From: Cogliano, Gerain 

Sent: Monday, February 08, 2016 1:19 PM

To: 'Jones, Danielle' <Danielle_Y_Jones@omb.eop.gov>

Cc: Jutras, Nathaniel <Jutras.Nathaniel@epa.gov>; Farber, Glenn <Farber.Glenn@epa.gov>

Subject: Response to Interagency Comments on RMP rule

Attachments: 

NATTSPO comments 

0679.pdf

OK MERC 

comments 0641.pdf

EO 12866 

Interagency Comments RMP_EPA response.docx

EO 12866 

Interagency Comments RMP 2_EPA response.docx

EO12866_RMP 

Modernization 2050-AG82 NPRM Proposal&Rule_20160208_redline.docx

Hi Danielle, 

The following RMP-related files are attached:

 The two interagency comment documents with responses included following each comment;

 A copy of RFI comments submitted by NASTTPO and the OK SERC in response to Interagency 

Comments #71 and #106; and

 A redline copy of the preamble and reg text with interagency comments and responses inserted 

in the margins.

EPA’s OGC weighed in on select issues (OSHA feasibility vs. practicability comment and 

the attorney-client privilege comment) and also gave us some minor edits to clarify the revised 

LEPC disclosure provision.

We are working on revising the RIA to remove the five-year requirement for periodic 

public meetings and only require them after an RMP reportable accident. Most of the costs have 

been updated, but we are now revising the analysis on impacts to small entities and this will 

take a few additional days to complete. We expect to have a revised version of the RIA by the 

end of this week. We will likely need to revise the RFA section of the preamble to reflect RIA 

revisions, once complete.

Additionally, we will incorporate revisions to the preamble/reg. text to reflect Federal 

Register format edits while the interagency reviewers review these responses. 

Please let me know if you have any further comments or questions on these responses.

Thanks!

Gerain Cogliano

OLEM's Regulatory Steering Committee Representative

Policy and Regulatory Management Team Leader

Policy Analysis and Regulatory Management Staff (PARMS)

Office of Program Management (OPM)

Office of Land and Emergency Management (OLEM)

EPA West Room 4130

Phone Number: 202-566-1929

Fax Number: 202-566-1934

Mail Code: 5103T

cogliano.gerain@epa.gov
Attachment: E.O.12866 Review – Revised Version – Do Not Cite, Quote, or Release 

During Review

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During Review

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6560-50-P

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

40 CFR Part 68

[EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725; FRL-xxxx-xx-OSWER]

RIN 2050-AG82

Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs Under the 

Clean Air Act, Section 112(r)(7)

AGENCY: Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

ACTION: Proposed rule.

________________________________________________________________________

SUMMARY: The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), in response to Executive Order (EO) 

13650, is proposing to amend its Risk Management Program regulations. The proposed revisions 

include several changes to the accident prevention program requirements including an additional 

analysis of safer technology and alternatives for the process hazard analysis for some Program 3 

processes, third-party audits and incident investigation root cause analysis for Program 2 and 3 

processes, enhancements to the emergency preparedness requirements, increased public 

availability of chemical hazard information, and several other changes to certain regulatory 

definitions and data elements submitted in risk management plans. These proposed amendments 

seek to improve chemical process safety, assist local emergency authorities in planning for and 

responding to accidents, and improve public awareness of chemical hazards at regulated sources.

DATES: Comments. Comments and additional material must be received on or before [INSERT 

DATE 60 DAYS AFTER DATE OF PUBLICATION IN THE FEDERAL REGISTER]. Under 

the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA), comments on the information collection provisions 
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are best assured of consideration if the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) receives a copy 

of your comments on or before [INSERT DATE 30 DAYS AFTER DATE OF PUBLICATION 

IN THE FEDERAL REGISTER].

Public Hearings. The EPA will hold public hearings on this proposed rule on [INSERT 

DATE] at [INSERT LOCATION], and on [INSERT DATE], at [INSERT LOCATION].

ADDRESSES: Comments. Submit comments and additional materials, identified by 

docket EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725 to the Federal eRulemaking Portal: 

http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the online instructions for submitting comments. Once 

submitted, comments cannot be edited or removed from Regulations.gov. The EPA may publish 

any comment received to its public docket. Do not submit electronically any information you 

consider to be Confidential Business Information (CBI) or other information whose disclosure is 

restricted by statute. Multimedia submissions (audio, video, etc.) must be accompanied by a 

written comment. The written comment is considered the official comment and should include 

discussion of all points you wish to make. The EPA will generally not consider comments or 

comment contents located outside of the primary submission (i.e., on the web, cloud, or other file 

sharing system). For additional submission methods, the full EPA public comment policy, 

information about CBI or multimedia submissions, and general guidance on making effective 

comments, please visit http://www2.epa.gov/dockets/commenting-epa-dockets.

Public Hearings. A public hearing will be held in [INSERT CITY, STATE] on [INSERT 

DATE] at [INSERT LOCATION]. The hearing will convene at [INSERT LOGISTICS]. Please 

contact [INSERT CONTACT and PHONE] or at [INSERT EMAIL] to register to speak at the 

hearing. The last day to preregister in advance to speak at the hearing is [INSERT DATE]
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. Additionally, requests to speak will be taken the day of the hearing at the hearing 

registration desk, although preferences on speaking times may not be able to be fulfilled. If you 

require the service of a translator or special accommodations such as audio description, please let 

us know at the time of registration.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: James Belke, United States Environmental 

Protection Agency, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, 1200 Pennsylvania Ave., 

NW (Mail Code 5104A), Washington, DC, 20460; telephone number: (202) 564-8023; email

address: belke.jim@epa.gov.

Electronic copies of this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) and related news 

releases are available on EPA’s website at http://www2.epa.gov/rmp. Copies of this NPRM are 

also available at http://www.regulations.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Acronyms and Abbreviations. We use multiple 

acronyms and terms in this preamble. While this list may not be exhaustive, to ease the reading of 

this preamble and for reference purposes, the EPA defines the following terms and acronyms 

here:

ACC American Chemistry Council

ACUS Administrative Conference of the United States

AFPM American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers

AMWA Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies

AN ammonium nitrate

ANSI American National Standards Institute

API American Petroleum Institute

ASTM American Society for Testing and Materials

AUC Allied Universal Corp

AWWA American Water Works Association
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AXPC American Exploration & Production Council

BSEE Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement

BTMU Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi

CAA Clean Air Act

CAAA Clean Air Act Amendments

CARB California Air Resources Board

CAS Chemical Abstracts Service

CBI confidential business information

CCHS Contra Costa County Health Services

CCPS Center for Chemical Process Safety

CEM European Committee for Standardization

CFATS Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

CGA Compressed Gas Association

CI Chlorine Institute

CO2 Carbon dioxide

COS Center for Offshore Safety

CPCD Coalition to Prevent Chemical Disasters

CPSC Consumer Product Safety Commission

CRA Corn Refiners Association

CSAG Chemical Safety Advocacy Group

CSB Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board

CSD Center for Science and Democracy

CSISSFRRA Chemical Safety Information, Site Security and Fuels Regulatory Relief Act

DHS Department of Homeland Security

DOI Department of Interior
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EO Executive Order

EPA Environmental Protection Agency

EPCRA Emergency Planning & Community Right-To-Know Act

FCC Federal Communications Commission

FDA Food and Drug Administration

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

FOIA Freedom of Information Act

FPC Formosa Plastics Corporation

FR Federal Register

FRP facility response plan

GHG greenhouse gas

GHS Globally Harmonized System of Classification and Labelling of Chemicals

GPA Gas Processors Association

HAZOP hazard and operability study

HF hydrofluoric acid

IPAA Independent Petroleum Association of America

ISD inherently safer design

ISO industrial safety ordinance

ISOM isomerization

ISS inherently safer strategies

IST inherently safer technology

LEPC local emergency planning committee

LPG liquefied petroleum gas

MACT maximum achievable control technology

MIC methyl isocyanate

MKOPSC Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center
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MOC management of change

NACD National Association of Chemical Distributors

NAICS North American Industrial Classification System

NAM National Association of Manufacturers

NAS National Academy of Sciences

NASTTPO National Association of SARA Title III Program Officials

NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology

NJDEP New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection

NOPA National Oilseed Processors Association

NPRM Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission

NSPS New Source Performance Standards

NTTAA National Technology Transfer Advancement Act

NYDFS New York State Department of Financial Services

OCA offsite consequences analysis

OCS outer continental shelf

OHMERC Oklahoma Hazardous Materials Emergency Response Commission

OMB Office of Management and Budget

OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration

PCAOB Public Company Accounting Oversight Board

PE professional engineer

PHA process hazard analysis

PRA Paperwork Reduction Act

PREP preparedness for response exercise program

PSI process safety information

PSM process safety management
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PSSAP Process Safety Site Assessment Program

PVC polyvinyl chloride

PwC PricewaterhouseCoopers

RAGAGEP recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices

RCRA Resource Conservation and Recovery Act

RFA Regulatory Flexibility Act

RFI request for information

RMP Risk Management Plan

SARA Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act

SBAR Small Business Advocacy Review

SBREFA Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act

SDS safety data sheet

SDWA Safe Drinking Water Act

SEC Securities and Exchange Commission

SEMS Safety and Environmental Management Systems

SER small entity representative

SERC state emergency response commission

SOCMA Society of Chemical Manufacturers and Affiliates

SOP standard operating procedure

STAA safer technology and alternatives analysis

TCPA Toxic Catastrophe Prevention Act

TEPC tribal emergency planning committees

TERC tribal emergency response commission

TPA Texas Pipeline Association

TQ threshold quantity
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TSCA Toxic Substances Control Act

UMRA Unfunded Mandates Reform Act

USCG United States Coast Guard

UST underground storage tank

USW United Steel Workers

VCM vinyl chloride monomer

VCS voluntary census standards

Organization of this Document. The contents of this preamble are:

I. General Information

A. Executive Summary

B. Does This Action Apply to Me?

II. Background

III. Additional Information

A. What Actions Are Not Addressed in This Rule?

B. What is the Agency’s Authority for Taking This Action?

IV. Prevention Program Requirements

A. Incident Investigation and Accident History Requirements

B. Third-Party Compliance Audits

C. Safer Technology and Alternatives Analysis (STAA)

D. Stationary Source Location and Emergency Shutdown

V. Emergency Response Preparedness Requirements

A. Emergency Response Program Coordination with Local Responders

B. Facility Exercises

VI. Information Availability Requirements

A. Proposed Public Disclosure Requirements to LEPCs or Emergency Response Officials

B. Proposed Revisions to Requirements for Information Availability to the Public 

C. Alternative Options

VII. Risk Management Plan Streamlining, Clarifications, and RMP Rule Technical 

Corrections

A. Deletions from Subpart G

B. Revisions to Subpart G

C. Additions to Subpart G

D. Proposed Amendments and Technical Corrections

VIII. Compliance Dates

IX. Statutory and EO Reviews 

A. EO 12866: Regulatory Planning and Review and EO 13563: Improving Regulation and 

Regulatory Review 

B. Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA)

C. Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA)

D. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA)

E. EO 13132: Federalism

F. EO 13175: Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments

G. EO 13045: Protection of Children from Environmental Health Risks and Safety Risks
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H. EO 13211: Actions That Significantly Affect Energy Supply, Distribution or Use

I. National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act (NTTAA)

J. EO 12898: Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and 

Low-Income Populations

A redline version of the regulatory language that incorporates the proposed changes in 

this action is available in the docket for this action.

I. General Information

A. Executive Summary

1. Purpose of the Regulatory Action

The purpose of this action is to improve safety at facilities that use and distribute 

hazardous chemicals. In response to catastrophic chemical facility incidents in the United States, 

including the explosion that occurred at the West Fertilizer facility in West, Texas, on April 17, 

2013 that killed 15 people, President Obama issued EO 13650, “Improving Chemical Facility 

Safety and Security,” on August 1, 2013.

1

Section 6(a)(i) of EO 13650 requires that various Federal agencies develop options for 

improved chemical facility safety and security that identify “improvements to existing risk 

management practices through agency programs, private sector initiatives, Government guidance, 

outreach, standards, and regulations.” One agency program presently in existence is the Risk 

Management Program implemented by EPA under section 112(r) of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 

7412(r)). Section 6(c) of EO 13650 requires the Administrator of EPA to review the chemical 

hazards covered by the Risk Management Program and expand, implement and enforce the Risk 

Management Program to address any additional hazards. As part of this effort to solicit comments 

and information from the public regarding potential changes to EPA’s Risk Management Program

regulations (40 CFR part 68), on July 31, 2014, EPA published a “Request for Information” 

notice or “RFI” (79 FR 44604). 

 

1

 For more information on the EO see https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/01/executiveorder-improving-chemical-facility-safety-and-security.
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EPA believes that the Risk Management Program regulations have been effective in 

preventing and mitigating chemical accidents in the United States. However, EPA believes that

revisions could further protect human health and the environment from chemical hazards through 

advancement of process safety management based on lessons learned. These revisions are a result 

of a review of the existing Risk Management Program and information gathered from the RFI and 

EO listening sessions.

2. Summary of the Major Provisions of the Regulatory Action 

This action proposes to amend EPA’s Risk Management Program regulations at 40 CFR 

part 68. These regulations apply to stationary sources (also referred to as “facilities”) that hold 

specific “regulated substances” in excess of threshold quantities. These facilities are required to

assess their potential release impacts, undertake steps to prevent releases, plan for emergency 

response to releases, and summarize this information in a risk management plan (RMP) submitted 

to EPA. The release prevention steps vary depending on the type of process, but progressively 

gain specificity and rigor over three program levels (i.e., Program 1, Program 2, and Program 3).

