# Euroopan unionin C 357/2012

| | ISSN 1977-1053
  doi:10.3000/19771053.C_2012.357.fin |
| --- | --- |
| Euroopan unionin
  virallinen lehti | C 357 |
| | |
| Suomenkielinen laitos | Tiedonantoja ja ilmoituksia | 55. vuosikerta20. marraskuuta 2012 |

ISSN 1977-1053

doi:10.3000/19771053.C_2012.357.fin

Euroopan unionin

virallinen lehti

C 357

Suomenkielinen laitos

Tiedonantoja ja ilmoituksia

55. vuosikerta20. marraskuuta 2012

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| Ilmoitusnumero | Sisältö | Sivu |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | IV   Tiedotteet |
| | JÄSENVALTIOIDEN TIEDOTTEET |
| 2012/C 357/01 | Tiedot, jotka jäsenvaltiot ovat toimittaneet tiettyjen tukimuotojen toteamisesta yhteismarkkinoille soveltuviksi perustamissopimuksen 87 ja 88 artiklan mukaisesti annetun komission asetuksen (EY) N:o 800/2008 (yleinen ryhmäpoikkeusasetus) (
  1
  ) | 1 |
| 2012/C 357/02 | Jäsenvaltion toimittamat tiedot perustamissopimuksen 87 ja 88 artiklan soveltamisesta maataloustuotteiden tuottamisen alalla toimiviin pieniin ja keskisuuriin yrityksiin sekä asetuksen (EY) N:o 70/2001 muuttamisesta annetun komission asetuksen (EY) N:o 1857/2006 mukaisesti myönnetystä valtiontuesta | 14 |
| 2012/C 357/03 | Jäsenvaltion toimittamat tiedot perustamissopimuksen 87 ja 88 artiklan soveltamisesta maataloustuotteiden tuottamisen alalla toimiviin pieniin ja keskisuuriin yrityksiin sekä asetuksen (EY) N:o 70/2001 muuttamisesta annetun komission asetuksen (EY) N:o 1857/2006 mukaisesti myönnetystä valtiontuesta | 18 |
| 2012/C 357/04 | Tiedot, jotka jäsenvaltiot ovat toimittaneet tiettyjen tukimuotojen toteamisesta yhteismarkkinoille soveltuviksi perustamissopimuksen 87 ja 88 artiklan mukaisesti annetun komission asetuksen (EY) N:o 800/2008 (yleinen ryhmäpoikkeusasetus) (
  1
  ) | 20 |

Ilmoitusnumero

Sisältö

Sivu

IV   Tiedotteet

JÄSENVALTIOIDEN TIEDOTTEET

2012/C 357/01

Tiedot, jotka jäsenvaltiot ovat toimittaneet tiettyjen tukimuotojen toteamisesta yhteismarkkinoille soveltuviksi perustamissopimuksen 87 ja 88 artiklan mukaisesti annetun komission asetuksen (EY) N:o 800/2008 (yleinen ryhmäpoikkeusasetus) (
  1
  )

1

1

2012/C 357/02

Jäsenvaltion toimittamat tiedot perustamissopimuksen 87 ja 88 artiklan soveltamisesta maataloustuotteiden tuottamisen alalla toimiviin pieniin ja keskisuuriin yrityksiin sekä asetuksen (EY) N:o 70/2001 muuttamisesta annetun komission asetuksen (EY) N:o 1857/2006 mukaisesti myönnetystä valtiontuesta

14

2012/C 357/03

Jäsenvaltion toimittamat tiedot perustamissopimuksen 87 ja 88 artiklan soveltamisesta maataloustuotteiden tuottamisen alalla toimiviin pieniin ja keskisuuriin yrityksiin sekä asetuksen (EY) N:o 70/2001 muuttamisesta annetun komission asetuksen (EY) N:o 1857/2006 mukaisesti myönnetystä valtiontuesta

18

2012/C 357/04

Tiedot, jotka jäsenvaltiot ovat toimittaneet tiettyjen tukimuotojen toteamisesta yhteismarkkinoille soveltuviksi perustamissopimuksen 87 ja 88 artiklan mukaisesti annetun komission asetuksen (EY) N:o 800/2008 (yleinen ryhmäpoikkeusasetus) (
  1
  )

1

20

| | V   Ilmoitukset |
| --- | --- |
| | KILPAILUPOLITIIKAN TOTEUTTAMISEEN LIITTYVÄT MENETTELYT |
| | Euroopan komissio |
| 2012/C 357/05 | Valtiontuki – Kreikka – Valtiontuki SA.34488 (2012/C) (ex 2012/NN) – Pankin perustamisen ja pääomanlisäysten muodossa annettava tuki Nea Proton Bankille sekä muodollisen tutkintamenettelyn aloittaminen – Kehotus huomautusten esittämiseen Euroopan unionin toiminnasta tehdyn sopimuksen 108 artiklan 2 kohdan mukaisesti (
  1
  ) | 26 |
| 2012/C 357/06 | Valtiontuki – Kreikka – Valtiontuki SA.34823 (2012/C) (ex 2012/NN) – Alpha Bankin pääomapohjan vahvistaminen Kreikan rahoitusvakausrahastosta – Kehotus huomautusten esittämiseen Euroopan unionin toiminnasta tehdyn sopimuksen 108 artiklan 2 kohdan mukaisesti (
  1
  ) | 36 |

V   Ilmoitukset

KILPAILUPOLITIIKAN TOTEUTTAMISEEN LIITTYVÄT MENETTELYT

Euroopan komissio

2012/C 357/05

Valtiontuki – Kreikka – Valtiontuki SA.34488 (2012/C) (ex 2012/NN) – Pankin perustamisen ja pääomanlisäysten muodossa annettava tuki Nea Proton Bankille sekä muodollisen tutkintamenettelyn aloittaminen – Kehotus huomautusten esittämiseen Euroopan unionin toiminnasta tehdyn sopimuksen 108 artiklan 2 kohdan mukaisesti (
  1
  )

1

26

2012/C 357/06

Valtiontuki – Kreikka – Valtiontuki SA.34823 (2012/C) (ex 2012/NN) – Alpha Bankin pääomapohjan vahvistaminen Kreikan rahoitusvakausrahastosta – Kehotus huomautusten esittämiseen Euroopan unionin toiminnasta tehdyn sopimuksen 108 artiklan 2 kohdan mukaisesti (
  1
  )

1

36

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   ETA:n kannalta merkityksellinen teksti |

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(1)   ETA:n kannalta merkityksellinen teksti

1

| FI | |
| --- | --- |

FI

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IV Tiedotteet

JÄSENVALTIOIDEN TIEDOTTEET

| 20.11.2012 | FI | Euroopan unionin virallinen lehti | C 357/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

20.11.2012

FI

Euroopan unionin virallinen lehti

C 357/1

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Tiedot, jotka jäsenvaltiot ovat toimittaneet tiettyjen tukimuotojen toteamisesta yhteismarkkinoille soveltuviksi perustamissopimuksen 87 ja 88 artiklan mukaisesti annetun komission asetuksen (EY) N:o 800/2008 (yleinen ryhmäpoikkeusasetus)

(ETA:n kannalta merkityksellinen teksti)

2012/C 357/01

| Valtion tuen viitenumero | SA.35327 (12/X) |
| --- | --- |
| Jäsenvaltio | Yhdistynyt kuningaskunta |
| Jäsenvaltion viitenumero | — |
| Alueen nimi (NUTS) | UNITED KINGDOM
  Yhdistelmäalue |
| Myöntävä viranomainen | BIS |
| 1 Victoria Street |
| London |
| SW1H 0ET |
| http://www.bis.gov.uk |

Valtion tuen viitenumero

SA.35327 (12/X)

Jäsenvaltio

Yhdistynyt kuningaskunta

Jäsenvaltion viitenumero

—

Alueen nimi (NUTS)

UNITED KINGDOM

Yhdistelmäalue

Myöntävä viranomainen

BIS

1 Victoria Street

London

SW1H 0ET

http://www.bis.gov.uk

Tukitoimenpiteen nimike

Employer Ownership of Skills Pilot

Kansallinen oikeusperusta (mainitaan julkaisuviite)

The empployer projects arising from the employer ownership pilot will be funded using the Secretary of States powers under section 14 of the Education Act 2002

Education Act 2002

http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2002/32/contents

Toimenpiteen tyyppi

Ohjelma

Voimassa olevan tukitoimenpiteen muutos

—

Kesto

21.8.2012-1.8.2014

Toimiala(t)

Kaikki tukikelpoiset toimialat

Tuensaajatyyppi

Pk-yritykset,suuret yritykset

Ohjelman mukainen suunniteltu vuosibudjetin kokonaismäärä

GBP 125,00 (miljoonaa)

Takaukset

GBP 0,00 (miljoonaa)

Tukiväline (5 artikla)

Suora avustus

Viittaus komission päätökseen

—

Jos yhteisön varoista saadaan yhteisrahoitusta

—

Tavoitteet

Tuen enimmäisintensiteetti prosentteina tai enimmäismäärä kansallisessa valuutassa

Pk-yrityksille myönnet-tävät lisät prosentteina

Erityiskoulutus (38 artiklan 1 alakohta)

25 %

30 %

Yleiskoulutus (38 artiklan 2 alakohta)

60 %

20 %

Internet-linkki tukitoimenpiteen koko tekstiin:

http://www.bis.gov.uk/policies/further-education-skills/employers/employer-ownership-pilot

| Valtion tuen viitenumero | SA.35359 (12/X) |
| --- | --- |
| Jäsenvaltio | Saksa |
| Jäsenvaltion viitenumero | 614-72565/12 |
| Alueen nimi (NUTS) | DEUTSCHLAND
  Tukialueiden ulkopuolella sijaitsevat alueet |
| Myöntävä viranomainen | Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung |
| Hannoversche Str. 28 |
| 10115 Berlin |
| www.bmbf.de |

Valtion tuen viitenumero

SA.35359 (12/X)

Jäsenvaltio

Saksa

Jäsenvaltion viitenumero

614-72565/12

Alueen nimi (NUTS)

DEUTSCHLAND

Tukialueiden ulkopuolella sijaitsevat alueet

Myöntävä viranomainen

Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung

Hannoversche Str. 28

10115 Berlin

www.bmbf.de

Tukitoimenpiteen nimike

Richtlinien zur Förderinitiative „Deutschland – USA Zusammenarbeit in Computational Neuroscience“

Kansallinen oikeusperusta (mainitaan julkaisuviite)

Haushaltsgesetz mit Bundeshaushaltsplan in der jährl. Fassung, zzt. 2012 v. 22.12.2011 BGBl I S.2938

www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/bundeshaushalt2012/html

BHO mit VV v. 19.8.1969 BGBl I S.1284, zuletzt geänd. durch Art. 10 G. v. 9.12.2010 BGBl I S.1885

VwVfG i. d. F. v. 23.1.2003 BGBl I S.102, zuletzt geänd. durch Art. 2 I G. v. 14.8.2009 BGBl I S.2827

BAnz AT 10.8.2012 B6

Toimenpiteen tyyppi

Ohjelma

Voimassa olevan tukitoimenpiteen muutos

—

Kesto

1.9.2013-31.7.2017

Toimiala(t)

Kaikki tukikelpoiset toimialat

Tuensaajatyyppi

Pk-yritykset,suuret yritykset

Ohjelman mukainen suunniteltu vuosibudjetin kokonaismäärä

EUR 0,50 (miljoonaa)

Takaukset

—

Tukiväline (5 artikla)

Suora avustus

Viittaus komission päätökseen

—

Jos yhteisön varoista saadaan yhteisrahoitusta

—

Tavoitteet

Tuen enimmäisintensiteetti prosentteina tai enimmäismäärä kansallisessa valuutassa

Pk-yrityksille myönnet-tävät lisät prosentteina

Kokeellinen kehittäminen (31 artiklan 2 kohdan c alakohta)

25 %

20 %

Perustutkimus (31 artiklan 2 kohdan a alakohta)

100 %

—

Teollinen tutkimus (31 artiklan 2 kohdan b alakohta)

50 %

20 %

Internet-linkki tukitoimenpiteen koko tekstiin:

http://www.gesundheitsforschung-bmbf.de/de/4581.php

| Valtion tuen viitenumero | SA.35361 (12/X) |
| --- | --- |
| Jäsenvaltio | Alankomaat |
| Jäsenvaltion viitenumero | NLD |
| Alueen nimi (NUTS) | KOP VAN NOORD-HOLLAND
  Tukialueiden ulkopuolella sijaitsevat alueet |
| Myöntävä viranomainen | Provincie Noord-Holland |
| Postbus 3007 |
| 2001 DA Haarlem |
| http://www.noord-holland.nl |

Valtion tuen viitenumero

SA.35361 (12/X)

Jäsenvaltio

Alankomaat

Jäsenvaltion viitenumero

NLD

Alueen nimi (NUTS)

KOP VAN NOORD-HOLLAND

Tukialueiden ulkopuolella sijaitsevat alueet

Myöntävä viranomainen

Provincie Noord-Holland

Postbus 3007

2001 DA Haarlem

http://www.noord-holland.nl

Tukitoimenpiteen nimike

Biomassavergistingsinstallatie

Kansallinen oikeusperusta (mainitaan julkaisuviite)

Algemene subsidieverordening Noord-Holland 2011

Toimenpiteen tyyppi

tapauskohtaiselle tuelle

Voimassa olevan tukitoimenpiteen muutos

—

Myöntämispäivä

21.8.2012 lähtien

Toimiala(t)

Kaasun tuotanto

Tuensaajatyyppi

Pk-yritykset – TexelEnergie Coöperatie U.A.Emmalaan 66A1791 AV DEN BURG

Yritykselle myönnettävän tapauskohtaisen tuen kokonaismäärä

EUR 0,70 (miljoonaa)

Takaukset

—

Tukiväline (5 artikla)

Suora avustus

Viittaus komission päätökseen

—

Jos yhteisön varoista saadaan yhteisrahoitusta

—

Tavoitteet

Tuen enimmäisintensiteetti prosentteina tai enimmäismäärä kansallisessa valuutassa

Pk-yrityksille myönnet-tävät lisät prosentteina

Uusiutuvista energialähteistä tuotetun energian käytön edistämiseen tehtäviin investointeihin myönnettävä ympäristönsuojelutuki (23 artikla)

45 %

20 %

Internet-linkki tukitoimenpiteen koko tekstiin:

| | http://decentrale.regelgeving.overheid.nl/cvdr/xhtmloutput/Historie/Noord-Holland/114219/114219_1.html |
| --- | --- |

http://decentrale.regelgeving.overheid.nl/cvdr/xhtmloutput/Historie/Noord-Holland/114219/114219_1.html

| | http://www.noord-holland.nl/web/file?uuid=2d37d088-a7b6-4bb8-8ad1-ed23dfc5b380&owner=da25edf2-3bbc-469a-8b08-656102d84c4d |
| --- | --- |

http://www.noord-holland.nl/web/file?uuid=2d37d088-a7b6-4bb8-8ad1-ed23dfc5b380&owner=da25edf2-3bbc-469a-8b08-656102d84c4d

| Valtion tuen viitenumero | SA.35362 (12/X) |
| --- | --- |
| Jäsenvaltio | Alankomaat |
| Jäsenvaltion viitenumero | Subsiside Energiesprong Amtserdamse buurt Haarlem |
| Alueen nimi (NUTS) | NOORD-HOLLAND
  Tukialueiden ulkopuolella sijaitsevat alueet |
| Myöntävä viranomainen | Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, Directie CZW |
| Postbus 20011 |
| 2500 EA Den Haag |
| email: angelique.herwijnen@minbzk.nl |
| www.rijksoverheid.nl/ministeries/bzk |

Valtion tuen viitenumero

SA.35362 (12/X)

Jäsenvaltio

Alankomaat

Jäsenvaltion viitenumero

Subsiside Energiesprong Amtserdamse buurt Haarlem

Alueen nimi (NUTS)

NOORD-HOLLAND

Tukialueiden ulkopuolella sijaitsevat alueet

Myöntävä viranomainen

Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, Directie CZW

Postbus 20011

2500 EA Den Haag

email: angelique.herwijnen@minbzk.nl

www.rijksoverheid.nl/ministeries/bzk

Tukitoimenpiteen nimike

Subsidie aan Consortium Energiesprong Amsterdamse buurt Haarlem

Kansallinen oikeusperusta (mainitaan julkaisuviite)

Subsidiebesluit experimenten en kennisoverdracht wonen

Geldend op 23.7.2012

http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0020333/geldigheidsdatum_23-07-2012

Regeling Subsidiebesluit experimenten en kennisoverdracht wonen

Geldend op 23.7.2012

http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0020311/geldigheidsdatum_23-07-2012

Toimenpiteen tyyppi

tapauskohtaiselle tuelle

Voimassa olevan tukitoimenpiteen muutos

—

Myöntämispäivä

7.8.2012 lähtien

Toimiala(t)

Rakennuttaminen ja rakennushankkeiden kehittäminen, Asuin- ja muiden rakennusten rakentaminen, Lämpö-, vesijohto- ja ilmastointiasennus, Omien tai leasing-kiinteistöjen vuokraus ja hallinta, Arkkitehti- ja insinööripalvelut ja niihin liittyvä tekninen konsultointi

Tuensaajatyyppi

Pk-yritykset,suuret yritykset – Elan Wonen, Seinen projectontwikkeling, adviesbureau Merosch, Schouten techniek, Van Wijnen Heerhugowaard

Yritykselle myönnettävän tapauskohtaisen tuen kokonaismäärä

EUR 0,40 (miljoonaa)

Takaukset

—

Tukiväline (5 artikla)

Suora avustus

Viittaus komission päätökseen

—

Jos yhteisön varoista saadaan yhteisrahoitusta

—

Tavoitteet

Tuen enimmäisintensiteetti prosentteina tai enimmäismäärä kansallisessa valuutassa

Pk-yrityksille myönnet-tävät lisät prosentteina

Energiansäästötoimenpiteisiin tehtäviin investointeihin myönnettävä ympäristönsuojelutuki (21 artikla)

40 %

0 %

Internet-linkki tukitoimenpiteen koko tekstiin:

http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/besluiten/2012/08/22/beschikking-energiesprong-amsterdamse-buurt-haarlem.html

| Valtion tuen viitenumero | SA.35395 (12/X) |
| --- | --- |
| Jäsenvaltio | Espanja |
| Jäsenvaltion viitenumero | — |
| Alueen nimi (NUTS) | GALICIA
  107 artiklan 3 kohdan a alakohta |
| Myöntävä viranomainen | Dirección General de I+D+i. Consellería de Economía e Industria. Xunta de Galicia |
| Rúa dos Feáns, 7 |
| 15706 Santiago de Compostela (A Coruña – España) |
| http://www.xunta.es/economia-e-industria |

Valtion tuen viitenumero

SA.35395 (12/X)

Jäsenvaltio

Espanja

Jäsenvaltion viitenumero

—

Alueen nimi (NUTS)

GALICIA

107 artiklan 3 kohdan a alakohta

Myöntävä viranomainen

Dirección General de I+D+i. Consellería de Economía e Industria. Xunta de Galicia

Rúa dos Feáns, 7

15706 Santiago de Compostela (A Coruña – España)

http://www.xunta.es/economia-e-industria

Tukitoimenpiteen nimike

Subvenciones para inversiones innovadoras para el crecimiento empresarial, en el marco del Programa Operativo Feder Galicia 2007-2013 (IN848A).

Kansallinen oikeusperusta (mainitaan julkaisuviite)

Diario Oficial de Galicia número 73, de 17 de abril de 2012.

Toimenpiteen tyyppi

Ohjelma

Voimassa olevan tukitoimenpiteen muutos

—

Kesto

17.4.2012-31.12.2012

Toimiala(t)

Kaikki tukikelpoiset toimialat

Tuensaajatyyppi

Pk-yritykset,suuret yritykset

Ohjelman mukainen suunniteltu vuosibudjetin kokonaismäärä

EUR 3,00 (miljoonaa)

Takaukset

—

Tukiväline (5 artikla)

Suora avustus

Viittaus komission päätökseen

—

Jos yhteisön varoista saadaan yhteisrahoitusta

La aplicación presupuestaria con la que se financia este orden está cofinanciada en un 80 % con fondos Feder y FCI. — EUR 2,40 (miljoonaa)

Tavoitteet

Tuen enimmäisintensiteetti prosentteina tai enimmäismäärä kansallisessa valuutassa

Pk-yrityksille myönnet-tävät lisät prosentteina

Ohjelma

50 %

0 %

Internet-linkki tukitoimenpiteen koko tekstiin:

http://www.xunta.es/dog/Publicados/2012/20120417/AnuncioCA04-130412-0002_es.pdf

| Valtion tuen viitenumero | SA.35433 (12/X) |
| --- | --- |
| Jäsenvaltio | Yhdistynyt kuningaskunta |
| Jäsenvaltion viitenumero | — |
| Alueen nimi (NUTS) | UNITED KINGDOM
  Yhdistelmäalue |
| Myöntävä viranomainen | DECC |
| DECC, 3 Whitehall Place, London, SW1A 2AW |
| www.decc.gov.uk |

Valtion tuen viitenumero

SA.35433 (12/X)

Jäsenvaltio

Yhdistynyt kuningaskunta

Jäsenvaltion viitenumero

—

Alueen nimi (NUTS)

UNITED KINGDOM

Yhdistelmäalue

Myöntävä viranomainen

DECC

DECC, 3 Whitehall Place, London, SW1A 2AW

www.decc.gov.uk

Tukitoimenpiteen nimike

Energy Entrepreneurs Fund Scheme

Kansallinen oikeusperusta (mainitaan julkaisuviite)

http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1965/4/section/7

Toimenpiteen tyyppi

Ohjelma

Voimassa olevan tukitoimenpiteen muutos

—

Kesto

31.10.2012-31.3.2016

Toimiala(t)

Tieteellinen tutkimus ja kehittäminen

Tuensaajatyyppi

Pk-yritykset,suuret yritykset

Ohjelman mukainen suunniteltu vuosibudjetin kokonaismäärä

GBP 35,00 (miljoonaa)

Takaukset

GBP 0,00 (miljoonaa)

Tukiväline (5 artikla)

Suora avustus

Viittaus komission päätökseen

—

Jos yhteisön varoista saadaan yhteisrahoitusta

—

Tavoitteet

Tuen enimmäisintensiteetti prosentteina tai enimmäismäärä kansallisessa valuutassa

Pk-yrityksille myönnet-tävät lisät prosentteina

Tuki innovaatiotoiminnan neuvontapalveluihin ja innovaatiotoimintaa tukeviin palveluihin (36 artikla)

100 000 GBP

—

Kokeellinen kehittäminen (31 artiklan 2 kohdan c alakohta)

45 %

60 %

Nuorille innovatiivisille yrityksille myönnettävä tuki (35 artikla)

800 000 GBP

—

Internet-linkki tukitoimenpiteen koko tekstiin:

http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/funding/funding_ops/innovation/innov_fund/eefs/eefs.aspx

Go to documents available for download and download Guidance Notes

| Valtion tuen viitenumero | SA.35441 (12/X) |
| --- | --- |
| Jäsenvaltio | Yhdistynyt kuningaskunta |
| Jäsenvaltion viitenumero | — |
| Alueen nimi (NUTS) | NORFOLK
  107 artiklan 3 kohdan a alakohta,107 artiklan 3 kohdan c alakohta,Tukialueiden ulkopuolella sijaitsevat alueet,Yhdistelmäalue |
| Myöntävä viranomainen | Norfolk County Council |
| County Hall |
| Martineau Lane |
| Norwich |
| Norfolk |
| NR1 2DH |
| http://www.norfolk.gov.uk/ |

Valtion tuen viitenumero

SA.35441 (12/X)

Jäsenvaltio

Yhdistynyt kuningaskunta

Jäsenvaltion viitenumero

—

Alueen nimi (NUTS)

NORFOLK

107 artiklan 3 kohdan a alakohta,107 artiklan 3 kohdan c alakohta,Tukialueiden ulkopuolella sijaitsevat alueet,Yhdistelmäalue

Myöntävä viranomainen

Norfolk County Council

County Hall

Martineau Lane

Norwich

Norfolk

NR1 2DH

http://www.norfolk.gov.uk/

Tukitoimenpiteen nimike

Funding to support apprenticeship training 2012 – 2014

Kansallinen oikeusperusta (mainitaan julkaisuviite)

In accordance with the Local Government Act 2000 wellbeing powers under section 2

Toimenpiteen tyyppi

tapauskohtaiselle tuelle

Voimassa olevan tukitoimenpiteen muutos

—

Myöntämispäivä

5.9.2012-31.12.2014

Toimiala(t)

Kaikki tukikelpoiset toimialat

Tuensaajatyyppi

suuret yritykset – Norse Commercial Services Limited

Yritykselle myönnettävän tapauskohtaisen tuen kokonaismäärä

GBP 0,89 (miljoonaa)

Takaukset

GBP 0,00 (miljoonaa)

Tukiväline (5 artikla)

Suora avustus

Viittaus komission päätökseen

—

Jos yhteisön varoista saadaan yhteisrahoitusta

—

Tavoitteet

Tuen enimmäisintensiteetti prosentteina tai enimmäismäärä kansallisessa valuutassa

Pk-yrityksille myönnet-tävät lisät prosentteina

Yleiskoulutus (38 artiklan 2 alakohta)

53 %

0 %

Internet-linkki tukitoimenpiteen koko tekstiin:

http://www.norfolk.gov.uk/Business/State_Aid/index.htm

Link at the bottom of the page.

| Valtion tuen viitenumero | SA.35442 (12/X) |
| --- | --- |
| Jäsenvaltio | Saksa |
| Jäsenvaltion viitenumero | 3124/50-2 |
| Alueen nimi (NUTS) | THUERINGEN
  107 artiklan 3 kohdan a alakohta |
| Myöntävä viranomainen | Thüringer Aufbaubank |
| Gorkistraße 7 |
| D99084 Erfurt |
| www.aufbaubank.de |

Valtion tuen viitenumero

SA.35442 (12/X)

Jäsenvaltio

Saksa

Jäsenvaltion viitenumero

3124/50-2

Alueen nimi (NUTS)

THUERINGEN

107 artiklan 3 kohdan a alakohta

Myöntävä viranomainen

Thüringer Aufbaubank

Gorkistraße 7

D99084 Erfurt

www.aufbaubank.de

Tukitoimenpiteen nimike

Förderprogramm „Thüringen Dynamik“

Kansallinen oikeusperusta (mainitaan julkaisuviite)

| 1. | Thüringer Landeshaushaltsordnung (ThürLHO) einschl. der hierzu erlassenen Verwaltungsvorschriften |
| --- | --- |

1.

Thüringer Landeshaushaltsordnung (ThürLHO) einschl. der hierzu erlassenen Verwaltungsvorschriften

| 2. | Thüringer Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz (ThürVwVfG) sowie |
| --- | --- |

2.

Thüringer Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz (ThürVwVfG) sowie

| 3. | die für Subventionen allgemein geltenden Rechtsvorschorschriften (z. B. Thüringer Subventionsgesetz) |
| --- | --- |

3.

die für Subventionen allgemein geltenden Rechtsvorschorschriften (z. B. Thüringer Subventionsgesetz)

Toimenpiteen tyyppi

Ohjelma

Voimassa olevan tukitoimenpiteen muutos

Modification X 289/2010

Kesto

20.7.2012-31.12.2015

Toimiala(t)

Kaikki tukikelpoiset toimialat

Tuensaajatyyppi

Pk-yritykset

Ohjelman mukainen suunniteltu vuosibudjetin kokonaismäärä

EUR 20,50 (miljoonaa)

Takaukset

—

Tukiväline (5 artikla)

Edullinen laina

Viittaus komission päätökseen

—

Jos yhteisön varoista saadaan yhteisrahoitusta

2007DE161PO001 – EUR 52,50 (miljoonaa)

Tavoitteet

Tuen enimmäisintensiteetti prosentteina tai enimmäismäärä kansallisessa valuutassa

Pk-yrityksille myönnet-tävät lisät prosentteina

Pk-yrityksille myönnettävä investointi- ja työllisyystuki (15 artikla)

20 %

—

Internet-linkki tukitoimenpiteen koko tekstiin:

http://www.aufbaubank.de/getfile.php?1555.pdf

| Valtion tuen viitenumero | SA.35445 (12/X) |
| --- | --- |
| Jäsenvaltio | Liettua |
| Jäsenvaltion viitenumero | LT |
| Alueen nimi (NUTS) | Lithuania
  107 artiklan 3 kohdan a alakohta |
| Myöntävä viranomainen | Lietuvos Respublikos ūkio ministerija |
| Gedimino pr.38, 01104 Vilnius, Lietuva |
| www.ukmin.lt |

Valtion tuen viitenumero

SA.35445 (12/X)

Jäsenvaltio

Liettua

Jäsenvaltion viitenumero

LT

Alueen nimi (NUTS)

Lithuania

107 artiklan 3 kohdan a alakohta

Myöntävä viranomainen

Lietuvos Respublikos ūkio ministerija

Gedimino pr.38, 01104 Vilnius, Lietuva

www.ukmin.lt

Tukitoimenpiteen nimike

Ekonomikos augimo veiksmų programos 2 prioriteto „Verslo produktyvumo didinimas ir aplinkos verslui gerinimas“ priemonė „Kontroliuojantieji fondai“

Kansallinen oikeusperusta (mainitaan julkaisuviite)

Lietuvos Respublikos ūkio ministro 2012 m. rugsėjo 7 d. įsakymas Nr. 4-882 „Dėl VP2-2.3-ŪM-01-K priemonės „Kontroliuojantieji fondai“ veiklos „Inovacijų plėtra“ valstybės pagalbos schemos patvirtinimo“ (Žin., 2012, Nr. 107-5427)

Toimenpiteen tyyppi

Ohjelma

Voimassa olevan tukitoimenpiteen muutos

—

Kesto

15.9.2012-31.12.2013

Toimiala(t)

Kaikki tukikelpoiset toimialat

Tuensaajatyyppi

Pk-yritykset

Ohjelman mukainen suunniteltu vuosibudjetin kokonaismäärä

LTL 6,60 (miljoonaa)

Takaukset

—

Tukiväline (5 artikla)

Riskipääoman tarjoaminen

Viittaus komission päätökseen

—

Jos yhteisön varoista saadaan yhteisrahoitusta

Lietuvos Respublikos Vyriausybės 2008 m. liepos 23 d. nutarimas Nr. 788 „Dėl Ekonomikos augimo veiksmų programos patvirtinimo“ – LTL 33,00 (miljoonaa)

Tavoitteet

Tuen enimmäisintensiteetti prosentteina tai enimmäismäärä kansallisessa valuutassa

Pk-yrityksille myönnet-tävät lisät prosentteina

Riskipääoman muodossa myönnettävä tuki (28–29 artikla)

5 180 000 LTL

—

Internet-linkki tukitoimenpiteen koko tekstiin:

http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter3/dokpaieska.showdoc_l?p_id=432731&p_query=&p_tr2=2

| Valtion tuen viitenumero | SA.35451 (12/X) |
| --- | --- |
| Jäsenvaltio | Viro |
| Jäsenvaltion viitenumero | — |
| Alueen nimi (NUTS) | Estonia
  107 artiklan 3 kohdan a alakohta |
| Myöntävä viranomainen | Sihtasutus Archimedes |
| Koidula 13a, Tallinn, 10125 |
| www.archimedes.ee |

Valtion tuen viitenumero

SA.35451 (12/X)

Jäsenvaltio

Viro

Jäsenvaltion viitenumero

—

Alueen nimi (NUTS)

Estonia

107 artiklan 3 kohdan a alakohta

Myöntävä viranomainen

Sihtasutus Archimedes

Koidula 13a, Tallinn, 10125

www.archimedes.ee

Tukitoimenpiteen nimike

Alameetme „Info- ja kommunikatsioonitehnoloogia alase teadus- ja arendustegevuse toetamine” tingimused

Kansallinen oikeusperusta (mainitaan julkaisuviite)

Haridus- ja teadusministri 28. augusti 2012. a määrus nr 27 „Alameetme „Info- ja kommunikatsioonitehnoloogia alase teadus- ja arendustegevuse toetamine” tingimused”, RT I, 5.9.2012, 5

Toimenpiteen tyyppi

Ohjelma

Voimassa olevan tukitoimenpiteen muutos

—

Kesto

8.9.2012-31.12.2013

Toimiala(t)

Kaikki tukikelpoiset toimialat

Tuensaajatyyppi

Pk-yritykset,suuret yritykset

Ohjelman mukainen suunniteltu vuosibudjetin kokonaismäärä

EUR 2,40 (miljoonaa)

Takaukset

—

Tukiväline (5 artikla)

Suora avustus

Viittaus komission päätökseen

—

Jos yhteisön varoista saadaan yhteisrahoitusta

ERDF – EUR 2,16 (miljoonaa)

Tavoitteet

Tuen enimmäisintensiteetti prosentteina tai enimmäismäärä kansallisessa valuutassa

Pk-yrityksille myönnet-tävät lisät prosentteina

Perustutkimus (31 artiklan 2 kohdan a alakohta)

94 %

—

Teollinen tutkimus (31 artiklan 2 kohdan b alakohta)

50 %

10 %

Internet-linkki tukitoimenpiteen koko tekstiin:

https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/105092012005

| Valtion tuen viitenumero | SA.35457 (12/X) |
| --- | --- |
| Jäsenvaltio | Yhdistynyt kuningaskunta |
| Jäsenvaltion viitenumero | — |
| Alueen nimi (NUTS) | LONDON
  Tukialueiden ulkopuolella sijaitsevat alueet |
| Myöntävä viranomainen | Big Lottery Fund |
| 1 Plough Place |
| London |
| EC4A 1DE |
| www.biglotteryfund.org.uk |

Valtion tuen viitenumero

SA.35457 (12/X)

Jäsenvaltio

Yhdistynyt kuningaskunta

Jäsenvaltion viitenumero

—

Alueen nimi (NUTS)

LONDON

Tukialueiden ulkopuolella sijaitsevat alueet

Myöntävä viranomainen

Big Lottery Fund

1 Plough Place

London

EC4A 1DE

www.biglotteryfund.org.uk

Tukitoimenpiteen nimike

Allia Research State Aid

Kansallinen oikeusperusta (mainitaan julkaisuviite)

The powers of the BIG Lottery Fund to grant public funds under this scheme are contained in the following legislation:

National Lottery Act 1993 (as amended in 2006)

http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1993/39/contents

Toimenpiteen tyyppi

tapauskohtaiselle tuelle

Voimassa olevan tukitoimenpiteen muutos

—

Myöntämispäivä

10.9.2012 lähtien

Toimiala(t)

Kaikki tukikelpoiset toimialat

Tuensaajatyyppi

Pk-yritykset – Allia

Yritykselle myönnettävän tapauskohtaisen tuen kokonaismäärä

GBP 0,03 (miljoonaa)

Takaukset

GBP 0,00 (miljoonaa)

Tukiväline (5 artikla)

Suora avustus

Viittaus komission päätökseen

—

Jos yhteisön varoista saadaan yhteisrahoitusta

—

Tavoitteet

Tuen enimmäisintensiteetti prosentteina tai enimmäismäärä kansallisessa valuutassa

Pk-yrityksille myönnet-tävät lisät prosentteina

Pk-yrityksille konsulttipalveluihin myönnettävä tuki (26 artikla)

50 %

—

Internet-linkki tukitoimenpiteen koko tekstiin:

http://www.biglotteryfund.org.uk/allia_sme_consultancy_aid

| Valtion tuen viitenumero | SA.35468 (12/X) |
| --- | --- |
| Jäsenvaltio | Italia |
| Jäsenvaltion viitenumero | — |
| Alueen nimi (NUTS) | CALABRIA
  107 artiklan 3 kohdan a alakohta |
| Myöntävä viranomainen | Regione Calabria |
| Dipartimento Attività Produttive |
| Viale Cassiodoro – Palazzo Europa |
| 88100 Catanzaro |
| 0961-769619 |
| http://www.regione.calabria.it/sviluppo |

Valtion tuen viitenumero

SA.35468 (12/X)

Jäsenvaltio

Italia

Jäsenvaltion viitenumero

—

Alueen nimi (NUTS)

CALABRIA

107 artiklan 3 kohdan a alakohta

Myöntävä viranomainen

Regione Calabria

Dipartimento Attività Produttive

Viale Cassiodoro – Palazzo Europa

88100 Catanzaro

0961-769619

http://www.regione.calabria.it/sviluppo

Tukitoimenpiteen nimike

MEZZANINE FINANCING

FONDO REGIONALE PER IL SOSTEGNO AGLI INVESTIMENTI DELLE PMI.

