can be no assurance that the class’s best interests are being

served.”).

286 See, e.g., In re Tyco International, Ltd., Securities Litig., 2000 WL 1513772, at *9

(D.N.H.) (approving an arrangement in which four law firms would operate as co-lead counsel;

noting that in this case “the potential dangers stemming from multiple representation, while real,

are less weighty than the benefits that it may produce”). The court in Tyco was satisfied that the

co-lead counsel would devise “a system for dividing and managing the workload arising from

this litigation efficiently and without duplication.” It put counsel on notice “that this court will

not approve any award of fees and expenses that reflects duplication, inefficiency, or the costs of

coordinating the efforts of the firms involved in the representation.” 

See also Memorandum of the SEC, Amicus Curiae, in In re Milestone Scientific

Securities Litig., No. 98-2854, at 4 (D.N.J.) (noting that multiple counsel carry the danger of

96

But this does not mean that the court has no role in scrutinizing the appointment of counsel

and controlling unreasonable fees in cases of private ordering.284 The court has an obligation to

determine whether counsel chosen through private ordering is indeed qualified and capable of

providing effective representation to the class.285 The court should reject the counsel arrangement if

the best interests of the class will not be served. Moreover, the court should rightly be concerned if

private ordering has resulted in excessive staffing of the case by various law firms who have cut a

deal. The court at the outset should scrutinize the staffing arrangement and should not hesitate to

intervene by removing counsel if it appears that lawyers are simply in the case as part of a negotiating

process for everyone to get a piece of the pie. At the same time the court should be cognizant of the

possibility that the class could benefit from the combined resources and expertise of a number of

counsel, especially in a complex case where the defendants are represented by a number of large and

highly qualified law firms.286
duplication of fees, but also that multiple counsel “may be justified where the firms provide

necessary resources, skill, experience or expertise”); Oxford Health Plans, Inc. Securities Litig.,

182 F.R.D. 42, 46, 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (approving multiple counsel arrangement; pooling of

resources and experience was necessary given the “magnitude” of the class action and to “ensure

that the litigation will proceed expeditiously against Oxford and the experienced counsel it has

retained to represent it.”). In Oxford, the multiple counsel arrangement was approved “with the

understanding that there shall be no duplication of attorneys’ services and that the use of co-lead

counsel will not in any way increase attorneys’ fees and expenses.”

287 Memorandum of the SEC, Amicus Curiae, in In re Milestone Scientific Securities

Litig., No. 98-2854, at 4 (D.N.J.) (“The court should not rely on, or give weight to, generic

asserted benefits such as assuring input from more rather than fewer class members or lawyers or

avoiding disputes among competing lead plaintiff movants and among their counsel.”).

288 Memorandum of the SEC, Amicus Curiae, in In re Milestone Scientific Securities

Litig., No. 98-2854, at 17 (D.N.J.).

289 See Arthur R. Miller, Attorneys’ Fees in Class Actions, at 344 (Federal Judicial Center

1980) (in some class actions, “the attorneys involved will agree among themselves to establish a

reasonable structure and present it to the court. Otherwise, the judge should appoint lead counsel

or establish any other organizational plan conducive to the management of the case.”).

97

In passing on the propriety of multiple counsel, the court should not be content with

conclusory assertions that multiple counsel is necessary to assure input from more class members or

to avoid disputes among counsel for various plaintiffs.287 As the SEC has put it, “lead counsel should

be able to explain to the court why and how the use of additional law firms promotes the effective,

efficient prosecution of the litigation, rather than serving the interests of the law firms.”288 The court

should also specify that it reserves the right to alter the counsel structure if it discovers substantial

duplication of effort or finds that the litigation is being unduly delayed due to the presence of

multiple counsel. 

If private ordering is not successful, or if the court has substantial questions about whether

an agreement reached among counsel will result in effective and efficient representation of the class,

then the court is faced with the choice of selection.289 This does not necessarily mean, however, that

the court should resort to an auction. Rather, courts have noted several criteria that might be
290 Data from the 1996 Federal Judicial Center study indicates that judges become

involved in selecting class counsel in about one in five cases. See Thomas E. Willging, Laural

L. Hooper & Robert J. Niemic, Empirical Study of Class Actions in Four Federal Districts 77

(Federal Judicial Center 1996). According to Thomas Willging of the FJC, an “informed but

untested hunch” from the data is that “an educated estimate of the amount at stake will be a

major factor in a judge’s decision about whether to become involved in selecting counsel.” The

more money at stake, the more likely the judge will be involved in appointing counsel—probably

because as the stakes increase, private agreement among the attorneys becomes less likely. 