The major provisions of this proposed rule include several changes to the accident 

prevention program requirements, as well as enhancements to the emergency response

requirements, and improvements to the public availability of chemical hazard information. Each 

of these proposed revisions is introduced in the following paragraphs of this Section and 

described in greater detail in Sections IV – VI, later in this notice.

Certain proposed provisions would apply to a subset of the processes based on program 

levels described in 40 CFR part 68 (or in one case, to a subset of processes within a program 

level). A full description of these program levels is provided in Section II of this notice.

a. Accident Prevention Program Revisions

This action proposes three changes to the accident prevention program requirements. 

First, the proposed rule would require all facilities with Program 2 or 3 processes to conduct a 
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root cause analysis as part of an incident investigation of a catastrophic release or an incident that 

could have reasonably resulted in a catastrophic release (i.e., a near-miss). This provision is 

intended to reduce the number of chemical accidents by requiring facilities to identify the 

underlying causes of an incident so that they may be addressed. Identifying the root causes, rather 

than isolating and correcting solely the immediate cause of the incident, will help prevent similar 

incidents at other locations, and will yield the maximum benefit or lessons learned from the 

incident investigation. 

Second, the proposed rule would require regulated facilities with Program 2 or 3 

processes to contract with an independent third-party to perform a compliance audit after the 

facility has a reportable release. Compliance audits are required under the existing rule, but are 

allowed to be self-audits (i.e., performed by the owner or operator of the regulated facility). This 

provision is intended to reduce the risk of future accidents by requiring an objective auditing 

process to determine whether the owner or operator of the facility is effectively complying with

the accident prevention procedures and practices required under 40 CFR part 68. 

The third proposed revision to the prevention program would add an element to the 

process hazard analysis (PHA), which is updated every five years. Specifically, owners or 

operators of facilities with Program 3 regulated processes in North American Industrial 

Classification System (NAICS) codes 322 (paper manufacturing), 324 (petroleum and coal 

products manufacturing), and 325 (chemical manufacturing) would be required to conduct a safer 

technology and alternatives analysis (STAA) as part of their PHA, and to evaluate the feasibility 

of any inherently safer technology (IST) identified. This provision is intended to reduce the risk 

of serious accidental releases by requiring facilities in these sectors to conduct a careful 

examination of potentially safer technology and designs that they could implement in lieu of, or 

in addition to, their current technologies. Data compiled from RMPs suggest processes in these 

NAICS codes have a disproportionate share of reportable releases.
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At this time, EPA is not proposing any additional requirements either for location of 

stationary sources (related to their proximity to public receptors) or emergency shutdown 

systems. However, EPA seeks comment on whether such requirements should be considered for 

future rulemakings, including the scope of such requirements, or whether the Agency should 

publish guidance.

b. Emergency Response Enhancements

This action also proposes to enhance the rule’s emergency response requirements. 

Owners or operators of all facilities with Program 2 or 3 processes would be required to 

coordinate with the local emergency response agencies at least once a year to ensure that 

resources and capabilities are in place to respond to an accidental release of a regulated substance.

As a result of improved coordination between facility owners and operators and local emergency 

response officials, EPA believes that some facilities that are currently designated as nonresponding facilities may become responding facilities (i.e., develop an emergency response 

program in accordance with §68.95).

Additionally, all facilities with Program 2 or 3 processes would be required to conduct 

notification exercises annually to ensure that their emergency contact information is accurate and 

complete. This provision is intended to reduce the impact of accidents by ensuring that 

appropriate mechanisms and processes are in place to notify local responders when an accident 

occurs. One of the factors that can contribute to the severity of chemical accidents is a lack of 

effective coordination between a facility and local emergency responders. Increasing such

coordination and establishing appropriate emergency response procedures can help reduce the

effects of accidents. 

This action also proposes to require that all facilities subject to the emergency response 

program requirements of subpart E of the rule (or "responding facilities") conduct a full field 

exercise at least once every five years and one tabletop exercise annually in the other years. 
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Responding facilities that have an RMP reportable accident would also have to conduct a full 

field exercise within a year of the accident. The purpose of this provision is to reduce the impact 

of accidents by ensuring that emergency response personnel understand their roles in the event of 

an incident, that local responders are familiar with the hazards at a facility, and that the 

emergency response plan is up-to-date. Improved coordination with emergency response 

personnel will better prepare responders to respond effectively to an incident and take steps to 

notify the community of appropriate actions, such as shelter-in-place or evacuation.

c. Enhanced Availability of Information

This action proposes various enhancements to the public availability of chemical hazard 

information. The proposed rule would require all facilities to provide certain basic information to 

the public through easily accessible means such as a facility website. If no website exists, the 

owner or operator may provide the information at public libraries or government offices, or use 

other means appropriate for particular locations and facilities. In addition, a subset of facilities 

would be required, upon request, to provide the Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC), 

Tribal Emergency Planning Committee (TEPC)2 or other local emergency response agencies with 

summaries related to: their activities on compliance audits (facilities with Program 2 and 3 

processes); emergency response exercises (facilities with Program 2 and 3 processes); accident 

history and investigation reports (all facilities that have had RMP reportable accidents); and any 

ISTs implemented at the facility (a subset of Program 3 processes). The proposed rule would also 

require all facilities to hold a public meeting for the local community within a specified 

timeframe after an RMP reportable accident. This provision will ensure that first responders and 

members of the community have easier access to appropriate facility chemical hazard 

information, which can significantly improve emergency preparedness and their understanding of 

how the facility is addressing potential risks. 

 

2

 Note for the purposes of this document the term TEPC can be substituted for LEPC, as appropriate.
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In addition to the major provisions described previously in this Section, this action 

proposes revisions to clarify or simplify the RMP submission. These changes are intended to 

reduce the compliance burden on facilities and increase their understanding of the RMP 

requirements. We are also proposing technical corrections to various provisions of the rule.

3. Costs and Benefits

a. Summary of Potential Costs

Approximately 12,500 facilities have filed current RMPs with EPA and are potentially 

affected by the proposed rule changes. These facilities range from petroleum refineries and large 

chemical manufacturers to water and wastewater treatment systems; chemical and petroleum 

wholesalers and terminals; food manufacturers, packing plants, and other cold storage facilities 

with ammonia refrigeration systems; agricultural chemical distributors; midstream gas plants; and

a limited number of other sources, including Federal installations, that use RMP-regulated 

substances.

Table 1 presents the number of facilities according to the latest RMP reporting as of 

February 2015 by industrial sector and chemical use. 

Table 1: Number of Affected Facilities by Sector

Sector NAICS Codes Total 

Facilities Chemical Uses

Administration of 

environmental quality 

programs (i.e., 

governments)

924 1,923 Use chlorine and other 

chemicals for treatment

Agricultural chemical 

distributors/wholesalers

111, 112, 115, 

42491 3,667

Store ammonia for sale; some 

in NAICS 111 and 115 use 

ammonia as a refrigerant

Chemical manufacturing 325 1,466 Manufacture, process, store

Chemical wholesalers 4246 333 Store for sale

Food and beverage 

manufacturing 311, 312 1,476 Use−mostly ammonia as a refrigerant

Oil and gas extraction 211 741

Intermediate processing

(mostly regulated flammable 

substances and flammable 

mixtures)
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Other 44, 45, 48, 54, 56, 

61, 72 248

Use chemicals for wastewater 

treatment, refrigeration, store 

chemicals for sale

Other manufacturing 313, 326, 327, 33 384

Use various chemicals in 

manufacturing process, waste 

treatment

Other wholesale 423, 424 302 Use (mostly ammonia as a 

refrigerant)

Paper manufacturing 322 70 Use various chemicals in pulp 

and paper manufacturing

Petroleum and coal 

products manufacturing 324 156

Manufacture, process, store

(mostly regulated flammable 

substances and flammable 

mixtures)

Petroleum wholesalers 4247 276

Store for sale (mostly 

regulated flammable 

substances and flammable 

mixtures)

Utilities 221 (except 

22131, 22132) 343 Use chlorine (mostly for water treatment)

Warehousing and storage 493 1,056 Use mostly ammonia as a 

refrigerant

Water/wastewater 

Treatment Systems 22131, 22132 102 Use chlorine and other chemicals

Total 12,542

Table 2 presents a summary of the annualized costs estimated in the regulatory impact

analysis3. In total, EPA estimates annualized costs of $158.3 million at a 3% discount rate and 

$161.0 million at a 7% discount rate.

Table 2: Summary of Annualized Costs (Millions, 2014 dollars)

Provision 3% 7%

Third-party Audits $5.0 $5.0

Incident Investigation/Root 

Cause $0.8 $0.8

STAA $34.8 $34.8

Coordination $6.3 $6.3

New Responders* $33.0 $35.6

Notification Exercises $1.4 $1.4

 

3

 A full description of costs and benefits for this proposed rule can be found in the Regulatory Impact 

Analysis for Proposed Revisions to the Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management 

Programs Under the Clean Air Act, Section 112(r)(7). This document is available in the docket for this 

rulemaking (Docket ID Number EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725). 
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Facility Exercises $60.7 $60.7

Information Sharing 

(LEPC) $11.7 $11.7

Information Sharing 

(Public) $4.0 $4.0

Public Meeting $0.4 $0.4

Rule Familiarization $0.3 $0.3

Total Cost+ $158.3 $161.0

* Reflects costs for some facilities to convert from “non-responding” to 

“responding” as a result of improved coordination with local emergency 

response officials.

+ Totals may not sum due to rounding.

The largest average annual cost of the proposed rule is the exercise costs for current 

responders ($60.7 million), followed by new responders (facilities that will comply with the 

emergency response program requirements of §68.95 as a result of local coordination activities or 

receiving a written request from the facility’s LEPC) ($35.6 million), STAA ($34.8 million), and 

information sharing (LEPC) ($11.7 million). The remaining provisions impose average annual 

costs under $10 million each, including coordination ($6.3 million), third-party audits ($5.0

million), information sharing (public) ($4.0 million), notification exercises ($1.4 million), 

incident investigation/root cause analysis ($0.8 million), public meetings ($0.4 million), and rule 

familiarization ($0.3 million). 

b. Summary of Potential Benefits

EPA anticipates that promulgation and implementation of this rule would result in a 

reduction of the frequency and magnitude of damages from releases. Accidents and releases from 

RMP facilities occur every year, causing fires and explosions; damage to property; acute and 

chronic exposures of workers and nearby residents to hazardous materials, and resulting in 

serious injuries and death. Although we are unable to quantify what specific reductions may 

occur as a result of these proposed revisions, we are able to present data on the total damages that 

currently occur at RMP facilities each year. The data presented is based on a 10-year baseline 

period, summarizing RMP accident impacts and, when possible, monetizing them. EPA expects
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that some portion of future damages would be prevented through implementation of a final rule. 

Table 3 presents a summary of the quantified damages identified in the analysis. 

Table 3: Summary of Quantified Damages (2014 dollars)

Unit Value 10-Year Total Ave/Year Average/Accident

On-site

Fatalities $8,583,113 $497,820,554 $49,782,055 $328,161

Injuries $50,000 $105,150,000 $10,515,000 $69,314 

Property Damage $2,054,895,236 $205,489,524 $1,354,578 

On-site Total $2,657,865,790 $265,786,579 $1,752,053

Offsite

Fatalities $8,583,113 $8,583,113 $858,311 $5,658 

Hospitalizations $36,000 $6,804,000 $680,400 $4,485 

Medical Treatment $1,000 $14,807,000 $1,480,700 $9,761 

Evacuations $181 $6,992,327 $699,233 $4,609

Sheltering in Place $91 $40,920,849 $4,092,085 $26,975

Property Damage $11,352,105 $1,135,211 $7,483 

Offsite Total $89,459,394 $8,945,939 $58,971

Total $2,747,325,184 $274,732,518 $1,811,024

EPA monetized both on-site and offsite damages. EPA estimated total average annual onsite damages of $265.8 million. The largest monetized average annual on-site damage was on-site 

property damage, which resulted in average annual damage of approximately $205.5 million. The 

next largest impact was on-site fatalities ($49.8 million) and injuries ($10.5 million). 

EPA estimated total average annual offsite damages of $8.9 million. The largest 

monetized average annual offsite damage was from sheltering in place ($4.1 million), followed 

by medical treatment ($1.5 million), property damage ($1.1 million), fatalities ($0.9 million), 

evacuations ($0.7 million), and hospitalizations ($0.7 million).

In total, EPA estimated monetized damages from RMP facility accidents of $275 million 

per year. However, the monetized impacts omit many important categories of accident impacts 

including lost productivity, the costs of emergency response, transaction costs, property value 

impacts in the surrounding community (that overlap with other benefit categories), and 

environmental impacts. Also not reflected in the 10-year baseline costs are the impacts of non-
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RMP accidents at RMP facilities and any potential impacts of rare high consequence 

catastrophes. A final omission is related to the information provision. Reducing the probability of 

chemical accidents and the severity of their impacts, and improving information disclosure by 

chemical facilities, as the proposed provisions intend, would provide benefits to potentially 

affected members of society.

Table 4 summarizes four broad social benefit categories related to accident prevention 

and mitigation including prevention of RMP accidents, mitigation of RMP accidents, prevention 

and mitigation of non-RMP accidents at RMP facilities, and prevention of major catastrophes. 

The table explains each and identifies ten associated specific benefit categories, ranging from 

avoided fatalities to avoided emergency response costs. Table 4 also highlights and explains the 

information disclosure benefit category and identifies two specific benefits associated with it: 

improved efficiency of property markets and allocation of emergency resources.