Kansallinen oikeusperusta (mainitaan julkaisuviite)

POR CALABRIA FESR 2007/2013 – Linea di Intervento 7.1.3.2

Delibera di Giunta Regionale n. 539 del 6.12.2011

Avviso pubblico – BURC n. 25, parte III, del 22 giugno 2012

Toimenpiteen tyyppi

Ohjelma

Voimassa olevan tukitoimenpiteen muutos

—

Kesto

22.6.2012-31.12.2015

Toimiala(t)

KAIVOSTOIMINTA JA LOUHINTA, TEOLLISUUS, SÄHKÖ-, KAASU-, LÄMPÖ- JA ILMASTOINTIHUOLTO, VESIHUOLTO, VIEMÄRI- JA JÄTEVESIHUOLTO, JÄTEHUOLTO JA MUU YMPÄRISTÖN PUHTAANAPITO, RAKENTAMINEN, INFORMAATIO JA VIESTINTÄ

Tuensaajatyyppi

Pk-yritykset

Ohjelman mukainen suunniteltu vuosibudjetin kokonaismäärä

EUR 6,25 (miljoonaa)

Takaukset

—

Tukiväline (5 artikla)

Edullinen laina, Muu — Lo strumento di aiuto MEZZANINE FINANCING prevede una Dotazione finanziaria di risorse destinate al Fondo regionale per il sostegno agli investimenti delle Pmi regionali pari ad EUR 25 000 000 a valere sulla Linea di Intervento 7.1.3.2 «Azioni per la promozione e l’utilizzazione di strumenti di finanza innovativa» dell’Asse VII «Sistemi produttivi» del POR Calabria FESR 2007/2013.

Nello specifico, l'avviso pubblico all'Art. 6 — Forma, misura e caratteristica del finanziamento prevede che a fronte di un programma di investimento da realizzarsi sul territorio regionale, l’intervento finanziario in favore dei Soggetti beneficiari è concesso nella forma di finanziamento mezzanino nella misura massima del 70 % delle spese complessive ritenute ammissibili.

L'Art. 13 dell'avviso Pubblico MEZZANINO FINANCING stabilisce le modalità di erogazione, di rendicontazione e di rimborso del finanziamento. Il finanziamento mezzanino dovrà essere rimborsato, a scelta dell’impresa proponente, in un periodo compreso tra un minimo di 36 ed un massimo di 96 mesi, e comunque secondo la tempistica ritenuta congrua dal Soggetto gestore in fase istruttoria. E’ previsto un periodo di ammortamento, nel corso del quale saranno corrisposti i soli interessi, della durata massima di 24 mesi, a cui potrà essere aggiunto unperiodo di preammortamento «tecnico» necessario per portare la scadenza della prima rata alle scadenze fisse.

Le specifiche modalità di erogazione, rimborso e rendicontazione saranno indicate in sede di comunicazione di ammissione e disciplinate nel contratto di finanziamento.

Viittaus komission päätökseen

—

Jos yhteisön varoista saadaan yhteisrahoitusta

POR Calabria FESR 2007/2013 CCI n. 2007 IT 161 PO 008

Decisione della Commissione Europea C (2007) 6322 del 7.12.2007 — EUR 12,50 (miljoonaa)

Tavoitteet

Tuen enimmäisintensiteetti prosentteina tai enimmäismäärä kansallisessa valuutassa

Pk-yrityksille myönnet-tävät lisät prosentteina

Riskipääoman muodossa myönnettävä tuki (28–29 artikla)

25 000 000 EUR

—

Internet-linkki tukitoimenpiteen koko tekstiin:

http://www.regione.calabria.it/sviluppo/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=315&Itemid=19

| Valtion tuen viitenumero | SA.35478 (12/X) |
| --- | --- |
| Jäsenvaltio | Romania |
| Jäsenvaltion viitenumero | — |
| Alueen nimi (NUTS) | Romania
  107 artiklan 3 kohdan a alakohta |
| Myöntävä viranomainen | Autoritatea Națională pentru Cercetare Științifică (ANCS) prin Agenția Spațială Română (ROSA) |
| Str. Mendeleev, nr.21-25, sector 1, București |
| www.ancs.ro, www.rosa.ro |

Valtion tuen viitenumero

SA.35478 (12/X)

Jäsenvaltio

Romania

Jäsenvaltion viitenumero

—

Alueen nimi (NUTS)

Romania

107 artiklan 3 kohdan a alakohta

Myöntävä viranomainen

Autoritatea Națională pentru Cercetare Științifică (ANCS) prin Agenția Spațială Română (ROSA)

Str. Mendeleev, nr.21-25, sector 1, București

www.ancs.ro, www.rosa.ro

Tukitoimenpiteen nimike

Finanțarea Proiectelor de cercetare-dezvoltare și inovare (CDI) prin Programul de Cercetare, Dezvoltare și Inovare – Tehnologie Spațială și Cercetare Avansată – STAR

Kansallinen oikeusperusta (mainitaan julkaisuviite)

Decizia președintelui ANCS nr. 9220 din 3.9.2012

Toimenpiteen tyyppi

Ohjelma

Voimassa olevan tukitoimenpiteen muutos

—

Kesto

3.9.2012-31.12.2017

Toimiala(t)

Kaikki tukikelpoiset toimialat

Tuensaajatyyppi

Pk-yritykset,suuret yritykset

Ohjelman mukainen suunniteltu vuosibudjetin kokonaismäärä

RON 384,18 (miljoonaa)

Takaukset

—

Tukiväline (5 artikla)

Suora avustus

Viittaus komission päätökseen

—

Jos yhteisön varoista saadaan yhteisrahoitusta

—

Tavoitteet

Tuen enimmäisintensiteetti prosentteina tai enimmäismäärä kansallisessa valuutassa

Pk-yrityksille myönnet-tävät lisät prosentteina

Kokeellinen kehittäminen (31 artiklan 2 kohdan c alakohta)

25 %

20 %

Teknisiin toteutettavuustutkimuksiin myönnettävä tuki (32 artikla)

75 %

—

Teollisoikeuksien kustannusten kattamiseen myönnettävä tuki pk-yrityksille (33 artikla)

100 %

—

Tuki innovaatiotoiminnan neuvontapalveluihin ja innovaatiotoimintaa tukeviin palveluihin (36 artikla)

900 000 RON

—

Perustutkimus (31 artiklan 2 kohdan a alakohta)

100 %

—

Teollinen tutkimus (31 artiklan 2 kohdan b alakohta)

50 %

20 %

Internet-linkki tukitoimenpiteen koko tekstiin:

http://www.ancs.ro/uploads/programe-nationale/decizia-9220-03-09-2012-privind-aprobarea-schemei-de-ajutor-de-stat-finantarea-proiectelor-cdi-conform-programului-de-cdi-tehnologie-spatiala-si-cercetare-avansata-star.pdf

---

| 20.11.2012 | FI | Euroopan unionin virallinen lehti | C 357/14 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

20.11.2012

FI

Euroopan unionin virallinen lehti

C 357/14

---

Jäsenvaltion toimittamat tiedot perustamissopimuksen 87 ja 88 artiklan soveltamisesta maataloustuotteiden tuottamisen alalla toimiviin pieniin ja keskisuuriin yrityksiin sekä asetuksen (EY) N:o 70/2001 muuttamisesta annetun komission asetuksen (EY) N:o 1857/2006 mukaisesti myönnetystä valtiontuesta

2012/C 357/02

Tuen N:o: SA.35360 (12/XA)

Jäsenvaltio: Kypros

Alue: Cyprus

Tukiohjelman nimike tai yritykselle myönnettyä yksittäistä tukea saaneen yrityksen nimi: Πρόγραμμα επιτήρησης της Σπογγώδους Εγκεφαλοπάθειας των Βοοειδών

Oikeusperusta:

| 1. | Άρθρο 03525 του Προϋπολογισμού για το 2013 — Συμμετοχή σε Προγράμματα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης |
| --- | --- |

1.

Άρθρο 03525 του Προϋπολογισμού για το 2013 — Συμμετοχή σε Προγράμματα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης

| 2. | Ο περί της Εφαρμογής Κοινοτικών Κανονισμών στον Τομέα της Κτηνιατρικής Νόμος του 2004 (Ν 149(Ι)/2004) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Ο περί της Εφαρμογής Κοινοτικών Κανονισμών στον Τομέα της Κτηνιατρικής Νόμος του 2004 (Ν 149(Ι)/2004)

| 3. | Νόμος που προνοεί για την Υγεία των Ζώων (Ν.109(Ι)2001) |
| --- | --- |

3.

Νόμος που προνοεί για την Υγεία των Ζώων (Ν.109(Ι)2001)

| 4. | Απόφαση Εφόρου Ελέγχου Κρατικών Ενισχύσεων με αριθμό 341 και ημερομηνία 30 Ιουλίου 2012 (Επίσημη Εφημερίδα της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας με αριθμό 3765 και ημερομηνία 10.8.2012 σ.3180). |
| --- | --- |

4.

Απόφαση Εφόρου Ελέγχου Κρατικών Ενισχύσεων με αριθμό 341 και ημερομηνία 30 Ιουλίου 2012 (Επίσημη Εφημερίδα της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας με αριθμό 3765 και ημερομηνία 10.8.2012 σ.3180).

Tukiohjelman arvioidut vuosikustannukset tai yritykselle myönnetyn yksittäisen tuen kokonaismäärä: Ohjelman mukainen suunniteltu vuosibudjetin kokonaismäärä: EUR 0,03 (miljoonaa)

Tuen enimmäisintensiteetti: 100,00 %

Tukiohjelman tai yksittäisen tuen kesto: 1.1.2013-31.12.2013

Tuen tarkoitus: Eläintaudit (asetuksen (EY) N:o 1857/2006 10 artikla)

Asianomainen ala: Lypsykarjan kasvatus, Muun nautakarjan ja puhvelien kasvatus

Tuen myöntävän viranomaisen nimi ja osoite:

| Κτηνιατρικές Υπηρεσίες |
| --- |
| Υπουργείο Γεωργίας, Φυσικών Πόρων και Περιβάλλοντος |
| 1417, Αθαλάσσα |
| Λευκωσία |
| Κύπρος |

Κτηνιατρικές Υπηρεσίες

Υπουργείο Γεωργίας, Φυσικών Πόρων και Περιβάλλοντος

1417, Αθαλάσσα

Λευκωσία

Κύπρος

Internet-osoite: http://www.moa.gov.cy/moa/vs/vs.nsf/All/285A7B869251CDFCC2257A620034CB1C?OpenDocument

Muita tietoja: —

Tuen N:o: SA.35405 (12/XA)

Jäsenvaltio: Kypros

Alue: Cyprus

Tukiohjelman nimike tai yritykselle myönnettyä yksittäistä tukea saaneen yrityksen nimi: Πρόγραμμα Ελέγχου της σαλμονέλας στα σμήνη αυγοπαραγωγής.

Oikeusperusta:

| 1) | Άρθρο 03525 του Προϋπολογισμού για το 2013 – Συμμετοχή σε Προγράμματα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης |
| --- | --- |

1)

Άρθρο 03525 του Προϋπολογισμού για το 2013 – Συμμετοχή σε Προγράμματα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης

| 2) | Οι περί της Υγείας των Ζώων Νόμοι του 2001 έως 2009. |
| --- | --- |

2)

Οι περί της Υγείας των Ζώων Νόμοι του 2001 έως 2009.

| 3) | Κανονισμός (ΕΚ) αριθ. 2160/2003 του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου και του Συμβουλίου της 17ης Νοεμβρίου 2003. |
| --- | --- |

3)

Κανονισμός (ΕΚ) αριθ. 2160/2003 του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου και του Συμβουλίου της 17ης Νοεμβρίου 2003.

| 4) | Κανονισμός (ΕΚ) αριθ. 517/2011 της Επιτροπής της 25ης Μαΐου 2011. |
| --- | --- |

4)

Κανονισμός (ΕΚ) αριθ. 517/2011 της Επιτροπής της 25ης Μαΐου 2011.

| 5) | Απόφαση Εφόρου Ελέγχου Κρατικών Ενισχύσεων με αριθμό 342 και ημερομηνία 21.8.2012. |
| --- | --- |

5)

Απόφαση Εφόρου Ελέγχου Κρατικών Ενισχύσεων με αριθμό 342 και ημερομηνία 21.8.2012.

Tukiohjelman arvioidut vuosikustannukset tai yritykselle myönnetyn yksittäisen tuen kokonaismäärä: Ohjelman mukainen suunniteltu vuosibudjetin kokonaismäärä: EUR 0,10 (miljoonaa)

Tuen enimmäisintensiteetti: 100,00 %

Tukiohjelman tai yksittäisen tuen kesto: 1.1.2013-31.12.2013

Tuen tarkoitus: Eläintaudit (asetuksen (EY) N:o 1857/2006 10 artikla)

Asianomainen ala: Siipikarjan kasvatus

Tuen myöntävän viranomaisen nimi ja osoite:

| Κτηνιατρικές Υπηρεσίες |
| --- |
| Υπουργείο Γεωργίας, Φυσικών Πόρων και Περιβάλλοντος, |
| 1417 Λευκωσία |

Κτηνιατρικές Υπηρεσίες

Υπουργείο Γεωργίας, Φυσικών Πόρων και Περιβάλλοντος,

1417 Λευκωσία

Internet-osoite: http://www.moa.gov.cy/moa/vs/vs.nsf/all/98ebbe88e8c29561c2257a7200357039/$file/2013%20brucellosis_salmonellosis_avian%20influenza.pdf

Muita tietoja: —

Tuen N:o: SA.35406 (12/XA)

Jäsenvaltio: Kypros

Alue: Cyprus

Tukiohjelman nimike tai yritykselle myönnettyä yksittäistä tukea saaneen yrityksen nimi: Προγράμματα εκρίζωσης και επιτήρησης βρουκέλωσης βοοειδών και αιγοπροβάτων

Oikeusperusta:

| 1. | Άρθρο 03525 του Προϋπολογισμού για το 2013- Συμμετοχή σε προγράμματα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Άρθρο 03525 του Προϋπολογισμού για το 2013- Συμμετοχή σε προγράμματα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης.

| 2. | Ο περί της Εφαρμογής Κοινοτικών Κανονισμών στον Τομέα της Κτηνιατρικής Νόμος του 2004 (Ν. 149(Ι)/2004). |
| --- | --- |

2.

Ο περί της Εφαρμογής Κοινοτικών Κανονισμών στον Τομέα της Κτηνιατρικής Νόμος του 2004 (Ν. 149(Ι)/2004).

| 3. | Νόμος που προνοεί για την υγεία των ζώων (Ν. 109(I)/2001). |
| --- | --- |

3.

Νόμος που προνοεί για την υγεία των ζώων (Ν. 109(I)/2001).

| 4. | Διατάγματα περί καταπολέμησης και εξάλειψης της βρουκέλωσης (Κ.Δ.Π. 14/2002, 724/2003, 309/2012). |
| --- | --- |

4.

Διατάγματα περί καταπολέμησης και εξάλειψης της βρουκέλωσης (Κ.Δ.Π. 14/2002, 724/2003, 309/2012).

| 5. | Διατάγματα περί υγείας των ζώων (Κ.Δ.Π. 308/2012). |
| --- | --- |

5.

Διατάγματα περί υγείας των ζώων (Κ.Δ.Π. 308/2012).

| 6. | Απόφαση Εφόρου Ελέγχου Κρατικών Ενισχύσεων με αρ. 342 και ημ. 21.8.2012 |
| --- | --- |

6.

Απόφαση Εφόρου Ελέγχου Κρατικών Ενισχύσεων με αρ. 342 και ημ. 21.8.2012

Tukiohjelman arvioidut vuosikustannukset tai yritykselle myönnetyn yksittäisen tuen kokonaismäärä: Ohjelman mukainen suunniteltu vuosibudjetin kokonaismäärä: EUR 0,24 (miljoonaa)

Tuen enimmäisintensiteetti: 100,00 %

Tukiohjelman tai yksittäisen tuen kesto: 1.1.2013-31.12.2013

Tuen tarkoitus: Eläintaudit (asetuksen (EY) N:o 1857/2006 10 artikla)

Asianomainen ala: Lypsykarjan kasvatus, Lampaiden ja vuohien kasvatus

Tuen myöntävän viranomaisen nimi ja osoite:

| Κτηνιατρικές Υπηρεσίες |
| --- |
| Υπουργείο Γεωργίας, Φυσικών Πόρων και Περιβάλλοντος |
| 1417, Αθαλάσσα |
| Λευκωσία |
| Κύπρος |

Κτηνιατρικές Υπηρεσίες

Υπουργείο Γεωργίας, Φυσικών Πόρων και Περιβάλλοντος

1417, Αθαλάσσα

Λευκωσία

Κύπρος

Internet-osoite: http://www.moa.gov.cy/moa/vs/vs.nsf/all/98ebbe88e8c29561c2257a7200357039/$file/2013%20brucellosis_salmonellosis_avian%20influenza.pdf

Muita tietoja: —

Tuen N:o: SA.35407 (12/XA)

Jäsenvaltio: Kypros

Alue: Cyprus

Tukiohjelman nimike tai yritykselle myönnettyä yksittäistä tukea saaneen yrityksen nimi: Πρόγραμμα Ελέγχου της σαλμονέλας στα σμήνη αναπαραγωγής.

Oikeusperusta:

| 1) | Άρθρο 03525 του Προϋπολογισμού για το 2013 – Συμμετοχή σε Προγράμματα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης. |
| --- | --- |

1)

Άρθρο 03525 του Προϋπολογισμού για το 2013 – Συμμετοχή σε Προγράμματα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης.

| 2) | Οι περί της Υγείας των Ζώων Νόμοι του 2001 έως 2009. |
| --- | --- |

2)

Οι περί της Υγείας των Ζώων Νόμοι του 2001 έως 2009.

| 3) | Κανονισμός (ΕΚ) αριθ. 2160/2003 του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου και του Συμβουλίου της 17ης Νοεμβρίου 2003. |
| --- | --- |

3)

Κανονισμός (ΕΚ) αριθ. 2160/2003 του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου και του Συμβουλίου της 17ης Νοεμβρίου 2003.

| 4) | Κανονισμός (ΕΕ) αριθ. 200/2010 της Επιτροπής της 10ης Μαρτίου 2010. |
| --- | --- |

4)

Κανονισμός (ΕΕ) αριθ. 200/2010 της Επιτροπής της 10ης Μαρτίου 2010.

| 5) | Κανονισμός (ΕΚ) αριθ. 517/2011 της Επιτροπής της 25ης Μαΐου 2011. |
| --- | --- |

5)

Κανονισμός (ΕΚ) αριθ. 517/2011 της Επιτροπής της 25ης Μαΐου 2011.

| 6) | Απόφαση Εφόρου Ελέγχου Κρατικών Ενισχύσεων με αριθμό 342 και ημερομηνία 21.8.2012 |
| --- | --- |

6)

Απόφαση Εφόρου Ελέγχου Κρατικών Ενισχύσεων με αριθμό 342 και ημερομηνία 21.8.2012

Tukiohjelman arvioidut vuosikustannukset tai yritykselle myönnetyn yksittäisen tuen kokonaismäärä: Ohjelman mukainen suunniteltu vuosibudjetin kokonaismäärä: EUR 0,20 (miljoonaa)

Tuen enimmäisintensiteetti: 100,00 %

Tukiohjelman tai yksittäisen tuen kesto: 1.1.2013-31.12.2013

Tuen tarkoitus: Eläintaudit (asetuksen (EY) N:o 1857/2006 10 artikla)

Asianomainen ala: Siipikarjan kasvatus

Tuen myöntävän viranomaisen nimi ja osoite:

| Κτηνιατρικές Υπηρεσίες |
| --- |
| Υπουργείο Γεωργίας, Φυσικών Πόρων και Περιβάλλοντος, |
| 1417 Λευκωσία, |
| Κύπρος |

Κτηνιατρικές Υπηρεσίες

Υπουργείο Γεωργίας, Φυσικών Πόρων και Περιβάλλοντος,

1417 Λευκωσία,

Κύπρος

Internet-osoite: http://www.moa.gov.cy/moa/vs/vs.nsf/all/98ebbe88e8c29561c2257a7200357039/$file/2013%20brucellosis_salmonellosis_avian%20influenza.pdf

Muita tietoja: —

Tuen N:o: SA.35408 (12/XA)

Jäsenvaltio: Kypros

Alue: Cyprus

Tukiohjelman nimike tai yritykselle myönnettyä yksittäistä tukea saaneen yrityksen nimi: Πρόγραμμα Ελέγχου της σαλμονέλας στα σμήνη κρεοπαραγωγής.

Oikeusperusta:

| 1) | Άρθρο 03525 του Προϋπολογισμού για το 2013 — Συμμετοχή σε Προγράμματα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης. |
| --- | --- |

1)

Άρθρο 03525 του Προϋπολογισμού για το 2013 — Συμμετοχή σε Προγράμματα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης.

| 2) | Οι περί της Υγείας των Ζώων Νόμοι του 2001 έως 2009. |
| --- | --- |

2)

Οι περί της Υγείας των Ζώων Νόμοι του 2001 έως 2009.

| 3) | Κανονισμός (ΕΚ) αριθ. 2160/2003 του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου και του Συμβουλίου της 17ης Νοεμβρίου 2003. |
| --- | --- |

3)

Κανονισμός (ΕΚ) αριθ. 2160/2003 του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου και του Συμβουλίου της 17ης Νοεμβρίου 2003.

| 4) | Κανονισμός (ΕΕ) αριθ. 200/2012 της Επιτροπής της 8ης Μαρτίου 2012. |
| --- | --- |

4)

Κανονισμός (ΕΕ) αριθ. 200/2012 της Επιτροπής της 8ης Μαρτίου 2012.

| 5) | Απόφαση Εφόρου Ελέγχου Κρατικών Ενισχύσεων με αριθμό 342 και ημερομηνία 21.8.2012. |
| --- | --- |

5)

Απόφαση Εφόρου Ελέγχου Κρατικών Ενισχύσεων με αριθμό 342 και ημερομηνία 21.8.2012.

Tukiohjelman arvioidut vuosikustannukset tai yritykselle myönnetyn yksittäisen tuen kokonaismäärä: —

Tuen enimmäisintensiteetti: 100,00 %

Tukiohjelman tai yksittäisen tuen kesto: 1.1.2013-31.12.2013

Tuen tarkoitus: Eläintaudit (asetuksen (EY) N:o 1857/2006 10 artikla)

Asianomainen ala: Siipikarjan kasvatus

Tuen myöntävän viranomaisen nimi ja osoite:

| Κτηνιατρικές Υπηρεσίες |
| --- |
| Υπουργείο Γεωργίας, Φυσικών Πόρων και Περιβάλλοντος, |
| 1417 Λευκωσία |

Κτηνιατρικές Υπηρεσίες

Υπουργείο Γεωργίας, Φυσικών Πόρων και Περιβάλλοντος,

1417 Λευκωσία

Internet-osoite: http://www.moa.gov.cy/moa/vs/vs.nsf/all/98ebbe88e8c29561c2257a7200357039/$file/2013%20brucellosis_salmonellosis_avian%20influenza.pdf

Muita tietoja: —

Tuen N:o: SA.35411 (12/XA)

Jäsenvaltio: Kypros

Alue: Cyprus

Tukiohjelman nimike tai yritykselle myönnettyä yksittäistä tukea saaneen yrityksen nimi: Πρόγραμμα Ελέγχου της σαλμονέλας στα σμήνη γαλοπούλων κρεοπαραγωγής.

Oikeusperusta:

| 1) | Άρθρο 03525 του Προϋπολογισμού για το 2013– Συμμετοχή σε Προγράμματα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης. |
| --- | --- |

1)

Άρθρο 03525 του Προϋπολογισμού για το 2013– Συμμετοχή σε Προγράμματα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης.

| 2) | Οι περί της Υγείας των Ζώων Νόμοι του 2001 έως 2009. |
| --- | --- |

2)

Οι περί της Υγείας των Ζώων Νόμοι του 2001 έως 2009.

| 3) | Κανονισμός (ΕΚ) αριθ. 2160/2003 του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου και του Συμβουλίου της 17ης Νοεμβρίου 2003. |
| --- | --- |

3)

Κανονισμός (ΕΚ) αριθ. 2160/2003 του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου και του Συμβουλίου της 17ης Νοεμβρίου 2003.

| 4) | Κανονισμός (ΕΚ) αριθ. 584/2008 της Επιτροπής της 20ής Ιουνίου 2008. |
| --- | --- |

4)

Κανονισμός (ΕΚ) αριθ. 584/2008 της Επιτροπής της 20ής Ιουνίου 2008.

| 5) | Απόφαση Εφόρου Ελέγχου Κρατικών Ενισχύσεων με αριθμό 342 και ημερομηνία 21.8.2012. |
| --- | --- |

5)

Απόφαση Εφόρου Ελέγχου Κρατικών Ενισχύσεων με αριθμό 342 και ημερομηνία 21.8.2012.

Tukiohjelman arvioidut vuosikustannukset tai yritykselle myönnetyn yksittäisen tuen kokonaismäärä: —

Tuen enimmäisintensiteetti: 100,00 %

Tukiohjelman tai yksittäisen tuen kesto: 1.1.2013-31.12.2013

Tuen tarkoitus: Eläintaudit (asetuksen (EY) N:o 1857/2006 10 artikla)

Asianomainen ala: Siipikarjan kasvatus

Tuen myöntävän viranomaisen nimi ja osoite:

| Κτηνιατρικές Υπηρεσίες |
| --- |
| Υπουργείο Γεωργίας, Φυσικών Πόρων και Περιβάλλοντος, |
| 1417 Λευκωσία |

Κτηνιατρικές Υπηρεσίες

Υπουργείο Γεωργίας, Φυσικών Πόρων και Περιβάλλοντος,

1417 Λευκωσία

Internet-osoite: http://www.moa.gov.cy/moa/vs/vs.nsf/all/98ebbe88e8c29561c2257a7200357039/$file/2013%20brucellosis_salmonellosis_avian%20influenza.pdf

Muita tietoja: —

Tuen N:o: SA.35412 (12/XA)

Jäsenvaltio: Kypros

Alue: Cyprus

Tukiohjelman nimike tai yritykselle myönnettyä yksittäistä tukea saaneen yrityksen nimi: Πρόγραμμα επιτήρησης της γρίπης των πτηνών σε πτηνά της οργανωμένης πτηνοτροφίας και άγρια πτηνά.

Oikeusperusta:

| 1) | Άρθρο 03525 του Προϋπολογισμού για το 2013 – Συμμετοχή σε Προγράμματα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης |
| --- | --- |

1)

Άρθρο 03525 του Προϋπολογισμού για το 2013 – Συμμετοχή σε Προγράμματα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης

| 2) | Οι περί της Υγείας των Ζώων Νόμοι του 2001 έως 2009. |
| --- | --- |

2)

Οι περί της Υγείας των Ζώων Νόμοι του 2001 έως 2009.

| 3) | Απόφαση της Επιτροπής, της 25ης Ιουνίου 2010 για την εφαρμογή από τα κράτη μέλη προγραμμάτων επιτήρησης για τη γρίπη των πτηνών σε πουλερικά και άγρια πτηνά (2010/367/ΕΕ). |
| --- | --- |

3)

Απόφαση της Επιτροπής, της 25ης Ιουνίου 2010 για την εφαρμογή από τα κράτη μέλη προγραμμάτων επιτήρησης για τη γρίπη των πτηνών σε πουλερικά και άγρια πτηνά (2010/367/ΕΕ).

| 4) | Απόφαση Εφόρου Ελέγχου Κρατικών Ενισχύσεων με αριθμό 342 και ημερομηνία 21.8.2012. |
| --- | --- |

4)

Απόφαση Εφόρου Ελέγχου Κρατικών Ενισχύσεων με αριθμό 342 και ημερομηνία 21.8.2012.