Another factor relevant to judicial involvement in selection of counsel is the strength of the case

on the merits. Statement of Thomas Willging, submitted to the Task Force, at 5-6.

291 See Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How

Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L. J.

2053, 2062-63 (1995) (discussing, and criticizing, cases in which lead counsel was awarded

largely on the basis of the first to file).

292 See, e.g., TCW Technology Limited Partnership v. Intermedia Communications Inc.,

2000 WL 1654504, at *3 (Del. Ch.):

Although it might be thought, based on myths, fables, or mere urban legends, that the

first to file a lawsuit in this Court wins some advantage in the race to represent the

shareholder class, that assumption, in my opinion, has neither empirical nor logical

support.

Too often judges of this Court face complaints filed hastily, minutes or hours after

a transaction is announced, based on snippets from the print or electronic media. Such

pleadings are remarkable, but only because of the speed with which they are filed in

reaction to an announced transaction. It is not the race to the courthouse door, however,

that impresses the members of this Court when it comes to deciding who should control

and coordinate litigation on behalf of the shareholder class.

Professor Fisch has justly criticized the first to file approach to appointment of lead counsel:

The natural and foreseeable consequence of this approach is the creation of a race to the

courthouse. There are at least three problems with this result. First, lawyers are

encouraged to file complaints rapidly and defer their investigation of the merits of those

complaints until after filing. Second, to file a complaint rapidly, lawyers must seek out

98

considered in assessing who is the best among competing counsel to prosecute the class action.290

In this section, the Task Force evaluates these criteria.

Cases can be found in which lead counsel was awarded solely on the basis of “first to file.”291

But the better reasoned decisions and the academic commentary rightly criticize a first to file rule.292
prospective plaintiffs rather than waiting to be approached by a disgruntled investor. 

Finally, class counsel is appointed with little consideration given to qualifications.

Jill E. Fisch, Aggregations, Auctions and Other Developments in the Selection of Lead Counsel

Under the PSLRA, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 56-57 (2001). See also HERBERT B.

NEWBERG & ALBERT CONTE, 3 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS ' 9.35 at 9-96 (3d ed. 1992) (“The

first attorney to file is not entitled to special consideration for appointment as lead counsel

simply by winning the race to the courthouse.”).

293 The Committee Note to the proposed amendment to Rule 23 states: “The fact that a

given attorney filed the action, for example, might not weigh heavily in the decision [to appoint]

if that lawyer had not done significant work identifying or investigating claims.”

294 The specific criteria for appointment set forth in the proposed amendment to Rule 23

are: “(i) counsel=s experience in handling class actions and other complex litigation, (ii) the work

counsel has done in identifying or investigating potential claims in this case, and (iii) the

resources counsel will commit to representing the class . . .” These criteria are not exclusive,

however, as the proposal goes on to provide that the court “may consider any other matter

pertinent to counsel’s ability to fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class.” The

Task Force believes the criteria set forth in the text are consistent with and supported by the

proposed amendment to Rule 23. 

295 See., e.g., Feldman v. Hanley, 49 F.R.D. 48, 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (one counsel chosen

over another due to the firm’s “long experience and demonstrated skill”). 

99

A first to file rule can create a perverse incentive to race to the courthouse with a skeletal complaint.

Speed is a poor surrogate for determining the best counsel to prosecute the particular class action.

The Task Force concludes that counsel’s diligence in filing an action is a relevant

consideration, but only if the filing indicates that counsel has done some real investigation into and

work on the case. The filing of a skeletal complaint should be a negative rather than a positive factor.

This view of the Task Force is consistent with the proposed amendment to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.

Proposed subdivision (g) provides criteria that the court “must consider” in appointing class counsel,

one of which is “the work counsel has done in identifying or investigating potential claims in this

case.” The filing of a well-prepared complaint after significant investigation is relevant “work”; the

filing of a skeletal complaint is no “work” at all. 293

Beyond prefiling investigation and preparation, a number of selection criteria have been cited

in the cases. These include:294

a. Does counsel’s client have the ability and motivation to supervise and monitor counsel’s

work for the class?

b. What is the firm’s reputation and experience in the type of class action before the court?295
296 HERBERT B. NEWBERG & ALBERT CONTE, 3 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS ' 9.35 at 9-

97 (3d ed. 1992) (relevant factors in the selection of lead counsel “include experience and prior

success record”).