Table 4: Summary of Social Benefits of Proposed Rule Provisions

Broad Benefit 

Category Explanation Specific Benefit Categories

Accident Prevention Prevention of future RMP 

facility accidents

 Reduced Fatalities

 Reduced Injuries

 Reduced Property Damage

 Fewer People Sheltered in 

Place

 Fewer Evacuations

 Avoided Lost Productivity

 Avoided Emergency Response 

Costs

 Avoided Transaction Costs

 Avoided Property Value 

Impacts*

 Avoided Environmental 

Impacts

Accident Mitigation Mitigation of future RMP 

facility accidents

Non-RMP accident 

prevention and 

mitigation

Prevention and mitigation of 

future non-RMP accidents at 

RMP facilities

Avoided Catastrophes

Prevention of rare but 

extremely high consequence 

events

Information 

Disclosure

Provision of information to the 

public and LEPCs

 Improved efficiency of property 

markets

 Improved resource allocation

* These impacts partially overlap with several other categories such as reduced health and environmental impacts.

B. Does This Action Apply to Me?
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This rule applies to those facilities (referred to as ‘‘stationary sources’’ under the CAA) 

that are subject to the chemical accident prevention requirements at 40 CFR part 68. This includes 

stationary sources holding more than a threshold quantity (TQ) of a regulated substance in a 

process. Table 5 below provides industrial sectors and the associated NAICS codes for entities 

potentially affected by this action. The Agency’s goal is to provide a guide for readers to consider 

regarding entities that potentially could be affected by this action. However, this action may 

affect other entities not listed in this table. If you have questions regarding the applicability of this 

action to a particular entity, consult the person(s) listed in the introductory section of this notice 

under the heading entitled FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT.

Table 5: Industrial Sectors and Associated NAICS Codes for Entities Potentially 

Affected by Proposed Action

Sector NAICS Code

Administration of Environmental Quality Programs 924

Agricultural Chemical Distributors

Animal Production and Aquaculture

Crop Production

Farm Supplies Merchant Wholesalers

Support Activities for Agriculture and Forestry

112

111

42491

115

Beverage Manufacturing

Food Manufacturing

3121

311

Chemical and Allied Products Merchant Wholesalers 4246

Chemical Manufacturing 325

Oil and Gas Extraction 211

Other4 313, 326, 327, 33, 44, 45, 48, 54, 

56, 61, 72

Other Wholesale

Merchant Wholesalers, Durable Goods

Merchant Wholesalers, Nondurable Goods

423

424

Paper Manufacturing 322

Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing 324

Petroleum and Petroleum Products Merchant 

Wholesalers

4247

Utilities 221 (except 22131 and 22132 

described below)

Warehousing and Storage 493

Water/Wastewater Treatment Systems

Sewage Treatment Facilities 22132

 

4 For descriptions of NAICS codes, see http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/sssd/naics/naicsrch
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Water Supply and Irrigation Systems 22131 

II. Background

Recent catastrophic chemical facility incidents in the United States prompted President 

Obama to issue EO 13650, “Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security,” on August 1, 

2013.

5 The purpose of the EO is to enhance the safety and security of chemical facilities and 

reduce risks associated with hazardous chemicals to owners and operators, workers, and 

communities. The EO establishes the Chemical Facility Safety and Security Working Group 

(“Working Group”), co-chaired by the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Administrator of 

EPA, and the Secretary of Labor or their designated representatives at the Assistant Secretary 

level or higher, and composed of senior representatives of other Federal departments, agencies, 

and offices. The EO requires the Working Group to carry out a number of tasks whose overall 

aim is to prevent chemical accidents, such as the explosion that occurred at the West Fertilizer 

facility in West, Texas, on April 17, 2013.

6

In addition to the tragedy at the West Fertilizer 

facility, a number of other incidents have demonstrated a significant risk to the safety of 

American workers and communities. On March 23, 2005, explosions at the BP Refinery in Texas 

City, Texas, killed 15 people and injured more than 170 people.

7 On April 2, 2010, an explosion 

and fire at the Tesoro Refinery in Anacortes, Washington, killed seven people.

8 On August 6, 

2012, at the Chevron Refinery in Richmond, California, a fire involving flammable fluids 

 

5 For more information on the EO see https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/01/executiveorder-improving-chemical-facility-safety-and-security.

6

 CSB. January 2016. Final Investigation Report, West Fertilizer Company Fire and Explosion, West, TX, 

April 17, 2013. REPORT 2013-02-I-TX. 

http://www.csb.gov/west-fertilizer-explosion-and-fire-/.

7

 U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB). March 2007. Investigation Report: 

Refinery Explosion and Fire, BP, Texas City, Texas, March 23, 2005. Report No. 2005-04-I-TX.

http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/19/CSBFinalReportBP.pdf.

8 CSB. May 2014. Investigation Report: Catastrophic Rupture of Heat Exchanger, Tesoro Anacortes 

Refinery, Anacortes, Washington, April 2, 2010. Report No. 2010-08-I-WA.

http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/7/Tesoro_Anacortes_2014-May-01.pdf.
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endangered 19 Chevron employees and created a large plume of highly hazardous chemicals that 

traveled across the Richmond, California, area.9 Nearly 15,000 residents sought medical 

treatment due to the release. On June 13, 2013, a fire and explosion at Williams Olefins in 

Geismar, Louisiana, killed two people and injured many more.

10

Section 6 of the EO is entitled “Policy, Regulation, and Standards Modernization.” This 

section, among other things, requires certain Federal agencies to consider possible changes to 

existing chemical safety and security regulations. To solicit comments and information from the 

public regarding potential changes to EPA’s Risk Management Program regulations (40 CFR part 

68), on July 31, 2014, EPA published an RFI (79 FR 44604). Information collected through the 

RFI has informed this proposal. Readers are encouraged to review the RFI, as this notice will not 

reiterate the full discussion of all of its topics.

EPA received a total of 579 public comments on the RFI. Several public comments were 

the result of various mass mail campaigns and contained numerous copies of letters or petition 

signatures. Approximately 99,710 letters and signatures were contained in these several 

comments. Discussion of RFI public comments pertaining to topics included in this proposal can 

be found below in Section IV. Prevention Program Requirements, Section V. Emergency 

Response Preparedness Requirements and Section VI. Information Availability Requirements.

EPA seeks comment on the proposed amendments. Any suggestions for alternative 

options should include an appropriate rationale and supporting data for the Agency to be able to 

consider it for a final action.

A. Overview of EPA’s Risk Management Program Regulations. 

 

9 CSB. January 2014. Regulatory Report: Chevron Richmond Refinery Pipe Rupture and Fire, Chevron 

Richmond Refinery #4 Crude Unit, Richmond, California, August 6, 2012. Report No. 2012-03-I-CA. 

http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/19/CSB_Chevron_Richmond_Refinery_Regulatory_Report.pdf.

10 CSB. June 27, 2013. Testimony of Rafael Moure-Eraso, Ph.D. Chairperson, CSB Before the U.S. Senate 

Committee on Environment and Public Works, pg. 8.

http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/19/CSB_Written_Senate_Testimony_6.27.13.pdf
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Both EPA’s 40 CFR part 68 RMP regulation11 and Occupational Safety and Health 

Administration’s (OSHA) 29 CFR 1910.119 Process Safety Management (PSM) standard were 

authorized in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 (1990 CAAA). This was in response to a 

number of catastrophic chemical accidents occurring worldwide that had resulted in public and 

worker fatalities and injuries, environmental damage, and other community impacts. OSHA 

published the PSM standard in 1992 (57 FR 6356, February 24, 1992), as required by section 304 

of the 1990 CAAA, using its authority under 29 U.S.C. §653.

The 1990 CAAA added accidental release provisions under section 112(r). The statute 

required EPA to develop a list of at least 100 regulated substances for accident prevention and 

related thresholds (CAA section 112(r)(3)-(5)), and authorized EPA to issue accident prevention 

regulations (CAA section 112(r)(7)(A)). The statute also required EPA to develop “reasonable 

regulations” requiring facilities with over a TQ of a regulated substance to undertake accident 

prevention steps and submit a “risk management plan” to various local, state, and Federal 

planning entities (CAA section 112(r)(7)(B)).

EPA published the RMP regulation in two stages. The Agency published the list of 

regulated substances and TQs in 1994 (59 FR 4478, January 31, 1994) (the “list rule”)12 and 

published the RMP final regulation, containing risk management requirements for covered 

sources, in 1996 (61 FR 31668, June 20, 1996) (the “RMP rule”).13,14 Both the OSHA PSM 

standard and the EPA RMP rule aim to prevent or minimize the consequences of accidental 

 

11

 40 CFR part 68 is titled, “Chemical Accident Prevention Provisions,” but is more commonly known as 

the “RMP regulation,” the “RMP rule,” or the “Risk Management Program.” This document uses all three 

terms to refer to 40 CFR part 68. The term “RMP” refers to the document required to be submitted under 

subpart F of 40 CFR part 68, the Risk Management Plan. See http://www2.epa.gov/rmp for more 

information on the Risk Management Program.

12

 Documents and information related to development of the list rule can be found in the EPA docket for 

the rulemaking, docket number A-91-74.

13

 Documents and information related to development of the RMP rule can be found in EPA docket 

number A-91-73.

14

 40 CFR part 68 applies to owners and operators of stationary sources that have more than a TQ of a 

regulated substance within a process. The regulations do not apply to chemical hazards other than listed 

substances held above a TQ within a regulated process. 
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chemical releases through implementation of management program elements that integrate 

technologies, procedures, and management practices. In addition to requiring implementation of 

management program elements, the RMP rule requires covered sources to submit (to EPA) a 

document summarizing the source’s risk management program – called a Risk Management Plan 

(or RMP). The RMP rule required covered sources to comply with its requirements and submit 

initial RMPs to EPA by June 21, 1999. Each RMP must be revised and updated at least once 

every five years from the date the plan was initially submitted.

EPA later revised the list rule and the RMP rule. EPA modified the regulated list of 

substances by exempting solutions with less than 37% concentrations of hydrochloric acid (62 FR 

45130, August 25, 1997). EPA also deleted the category of Department of Transportation

Division 1.1 explosives, and exempted flammable substances in gasoline used as fuel and in 

naturally occurring hydrocarbon mixtures prior to initial processing (63 FR 640, January 6, 1998). 

EPA subsequently modified the RMP rule five times. First, in 1999, EPA revised the

facility identification data and contact information reported in the RMP (64 FR 964, January 6, 

1999). Next, EPA revised assumptions for the worst case scenario analysis for flammable 

substances and clarified what the Agency means by chemical storage not incidental to 

transportation (64 FR 28696, May 26, 1999). After the Chemical Safety Information, Site 

Security and Fuels Regulatory Relief Act (CSISSFRRA) was enacted on August 5, 1999, EPA 

excluded regulated flammable substances when used as a fuel or held for sale as a fuel at a retail 

facility (65 FR 13243, March 13, 2000). Later, EPA restricted access to offsite consequence 

analysis (OCA) data for the public and government officials to minimize the security risks 

associated with posting the information on the Internet (65 FR 48108, August 4, 2000). Finally, 

EPA revised the RMP executive summary to remove a requirement to describe the OCA; revised 

reporting deadlines for RMP reportable accidents and emergency contact changes; and made 

other minor revisions to RMP facility contact information (69 FR 18819, April 8, 2004).
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The RMP rule establishes three “program levels” for regulated processes:

Program 1 applies to processes that would not affect the public in the case of a worst-case 

release and that have had no accidents with specific offsite consequences within the past five 

years. Program 1 imposes limited hazard assessment requirements, requires coordination with 

local response agencies, and requires submission of an RMP.

Program 2 applies to processes not eligible for Program 1 or subject to Program 3, and 

imposes streamlined prevention program requirements, including safety information, hazard 

review, operating procedures, training, maintenance, compliance audits, and incident 

investigation elements. Program 2 also imposes additional hazard assessment, management, and 

emergency response requirements.

Program 3 applies to processes not eligible for Program 1 and either subject to OSHA’s 

PSM standard under Federal or state OSHA programs or classified in one of ten specified 

industry sectors identified by their 2002 NAICS codes listed at §68.10(d)(1). These industries 

were selected because they had a higher frequency of the most serious accidents as compared to 

other industry sectors. The ten NAICS codes and the industries they represent are 32211 (pulp 

mills), 32411 (petroleum refineries), 32511 (petrochemical manufacturing), 325181 (alkalies and 

chlorine manufacturing), 325188 (all other basic inorganic chemical manufacturing), 325192 

(cyclic crude and intermediate manufacturing), 325199 (all other basic chemical manufacturing), 

325211 (plastics material and resin manufacturing), 325311 (nitrogenous fertilizer 

manufacturing), or 32532 (pesticide and other agricultural chemicals manufacturing).15 Program 3 

imposes elements nearly identical to those in OSHA’s PSM standard as the accident prevention 

program. The Program 3 prevention program includes requirements relating to process safety 

information (PSI), PHA, operating procedures, training, mechanical integrity, management of 

 

15

 NAICS codes 325181 and 325188 are now combined and represented as 2012 revised NAICS code 

325180 (other basic inorganic chemical manufacturing). NAICS code 325192 is now 2012 revised NAICS 

code 325194 (cyclic crude, intermediate, and gum and wood chemical manufacturing).
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change (MOC), pre-startup review, compliance audits, incident investigations, employee 

participation, hot work permits, and contractors. Program 3 also imposes the same hazard 

assessment, management, and emergency response requirements that are required for Program 2.