Tukiohjelman arvioidut vuosikustannukset tai yritykselle myönnetyn yksittäisen tuen kokonaismäärä: Ohjelman mukainen suunniteltu vuosibudjetin kokonaismäärä: EUR 0,03 (miljoonaa)

Tuen enimmäisintensiteetti: 100,00 %

Tukiohjelman tai yksittäisen tuen kesto: 1.1.2013-31.12.2013

Tuen tarkoitus: Eläintaudit (asetuksen (EY) N:o 1857/2006 10 artikla)

Asianomainen ala: Siipikarjan kasvatus

Tuen myöntävän viranomaisen nimi ja osoite:

| Κτηνιατρικές Υπηρεσίες |
| --- |
| Υπουργείο Γεωργίας, Φυσικών Πόρων και Περιβάλλοντος, |
| 1417, Λευκωσία. |

Κτηνιατρικές Υπηρεσίες

Υπουργείο Γεωργίας, Φυσικών Πόρων και Περιβάλλοντος,

1417, Λευκωσία.

Internet-osoite: http://www.moa.gov.cy/moa/vs/vs.nsf/All/98EBBE88E8C29561C2257A7200357039/$file/2013%20brucellosis_salmonellosis_avian%20influenza.pdf

Muita tietoja: —

Tuen N:o: SA.35469 (12/XA)

Jäsenvaltio: Kypros

Alue: Cyprus

Tukiohjelman nimike tai yritykselle myönnettyä yksittäistä tukea saaneen yrityksen nimi: Σχέδιο Ελέγχου Τρομώδους Νόσου Αιγοπροβάτων.

Oikeusperusta:

| 1. | ΆρθρA 03525 και 03619 του Προϋπολογισμού για το 2013 – Συμμετοχή σε Προγράμματα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης |
| --- | --- |

1.

ΆρθρA 03525 και 03619 του Προϋπολογισμού για το 2013 – Συμμετοχή σε Προγράμματα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης

| 2. | Ο περί της Εφαρμογής Κοινοτικών Κανονισμών στον Τομέα της Κτηνιατρικής Νόμος του 2004 (Ν 149(Ι)/2004). |
| --- | --- |

2.

Ο περί της Εφαρμογής Κοινοτικών Κανονισμών στον Τομέα της Κτηνιατρικής Νόμος του 2004 (Ν 149(Ι)/2004).

| 3. | Νόμος που προνοεί για την Υγεία των Ζώων (Ν.109(Ι)2001). |
| --- | --- |

3.

Νόμος που προνοεί για την Υγεία των Ζώων (Ν.109(Ι)2001).

| 4. | Τα περί της Τρομώδους Νόσου Διατάγματα του 2005 έως 2010 (Κ.Δ.Π. 545/2005, 160/2007, 44/2008, 307/2010). |
| --- | --- |

4.

Τα περί της Τρομώδους Νόσου Διατάγματα του 2005 έως 2010 (Κ.Δ.Π. 545/2005, 160/2007, 44/2008, 307/2010).

| 5. | Απόφαση Εφόρου Ελέγχου Κρατικών Ενισχύσεων με αριθμό 343 και ημερομηνία 3.9.2012. |
| --- | --- |

5.

Απόφαση Εφόρου Ελέγχου Κρατικών Ενισχύσεων με αριθμό 343 και ημερομηνία 3.9.2012.

Tukiohjelman arvioidut vuosikustannukset tai yritykselle myönnetyn yksittäisen tuen kokonaismäärä: Ohjelman mukainen suunniteltu vuosibudjetin kokonaismäärä: EUR 1,82 (miljoonaa)

Tuen enimmäisintensiteetti: 100,00 %

Tukiohjelman tai yksittäisen tuen kesto: 1.1.2013-31.12.2013

Tuen tarkoitus: Eläintaudit (asetuksen (EY) N:o 1857/2006 10 artikla)

Asianomainen ala: Lampaiden ja vuohien kasvatus

Tuen myöntävän viranomaisen nimi ja osoite:

| Κτηνιατρικές Υπηρεσίες |
| --- |
| 1417 Λευκωσία, |
| Κύπρος |

Κτηνιατρικές Υπηρεσίες

1417 Λευκωσία,

Κύπρος

Internet-osoite: http://www.moa.gov.cy/moa/vs/vs.nsf/All/F92B84F6BF104926C2257A84001C9603/$file/2013_scrapie.pdf

Muita tietoja: —

---

| 20.11.2012 | FI | Euroopan unionin virallinen lehti | C 357/18 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

20.11.2012

FI

Euroopan unionin virallinen lehti

C 357/18

---

Jäsenvaltion toimittamat tiedot perustamissopimuksen 87 ja 88 artiklan soveltamisesta maataloustuotteiden tuottamisen alalla toimiviin pieniin ja keskisuuriin yrityksiin sekä asetuksen (EY) N:o 70/2001 muuttamisesta annetun komission asetuksen (EY) N:o 1857/2006 mukaisesti myönnetystä valtiontuesta

2012/C 357/03

Tuen N:o: SA.35417 (12/XA)

Jäsenvaltio: Bulgaria

Alue: Bulgaria

Tukiohjelman nimike tai yritykselle myönnettyä yksittäistä tukea saaneen yrityksen nimi: Помощ за участие на Международното изложение за животновъдство „Еуро Тийр“, гр. Хановер, Германия – 2012

Oikeusperusta: Чл. 12, ал.1, т. 10 от Закона за подпомагане на земеделските производители; Указания за прилагане на схемата на държавна помощ

Tukiohjelman arvioidut vuosikustannukset tai yritykselle myönnetyn yksittäisen tuen kokonaismäärä: Ohjelman mukainen suunniteltu vuosibudjetin kokonaismäärä: BGN 0,18 (miljoonaa)

Tuen enimmäisintensiteetti: 100,00 %

Tukiohjelman tai yksittäisen tuen kesto: 17.10.2012-31.12.2012

Tuen tarkoitus: Tekninen tuki (asetuksen (EY) N:o 1857/2006 15 artikla)

Asianomainen ala: Kasvinviljely ja kotieläintalous, riistatalous ja niihin liittyvät palvelut

Tuen myöntävän viranomaisen nimi ja osoite:

| Държавен фонд „Земеделие“ |
| --- |
| гр. София 1618, бул. Цар Борис III 138 |

Държавен фонд „Земеделие“

гр. София 1618, бул. Цар Борис III 138

Internet-osoite: http://www.dfz.bg/bg/darzhavni-pomoshti/shemi_durjavni_pomoshti_reglament_1857_2006/

Muita tietoja: —

Tuen N:o: SA.35424 (12/XA)

Jäsenvaltio: Ranska

Alue: PROVENCE-ALPES-COTE D'AZUR

Tukiohjelman nimike tai yritykselle myönnettyä yksittäistä tukea saaneen yrityksen nimi: Aide exceptionnelle de solidarité de la région Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur envers les agriculteurs sinistrés suite aux orages de grêle du printemps 2011 dans les territoires du Vaucluse et des Bouches-du-Rhône.

Oikeusperusta:

| | Arrêté préfectoral (84) du 25 octobre 2011 |
| --- | --- |

Arrêté préfectoral (84) du 25 octobre 2011

| | Arrêté préfectoral (84) du 13 juillet 2012 |
| --- | --- |

Arrêté préfectoral (84) du 13 juillet 2012

| | Arrêté préfectoral (13) du 3 Octobre 2011 |
| --- | --- |

Arrêté préfectoral (13) du 3 Octobre 2011

| | Arrêté préfectoral (13) du 13 février 2012 |
| --- | --- |

Arrêté préfectoral (13) du 13 février 2012

Tukiohjelman arvioidut vuosikustannukset tai yritykselle myönnetyn yksittäisen tuen kokonaismäärä: Ohjelman mukainen suunniteltu vuosibudjetin kokonaismäärä: EUR 0,30 (miljoonaa)

Tuen enimmäisintensiteetti: 5,00 %

Tukiohjelman tai yksittäisen tuen kesto: 20.10.2012-31.12.2013

Tuen tarkoitus: Epäsuotuisat sääolot (asetuksen (EY) N:o 1857/2006 11 artikla)

Asianomainen ala: MAATALOUS, METSÄTALOUS JA KALATALOUS

Tuen myöntävän viranomaisen nimi ja osoite:

| Conseil régional Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur |
| --- |
| Direction de l'Eau et de l'Agriculture |
| Service Agriculture |
| Hôtel de Région |
| 27, place Jules Guesde |
| 13481 Marseille Cedex 20 |

Conseil régional Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur

Direction de l'Eau et de l'Agriculture

Service Agriculture

Hôtel de Région

27, place Jules Guesde

13481 Marseille Cedex 20

Internet-osoite: http://www.regionpaca.fr/agriculture-mer-et-foret/une-agriculture-regionale-durable/dispositif-d-aide-financiere-pour-les-agriculteurs-greles.html

Muita tietoja: —

Tuen N:o: SA.35452 (12/XA)

Jäsenvaltio: Italia

Alue: FRIULI-VENEZIA GIULIA

Tukiohjelman nimike tai yritykselle myönnettyä yksittäistä tukea saaneen yrityksen nimi: Regolamento per la concessione di contributi a favore delle aziende agricole operanti nel comprensorio della Carnia

Oikeusperusta: Provvedimento dell'Amministratore temporaneo della Comunità Montana della Carnia n. 80/AT del 8.6.2012

Tukiohjelman arvioidut vuosikustannukset tai yritykselle myönnetyn yksittäisen tuen kokonaismäärä: Ohjelman mukainen suunniteltu vuosibudjetin kokonaismäärä: EUR 0,30 (miljoonaa)

Tuen enimmäisintensiteetti: 60,00 %

Tukiohjelman tai yksittäisen tuen kesto: 26.10.2012-31.12.2013

Tuen tarkoitus: Maatilainvestoinnit (asetuksen (EY) N:o 1857/2006 4 artikla)

Asianomainen ala: Kasvinviljely ja kotieläintalous, riistatalous ja niihin liittyvät palvelut

Tuen myöntävän viranomaisen nimi ja osoite:

| Comunità Montana della Carnia |
| --- |
| Via Carnia Libera 1944, n. 29 |
| 33028 TOLMEZZO (UD) |

Comunità Montana della Carnia

Via Carnia Libera 1944, n. 29

33028 TOLMEZZO (UD)

Internet-osoite: http://www.comunitamontanacarnia.it/

Muita tietoja: —

Tuen N:o: SA.35470 (12/XA)

Jäsenvaltio: Alankomaat

Alue: ZUID-HOLLAND

Tukiohjelman nimike tai yritykselle myönnettyä yksittäistä tukea saaneen yrityksen nimi: Projectsubsidie grootschalige Proef van Onderwaterdrainage (GPO)

Oikeusperusta: De GPO is opgenomen in paragraaf 3.31 van de Subsidieregeling Landelijk Gebied (SLG, zie bijlage). De Subsidieregeling Landelijk Gebied is vastgesteld op basis van de Algemene subsidieverordening Zuid-Holland (Asv).

Tukiohjelman arvioidut vuosikustannukset tai yritykselle myönnetyn yksittäisen tuen kokonaismäärä: Ohjelman mukainen suunniteltu vuosibudjetin kokonaismäärä: EUR 0,15 (miljoonaa)

Tuen enimmäisintensiteetti: 50,00 %

Tukiohjelman tai yksittäisen tuen kesto: 24.10.2012-31.12.2013

Tuen tarkoitus: Perinteisten maisemien ja rakennusten säilyttäminen (asetuksen (EY) N:o 1857/2006 5 artikla)

Asianomainen ala: MAATALOUS, METSÄTALOUS JA KALATALOUS

Tuen myöntävän viranomaisen nimi ja osoite:

| Provincie Zuid-Holland |
| --- |
| Postbus 90602 |
| 2509 LP Den Haag |

Provincie Zuid-Holland

Postbus 90602

2509 LP Den Haag

Internet-osoite:

| | http://www.zuid-holland.nl/loket/reglement?action=getregulation®elingid=72&versie=127 |
| --- | --- |

http://www.zuid-holland.nl/loket/reglement?action=getregulation®elingid=72&versie=127

| | http://www.zuid-holland.nl/loket/reglement?action=getregulation®elingid=56&versie=0 |
| --- | --- |

http://www.zuid-holland.nl/loket/reglement?action=getregulation®elingid=56&versie=0

Muita tietoja: —

Tuen N:o: SA.35572 (12/XA)

Jäsenvaltio: Yhdistynyt kuningaskunta

Alue: SOUTH EAST, NORTH EAST, NORTH WEST, YORKSHIRE AND THE HUMBER, EAST MIDLANDS, WEST MIDLANDS, EASTERN, LONDON, SOUTH WEST

Tukiohjelman nimike tai yritykselle myönnettyä yksittäistä tukea saaneen yrityksen nimi: Plant Disease and Plant Pest Prevention and Control (England) Scheme

Oikeusperusta: Natural Environment and Rural Communities Act 2006 Sections 2-10 and 13.

Tukiohjelman arvioidut vuosikustannukset tai yritykselle myönnetyn yksittäisen tuen kokonaismäärä: Ohjelman mukainen suunniteltu vuosibudjetin kokonaismäärä: GBP 10,00 (miljoonaa)

Tuen enimmäisintensiteetti: 100,00 %

Tukiohjelman tai yksittäisen tuen kesto: 1.11.2012-31.10.2019

Tuen tarkoitus: Eläintaudit (asetuksen (EY) N:o 1857/2006 10 artikla)

Asianomainen ala: MAATALOUS, METSÄTALOUS JA KALATALOUS

Tuen myöntävän viranomaisen nimi ja osoite:

| Natural England |
| --- |
| Foundry House, 3 Millsands, River Exchange, Sheffield S3 8NH United Kingdom |

Natural England

Foundry House, 3 Millsands, River Exchange, Sheffield S3 8NH United Kingdom

Internet-osoite: http://www.naturalengland.org.uk/ourwork/conservation/biodiversity/threats/diseases.aspx

Muita tietoja: —

---

| 20.11.2012 | FI | Euroopan unionin virallinen lehti | C 357/20 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

20.11.2012

FI

Euroopan unionin virallinen lehti

C 357/20

---

Tiedot, jotka jäsenvaltiot ovat toimittaneet tiettyjen tukimuotojen toteamisesta yhteismarkkinoille soveltuviksi perustamissopimuksen 87 ja 88 artiklan mukaisesti annetun komission asetuksen (EY) N:o 800/2008 (yleinen ryhmäpoikkeusasetus)

(ETA:n kannalta merkityksellinen teksti)

2012/C 357/04

| Valtion tuen viitenumero | SA.35467 (12/X) |
| --- | --- |
| Jäsenvaltio | Italia |
| Jäsenvaltion viitenumero | — |
| Alueen nimi (NUTS) | CAMPANIA
  107 artiklan 3 kohdan a alakohta |
| Myöntävä viranomainen | Regione Campania — Autorità di Gestione FSE 2007-2013 |
| Via Santa Lucia, 81 – Napoli – ITALIA |
| www.fse.regione.campania.it |

Valtion tuen viitenumero

SA.35467 (12/X)

Jäsenvaltio

Italia

Jäsenvaltion viitenumero

—

Alueen nimi (NUTS)

CAMPANIA

107 artiklan 3 kohdan a alakohta

Myöntävä viranomainen

Regione Campania — Autorità di Gestione FSE 2007-2013

Via Santa Lucia, 81 – Napoli – ITALIA

www.fse.regione.campania.it

Tukitoimenpiteen nimike

INCENTIVI FISCALI PER L'ASSUNZIONE DI LAVORATORI SVANTAGGIATI IN CAMPANIA – CREDITO DI IMPOSTA

Kansallinen oikeusperusta (mainitaan julkaisuviite)

| — | Decreto legge 13 maggio 2011, n. 70 convertito, con modificazioni, dalla Legge 12 luglio 2011, n. 106, ulteriori modifiche apportate dal Decreto legge 9 febbraio 2012 n. 5 convertito, con modificazioni, dalla Legge 4 aprile 2012, n. 35. |
| --- | --- |

—

Decreto legge 13 maggio 2011, n. 70 convertito, con modificazioni, dalla Legge 12 luglio 2011, n. 106, ulteriori modifiche apportate dal Decreto legge 9 febbraio 2012 n. 5 convertito, con modificazioni, dalla Legge 4 aprile 2012, n. 35.

| — | DGR 298 DEL 28.6.2012 |
| --- | --- |

—

DGR 298 DEL 28.6.2012

| — | Decreto Dirigenziale n. 633 del 24.8.2012 |
| --- | --- |

—

Decreto Dirigenziale n. 633 del 24.8.2012

Toimenpiteen tyyppi

Ohjelma

Voimassa olevan tukitoimenpiteen muutos

—

Kesto

10.9.2012-1.10.2012

Toimiala(t)

Kaikki tukikelpoiset toimialat

Tuensaajatyyppi

Pk-yritykset,suuret yritykset

Ohjelman mukainen suunniteltu vuosibudjetin kokonaismäärä

EUR 20,00 (miljoonaa)

Takaukset

—

Tukiväline (5 artikla)

Veroetu muussa muodossa

Viittaus komission päätökseen

—

Jos yhteisön varoista saadaan yhteisrahoitusta

POR Campania FSE 2007-2013Asse II — Occupabilità, Obiettivo specifico e) attuare politiche del lavoro attive e preventive con particolare attenzione all’integrazione dei migranti nel mercato del lavoro, all’invecchiamento attivo, al lavoro autonomo e all’avvio di imprese, Obiettivo operativo e3) consolidare ed ampliare il sistema di incentivi rivolti ai segmenti deboli del mercato del lavoro con priorità ai giovani, ai disoccupati di lunga durata e alle donne. — EUR 4,00 (miljoonaa)

Tavoitteet

Tuen enimmäisintensiteetti prosentteina tai enimmäismäärä kansallisessa valuutassa

Pk-yrityksille myönnet-tävät lisät prosentteina

Palkkatukien muodossa myönnettävä tuki epäedullisessa asemassa olevien työntekijöiden työhönottoon

(40 artikla)

50 %

—

Internet-linkki tukitoimenpiteen koko tekstiin:

| | http://www.creditoimpostafse.regione.campania.it/ifals/home.do;jsessionid=7684E0CFDC858D2E82E2A60B6E971DD9.cred-impo2 |
| --- | --- |

http://www.creditoimpostafse.regione.campania.it/ifals/home.do;jsessionid=7684E0CFDC858D2E82E2A60B6E971DD9.cred-impo2

| | http://www.creditoimpostafse.regione.campania.it/ifals/files/Avviso_Ifals.pdf |
| --- | --- |

http://www.creditoimpostafse.regione.campania.it/ifals/files/Avviso_Ifals.pdf

| Valtion tuen viitenumero | SA.35495 (12/X) |
| --- | --- |
| Jäsenvaltio | Itävalta |
| Jäsenvaltion viitenumero | — |
| Alueen nimi (NUTS) | PINZGAU-PONGAU
  Tukialueiden ulkopuolella sijaitsevat alueet |
| Myöntävä viranomainen | Land Salzburg |
| Südtiroler Platz 11 |
| Postfach 527 |
| A – 5010 Salzburg |
| www.salzburg.gv.at |

Valtion tuen viitenumero

SA.35495 (12/X)

Jäsenvaltio

Itävalta

Jäsenvaltion viitenumero

—

Alueen nimi (NUTS)

PINZGAU-PONGAU

Tukialueiden ulkopuolella sijaitsevat alueet

Myöntävä viranomainen

Land Salzburg

Südtiroler Platz 11

Postfach 527

A – 5010 Salzburg

www.salzburg.gv.at

Tukitoimenpiteen nimike

Seilbahninvestitionen und skitechnische Verbesserungen im Skigebiet Loferer Alm

Kansallinen oikeusperusta (mainitaan julkaisuviite)

Grundsatzbeschluss des Wirtschaftsreferenten der Salzburger Landesregierung in der Projektbesprechung vom 19.5.2011

Toimenpiteen tyyppi

tapauskohtaiselle tuelle

Voimassa olevan tukitoimenpiteen muutos

—

Myöntämispäivä

21.9.2012 lähtien

Toimiala(t)

Muu maaliikenteen henkilöliikenne

Tuensaajatyyppi

Pk-yritykset – Firma Bergbahn Lofer GmbH

Yritykselle myönnettävän tapauskohtaisen tuen kokonaismäärä

EUR 0,75 (miljoonaa)

Takaukset

—

Tukiväline (5 artikla)

Suora avustus

Viittaus komission päätökseen

—

Jos yhteisön varoista saadaan yhteisrahoitusta

—

Tavoitteet

Tuen enimmäisintensiteetti prosentteina tai enimmäismäärä kansallisessa valuutassa

Pk-yrityksille myönnet-tävät lisät prosentteina

Pk-yrityksille myönnettävä investointi- ja työllisyystuki (15 artikla)

9,74 %

—

Internet-linkki tukitoimenpiteen koko tekstiin:

http://www.salzburg.gv.at/wirtschaftsfoerderung2007

Ad-hoc-Beihillfen

| Valtion tuen viitenumero | SA.35522 (12/X) |
| --- | --- |
| Jäsenvaltio | Saksa |
| Jäsenvaltion viitenumero | N 790/2006 |
| Alueen nimi (NUTS) | DEUTSCHLAND
  107 artiklan 3 kohdan c alakohta |
| Myöntävä viranomainen | Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung |
| Heinemannstraße 2 und 6 |
| 53175 Bonn |
| http://www.bmbf.de |

Valtion tuen viitenumero

SA.35522 (12/X)

Jäsenvaltio

Saksa

Jäsenvaltion viitenumero

N 790/2006

Alueen nimi (NUTS)

DEUTSCHLAND

107 artiklan 3 kohdan c alakohta

Myöntävä viranomainen

Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung

Heinemannstraße 2 und 6

53175 Bonn

http://www.bmbf.de

Tukitoimenpiteen nimike

Dienstleistungsinnovationen für Elektromobilität

Kansallinen oikeusperusta (mainitaan julkaisuviite)

Förderrichtlinie „Dienstleistungsinnovationen für Elektromobilität“ (20.8.2012 im BAnz. AT 31.8.2012 B7); Bundeshaushaltsplan 2012, Einzelplan 30, Kapitel 3002, Titel 6092/68304

Haushaltsgesetz 2012 vom 22.12.2011 (BGBL. I S.2938), geändert durch Art. 1 und 2 G vom 13.9.2012 (BGBL. I S. 1902)

Toimenpiteen tyyppi

Ohjelma

Voimassa olevan tukitoimenpiteen muutos

—

Kesto

20.8.2012-31.12.2017

Toimiala(t)

Kaikki tukikelpoiset toimialat

Tuensaajatyyppi

Pk-yritykset,suuret yritykset

Ohjelman mukainen suunniteltu vuosibudjetin kokonaismäärä

EUR 6,00 (miljoonaa)

Takaukset

—

Tukiväline (5 artikla)

Suora avustus

Viittaus komission päätökseen

—

Jos yhteisön varoista saadaan yhteisrahoitusta

—

Tavoitteet

Tuen enimmäisintensiteetti prosentteina tai enimmäismäärä kansallisessa valuutassa

Pk-yrityksille myönnet-tävät lisät prosentteina

Kokeellinen kehittäminen (31 artiklan 2 kohdan c alakohta)

25 %

10 %

Perustutkimus (31 artiklan 2 kohdan a alakohta)

100 %

—

Teollinen tutkimus (31 artiklan 2 kohdan b alakohta)

50 %

10 %

Internet-linkki tukitoimenpiteen koko tekstiin:

http://www.bmbf.de/foerderungen/19905.php

| Valtion tuen viitenumero | SA.35533 (12/X) |
| --- | --- |
| Jäsenvaltio | Belgia |
| Jäsenvaltion viitenumero | — |
| Alueen nimi (NUTS) | REG.BRUXELLES-CAP./BRUSSELS HFDST.GEW.
  Yhdistelmäalue |
| Myöntävä viranomainen | Institut d'encouragement de la recherche scientifique et de l'innovation de Bruxelles |
| Domaine Latour de Freins |
| Rue engeland 555, |
| 1180 Bruxelles |
| www.innoviris.be |

Valtion tuen viitenumero

SA.35533 (12/X)

Jäsenvaltio

Belgia

Jäsenvaltion viitenumero

—

Alueen nimi (NUTS)

REG.BRUXELLES-CAP./BRUSSELS HFDST.GEW.

Yhdistelmäalue

Myöntävä viranomainen

Institut d'encouragement de la recherche scientifique et de l'innovation de Bruxelles

Domaine Latour de Freins

Rue engeland 555,

1180 Bruxelles

www.innoviris.be

Tukitoimenpiteen nimike

Le régime d'aide en faveur du développement expérimental

Kansallinen oikeusperusta (mainitaan julkaisuviite)

Ordonnance du 26 mars 2009 visant à promouvoir la recherche, le développement et l'innovation (Article 15 §1er al 1 et 2; § 2 et 3)

Toimenpiteen tyyppi

Ohjelma

Voimassa olevan tukitoimenpiteen muutos

—

Kesto

1.1.2010-31.12.2015

Toimiala(t)

Kaikki tukikelpoiset toimialat

Tuensaajatyyppi

Pk-yritykset,suuret yritykset

Ohjelman mukainen suunniteltu vuosibudjetin kokonaismäärä

EUR 7,50 (miljoonaa)

Takaukset

—

Tukiväline (5 artikla)

Suora avustus

Viittaus komission päätökseen

—

Jos yhteisön varoista saadaan yhteisrahoitusta

—

Tavoitteet

Tuen enimmäisintensiteetti prosentteina tai enimmäismäärä kansallisessa valuutassa

Pk-yrityksille myönnet-tävät lisät prosentteina

Kokeellinen kehittäminen (31 artiklan 2 kohdan c alakohta)

60 %

0 %

Internet-linkki tukitoimenpiteen koko tekstiin:

http://www.innoviris.be/site/wp-content/documents/legal_documents/nouvelle_ordonnance.pdf

Article 15 §1er al 1 et 2; § 2 et 3

http://www.innoviris.be/site/wp-content/documents/legal_documents/nouvel_arrete.pdf

| Valtion tuen viitenumero | SA.35535 (12/X) |
| --- | --- |
| Jäsenvaltio | Belgia |
| Jäsenvaltion viitenumero | — |
| Alueen nimi (NUTS) | REG.BRUXELLES-CAP./BRUSSELS HFDST.GEW.
  Yhdistelmäalue |
| Myöntävä viranomainen | L'institut d'encouragement de la Recherche Scientifique et de l'Innovation de Bruxelles |
| Domaine Latour de Freins |
| Rue Engeland 555 |
| 1180 Bruxelles |
| www.innoviris.be |

Valtion tuen viitenumero

SA.35535 (12/X)

Jäsenvaltio

Belgia

Jäsenvaltion viitenumero

—

Alueen nimi (NUTS)

REG.BRUXELLES-CAP./BRUSSELS HFDST.GEW.

Yhdistelmäalue

Myöntävä viranomainen

L'institut d'encouragement de la Recherche Scientifique et de l'Innovation de Bruxelles

Domaine Latour de Freins

Rue Engeland 555

1180 Bruxelles

www.innoviris.be

Tukitoimenpiteen nimike

Aide visant à couvrir les frais de droits de propriété intellectuelle

Kansallinen oikeusperusta (mainitaan julkaisuviite)

Ordonnance du 26 mars 2009 visant à promouvoir la recherche, le développement et l'innovation (Article 20).

Toimenpiteen tyyppi

Ohjelma

Voimassa olevan tukitoimenpiteen muutos

—

Kesto

1.1.2010-31.12.2015

Toimiala(t)

Kaikki tukikelpoiset toimialat

Tuensaajatyyppi

Pk-yritykset

Ohjelman mukainen suunniteltu vuosibudjetin kokonaismäärä

EUR 0,30 (miljoonaa)

Takaukset

—

Tukiväline (5 artikla)

Suora avustus

Viittaus komission päätökseen

—

Jos yhteisön varoista saadaan yhteisrahoitusta

—

Tavoitteet

Tuen enimmäisintensiteetti prosentteina tai enimmäismäärä kansallisessa valuutassa

Pk-yrityksille myönnet-tävät lisät prosentteina

Teollisoikeuksien kustannusten kattamiseen myönnettävä tuki pk-yrityksille (33 artikla)

80 %

0 %

Internet-linkki tukitoimenpiteen koko tekstiin:

http://www.innoviris.be/site/wp-content/documents/legal_documents/nouvelle_ordonnance.pdf

Article 20

http://www.innoviris.be/site/wp-content/documents/legal_documents/nouvel_arrete.pdf

---

V Ilmoitukset

KILPAILUPOLITIIKAN TOTEUTTAMISEEN LIITTYVÄT MENETTELYT

Euroopan komissio

| 20.11.2012 | FI | Euroopan unionin virallinen lehti | C 357/26 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

20.11.2012

FI

Euroopan unionin virallinen lehti

C 357/26

---

VALTIONTUKI – KREIKKA

Valtiontuki SA.34488 (2012/C) (ex 2012/NN) – Pankin perustamisen ja pääomanlisäysten muodossa annettava tuki Nea Proton Bankille sekä muodollisen tutkintamenettelyn aloittaminen

Kehotus huomautusten esittämiseen Euroopan unionin toiminnasta tehdyn sopimuksen 108 artiklan 2 kohdan mukaisesti

(ETA:n kannalta merkityksellinen teksti)

2012/C 357/05

Komissio on ilmoittanut 26. heinäkuuta 2012 päivätyllä, tätä tiivistelmää seuraavilla sivuilla todistusvoimaisella kielellä toistetulla kirjeellä Kreikalle päätöksestään aloittaa Euroopan unionin toiminnasta tehdyn sopimuksen 108 artiklan 2 kohdassa tarkoitettu menettely, joka koskee edellä mainittua tukea/toimenpidettä.

Asianomaiset voivat esittää huomautuksensa tuesta/toimenpiteestä, jota koskevan menettelyn komissio aloittaa, kuukauden kuluessa tämän tiivistelmän ja sitä seuraavan kirjeen julkaisemisesta. Huomautukset on lähetettävä osoitteeseen:

| European Commission |
| --- |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| State Aid Greffe |
| J70 03/225 |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |
| Faksi: (+32-2) 296 12 42 |

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

State Aid Greffe

J70 03/225

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Faksi: (+32-2) 296 12 42

Huomautukset toimitetaan Kreikalle. Huomautusten esittäjä voi pyytää kirjallisesti henkilöllisyytensä luottamuksellista käsittelyä. Tämä pyyntö on perusteltava.

1.   MENETTELY

Kreikan viranomaiset ilmoittivat 12. maaliskuuta 2012 komissiolle Nea Proton Bankin rakenneuudistussuunnitelmasta. Ne esittivät päivitetyn rakenneuudistussuunnitelman 16. heinäkuuta 2012.

2.   KUVAUS

2.1.   Proton Bankin kuvaus

Proton Bank perustettiin vuonna 2001 toimimaan ensisijaisesti investointipankkina. Kyseessä oli pieni pankki, jos tarkastellaan sen osuutta Kreikan pankkijärjestelmän kokonaisvaroista. Proton Bankilla oli 30. kesäkuuta 2011 eri puolilla Kreikkaa 28 konttoria, joissa työskenteli 562 työntekijää.

Proton Bankin toiminnan lopettamista edeltävinä vuosina pankki kärsi useista ongelmista (esim. petostapaus), ja sen toiminta oli muutaman vuoden ajan tappiollista. Proton Bank sai merkittäviä määriä valtiontukea. Pankin toiminta lopetettiin 9. lokakuuta 2011 pankkijärjestelmän vakauden ja yleisen edun turvaamiseksi.

2.2.   Nea Proton Bankin kuvaus

Nea Proton Bank perustettiin Kreikan keskuspankin ehdotuksesta 9. lokakuuta 2011 valtiovarainministeriön päätöksellä. Sen ainoa osakkeenomistaja on Kreikan rahoitusvakausrahasto. Nea Proton Bankin avaustase on noin 3 miljardia euroa. Kreikan keskuspankki peruutti vanhan Proton Bankin toimiluvan, ja pankki asetettiin selvitystilaan.