297 See TCW Technology Limited Partnership v. Intermedia Communications Inc., 2000

WL 1654504, at *4 (Del. Ch.) (stating that “the Court should give weight to the shareholder

plaintiff that has the greatest economic stake in the outcome of the lawsuit.”). Consideration of

this factor is not inconsistent with the Task Force position, supra, that the “most adequate

plaintiff” model of the PSLRA should not be extended to other cases. Under the PSLRA,

economic loss is the sole factor used to establish the presumptive lead plaintiff. The Task Force

position is that the plaintiff’s economic stake in the action is a relevant but not dispositive factor.

298 See TCW Technology Limited Partnership v. Intermedia Communications Inc., 2000

WL 1654504, at *4 (Del. Ch.) (stating that the court should “accord some weight” to whether

counsel has performed with more energy and vigor than other contestants).

299 See FJC Report, at 91 (noting interviews with a small number of judges experienced in

class actions; those judges consider it highly relevant that counsel has previously prosecuted

other class actions before the court and fees were reasonable and counsel performed effectively

in those actions).

100

c. Has counsel been successful in handling class actions and other complex litigation?296

d. Does the firm have sufficient resources to fund and staff the prosecution of the particular

class action and does it appear willing to expend those resources?

e. Does counsel have appropriate malpractice insurance?

f. Does it appear that counsel has a good sense of what the case is about, and what the value

of the case might be?

g. Does counsel have any financial arrangements with plaintiffs or other counsel that may be

detrimental to the proper prosecution of the case?

h. Does counsel represent a plaintiff with a significant economic stake in the litigation in

comparison with other contestants?297

i. Has counsel prosecuted the lawsuit to this point with greater energy and to better effect than

other contestants by creating work product that will be useful in the future progress of the

litigation?298

j. Does the court have previous experience with counsel that is relevant to whether counsel

is likely to perform professionally, diligently and effectively in this action?299
300 In re Cendant Corp. Prides Litig., 243 F.3d 722, 742-43 (3d Cir. 2001) (requiring an

ex post assessment of the reasonableness of a fee even where the fee was set ex ante through an

auction). 

301 See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (Third) ' 24.21 at 195 (“At the

commencement of the litigation, the court should also establish guidelines, ground rules, and

procedures that will lighten the burdens on the participants, clarify expectations, and reduce the

opportunities for disputes. This should be done at an early conference after consultation with

counsel”). See also In re First Fidelity Bancorp Securities Litig., 750 F. Supp. 160, 162 (D.N.J.

101

The Task Force endorses the use of this non-exclusive list of factors when courts find it necessary

to appoint lead counsel other than through private ordering. 

XIII. Suggested Procedures For Reviewing Fees In Non-Auction Cases 

The question of appointment cannot be divorced from the question of fees. The auction

experiment developed partly in response to the concern over perceived windfall awards of attorney

fees arising from the difficulty of making an informed ex post assessment of a reasonable fee. The

Task Force believes that while there are advantages to conducting a fee negotiation at the beginning

of the case, a precise ex ante determination of fees is usually unworkable. An ex post assessment,

while obviously not perfect, is usually preferable to the difficulties presented by an auction. Given

the uncertainty of class action litigation and given the Rule 23 requirement that the court review a

fee award for reasonableness at the end of the case, it is not possible to set a precise fee at a

preliminary stage of the proceedings.300

The Task Force believes that the judge will better serve the class by appointing counsel in the

traditional manner and reviewing the fee for reasonableness at the end of the matter. This is not to

say, however, that courts should be uninvolved in the fee question until the end of the case. Ignoring

fee questions until the end of the case raises the specter of more costly ex post review, and the

possibility that an award will be excessive due to the court’s inability to determine the precise effect

or extent of the efforts expended by counsel. 

Therefore, the Task Force recommends that the topic of attorney fees should be addressed at

the early stages of the case as well as throughout the prosecution of the case.301 At the outset of the
1990) (setting a fee structure at the outset of the case); Seinfeld v. Coker, Civ. No. 16964, 2000

Del. Ch. LEXIS 172, at *26, n.36 (recognizing that an auction system “may not lead to a fully

motivated class counsel, especially if the auction process has caused counsel to discount

aggressively their bid,” and concluding that negotiated fee arrangements “may provide a superior

ex ante approach to creating the proper incentives”); RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING

LAWYERS ' 251, Comment f. (“A more appropriate arrangement [in class action representations],

where possible, is for the lawyer's fee to be negotiated initially by the client and the lawyer at the

onset of the relationship, it being understood and disclosed to the client that the award may be

scrutinized by the opposing party and approved by the court.”).