On July 22, 2015, OSHA issued a revised interpretation to its PSM retail exemption at 29

CFR 119(a)(2)(i).

16 This interpretation now only allows facilities in NAICS codes 44 and 45, the 

retail trade, to be eligible for the retail exemption. As a result of this change, many agricultural 

chemical distributors who sell bulk anhydrous ammonia and some chemical warehouses, are no 

longer exempt from the PSM standard. This makes them subject to RMP Program 3 

requirements, whereas before most were covered under Program 2. 

EPA believes the RMP rule has been effective in preventing and mitigating chemical 

accidents in the United States and protecting human health and the environment from chemical 

hazards. However, major incidents, such as the West, Texas, explosion, highlight the importance 

of reviewing and evaluating current practices and regulatory requirements, and applying lessons 

learned from other incident investigations to advance process safety where needed.

III. Additional Information

A. What Actions Are Not Addressed in This Rule?

Under Section 6 of EO 13650, “Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security,” the 

EO Working Group (chaired by EPA, OSHA, and Department of Homeland Security [DHS]) was

tasked with enhancing safety at chemical facilities by identifying key improvements to existing 

risk management practices through guidance, policies, procedures, outreach, and regulations. As 

part of this task, the Working Group solicited public comment on potential options for improving 

chemical facility safety. Additionally, EPA gathered information from the public regarding 

potential changes to EPA’s Risk Management Program regulations (40 CFR part 68) via a RFI 

(79 FR 44604, July 31, 2014). Using the results from these efforts as well as information 

 

16 See OSHA PSM Retail Exemption Policy

https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=29528
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collected through implementing the Risk Management Program, EPA is proposing revisions to 

the RMP rule to advance chemical facility safety. However, this proposed rule does not address 

all of the topics included in the RFI. For example, EPA is not proposing any revisions to the list 

of regulated substances and is therefore not addressing ammonium nitrate (AN) in this proposed 

rule. EPA may propose listing additional hazardous substances in a separate action.

Currently AN is not listed as a regulated substance under the RMP rule or the OSHA 

PSM standard. Required safe handling and storage practices for AN are covered under OSHA’s 

Explosives and Blasting Agents Standard (29 CFR 1910.109) and includes coverage of fertilizer 

grade AN in section 1910.109(i). Section 1910.109(k)(2) requires that manufacturing of 

explosives must meet requirements under OSHA’s PSM standard (29 CFR 1910.119); this would 

include any explosive manufacturing process involving AN. OSHA is considering whether AN 

should be added to the §1910.119 Appendix A list of chemicals subject to the PSM standard, 

which could expand the standard’s applicability to include processes at fertilizer mixers, 

distributors and wholesalers who store and handle AN. OSHA is also considering whether to 

make changes to the AN storage and handling requirements in their Explosives and Blasting 

Agents standard, which has requirements for AN stored with and without, explosives and blasting 

agents. DHS is considering potential modifications of its Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism 

Standards (CFATS) regulation, including reviewing the applicability and/or modification of 

screening TQs for chemicals of interest in Appendix A in 6 CFR part 27, which include AN (79 

FR 48693, August 18, 2014).

17 We plan to coordinate any potential change to the list of 

substances 40 CFR part 68 with the actions of these other agencies. Therefore, EPA is not 

presently proposing that AN be added to the list of substances subject to the RMP rule, but the 

Agency may elect to propose such a listing at a later date. 

B. What is the Agency’s Authority for Taking This Action?

 

17

 CFATS. 79 FR 48693, August 18, 2014. http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=DHS-2014-

0016-0001.
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The statutory authority for this action is provided by section 112(r) of the CAA as 

amended (42 U.S.C. 7412(r)). Each of the portions of the Risk Management Program rule we 

propose to modify in this notice are based on EPA’s rulemaking authority under section 112(r)(7) 

of the CAA (42 U.S.C. 7412(r)(7)). A more detailed discussion of the underlying statutory 

authority for the current requirements of the Risk Management Program rule appears in the notice 

that proposed the Risk Management Program (58 FR 54190, 54191-93 [Oct. 20, 1993]). The 

prevention program provisions discussed below (auditing, incident investigation, and safer 

technologies alternatives analysis) address the “prevention and detection of accidental releases.” 

The emergency coordination and exercises provisions in this rule modify existing provisions that 

provide for “response to such release by the owners or operators of the sources of such releases.” 

(CAA 112(r)(7)(B)(i)). This paragraph calls for EPA’s regulations to recognize differences in 

“size, operations, processes, class and categories of sources.” In this notice, we propose to 

maintain distinctions in prevention program levels and in response actions authorized by this 

provision. The information disclosure provisions discussed in this notice generally assist in the 

development of “procedures and measures for emergency response after an accidental release of a 

regulated substance in order to protect human health and the environment.” This information 

disclosure ensures the emergency plans for impacts on the community are based on more relevant 

and accurate information than would otherwise be available and ensures that the public can 

become an informed participant in such emergency planning.

IV. Prevention Program Requirements

A. Incident Investigation and Accident History Requirements

1. Summary of Existing Investigation Requirements

Currently, owners or operators of facilities with processes subject to Program 2 and 3 are 

required to investigate each incident which resulted in, or could reasonably have resulted in a 

catastrophic release (§§68.60 and 68.81). The RMP rule defines a catastrophic release in §68.3 as 
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a major uncontrolled emission, fire, or explosion, involving one or more regulated substances that 

presents an imminent and substantial endangerment to public health and the environment. 

Imminent and substantial endangerment includes offsite consequences such as death, injury, or 

adverse effects to human health or the environment, or the need for the public to shelter-in-place 

or be evacuated to avoid such consequences. 

Facility owners or operators are required to determine the factors that contributed to the 

incident and develop recommendations resulting from the investigation. The PHA (§68.67 (c)(2)) 

is required to address previous incidents which had a likely potential for catastrophic 

consequences. In the preamble to the existing final rule, EPA explained that while most 

catastrophic releases affect workers first, there are incidents where workers are protected but the 

public and the environment may be threatened (e.g., emergency relief devices are designed to 

vent hazardous atmospheres away from the workplace and into the air where they may be carried 

downwind). The PHA should recognize and address the potential offsite impact associated with 

safety measures that protect workers (e.g., by installing a control device on an emergency vent). 

The RMP rule requires that facility owners and operators consider such possibilities and integrate 

the protection of workers, the public, and the environment into one program. Thus, RMP facility 

owners and operators must investigate each significant incident which resulted in, or could 

reasonably have resulted in a catastrophic release with on- or offsite consequences.

2. Catastrophic Release Definition

In the 1996 final rule (61 FR 31687, June 20, 1996), EPA developed a definition of 

catastrophic release similar to the definition OSHA used in the PSM standard, with modifications 

to cover events that presented imminent and substantial endangerment to public health and the 

environment.

18 This ensured that owners or operators of sources covered by both OSHA and EPA 

 

18

 The OSHA definition provides that “Catastrophic release means a major uncontrolled emission, fire, or 

explosion, involving one or more highly hazardous chemicals, that presents serious danger to employees in 

the workplace.” (see 29 CFR 1910.119(b))
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requirements investigated not only accidents that threatened workers, but also those that 

threatened the public and the environment. Because EPA modified OSHA’s definition of 

catastrophic releases so that offsite impacts were covered, there has been confusion among some 

owners and operators of facilities subject to the RMP rule; some believe they should not have to 

investigate accidents involving only workers for the purposes of fulfilling requirements under the 

RMP rule. EPA recognized that the PHA process must address potential offsite impacts 

associated with safety measures that also protect workers, and that the final rule would ensure that 

all sources routinely consider such possibilities and integrate protection of workers, the public 

and the environment into one program. In similar fashion, EPA believes that incident 

investigation was not intended to be and should not be limited to only those incidents with offsite 

impacts. 

Learning from accident causes identified from incident investigations involving only 

workers can also lead to preventing incidents with further impacts to the surrounding community 

and therefore, findings and recommendations from all incidents, regardless of who is impacted, 

should be addressed. In the preamble to the 1996 final RMP rule (61 FR 31711, June 20, 1996), 

EPA emphasized that “any incident with the potential for catastrophic consequences in the 

workplace will also have had the potential for catastrophic consequences offsite.” Thus, facility 

owners or operators should be investigating incidents even if they only impacted workers, as 

these could have potentially been an accident impacting the public or the environment. 

EPA has not defined or clarified the term “imminent and substantial endangerment” but 

did make revisions in the 1996 final RMP rule in order to better define accidents to be reported 

under the RMP accident history requirements. To make the requirement less vague and less 

subject to a wide variety of interpretations, the final rule required that accident history shall 

include all accidental releases from covered processes “that resulted in deaths, injuries, or 

significant property damage on site, or known offsite deaths, injuries, evacuations, sheltering in 
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place, property damage, or environmental damage.” EPA also provided a definition for “offsite” 

and “injury.” 

EPA is proposing to modify the definition of catastrophic release to mean an uncontrolled 

emission, fire, or explosion, involving one or more regulated substances that resulted in deaths, 

injuries, or significant property damage on-site, or known offsite deaths, injuries, evacuations, 

sheltering in place, property damage, or environmental damage. This better defines the impacts 

for incidents requiring investigations that caused or could have caused these impacts and clarifies 

EPA’s intent, rather than leaving it open for interpretation. This is consistent with the accident 

impacts that must be reported under the 5-year accident history, which EPA considered relevant 

to include in 1996 “because it may reflect safety practices at the source” and because “accidental 

releases from covered processes which resulted in deaths, injuries, or significant property damage 

on-site, involve failures of sufficient magnitude that they have the potential to affect offsite 

areas.”19 EPA seeks comment on the proposed revision to the catastrophic release definition and 

whether it should be limited to loss of life; serious injury; significant damage; or loss of offsite 

property.

3. Root Causes

The cause of an incident is often the result of a series of other problems that need to be 

addressed to prevent recurrences. For example, an operator’s mistake may be the result of poor 

training, inappropriate procedures, or poor design of control systems; and equipment failure may 

result from improper maintenance, misuse of equipment (e.g., operating at too high a 

temperature), or use of incompatible materials. These types of causes are commonly referred to as 

causal factors (also known as contributing causes, contributory causes, contributing factors, or 

critical factors). The Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) defines a causal factor as a 

major unplanned, unintended contributor to the incident (a negative occurrence or undesirable 

 

19

 EPA. May 24, 1996. Risk Management Plan Rule, Summary and Response to Comments. Volume 1, pp. 

3-11 and 17-4. Docket No. A-91-73, Document No. IX-C-1.
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condition), that if eliminated would have either prevented the occurrence, or reduced its severity 

or frequency.20 These are factors that facilitate the occurrence of an incident such as physical 

conditions and management practices. Causal or contributing factors usually have underlying 

reasons why they occurred, which are known as root causes. 

Most root causes are associated with weaknesses, defects or breakdowns in management 

systems.21 Identifying root causes provides the mechanism for understanding the interaction and 

impact of system management failures, so that the root causes can be addressed and the maximum 

benefit is obtained from an incident investigation. CCPS defines a root cause as a fundamental, 

underlying, system-related reason why an incident occurred that identifies a correctable failure(s) 

in management systems. There is typically more than one root cause for a process safety incident. 

Correcting only the immediate cause of an incident (e.g., operator error) may prevent the identical 

incident from occurring at the same location, but may not prevent similar incidents. Instead, 

identifying and addressing incident contributing factors and their root causes helps eliminate or 

substantially reduce the risk of reoccurrence of the incident and other similar incidents. The

current Risk Management Program incident investigation requirements under §§68.60 and 68.81 

do not explicitly require root causes to be determined and reported, rather they only require “the 

factors that contributed to the incident.” Facility owners and operators that conduct incident 

investigations that only identify “factors that contributed to the incident” may miss identifying the 

underlying, system-related reason why an incident occurred (which would be revealed in a root 

cause analysis). Thus EPA is proposing to require a root cause analysis to ensure that facilities 

determine the underlying causes of an incident to reduce or eliminate the potential for additional 

accidents resulting from deficiencies of the same process safety management system.

4. Lack of Root Cause Analysis for Prior Incidents 

 

20

 CCPS. March 2003. Guidelines for Investigating Chemical Process Incidents, 2nd ed., pp.3, 62, 181, 

434. CCPS, American Institute of Chemical Engineers, New York, NY. John Wiley and Sons.

21

 EPA recognizes that some root causes could be events that management systems could not have 

prevented or protected against. The analytic techniques used to identify root causes account for such events. 
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Below are examples of incident investigations that identified similar prior incidents 

within the same facility or company where root causes for the prior incidents were not analyzed 

and determined. This resulted in missed opportunities to address the proper causes of the 

incidents, share the lessons learned and prevent further similar incidents.

On January 21, 1997, at a Tosco refinery, effluent piping on a hydrocracker reactor 

ruptured, causing an explosion and fire, killing one operator and injuring 46 other Tosco and 

contractor personnel. The accident was caused by an uncontrolled temperature excursion in the 

reactor resulting in an excessively high temperature that caused the pipe to rupture.22 Operators 

did not follow prescribed emergency depressurizing procedures for extremely high temperature 

occurrences and attempted to control the temperature by other means. Investigations of prior 

incidents involving unsafe temperature excursions were inadequate and not all these excursions 

were documented. Failure to investigate these “near-misses” resulted in a missed opportunity to 

determine why operators were not following prescribed emergency depressurizing procedures and 

to develop solutions to address the cause. After the 1997 accident, the company designed the 

depressurizing system to activate automatically when the reactor temperature exceeded safe 

operating limits. 