Oman pääoman ehtoiset vastuut, etuoikeusasemaltaan huonommassa asemassa olevat lainat, lykätyt verovelat ja riskiluotot jäivät vanhaan Proton Bankiin. Kaikki talletukset (vähittäis- ja pankkitalletukset sekä valtion talletukset), konttoriverkosto ja tietyt omaisuuserät (lainat ja arvopaperisalkut) siirrettiin Nea Proton Bankille.

2.3.   Nea Proton Bankin rakenneuudistussuunnitelma

Kreikan viranomaiset ilmoittivat 12. maaliskuuta 2012 komissiolle Nea Proton Bankia koskevasta rakenneuudistussuunnitelmasta (päivätty 30.1.2012).

Pankin strategisia tavoitteita ovat muun muassa tehdä pankista houkuttelevampi sijoittajien kannalta ja parantaa sen rahoitustuloksia, jotta se voidaan pankkien kriisinratkaisua koskevien säännösten mukaisesti myydä kolmannelle osapuolelle 2–3 vuoden kuluessa, vahvistaa suhteita kuluttajiin, parantaa konttoriverkoston myyntivalmiuksia siten, että konttorit alkavat pelkän talletusten vastaanottamisen sijasta lisätä asiakaspalvelua/ristiinmyyntiä, luopua eräistä toiminnoista, tehostaa merkittävästi riskinhallintaa ja sisäistä valvontaa sekä supistaa henkilöstöä 30 prosenttia 521 kokoaikaisesta työntekijästä 369:ään vuoden 2012 loppuun mennessä.

Heinäkuun 16. päivänä 2012 toimitetun rakenneuudistussuunnitelman ennakoidun tuloslaskelman (perusskenaario) mukaan Nea Proton Bank tekee tappiota vuosina 2012–2014 (tappiot verojen jälkeen), ja sen toiminta alkaa tuottaa voittoa vuonna 2015 (tuotto verojen jälkeen).

2.4.   Kuvaus toimenpiteestä/tuesta, jota koskevan menettelyn komissio aloittaa

2.4.1.   Kreikan talletus- ja investointitakausrahaston kriisinratkaisusuunnitelmassa esitetty tuki Nea Proton Bankille

Kreikan keskuspankki vaati, että Kreikan talletus- ja investointitakausrahaston laatimassa kriisinratkaisusuunnitelmassa katetaan Nea Proton Bankin rahoitusvaje, joka johtuu siirrettyjen omaisuuserien arvon (omaisuuserät arvostettiin käypään arvoon, joka oli huomattavasti pienempi kuin Proton Bankin kirjanpitoon edellisenä päivänä kirjattu samojen omaisuuserien arvo) ja siirrettyjen vastuiden nimellisarvon erotuksesta. Kreikan keskuspankki vahvisti 19. tammikuuta 2012 vajeen määräksi 1,122 miljardia euroa (1).

2.4.2.   Kreikan rahoitusvakausrahaston pääomasijoitukset Nea Proton Bankiin

Kreikan rahoitusvakausrahasto on Nea Proton Bankin ainoa osakkeenomistaja, ja se antoi pankille valtiontukea peruspääoman muodossa (kantaosakkeet), jonka määrä oli 250 miljoonaa euroa (maksettiin kahdessa erässä).

Komissiolle 16. heinäkuuta 2012 toimitetun päivitetyn rakenneuudistussuunnitelman mukaan Nea Proton Bank tarvitsee pääomaa vielä [230–300] miljoonaa euroa ([...] (2)), eli 12. maaliskuuta 2012 toimitetussa rakenneuudistussuunnitelmassa kaavailtu 35 miljoonan euron pääomanlisäys ei riitä. Nea Proton Bank kärsi tappioita yksityisen sektorin osallistumisen (3) vuoksi (arvonalentumistappiot olivat vuoden 2011 osalta 146,5 miljoonaa euroa, minkä lisäksi vuoden 2012 ensimmäisen neljänneksen tuloksiin sisällytettiin 22 miljoonaa euroa arvonalentumistappioita muiden omaisuuserien osalta). Toinen syy suurempaan pääomatarpeeseen on se, että menovaraukset vuosina 2011–2016 ovat suuremmat kuin 12. maaliskuuta 2012 esitetyssä rakenneuudistussuunnitelmassa arvioitiin.

3.   TOIMENPITEEN/TUEN ARVIOINTI

Komissio katsoo, että ilmoitetut toimenpiteet eli Kreikan talletus- ja investointitakausrahaston kriisinratkaisusuunnitelmassa ilmoitettu 1,122 miljardin euron pääomanlisäys, Kreikan rahoitusvakausrahaston 0,25 miljardin euron pääomanlisäys ja saman rahaston yhteensä [0,23–0,3] miljardin euron pääomanlisäykset ([...]) Nea Proton Bankiin ovat Euroopan unionin toiminnasta tehdyn sopimuksen, jäljempänä ’SEUT-sopimus’, 107 artiklan 1 kohdassa tarkoitettua valtiontukea. Turvatakseen Kreikan rahoitusvakauden komissio hyväksyi väliaikaisesti valtiontuen eli Kreikan talletus- ja investointitakausrahaston kriisinratkaisusuunnitelmassa ilmoitetun 1,122 miljardin euron pääomanlisäyksen, Kreikan rahoitusvakausrahaston 0,25 miljardin euron pääomanlisäyksen ja saman rahaston yhteensä [0,23–0,3] miljardin euron pääomanlisäykset ([...]) Nea Proton Bankiin sisämarkkinoille soveltuvana pelastamistukena, kunnes komissio antaa lopullisen rakenneuudistuspäätöksen Nea Proton Bankin osalta. Komissiolla on tällä hetkellä epäilyksiä siitä, onko Nea Proton Bank elinkelpoinen yksinään ja onko kilpailun vääristymisen rajoittamiseksi ja riskien jakamiseksi toteutettu riittävästi toimenpiteitä.

Sen vuoksi komissio on päättänyt aloittaa SEUT-sopimuksen 108 artiklan 2 kohdassa tarkoitetun menettelyn.

Komissio pyytää Kreikkaa toimittamaan uuden Nea Proton Bankia koskevan rakenneuudistussuunnitelman, jossa on otettu huomioon komission tässä päätöksessä esittämät epäilyt.

Neuvoston asetuksen (EY) N:o 659/1999 14 artiklan mukaan sääntöjenvastainen tuki voidaan periä takaisin tuensaajalta.

KIRJEEN TEKSTI

”The Commission wishes to inform Greece that, having examined the information supplied by your authorities on the aid referred to above, it has decided to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 108(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

1.   PROCEDURE

| (1) | In May 2009, Proton Bank received a capital injection of EUR 80 million from the Greek State under the recapitalisation scheme for credit institutions in Greece (4). |
| --- | --- |

(1)

In May 2009, Proton Bank received a capital injection of EUR 80 million from the Greek State under the recapitalisation scheme for credit institutions in Greece (4).

| (2) | On 1 October 2010, the Greek authorities submitted to the Commission a restructuring plan for Proton Bank. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

On 1 October 2010, the Greek authorities submitted to the Commission a restructuring plan for Proton Bank.

| (3) | By letter dated 12 October 2011, the Commission services asked the Greek authorities, under case number SA.31711, to submit information regarding the resolution of Proton Bank. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

By letter dated 12 October 2011, the Commission services asked the Greek authorities, under case number SA.31711, to submit information regarding the resolution of Proton Bank.

| (4) | On 15 December 2011 and 10 January 2012, the Greek authorities submitted information. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

On 15 December 2011 and 10 January 2012, the Greek authorities submitted information.

| (5) | On 12 March 2012, the Greek authorities notified to the Commission, under case number SA.34488 (2012 /N), a restructuring plan for Nea Proton Bank. The case number SA.34488 (2012 /N) was administratively transformed into case number SA.34488 (2012 /NN) as Greece already granted parts of the aid to Nea Proton Bank. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

On 12 March 2012, the Greek authorities notified to the Commission, under case number SA.34488 (2012 /N), a restructuring plan for Nea Proton Bank. The case number SA.34488 (2012 /N) was administratively transformed into case number SA.34488 (2012 /NN) as Greece already granted parts of the aid to Nea Proton Bank.

| (6) | On 13 March 2012, the Greek authorities submitted to the Commission further information. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

On 13 March 2012, the Greek authorities submitted to the Commission further information.

| (7) | On 30 June 2012, the Commission services asked the Greek authorities to provide additional information. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

On 30 June 2012, the Commission services asked the Greek authorities to provide additional information.

| (8) | On 6 July 2012, the Greek authorities informed the Commission services that Greece accepts the adoption of the Decision in the English language. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

On 6 July 2012, the Greek authorities informed the Commission services that Greece accepts the adoption of the Decision in the English language.

| (9) | On 13 July 2012, the Greek authorities submitted additional information.
  On 16 July 2012, the Greek authorities submitted an updated restructuring plan for Nea Proton Bank. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

On 13 July 2012, the Greek authorities submitted additional information.

On 16 July 2012, the Greek authorities submitted an updated restructuring plan for Nea Proton Bank.

| (10) | On 17 July 2012, the Commission services asked the Greek authorities to provide additional information, which the Greek authorities submitted on the same day. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

On 17 July 2012, the Commission services asked the Greek authorities to provide additional information, which the Greek authorities submitted on the same day.

2.   DESCRIPTION

2.1   Proton Bank

| (11) | Proton Bank, which was a small sized bank based on its share in the total assets of the Greek banking system, was incorporated in 2001 with primary focus on investment banking. In 2005, the bank was listed in the Athens Stock Exchange. Proton Bank had a network of 28 branches across Greece and as of 30 June 2011 employed 562 people. The bank was resolved on 9 October 2011 in order to protect systemic stability and the public interest. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

Proton Bank, which was a small sized bank based on its share in the total assets of the Greek banking system, was incorporated in 2001 with primary focus on investment banking. In 2005, the bank was listed in the Athens Stock Exchange. Proton Bank had a network of 28 branches across Greece and as of 30 June 2011 employed 562 people. The bank was resolved on 9 October 2011 in order to protect systemic stability and the public interest.

| (12) | In the last years before it was resolved, the corporate credit portfolio of Proton Bank expanded very rapidly. Part of the credit expansion was extended to companies directly, indirectly or economically interconnected with a major shareholder of the bank. The balance sheet total of Proton Bank Group increased from 1,9 billion EUR at the end of 2008 to 2,9 billion EUR at the end of 2009 and to 4,3 billion EUR at the end of 2010. From the end of 2008 until the end of 2010, the balance sheet total therefore grew by more than 100 %. At the end of 2010, the group's risk weighted assets amounted to 3,1 billion EUR. The amount of client deposits increased rapidly. Nevertheless, the bank still was a small bank with a market share in the retail deposits segment of approximately 1 %. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

In the last years before it was resolved, the corporate credit portfolio of Proton Bank expanded very rapidly. Part of the credit expansion was extended to companies directly, indirectly or economically interconnected with a major shareholder of the bank. The balance sheet total of Proton Bank Group increased from 1,9 billion EUR at the end of 2008 to 2,9 billion EUR at the end of 2009 and to 4,3 billion EUR at the end of 2010. From the end of 2008 until the end of 2010, the balance sheet total therefore grew by more than 100 %. At the end of 2010, the group's risk weighted assets amounted to 3,1 billion EUR. The amount of client deposits increased rapidly. Nevertheless, the bank still was a small bank with a market share in the retail deposits segment of approximately 1 %.

| (13) | Proton Bank started to suffer from significant loan impairments and had to rely on high deposit rates in order to maintain deposits and liquidity. There was also a fraud investigation regarding former members of the board of directors and regarding a major shareholder. |
| --- | --- |

(13)

Proton Bank started to suffer from significant loan impairments and had to rely on high deposit rates in order to maintain deposits and liquidity. There was also a fraud investigation regarding former members of the board of directors and regarding a major shareholder.

| (14) | Proton Bank received, under the Greek bank support scheme (5), a capital injection of EUR 80 million (corresponding to 4,58 % of the bank's risk weighted assets at that time) from the Greek State in May 2009, a State guarantee for issued bonds with a nominal value of EUR 149,4 million, and Greek government securities amounting to EUR 78 million in April 2009. On 1 October 2010, the Greek authorities submitted to the Commission a restructuring plan for Proton Bank. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

Proton Bank received, under the Greek bank support scheme (5), a capital injection of EUR 80 million (corresponding to 4,58 % of the bank's risk weighted assets at that time) from the Greek State in May 2009, a State guarantee for issued bonds with a nominal value of EUR 149,4 million, and Greek government securities amounting to EUR 78 million in April 2009. On 1 October 2010, the Greek authorities submitted to the Commission a restructuring plan for Proton Bank.

| (15) | In the summer of 2011, the four largest banks of Greece offered to support Proton Bank, by purchasing convertible bonds of approximately 50 million EUR issued by Proton Bank. |
| --- | --- |

(15)

In the summer of 2011, the four largest banks of Greece offered to support Proton Bank, by purchasing convertible bonds of approximately 50 million EUR issued by Proton Bank.

| (16) | Proton Bank also received around EUR 900 million in Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) funding from the Bank of Greece (6). |
| --- | --- |

(16)

Proton Bank also received around EUR 900 million in Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) funding from the Bank of Greece (6).

| (17) | In March 2011, the bank held Greek government bonds amounting to 1,2 billion EUR (including Treasury bills) (7), amounting therefore to more than 25 % of the balance sheet total. |
| --- | --- |

(17)

In March 2011, the bank held Greek government bonds amounting to 1,2 billion EUR (including Treasury bills) (7), amounting therefore to more than 25 % of the balance sheet total.

2.2   Nea Proton Bank

| (18) | On 9 October 2011, upon proposal of the Bank of Greece, and following the decision of the Ministry of Finance, Nea Proton Bank was created. The sole shareholder of Nea Proton Bank is the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund (HFSF). The size of the opening balance sheet of Nea Proton Bank is approximately EUR 3 billion. The license of the "old" Proton Bank was recalled by the Bank of Greece and it was put under liquidation. |
| --- | --- |

(18)

On 9 October 2011, upon proposal of the Bank of Greece, and following the decision of the Ministry of Finance, Nea Proton Bank was created. The sole shareholder of Nea Proton Bank is the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund (HFSF). The size of the opening balance sheet of Nea Proton Bank is approximately EUR 3 billion. The license of the "old" Proton Bank was recalled by the Bank of Greece and it was put under liquidation.

| (19) | Equity claims, subordinated debt, deferred taxes and high-risk loans remained with "old" Proton Bank. All deposits (retail, bank and government), the branch network and selected assets (loans and securities portfolios) were transferred to Nea Proton Bank. Loans and securities were transferred at fair value. The Greek government bonds were transferred at 50 % of their nominal value (contributing therefore significantly to the funding gap). |
| --- | --- |

(19)

Equity claims, subordinated debt, deferred taxes and high-risk loans remained with "old" Proton Bank. All deposits (retail, bank and government), the branch network and selected assets (loans and securities portfolios) were transferred to Nea Proton Bank. Loans and securities were transferred at fair value. The Greek government bonds were transferred at 50 % of their nominal value (contributing therefore significantly to the funding gap).

| (20) | At the end of 2011, Nea Proton Bank's risk weighted assets amounted to EUR 1,2 billion. |
| --- | --- |

(20)

At the end of 2011, Nea Proton Bank's risk weighted assets amounted to EUR 1,2 billion.

| (21) | According to the current resolution framework in Greece, the HFSF needs to dispose of its shares in Nea Proton Bank within two years from the date of the Ministerial decision establishing the new bank and that period may be extended by two more years by decision of the Minister of Finance following a recommendation from the Bank of Greece for reasons of financial stability. In the event that the HFSF does not succeed in disposing of its shares in Nea Proton Bank, or at any time by decision of the Minister of Finance following a recommendation from the Bank of Greece, Nea Proton Bank will be put into liquidation. |
| --- | --- |

(21)

According to the current resolution framework in Greece, the HFSF needs to dispose of its shares in Nea Proton Bank within two years from the date of the Ministerial decision establishing the new bank and that period may be extended by two more years by decision of the Minister of Finance following a recommendation from the Bank of Greece for reasons of financial stability. In the event that the HFSF does not succeed in disposing of its shares in Nea Proton Bank, or at any time by decision of the Minister of Finance following a recommendation from the Bank of Greece, Nea Proton Bank will be put into liquidation.

2.3   Nea Proton Bank's restructuring plan

| (22) | On 12 March 2012, the Greek authorities notified to the Commission a restructuring plan for Nea Proton Bank (dated 30 January 2012). |
| --- | --- |

(22)

On 12 March 2012, the Greek authorities notified to the Commission a restructuring plan for Nea Proton Bank (dated 30 January 2012).

| (23) | The strategic objectives of Nea Proton Bank are inter alia:






  (i) | To improve the bank's investor attractiveness and financial results with the aim of selling it to a third party within two to three years, as per the resolution framework |
| --- | --- | --- |

(23)

The strategic objectives of Nea Proton Bank are inter alia:

(i)

To improve the bank's investor attractiveness and financial results with the aim of selling it to a third party within two to three years, as per the resolution framework

| (ii) | To strengthen customer relationships |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

To strengthen customer relationships

| (iii) | To strengthen the selling capabilities of the branch network to effectively change the culture from a deposit-taking mechanism into a relationship/cross-selling banking facility |
| --- | --- |

(iii)

To strengthen the selling capabilities of the branch network to effectively change the culture from a deposit-taking mechanism into a relationship/cross-selling banking facility

| (iv) | To dispose of certain activities |
| --- | --- |

(iv)

To dispose of certain activities

| (v) | To drastically enhance the risk management and internal control framework capabilities |
| --- | --- |

(v)

To drastically enhance the risk management and internal control framework capabilities

| (vi) | To reduce the headcount by [...] % (8) from 521 FTEs (Full Time Equivalents) to [...]. |
| --- | --- |

(vi)

To reduce the headcount by [...] % (8) from 521 FTEs (Full Time Equivalents) to [...].

| (24) | The key figures (approximate amounts in EUR million) from the Profit and Loss statement forecast (base case) of the restructuring plan which was submitted on 12 March 2012 are listed in Table 1:

  Table 1


  Key figures from the Profit and Loss statement forecast (base case) of the restructuring plan which was submitted on 12 March 2012 | 2011
  (9 Oct. – 31 Dec.) | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Net interest income / loss | –2,3 | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] |
| Net Fee and Commission Income | 0,6 | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] |
| Total banking income | –1,6 | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] |
| Total operating expenses | –9,9 | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] |
| Profit / Loss after tax | –13,3 | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] |

(24)

The key figures (approximate amounts in EUR million) from the Profit and Loss statement forecast (base case) of the restructuring plan which was submitted on 12 March 2012 are listed in Table 1:

Table 1

Key figures from the Profit and Loss statement forecast (base case) of the restructuring plan which was submitted on 12 March 2012

2011

(9 Oct. – 31 Dec.)

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Net interest income / loss

–2,3

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

Net Fee and Commission Income

0,6

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

Total banking income

–1,6

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

Total operating expenses

–9,9

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

Profit / Loss after tax

–13,3

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

| (25) | On 16 July 2012, the Greek authorities submitted to the Commission an updated restructuring plan for Nea Proton Bank. The Commission notes that the update does not contain substantial changes regarding restructuring measures. However, the financial forecasts were updated in order to take into account recent developments (inter alia: there was a significant impact of the "Private Sector Involvement" (9) (PSI) exercise, the macroeconomic assumptions had to be changed). The aid amounts were also revised; i.e. Nea Proton Bank will need more aid compared to the aid amounts mentioned in the restructuring plan which was submitted on 12 March 2012. |
| --- | --- |

(25)

On 16 July 2012, the Greek authorities submitted to the Commission an updated restructuring plan for Nea Proton Bank. The Commission notes that the update does not contain substantial changes regarding restructuring measures. However, the financial forecasts were updated in order to take into account recent developments (inter alia: there was a significant impact of the "Private Sector Involvement" (9) (PSI) exercise, the macroeconomic assumptions had to be changed). The aid amounts were also revised; i.e. Nea Proton Bank will need more aid compared to the aid amounts mentioned in the restructuring plan which was submitted on 12 March 2012.

| (26) | The key figures (approximate amounts in EUR million) from the Profit and Loss statement forecast (base case) of the restructuring plan update which was submitted on 16 July 2012 are listed in Table 2:

  Table 2


  Key figures from the Profit and Loss statement forecast (base case) of the restructuring plan update which was submitted on 16 July 2012 | 2011
  (9 Oct. – 31 Dec.) | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Net interest income / loss | 7,1 | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] |
| Net Fee and Commission Income | 0,6 | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] |
| Total banking income | 5,3 | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] |
| Total operating expenses | –11,7 | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] |
| Profit / Loss after tax | – 244,6 | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] |

(26)

The key figures (approximate amounts in EUR million) from the Profit and Loss statement forecast (base case) of the restructuring plan update which was submitted on 16 July 2012 are listed in Table 2:

Table 2

Key figures from the Profit and Loss statement forecast (base case) of the restructuring plan update which was submitted on 16 July 2012

2011

(9 Oct. – 31 Dec.)

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Net interest income / loss

7,1

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

Net Fee and Commission Income

0,6

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

Total banking income

5,3

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

Total operating expenses

–11,7

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

Profit / Loss after tax

– 244,6

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

2.4   The measures

2.4.1   Intervention by the Resolution scheme of the HDIGF in Nea Proton Bank (measure 1)

| (27) | The Resolution scheme of the Hellenic Deposit and Investment Guarantee Fund (HDIGF) was called upon by the Bank of Greece to cover the gap in Nea Proton Bank, representing the difference between the value of the transferred assets (valued at their fair value, which was significantly below the value at which those assets were registered in the book of Proton Bank the day before) and the nominal value of the transferred liabilities. That amount was finalized on 19 January 2012 by the Bank of Greece at EUR 1,122 billion (10). |
| --- | --- |

(27)

The Resolution scheme of the Hellenic Deposit and Investment Guarantee Fund (HDIGF) was called upon by the Bank of Greece to cover the gap in Nea Proton Bank, representing the difference between the value of the transferred assets (valued at their fair value, which was significantly below the value at which those assets were registered in the book of Proton Bank the day before) and the nominal value of the transferred liabilities. That amount was finalized on 19 January 2012 by the Bank of Greece at EUR 1,122 billion (10).

2.4.2   Capital injections by the HFSF into Nea Proton Bank (measure 2)

| (28) | The HFSF constitutes the sole shareholder of Nea Proton Bank and provided State aid in the form of the initial share capital (common shares) of EUR 250 million. |
| --- | --- |

(28)

The HFSF constitutes the sole shareholder of Nea Proton Bank and provided State aid in the form of the initial share capital (common shares) of EUR 250 million.

| (29) | According to the updated restructuring plan submitted on 16 July 2012, Nea Proton Bank still needs additional capital of EUR [230 – 300] million ([...]), instead of additional capital of EUR 35 million as mentioned in the restructuring plan submitted on 12 March 2012. Nea Proton Bank suffered losses because of PSI (11) in Greece that imposed haircuts on holdings of Greek sovereign debt (impairment losses for 2011 reached EUR 146,5 million related to the Greek government bonds, additional impairments of EUR 22 million were incorporated in the results of the first quarter of 2012). Another reason for the higher amount of capital needed is, that the provision charges for 2011 until 2016 are higher than previously assumed in the restructuring plan that was submitted on 12 March 2012. |
| --- | --- |

(29)

According to the updated restructuring plan submitted on 16 July 2012, Nea Proton Bank still needs additional capital of EUR [230 – 300] million ([...]), instead of additional capital of EUR 35 million as mentioned in the restructuring plan submitted on 12 March 2012. Nea Proton Bank suffered losses because of PSI (11) in Greece that imposed haircuts on holdings of Greek sovereign debt (impairment losses for 2011 reached EUR 146,5 million related to the Greek government bonds, additional impairments of EUR 22 million were incorporated in the results of the first quarter of 2012). Another reason for the higher amount of capital needed is, that the provision charges for 2011 until 2016 are higher than previously assumed in the restructuring plan that was submitted on 12 March 2012.

3.   ASSESSMENT

3.1   Existence of State aid in the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU and quantity of State Aid

| (30) | The Commission first has to assess whether the measures constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU. According to that provision, State aid is any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts, or threatens to distort, competition by favoring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods, in so far as it affects trade between Member States. |
| --- | --- |

(30)

The Commission first has to assess whether the measures constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU. According to that provision, State aid is any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts, or threatens to distort, competition by favoring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods, in so far as it affects trade between Member States.

Intervention by the Resolution scheme of the HDIGF for Nea Proton Bank (measure 1):

| (31) | The Commission considers the intervention by the Resolution scheme of the HDIGF amounting to EUR 1,122 billion to be State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU. |
| --- | --- |

(31)

The Commission considers the intervention by the Resolution scheme of the HDIGF amounting to EUR 1,122 billion to be State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU.

| (32) | According to case-law (12) even if the Resolution Scheme is financed through private contributions (which are collected from banks), the intervention of the Resolution scheme is considered to involve State resources as the scheme was created by Greek law, which made contributions to the Scheme by the banks compulsory, and the management and use of its resources is decided in accordance with that legislation. It should be noted that, unlike the deposit guarantee part of the HDIGF, which was created following the implementation of an EU Directive, the Resolution scheme of HDIGF was not created to implement EU legislation. When deciding to create the Resolution scheme of HDIGF, Greece was therefore not bound by an obligation originating from EU law. It was an autonomous decision of the Greek authorities. Therefore the set-up of the Resolution scheme and any measures granted by the Resolution scheme are imputable to the Greek State. The Commission considers that the measure is financed through State resources, and is imputable to the State. |
| --- | --- |

(32)

According to case-law (12) even if the Resolution Scheme is financed through private contributions (which are collected from banks), the intervention of the Resolution scheme is considered to involve State resources as the scheme was created by Greek law, which made contributions to the Scheme by the banks compulsory, and the management and use of its resources is decided in accordance with that legislation. It should be noted that, unlike the deposit guarantee part of the HDIGF, which was created following the implementation of an EU Directive, the Resolution scheme of HDIGF was not created to implement EU legislation. When deciding to create the Resolution scheme of HDIGF, Greece was therefore not bound by an obligation originating from EU law. It was an autonomous decision of the Greek authorities. Therefore the set-up of the Resolution scheme and any measures granted by the Resolution scheme are imputable to the Greek State. The Commission considers that the measure is financed through State resources, and is imputable to the State.

| (33) | Moreover, the measure is selective in nature, since it benefits only banks in difficulty. |
| --- | --- |

(33)

Moreover, the measure is selective in nature, since it benefits only banks in difficulty.

| (34) | The Commission considers that the intervention does not comply with the market economy investor principle (13). In fact, the HDIGF has no prospect of making a profit on its contribution: in exchange for its contribution, it received no claim against Nea Proton Bank but only a claim against Proton Bank. The latter is a bankrupt entity with nearly no assets remaining in it. Therefore, the HDIGF will almost certainly not recover the money contributed. The Commission considers that, under those circumstances and taking into account the very bad track record of Proton Bank, no private investor would have made such an investment in Nea Proton Bank. As regards the fact that the HDIGF's/the State's contribution would have been lower if Proton Bank had been let to go bankrupt, it is not a valid comparison. Any such payment by the HDIGF or by the State to indemnify depositors would not be made as a market operator but would be made as a public authority. It is settled case-law (14) that payments made by an entity as a public authority should not be counted in the application of private investor test or private creditor test. |
| --- | --- |

(34)

The Commission considers that the intervention does not comply with the market economy investor principle (13). In fact, the HDIGF has no prospect of making a profit on its contribution: in exchange for its contribution, it received no claim against Nea Proton Bank but only a claim against Proton Bank. The latter is a bankrupt entity with nearly no assets remaining in it. Therefore, the HDIGF will almost certainly not recover the money contributed. The Commission considers that, under those circumstances and taking into account the very bad track record of Proton Bank, no private investor would have made such an investment in Nea Proton Bank. As regards the fact that the HDIGF's/the State's contribution would have been lower if Proton Bank had been let to go bankrupt, it is not a valid comparison. Any such payment by the HDIGF or by the State to indemnify depositors would not be made as a market operator but would be made as a public authority. It is settled case-law (14) that payments made by an entity as a public authority should not be counted in the application of private investor test or private creditor test.

| (35) | The measure provided the economic activities of Proton Bank with a clear advantage by keeping them alive within a new legal entity, i.e. Nea Proton Bank. Indeed, while the equity, subordinated debt, deferred tax assets and high risk loans of Proton were not transferred, all the key productive banking assets were transferred (employees, branches, deposits, part of the loans and central services and infrastructure). It is therefore an advantage to the economic activity that continues to exist due to the intervention of the HDIGF which allows the transfer of those productive assets to the newly created Nea Proton Bank. Without the intervention of the HDIGF (in combination with the capital provided by the HFSF), Nea Proton Bank would have strongly negative equity and could not operate. |
| --- | --- |

(35)

The measure provided the economic activities of Proton Bank with a clear advantage by keeping them alive within a new legal entity, i.e. Nea Proton Bank. Indeed, while the equity, subordinated debt, deferred tax assets and high risk loans of Proton were not transferred, all the key productive banking assets were transferred (employees, branches, deposits, part of the loans and central services and infrastructure). It is therefore an advantage to the economic activity that continues to exist due to the intervention of the HDIGF which allows the transfer of those productive assets to the newly created Nea Proton Bank. Without the intervention of the HDIGF (in combination with the capital provided by the HFSF), Nea Proton Bank would have strongly negative equity and could not operate.

| (36) | That selective advantage distorts competition by keeping the banking activities alive and allowing them to continue competing on the market (15). It also affects trade between Member States as several subsidiaries of foreign banking groups are present on the Greek banking market and in direct competition with the banking activities previously operated within the legal entity Proton Bank. |
| --- | --- |

(36)

That selective advantage distorts competition by keeping the banking activities alive and allowing them to continue competing on the market (15). It also affects trade between Member States as several subsidiaries of foreign banking groups are present on the Greek banking market and in direct competition with the banking activities previously operated within the legal entity Proton Bank.

| (37) | The Commission therefore considers the contribution by the Resolution scheme of the HDIGF to be State aid. The amount of aid is the amount of the contribution, which according to available information is approximately EUR 1,122 billion. |
| --- | --- |

(37)

The Commission therefore considers the contribution by the Resolution scheme of the HDIGF to be State aid. The amount of aid is the amount of the contribution, which according to available information is approximately EUR 1,122 billion.

| (38) | The Commission considers Nea Proton Bank to be the economic beneficiary as Nea Proton Bank harbours the Proton Bank's economic activity which continue to exist because of the aid received. |
| --- | --- |

(38)

The Commission considers Nea Proton Bank to be the economic beneficiary as Nea Proton Bank harbours the Proton Bank's economic activity which continue to exist because of the aid received.

| (39) | The Commission regrets that Greece put the aid in question into effect, in breach of Article 108(3) TFEU. |
| --- | --- |

(39)

The Commission regrets that Greece put the aid in question into effect, in breach of Article 108(3) TFEU.