The Task Force recommendation is basically consistent, in our view, with the

recommendations of the 1985 Third Circuit Task Force. The 1985 Task Force suggested, as we

do, that the subject of fees should be addressed early in the case. The 1985 Report also suggested

that a court might want to consider appointment of a representative to negotiate a fee at the

outset with class counsel. We do not reject such an approach, but feel bound to note that we

cannot find any instances in which courts have experimented with it. In some cases, the

recommendation might work, but even without the appointment of a class representative, the

court can engage in preliminary discussions with class counsel as to how the court will approach

a fee determination if the class prevails. 

302 See In re Synthroid Marketing Litig., 264 F.3d 712, 719 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Before the

litigation occurs, a judge can design a fee structure that emulates the incentives a private client

would put in place.”). Model Rule 1.5 requires that fees be set before or a reasonable time after

commencing representation in situations where the lawyer has not regularly represented the

client. It also provides specific protections to clients paying contingent fees. 

303 See In re Unisys Corp. Retiree Medical Benefits ERISA Litig., 886 F. Supp. 445, 461

(E.D. Pa. 1995) (observing that “a negotiated agreement would infuse simplicity, certainty, and

fairness into the attorneys’ fees process”).

The Committee Note to the proposed amendment to Rule 23 provides:

The court may . . . direct counsel to propose terms for a potential award of

attorney fees and nontaxable costs. . . . [A]ttorney fee awards are an important feature of

class action practice, and attention to this subject from the outset may often be a

productive technique for dealing with these issues. Paragraph (2)(C) therefore authorizes

the court to provide directions about attorney fees and costs when appointing class

102

case, the court may be well-advised to direct counsel to propose the terms for a potential award of

fees; the potential fees might be established within ranges, with the court making it clear to the

parties that the fee remains open for further review for reasonableness.302 A preliminary fee

arrangement may provide a helpful structure for the court when it conducts its reasonableness review

at the end of the case.303
counsel. 

The Committee Note to the proposed subdivision (h), providing procedural guidelines for the

award of attorney fees, declares that one of the intentions of the proposal is to “afford an

opportunity for the court to provide an early framework for an eventual fee award, or for

monitoring the work of class counsel during the pendency of the action.” The suggestions in the

Committee Note to the proposed amendment are consistent with the position of the Task Force

that the topic of fees should be addressed at an early stage and throughout the class proceedings.

304 See, e.g., Camden I Condominium Assoc., Inc. v. Dunkle, 946 F.2d 768, 774 (11th Cir.

1991) (“Henceforth in this circuit, attorneys’ fees awarded from a common fund shall be based

upon a reasonable percentage of the fund established for the benefit of the class”); Swedish

Hospital Corp. v. Shalala, 1 F.3d 1261, 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding that the percentage of

the fund method is the only permissible method for awarding attorney fees in common fund class

actions); Chatelain v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 805 F. Supp. 209, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).

305 See, e.g., Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 1998) (approving a fee

awarded by use of the lodestar method, and noting that the district court has discretion to use

either the lodestar method or the percentage of the fund method for determining fees). For a

circuit-by-circuit survey of percentage versus lodestar approach to fee determinations, see

HERBERT B. NEWBERG & ALBERT CONTE, 3 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS Appendix 14-1 (3d

ed. Supp. 2000).

306 See Court Awarded Attorney Fees, Report of the Third Circuit Task Force, 108 F.R.D.

237, 255 (1985) (criticizing the lodestar approach and recommending the use of the percentage

of the fund method in common fund cases).

307 See, e.g., Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Corp., 223 F. 3d 190, 198 (3d Cir. 2000).

308 See In re Cendant Corp. Prides Litig., 243 F.3d 722, 735 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting that a

lodestar cross-check is the “suggested practice for district courts setting fee awards by the

percentage-of-recovery method”). See also In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices

Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 333 (3d Cir. 1998) (stating that “it is sensible for a court to use a second

method of fee approval to cross check its initial fee calculation”).

309 See, e.g., LaChance v. Harrington, 965 F. Supp. 630, 649 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (applying

the lodestar cross-check to ensure that the percentage awarded did not create an unreasonably

high fee). See also In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 285 (3d Cir. 2001) (the goal of the

103

The courts are by no means uniform in their approach to awarding fees in class actions. Most

courts use the percentage of the fund method.304 Other courts use the lodestar.305 The Third Circuit,

following the recommendations of the 1985 Task Force,306 has favored the use of the percentage of

the fund method in common fund cases.307 However, the Third Circuit has also suggested that a

district court conduct a lodestar cross-check on the percentage award.308 The lodestar cross-check

is intended to give the court some guidance on whether the proposed percentage award is

unreasonably high.309
lodestar cross-check “is to ensure that the proposed fee award does not result in counsel being

paid a rate vastly in excess of what any lawyer could reasonably charge per hour, thus avoiding a

‘windfall’ to lead counsel”).