On September 10, 1997, an explosion occurred in a resins production unit at GeorgiaPacific Resins, Inc. in Columbus, Ohio, causing the death of one worker, four injuries, extensive 

damage to the plant, and sheltering in place for nearby residents, a vocational school and 

businesses.23 Three firefighters received first-degree burns. An accident investigation determined 

that raw materials and a catalyst were charged too quickly to a reactor, causing a runaway 

reaction generating too much heat and pressure, which caused the reactor to explode. Prior to the 

 

22

 EPA. November 1998. EPA Chemical Accident Investigation Report, Tosco Avon Refinery, Martinez, 

CA. EPA 550-R-98-009. http://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi/10003A2E.PDF?Dockey=10003A2E.PDF.

23

 EPA, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response. August 1999. How to Prevent Runaway 

Reactions, Case Study: Phenol-Formaldehyde Reaction Hazards. EPA 550-F99-004. 

http://archive.epa.gov/emergencies/docs/chem/web/pdf/gpcasstd.pdf.
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accident, the facility had recently experienced a near miss involving similar circumstances.24 An 

operator added chemicals to a batch resin process at too high a rate. Other alert operators noted 

the procedural deviation and were able to prevent an accident. The company investigated the 

accident and disciplined the operator, but took no other actions.

An accident on June 22, 1997, at a Shell olefins plant involved a release of flammable 

gases from a structural failure and drive shaft blowout from a 36 inch diameter failed check (nonreturn) valve, resulting in a massive explosion and fire causing extensive damage to the facility, 

damage to nearby residential property, several worker injuries, and sheltering in place for nearby 

residents. An EPA/OSHA accident investigation determined that these check valves were not 

appropriately designed and manufactured for the heavy-duty service to which they were subjected 

in the olefins production unit.25 Similar problems with the check valves had occurred previously 

at the facility and at other facilities owned by the company, but the occurrences were not 

adequately investigated and did not identify all the factors involved in the valves’ failure. The 

other valve failure occurrences did not result in as severe consequences as the 1997 event and 

were treated as maintenance failures, not incidents or accidents. Thus, the lessons that could have 

been learned from these prior failures were not adequately identified, shared, and implemented.

On April 8, 1998, at a Morton International chemical plant, a runaway reaction in a 

process kettle caused an overpressure of the vessel, blew off the top hatch, and spewed a stream 

of gas and liquid through the roof of the building and down onto the surrounding community. 

Residents in a 100 city-block area were confined to their homes. Nine workers were injured, two 

with severe burns. The U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB) determined that Morton could have 

corrected safety problems in the process if they had conducted investigations into any of the eight 

 

24 Belke, James C (EPA). 1997. Recurring Causes of Recent Chemical Accidents. 

http://psc.che.tamu.edu/wp-content/uploads/recurring-causes-of-recent-chemical-accidents.pdf.

25

 EPA and OSHA. June 1998. EPA/OSHA Joint Chemical Accident Investigation Report, Shell Chemical 

Company, Deer Park, TX. EPA 550-R-98-005. 

http://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi/100039YA.PDF?Dockey=100039YA.PDF.
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prior instances when process temperatures exceeded the normal range.26 Process and design 

changes resulting from such investigations could have prevented the 1998 explosion. 

On April 23, 2004, an explosion and fire at the Formosa Plastics Corporation (FPC 

USA), Illiopolis, Illinois, (Formosa-IL) polyvinyl chloride (PVC) manufacturing facility killed 

five and severely injured three workers. The explosion and fire destroyed most of the reactor 

facility and adjacent warehouse and ignited PVC resins stored in the warehouse. Smoke from the 

smoldering fire drifted over the local community, and as a precaution, local authorities ordered an 

evacuation of the community for two days. CSB determined that this incident occurred when an 

operator drained a full, heated, and pressurized PVC reactor and bypassed a pressure interlock.27

The safeguards to prevent bypassing the interlock were insufficient for the high risk associated 

with this activity. Two similar incidents at FPC USA PVC manufacturing facilities highlighted 

problems with safeguards designed to prevent inadvertent discharge of an operating reactor. The 

FPC USA Environmental Health & Safety group had received reports of both incidents, but did 

not recognize a key similarity: operators could mistakenly go to the wrong reactor and bypass 

safeguards to open a reactor bottom valve.

On March 23, 2005, at the BP Texas City Refinery in Texas City, Texas, explosions and 

fires killed 15 people and injured another 180, required shelter-in-place for 43,000 people, 

damaged nearby houses, and resulted in financial losses exceeding $1.5 billion. The incident 

occurred during the startup of an isomerization (ISOM) unit when a raffinate splitter tower was 

overfilled and pressure relief devices opened, resulting in a flammable liquid geyser from a 

blowdown stack that was not equipped with a flare. The release of flammables led to an explosion 

and fire. All of the fatalities occurred in or near office trailers located close to the blowdown 

 

26 CSB. 2000. Investigation Digest: Morton International Explosion, Paterson, NJ, April 8, 1998. 

http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/19/Morton_Digest.pdf.

27 CSB. March 2007. Investigation Report: VCM Explosion, Formosa Plastics Corp., Illiopolis, Illinois, 

April 23, 2004. Report No. 2004-10-I-IL. http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/19/Formosa_IL_Report.pdf

http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/19/Formosa_IL_Report.pdf.
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drum. A CSB investigation found that in the years prior to the incident, eight serious releases of 

flammable material from the ISOM blowdown stack had occurred, and most ISOM startups 

experienced high liquid levels in the splitter tower.28 The investigation identified root causes of 

the accident involving senior leadership failures including: 

 ineffective safety culture leadership and oversight; 

 ineffective evaluation of safety implications or organization, personnel, and policy 

changes; and 

 inadequate resources to prevent major accidents. 

Root causes identified involving plant management failures included:

 lack of an effective reporting and learning culture (incidents were often ineffectively 

investigated); 

 use of outdated plant policies and procedures; 

 poor design of the ISOM unit; 

 inadequate supervision of operators; 

 inadequate training of operators; 

 ineffective consideration of human factors regarding training, staffing, and work 

schedules for operators. 

The ineffective investigation of previous incidents resulted in a failure to identify, or act 

upon, lessons from incidents and near-misses. This includes a failure to incorporate relevant 

safety lessons from a British government investigation29 of incidents at BP’s Grangemouth, 

Scotland, refinery, which were relevant to the Texas City refinery. 

 

28

 CSB. March 2007. Investigation Report: Refinery Explosion and Fire, BP, Texas City, Texas, March 23, 

2005. Report No. 2005-04-I-TX. http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/19/CSBFinalReportBP.pdf .

29

 Health and Safety Executive (United Kingdom) and Scottish Environment Protection Agency. August 

18, 2003. Major Incident Investigation Report-BP Grangemouth Scotland, 29th June- 10th May, 2000. A 

Public Report Prepared on Behalf of the Competent Authority. 

http://www.hse.gov.uk/comah/bpgrange/images/bprgrangemouth.pdf.
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On August 23, 2010, the Millard Refrigerated Service warehouse in Theodore, Alabama,

had a release of approximately 32,000 pounds of anhydrous ammonia from a cracked pipe, when 

refrigeration equipment malfunctioned. The ammonia travelled directly over a shipyard in 

Mobile, Alabama, where more than 800 people were working, causing 152 people to be treated at 

hospitals, four of whom were admitted into intensive care units. An EPA investigation of the 

incident revealed that Millard failed to adequately address a well-known risk for ammonia 

production systems called hydraulic shock, which can cause catastrophic equipment failures.30

EPA also discovered that Millard had two prior smaller ammonia releases in April 2007 and 

January 2010 caused by hydraulic shock. Company investigations of those incidents failed to 

identify and correct this problem, which could have prevented the catastrophic release that 

occurred in August 2010. 

5. Current Use of Root Cause Analysis

Root cause analysis of accidents is an accepted safe management practice used by many 

industries. The American Chemistry Council (ACC) noted that root cause analysis is conducted 

routinely under a number of voluntary programs, including Responsible Care.31 The Texas 

Pipeline Association (TPA) stated that a requirement to perform a root cause analysis was not 

needed because it is a common industry practice.32 However, the Compressed Gas Association 

(CGA) stated that they supported modifying current regulations to include a requirement that root 

cause analyses be conducted for incidents but not for near misses or process upsets because 

defining a “near miss” or “process upset” is extremely difficult and will likely vary by industry, 

 

30 EPA. May 29, 2015. USA vs. Millard Refrigerated Services, LLC, US District Court for the Southern 

District of Alabama, Civil Action No. 15-186. pp. 9-11, and 19-20. Case 1:15-cv-00186-WS-M Document 

5. http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-06/documents/millard-cp.pdf.

See also http://www2.epa.gov/enforcement/millard-refrigerated-services-llc-clean-air-act-caa-settlement.

31 ACC. October 29, 2014. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0694 on Risk Management Program 

RFI, p. 43 of 189.

32

 TPA. October 29, 2014. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0617 on Risk Management Program 

RFI, p. 8.
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process, locations and the like.

33 EPA addresses the difficulty of defining the term “near miss”, in 

Section IV.A.7. Near Misses. 

ACC also notes that there are a number of recognized industry resources to aid incident 

investigations of root causes. For example, CCPS offers several resources, including the 

“Guidelines for Investigating Chemical Process Incidents,” 2nd edition, which provides valuable, 

practical reference tools, and focuses on process-related incidents with real or potential 

catastrophic consequences.34 ACC further notes that there are a number of companies that provide 

excellent root cause failure analysis training.

California’s Contra Costa County Health Services (CCHS) and the city of Richmond, 

California, each have incident investigation regulations in their Industrial Safety Ordinances 

(ISO) similar to those in §68.81 and, in addition, require a root cause analysis for each major 

chemical accident.35,36

New Jersey’s Toxic Catastrophe Prevention Act (TCPA) requires investigation of all 

extraordinarily hazardous substance accidents or potential catastrophic events. The TCPA 

requirements have the same incident investigation requirements found in §68.81, but the TCPA 

investigation report requires additional information beyond the requirements in §68.81. 37 The 

TCPA investigation report must include:

 Time and location of the chemical accident or potential catastrophic event;

 

33 CGA. October 29, 2014. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0633 on Risk Management Program 

RFI, p. 6

34

 CCPS 2003. Center for Chemical Process Safety, Guidelines for Investigating Chemical Process 

Incidents, 2nd Edition, NY: AIChE.

35

 Contra Costa County Board of Supervisors. 2006. California’s Contra Costa County ISO, pp. 5, 12-13, 

17-19. http://cchealth.org/hazmat/pdf/iso/2006_iso_official_code_complete.pdf.

36

 A major chemical accident is defined in the ISO as one meeting a level 2 or 3 incident classification as 

determined by the county or one resulting in: one or more fatalities; at least three persons hospitalized for at 

24 hours; on- and/or offsite property damage (including clean-up and restoration activities) initially 

estimated at $500,000 or more; or a vapor cloud of flammables and/or combustibles that is more than 5,000 

pounds.

37

 New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) TCPA. March 29, 2012. NJDEP. Title 7, 

Chapter 31 TCPA Program Consolidated Rule Document, p. 62. 

http://www.state.nj.us/dep/rpp/brp/tcpa/downloads/conrulerev9_fonts.pdf.
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 A description of the chemical accident or potential catastrophic event in 

chronological order, providing all the relevant facts;

 The identity, amount, and duration of the chemical release if these facts can be 

reasonably determined based on the information obtained through the investigation; 

 The consequences, if any, of the chemical accident or potential catastrophic event, 

including the number of evacuees, injured, and fatalities, and the impact on the 

community;

 The factors that contributed to the chemical accident or potential catastrophic event 

that includes an identification of basic and contributory causes, either direct or 

indirect; and

 The names and position titles of the investigators. 

Once the incident scenario is understood and contributory causes identified, this 

information may be used to determine the incident’s root causes which are the underlying 

systemic reasons related to a failure in a management system. 

EPA believes that providing the following information is vital for understanding the 

nature of the incident and should be included in the incident investigation report:

 the chronological order of details of the incidents, 

 the chemical identity, 

 amount and duration of the release, 

 the impacts of the release, and 

 basic and contributory causes, either direct or indirect. 

Some facility owners or operators may already include this information in incident investigation 

reports prepared to comply with the RMP rule; however, EPA is proposing that §§68.60 and 

68.81 be revised to require this information to ensure clarity and consistency among reports. 
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To better address causes of incidents and further reduce the occurrence of catastrophic 

releases, EPA is proposing to require that for all Program 2 and 3 process incidents that resulted 

in, or could reasonably have resulted in, a catastrophic release, the owner or operator determine 

and identify the factors that contributed to the incident, including immediate and contributory 

causes, either direct or indirect, and root causes. EPA is proposing to define “root cause” in §68.3 

to mean a fundamental, underlying, system-related reason why an incident occurred that identifies 

a correctable failure(s) in management systems.

Root causes shall be determined by conducting a root cause analysis for each incident 

using a recognized method or approach. CCPS’ “Guidelines for Investigating Chemical Process 

Incidents” discusses incident investigation approaches and techniques and root cause analysis 

methods.38 OSHA plans to develop a fact sheet on existing resources that explain how to conduct 

root cause analyses so the regulated community can better understand the causes of incidents and 

can increase its capability to effectively prevent future occurrences.39

In order that lessons learned from incident investigations be applied, EPA is proposing to 

modify the hazard review requirement in §68.50(a)(2) and the PHA requirement in §68.67(c)(2) 

to require the owner or operator to address findings from all incident investigations required 

under §§68.60 and 68.81, respectively. EPA is also proposing to require that for incident 

investigations conducted by Program 2 sources, an incident investigation team be established and 

consist of at least one person knowledgeable in the process involved and other persons with 

appropriate knowledge and experience to thoroughly investigate and analyze the incident. This 

requirement is already part of Program 3 incident investigation requirements, and is a necessary 

component for investigations that would include analysis of root causes. 