Capital injections by the HFSF into Nea Proton Bank (measure 2):

| (40) | The Commission considers the capital injection by the HFSF amounting to EUR 250 million and subsequent the capital injections by the HFSF amounting to a total of EUR [230 – 300] million ([...]) to be State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU. |
| --- | --- |

(40)

The Commission considers the capital injection by the HFSF amounting to EUR 250 million and subsequent the capital injections by the HFSF amounting to a total of EUR [230 – 300] million ([...]) to be State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU.

| (41) | The Commission notes that the capital injections were provided by the HFSF, an entity set up and financed by the Greek State, and so was made by using State resources. The Commission also notes that the capital injections provided a selective advantage, enabling Nea Proton Bank to obtain capital it could not have found on the market. Given the difficulties of Proton Bank and given the challenging economic situation in Greece which directly affecta the banking sector, it is highly doubtful that any private investor would have injected capital into Nea Proton Bank under those conditions. |
| --- | --- |

(41)

The Commission notes that the capital injections were provided by the HFSF, an entity set up and financed by the Greek State, and so was made by using State resources. The Commission also notes that the capital injections provided a selective advantage, enabling Nea Proton Bank to obtain capital it could not have found on the market. Given the difficulties of Proton Bank and given the challenging economic situation in Greece which directly affecta the banking sector, it is highly doubtful that any private investor would have injected capital into Nea Proton Bank under those conditions.

| (42) | Nea Proton Bank is in competition with other banks, inter alia with subsidiaries of foreign banks. Hence, the capital injections have an effect on trade and are capable of distorting competition. |
| --- | --- |

(42)

Nea Proton Bank is in competition with other banks, inter alia with subsidiaries of foreign banks. Hence, the capital injections have an effect on trade and are capable of distorting competition.

| (43) | The Commission therefore comes to the conclusion that the capital injections constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU. |
| --- | --- |

(43)

The Commission therefore comes to the conclusion that the capital injections constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU.

| (44) | The Commission regrets that Greece put parts of the aid in question into effect, in breach of Article 108(3) TFEU. |
| --- | --- |

(44)

The Commission regrets that Greece put parts of the aid in question into effect, in breach of Article 108(3) TFEU.

3.2   Compatibility of the aid

4.2.1   Legal basis for the compatibility assessment

| (45) | Article 107(3)(b) TFEU provides that aid falling within the scope of Article 107(1) TFEU may be compatible with the internal market where it "remedies a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State". |
| --- | --- |

(45)

Article 107(3)(b) TFEU provides that aid falling within the scope of Article 107(1) TFEU may be compatible with the internal market where it "remedies a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State".

| (46) | The Commission has acknowledged in its decisions approving the Greek recapitalisation scheme and its prolongation until now that there is a threat of serious disturbance in the Greek economy and that State support of banks is suitable to remedy that disturbance. In view of the persistent turbulence that continues to affect the financial markets and institutions, the Commission still considers that requirements for State aid to be approved pursuant to Article 107(3)(b) TFEU are fulfilled (16). |
| --- | --- |

(46)

The Commission has acknowledged in its decisions approving the Greek recapitalisation scheme and its prolongation until now that there is a threat of serious disturbance in the Greek economy and that State support of banks is suitable to remedy that disturbance. In view of the persistent turbulence that continues to affect the financial markets and institutions, the Commission still considers that requirements for State aid to be approved pursuant to Article 107(3)(b) TFEU are fulfilled (16).

| (47) | For those reasons the Commission accepts that the intervention by the Resolution Scheme of the HDIGF and the capital injection by the HFSF can be analysed as measures taken to avoid a serious disturbance in the economy of Greece. |
| --- | --- |

(47)

For those reasons the Commission accepts that the intervention by the Resolution Scheme of the HDIGF and the capital injection by the HFSF can be analysed as measures taken to avoid a serious disturbance in the economy of Greece.

4.2.2   Compatibility assessment

| (48) | In line with point 15 of the Banking Communication (17), in order for an aid to be compatible under Article 107(3)(b) TFEU it must comply with the general criteria for compatibility (18):
  a.   Appropriateness: The aid has to be well-targeted in order to be able to effectively achieve the objective of remedying a serious disturbance in the economy. It would not be the case if the measure were not appropriate to remedy the disturbance.
  b.   Necessity: The aid measure must, in its amount and form, be necessary to achieve the objective. Therefore it must be of the minimum amount necessary to reach the objective, and take the form most appropriate to remedy the disturbance.
  c.   Proportionality: The positive effects of the measure must be properly balanced against the distortions of competition, in order for the distortions to be limited to the minimum necessary to reach the measure's objectives. |
| --- | --- |

(48)

In line with point 15 of the Banking Communication (17), in order for an aid to be compatible under Article 107(3)(b) TFEU it must comply with the general criteria for compatibility (18):

a.   Appropriateness: The aid has to be well-targeted in order to be able to effectively achieve the objective of remedying a serious disturbance in the economy. It would not be the case if the measure were not appropriate to remedy the disturbance.

b.   Necessity: The aid measure must, in its amount and form, be necessary to achieve the objective. Therefore it must be of the minimum amount necessary to reach the objective, and take the form most appropriate to remedy the disturbance.

c.   Proportionality: The positive effects of the measure must be properly balanced against the distortions of competition, in order for the distortions to be limited to the minimum necessary to reach the measure's objectives.

| (49) | The Recapitalisation Communication (19) elaborates further on the level of remuneration required for State capital injections. |
| --- | --- |

(49)

The Recapitalisation Communication (19) elaborates further on the level of remuneration required for State capital injections.

| (50) | Finally, the Commission has explained in the Restructuring Communication (20) how it will assess restructuring plans. |
| --- | --- |

(50)

Finally, the Commission has explained in the Restructuring Communication (20) how it will assess restructuring plans.

4.2.3   Compatibility with the Banking and Recapitalisation Communications

a.   Appropriateness of the measures

| (51) | The intervention by the Resolution scheme is needed in order to fill the gap between the fair value of Proton Bank's assets and the nominal value of its liabilities which were transferred to Nea Proton Bank. |
| --- | --- |

(51)

The intervention by the Resolution scheme is needed in order to fill the gap between the fair value of Proton Bank's assets and the nominal value of its liabilities which were transferred to Nea Proton Bank.

| (52) | The Commission considers that the intervention by the Resolution scheme is appropriate because it helps keep alive Proton Bank's economic activities which were transferred to Nea Proton Bank. Without the intervention of the Resolution scheme, those activities would not have been able to continue, as Proton Bank was on the verge of bankruptcy and in current difficult market conditions no bank would have acquired a package having a negative value (i.e. with the fair value of the assets lower than the fair value of the liabilities). The measure thereby ensures that financial stability in Greece is maintained in the short-term. On that basis, the Commission finds that the intervention by the Resolution scheme is appropriate as rescue aid. |
| --- | --- |

(52)

The Commission considers that the intervention by the Resolution scheme is appropriate because it helps keep alive Proton Bank's economic activities which were transferred to Nea Proton Bank. Without the intervention of the Resolution scheme, those activities would not have been able to continue, as Proton Bank was on the verge of bankruptcy and in current difficult market conditions no bank would have acquired a package having a negative value (i.e. with the fair value of the assets lower than the fair value of the liabilities). The measure thereby ensures that financial stability in Greece is maintained in the short-term. On that basis, the Commission finds that the intervention by the Resolution scheme is appropriate as rescue aid.

| (53) | The capital injections from the HFSF are needed in order to have capital in Nea Proton Bank and to enable Nea Proton Bank to adhere to the minimum capital adequacy ratio set by the Bank of Greece. |
| --- | --- |

(53)

The capital injections from the HFSF are needed in order to have capital in Nea Proton Bank and to enable Nea Proton Bank to adhere to the minimum capital adequacy ratio set by the Bank of Greece.

| (54) | The Commission considers that the capital injection of EUR 250 million is appropriate as rescue aid since it enabled the transfer of the economic activities of Proton Bank to Nea Proton Bank and the creation of Nea Proton Bank. Hence, the economic activities have not been wound-up. An immediate winding-up of Proton Bank's activities could have led to a bank run and could have triggered a serious disturbance on the Greek financial markets. A serious disturbance on the Greek financial markets could be avoided through the creation of Nea Proton Bank and the transfer of Proton Bank's economic activities into Nea Proton Bank. |
| --- | --- |

(54)

The Commission considers that the capital injection of EUR 250 million is appropriate as rescue aid since it enabled the transfer of the economic activities of Proton Bank to Nea Proton Bank and the creation of Nea Proton Bank. Hence, the economic activities have not been wound-up. An immediate winding-up of Proton Bank's activities could have led to a bank run and could have triggered a serious disturbance on the Greek financial markets. A serious disturbance on the Greek financial markets could be avoided through the creation of Nea Proton Bank and the transfer of Proton Bank's economic activities into Nea Proton Bank.

| (55) | As regards the capital injections amounting to a total of EUR [230 – 300] million ([...]), the Commission notes that, based on the restructuring plan update submitted on 16 July 2012, Nea Proton Bank needs that capital in order to adhere to the minimum capital adequacy ratio set by the Bank of Greece. |
| --- | --- |

(55)

As regards the capital injections amounting to a total of EUR [230 – 300] million ([...]), the Commission notes that, based on the restructuring plan update submitted on 16 July 2012, Nea Proton Bank needs that capital in order to adhere to the minimum capital adequacy ratio set by the Bank of Greece.

| (56) | On that basis, the Commission finds that the capital injections from the HFSF are appropriate as rescue aid. |
| --- | --- |

(56)

On that basis, the Commission finds that the capital injections from the HFSF are appropriate as rescue aid.

b.   Necessity – limitation of the aid to the minimum

| (57) | According to the Banking Communication, the aid measure must, in its amount and form, be necessary to achieve the objective. It implies that the capital injection must be of the minimum amount necessary to reach the objective. |
| --- | --- |

(57)

According to the Banking Communication, the aid measure must, in its amount and form, be necessary to achieve the objective. It implies that the capital injection must be of the minimum amount necessary to reach the objective.

| (58) | As regards the amount of the intervention of the Resolution Scheme, the Commission observes that the amount exactly covered the difference between the fair value of the transferred assets and the nominal value of the transferred liabilities. The Commission concludes that the amount was not excessive. The Commission also notes that Proton Bank's equity and subordinated debt was left in Proton Bank. Therefore, the shareholders and subordinated debt-holders will suffer a full loss and the contribution of the HDIGF is not inflated by the cost of rescuing those investors. |
| --- | --- |

(58)

As regards the amount of the intervention of the Resolution Scheme, the Commission observes that the amount exactly covered the difference between the fair value of the transferred assets and the nominal value of the transferred liabilities. The Commission concludes that the amount was not excessive. The Commission also notes that Proton Bank's equity and subordinated debt was left in Proton Bank. Therefore, the shareholders and subordinated debt-holders will suffer a full loss and the contribution of the HDIGF is not inflated by the cost of rescuing those investors.

| (59) | As regards the amount of the capital injections from the HFSF, the Commission has doubts that the amount is limited to the minimum necessary because the Member State envisages that Nea Proton Bank is to be restructured on a stand-alone basis. The Commission doubts that the bank can be viable on a stand-alone basis. Hence, the Commission is of the opinion that State aid is used for an option which is not realistic in the long-term. The Commission is of the opinion that Greece should also assess other options, which might be less expensive than the stand-alone option. At this stage the Commission is of the preliminary view that the stand-alone option might not be the cheapest option available and therefore it doubts that the State aid is limited to the minimum necessary. The Commission invites interested parties to provide comments on that issue. |
| --- | --- |

(59)

As regards the amount of the capital injections from the HFSF, the Commission has doubts that the amount is limited to the minimum necessary because the Member State envisages that Nea Proton Bank is to be restructured on a stand-alone basis. The Commission doubts that the bank can be viable on a stand-alone basis. Hence, the Commission is of the opinion that State aid is used for an option which is not realistic in the long-term. The Commission is of the opinion that Greece should also assess other options, which might be less expensive than the stand-alone option. At this stage the Commission is of the preliminary view that the stand-alone option might not be the cheapest option available and therefore it doubts that the State aid is limited to the minimum necessary. The Commission invites interested parties to provide comments on that issue.

| (60) | As regards the remuneration of the intervention of the Resolution scheme of the HDIGF and the capital injections from the HFSF, Nea Proton Bank will most probably not be able to remunerate the State aid it received. The Commission observes that in line with point 44 of the Recapitalisation Communication any rescue recapitalisation should in principle reflect the risk profile of the beneficiary and not fundamentally sound banks should pay higher remuneration than those that are fundamentally sound. If a bank that is not fundamentally sound is unable to sufficiently remunerate the received recapitalisation, it can only be accepted on the condition of either a bank's winding-up or a through and far-reaching restructuring including a change in management and corporate governance where appropriate. In view of the fact that Nea Proton Bank is not able to remunerate the recapitalisation by the HFSF, the Commission has doubts whether Nea Proton Bank is a fundamentally sound bank. |
| --- | --- |

(60)

As regards the remuneration of the intervention of the Resolution scheme of the HDIGF and the capital injections from the HFSF, Nea Proton Bank will most probably not be able to remunerate the State aid it received. The Commission observes that in line with point 44 of the Recapitalisation Communication any rescue recapitalisation should in principle reflect the risk profile of the beneficiary and not fundamentally sound banks should pay higher remuneration than those that are fundamentally sound. If a bank that is not fundamentally sound is unable to sufficiently remunerate the received recapitalisation, it can only be accepted on the condition of either a bank's winding-up or a through and far-reaching restructuring including a change in management and corporate governance where appropriate. In view of the fact that Nea Proton Bank is not able to remunerate the recapitalisation by the HFSF, the Commission has doubts whether Nea Proton Bank is a fundamentally sound bank.

| (61) | In conclusion, the intervention of the Resolution scheme of the HDIGF is necessary in both its amount and form to achieve the objectives of limiting the disturbance in the Greek banking system and economy as a whole. The capital injections by the HFSF are also necessary in their form to achieve the objectives of limiting the disturbance in the Greek banking system and economy as a whole. However, at this stage the Commission has doubts that the amount of the capital injections by the HFSF is limited to the minimum. The Commission underlines that the absence of remuneration triggers the need for in-depth restructuring. |
| --- | --- |

(61)

In conclusion, the intervention of the Resolution scheme of the HDIGF is necessary in both its amount and form to achieve the objectives of limiting the disturbance in the Greek banking system and economy as a whole. The capital injections by the HFSF are also necessary in their form to achieve the objectives of limiting the disturbance in the Greek banking system and economy as a whole. However, at this stage the Commission has doubts that the amount of the capital injections by the HFSF is limited to the minimum. The Commission underlines that the absence of remuneration triggers the need for in-depth restructuring.

c.   Proportionality – measures limiting negative spill-over effects

| (62) | The Commission notes that the legal entity Proton Bank will be liquidated and will exit the market. However, thanks to measure 1 and measure 2, the economic activities of Proton Bank continue to exist in Nea Proton Bank and produce negative spill-over effects. Nea Proton Bank should be subject to measures limiting negative spill-over effects. However, the risk of distortions of competition in the short-term is rather limited given the very small size of Nea Proton Bank and the fact that Nea Proton Bank does not aim to grow in the short-term. |
| --- | --- |

(62)

The Commission notes that the legal entity Proton Bank will be liquidated and will exit the market. However, thanks to measure 1 and measure 2, the economic activities of Proton Bank continue to exist in Nea Proton Bank and produce negative spill-over effects. Nea Proton Bank should be subject to measures limiting negative spill-over effects. However, the risk of distortions of competition in the short-term is rather limited given the very small size of Nea Proton Bank and the fact that Nea Proton Bank does not aim to grow in the short-term.

| (63) | Therefore the Commission considers that the intervention by the Resolution scheme and the capital injections from the HFSF are proportionate as rescue aid. |
| --- | --- |

(63)

Therefore the Commission considers that the intervention by the Resolution scheme and the capital injections from the HFSF are proportionate as rescue aid.

| (64) | After having assessed whether the rescue aid measures (measure 1 and measure 2) are compatible with the Banking Communication and the Recapitalisation Communication, the Commission will now assess whether the restructuring envisaged complies with the requirements of the Restructuring Communication. |
| --- | --- |

(64)

After having assessed whether the rescue aid measures (measure 1 and measure 2) are compatible with the Banking Communication and the Recapitalisation Communication, the Commission will now assess whether the restructuring envisaged complies with the requirements of the Restructuring Communication.

4.2.4   Compatibility with the Restructuring Communication

Restoration of long-term viability of Nea Proton Bank:

| (65) | The HFSF has the obligation to sell the shares it owns in Nea Proton Bank. Since the obligation is only to sell the shares, it can be a sale to any type of investor. It means that the sale does not necessarily entail the integration of Nea Proton Bank into a larger banking group; the bank could remain a standalone bank with the only change being that it would have a new shareholder, for instance, a private equity group. Given that uncertainty about the type of the future owner, the notified restructuring plan is based on continuation of the operations of the bank on a stand-alone basis, i.e. not merged in a larger bank. |
| --- | --- |

(65)

The HFSF has the obligation to sell the shares it owns in Nea Proton Bank. Since the obligation is only to sell the shares, it can be a sale to any type of investor. It means that the sale does not necessarily entail the integration of Nea Proton Bank into a larger banking group; the bank could remain a standalone bank with the only change being that it would have a new shareholder, for instance, a private equity group. Given that uncertainty about the type of the future owner, the notified restructuring plan is based on continuation of the operations of the bank on a stand-alone basis, i.e. not merged in a larger bank.

| (66) | The Commission doubts that Nea Proton Bank can be viable on a stand-alone basis, as planned in the restructuring plan submitted to the Commission. |
| --- | --- |

(66)

The Commission doubts that Nea Proton Bank can be viable on a stand-alone basis, as planned in the restructuring plan submitted to the Commission.

| (67) | The Commission in particular notes that in a stand-alone approach high costs have to be incurred to, for instance, build solid risk management systems and solid IT platforms which did not exist within Proton Bank and which, as the failure of Proton Bank has shown, are necessary for a viable business model. |
| --- | --- |

(67)

The Commission in particular notes that in a stand-alone approach high costs have to be incurred to, for instance, build solid risk management systems and solid IT platforms which did not exist within Proton Bank and which, as the failure of Proton Bank has shown, are necessary for a viable business model.

| (68) | High synergies could be achieved by integration of Nea Proton Bank into a larger and viable financial services group (e.g. another bank) or by merging it with other small banks to form a larger and viable group. It would allow a significant part of those infrastructures and corporate functions costs to be saved. |
| --- | --- |

(68)

High synergies could be achieved by integration of Nea Proton Bank into a larger and viable financial services group (e.g. another bank) or by merging it with other small banks to form a larger and viable group. It would allow a significant part of those infrastructures and corporate functions costs to be saved.

| (69) | In addition, the Nea Proton Bank has little franchise value, as its depositors are primarily attracted by very high interest rates offered on deposits. The bank is structurally unprofitable because its costs of funding are significantly above the level of most of its competitors. Attempts by the new management to reduce the interest rates have resulted in deposit withdrawal, forcing the bank to keep high interest rates. Conversely if the bank was integrated in a larger and solid bank, it would probably give more confidence to depositors and increase the range of services offered to them, such that the bank would not have to continue offering interest rates on deposits which are significantly above the rate offered by most competitors. The bank could thereby offer lower interest rates to depositors without losing them, such that profitability would be higher. |
| --- | --- |

(69)

In addition, the Nea Proton Bank has little franchise value, as its depositors are primarily attracted by very high interest rates offered on deposits. The bank is structurally unprofitable because its costs of funding are significantly above the level of most of its competitors. Attempts by the new management to reduce the interest rates have resulted in deposit withdrawal, forcing the bank to keep high interest rates. Conversely if the bank was integrated in a larger and solid bank, it would probably give more confidence to depositors and increase the range of services offered to them, such that the bank would not have to continue offering interest rates on deposits which are significantly above the rate offered by most competitors. The bank could thereby offer lower interest rates to depositors without losing them, such that profitability would be higher.

| (70) | According to the updated restructuring plan submitted on 16 July 2012, Nea Proton Bank plans to increase its net interest income from EUR [...]. The Commission doubts that Nea Proton Bank can achieve such strong growth rate, especially if it remains a stand-alone small bank. |
| --- | --- |

(70)

According to the updated restructuring plan submitted on 16 July 2012, Nea Proton Bank plans to increase its net interest income from EUR [...]. The Commission doubts that Nea Proton Bank can achieve such strong growth rate, especially if it remains a stand-alone small bank.

| (71) | The net interest income is an important income driver. If Nea Proton Bank does not manage to achieve the planned strong growth rate, it will not achieve the planned future profits or will generate further losses in the future. |
| --- | --- |

(71)

The net interest income is an important income driver. If Nea Proton Bank does not manage to achieve the planned strong growth rate, it will not achieve the planned future profits or will generate further losses in the future.

| (72) | There is therefore a risk of Nea Proton Bank ending up as a bridge bank repeatedly relying on State aid. |
| --- | --- |

(72)

There is therefore a risk of Nea Proton Bank ending up as a bridge bank repeatedly relying on State aid.

| (73) | The Commission is at this stage of the opinion that the reintegration of Nea Proton Bank into a larger viable financial company might increase the viability prospects of Nea Proton Bank. The Restructuring Communication provides that in case a bank cannot return to viability on a stand-alone basis, viability can be restored through a sale and integration into a larger entity. In that respect, point 17 of the Restructuring Communication clarifies that the sale of an ailing bank to another financial institution can contribute to restoring long-term viability, if the purchaser is viable and capable of absorbing the transfer of the ailing bank and may help restoring market confidence. |
| --- | --- |

(73)

The Commission is at this stage of the opinion that the reintegration of Nea Proton Bank into a larger viable financial company might increase the viability prospects of Nea Proton Bank. The Restructuring Communication provides that in case a bank cannot return to viability on a stand-alone basis, viability can be restored through a sale and integration into a larger entity. In that respect, point 17 of the Restructuring Communication clarifies that the sale of an ailing bank to another financial institution can contribute to restoring long-term viability, if the purchaser is viable and capable of absorbing the transfer of the ailing bank and may help restoring market confidence.

| (74) | In conclusion, the Commission doubts that the restructuring plan notified on 12 March 2012 and the updated restructuring plan submitted on 16 July 2012 will restore Nea Proton Bank's long-term viability. |
| --- | --- |

(74)

In conclusion, the Commission doubts that the restructuring plan notified on 12 March 2012 and the updated restructuring plan submitted on 16 July 2012 will restore Nea Proton Bank's long-term viability.

| (75) | The Commission also doubts that the depth of the restructuring is sufficient compared to the depth which is required in the case of absence of remuneration. |
| --- | --- |

(75)

The Commission also doubts that the depth of the restructuring is sufficient compared to the depth which is required in the case of absence of remuneration.

Burden-sharing and limitation of the aid to the minimum necessary:

| (76) | The Commission has doubts that the aid is limited to the minimum. In particular, the Commission doubts that the restructuring costs are limited to the minimum, because Nea Proton Bank is restructured on a stand-alone basis, which inflates the restructuring costs. The Commission doubts that the bank can be made viable on a stand-alone basis without incurring very high costs, notably to develop a viable IT infrastructure and risk management structure. At this stage the Commission considers that the stand-alone option might not be the cheapest option and doubts that the State aid is limited to the minimum. |
| --- | --- |

(76)

The Commission has doubts that the aid is limited to the minimum. In particular, the Commission doubts that the restructuring costs are limited to the minimum, because Nea Proton Bank is restructured on a stand-alone basis, which inflates the restructuring costs. The Commission doubts that the bank can be made viable on a stand-alone basis without incurring very high costs, notably to develop a viable IT infrastructure and risk management structure. At this stage the Commission considers that the stand-alone option might not be the cheapest option and doubts that the State aid is limited to the minimum.

| (77) | Concerning burden-sharing of shareholders and subordinated debt holders, the Commission notes that the shareholders and subordinated debt holders were not transferred to Nea Proton Bank but have remained in the entity in liquidation. Therefore, there is a high probability that they will lose their investments. That burden-sharing reduces the aid amount needed. Hence, the Commission considers that sufficient burden-sharing of shareholders and subordinated debt holders is achieved. |
| --- | --- |

(77)

Concerning burden-sharing of shareholders and subordinated debt holders, the Commission notes that the shareholders and subordinated debt holders were not transferred to Nea Proton Bank but have remained in the entity in liquidation. Therefore, there is a high probability that they will lose their investments. That burden-sharing reduces the aid amount needed. Hence, the Commission considers that sufficient burden-sharing of shareholders and subordinated debt holders is achieved.

| (78) | There will be no remuneration for the HDIGF. There is a very small probability of recovering much of the amount contributed by the HDIGF. It is therefore highly probable that most aid is lost. The Greek State could expect to recover only part of the capital injections by the HFSF amounting to a total of EUR 550 million. By contrast, the EUR 1,122 billion granted by the Resolution scheme of the HDIGF to cover the gap between assets and liabilities are most probably lost. |
| --- | --- |

(78)

There will be no remuneration for the HDIGF. There is a very small probability of recovering much of the amount contributed by the HDIGF. It is therefore highly probable that most aid is lost. The Greek State could expect to recover only part of the capital injections by the HFSF amounting to a total of EUR 550 million. By contrast, the EUR 1,122 billion granted by the Resolution scheme of the HDIGF to cover the gap between assets and liabilities are most probably lost.

| (79) | Therefore the Commission considers that the burden-sharing, even if it probably represents the maximum of what is feasible for that distressed bank, does not meet the Communication's requirement and that the absence of remuneration triggers the need for in-depth restructuring, both in terms of viability measures and in terms of measures to limit distortions of competition. |
| --- | --- |

(79)

Therefore the Commission considers that the burden-sharing, even if it probably represents the maximum of what is feasible for that distressed bank, does not meet the Communication's requirement and that the absence of remuneration triggers the need for in-depth restructuring, both in terms of viability measures and in terms of measures to limit distortions of competition.

Distortion of competition:

| (80) | Nea Proton Bank will receive EUR 1,672 billion of aid (EUR 1,122 billion intervention by the resolution scheme of the HDIGF, EUR 0,25 billion capital injection by the HFSF and EUR [0.23 - 0.3] billion capital injection by the HFSF), which is a considerable amount of aid. That aid represents more than 50 % of Proton Bank's risk weighted assets, respectively more than 130 % of Nea Proton Bank's risk weighted assets. The Commission notes that Proton Bank (which is the legal entity which previously performed the activities which are now harboured in Nea Proton Bank) had received considerable aid: Proton Bank received, under the Greek bank support scheme (21), a capital injection of EUR 80 million from the Greek State in 2009 (more than 4 % of that bank's risk weighted assets at that time), a State guarantee for issued bonds with a nominal value of EUR 149,4 million, and Greek government securities amounting to EUR 78 million. Such amounts of aid normally call for a deep restructuring and reduction of the market presence of the bank. Those requirements are even more acute if there is no remuneration of the aid, most of which will never be recovered. |
| --- | --- |

(80)

Nea Proton Bank will receive EUR 1,672 billion of aid (EUR 1,122 billion intervention by the resolution scheme of the HDIGF, EUR 0,25 billion capital injection by the HFSF and EUR [0.23 - 0.3] billion capital injection by the HFSF), which is a considerable amount of aid. That aid represents more than 50 % of Proton Bank's risk weighted assets, respectively more than 130 % of Nea Proton Bank's risk weighted assets. The Commission notes that Proton Bank (which is the legal entity which previously performed the activities which are now harboured in Nea Proton Bank) had received considerable aid: Proton Bank received, under the Greek bank support scheme (21), a capital injection of EUR 80 million from the Greek State in 2009 (more than 4 % of that bank's risk weighted assets at that time), a State guarantee for issued bonds with a nominal value of EUR 149,4 million, and Greek government securities amounting to EUR 78 million. Such amounts of aid normally call for a deep restructuring and reduction of the market presence of the bank. Those requirements are even more acute if there is no remuneration of the aid, most of which will never be recovered.

| (81) | In terms of market presence, the Commission observes that the creation of the bridge bank is not a real resolution of Proton Bank as the restructuring plan of Nea Proton Bank foresees that Nea Proton Bank remains on the market nearly as Proton Bank was before. |
| --- | --- |

(81)

In terms of market presence, the Commission observes that the creation of the bridge bank is not a real resolution of Proton Bank as the restructuring plan of Nea Proton Bank foresees that Nea Proton Bank remains on the market nearly as Proton Bank was before.

| (82) | Proton Bank was a very small bank (approximately 1 % market share of Greek banks total assets and consequently Proton Bank's assets and liabilities transferred into Nea Proton Bank are relatively small when compared with the size of the Greek banking system, as indicated above. Therefore, despite the exceptionally large aid amount, the distortions of competition caused by the aid to Nea Proton Bank could be considered to be limited. |
| --- | --- |

(82)

Proton Bank was a very small bank (approximately 1 % market share of Greek banks total assets and consequently Proton Bank's assets and liabilities transferred into Nea Proton Bank are relatively small when compared with the size of the Greek banking system, as indicated above. Therefore, despite the exceptionally large aid amount, the distortions of competition caused by the aid to Nea Proton Bank could be considered to be limited.

| (83) | However, since the bank's market behaviour has been characterised by offering interest rates on deposits which are much higher than the interest rates on deposits of most of the competitors, a price leadership ban may be contemplated for Nea Proton Bank. Such a price leadership ban would decrease the probability that Nea Proton Bank uses the State aid to pay high interest rates and distorts competition on the market for deposits. To ensure that Nea Proton Bank does not continue the unsustainable business model of Proton Bank and to limit the competition distortions, the Commission is of the view that behavioural measures such as an acquisition ban and a ban on strong growth in lending and deposit-taking are necessary. |
| --- | --- |

(83)

However, since the bank's market behaviour has been characterised by offering interest rates on deposits which are much higher than the interest rates on deposits of most of the competitors, a price leadership ban may be contemplated for Nea Proton Bank. Such a price leadership ban would decrease the probability that Nea Proton Bank uses the State aid to pay high interest rates and distorts competition on the market for deposits. To ensure that Nea Proton Bank does not continue the unsustainable business model of Proton Bank and to limit the competition distortions, the Commission is of the view that behavioural measures such as an acquisition ban and a ban on strong growth in lending and deposit-taking are necessary.

Conclusion

| (84) | On the basis of the above, the Commission comes to the preliminary conclusion that the notified measures consisting of measure 1 (EUR 1,122 billion intervention by the Resolution scheme of the HDIGF) and measure 2 (EUR 0,25 billion capital injection by the HFSF and apital injections by the HFSF amounting to a total of EUR [0,23 - 0,3] billion ([...])) for Nea Proton Bank constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU. The Commission has at this stage doubts that such aid can be found compatible with the internal market pursuant to Article 107(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. |
| --- | --- |

(84)

On the basis of the above, the Commission comes to the preliminary conclusion that the notified measures consisting of measure 1 (EUR 1,122 billion intervention by the Resolution scheme of the HDIGF) and measure 2 (EUR 0,25 billion capital injection by the HFSF and apital injections by the HFSF amounting to a total of EUR [0,23 - 0,3] billion ([...])) for Nea Proton Bank constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU. The Commission has at this stage doubts that such aid can be found compatible with the internal market pursuant to Article 107(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

DECISION

In the light of the foregoing considerations, the Commission has decided to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 108(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union with respect to State aid (i.e. the EUR 1,122 billion intervention by the Resolution scheme of the HDIGF, the EUR 0,25 billion capital injection by the HFSF and the capital injections by the HFSF amounting to a total of EUR [0,23 - 0,3] billion ([...])) for Nea Proton Bank and with respect to Nea Proton Bank's restructuring plan and, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 108(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, requests Greece to submit its comments and to provide all such information as may help to assess the aid measures, within one month of the date of receipt of this letter. It requests your authorities to forward a copy of this letter to the potential recipient of the aid immediately.

In order to preserve financial stability in Greece, the Commission temporarily approves the State aid (i.e. the EUR 1,122 billion intervention by the Resolution scheme of the HDIGF, the EUR 0,25 billion capital injection by the HFSF and the capital injections by the HFSF amounting to a total of EUR [0,23 - 0,3] billion ([...])) for Nea Proton Bank as compatible rescue aid until the Commission adopts a final restructuring decision regarding Nea Proton Bank. The Commission requests Greece to submit a new restructuring plan for Nea Proton Bank which addresses the Commission's doubts expressed in this decision.

The Commission wishes to remind Greece that Article 108(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union has suspensory effect, and would draw your attention to Article 14 of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999, which provides that all unlawful aid may be recovered from the recipient.

The Commission warns Greece that it will inform interested parties by publishing this letter and a meaningful summary of it in the Official Journal of the European Union. It will also inform interested parties in the EFTA countries which are signatories to the EEA Agreement, by publication of a notice in the EEA Supplement to the Official Journal of the European Union and will inform the EFTA Surveillance Authority by sending a copy of this letter. All such interested parties will be invited to submit their comments within one month of the date of such publication.