310 See, e.g., Swedish Hospital Corp. v. Shalala, 1 F.3d 1261, 1269 (D.C. Cir. 1993)

(noting that it “matters little to the class how much the attorney spends in time or money to reach

a successful result”); In re SmithKline Beckman Corp. Securities Litig., 751 F. Supp. 525, 554

(E.D. Pa. 1990) (“it would be the height of folly to penalize an efficient attorney for settling a

case on the ground that less total hours were expended in the litigation”).

311 See, e.g., In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 285 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting that the

lodestar cross-check is “very time consuming”).

312 See In re Cendant Corp. Prides Litig., 243 F.3d 722, 735 (3d Cir. 2001) (referring to

lodestar cross-check as a “suggested practice”). The Task Force does not believe it dispositive

that the Court in In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 285, n. 57 (3d Cir. 2001), speculated

that the Court in Cendant Prides may have raised the lodestar cross-check from discretionary to

mandatory. The Court in Cendant Prides referred to the lodestar as a “suggested,” not

“mandatory” practice. Given all the problems involved in the use of the lodestar, and the solid

precedent endorsing the use of the percentage method, the Task Force believes that the Court in

Prides would have had to be more explicit than it was to conclude that the lodestar cross-check

is now mandatory. The Court in In re Cendant Corp. Litig. only raised the inference of a

mandatory lodestar in a sentence that begins, “Arguably . . .”. In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264

F.3d at 285 n.57.

104

The 1985 Task Force made a compelling case for rejecting the lodestar approach in common

fund cases. We see nothing that has changed in the interim to diminish the power of the arguments

made in 1985. The lodestar remains difficult and burdensome to apply, and it positively encourages

counsel to run up the bill, expending hours that are of no benefit to the class. Moreover, use of the

lodestar may result in undercompensation of talented attorneys. Experienced practitioners know that

a highly qualified and dedicated attorney may do more for a class in an hour than another attorney

could do in ten. The lodestar can end up prejudicing lawyers who are more effective with a lesser

expenditure of time.310

Given the substantial problems with the lodestar approach generally, the Task Force is highly

skeptical about the use of the lodestar even as a cross-check when awarding a percentage of the

common fund. The inherent flaws of the lodestar method are diminished, but certainly not

eliminated, by making the lodestar a relevant rather than dispositive factor.311 The Task Force notes

that in the Third Circuit the lodestar cross-check is only a “suggested” and not a mandated

procedure.312 We emphasize that the lodestar is at most a relevant factor if it is to be used at all, and

it should not receive exaggerated importance in assessing the appropriate fee. We also emphasize that

even if a lodestar cross-check is to be conducted, it is only a “cross-check” and not a full-blown
313 See, e.g., Di Giacomo v. Plains All American Pipeline, Civ. No. H-99-4137, at 23

(S.D. Tex. 2001) (Court conducts a lodestar cross-check but notes that it “will not conduct a

detailed analysis of charged hours and hourly rates” because to do so “would undermine the

utility of the percentage method.”).

314 See In re Dreyfus Aggressive Growth Mutual Fund Litig., 2001 WL 709262, at *6

(S.D.N.Y.) (awarding attorney’s fees amounting to 15% of the fund, citing the “emerging trend

within the Circuit of awarding attorneys considerably less than 30% of common funds in

securities class actions, even where there is considerable contingency risk”).

315 See Goldberger v. Integrated Resources, Inc., 209 F.3d 43, 52-53 (2d Cir. 2000)

(criticizing the use of a “benchmark” percentage as an “all too tempting substitute for the

searching assessment that should properly be performed in each case” and stating that “a fee

award should be assessed based on scrutiny of the unique circumstances of each case, and a

jealous regard to the rights of those who are interested in the fund”).

316 See Mashburn v. National Healthcare, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 679, 692 (M.D. Ala. 1988)

(“There is no general rule of what percentage of a common fund may reasonably be awarded as

a fee because the amount of any fee must be determined upon the facts of each case.”). See also 

Bruce Hay, Contingent Fees and Agency Costs, 25 J. LEG. STUD. 503, 521 (1996) (optimal

contingent fee, providing the best incentive to the lawyer and maximum return to the client,

depends on the characteristics of the case and thus varies from case to case).

317 223 F.3d 190, 195, n.1 (3d Cir. 2000).