 

38 CCPS. March 2003. Guidelines for Investigating Chemical Process Incidents, 2nd ed.

39

 Chemical Facility Safety and Security Working Group. May 2014. EO 13650 Report to the President –

Actions to Improve Chemical Facility Safety and Security – A Shared Commitment, p. 47. 

https://www.osha.gov/chemicalexecutiveorder/final_chemical_eo_status_report.pdf.
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EPA seeks comment on the proposed amendments of the incident investigation 

requirements to require root cause investigations for each incident which resulted in, or could 

reasonably have resulted in, a catastrophic release and on the proposed definition for root cause. 

EPA seeks comment on whether a root cause analysis is appropriate for every RMP reportable 

accident and near miss. Should EPA eliminate the root cause analysis, or revise to limit or 

increase the scope or applicability of the root cause analysis requirement? If so, how should EPA 

revise the scope or applicability of this proposed requirement? EPA also seeks comment on 

proposed amendments to require consideration of incident investigation findings, in the hazard

review (§68.50) and PHA (§68.67) requirements. Finally, EPA seeks comment on the proposed 

additional requirement in §68.60 to require personnel with appropriate knowledge of the facility 

process and knowledge and experience in incident investigation techniques to participate on an 

incident investigation team. 

6. Decommissioned Processes

EPA has encountered some cases where a facility chose not to conduct an incident 

investigation because the owner or operator elected to decommission the process involved, or 

because the process was destroyed in the incident. While an investigation would have no impact 

on a decommissioned or destroyed process, other similar processes or operations at the facility, or 

at similar facilities, could potentially benefit from its findings. 

CCHS and two industry associations commented that there are lessons that can be learned 

from requiring investigations to be performed, even in cases where the owner or operator elects to 

decommission the process involved or where the process is destroyed in the incident.40, 41

Therefore, EPA is proposing to revise §§68.60 and 68.81 to clarify that incident investigations are 

required even if the process involving the regulated substance is destroyed or decommissioned 

 

40

 CCHS. October 28, 2014. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0546 on Risk Management 

Program RFI, p. 12. 

41

 Independent Petroleum Association of America (IPAA) AXPC. October 29, 2014. Comment No. EPAHQ-OEM-2014-0328-0584 on Risk Management Program RFI, p. 33.
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following or as the result of an incident. EPA is also proposing to revise §68.190, which 

addresses updates to the RMP, to require that prior to any de-registration of a process or 

stationary source that is no longer subject to the Risk Management Program rule, the owner or 

operator must report any accidents subject to the requirements of §68.42 and conduct incident 

investigations as required under §§68.60 and/or 68.81. EPA seeks comment on the proposed 

revisions to require an owner or operator to meet applicable reporting and incident investigation 

requirements prior to de-registering a process. 

7. Near Misses

The current incident investigation provisions require facilities with Program 2 and/or 3 

processes to investigate incidents that could reasonably have resulted in a catastrophic release. 

These types of incidents are sometimes characterized as “near misses” but there is confusion 

about what this term means. Several commenters on the Risk Management Program RFI, 

including the Society of Chemical Manufacturers and Affiliates (SOCMA),

42 American 

Petroleum Institute (API),

43 Gas Processors Association (GPA),44 National Oilseed Processors 

Association (NOPA), & Corn Refiners Association (CRA),

45 and American Fuel & Petrochemical 

Manufacturers (AFPM),

46 stated that they interpret the current requirements as including near 

 

42

 SOCMA. October 29, 2014. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0560 on Risk Management 

Program RFI, p. 9. 

43

 API. October 29, 2014. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0624 on Risk Management Program 

RFI, p. 32.

44

 GPA. October 29, 2014. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0626 on Risk Management Program

RFI, p. 12.

45

 NOPA & CRA. October 29, 2014. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0328 on Risk Management 

Program RFI, pp. 30-31. 

46

 AFPM. October 29, 2014. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0665 on Risk Management 

Program RFI, pp. 46-47. 
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misses. Other commenters (ACC,47 TPA,48 CGA,49 DPC Industries, Inc.,

50 and Allied Universal 

Corp [AUC]

51) urged EPA to not require investigations of near misses because the term is vague, 

inherently situation-specific and not reducible to a singular definition. CCPS defines a near miss 

as an event in which an accident causing injury, death, property damage, or environmental 

impact, could have plausibly resulted if circumstances had been slightly different.52

EPA itself may have contributed to the confusion over the meaning of the term “near 

miss.” In the 1993 proposed RMP rule (58 FR 54200, October 20 1993), EPA indicated that 

investigation of near misses could provide facilities with important information on problems that 

should be addressed before a significant accidental release occurs. EPA considered a near miss as 

a mishap that did not result in a release for some reason, such as employee actions or luck. 

However, in the primary interpretive guidance document for the RMP rule, “General Guidance on 

Risk Management Programs for Chemical Accident Prevention (40 CFR Part 68)” (RMP 

Guidance), originally published in 1999, EPA indicated that while the owner or operator “must 

investigate each incident which resulted in, or could have resulted in, a catastrophic release of a 

regulated substance,” the owner or operator was not required to investigate “minor accidents or 

near misses:” 

You should also consider investigating minor accidents or near misses because 

they may help you identify problems that could lead to more serious accidents; 

however, you are not required to do so under part 68.

53

 

47

 ACC. October 29, 2014. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0694 on Risk Management Program 

RFI, PDF pp. 44-45 of 189. 

48

 TPA. October 29, 2014. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0617 on Risk Management Program 

RFI, pp. 7-8. 

49

 CGA. October 29, 2014. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0633 on Risk Management Program 

RFI, p. 6.

50

 DPC Industries, Inc. October 29, 2014. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0649 on Risk 

Management Program RFI, p. 4. 

51

 AUC. October 29, 2014. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0646 on Risk Management Program 

RFI, p. 3. 

52

 CCPS. March 2003. Guidelines for Investigating Chemical Process Incidents, 2nd ed., p. 61.

53

 See General Guidance on Risk Management Programs for Chemical Accident Prevention (40 CFR part 

68), EPA-550-B-04-001, April 2004, page 6-26. http://www2.epa.gov/rmp/guidance-facilities-riskmanagement-programs-rmp#general
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Here, EPA intended to differentiate between incidents, which “could have resulted in a 

catastrophic release,” and “minor accidents and [minor] near misses,” which are unlikely to have 

led to a catastrophic release. 

EPA’s experiences with RMP facility inspections and incident investigations show there 

have been incidents that were not investigated, even though under slightly different 

circumstances, the incident could have resulted in a catastrophic release. While these events did 

not result in deaths, injuries, adverse health or environmental effects, or sheltering-in-place, if 

circumstances had been slightly different, a catastrophic release could have occurred. For 

example, a runaway reaction that is brought under control by operators is a near miss that may 

need to be investigated to determine why the problem occurred, even if it does not directly 

involve a covered process both because it may have led to a release from a nearby covered 

process or because it may indicate a safety management failure that applies to a covered process 

at the facility. Similarly, fires and explosions near or within a covered process, any unanticipated 

release of a regulated substance, and some process upsets could potentially lead to a catastrophic 

release. 

Facilities regulated under New Jersey’s TCPA program are required to investigate each 

regulated chemical (“extraordinarily hazardous substance”), involved in an accident or potential 

catastrophic event.54 The NJDEP notes that “potential catastrophic event” means an incident that 

could have reasonably resulted in a catastrophic release of a regulated chemical which includes 

incidents in which no regulated chemical was released or no regulated chemical was released 

beyond a permitted level, or in other words, a near miss. Facilities report accidents and potential 

catastrophic events annually to New Jersey. NJDEP notes that each year, less than fifty percent of 

the facilities reported that they had one or more incidents.55 Most of the incidents reported 

 

54

 NJDEP TCPA. March 29, 2012. NJ Title 7, Chapter 31 TCPA Program Consolidated Rule Document, p. 

2. http://www.state.nj.us/dep/rpp/brp/tcpa/downloads/conrulerev9_fonts.pdf.

55

 NJDEP. October 21, 2014. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0338 on Risk Management 

Program RFI, p. 16. 
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involved the release of a regulated chemical. The number of near misses reported averaged less 

than 1 per facility.

In its comments on the Risk Management Program RFI, GPA reasoned that requiring a 

root cause analysis for minor near misses would be burdensome and costly and would discourage 

employees and contractors from reporting near misses because of the burden of conducting a 

rigorous investigation.56 Similarly, some commenters, such as API thought that process upsets 

should not be included in incident investigation requirements because there is no standard 

definition; process upsets vary across a wide range from product quality/efficiency issues to ones 

that represent near-miss situations; and learning from process upset events that do potentially 

challenge process safety systems can be accomplished via other means. According to API, 

including all process upsets would overburden the root cause analysis/investigation resources 

within a facility.

57

CCPS’s “Process Safety Leading and Lagging Metrics – You Don’t Improve What You 

Don’t Measure” explains that a near miss has three essential elements.58 These include:

• an event occurs, or a potentially unsafe situation is discovered;

• the event or unsafe situation had reasonable potential to escalate, and

• the potential escalation would have led to adverse impacts. 

The CCPS document and the CCPS “Guidelines for Investigating Chemical Process Incidents”

contain many examples of near misses, which can be an actual event or discovery of a potentially 

unsafe situation. 59 Examples of incidents that should be investigated include some process upsets, 

such as: excursions of process parameters beyond pre-established critical control limits; 

 

56

 GPA. October 29, 2014. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0626 on Risk Management Program 

RFI, p. 14. 

57

 API. October 29, 2014. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0624 on Risk Management Program 

RFI, p. 32. 

58

 CCPS. January 2011. Process Safety Leading and Lagging Metrics – You Don’t Improve What You 

Don’t Measure, p. 36. CCPS, American Institute of Chemical Engineers, New York, NY. John Wiley and 

Sons. http://www.aiche.org/sites/default/files/docs/pages/CCPS_ProcessSafety_Lagging_2011_2-24.pdf.

59

 CCPS. March 2003. Guidelines for Investigating Chemical Process Incidents, 2nd ed., p. 68. 
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activation of layers of protection such as relief valves, interlocks, rupture discs, blowdown 

systems, halon systems, vapor release alarms, and fixed vapor spray systems; and activation of 

emergency shutdowns. 

Near misses should also include any incidents at nearby processes or equipment outside 

of a regulated process if the incident had the potential to cause a catastrophic release from a 

nearby regulated process. An example would be a transformer explosion that could have impacted 

nearby regulated process equipment causing it to lose containment of a regulated substance. 

Because it is difficult to prescribe the various types of incidents that may occur in RMPregulated sectors that should be considered near misses, and therefore be investigated, EPA is not 

proposing a regulatory definition. Instead, EPA will rely on facility owners or operators to decide 

which incidents to investigate, based on the seriousness of the incident, the process(es) involved, 

and the specific conditions and circumstances involved. In the 1996 Response to Comments on 

the Final Rule, EPA acknowledged that 

the range of incidents that reasonably could have resulted in a catastrophic release 

is very broad and cannot be specifically defined. 60 EPA decided to leave it up to 

the discretion of the owner or operator to determine whether an incident could 

reasonably have resulted in a catastrophic release and to investigate such incidents.

The intent is not to include every minor incident or leak, but focus on serious incidents that could 

have resulted in a catastrophic release, although EPA acknowledges this will require subjective 

judgment.

Finally, EPA expects that lessons learned from near miss incident investigations be 

considered when conducting a hazard review or PHA. Therefore, the proposed amendments to 

§§68.50(a)(2) and 68.67(c)(2) would require the hazard review and the PHA to include findings 

from all incident investigations required under §§68.60 and 68.81. This includes incidents that 

could reasonably have resulted in a catastrophic release (i.e., a near miss). 

 

60

 EPA. May 24, 1996. Risk Management Plan Rule, Summary and Response to Comments. Volume 1, p. 

16-4. Docket No. A-91-73, Document No. IX-C-1.
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EPA seeks comment on the guidance and examples provided of a near miss. Is further 

clarification needed in this instance? Should EPA consider limiting root cause analyses only for 

incidents that resulted in a catastrophic release?.

8. Investigation Timeframe 

EPA believes incident investigations will result in improved process safety through the 

dissemination of lessons learned and the implementation of recommended corrective actions. 

Conducting these investigations as soon as possible after an incident may yield better quality data 

and information, although it may take time to collect, validate, and integrate data from a range of 

sources. EPA has discovered situations where owners or operators of regulated facilities 

indefinitely delayed completing incident investigations. Therefore, in the Risk Management 

Program RFI, EPA considered whether incident investigations should be required to be 

completed within a certain amount of time. In their comments on the RFI, Mary Kay O’Connor 

Process Safety Center (MKOPSC)

61 stated that the timeframe requirement for an incident 

investigation to be completed should be based on the following factors: the consequence, the 

complexity of the incident, the process, the substance, and the investigation team’s experience, 

knowledge and members. ACC62 and API63 noted that the time to complete an investigation is 

highly dependent on the complexity of the accident and the process and can require assistance 

from outside process experts that may not immediately be available. CCHS commented that a 

specific timeframe for incident investigations to be completed would benefit overall safety and 

noted that most incidents can be investigated within six months.64 However, CCHS stated that it 

 

61

 MKOPSC. October 29, 2014. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0543 on Risk Management 

Program RFI, p. 144.