The Commission notes that Greece accepts that the adoption of the Decision be in the English language.”

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(1)  Kyseinen 1,122 miljardin euron rahoitusvaje katettiin kahdessa erässä: Kreikan talletus- ja investointitakausrahasto maksoi 862 miljoonaa euroa vuonna 2012, ja loppuosan eli 260 miljoonaa euroa kattoi Kreikan rahoitusvakausrahasto, joka otti vastattavakseen talletus- ja investointitakausrahaston velvollisuudet lain nro 3845/2010 mukaisesti (lain nro 4051/2012 nojalla).

1

(2)  Luottamuksellisia tietoja

2

(3)  Kreikan viranomaiset neuvottelivat yksityisten velkojiensa kanssa saadakseen nämä vapaaehtoisesti mitätöimään osan valtion velasta. Yksityisen sektorin osallistumisessa on kyse poikkeuksellisesta toimenpiteestä, jolla oli huomattava vaikutus Kreikan pankkeihin, sillä useat pankit kärsivät sen johdosta tappioita.

3

(4)  Commission decision of 19 November 2008 in State Aid N 560/2008 "Support Measures for the Credit Institutions in Greece", OJ C 125, 05.06.2009, p. 6.

4

(5)  See Commission decision of 19 November 2008 in State Aid N 560/2008 "Support Measures for the Credit Institutions in Greece", OJ C 125, 05.06.2009, p. 6. and the respective prolongation and amendment decisions: Commission decision of 18 September 2009 in State Aid N 504/2009 "Prolongation and amendment of the Support Measures for the Credit Institutions in Greece", OJ C 264, 06.11.2009, p. 5.; Commission decision of 25 January 2010 in State Aid N 690/2009 "Prolongation of the Support Measures for the Credit Institutions in Greece", OJ C 57, 09.03.2010, p. 6.; Commission decision of 12 May 2010 in State Aid N 163/2010 "Amendment to the Support Measures for the Credit Institutions in Greece", OJ C 166, 25.06.2010, p. 2.; Commission decision of 30 June 2010 in State Aid N 260/2010 "Extension of the Support Measures for the Credit Institutions in Greece", OJ C 238, 03.09.2010, p. 3.; Commission decision of 21 December 2010 in State Aid SA.31998 (2010/N) "Fourth extension of the Support Measures for the Credit Institutions in Greece", OJ C 53, 19.02.2011, p. 2.; Commission decision of 4 April 2011 in State Aid SA.32767 (2011/N) "Amendment to the Support Measures for the Credit Institutions in Greece", OJ C 164, 02.06.2011, p. 8.; Commission decision of 30 June 2011 in State Aid SA.33153 (2011/N) "Fifth prolongation of the Support Measures for the Credit Institutions in Greece", OJ C 274, 17.09.2011, p. 5.; Commission decision of 6 February 2012 in State aid SA.34149 (2011/N) "Sixth prolongation of the Support Measures for the Credit Institutions in Greece", OJ C 101, 04.04.2012, p.2-3.; Commission decision of 6 July 2012 in State aid case SA.35002 (2012/N) "Seventh prolongation of the Support Scheme for Credit Institutions in Greece", not yet published.

5

(6)  The ELA funding provided by the Bank of Greece is covered by an "umbrella" State guarantee. That means that the guarantee is not earmarked to cover the ELA funding received by any particular bank; it rather covers the total amount of ELA funding provided to the whole banking sector and it aims to cover potential future losses of the Bank of Greece.

6

(7)  Short-term notes issues by the Greek state for raising funds.

7

(8)  Parts of this text have been omitted to ensure that confidential information is not disclosed. Those parts are indicated by three full stops enclosed in square brackets and marked with one asterisk.

8

(9)  Private Sector Involvement (PSI): Negotiation between the Greek authorities and its private creditors which aimed to achieve a partial waiver of the Greek government debt by its private creditors on a voluntary basis. The PSI is extraordinary in nature and had a considerable impact on Greek banks: A series of banks made losses stemming from PSI.

9

(10)  The funding gap of EUR 1,122 billion was covered in two tranches: EUR 862 million were paid up by the HDIGF and the remaining EUR 260 million were disbursed by the HFSF which undertook the obligations of the HDIGF according to the Law 3845/2010 (based on Law 4051/2012).

10

(11)  Explanation of PSI: See footnote 7.

11

(12)  See Case C-345/02 Pearle and Others [2004] ECR I-7139, paragraphs 37 and 38. That approach was applied in Commission decision in the State aid case NN 61/2009 – "Rescue and restructuring of Caja Castilla-La Mancha", Spain, 29.06.2010, C(2010)4453 corr., recitals 96-118, and in Commission decision in the State aid case SA.34115 (2012 /NN) – "Resolution of T Bank", Greece, 16.05.2012.

12

Pearle and Others

(13)  The Greek authorities do not discuss that issue in their submission.

13

(14)  As the General Court ruled in Case T-196/04 Ryanair v Commission [2008] ECR II-3643 at paragraph 85, "the application of [the MEIP] must be excluded in the event that the State acts as a public authority. In [that] event, the conduct of the State can never be compared to that of an operator or private investor in a market economy".

14

Ryanair v Commission

the application of [the MEIP] must be excluded in the event that the State acts as a public authority. In [that] event, the conduct of the State can never be compared to that of an operator or private investor in a market economy

(15)  See Commission decision of 25.01.2010 in the State aid case NN 19/2009 – Restructuring aid to Dunfermline Building Society, recital 51; Commission decision of 25.10.2010 in State aid case N 560/2009 – Aid for the liquidation of Fionia bank, recital 56; Commission decision of 8.11.2010 in State aid case N 392/2010 – Restructuring of CajaSur, recital 52.

15

(16)  See Commission decision of 6 February 2012 in State Aid SA.34149 "Sixth prolongation of the Support Measures for the Credit Institutions in Greece"OJ C 101, 04.04.2012, p. 2.

16

(17)  The application of State aid rules to measures taken in relation to financial institutions in the context of the current global financial crisis, OJ C 270, 25.10.2008, p. 8.

17

(18)  See recital 41 of Commission decision in Case NN 51/2008 Guarantee scheme for banks in Denmark, OJ C 273, 28.10.2008, p. 2.

18

(19)  Communication from the Commission - The recapitalisation of financial institutions in the current financial crisis: limitation of aid to the minimum necessary and safeguards against undue distortions of competition, OJ C 10, 15.1.2009, p. 2.

19

(20)  Commission Communication "The return to viability and the assessment of restructuring measures in the financial sector in the current crisis under the State aid rules" - Official Journal C 195, 19.8.2009, p. 9.

20

(21)  See Commission decision of 19 November 2008 in State Aid N 560/2008 "Support Measures for the Credit Institutions in Greece", OJ C 125, 05.06.2009, p. 6. and the respective prolongation decision.

21

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| 20.11.2012 | FI | Euroopan unionin virallinen lehti | C 357/36 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

20.11.2012

FI

Euroopan unionin virallinen lehti

C 357/36

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VALTIONTUKI – KREIKKA

Valtiontuki SA.34823 (2012/C) (ex 2012/NN) – Alpha Bankin pääomapohjan vahvistaminen Kreikan rahoitusvakausrahastosta

Kehotus huomautusten esittämiseen Euroopan unionin toiminnasta tehdyn sopimuksen 108 artiklan 2 kohdan mukaisesti

(ETA:n kannalta merkityksellinen teksti)

2012/C 357/06

Komissio on ilmoittanut 27. heinäkuuta 2012 päivätyllä, tätä tiivistelmää seuraavilla sivuilla todistusvoimaisella kielellä toistetulla kirjeellä Kreikalle päätöksestään aloittaa Euroopan unionin toiminnasta tehdyn sopimuksen 108 artiklan 2 kohdassa tarkoitettu menettely, joka koskee mainittua tukea/toimenpidettä.

Rahoitusvakauden ylläpitämiseksi komissio päätti väliaikaisesti hyväksyä sitoumuskirjeen ja väliaikaisrahoituksen muodossa toteutetun toimenpiteen pelastamistukena kuuden kuukauden ajaksi tämän päätöksen antamispäivämäärästä.

Asianomaiset voivat esittää huomautuksensa tuesta/toimenpiteestä, jota koskevan menettelyn komissio aloittaa, kuukauden kuluessa tämän tiivistelmän ja sitä seuraavan kirjeen julkaisemisesta. Huomautukset on lähetettävä osoitteeseen:

| European Commission |
| --- |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| State Aid Greffe |
| J70 03/225 |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |
| Faksi: (+32-2) 296 12 42 |

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

State Aid Greffe

J70 03/225

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Faksi: (+32-2) 296 12 42

Huomautukset toimitetaan Kreikalle. Huomautusten esittäjä voi pyytää kirjallisesti henkilöllisyytensä luottamuksellista käsittelyä. Tämä pyyntö on perusteltava.

TIIVISTELMÄ

MENETTELY

Kreikan rahoitusvakausrahasto lähetti 20. huhtikuuta 2012 Alpha Bankille, jäljempänä ’pankki’, sitoumuskirjeen osallistumisesta sen osakepääoman korottamiseen. Alpha Bankin väliaikaisrahoitus maksettiin 28. toukokuuta 2012. Samanlaiset sitoumuskirjeet on lähetetty ja väliaikaisrahoitukset myönnetty myös seuraaville pankeille: National Bank of Greece (SA. 34824 (2012/NN)), EFG Eurobank (SA. 34825 (2012/NN)) ja Piraeus Bank (SA. 34826 (2012/NN)). Kreikan viranomaiset ilmoittivat sitoumuskirjeistä 10. toukokuuta 2012. Koska toimenpide oli jo toteutettu, komission yksiköt rekisteröivät sen ilmoittamattomana tukena asianumerolla SA. 34823 (2012/NN).

KUVAUS TOIMENPITEESTÄ/TUESTA, JOTA KOSKEVAN MENETTELYN KOMISSIO ALOITTAA

Alpha Bankin pääoma pieneni merkittävästi sen jälkeen, kun pankki osallistui yksityisen sektorin osallistumista koskevaan järjestelyyn (1), joka kirjattiin takautuvasti vuoden 2011 viimeisen vuosineljänneksen kirjanpitoon. Sen rajoituksettomien ensisijaisten omien varojen osuus (Core Tier 1) oli 3 prosenttia ja vakavaraisuussuhde 5,5 prosenttia. Kreikan rahoitusvakausrahasto lähetti 20. huhtikuuta 2012 kirjeen, jolla se sitoutui osallistumaan Alpha Bankin suunniteltuun osakepääoman korottamiseen 1,9 miljardilla eurolla. [...] (2). Vuoden 2011 lopussa vakavaraisuussuhde, jossa on huomioitu Kreikan rahoitusvakausrahaston sitoumuskirjeeseen sisältyneen pääomatuen takautuvat vaikutukset, oli noussut 9,8 prosenttiin (pro forma). Kreikan rahoitusvakausrahasto maksoi 28. toukokuuta 2012 Alpha Bankille sitoumuskirjeessä antamansa sitoumuksen mukaiset 1,9 miljardia euroa Kreikan rahoitusvakausrahastosta annetun lain, sellaisena kuin se oli muutettuna tapahtuma-aikaan, väliaikaisrahoitusta koskevien säännösten mukaisesti. Kreikan keskuspankki oli laskenut sekä sitoumuskirjeessä mainitut summat että väliaikaisrahoituksen sen varmistamiseksi, että pankki noudatti silloisia vakavaraisuusvaatimuksia. Näin ollen 31. maaliskuuta 2012 päivätyssä taseessa Alpha Bankin vakavaraisuussuhde oli 9,6 prosenttia ja rajoituksettomien omien varojen osuus 7,2 prosenttia. Väliaikaisrahoituksen määrä muodosti 31. maaliskuuta 2012 noin 4,3 prosenttia Alpha Bankin riskipainotetuista omaisuuseristä. Toukokuussa 2009 sijoitetut etuoikeutetut osakkeet mukaan luettuina Alpha Bankin muina kuin takauksina tai maksuvalmiusapuna saama tuki muodostaa noin 6,3 prosenttia pankin riskipainotetuista omaisuuseristä.

TOIMENPITEEN/TUEN ARVIOINTI

Kreikan rahoitusvakausrahasto sitoutui 20. huhtikuuta 2012 lähettämällään kirjeellä vakaasti vahvistamaan pankin pääomapohjaa. Rahoitusvakausrahasto saa varoja valtiolta, ja olosuhteet, joissa se voi myöntää tukea rahoituslaitoksille, on määritelty ja rajattu tarkasti Kreikan lainsäädännössä. Näin ollen valtion varojen käyttö on katsottava valtion toimenpiteeksi.

Jo sitoumuskirjeestä koitui etua pankille [...]. Sitoumuskirjeessä asetettu velvoite toteutettiin väliaikaisrahoituksella, joka maksettiin 28. toukokuuta 2012, joten väliaikaisrahoitus on jatkoa samalle tuelle. ERVV:n joukkovelkakirjalainojen muodossa annettu väliaikaisrahoitus nosti Alpha Bankin vakavaraisuussuhteen tasolle, joka mahdollistaa toimimisen markkinoilla ja osallistumisen eurojärjestelmän operaatioihin. Siten myös se antoi pankille etua valtion varoista.

Tämän seurauksena tuensaajan asema vahvistui, sillä sille annettiin pääomavaatimusten jatkuvan noudattamisen edellyttämä rahoitus, mikä johti kilpailun vääristymiseen. Koska pankki toimii aktiivisesti Euroopan muilla rahoitusmarkkinoilla ja koska muiden jäsenvaltioiden rahoituslaitokset toimivat Kreikassa, toimenpide vaikuttaa todennäköisesti myös jäsenvaltioiden väliseen kauppaan.

Toimenpiteen arvioinnin oikeudellisena perustana on Euroopan unionin toiminnasta tehdyn sopimuksen 107 artiklan 3 kohdan b alakohta, jonka mukaan valtiontukea voidaan pitää sisämarkkinoille soveltuvana, jos sitä myönnetään ”jäsenvaltion taloudessa olevan vakavan häiriön poistamiseen”. Komissio katsoo, että edellytykset valtiontuen hyväksymiselle SEUT-sopimuksen 107 artiklan 3 kohdan b alakohdan nojalla täyttyvät edelleen, koska rahoitusmarkkinoilla on ilmennyt uusia paineita. Komissio vahvisti tämän näkemyksen hyväksymällä joulukuussa 2011 tiedonannon, jolla jatkettiin valtiontukisääntöjen soveltamista pankkien hyväksi toteutettaviin tukitoimenpiteisiin. Komissio on hyväksynyt toistuvasti Kreikan luottolaitoksia koskevia tukijärjestelmiä ja vahvistanut näin, että Kreikan taloutta uhkaa vakava häiriö ja että valtion tuki pankeille on omiaan poistamaan kyseisen häiriön. Uhka on tässä tapauksessa vieläkin suurempi, sillä Alpha Bank on suuri pankki.

Komissio kuitenkin epäilee tässä vaiheessa, täyttääkö tukitoimenpide sisämarkkinoille soveltumisen yleiset edellytykset, jotka koskevat asianmukaisuutta, tarpeellisuutta ja suhteellisuutta.

Asianmukaisuuden osalta komissio katsoo, että lähinnä yksityissektorin osallistumisen seurauksena tarpeelliseksi osoittautuneen toimenpiteen tarkoituksena on varmistaa, että pankki noudattaa lakisääteisiä pääomavaatimuksia ja voi jatkossakin saada keskuspankkilikviditeettiä. Kun otetaan huomioon, että Alpha Bank on rahoitusjärjestelmän kannalta tärkeä pankki Kreikassa ja että toimenpiteen tarkoituksena on edistää Kreikan rahoitusvakautta, toimenpide vaikuttaisi ensi näkemältä asianmukaiselta. Komissiolla on kuitenkin epäilyjä eikä se voi tässä vaiheessa katsoa, että kaikkiin sellaisiin toimiin olisi ryhdytty välittömästi, joilla torjutaan pankin uutta avuntarvetta tulevaisuudessa. Tässä vaiheessa ei ole selvyyttä siitä, kenen määräysvallassa pankki on sen jälkeen, kun väliaikaisrahoitus on korvattu pysyvällä pääomarakenteen vahvistamisella. Pankki voi siirtyä valtion määräysvaltaan tai sitten yksityiset vähemmistöosakkaat voivat saada määräysvallan ja sitä kautta huomattavan hyödyn. Komissio haluaisi molemmissa tapauksissa varmistaa, että pankin hallinnon ja erityisesti sen lainanantoprosessin laatu ei heikkene. Jos pankki esimerkiksi siirtyy valtion määräysvaltaan, sen ei pitäisi kärsiä huonosta hallinnosta tai väärästä hinnoittelusta tai harjoittaa muuta kuin liiketoimintalähtöistä lainanantoa. Komissiolla on tässä vaiheessa epäilyksiä siitä, voidaanko nykyisen yrityshallinnon puitteissa rajoittaa julkisen vallan vaikutusta ja koordinointia. Jos taas suurin osa Alpha Bankin äänioikeuksista olisi tulevaisuudessa sellaisen sijoittajan hallussa, joka olisi sijoittanut vain rajallisen määrän rahaa ja jolla olisi osto-optio valtion hallussa oleviin osakkeisiin, kyseisellä sijoittajalla saattaisi olla kiusaus ottaa kohtuuttomia riskejä. Päätelmänä voidaan todeta, että olemassa on riski pankin hallintotavan rappeutumisesta, mikä saattaisi vaarantaa kannattavuuden palauttamisen ja rahoitusvakauden ylläpitämisen. Koska pankin tulevasta omistajasta ja määräysvallan haltijasta ei ole selvyyttä, komissio epäilee tässä vaiheessa tukitoimenpiteen asianmukaisuutta. Komissio kehottaakin Kreikan viranomaisia, pankkia ja asianomaisia kolmansia osapuolia esittämään huomautuksensa ja antamaan tietoja.

Vaikka tuen määrä laskettiin siten, että sillä varmistettiin pankin mahdollisuus noudattaa silloisia vakavaraisuusvaatimuksia, pääomapohjaa oli vahvistettu jo useita kertoja aikaisemmin. Komissio suhtautuu epäillen siihen, että kaikkiin mahdollisiin toimiin olisi ryhdytty sen varmistamiseksi, että pankki ei tulevaisuudessa tarvitsisi lisää pääomankorotustukea ja että se esimerkiksi noudattaisi sitoumuksia, jotka sisältyvät Kreikan toisen sopeutusohjelman talous- ja finanssipolitiikan muistioon (jossa edellytetään, että pankkien rajoituksettomien ensisijaisten omien varojen osuus on syyskuuhun 2012 mennessä 9 prosenttia ja kesäkuuhun 2013 mennessä 10 prosenttia). Tuesta maksettavan korvauksen osalta todettakoon, että Kreikan rahoitusvakausrahaston saama korvaus on pienempi kuin 7–9 prosentin osuus, josta pääomapohjan vahvistamista koskevassa tiedonannossa määrätään. Jos väliaikaisrahoituksen kesto on riittävän lyhyt, komissio saattaisi voida ottaa huomioon väliaikaisrahoituksen erityispiirteet sekä olosuhteet, joissa se myönnettiin, ja hyväksyä näin ollen pienemmän korvauksen. Koska väliaikaisrahoituksen kesto on tässä vaiheessa kuitenkin vielä epäselvä lähinnä vaikean taloustilanteen vuoksi, komissio epäilee korvauksen riittävyyttä. Väliaikaisrahoitus ei myöskään johda pankin nykyisten osakkaiden omistusoikeuksien laimentumiseen. Pankin taloudellinen ja oikeudellinen omistajuus ei muutu ennen siirtymistä lopulliseen pääomarakenteen vahvistamiseen. Näin ollen kyseinen toimenpide ei olisi valtiontukisääntöjen korvaus- ja vastuunjakoperiaatteiden mukainen, jos väliaikaisrahoitus kestäisi aiottua pidempään. Komissio pyytää huomautuksia näistä seikoista.

Toimenpiteen suhteellisuuden osalta todettakoon, että pankki saa suuren määrän tukea, mikä saattaa johtaa vakaviin kilpailun vääristymiin, jos huomioon otetaan myös se, että Kreikan rahoitusvakausrahasto osallistuu myös kolmen muun suuren kreikkalaispankin pääomapohjan vahvistamiseen. Tuen suurta määrää ja pelastamiskauden pituutta silmällä pitäen komissio epäilee tässä vaiheessa, että tällä hetkellä hyväksyttyihin järjestelmiin sisältyvät suojakeinot, kuten osingonjakokielto ja se, ettei osto-oikeuksia hyödynnetä konsultoimatta ensin komissiota, eivät ole riittäviä suhteessa tarkasteltavaan väliaikaisrahoitukseen. Komissio kehottaa Kreikan viranomaisia, tuensaajaa ja asianomaisia kolmansia osapuolia esittämään huomautuksensa tästä asiasta. Komissio toteaa lisäksi, että Kreikan rahoitusvakausrahasto on jo nimittänyt edustajan kaikkiin neljään pankkiin, joita väliaikaisrahoitus koskee, mutta olemassa ei ole vielä sääntöjä, jotka estäisivät rahoitusvakausrahastoa jakamasta tietoa kyseisten yritysten välillä tai harjoittamasta niiden välillä koordinointia. Pankin tarkan seurannan kannalta vaikuttaisi asianmukaiselta, että komissiolla olisi mahdollisuus turvautua seurannasta vastaavaan toimitsijamieheen, joka olisi fyysisesti läsnä pankissa ja tarkkailisi pankin kaupallisissa käytänteissä ilmeneviä vahingollisia muutoksia, kuten väärää hinnoittelua, muuta kuin liiketoimintalähtöistä lainanantoa tai kestämättömällä tasolla olevien korkojen myöntämistä talletuksille. Komissio kehottaa tuensaajaa ja asianomaisia esittämään huomautuksensa tästäkin asiasta.

Neuvoston asetuksen (EY) N:o 659/1999 14 artiklan mukaan sääntöjenvastainen tuki voidaan periä takaisin tuensaajalta.

KIRJEEN TEKSTI

”The Commission wishes to inform Greece that, having examined the information supplied by your authorities on the aid measure referred to above, it has decided to temporarily approve the measure in the form of a commitment letter and bridge recapitalisation as rescue aid and to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 108(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union ("TFEU") in regard to that measure.

1.   PROCEDURE

| (1) | In May 2009, Alpha Bank ("the bank") was recapitalised under the recapitalisation scheme which is part of the "Support Measures for the Credit Institutions in Greece" approved by the European Commission on 19 November 2008 (3). |
| --- | --- |

(1)

In May 2009, Alpha Bank ("the bank") was recapitalised under the recapitalisation scheme which is part of the "Support Measures for the Credit Institutions in Greece" approved by the European Commission on 19 November 2008 (3).

| (2) | Recital 14 of the decision of 19 November 2008 provided that a restructuring plan needed to be notified to the Commission for the beneficiaries of that recapitalisation scheme. The extent of the restructuring plan for each bank depended on that bank's individual situation. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Recital 14 of the decision of 19 November 2008 provided that a restructuring plan needed to be notified to the Commission for the beneficiaries of that recapitalisation scheme. The extent of the restructuring plan for each bank depended on that bank's individual situation.

| (3) | A plan was submitted to the European Commission by the Greek authorities on 2 August 2010 describing the bank's programme for ensuring long-term viability under the macro-economic assumptions which were relevant at that point in time. That plan, its subsequent updates as well as additional information submitted by the Greek authorities were administratively registered by the Commission services under case SA. 30342 (PN 26/2010) and then SA. 32786 (2011/PN). |
| --- | --- |

(3)

A plan was submitted to the European Commission by the Greek authorities on 2 August 2010 describing the bank's programme for ensuring long-term viability under the macro-economic assumptions which were relevant at that point in time. That plan, its subsequent updates as well as additional information submitted by the Greek authorities were administratively registered by the Commission services under case SA. 30342 (PN 26/2010) and then SA. 32786 (2011/PN).

| (4) | Alpha Bank has also benefited from aid measures under the guarantee and the bond loan schemes which are part of the "Support Measures for the Credit Institutions in Greece" approved by the European Commission on 19 November 2008 and subsequently prolonged and amended (4). |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Alpha Bank has also benefited from aid measures under the guarantee and the bond loan schemes which are part of the "Support Measures for the Credit Institutions in Greece" approved by the European Commission on 19 November 2008 and subsequently prolonged and amended (4).

| (5) | On 20 April 2012, the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund provided Alpha Bank with a commitment letter to participate in the share capital increase of the bank. On 28 May 2012, a bridge recapitalisation of Alpha Bank was implemented. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

On 20 April 2012, the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund provided Alpha Bank with a commitment letter to participate in the share capital increase of the bank. On 28 May 2012, a bridge recapitalisation of Alpha Bank was implemented.

| (6) | Similar commitment letters have been sent and bridge recapitalisations granted to National Bank of Greece (SA. 34824 (2012/NN)), EFG Eurobank (SA. 34825 (2012/NN)) and Piraeus Bank (SA. 34826 (2012/NN)). On 10 May 2012, the Greek authorities formally notified to the Commission the commitment letters provided to Alpha Bank (and the other banks) in line with recital 43 of the Commission decision of 6 February 2012. (5) As the measure had already been taken, the Commission services registered as non-notified aid under case SA. 34823 (2012/NN). |
| --- | --- |

(6)

Similar commitment letters have been sent and bridge recapitalisations granted to National Bank of Greece (SA. 34824 (2012/NN)), EFG Eurobank (SA. 34825 (2012/NN)) and Piraeus Bank (SA. 34826 (2012/NN)). On 10 May 2012, the Greek authorities formally notified to the Commission the commitment letters provided to Alpha Bank (and the other banks) in line with recital 43 of the Commission decision of 6 February 2012. (5) As the measure had already been taken, the Commission services registered as non-notified aid under case SA. 34823 (2012/NN).

| (7) | The Commission notes that Greece accepts that the adoption of the decision be in the English language. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

The Commission notes that Greece accepts that the adoption of the decision be in the English language.

2.   DESCRIPTION

2.1.   General context of the Greek banking sector

| (8) | As regards the performance of their assets and resulting capital needs, the Greek banks face the double challenge of high losses on their holding of Greek government bonds (GGBs) and a deep and protracted recession which has given rise to a rapidly raising default rate on loans to Greek households and companies (6). |
| --- | --- |

(8)

As regards the performance of their assets and resulting capital needs, the Greek banks face the double challenge of high losses on their holding of Greek government bonds (GGBs) and a deep and protracted recession which has given rise to a rapidly raising default rate on loans to Greek households and companies (6).

| (9) | Greek banks have participated in the private sector bond exchange, known as Private Sector Involvement – PSI. The first decision on the PSI, envisaging a 21 % write-down on GGBs, was taken in the European Council of 21 July 2011. PSI-II was put forward by the Euro-area Member States on 26 October 2011 and envisaged a bond exchange with a nominal discount of around 50 % on notional Greek debt held by private investors. In February 2012, Greece put in place PSI-II and announced the results on 9 May 2012. The debt exchange resulted in significant additional losses and capital needs for the Greek banks. At that time, Euro-area Member States decided that additional financing to Greece would include the recapitalisation of Greek banks (7). |
| --- | --- |

(9)

Greek banks have participated in the private sector bond exchange, known as Private Sector Involvement – PSI. The first decision on the PSI, envisaging a 21 % write-down on GGBs, was taken in the European Council of 21 July 2011. PSI-II was put forward by the Euro-area Member States on 26 October 2011 and envisaged a bond exchange with a nominal discount of around 50 % on notional Greek debt held by private investors. In February 2012, Greece put in place PSI-II and announced the results on 9 May 2012. The debt exchange resulted in significant additional losses and capital needs for the Greek banks. At that time, Euro-area Member States decided that additional financing to Greece would include the recapitalisation of Greek banks (7).

| (10) | As regards the liquidity position of the Greek banks, it has continued to tighten. Domestic deposits decreased markedly in 2011 (-18 %) due to recession and political uncertainty. As Greek banks are shut out from wholesale funding markets, they are entirely dependent on Central Bank financing, a growing portion of which is in the form of emergency liquidity assistance. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

As regards the liquidity position of the Greek banks, it has continued to tighten. Domestic deposits decreased markedly in 2011 (-18 %) due to recession and political uncertainty. As Greek banks are shut out from wholesale funding markets, they are entirely dependent on Central Bank financing, a growing portion of which is in the form of emergency liquidity assistance.

| (11) | Since the Greek banks were expected to face substantial capital shortfalls as a result of the PSI-II and the continuing recession, the Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies of the Second Adjustment Programme for Greece between the Greek Government, the European Union, the International Monetary Fund and the European Central Bank dated 11 March 2012 has made available funds for the banks' recapitalisation. Total bank recapitalisation needs and resolution costs to be financed under that programme are estimated at EUR 50 billion (8). An amount of EUR 25 billion was made available upfront to deal with recapitalisation needs arising from PSI and the estimated funding gap due to resolutions (9). The funds are available through the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

Since the Greek banks were expected to face substantial capital shortfalls as a result of the PSI-II and the continuing recession, the Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies of the Second Adjustment Programme for Greece between the Greek Government, the European Union, the International Monetary Fund and the European Central Bank dated 11 March 2012 has made available funds for the banks' recapitalisation. Total bank recapitalisation needs and resolution costs to be financed under that programme are estimated at EUR 50 billion (8). An amount of EUR 25 billion was made available upfront to deal with recapitalisation needs arising from PSI and the estimated funding gap due to resolutions (9). The funds are available through the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund.

| (12) | According to the Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, “banks submitting viable capital raising plans will be given the opportunity to apply for and receive public support in a manner that preserves private sector incentives to inject capital and thus minimizes the burden for taxpayers” (10). The recapitalisation of the Greek banking sector has to be carried out by the end of September 2012, in order for banks to comply with a Core Tier 1 ratio of 9 % by September 2012 and of 10 % by June 2013. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

According to the Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, “banks submitting viable capital raising plans will be given the opportunity to apply for and receive public support in a manner that preserves private sector incentives to inject capital and thus minimizes the burden for taxpayers” (10). The recapitalisation of the Greek banking sector has to be carried out by the end of September 2012, in order for banks to comply with a Core Tier 1 ratio of 9 % by September 2012 and of 10 % by June 2013.

2.2.   Description of the schemes put in place by greece during the financial crisis

2.2.1.   
  Description of the support measures for the credit institutions in Greece introduced in 2008

| (13) | On 19 November 2008, the Commission approved the "Support Measures for the Credit Institutions in Greece" (11) designed to ensure the stability of the Greek financial system. The Greek package of State aid measures for credit institutions included (i) a recapitalisation scheme, (ii) a guarantee scheme, and (iii) a government bond loan scheme. The Commission subsequently approved amendments to those measures and prolonged them several times (12). |
| --- | --- |

(13)

On 19 November 2008, the Commission approved the "Support Measures for the Credit Institutions in Greece" (11) designed to ensure the stability of the Greek financial system. The Greek package of State aid measures for credit institutions included (i) a recapitalisation scheme, (ii) a guarantee scheme, and (iii) a government bond loan scheme. The Commission subsequently approved amendments to those measures and prolonged them several times (12).

2.2.2.   
  Description of the recapitalisation scheme for credit institutions in Greece under the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund

| (14) | The Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic Policy Conditionality between the Greek Government, the European Union, the International Monetary Fund and the European Central Bank dated 3 May 2010 provided for the establishment of the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund (HFSF). The objective of the HFSF is to safeguard the stability of the Greek banking system by providing equity capital to credit institutions (13). On 3 September 2010, the Commission approved the HFSF as a recapitalisation scheme in line with the rules on support schemes for the financial sector during the crisis (14) and prolonged it several times (15). The Commission approved the most recent prolongation of the HFSF recapitalisation scheme on 6 February 2012 until 30 June 2012 (16). The HFSF Law has subsequently been amended as regards the recapitalisation scheme. The provisions referred to below were in place when the commitment letter was sent and the bridge recapitalisation took place. Since the later amendments were adopted after the date of the Commission's most recent decision on the HFSF recapitalisation scheme, they were not part of the Commission's approval at the time. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

The Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic Policy Conditionality between the Greek Government, the European Union, the International Monetary Fund and the European Central Bank dated 3 May 2010 provided for the establishment of the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund (HFSF). The objective of the HFSF is to safeguard the stability of the Greek banking system by providing equity capital to credit institutions (13). On 3 September 2010, the Commission approved the HFSF as a recapitalisation scheme in line with the rules on support schemes for the financial sector during the crisis (14) and prolonged it several times (15). The Commission approved the most recent prolongation of the HFSF recapitalisation scheme on 6 February 2012 until 30 June 2012 (16). The HFSF Law has subsequently been amended as regards the recapitalisation scheme. The provisions referred to below were in place when the commitment letter was sent and the bridge recapitalisation took place. Since the later amendments were adopted after the date of the Commission's most recent decision on the HFSF recapitalisation scheme, they were not part of the Commission's approval at the time.