105

lodestar inquiry.313 The court should be satisfied with a summary of the hours expended by all

counsel at various stages with less detailed breakdown than would be required in a lodestar

jurisdiction. This would enable the court to make a judgment as to whether the percentage appears

too high or low given the time required to handle the case. The court will, of course, be aware that

lawyers have an incentive to increase their hours for cross-check purposes just as they have an

incentive to maximize them when seeking lodestar compensation, but possessed of this awareness

the court may well assume that the hours are stated on the high side and take that into account in

deciding how to factor in the amount of time devoted to the case when arriving at a percentage figure.

In setting a fee at the end of a case, the Task Force emphasizes the point made by decisions

cited throughout this Report: that judges have ample discretion to set fees that depart from any

supposed “benchmark.”314 Indeed, departure from any asserted “benchmark” isrequired by Rule 23

if such a fee would be unreasonably high, or low, under the circumstances.315 There is nothing in the

percentage approach that requires a locked-in or “standard” percentage to apply automatically in

every class action.316

The Task Force notes that there is a well-developed body of case law that will assist the

district court in setting a reasonable percentage fee after the litigation. In Gunter v. Ridgewood

Energy Corp.,

317 the Court set forth a list of relevant factors from the “well developed and familiar”

Third Circuit case law. The Gunter Court described that case law in the following passage:
318 See also In re Cendant Corp. Prides Litig., 243 F.3d 722, 737-38 (3d Cir. 2001)

(applying the factors set forth in Gunter and reversing a fee award where the district court

apparently failed without explanation to consider a number of the factors); Goldberger v.

Integrated Resources, Inc., 209 F. 3d 43, 50-54 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing the Gunter factors with

approval). The Task Force notes that the factors listed in Gunter are similar to the factors

enumerated in the Rules of Professional Conduct governing the reasonableness of attorney fees

generally. See Model Rule 1.5.

319 See also In re Cendant Corp. Prides Litig., 243 F.3d 722, 737 (3d Cir. 2001)

(declaring that “a district court may not rely on a formulaic application of the appropriate range

in awarding fees but must consider the relevant circumstances of the particular case”). The

Conference Report to the PSLRA states, consistent with this precedent, that judges awarding fees

are not to be locked into a benchmark. The Report observes that the PSLRA does not fix the

percentage of fees and costs counsel may receive, and states that the intent of the Committee was

“to give the court flexibility in determining what is reasonable on a case-by-case basis.” H.R.

CONF. REP. 104-369, at 36.

320 See Testimony of Professor Joseph A. Grundfest at 9, noting that some courts employ

a benchmark of 25%, and that there is “no persuasive argument that the norm was ever a

reasonable approximation of the fee that would result from an arm’s-length bargain over

106

In common fund cases of this sort B in which the attorneys' fees and the clients' award

come from the same source and the fees are based on a percentage amount of the clients'

settlement award B district courts should consider several factors in setting a fee award.

Among other things, these factors include: (1) the size of the fund created and the number of

persons benefited; (2) the presence or absence of substantial objections by members of the

class to the settlement terms and/or fees requested by counsel; (3) the skill and efficiency of

the attorneys involved; (4) the complexity and duration of the litigation; (5) the risk of

nonpayment; (6) the amount of time devoted to the case by plaintiffs' counsel; and (7) the

awards in similar cases. See In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 148 F.3d

283, 336-40 (3d Cir. 1998); In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Products

Liability Litigation, 55 F.3d 768, 819-22 (3d Cir. 1995); MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE,

MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (THIRD) ' 24.121, at 207 (1997).318

Most importantly, the Gunter Court emphasized that the factors that it listed should not be applied

in a formulaic way. Each case is different, and the weight to be given to any of the factors will depend

on the circumstances. Thus, the Gunter Court appropriately cautioned that district courts are not to

be slavish adherents to a benchmark.319 The court must consider awards in similar cases, but this

does not mean that the court is bound by a benchmark. 

Application of the factors listed in Gunter has led to fee awards in many cases below what

some have argued to be a “benchmark” of 25%.320 The Task Force commends the use of these Gunter
representation in a securities fraud class action lawsuit.” For cases departing far downward from

any such asserted benchmark, see the cases cited in note 121, supra. See also In re Prudential

Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 339 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting that the district

court in that case “examined the fee awards in class actions with recoveries exceeding $100

million and found the fee percentages ranges from 4.1% to 17.92%”); Shaw v. Toshiba America

Information Systems, Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d 942, 946 (E.D. Tex. 2000) (14% awarded; court finds

it unnecessary to conduct a lodestar cross-check). 