62

 ACC. October 29, 2014. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0694 on Risk Management Program 

RFI, p. 44.

63

 API. October 29, 2014. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0624 on Risk Management Program 

RFI, p. 32.

64

 CCHS. October 28, 2014. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0546 on Risk Management 

Program RFI, p. 12. 
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may be appropriate that a specific time be required that could be changed by documented 

justification. As to timeframes, some of the refineries in Contra Costa County, California, have 

corporate requirements to complete all investigations within 30 to 60 days. Exceptions can be 

granted for large events. CCHS noted that there are challenges and limitations to completing an 

incident investigation within a specified timeframe. Other RFI commenters, such as TPA,65

GPA,66 and JR Simplot,67 noted that having a specific timeline to complete an investigation could 

cause facilities to focus more on complying with a deadline at the expense of using the 

appropriate level of rigor and getting the right answer. EPA’s own experience with accident 

investigation has shown that a major accident investigation can take up to a year or more. Taking 

into consideration the need for completion of an investigation while allowing the proper time to 

determine the correct root causes, EPA is proposing to require that facility owners or operators 

complete an incident investigation report within 12 months of an incident that resulted in, or 

could reasonably have resulted in, a catastrophic release. For very complex incident 

investigations that cannot be completed within 12 months, EPA is allowing an extension of time 

if the implementing agency approves, in writing. EPA believes that 12 months is long enough to 

complete most complex accident investigations but will allow facilities more time if they consult 

with their implementing agency and receive approval for an extension of time. 

EPA notes that the Agency’s own requirements under the Petroleum Refinery maximum 

achievable control technology (MACT) and New Source Performance Standards (NSPS)

regulations already require root cause and corrective action analyses for certain release events

(see 40 CFR parts 63.648(j)(6) and (j)(7)), and 60.103a(d)) with a more stringent timeframe (i.e., 

45 days) for completing these analyses than the 12 months specified in this proposed rule. RMP-

 

65

 TPA. October 29, 2014. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0617 on Risk Management Program 

RFI, p. 9.

66

 GPA. October 29, 2014. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0626 on Risk Management Program 

RFI, p. 13. 

67

 JR Simplot. October 29, 2014. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0667 on Risk Management 

Program RFI, p. 31.
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regulated facilities that are also required to meet the MACT and NSPS root cause analysis

requirements must continue to meet the timeframes specified under those rules as applicable. 

However, root cause analyses conducted to meet those requirements may also be used to comply 

with the root cause analysis requirements proposed herein, provided the analysis meets the 

requirements of §68.60 or §68.81, as applicable.

EPA seeks comment on the appropriateness of establishing a specific timeframe for 

incident investigations to be completed and what that timeframe should be. As an alternative, 

EPA considered whether the incident investigation should be completed prior to restart of the 

affected process, if the incident resulted in a process shutdown, to ensure that the causes of an 

incident have been addressed. EPA seeks comment on whether to add this condition to the 

incident investigation requirements or whether there are other options to ensure that unsafe 

conditions that led to the incident are addressed before a process is re-started. EPA also seeks 

comment on whether the different root cause analysis timeframes specified under the MACT and

NSPS and proposed herein will cause any difficulties for sources covered under both rules, and if 

so, what approach EPA should take to resolve this issue.

9. Accident History Reporting

Thorough investigations and reporting may help facilities identify and address root 

causes. Accident history reporting provides an avenue to disseminate lessons learned. Local 

communities are interested in whether facilities are investigating incidents and taking steps to 

prevent future accidents. EPA believes it is important to determine and report results of root cause 

analysis for accidents with reportable impacts in the RMP accident history. Therefore, EPA has 

proposed that information on root causes analyzed as part of an incident investigation be included 

in the RMP accident history in §68.42. Because there can be numerous potential incident root 

causes identified for a single incident, and in order to simplify reporting for the RMP accident 

history, EPA believes that the root cause information should be reported as root cause categories. 
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Various methods for identifying root causes have been published. Some methods involve 

the use of root cause trees which show root cause categories for different PSM systems, where 

each category can be associated with many specific root cause deficiencies.68, 69 One root cause 

system uses the following list of root cause categories: Procedures; Training; Communications; 

Administrative/Management System; Personal Performance; Human Factors Engineering; 

Immediate Supervision; Equipment Design; Equipment/Records; Equipment 

Reliability/Maintenance; and Equipment Installation/Fabrication. Another uses a slightly different 

list: Procedures, Training, Quality Control, Communications, Management System, Human 

Engineering and Immediate Supervision. EPA will modify its on-line reporting system for RMPs 

(RMP*eSubmit) to incorporate an appropriate list of root cause categories for RMP facility 

incident investigations of RMP reportable accidents based on these categories. 

Because EPA is proposing that the incident investigation be required to be completed 

within 12 months, root causes may not be known until 12 months after an accidental release. 

Section 68.195(a) currently requires that the accident history information in §68.42 be submitted 

within six months of the release. Because EPA is proposing to add accident root cause categories 

to §68.42, EPA is also proposing in §68.195(a)(2) that the root cause categories be submitted in 

the RMP within 12 months of the release. 

EPA seeks comment on the appropriateness of requiring root cause reporting as part of 

the accident history requirements of §68.42, as well as the categories that should be considered 

and the timeframe within which the root cause information must be submitted.

10. Proposed Revisions to Regulatory Text

a. Definitions (§68.3)

 

68 Paradies, Mark, Unger, Linda and Busch, David. 1996. TapRooT® Root Cause TreeTM & User’s 

Manual, Rev. 4. Systems Improvements, Inc., Knoxville, TN. 

69 ABS Group Inc. 1999. Root Cause MapTM and Root Cause Analysis Handbook, A Guide to Effective 

Incident Investigation. ABS Group, Inc., Risk & Reliability Division, Knoxville, TN.
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EPA is proposing to add a definition of “root cause” and modify the definition of 

“catastrophic release” in §68.3. 

b. Five-year accident history (§68.42)

EPA is proposing to amend paragraph (b) by adding a new subparagraph (b)(10) to 

require of incident investigation root cause categories to be reported. Current subparagraphs 

(b)(10) and (b)(11) will become subparagraphs (b)(11) and (b)(12), respectively. 

c. Hazard review (§68.50)

EPA is proposing to amend subparagraph (a)(2) by adding a phrase at the end to require 

the owner or operator to consider findings from incident investigations. This is similar to the 

revision proposed for Program 3 facilities in §68.67(c)(2).

d. Incident investigation (§§68.60 and 68.81)

EPA is proposing to revise §68.60, which is applicable to Program 2 processes, and 

§68.81, which is applicable to Program 3 processes, by revising paragraph (a) to add 

subparagraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) to better clarify the scope of incidents that must be investigated. 

Subparagraph (a)(1) applies to an incident that resulted in a catastrophic release and clarifies that 

the owner or operator must investigate the incident even if the process involving the regulated 

substance is destroyed or decommissioned. Subparagraph (a)(2) applies to a near-miss, which is 

an incident that could reasonably have resulted in a catastrophic release. EPA is also removing 

the phrase “of a regulated substance” from paragraph (a) because it is duplicative. The definition 

of catastrophic release refers to releases of regulated substances.

EPA is also proposing to add a new paragraph (c) to §68.60 requiring that an incident 

investigation team be established and consist of at least one person knowledgeable in the process 

involved and other persons with appropriate knowledge and experience to thoroughly investigate 

and analyze the incident. This is similar to the requirement in §68.81(c) for Program 3 processes. 

Current paragraphs (c) through (f) would become paragraph (d) through (g). 
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EPA is also proposing to make changes to the new paragraph (d) in §68.60 and current 

paragraph (d) in §68.81 to revise the incident investigation report requirements. EPA is proposing 

to change the word “summary” to “report” and require facility owners or operators to complete 

incident investigation reports within 12 months unless the implementing agency approves, in 

writing, an extension of time.

Furthermore, EPA is proposing to amend and add new subparagraphs in the new 

paragraph (d) in §68.60 and current paragraph (d) in §68.81 requiring additional elements in an 

incident investigation report. EPA is proposing to:

 Revise paragraph (d)(1) to require the time and location of the incident in the 

investigation report;

 Revise paragraph (d)(3) to specify that the description of the incident be in 

chronological order and provide all relevant facts;

 Add new paragraph (d)(4) to require that the investigation report include the name 

and amount of the regulated substance involved in the release or near miss and the 

duration of the event; 

 Add paragraph (d)(5) to require a description of the consequences, if any, of the 

incident; 

 Add paragraph (d)(6) to require a description of emergency response actions taken;

 Renumber current paragraph (d)(4) to (d)(7) and require additional criteria related to 

the factors contributing to the incident, including the initiating event, direct and 

indirect contributing factors, and root causes. Add language to new paragraph (d)(7) 

to require that root causes must be determined through the use of a recognized 

method. 
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 Renumber the current paragraph (d)(5) to (d)(8) and add language to require a 

schedule for addressing recommendations resulting from the investigation to be 

included in the investigation report. 

Finally, EPA is proposing to amend the current paragraph (f) which would be the new 

paragraph (g) to add the word incident before investigation and change “summaries” to “reports” 

for consistency.

e. Process hazard analysis (PHA) (§68.67)

EPA is proposing to add subparagraph (c)(2) to require the owner or operator to address

findings from incident investigations, as well as any other potential failure scenarios (e.g., 

incidents that occurred at other similar facilities and or processes, failure mechanisms discovered 

in literature or from other sources of information). This is similar to the revision for Program 2 

facilities in §68.50(a)(2). 

f. Updates (§68.190) 

EPA is proposing to amend paragraph (c) to require that the owner or operator report any 

accidents covered by §68.42 and conduct incident investigations required under §§68.60 and/or 

68.81 prior to de-registering a process or stationary source that is no longer subject to the RMP 

rule.

11. Alternative Options

EPA considered limiting these requirements to the original universe of Program 3 

processes that existed before OSHA changed its PSM retail exemption. Accidents occur at a 

higher frequency in these processes as compared to processes covered in Program 2. However, 

with the shift of many Program 2 processes into Program 3 due to OSHA’s revised policy on the 

PSM retail facility exemption, most of the accidents at remaining Program 2 processes occur at 

publicly owned water and wastewater treatment facilities that are not in Program 3 because they 

are not subject to OSHA PSM. State and local government employees at facilities in states under 
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Federal OSHA authority are not covered by the OSHA PSM standard as opposed to state and 

local government employees at facilities covered by OSHA delegated State Plans. These 

processes pose the same risk as the publicly owned water/wastewater treatment processes that are 

in Program 3. EPA decided that there was little justification for limiting the proposed 

requirements to the changed universe of Program 3 processes after the OSHA retail exemption 

change; there are fewer than six RMP reportable accidents a year at remaining Program 2 

processes. Although the alternative would be slightly less burdensome on the regulated 

community, it would also likely prevent fewer accidents than the proposed approach. EPA seeks 

comment on the alternative approach and whether there are any other alternative options that EPA 

should consider prior to issuing a final action.

B. Third-Party Compliance Audits

In addition to strengthening the incident investigation requirements, EPA is proposing to 

strengthen the RMP rule’s compliance audit provisions to require independent third-party 

compliance audits after an accident or findings of significant non-compliance by an implementing 

agency for stationary sources with Program 2 and/or Program 3 processes. Incident investigations 

often reveal that these facilities have deficiencies in some prevention program requirements 

related to that process. Compliance audits entail a systematic evaluation of the full prevention 

program for all covered processes. As described below, in some cases, self-auditing may be 

insufficient to prevent accidents, determine compliance with the RMP rule’s prevention program 

requirements, and ensure safe operation. Stationary sources that have had accidents and/or 

substantial non-compliance with Risk Management Program requirements pose a greater risk to 

the surrounding communities. EPA therefore believes it is appropriate to require such stationary 

sources to undergo objective auditing by competent and independent third-party auditors. Such 

independent third-party auditing can assist the owners and operators, EPA (or the implementing 

agency), and the public to better determine whether the procedures and practices developed by 
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the owner and/or operator under Subparts C and/or D of the RMP rule (i.e., the prevention 

program requirements) are adequate and being followed.

EPA and the CSB have cited poor compliance audits as a contributing factor to the 

severity of past chemical accidents. The CSB identified a lack of rigorous compliance audits as a 

contributing factor behind the March 23, 2005 explosion and fire at the BP Texas City Refinery 

in Texas City, Texas. 70 This explosion and fire killed 15 people, injured another 180, led to a 

shelter-in-place order that required 43,000 people to remain indoors, and damaged houses as far 

away as three-quarters of a mile from the refinery. 

A CSB investigation of the July 2009 fire and explosion at the Citgo Corpus Christi 

Refinery found that Citgo had never conducted a safety audit of hydrofluoric acid (HF) alkylation 

operations at either of its U.S. refineries equipped with HF alkylation units pursuant to 

recommendations in API Recommended Practice 751, Safe Operation of HF Alkylation Units.71

The CSB recommended that within 60 days, Citgo complete a third-party audit of all Citgo HF 

alkylation unit operations in the United States (Corpus Christi, Texas and Lemont, Illinois) in 

accordance with API Recommended Practice 751. The CSB also specified qualifications for the 

selected lead auditor including extensive knowledge of HF hazards, HF alkylation units, and API 

751.