Provisions of the HFSF Law

| (15) | A credit institution whose viability has been confirmed by the Bank of Greece may submit a request to the HFSF for capital support, following an instruction from the Bank of Greece. |
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(15)

A credit institution whose viability has been confirmed by the Bank of Greece may submit a request to the HFSF for capital support, following an instruction from the Bank of Greece.

| (16) | A credit institution’s request for the provision of capital support must be accompanied by the following documents:






  a) | a business plan, that shows how the credit institution will ensure viability for the next three to five years under conservative/prudent assumptions and that has been assessed as sustainable and credible by the Bank of Greece, establishing the amount of the required capital support and detailing the measures that the credit institution intends to take so as to safeguard and strengthen its solvency as soon as possible, in particular by increasing its capital (including through capital support from the HFSF), sale of parts of the credit institution, and/or restoring its profitability through cost-cutting, reducing risks or securing support from other companies within its group; and |
| --- | --- | --- |

(16)

A credit institution’s request for the provision of capital support must be accompanied by the following documents:

a)

a business plan, that shows how the credit institution will ensure viability for the next three to five years under conservative/prudent assumptions and that has been assessed as sustainable and credible by the Bank of Greece, establishing the amount of the required capital support and detailing the measures that the credit institution intends to take so as to safeguard and strengthen its solvency as soon as possible, in particular by increasing its capital (including through capital support from the HFSF), sale of parts of the credit institution, and/or restoring its profitability through cost-cutting, reducing risks or securing support from other companies within its group; and

| b) | a detailed timetable for the implementation of the measures described in the business plan. |
| --- | --- |

b)

a detailed timetable for the implementation of the measures described in the business plan.

| (17) | Following the finalisation of the terms and conditions of the share capital increase, the HFSF will provide capital support in compliance with the EU State aid legislation. |
| --- | --- |

(17)

Following the finalisation of the terms and conditions of the share capital increase, the HFSF will provide capital support in compliance with the EU State aid legislation.

| (18) | The credit institution must prepare a detailed restructuring plan or amend the plan already submitted to the European Commission, in accordance with the applicable EU State aid rules. The restructuring plan will be approved by the HFSF. Within three months from the provision of capital support, the Ministry of Finance must submit the restructuring plan to the European Commission for approval. |
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(18)

The credit institution must prepare a detailed restructuring plan or amend the plan already submitted to the European Commission, in accordance with the applicable EU State aid rules. The restructuring plan will be approved by the HFSF. Within three months from the provision of capital support, the Ministry of Finance must submit the restructuring plan to the European Commission for approval.

| (19) | The implementation period of the restructuring plan may not exceed three years. An extension of up to two years may be granted by decision of the HFSF, following consultation with the Bank of Greece and subject to approval by the European Commission. |
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(19)

The implementation period of the restructuring plan may not exceed three years. An extension of up to two years may be granted by decision of the HFSF, following consultation with the Bank of Greece and subject to approval by the European Commission.

| (20) | Until the share capital increase is finalised, the relevant HFSF legal framework specifies that the HFSF may provide two temporary solutions as capital support:






  I. | A commitment letter; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(20)

Until the share capital increase is finalised, the relevant HFSF legal framework specifies that the HFSF may provide two temporary solutions as capital support:

I.

A commitment letter;

| II. | A bridge recapitalisation. |
| --- | --- |

II.

A bridge recapitalisation.

I.   Commitment letters provided by the HFSF

| (21) | The HFSF, upon a decision of the Bank of Greece, may provide a credit institution with a letter stating that it will participate in that bank's share capital increase (hereinafter "commitment letter"). That credit institution (i) has to be assessed as viable by the Bank of Greece and (ii) has to submit a request for capital support to the HFSF. |
| --- | --- |

(21)

The HFSF, upon a decision of the Bank of Greece, may provide a credit institution with a letter stating that it will participate in that bank's share capital increase (hereinafter "commitment letter"). That credit institution (i) has to be assessed as viable by the Bank of Greece and (ii) has to submit a request for capital support to the HFSF.

| (22) | The HFSF provides the commitment letter on condition that:






  a) | the business plan of the credit institution has been assessed as viable and credible by the Bank of Greece, |
| --- | --- | --- |

(22)

The HFSF provides the commitment letter on condition that:

a)

the business plan of the credit institution has been assessed as viable and credible by the Bank of Greece,

| b) | the request for capital support has been approved by the Bank of Greece, |
| --- | --- |

b)

the request for capital support has been approved by the Bank of Greece,

| c) | the Bank of Greece has considered that the provision of that letter is necessary for the credit institution:






  i. | to continue operating on a going concern basis; |
| --- | --- | --- |

c)

the Bank of Greece has considered that the provision of that letter is necessary for the credit institution:

i.

to continue operating on a going concern basis;

| ii. | to meet the current capital adequacy requirements set up by the Bank of Greece (17); and |
| --- | --- |

ii.

to meet the current capital adequacy requirements set up by the Bank of Greece (17); and

| iii. | to maintain the financial stability of the Greek banking system. |
| --- | --- |

iii.

to maintain the financial stability of the Greek banking system.

| (23) | For a credit institution for which the HFSF has issued a commitment letter and until the completion of the share capital increase, the HFSF:






  a) | appoints up to two representatives in the Board of Directors of the credit institution; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(23)

For a credit institution for which the HFSF has issued a commitment letter and until the completion of the share capital increase, the HFSF:

a)

appoints up to two representatives in the Board of Directors of the credit institution;

| b) | may request from the credit institution any data and information which it considers necessary, e.g. due diligence. |
| --- | --- |

b)

may request from the credit institution any data and information which it considers necessary, e.g. due diligence.

| (24) | The HFSF's representative in the Board of Directors of the credit institution has the following rights:






  a) | to call the General Assembly of Shareholders; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(24)

The HFSF's representative in the Board of Directors of the credit institution has the following rights:

a)

to call the General Assembly of Shareholders;

| b) | to veto any decision of the credit institution’s Board of Directors:






  i. | regarding the distribution of dividends and the bonus policy concerning the Chairman, the Managing Director and the other members of the Board of Directors, as well as the general managers and their deputies; or |
| --- | --- | --- |

b)

to veto any decision of the credit institution’s Board of Directors:

i.

regarding the distribution of dividends and the bonus policy concerning the Chairman, the Managing Director and the other members of the Board of Directors, as well as the general managers and their deputies; or

| ii. | where the decision in question could seriously compromise the interests of depositors, or impair the credit institution’s liquidity or solvency or its overall sound and smooth operation (e.g. business strategy, asset/liability management, etc.); |
| --- | --- |

ii.

where the decision in question could seriously compromise the interests of depositors, or impair the credit institution’s liquidity or solvency or its overall sound and smooth operation (e.g. business strategy, asset/liability management, etc.);

| c) | to request an adjournment of any meeting of the credit institution’s Board of Directors for three business days, until instructions are given by the HFSF’s Executive Board, following consultation with the Bank of Greece; |
| --- | --- |

c)

to request an adjournment of any meeting of the credit institution’s Board of Directors for three business days, until instructions are given by the HFSF’s Executive Board, following consultation with the Bank of Greece;

| d) | the right to request that the Board of Directors of the credit institution be convened; |
| --- | --- |

d)

the right to request that the Board of Directors of the credit institution be convened;

| e) | the right to approve the Economic Director. |
| --- | --- |

e)

the right to approve the Economic Director.

| (25) | In exercising its rights, the HFSF’s representative in the Board of Directors must respect the credit institution’s business autonomy. |
| --- | --- |

(25)

In exercising its rights, the HFSF’s representative in the Board of Directors must respect the credit institution’s business autonomy.

II.   Bridge recapitalisations provided by the HFSF

| (26) | In view of its participation in the future capital increase of a credit institution that has been deemed viable by the Bank of Greece, the HFSF may advance its contribution (hereinafter "bridge recapitalisation") to such an increase or part thereof, up to the amount specified by the Bank of Greece. |
| --- | --- |

(26)

In view of its participation in the future capital increase of a credit institution that has been deemed viable by the Bank of Greece, the HFSF may advance its contribution (hereinafter "bridge recapitalisation") to such an increase or part thereof, up to the amount specified by the Bank of Greece.

| (27) | The bridge recapitalisation is paid by the HFSF to the bank in the form of European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF) floating notes with maturities of six and ten years with an issue date of 19 April 2012. |
| --- | --- |

(27)

The bridge recapitalisation is paid by the HFSF to the bank in the form of European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF) floating notes with maturities of six and ten years with an issue date of 19 April 2012.

| (28) | The EFSF notes are deposited into an account of the credit institution with the Bank of Greece exclusively for the purpose of the HFSF participation in the capital increase. The EFSF notes can be used only for the purpose of ensuring liquidity through repurchase transactions with market participants or/and through Euro-system operations. |
| --- | --- |

(28)

The EFSF notes are deposited into an account of the credit institution with the Bank of Greece exclusively for the purpose of the HFSF participation in the capital increase. The EFSF notes can be used only for the purpose of ensuring liquidity through repurchase transactions with market participants or/and through Euro-system operations.

| (29) | The terms of the bridge recapitalisation are enshrined into a pre-subscription agreement agreed between the credit institution, the HFSF and the EFSF. |
| --- | --- |

(29)

The terms of the bridge recapitalisation are enshrined into a pre-subscription agreement agreed between the credit institution, the HFSF and the EFSF.

| (30) | For the period between the date of the bridge recapitalisation and the date of the conversion of the bridge recapitalisation into ordinary shares and other convertible financial instruments (hereinafter "conversion into the final recapitalisation instruments"), the pre-subscription agreement provides that:






  a) | the bank must pay to the HFSF a 1 % annual fee on the nominal value of the EFSF notes; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(30)

For the period between the date of the bridge recapitalisation and the date of the conversion of the bridge recapitalisation into ordinary shares and other convertible financial instruments (hereinafter "conversion into the final recapitalisation instruments"), the pre-subscription agreement provides that:

a)

the bank must pay to the HFSF a 1 % annual fee on the nominal value of the EFSF notes;

| b) | any coupon payments and accrued interest to the EFSF notes for that period will count as additional capital contribution by the HFSF (18). |
| --- | --- |

b)

any coupon payments and accrued interest to the EFSF notes for that period will count as additional capital contribution by the HFSF (18).

| (31) | The HFSF grants the bridge recapitalisation following a decision of the Bank of Greece, provided that:






  a) | The credit institution has submitted to the HFSF an application for capital support, accompanied by a business plan and a detailed timetable; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(31)

The HFSF grants the bridge recapitalisation following a decision of the Bank of Greece, provided that:

a)

The credit institution has submitted to the HFSF an application for capital support, accompanied by a business plan and a detailed timetable;

| b) | The application for capital support has been approved by the Bank of Greece, while the business plan has been assessed by the Bank of Greece as being viable and credible; |
| --- | --- |

b)

The application for capital support has been approved by the Bank of Greece, while the business plan has been assessed by the Bank of Greece as being viable and credible;

| c) | The Bank of Greece considers that the bridge recapitalisation is necessary in order for:






  i. | the credit institution to meet the capital adequacy requirements set up by the Bank of Greece; |
| --- | --- | --- |

c)

The Bank of Greece considers that the bridge recapitalisation is necessary in order for:

i.

the credit institution to meet the capital adequacy requirements set up by the Bank of Greece;

| ii. | the credit institution to maintain access to the monetary policy operations of the Euro-system; and |
| --- | --- |

ii.

the credit institution to maintain access to the monetary policy operations of the Euro-system; and

| iii. | to ensure the stability of the Greek banking system; |
| --- | --- |

iii.

to ensure the stability of the Greek banking system;

| d) | The credit institution has agreed with the HFSF and the EFSF a presubscription agreement for the capital increase. |
| --- | --- |

d)

The credit institution has agreed with the HFSF and the EFSF a presubscription agreement for the capital increase.

| (32) | The Minister of Finance, following an opinion of the HFSF, may decide to provide additional corporate governance safeguards until the conversion into the final recapitalisation instruments. |
| --- | --- |

(32)

The Minister of Finance, following an opinion of the HFSF, may decide to provide additional corporate governance safeguards until the conversion into the final recapitalisation instruments.

2.3.   Beneficiary

| (33) | Alpha Bank, founded in 1879, is one of the largest banks in Greece. The bank offers a wide range of services including retail, SME and corporate banking, credit cards, asset management, investment banking, private banking, brokerage, leasing and factoring. |
| --- | --- |

(33)

Alpha Bank, founded in 1879, is one of the largest banks in Greece. The bank offers a wide range of services including retail, SME and corporate banking, credit cards, asset management, investment banking, private banking, brokerage, leasing and factoring.

| (34) | Out of a total network of 900 branches, a number of 436 are located in Greece (including Alpha Private Bank and Commercial Centres). In the international banking markets, Alpha Bank Group is present in Cyprus, Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia, Ukraine, Albania, F.Y.R.O.M. and the United Kingdom. |
| --- | --- |

(34)

Out of a total network of 900 branches, a number of 436 are located in Greece (including Alpha Private Bank and Commercial Centres). In the international banking markets, Alpha Bank Group is present in Cyprus, Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia, Ukraine, Albania, F.Y.R.O.M. and the United Kingdom.

| (35) | Alpha Bank fully participated in the PSI programme with eligible bonds of EUR 3,8 billion and State-guaranteed loans of EUR 2,1 billion. In that framework, the total PSI-impairment charge amounted to EUR 3,8 billion, entirely booked in 2011 accounts. |
| --- | --- |

(35)

Alpha Bank fully participated in the PSI programme with eligible bonds of EUR 3,8 billion and State-guaranteed loans of EUR 2,1 billion. In that framework, the total PSI-impairment charge amounted to EUR 3,8 billion, entirely booked in 2011 accounts.

| (36) | The key figures of Alpha Bank Group in March 2012, December 2011 and December 2010 (consolidated data) are as follows:









  Selective Volume figures (EUR million) | 31 March 2012 | 31 December 2011 | 31 December 2010 | Δ % Dec 2011/ Dec 2010 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Net Loans | 43,695 | 44,876 | 49,305 | (9,0 %) |
| Deposits | 27,852 | 29,399 | 38,293 | (23,2 %) |
| Shareholders’ Equity | 1,319 | 1,417 | 5,211 | (72,8 %) |
| Assets | 57,572 | 59,148 | 66,798 | (11,5 %) |
| Operating Income | 466,3 | 2 283,8 | 2 249,6 | 1,5 % |
| Operating Expenses | (264,8) | (1 096,3) | (1 148,5) | (4,5 %) |
| Pre-Provision Income | 201,4 | 1 187,5 | 1 101,1 | 7,8 % |
| Net Profit excluding PSI impairment | — | 21,4 | 86,0 | (75,1 %) |
| Impairment Losses on PSI | — | (3 831,4) | 0,0 | ... |
| Net profit after tax | (107,8) | (3 809,9) | 86,0 | ... |
| Source: | Alpha Bank – Presentation of the FY 2011 Results, 20 April 2012, p. 6, available online at:
  http://www.alpha.gr/files/investorrelations/2011_FY_Financial_Report.pdf.

  Alpha Bank – Press Release: Full Year 2011 Results, p. 9, available online at:

  http://www.alpha.gr/files/deltia_typou/Deltio_Typou_20120420EN.pdf.

  Alpha Bank – Press Release: First Quarter 2012 Results, p. 9, available online at:

  http://www.alpha.gr/files/deltia_typou/Deltio_Typou_20120531EN.pdf. |

(36)

The key figures of Alpha Bank Group in March 2012, December 2011 and December 2010 (consolidated data) are as follows:

Selective Volume figures (EUR million)

31 March 2012

31 December 2011

31 December 2010

Δ % Dec 2011/ Dec 2010

Net Loans

43,695

44,876

49,305

(9,0 %)

Deposits

27,852

29,399

38,293

(23,2 %)

Shareholders’ Equity

1,319

1,417

5,211

(72,8 %)

Assets

57,572

59,148

66,798

(11,5 %)

Operating Income

466,3

2 283,8

2 249,6

1,5 %

Operating Expenses

(264,8)

(1 096,3)

(1 148,5)

(4,5 %)

Pre-Provision Income

201,4

1 187,5

1 101,1

7,8 %

Net Profit excluding PSI impairment

—

21,4

86,0

(75,1 %)

Impairment Losses on PSI

—

(3 831,4)

0,0

...

Net profit after tax

(107,8)

(3 809,9)

86,0

...

Source:

http://www.alpha.gr/files/investorrelations/2011_FY_Financial_Report.pdf.

Alpha Bank – Press Release: Full Year 2011 Results, p. 9, available online at:

http://www.alpha.gr/files/deltia_typou/Deltio_Typou_20120420EN.pdf.

Alpha Bank – Press Release: First Quarter 2012 Results, p. 9, available online at:

http://www.alpha.gr/files/deltia_typou/Deltio_Typou_20120531EN.pdf.

2.4.   State recapitalisation already received by the bank

| (37) | In May 2009, Alpha Bank received a capital injection of EUR 940 million, equivalent to around 2 % of its risk weighted assets ("RWA") at the time from the Greek State under the recapitalisation scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(37)

In May 2009, Alpha Bank received a capital injection of EUR 940 million, equivalent to around 2 % of its risk weighted assets ("RWA") at the time from the Greek State under the recapitalisation scheme.

| (38) | The recapitalisation took the form of preference shares subscribed by the State which have a fixed remuneration of 10 %. |
| --- | --- |

(38)

The recapitalisation took the form of preference shares subscribed by the State which have a fixed remuneration of 10 %.

2.5.   State liquidity support already received by the bank

| (39) | Alpha Bank has benefited and still benefits from aid measures under the guarantee and the bond loan schemes which are part of the "Support Measures for the Credit Institutions in Greece". As of 22 May 2012 (19), the guarantees granted to Alpha Bank amounted to around EUR 9,8 billion and the bond loans to about EUR 0,5 billion. The bank has benefited and still benefits also from the emergency liquidity assistance granted by the Bank of Greece. |
| --- | --- |

(39)

Alpha Bank has benefited and still benefits from aid measures under the guarantee and the bond loan schemes which are part of the "Support Measures for the Credit Institutions in Greece". As of 22 May 2012 (19), the guarantees granted to Alpha Bank amounted to around EUR 9,8 billion and the bond loans to about EUR 0,5 billion. The bank has benefited and still benefits also from the emergency liquidity assistance granted by the Bank of Greece.

3.   DESCRIPTION OF THE AID MEASURE

| (40) | Following its participation in the PSI, which was booked retrospectively in the account of the fourth quarter of 2011, the capital of Alpha Bank significantly diminished: the bank registered a Core Tier 1 ratio of 3 % and a capital adequacy ratio of 5,5 % (20). |
| --- | --- |

(40)

Following its participation in the PSI, which was booked retrospectively in the account of the fourth quarter of 2011, the capital of Alpha Bank significantly diminished: the bank registered a Core Tier 1 ratio of 3 % and a capital adequacy ratio of 5,5 % (20).

| (41) | On 20 April 2012, the HFSF provided a letter committing to participate for an amount of up to EUR 1,9 billion in the planned share capital increase of Alpha Bank (21). [...] (22) The capital adequacy ratio at end-2011 that included the retroactive effect of the capital support included in the HFSF commitment letter reached 9,8 % (pro-forma) (23). |
| --- | --- |

(41)

On 20 April 2012, the HFSF provided a letter committing to participate for an amount of up to EUR 1,9 billion in the planned share capital increase of Alpha Bank (21). [...] (22) The capital adequacy ratio at end-2011 that included the retroactive effect of the capital support included in the HFSF commitment letter reached 9,8 % (pro-forma) (23).

| (42) | On the basis of the obligation already undertaken in the commitment letter, the HFSF advanced EUR 1,9 billion to Alpha Bank on 28 May 2012 (24), in line with the provisions for bridge recapitalisations laid down in the HFSF Law. Both the amounts provided in the commitment letter and in the bridge recapitalisation were calculated by the Bank of Greece in order to ensure the bank's compliance with the current capital adequacy requirements. Therefore, in the balance sheet of 31 March 2012, Alpha Bank registered a capital adequacy ratio of 9,6 % and a Core Tier 1 of 7,2 % (25). |
| --- | --- |

(42)

On the basis of the obligation already undertaken in the commitment letter, the HFSF advanced EUR 1,9 billion to Alpha Bank on 28 May 2012 (24), in line with the provisions for bridge recapitalisations laid down in the HFSF Law. Both the amounts provided in the commitment letter and in the bridge recapitalisation were calculated by the Bank of Greece in order to ensure the bank's compliance with the current capital adequacy requirements. Therefore, in the balance sheet of 31 March 2012, Alpha Bank registered a capital adequacy ratio of 9,6 % and a Core Tier 1 of 7,2 % (25).

| (43) | The amount of bridge recapitalisation represents around 4,3 % of Alpha Bank's RWA as of 31 March 2012 (26). With the preference shares injected in May 2009, the amount of aid received by Alpha Bank in forms other than guarantees and liquidity assistance stands at around 6,3 % of the bank's RWA. |
| --- | --- |

(43)

The amount of bridge recapitalisation represents around 4,3 % of Alpha Bank's RWA as of 31 March 2012 (26). With the preference shares injected in May 2009, the amount of aid received by Alpha Bank in forms other than guarantees and liquidity assistance stands at around 6,3 % of the bank's RWA.

4.   THE POSITION OF GREECE

| (44) | The Greek authorities acknowledged that the commitment to provide capital to Alpha Bank contained in the letter provided to the bank constitutes State aid. |
| --- | --- |

(44)

The Greek authorities acknowledged that the commitment to provide capital to Alpha Bank contained in the letter provided to the bank constitutes State aid.

| (45) | The Greek authorities consider that the measures are compatible with the internal market under Article 107(3)(b) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union ("TFEU"). |
| --- | --- |

(45)

The Greek authorities consider that the measures are compatible with the internal market under Article 107(3)(b) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union ("TFEU").

5.   ASSESSMENT OF THE AID

5.1.   Existence of aid in the form of the commitment letter and bridge recapitalisation

| (46) | As stated in Article 107(3)(b) TFEU any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the internal market. |
| --- | --- |

(46)

As stated in Article 107(3)(b) TFEU any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the internal market.

| (47) | The Commission notes that the commitment letter provided by the HFSF on 20 April 2012 firmly commits the HFSF to recapitalise the bank. HFSF receives its resources from the State. The HFSF has a limited duration up to 2017, and so any profit or loss it incurs will eventually be borne by the State. The Commission therefore concludes that the letter commits State resources and that the bridge recapitalisation involves State resources. The circumstances in which the HFSF can grant support to financial institutions are precisely defined and limited by the Law. Accordingly the use of those State resources is imputable to the State. |
| --- | --- |

(47)

The Commission notes that the commitment letter provided by the HFSF on 20 April 2012 firmly commits the HFSF to recapitalise the bank. HFSF receives its resources from the State. The HFSF has a limited duration up to 2017, and so any profit or loss it incurs will eventually be borne by the State. The Commission therefore concludes that the letter commits State resources and that the bridge recapitalisation involves State resources. The circumstances in which the HFSF can grant support to financial institutions are precisely defined and limited by the Law. Accordingly the use of those State resources is imputable to the State.

| (48) | As regards the existence of an advantage, the commitment letter already granted an advantage to the bank. [...] The bridge recapitalisation finalised on 28 May 2012 is the implementation of the obligation undertaken in the commitment letter and thus a continuation of the same aid. The bridge recapitalisation in the form of EFSF notes increased the bank's capital ratio to a level that allows the functioning of the bank on the market and access to Euro-system operations. Therefore, the bridge recapitalisation also granted an advantage to the bank from State resources. |
| --- | --- |

(48)

As regards the existence of an advantage, the commitment letter already granted an advantage to the bank. [...] The bridge recapitalisation finalised on 28 May 2012 is the implementation of the obligation undertaken in the commitment letter and thus a continuation of the same aid. The bridge recapitalisation in the form of EFSF notes increased the bank's capital ratio to a level that allows the functioning of the bank on the market and access to Euro-system operations. Therefore, the bridge recapitalisation also granted an advantage to the bank from State resources.

| (49) | As a result, the position of the beneficiary was strengthened since the bank was provided with the financial resources to continue to comply with the capital requirements, thus leading to competition distortions. As the bank is active in other European financial markets and as financial institutions from other Member States operate in Greece, the bridge recapitalisation by the HFSF is also likely to affect trade between Member States. |
| --- | --- |

(49)

As a result, the position of the beneficiary was strengthened since the bank was provided with the financial resources to continue to comply with the capital requirements, thus leading to competition distortions. As the bank is active in other European financial markets and as financial institutions from other Member States operate in Greece, the bridge recapitalisation by the HFSF is also likely to affect trade between Member States.

| (50) | The bridge recapitalisation in essence implements the commitment contained in the HFSF letter to Alpha Bank. The Commission considers that the commitment letter and the bridge recapitalisation refer to one and the same measure. The Commission will hereafter refer to ‧the measure‧ and only make reference to the bridge recapitalisation when necessary. |
| --- | --- |

(50)

The bridge recapitalisation in essence implements the commitment contained in the HFSF letter to Alpha Bank. The Commission considers that the commitment letter and the bridge recapitalisation refer to one and the same measure. The Commission will hereafter refer to ‧the measure‧ and only make reference to the bridge recapitalisation when necessary.

5.2.   Compatibility of the aid

5.2.1.   
  Application of article 107(3)(b) TFEU

| (51) | Article 107(3)(b) TFEU provides for the possibility that State aid can be regarded as compatible with the internal market where it is granted "to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State". |
| --- | --- |

(51)

Article 107(3)(b) TFEU provides for the possibility that State aid can be regarded as compatible with the internal market where it is granted "to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State".

| (52) | The Commission has acknowledged that the global financial crisis can create a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State and that measures supporting banks are apt to remedy that disturbance. The Commission explained its approach in the Banking Communication (27), the Recapitalisation Communication (28) and the Restructuring Communication (29). The Commission still considers that requirements for State aid to be approved pursuant to Article 107(3)(b) TFEU are fulfilled in view of the reappearance of stress in financial markets. The Commission confirmed that view by adopting the 2011 Prolongation Communication in December 2011 (30). |
| --- | --- |

(52)

The Commission has acknowledged that the global financial crisis can create a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State and that measures supporting banks are apt to remedy that disturbance. The Commission explained its approach in the Banking Communication (27), the Recapitalisation Communication (28) and the Restructuring Communication (29). The Commission still considers that requirements for State aid to be approved pursuant to Article 107(3)(b) TFEU are fulfilled in view of the reappearance of stress in financial markets. The Commission confirmed that view by adopting the 2011 Prolongation Communication in December 2011 (30).

| (53) | In respect to the Greek economy, the Commission has acknowledged in its successive approval of the Greek support schemes for credit institutions that there is a threat of serious disturbance in the Greek economy and that State support of banks is suitable to remedy that disturbance. Such a threat is even greater here as Alpha Bank is a large bank. Therefore, the legal basis for the assessment of the aid measure should be Article 107(3)(b) TFEU. |
| --- | --- |

(53)

In respect to the Greek economy, the Commission has acknowledged in its successive approval of the Greek support schemes for credit institutions that there is a threat of serious disturbance in the Greek economy and that State support of banks is suitable to remedy that disturbance. Such a threat is even greater here as Alpha Bank is a large bank. Therefore, the legal basis for the assessment of the aid measure should be Article 107(3)(b) TFEU.

5.2.2.   
  Compatibility of the aid measure under article 107(3)(b) TFEU

| (54) | In line with point 15 of the Banking Communication, in order for an aid to be compatible under Article 107(3)(b) TFEU it must comply with the general criteria for compatibility (31):








  a) | : | Appropriateness | : | The aid has to be well-targeted in order to be able to effectively achieve the objective of remedying a serious disturbance in the economy. It would not be the case if the measure were not appropriate to remedy the disturbance. |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| b) | : | Necessity | : | The aid measure must, in its amount and form, be necessary to achieve the objective. Therefore it must be of the minimum amount necessary to reach the objective, and take the form most appropriate to remedy the disturbance. |
| c) | : | Proportionality | : | The positive effects of the measure must be properly balanced against the distortions of competition, in order for the distortions to be limited to the minimum necessary to reach the measure's objectives. |

(54)

In line with point 15 of the Banking Communication, in order for an aid to be compatible under Article 107(3)(b) TFEU it must comply with the general criteria for compatibility (31):

a)

:

Appropriateness

:

The aid has to be well-targeted in order to be able to effectively achieve the objective of remedying a serious disturbance in the economy. It would not be the case if the measure were not appropriate to remedy the disturbance.

b)

:

Necessity

:

The aid measure must, in its amount and form, be necessary to achieve the objective. Therefore it must be of the minimum amount necessary to reach the objective, and take the form most appropriate to remedy the disturbance.

c)

:

Proportionality

:

The positive effects of the measure must be properly balanced against the distortions of competition, in order for the distortions to be limited to the minimum necessary to reach the measure's objectives.

| (55) | The Recapitalisation Communication elaborates further on the three principles of the Banking Communication and states that recapitalisations can contribute to the restoration of financial stability. |
| --- | --- |

(55)

The Recapitalisation Communication elaborates further on the three principles of the Banking Communication and states that recapitalisations can contribute to the restoration of financial stability.

| (56) | The Commission has doubts on the application of all three criteria i.e. the criteria of "appropriateness", "necessity" and "proportionality". |
| --- | --- |

(56)

The Commission has doubts on the application of all three criteria i.e. the criteria of "appropriateness", "necessity" and "proportionality".