The Task Force also notes some substantial evidence that institutional investors have

reached fee agreements that award attorneys significantly less than any supposed 25%

“benchmark.” See State of Wisconsin Investment Board v. Godfield, Civil No. 3:96-CV-1353-R

(N.D. Tex.) (18%) ; In re Physicians Computer Network Securities Litig., Civil No. 98-981

(D.N.J.)(15%) ; In re Orbital Sciences Corp. Securities Litig., Civil Action No. 99-197-A

(E.D.Va.) (15%); In re UCAR International Inc. Securities Litig., 3098-CV-00600 (D.Ct.)

(22.5%); In re California Micro Devices Securities Litig., 965 F. Supp. 1327, 1331-32 (N.D.

Cal.) (less than 8%). See also Statement of Lawrence Sucharow, submitted to the Task Force, at

6 (counsel who represented several institutional lead plaintiffs in class actions concludes that

“they frequently interview several firms before selecting one to represent them in a litigation and

they often aggressively negotiate the maximum amount lead counsel may seek upon the

successful conclusion of a litigation”). While the fee negotiated by an empowered plaintiff must

be reviewed for reasonableness at the end of an action under Rule 23 and Cendant Prides, the

point is that these cases indicate that there is no need for rigid adherence to a benchmark. 

321 Witnesses before the Task Force suggested additional factors for courts to consider in

conducting a fee review at the end of the case. Professor Jill Fisch suggested that counsel be

judged against its own undertakings at the beginning of the case in its application to become lead

counsel, such as the undertaking to be accountable to class members. Testimony of Professor Jill

E. Fisch at 164, March 16, 2001. Professor Joseph Grundfest suggested that the court consider

market rates for private commercial recoveries. Testimony of Professor Joseph A. Grundfest at

202, June 1, 2001. One way to bring that information into court is for the court to appoint a

special master to report on fees in the relevant market. Testimony of Howard I. Langer at 291,

June 1, 2001. Another indicator is “data from securities suits where large investors have chosen

to hire counsel up front.” In re Synthroid Marketing Litig., 264 F.3d 712, 720 (7th Cir. 2001)

(noting that data about fee arrangements between counsel and institutional investors “have been

widely available since the changes to securities practice wrought by legislation in the mid

1990s.”). The Task Force commends all of these factors for consideration by district courts.

Another possible factor to consider in setting the fee, which raises complex issues beyond

the scope of this Report, is whether the class action resulted in improvements in corporate

107

factors as a means of providing fair compensation to class counsel under the specific circumstances

of the case.321 The Task Force also notes that courts may wish to consider whether the results in
governance. See In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201 (3d Cir. 2001) (approving a settlement

including corporate governance changes).

322 See In re Synthroid Marketing Litig., 264 F.3d 712, 720 (7th Cir. 2001) (outcome of

auctions can provide some relevant information for the court in awarding fees ex post). 

323 See In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 220 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that under

the PSLRA, “courts should accord a presumption of reasonableness to any fee request submitted

pursuant to a retainer agreement that was entered into between a properly-selected lead plaintiff

and a properly-selected lead counsel.”). See also In re California Micro Devices Securities

Litig., Reporter’s Transcript of Proceedings of May 24, 2001, Final Fairness Hearing, at 20

(Judge Vaughn R. Walker, N.D. Cal.) (“the best indication that the fee requested is a reasonable

one is that it was calculated under a fee arrangement negotiated by sophisticated, informed

institutional investors serving as lead plaintiffs.”).

324 The PSLRA requires the court to determine that fees do not exceed “a reasonable

percentage of the amount of any damages and prejudgment interest actually paid to the class.” 18

U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(6). This language does not permit strict scrutiny review of the fee award,

given the general premise of the PSLRA that it is the lead plaintiff, and not the court, that is to

choose counsel and negotiate the fee. However, the language does justify rejection of fees that

are clearly excessive in relation to the amount awarded to the class. See In re Cendant Corp.

Litig. 264 F.3d 201, 283 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting that the presumption that a negotiated fee was

reasonable “may be rebutted by a prima facie showing” that the agreement is “clearly

excessive”). 

325 For example, if the case appeared at the time of the fee negotiation to be quite difficult

and then a bombshell development (such as a public concession from the defendant) resulted in a

substantially easier case, a fee award of a high percentage might no longer be justified. See In re

Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 210, 282-83 (3d Cir. 2001) (the presumption that the negotiated

fee is reasonable “could likely be abrogated entirely were the court to find that the assumptions

108

auction cases are useful as a source of information in determining what is a reasonable fee in class

actions. 322

The Gunter factors were developed before the PSLRA, but the factors have obvious relevance

to whether a fee is reasonable in any class action, including those brought under the PSLRA. The

Task Force believes, however, that the deference to the empowered plaintiff’s choice of counsel in