5.2.3.   
  Compatibility with the banking and recapitalisation communications

a.   Appropriateness of the measure

| (57) | The measure aims to help the bank to comply with the current regulatory capital requirements of the Bank of Greece, i.e. a total capital adequacy ratio of 8 %. In addition, in order to be eligible for Central bank financing a bank has to comply with the regulatory capital requirements. In the present case, the measure helps the bank to remain eligible to obtain Central bank liquidity until the final recapitalisation of the bank takes place. |
| --- | --- |

(57)

The measure aims to help the bank to comply with the current regulatory capital requirements of the Bank of Greece, i.e. a total capital adequacy ratio of 8 %. In addition, in order to be eligible for Central bank financing a bank has to comply with the regulatory capital requirements. In the present case, the measure helps the bank to remain eligible to obtain Central bank liquidity until the final recapitalisation of the bank takes place.

| (58) | In that respect, the Commission notes that the bank is one of the largest banking institutions in Greece, both in terms of lending and collection of deposits. As such, Alpha Bank is a systemically important bank for Greece. Consequently, a default of the bank would create a serious disturbance in the Greek economy. Under the current circumstances where all financial institutions in Greece have difficulties in accessing funding, which limits to a certain extent the provisions of loans to the Greek economy, the disturbance to the economy would be aggravated by such a default. Moreover, the Commission notes that the measure came about mainly as a result of PSI, a highly extraordinary and unpredictable event and not as a result of mismanagement or excessive risk-taking from the bank. The measure thereby aims to mainly deal with the results of PSI and contribute to maintain financial stability in Greece. For those reasons, the measure would at first seem appropriate. |
| --- | --- |

(58)

In that respect, the Commission notes that the bank is one of the largest banking institutions in Greece, both in terms of lending and collection of deposits. As such, Alpha Bank is a systemically important bank for Greece. Consequently, a default of the bank would create a serious disturbance in the Greek economy. Under the current circumstances where all financial institutions in Greece have difficulties in accessing funding, which limits to a certain extent the provisions of loans to the Greek economy, the disturbance to the economy would be aggravated by such a default. Moreover, the Commission notes that the measure came about mainly as a result of PSI, a highly extraordinary and unpredictable event and not as a result of mismanagement or excessive risk-taking from the bank. The measure thereby aims to mainly deal with the results of PSI and contribute to maintain financial stability in Greece. For those reasons, the measure would at first seem appropriate.

| (59) | However, the Commission notes that the aid comes after prior recapitalisations and liquidity aid. The Commission can therefore not treat the aid as rescue aid received for the first time by a company. That context of repeated rescue aid measures requires additional safeguards. The context of a protracted rescue period blurs the distinction between rescue aid - which is normally temporarily approved without the Commission seeking many commitments from the Member State restraining the beneficiary's actions during the rescue period - and restructuring aid which is approved only after a thorough assessment. In particular, the Commission doubts at this stage that all the measures possible have been taken immediately to avoid that the bank again needs aid in the future. |
| --- | --- |

(59)

However, the Commission notes that the aid comes after prior recapitalisations and liquidity aid. The Commission can therefore not treat the aid as rescue aid received for the first time by a company. That context of repeated rescue aid measures requires additional safeguards. The context of a protracted rescue period blurs the distinction between rescue aid - which is normally temporarily approved without the Commission seeking many commitments from the Member State restraining the beneficiary's actions during the rescue period - and restructuring aid which is approved only after a thorough assessment. In particular, the Commission doubts at this stage that all the measures possible have been taken immediately to avoid that the bank again needs aid in the future.

| (60) | There is no clarity at this stage about who will control the bank in the future once the bridge recapitalisation is replaced by a permanent recapitalisation. The bank may either come under the control of the State or the minority private owners may enjoy control and high leverage. The Commission would wish to ensure that the quality of the bank's management, and notably its lending process, should not deteriorate in either case. |
| --- | --- |

(60)

There is no clarity at this stage about who will control the bank in the future once the bridge recapitalisation is replaced by a permanent recapitalisation. The bank may either come under the control of the State or the minority private owners may enjoy control and high leverage. The Commission would wish to ensure that the quality of the bank's management, and notably its lending process, should not deteriorate in either case.

| (61) | If the bank comes under State control, the bank should not suffer from poor management or mispricing or carry out lending that was not business-oriented. The bank's assessment of credit applications has to include, inter alia, the quality of collateral, the pricing and the solvency of the borrower. If such decisions were no longer taken on the basis of commercial criteria due to, for instance, State interference, it would increase the bank's need for aid (or reduce the remuneration for the shareholder i.e. the State) and endanger the restoration of viability. In light of the poor track record of some State-controlled banks in Greece, additional safeguards might have to be put in place in order to limit the public interference in the day-to-day management of banks, including regarding pricing and lending decisions. In that respect, lending to public companies should be scrutinised and normal commercial practices applied in the assessment of their borrowing capacity. The Commission has doubts, at this stage, whether the current corporate governance framework can limit public interference and coordination (coordination due to the high amounts of State aid provided by the HFSF which thus becomes a shareholder in several banks which may, inter alia, lead to an infringement of the EU rules in mergers and antitrust). |
| --- | --- |

(61)

If the bank comes under State control, the bank should not suffer from poor management or mispricing or carry out lending that was not business-oriented. The bank's assessment of credit applications has to include, inter alia, the quality of collateral, the pricing and the solvency of the borrower. If such decisions were no longer taken on the basis of commercial criteria due to, for instance, State interference, it would increase the bank's need for aid (or reduce the remuneration for the shareholder i.e. the State) and endanger the restoration of viability. In light of the poor track record of some State-controlled banks in Greece, additional safeguards might have to be put in place in order to limit the public interference in the day-to-day management of banks, including regarding pricing and lending decisions. In that respect, lending to public companies should be scrutinised and normal commercial practices applied in the assessment of their borrowing capacity. The Commission has doubts, at this stage, whether the current corporate governance framework can limit public interference and coordination (coordination due to the high amounts of State aid provided by the HFSF which thus becomes a shareholder in several banks which may, inter alia, lead to an infringement of the EU rules in mergers and antitrust).

| (62) | If, conversely, the majority of the voting rights of the bank were held in the future by an investor which had invested only a limited amount of money and enjoyed call options on the shares held by the State, that investor might be tempted to take excessive risks. In such a scenario, in case of success it would earn a large and disproportionate return thanks to the leverage offered by the call options. The Commission notes that the current situation of the bank already presents such a risk as, while the State has provided all the capital to the bank through the bridge recapitalisation, all the regular shares of the bank are held by its historical shareholders. |
| --- | --- |

(62)

If, conversely, the majority of the voting rights of the bank were held in the future by an investor which had invested only a limited amount of money and enjoyed call options on the shares held by the State, that investor might be tempted to take excessive risks. In such a scenario, in case of success it would earn a large and disproportionate return thanks to the leverage offered by the call options. The Commission notes that the current situation of the bank already presents such a risk as, while the State has provided all the capital to the bank through the bridge recapitalisation, all the regular shares of the bank are held by its historical shareholders.

| (63) | In conclusion, there is a risk that the way the bank is managed will deteriorate and it could endanger the restoration of viability and preservation of financial stability. In the absence of clarity about who will own and control the bank in the future, the Commission has doubts at this stage that the aid measure is appropriate. The Commission therefore finds it necessary to open the procedure under Article 108(2) TFEU on that new aid in order to collect all the facts from the Greek authorities and allow interested parties to comment. |
| --- | --- |

(63)

In conclusion, there is a risk that the way the bank is managed will deteriorate and it could endanger the restoration of viability and preservation of financial stability. In the absence of clarity about who will own and control the bank in the future, the Commission has doubts at this stage that the aid measure is appropriate. The Commission therefore finds it necessary to open the procedure under Article 108(2) TFEU on that new aid in order to collect all the facts from the Greek authorities and allow interested parties to comment.

b.   Necessity – limitation of the aid to the minimum

| (64) | According to the Banking Communication, the aid measure must, in its amount and form, be necessary to achieve the objective. Thus the capital injection must be of the minimum amount necessary to reach the objective. |
| --- | --- |

(64)

According to the Banking Communication, the aid measure must, in its amount and form, be necessary to achieve the objective. Thus the capital injection must be of the minimum amount necessary to reach the objective.

| (65) | As regards the amount of aid, the Commission notes that it was calculated in order to ensure the bank's compliance with the current capital adequacy requirements of the Bank of Greece. It therefore does not seem to provide the bank with excess capital. However, as indicated above, that aid comes after several other aid measures in the context of a protracted rescue period. In particular, as indicated above, the Commission doubts at this stage that all the measures possible have been taken to avoid that the bank again needs aid in the future. |
| --- | --- |

(65)

As regards the amount of aid, the Commission notes that it was calculated in order to ensure the bank's compliance with the current capital adequacy requirements of the Bank of Greece. It therefore does not seem to provide the bank with excess capital. However, as indicated above, that aid comes after several other aid measures in the context of a protracted rescue period. In particular, as indicated above, the Commission doubts at this stage that all the measures possible have been taken to avoid that the bank again needs aid in the future.

| (66) | As regards the remuneration of the aid, the Commission notes that, for the period until the conversion of the bridge recapitalisation into a permanent recapitalisation, the HFSF will receive a fee of 1 % plus the accrued interest on the EFSF notes. It will not receive any shares in the bank. That remuneration is below the range of 7 % to 9 % laid down in the Recapitalisation Communication. At this stage, the duration of the bridge recapitalisation period is uncertain. If it is sufficiently short, the Commission might be able to take into account the specific characteristics of the bridge recapitalisation and the context in which it was granted, and so to accept the lower remuneration. It is indeed recalled that the bridge recapitalisation aims at immediately covering the large capital gap which was the result of the PSI, while leaving some time to the bank to try to raise capital on the market (and thereby reduce the amount of recapitalisation aid which would have to be permanently injected in the bank). Accordingly, the bridge recapitalisation seems acceptable if it is truly a short-term solution to give time to find private investors. However, it would become problematic if it remains in its current form for a long period without being converted. In conclusion, given that at this stage the duration of the bridge recapitalisation is uncertain, the Commission has doubts that its remuneration is sufficient. |
| --- | --- |

(66)

As regards the remuneration of the aid, the Commission notes that, for the period until the conversion of the bridge recapitalisation into a permanent recapitalisation, the HFSF will receive a fee of 1 % plus the accrued interest on the EFSF notes. It will not receive any shares in the bank. That remuneration is below the range of 7 % to 9 % laid down in the Recapitalisation Communication. At this stage, the duration of the bridge recapitalisation period is uncertain. If it is sufficiently short, the Commission might be able to take into account the specific characteristics of the bridge recapitalisation and the context in which it was granted, and so to accept the lower remuneration. It is indeed recalled that the bridge recapitalisation aims at immediately covering the large capital gap which was the result of the PSI, while leaving some time to the bank to try to raise capital on the market (and thereby reduce the amount of recapitalisation aid which would have to be permanently injected in the bank). Accordingly, the bridge recapitalisation seems acceptable if it is truly a short-term solution to give time to find private investors. However, it would become problematic if it remains in its current form for a long period without being converted. In conclusion, given that at this stage the duration of the bridge recapitalisation is uncertain, the Commission has doubts that its remuneration is sufficient.

| (67) | The bridge recapitalisation will be converted into a permanent recapitalisation at a later stage. However, as regards the remuneration of the aid once the bridge recapitalisation is converted into a permanent one, the terms of the conversion are still unknown. The Commission can therefore not assess them at this stage. The present decision cannot therefore endorse them and the Greek authorities must notify that measure once the terms of the final recapitalisation are known. |
| --- | --- |

(67)

The bridge recapitalisation will be converted into a permanent recapitalisation at a later stage. However, as regards the remuneration of the aid once the bridge recapitalisation is converted into a permanent one, the terms of the conversion are still unknown. The Commission can therefore not assess them at this stage. The present decision cannot therefore endorse them and the Greek authorities must notify that measure once the terms of the final recapitalisation are known.

| (68) | The Commission notes that the bridge recapitalisation does not trigger the dilution of the bank's current shareholders. Until the conversion into the final recapitalisation instruments, the bank's economic and legal ownership does not change. The State does not receive any shares, despite the large size of the recapitalisation (without the State recapitalisation there would be almost no capital left in the bank as a result, mainly, of the extraordinary circumstances triggered by the PSI). While such an arrangement could be acceptable as a temporary measure, to give some time to find private investors, it would not comply with the remuneration and burden-sharing principles under State aid rules if the bridge recapitalisation were to last over a protracted period. |
| --- | --- |

(68)

The Commission notes that the bridge recapitalisation does not trigger the dilution of the bank's current shareholders. Until the conversion into the final recapitalisation instruments, the bank's economic and legal ownership does not change. The State does not receive any shares, despite the large size of the recapitalisation (without the State recapitalisation there would be almost no capital left in the bank as a result, mainly, of the extraordinary circumstances triggered by the PSI). While such an arrangement could be acceptable as a temporary measure, to give some time to find private investors, it would not comply with the remuneration and burden-sharing principles under State aid rules if the bridge recapitalisation were to last over a protracted period.

c.   Proportionality – measures limiting negative spill-over effects

| (69) | The Commission notes that the bank receives a very large amount of State aid. It is also the case of the three other large privately-owned banks. If one also takes into account the recapitalisations of Agricultural Bank of Greece (ATE) (32) and Hellenic Postbank (TT) (33), all the domestic large and medium-sized banks in Greece will have received large amounts of State aid. That situation may therefore lead to serious distortions of competition. However, it is noted that the need for the bridge recapitalisation stems mainly from the participation in the PSI programme and not from the mismanagement or excessive risk-taking from existing investors. |
| --- | --- |

(69)

The Commission notes that the bank receives a very large amount of State aid. It is also the case of the three other large privately-owned banks. If one also takes into account the recapitalisations of Agricultural Bank of Greece (ATE) (32) and Hellenic Postbank (TT) (33), all the domestic large and medium-sized banks in Greece will have received large amounts of State aid. That situation may therefore lead to serious distortions of competition. However, it is noted that the need for the bridge recapitalisation stems mainly from the participation in the PSI programme and not from the mismanagement or excessive risk-taking from existing investors.

| (70) | As indicated above, the repeated rescue aid granted to the bank means that the new aid cannot be considered as a genuine rescue aid and should be scrutinized in more depth. In addition, more safeguards should be required, taking inspiration from what is required for restructuring aid. |
| --- | --- |

(70)

As indicated above, the repeated rescue aid granted to the bank means that the new aid cannot be considered as a genuine rescue aid and should be scrutinized in more depth. In addition, more safeguards should be required, taking inspiration from what is required for restructuring aid.

| (71) | Point 38 of the Banking Communication requires that capital injections should not allow the beneficiary to engage in aggressive commercial strategies. Furthermore, point 37 of the Recapitalisation Communication acknowledges that safeguards may be necessary to prevent aggressive commercial expansion financed by State aid. Under the current approved schemes, Greece has committed that the beneficiary banks will suspend dividend and coupon payments on outstanding hybrid instruments unless those payments stem from a legal obligation, will not exercise a call option on the same instruments and will not carry out any other capital management deals (e.g. buy-back) on hybrid instruments or any other equity-like instruments without consulting with the Commission in advance. The Commission doubts at this stage that those safeguards are sufficient in relation to the bridge recapitalisation under consideration. The Commission invites the beneficiary and third parties to comment on that issue. |
| --- | --- |

(71)

Point 38 of the Banking Communication requires that capital injections should not allow the beneficiary to engage in aggressive commercial strategies. Furthermore, point 37 of the Recapitalisation Communication acknowledges that safeguards may be necessary to prevent aggressive commercial expansion financed by State aid. Under the current approved schemes, Greece has committed that the beneficiary banks will suspend dividend and coupon payments on outstanding hybrid instruments unless those payments stem from a legal obligation, will not exercise a call option on the same instruments and will not carry out any other capital management deals (e.g. buy-back) on hybrid instruments or any other equity-like instruments without consulting with the Commission in advance. The Commission doubts at this stage that those safeguards are sufficient in relation to the bridge recapitalisation under consideration. The Commission invites the beneficiary and third parties to comment on that issue.

| (72) | The Commission notes that the HFSF has already appointed its representatives in all of the four banks which have received a bridge recapitalisation. The HFSF representatives are different for each bank and the HFSF does not yet have control in the four banks. Nevertheless, the Commission notes that there are no rules in place that prevent the HFSF from carrying out coordination between them. Moreover, adequate safeguards should be in place to ensure that commercially sensitive information is not shared between those undertakings which could lead to distortions of competition. In order to monitor the bank closely, it seems appropriate that the Commission should be able to rely on a monitoring trustee which would be physically present in the bank. The same monitoring trustee might have in its mandate to observe any detrimental changes in the bank's commercial practices, such mispricing, carrying out lending that is not business-oriented or offering unsustainable interest rates on deposits. The Commission invites the beneficiary and third parties to comment. |
| --- | --- |

(72)

The Commission notes that the HFSF has already appointed its representatives in all of the four banks which have received a bridge recapitalisation. The HFSF representatives are different for each bank and the HFSF does not yet have control in the four banks. Nevertheless, the Commission notes that there are no rules in place that prevent the HFSF from carrying out coordination between them. Moreover, adequate safeguards should be in place to ensure that commercially sensitive information is not shared between those undertakings which could lead to distortions of competition. In order to monitor the bank closely, it seems appropriate that the Commission should be able to rely on a monitoring trustee which would be physically present in the bank. The same monitoring trustee might have in its mandate to observe any detrimental changes in the bank's commercial practices, such mispricing, carrying out lending that is not business-oriented or offering unsustainable interest rates on deposits. The Commission invites the beneficiary and third parties to comment.

| (73) | The Commission notes that the restructuring plan/viability review submitted under State aid cases SA. 30342 (PN 26/2010) – "Assessment of the recapitalised Greek banks" and SA. 32786 (2011/PN) – "Viability plan of Alpha Bank" was based on a much lower amount of aid and outdated macro-economic assumptions. For example, it does not include the effect of PSI. Therefore, the Commission requests the Greek authorities that the updated restructuring plan that Greece has to submit three months from the date of the bridge recapitalisation, as also provided under the amended HFSF law, should take account of the large aid amount received, include the new developments and update the measures envisaged by the bank to cope with the new environment. |
| --- | --- |

(73)

The Commission notes that the restructuring plan/viability review submitted under State aid cases SA. 30342 (PN 26/2010) – "Assessment of the recapitalised Greek banks" and SA. 32786 (2011/PN) – "Viability plan of Alpha Bank" was based on a much lower amount of aid and outdated macro-economic assumptions. For example, it does not include the effect of PSI. Therefore, the Commission requests the Greek authorities that the updated restructuring plan that Greece has to submit three months from the date of the bridge recapitalisation, as also provided under the amended HFSF law, should take account of the large aid amount received, include the new developments and update the measures envisaged by the bank to cope with the new environment.

5.3.   Conclusion

| (74) | The Commission has doubts at this stage that the bridge recapitalisation by the HFSF is appropriate, limited to the minimum and proportionate. On that basis, the Commission has doubts whether the aid can be considered compatible with the internal market pursuant to Article 107(3)(b) TFEU. It therefore finds it necessary to open the procedure laid down in Article 107(3)(b) TFEU. |
| --- | --- |

(74)

The Commission has doubts at this stage that the bridge recapitalisation by the HFSF is appropriate, limited to the minimum and proportionate. On that basis, the Commission has doubts whether the aid can be considered compatible with the internal market pursuant to Article 107(3)(b) TFEU. It therefore finds it necessary to open the procedure laid down in Article 107(3)(b) TFEU.

| (75) | At the same time, the Commission notes that the Greek banks are currently operating under extreme conditions. Their participation in the PSI and the deep recession have wiped out banks' capital. Given those totally exceptional circumstances which are not the result of the banks' own mismanagement or excessive risk-taking, the Commission approves the aid in the form of the commitment letter and the bridge recapitalisation for six months from the date of adoption of the current decision. |
| --- | --- |

(75)

At the same time, the Commission notes that the Greek banks are currently operating under extreme conditions. Their participation in the PSI and the deep recession have wiped out banks' capital. Given those totally exceptional circumstances which are not the result of the banks' own mismanagement or excessive risk-taking, the Commission approves the aid in the form of the commitment letter and the bridge recapitalisation for six months from the date of adoption of the current decision.

| (76) | The Commission recalls that this temporary approval does not cover the conversion of the bridge recapitalisation into the final recapitalisation which the Greek authorities need to notify to the Commission. Upon the receipt of the complete notification of that conversion, if it is received by the Commission within six months from the date of this decision, the duration of that approval will be automatically extended until the Commission reaches a final decision on those terms. |
| --- | --- |

(76)

The Commission recalls that this temporary approval does not cover the conversion of the bridge recapitalisation into the final recapitalisation which the Greek authorities need to notify to the Commission. Upon the receipt of the complete notification of that conversion, if it is received by the Commission within six months from the date of this decision, the duration of that approval will be automatically extended until the Commission reaches a final decision on those terms.

| (77) | The Commission observes that Greece has to submit a restructuring plan for the bank three months after granting the bridge recapitalisation. |
| --- | --- |

(77)

The Commission observes that Greece has to submit a restructuring plan for the bank three months after granting the bridge recapitalisation.

6.   DECISION

The Commission concludes that the commitment to provide capital to the bank in the HFSF commitment letter and the bridge recapitalisation which took place on 28 May 2012 constitutes State aid pursuant to Article 107(1) TFEU.

The Commission temporarily approves that measure as rescue aid for reasons of financial stability for a period of six months from the date of this decision. If within that period, the Greek authorities submit a complete notification of the conversion of the bridge recapitalisation into a final recapitalisation, then the duration of the approval will be automatically extended until the Commission reaches a final decision on those terms.

Moreover, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Commission, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 108(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, requests Greece to submit its comments and to provide all such information as may help to assess the aid measure, within one month of the date of receipt of this letter. It requests your authorities to forward a copy of this letter to Alpha Bank immediately.

The Commission notes that Greece accepts for reasons of urgency that the adoption of the decision be in the English language.

The Commission warns Greece that it will inform interested parties by publishing this letter and a meaningful summary of it in the Official Journal of the European Union. It will also inform interested parties in the EFTA countries which are signatories to the EEA Agreement, by publication of a notice in the EEA Supplement to the Official Journal of the European Union and will inform the EFTA Surveillance Authority by sending a copy of this letter. All such interested parties will be invited to submit their comments within one month of the date of such publication.”

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(1)  Yksityisen sektorin osallistuminen: Kreikan viranomaisten ja sen yksityisten velkojien väliset neuvottelut, joiden tavoitteena oli, että yksityiset velkojat mitätöisivät vapaaehtoiselta pohjalta osan Kreikan valtion veloista. Yksityisen sektorin osallistuminen on poikkeuksellista, ja sillä oli huomattava vaikutus Kreikan pankkeihin: joukko pankkeja kärsi yksityisen sektorin osallistumisesta johtuvia tappioita.

1

(2)  Luottamuksellinen tieto, jäljempänä ’[...]’.

2

(3)  See Commission decision of 19 November 2008 in State Aid N 560/2008 "Support Measures for the Credit Institutions in Greece", OJ C 125, 05.06.2009, p. 6. It was attributed the number SA.26678 (N 560/2008). That scheme was subsequently prolonged and amended (see below under footnote 2).

3

Support Measures for the Credit Institutions in Greece

(4)  On 2 September 2009, Greece notified a number of amendments to the support measures and a prolongation until 31 December 2009 that were approved on 18 September 2009 (See Commission decision of 18 September 2009 in State Aid N 504/2009 "Prolongation and amendment of the Support Measures for the Credit Institutions in Greece", OJ C 264, 06.11.2009, p. 5). On 25 January 2010, the Commission approved a second prolongation of the support measures until 30 June 2010 (See Commission decision of 25 January 2010 in State Aid N 690/2009 "Prolongation of the Support Measures for the Credit Institutions in Greece", OJ C 57, 09.03.2010, p. 6). On 30 June 2010, the Commission approved a number of amendments to the support measures and an extension until 31 December 2010 (See Commission decision of 30 June 2010 in State Aid N 260/2010 "Extension of the Support Measures for the Credit Institutions in Greece", OJ C 238, 03.09.2010, p. 3.). On 21 December 2010 the Commission approved a prolongation of the support measures until 30 June 2010 (See Commission decision of 21 December 2010 in State aid SA 31998 (2010/N) "Fourth extension of the Support measures for the credit Institutions in Greece", OJ C 53, 19.02.2011, p. 2). On 4 April 2011 the Commission approved an amendment (See Commission decision of 4 April 2011 in State Aid SA.32767 (2011/N) "Amendment to the Support Measures for the Credit Institutions in Greece", OJ C 164, 02.06.2011, p. 8). On 27 June 2011 the Commission approved a prolongation of the support measures until 31 December 2011 (See Commission decision of 27 June 2011 in State aid SA.33153 (2011/N) "Fifth prolongation of the Support measures for the credit Institutions in Greece", OJ C 274, 17.09.2011, p. 6). On 6 February 2012, the Commission approved a prolongation of the support measures until 30 June 2012 (See Commission decision of 6 February 2012 in State aid SA.34149 (2011/N) "Sixth prolongation of the Support Measures for the Credit Institutions in Greece", OJ C 101, 04.04.2012, p. 2. On 6 July 2012, the Commission approved a prolongation of the support measures until 31 December 2012 (See Commission decision of 6 July 2012 in State aid SA.35002 (2012/N) "Seventh prolongation of the Support Scheme for Credit Institutions in Greece", not yet published.

4

Prolongation and amendment of the Support Measures for the Credit Institutions in Greece

Prolongation of the Support Measures for the Credit Institutions in Greece

Extension of the Support Measures for the Credit Institutions in Greece

Fourth extension of the Support measures for the credit Institutions in Greece

Amendment to the Support Measures for the Credit Institutions in Greece

Fifth prolongation of the Support measures for the credit Institutions in Greece

Sixth prolongation of the Support Measures for the Credit Institutions in Greece

Seventh prolongation of the Support Scheme for Credit Institutions in Greece

(5)  See Commission decision of 6 February 2012 in State Aid SA.34148 (2011/N) "Third prolongation of the Recapitalisation of credit institutions in Greece under the Financial Stability Fund (FSF)", OJ C 101, 04.04.2012, p. 2. Recital 43 of the decision provides that the Greek authorities will ‧notify individually any recapitalisation of a bank which has already received a recapitalisation from the State in the current crisis. The Commission notes that commitment will allow it to assess individually recapitalisation of banks which receive successive aid. It is important, as, in such cases, it has to be assessed more in detail whether an additional recapitalisation of the bank is the best option to preserve financial stability and limit distortions of competition. In such cases of successive aid, it has also to be verified whether the recapitalisation instrument and remuneration to be used by the HFSF are still appropriate‧.

5

notify individually any recapitalisation of a bank which has already received a recapitalisation from the State in the current crisis. The Commission notes that commitment will allow it to assess individually recapitalisation of banks which receive successive aid. It is important, as, in such cases, it has to be assessed more in detail whether an additional recapitalisation of the bank is the best option to preserve financial stability and limit distortions of competition. In such cases of successive aid, it has also to be verified whether the recapitalisation instrument and remuneration to be used by the HFSF are still appropriate

(6)  European Commission - Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs. The Second Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece - March 2012, p. 17, available online at

6

The Second Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece - March 2012

http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2012/pdf/ocp94_en.pdf.

(7)  See the Euro Summit Statement of 26 October 2011, point 12, available online at:

7

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/125644.pdf.

(8)  European Commission - Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs. The Second Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece - March 2012, p. 106.

8

The Second Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece - March 2012

(9)  International Monetary Fund, Greece: Request for Extended Arrangement Under the Extended Fund Facility - Staff Report, IMF Country Report No. 12/57, 16 March 2012, p. 28, available online at

9

Greece: Request for Extended Arrangement Under the Extended Fund Facility - Staff Report

http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2012/cr1257.pdf.

(10)  European Commission - Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs. The Second Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece - March 2012, p. 104.

10

The Second Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece - March 2012

(11)  See Commission decision of 19 November 2008 in State Aid N 560/2008 "Support Measures for the Credit Institutions in Greece", OJ C 125, 05.06.2009, p. 6.

11

Support Measures for the Credit Institutions in Greece

(12)  See footnote 3.

12

(13)  HFSF operates in parallel with the Recapitalisation Scheme. The other new role of the HFSF is to provide capital support to transitional credit institutions established under the resolution framework in Greece (Article 63 of Law 3601/2007). The HFSF's role in the resolution process was not subject to the Commission's approval.

13

(14)  See Commission Decision of 3 September 2010 in State aid Case N 328/2010, “Recapitalisation of Credit Institutions in Greece under the Financial Stability Fund (FSF)”, OJ C 316, 20.11.2010, p. 7.

14

Recapitalisation of Credit Institutions in Greece under the Financial Stability Fund (FSF)

(15)  See Commission Decision of 14 December 2010 under State aid case SA.31999 (2010/N), “Prolongation of the Recapitalisation of credit institutions in Greece under the Financial Stability Fund (FSF)”, OJ C 62, 26.02.2011, p. 16. See Commission decision of 27 June 2011 in State Aid case SA.33154 (2010/N), "Second prolongation of the Recapitalisation of credit institutions in Greece under the Financial Stability Fund (FSF)", OJ C 244, 23.08.2011, p. 2.

15

Prolongation of the Recapitalisation of credit institutions in Greece under the Financial Stability Fund (FSF)

Second prolongation of the Recapitalisation of credit institutions in Greece under the Financial Stability Fund (FSF)

(16)  See Commission decision of 6 February 2012 in State Aid SA.34148 (2011/N) "Third prolongation of the Recapitalisation of credit institutions in Greece under the Financial Stability Fund (FSF)", OJ C 101, 04.04.2012, p. 2.

16

Third prolongation of the Recapitalisation of credit institutions in Greece under the Financial Stability Fund (FSF)

(17)  The current capital adequacy requirements of the Bank of Greece are set at 8 %.

17

(18)  The pre-subscription agreement provided that: "The Effective Risk payable to the Bank shall include the EFSF bonds and any coupon payments and accrued interest to the EFSF bonds for the period from the issuance of the bonds until the conversion of the Advance into share capital and other convertible financial instruments as prescribed herein".

18

The Effective Risk payable to the Bank shall include the EFSF bonds and any coupon payments and accrued interest to the EFSF bonds for the period from the issuance of the bonds until the conversion of the Advance into share capital and other convertible financial instruments as prescribed herein

(19)  According to the mid-term report on the operation of the guarantee and the bond loan schemes submitted by the Ministry of Finance on 27 June 2012. See recital 38 of the Commission decision of 6 February 2012 in State aid SA.34149 (2011/N) "Sixth prolongation of the Support Measures for the Credit Institutions in Greece", OJ C 101, 04.04.2012, p. 2.

19

Sixth prolongation of the Support Measures for the Credit Institutions in Greece

(20)  See Alpha Bank – Presentation of the FY 2011 Results, 20 April 2012, p. 8, available online at: http://www.alpha.gr/files/investorrelations/2011_FY_Financial_Report.pdf.

20

Alpha Bank – Presentation of the FY 2011 Results

(21)  See Alpha Bank – Financial information of Alpha Bank A.E. and the Group for the year from January 1, 2011 to December 31, 2011, available online at:

21

Alpha Bank – Financial information of Alpha Bank A.E. and the Group for the year from January 1, 2011 to December 31, 2011

http://www.alpha.gr/files/investorrelations/IFRS_Alphagroup_FY_2011_en.pdf.

(22)  Confidential information, also indicated below by [...]

22

(23)  See Alpha Bank – Presentation of the FY 2011 Results, 20 April 2012, p. 8.

23

Alpha Bank – Presentation of the FY 2011 Results

(24)  See Alpha Bank - Financial Information of Alpha Bank A.E. and the Group for the period from January 1, 2012 to March 31, 2012, available online at

24

Alpha Bank - Financial Information of Alpha Bank A.E. and the Group for the period from January 1, 2012 to March 31, 2012

http://www.alpha.gr/files/investorrelations/IFRS_Alphagroup_Q1_2012_en.pdf.

(25)  See Alpha Bank – Presentation of the Q1 2012 Results, 31 May 2012, p. 6, available online at: http://www.alpha.gr/files/investorrelations/2012_Q1_Financial_Report.pdf.

25

Alpha Bank – Presentation of the Q1 2012 Results

(26)  The amount of RWA as of 31 March 2012 stood at EUR 44,2 billion. See Alpha Bank – Presentation of the Q1 2012 Results, 31 May 2012, p. 8.

26

Alpha Bank – Presentation of the Q1 2012 Results

(27)  Communication from the Commission "The application of State aid rules to measures taken in relation to financial institutions in the context of the current global financial crisis"OJ C 270, 25.10.2008, p. 8.

27

(28)  Commission Communication "Recapitalisation of financial institutions in the current financial crisis: limitation of the aid to the minimum necessary and safeguards against undue distortions of competition", OJ C 10, 15.1.2009, p. 2.

28

(29)  Commission Communication "The return to viability and the assessment of restructuring measures in the financial sector in the current crisis under the State aid rules" - OJ C 195, 19.8.2009, p. 9.

29

(30)  Communication from the Commission on the application, from 1 January 2012, of State aid rules to support measures in favour of banks in the context of the financial crisis, OJ C 356, 6.12.2011, p. 7.

30

(31)  See recital 41 of Commission decision in Case NN 51/2008 Guarantee scheme for banks in Denmark, OJ C 273, 28.10.2008, p. 2.

31

(32)  ATE, a State-owned bank was the fifth-largest banking group in Greece in 2011. It has received State aid under the support measures for credit institutions in Greece in the form of recapitalisation, guarantees and bond loans.

32

(33)  TT was listed on the Athens Stock Exchange in June 2006. It has a network of 146 branches in 65 cities around the country and it operates also in the 850 Hellenic Post offices. The shareholders' structure includes the Greek State which is the biggest shareholder with a participation of 34 % and the Hellenic Post with 10 %. Hellenic Postbank received a State capital injection under the Support scheme for credit institutions in Greece of approximately EUR 225 million.

33

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