PSLRA cases should extend to the ex post review of the fee agreement in those cases. The PSLRA

establishes a model of client control that extends not only to appointment of counsel but also to

monitoring of counsel and negotiation of the fee. The Task Force concludes, therefore, that strict

scrutiny of the fee agreement is inconsistent with the client-driven litigation model established in the

PSLRA. This means that a court should presume that the fee is reasonable when it is the result of an

agreement between the “most adequate” plaintiff and chosen counsel.323 The fee reached by

agreement between the “most adequate” plaintiff and counsel should be accepted by the court unless

1) it is clearly excessive;324 2) it has been rendered unfair by unforeseen developments;325 or 3) it is
underlying the original retainer agreement had been materially altered by significant and unusual

factual and/or legal developments that could not reasonably have been foreseen at the time of the

original agreement.”). Even if the assumptions underlying the original agreement have not

materially changed, there may be cases in which subsequent events suggest that some

modification—perhaps not huge in percentage or actual terms—might be appropriate. Our

assumption is that most of these changes would result in a reduction of fees, a result sought by

the objectors in the Cendant litigation. It is possible, however, that litigation might well be so

much more onerous or affected by mid-stream changes in the law that both the empowered

plaintiff and lead counsel would join in an effort to raise the percentage originally agreed upon. 

There may also be cases in which lead counsel seeks an increase because of changed

circumstances and the empowered plaintiff objects. 

326 If the court had found at the time of appointment of the lead plaintiff that the fee

agreement reached with counsel was not the result of bargaining, then that would have been a

reason to hold the lead plaintiff inadequate under the terms of the PSLRA, or to order such

negotiations to take place. It is possible, however, that information about the fee negotiation

might not be presented at the time of appointment. See In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201,

257 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting that the PSLRA does not require the putative lead plaintiff to

volunteer information concerning fee negotiations at the outset of the case). The fact that a

failure to negotiate comes to light in an ex post review does not diminish its importance. 

Moreover, if there is an allegation of “pay-to-play” that arises late in the litigation, the court may

want to hear evidence with regard to the allegation because such evidence may undermine a

claim of arm’s-length, good faith bargaining.

109

found in an ex post review that the fee was not reached by arm’s-length negotiation between the lead

plaintiff and counsel.326 In making this ultimate determination of reasonableness, the court should

apply the Gunter factors, set forth above, but with greater deference than in a non-PSLRA case.

The court may in PSLRA cases follow the recommendation of the 1985 Third Circuit Task

force and seek to do some review of the retainer agreement and its reasonableness at the outset of the

litigation. If there are concerns about aspects of the agreement that ought to be aired earlier rather

than later, early review would provide guidance to both the lead plaintiff and the lead counsel. No

matter what the court does at the outset, a final review of the fees at the conclusion of the case is

clearly required by both the PSLRA and Rule 23. Our suggestion is that the deference to the

negotiated agreement at the end of the case might well be greatest when there has been preliminary

judicial review early on. Naturally, changed circumstances could affect the final review no matter

how carefully the court examined the agreement at the outset of the case. But absent changed

circumstances, judicial approval of an agreement at the beginning ought to create a presumption that

the agreement will be valid at the end of the case.
110

XIV. Conclusion

The Task Force recognizes that the recommendations contained in this Report largely concern

a practice that is in an embryonic stage. It also recognizes that assertions on either side of the debate

are mostly unproven by hard evidence; for example, we have a collective sense that the lowest fee

does not necessarily lead to the best outcome for the class, but the hard data to prove our point does

not as yet exist. The Task Force hopes that its recommendations will be accepted for what they are--

an effort to sound a cautionary note on auctions and to provide guidance for courts in using

traditional methods of appointment of class counsel. The matters addressed in this Report could

usefully occupy years of study; the Task Force's time was limited. However, we are convinced that

this Report serves an important function in illustrating the problems created by auctioning class

counsel, and in setting forth suggested practices for departing from a “benchmark” fee award where

such a departure is warranted.

Date: January 15, 2002
111

Third Circuit Task Force on Selection of Class Counsel 

Co-Chairs

Professor Stephen A. Saltzburg

Gregory P. Joseph

Members

Hon. Thomas L. Ambro

Louis C. Bechtle

Melvin C. Breaux

Hon. William B. Chandler, III

Professor Howard M. Erichson

John J. Gibbons

John G. Harkins, Jr.

Stephen J. Harmelin

Joseph C. Kohn

Ronald L. Marmer

Dianne M. Nast

Lisa J. Rodriguez

Melvyn I. Weiss

Reporter

Professor Daniel J. Capra

Associate Reporter

Professor Eleanor W. Myers

Secretary

Toby D. Slawsky