The CSB found that facility PSM audits failed to detect PSI and operating procedure 

deficiencies that contributed to the November 2003 chlorine release at DPC Enterprises, L.P. in 

Glendale, Arizona.72 The CSB recommended that DPC use a qualified, independent auditor to 

 

70 CSB. March 2007. Investigation Report: Refinery Explosion and Fire, BP, Texas City, Texas, March 23, 

2005. Report No. 2005-04-I-TX. http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/19/CSBFinalReportBP.pdf

71 CSB. December 9, 2009. Urgent Recommendations to Citgo. http://www.csb.gov/csb-issues-urgentrecommendations-to-citgo-finds-inadequate-hydrogen-fluoride-water-mitigation-system-during-corpuschristi-refinery-fire-last-july/

72

 CSB. February 2007. Investigation Report: Chlorine Release, DPC Enterprises, L.P., Glendale, Arizona, 

November 17, 2003. Report No. 2004-02-I-AZ. http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/19/DPC_Report.pdf
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evaluate DPC’s PSM and Risk Management Programs against best practices and implement audit 

recommendations in a timely manner at all DPC chlorine repackaging sites.

The CSB also found numerous auditing deficiencies following the January 2008 

explosion at Bayer CropScience, LP, in Institute, West Virginia.73 The CSB recommended that 

Bayer commission an independent human factors and ergonomics study of all Institute site PSM

and Risk Management Program covered process control rooms to evaluate the human-control 

system interface, operator fatigue, and control system familiarity and training.

EPA has required third-party audits in enforcement settlement agreements. For example, 

EPA found multiple occasions of noncompliance with the Risk Management Program 

requirements at Tyson Foods, Inc. facilities through a series of inspections and information 

requests. Dating back to October 2006, violations included failures to follow the general industry 

standards to test or replace safety relief valves, improperly co-located gas-fired boilers and 

ammonia machinery, as well as failures to abide by the RMP rule’s prevention program and 

reporting requirements. As part of a 2014 consent decree, Tyson Foods, Inc. agreed, in addition to 

paying a penalty of $3.95 million, to conduct pipe-testing and third-party audits of its ammonia 

refrigeration systems to improve compliance with Risk Management Program requirements at all 

23 of the company’s facilities in four Midwestern states.74

In March 2015, EPA Region 1 issued an administrative order on consent to Mann 

Distribution LLC and 3134 Post Road LLC (Respondents) regarding Resource Conservation and 

Recovery Act (RCRA) and CAA 112(r)(1) (the “general duty clause”) violations found during an 

April 4, 2013 inspection at a chemical distribution facility in Warwick, Rhode Island.75 Like the 

 

73

 CSB. January 2011. Investigation Report: Pesticide Chemical Runaway Reaction Pressure Vessel 

Explosion, Bayer CropScience LP, Institute, West Virginia, August 28, 2008. Report No. 2008-08-I-WV.

http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/19/Bayer_Report_Final.pdf

74

 Consent Decree, United States v. Tyson Foods, Inc., et al., E.D. Miss., April 4, 2013.

http://www2.epa.gov/enforcement/tyson-foods-inc

75 Finding of Violation and Administrative Order on Consent, In the Matter of Mann Distribution LLC and 

3134 Post LLC, Docket Nos. RCRA-01-2015-0028 and CAA-01-2015-0029, March 17, 2015.
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Risk Management Program requirements, Section 112(r)(1) of the CAA addresses safe operation 

and prevention of accidental releases. Unsafe conditions found during the inspection included, 

among other things, failure to have a fire suppression system, failure to inspect a fire alarm, colocation of incompatible chemicals, and many RCRA generator violations. The facility also had a 

prior history of non-compliance. The order requires Respondents to implement an independent 

third-party inspection program, in addition to imposing other compliance requirements. 

The proposed independent third-party compliance audit requirements include a definition 

of “third-party audit” in §68.3; modifications to existing §§68.58 and 68.79 to specify when a 

third-party audit must be performed; and the requirements for third-party auditors and third-party 

audits in new §§68.59 and 68.80. EPA is proposing to require third-party compliance audits to be 

conducted at stationary sources following an accident meeting the five-year accident history 

criteria in §68.42(a). EPA is also proposing a provision to allow an implementing agency to 

require a third-party audit be performed at a facility under certain circumstances that suggest a 

heightened risk for an accident. These circumstances are: non-compliance with the Prevention 

Program requirements of Subpart C (Program 2) or D (Program 3), including non-compliance 

with the competency, independence, or impartiality criteria of §68.59(b) or §68.80(b) regarding a 

previous third-party audit. All other stationary sources with Program 2 and Program 3 processes 

will continue to follow the current compliance audit requirements of §§68.58 and 68.79. 

Sections 68.58 and 68.79 of the RMP regulation (Program 2 and Program 3 Compliance 

Audits) require owners or operators of stationary sources with processes subject to Program 2 or 

Program 3 requirements to audit compliance with the provisions of Subpart C (Program 2 

Prevention Program requirements) or Subpart D (Program 3 Prevention Program requirements) at 

least every three years. The purpose of the compliance audits is to verify that the procedures and 

practices developed under Subparts C and D of the RMP rule are adequate and being followed. 

These compliance audit provisions are similar to language to that is found in 29 CFR 1910.119(o) 
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of the OSHA PSM standard. Sections 68.58 and 68.79 of the RMP regulation and 1910.119(o) of 

the OSHA PSM standard require that the compliance audit be conducted by at least one person 

knowledgeable in the process, that audit findings be addressed promptly, and that a report be 

generated documenting the findings of the audit. 

Currently, neither EPA nor OSHA requires employers to use independent third-parties in 

conducting compliance audits. However, third-party compliance auditors exist, both the RMP rule 

and the PSM standard permit their use, and they are utilized by some of the Risk Management 

Program and PSM regulated community, both voluntarily, and pursuant to enforcement 

settlement agreements. 

EPA discussed the potential to use independent third-party auditors for Risk Management 

Program compliance audits, in the preamble of the 1996 final RMP rule, as an issue for further 

consideration.76 The preamble endorsed the concept of using third parties, citing the following 

reasons: to assist in rule compliance and oversight, provided that any third-party proposal not 

weaken the compliance responsibilities of facility owners or operators; offer cost savings and 

benefits to the industry, community, and implementing agencies that significantly exceed the cost 

of implementing the approach; lead to a net increase in process safety, particularly for smaller, 

less technically sophisticated facilities; and promote cost-effective Agency prioritization of 

oversight resources. At the time, EPA did not require the use of third-party auditors because the 

Agency believed that several key issues, including qualification criteria, certification procedures, 

liability, and others, needed to be investigated. Based on EPA’s research of other third-party audit 

programs as well as the Agency’s own experience with third-party auditors in the context of 

enforcement settlements, the Agency is proposing third-party audit requirements for the rule’s 

accident prevention program.

 

76

 Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs Under CAA Section 

112(r)(7), 61 FR 31705, June 20, 1996. http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-1996-06-20/pdf/96-14597.pdf
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Third-party audits are required by other Federal programs in appropriate existing rules,

and rules currently in development, to ensure safe operations. The Administrative Conference of 

the United States (ACUS) “Third-Party Programs Final Report” (October 22, 2012) describes a 

variety of third-party programs in Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Consumer Product 

Safety Commission, and Federal Communications Commission regulations.

77 Further examples 

follow. The Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) promulgated revisions to 

their Safety and Environmental Management Systems (SEMS II) requirements (78 FR 20423,

April 5, 2013) to help ensure the safe operations of offshore oil and natural gas drilling and 

production facilities. BSEE’s SEMS standard, 30 CFR 250, Subpart S, requires audits conducted 

by an independent third-party, subject to approval by BSEE, or by designated and qualified 

personnel if the employer implements procedures to avoid conflicts of interest. BSEE’s SEMS II 

revisions to the standard require that, by June 4, 2015, the team lead for compliance audits must 

be independent and represent an accredited audit service provider. In the preamble to its SEMS II 

final rule, BSEE discussed its third-party-auditing requirements as follows: 

Consistent audits performed by well trained and experienced auditors are critical 

to ensuring that SEMS programs are successfully implemented and maintained on 

the [Outer Continental Shelf] OCS. As a result, we are adopting industry best 

practices related to SEMS audits and auditor qualifications. Industry is already 

voluntarily adopting these practices in many deepwater operations. We believe that 

the application of these requirements to all OCS operations will result in more 

robust and consistent SEMS audits. (78 FR 20430, April 5, 2013.)

Independent third-party audits or other forms of compliance verification are also required 

by a variety of EPA rules to promote compliance with regulatory standards. One eample of an 

EPA regulatory program with built-in third-party verification is the EPA CAA wood stoves 

rule.

78 Additionally, EPA is developing a rule for a third-party certification framework for the 

 

77

 McCallister, Lesley. October 22, 2012. Third-Party Programs Final Report (2012).

http://www.acus.gov/report/third-party-programs-final-report.

78

 Standards of Performance for New Residential Wood Heaters, New Residential Hydronic Heaters and 

Forced-Air Furnaces, 80 FR 13671, March 16, 2015. http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-03-

16/pdf/2015-03733.pdf
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formaldehyde standards for composite wood products in accordance with the Formaldehyde 

Standards for Composite Wood Products Act in which Congress mandated that EPA promulgate 

rules that include a third-party testing and certification program.

79

Third-party verification and certification approaches are also employed in a variety of 

state regulatory settings. Examples include the CAA Title II vehicle inspection, maintenance, and 

emissions programs in authorized states,80 California’s mandatory greenhouse gas (GHG) 

reporting program,81 and Massachusetts Underground Storage Tank (UST) third-party inspection 

program.82

There are advantages to third-party auditing, particularly with strong auditor competence 

and independence criteria. According to the CCPS, ‘‘Third-party auditors (typically, consulting 

companies who can provide experienced auditors) potentially provide the highest degree of 

objectivity.’’83 ACUS, in its “Recommendation on Agency Use of Third-Party Programs to 

Assess Regulatory Compliance” (December 6, 2012) (Recommendation), found that, when welldesigned and implemented per the Recommendation, “[s]everal broad reasons support the 

growing use of third-party programs in Federal regulation.” Specifically, ACUS found that 

 

79

 Formaldehyde; Third-Party Certification Framework for the Formaldehyde Standards for Composite 

Wood Products, 78 FR 34796, June 10, 2013. http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-06-10/pdf/2013-

13254.pdf. See also the Formaldehyde Standards for Composite Wood Products Act 

https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-111s1660enr/pdf/BILLS-111s1660enr.pdf. 

80

 See, e.g., Missouri Dept. of Nat. Resources and Missouri State Highway Patrol, First Annual Oversight 

Report of the Decentralized Gateway Vehicle Inspection Program (2008). 

http://www.dnr.mo.gov/gatewayvip/docs/enforcementrpt.pdf.

81 Cal. Code of Regs. Accreditation Requirements for Verification Bodies, Lead Verifiers, and Verifiers of

Emissions Data Reports and Offset Project Data Reports. tit. 17 §95132(b)(4) (2010); see also Cal. Code of 

Regs. tit. 17 §95132(b)(1)(describing the firm requirement of having a lead verifier); Cal. Code of Regs. tit. 

17 §95132(b)(2) (2010)(describing the lead verifier requirements) and Cal. Code of Regs. tit. 17 

§95132(b)(1).

https://govt.westlaw.com/calregs/Document/I047B3A909A3011E4A28EDDF568E2F8A2?viewType=Full

Text&originationContext=documenttoc&transitionType=CategoryPageItem&contextData=%28sc.Default

%29

82

 MassDEP. 2015. UST Inspection Program. http://www.mass.gov/eea/agencies/massdep/toxics/ust/thirdparty-ust-inspection-program.html.

83

 CCPS. March 2007. Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety. 

http://www.aiche.org/ccps/resources/publications/books/guidelines-risk-based-process-safety.
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... Federal regulatory agencies are faced with assuring the compliance of an increasing 

number of entities and products without a corresponding growth in agency resources. 

Third-party programs may leverage private resources and expertise in ways that make 

regulation more effective and less costly. In comparison with other regulatory 

approaches, third-party programs may also enable more frequent compliance assessment 

and more complete and reliable compliance data.

A leading scholar on regulatory third-party programs likewise found that, when well-designed 

and implemented, “third-party verification could furnish more and better data about regulatory 

compliance” while providing additional compliance and resource savings benefits.84

An “independent third-party” is a private auditor, inspector, or other type of verifier 

external to the facility. “Independent third-party” excludes the regulated entity, which is the first 

party (e.g., the stationary source and its parent company and subsidiaries), second parties within 

the firm’s industry or business community with whom the regulated entity has a supply-chain 

relationship, and third parties that are not independent of the first party, which may include 

contractors, consultants, or purchasers of the facility’s goods or services.85 An independent thirdparty program should not be confused with a second party program in which a regulated source 

employs a contractor or consultant, even when the contractor is a separate legal entity from the 

regulated facility and highly qualified. If a regulated source provides direct or indirect control 

over the contractor or consultant preparing the audit report, including controlling the report’s 

scope or findings, or has other non-audit relationships with the auditor, then the auditor is not a 

true independent third-party. This is important because when developing a third-party audit 

program, auditor independence can be critical to the success of the program. 

Third-party compliance audit programs should also establish criteria and standards for 

auditor independence. As documented in the ACUS Recommendation on Agency Use of Third-

 

84

 Lesley K. McAllister. Jan. 2012. Regulation by Third-Party Verification. 53 B.C.L REV. 1, 21-26. 

http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol53/iss1/1/

85

 Lesley K. McAllister. Jan. 2012. Regulation by Third-Party Verification. 53 B.C. L. REV. 1, 22-23 at p. 

37. 
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Party Programs to Assess Regulatory Compliance (December 6, 2012),

86 the ACUS Third-Party 

Programs Final Report (October 22, 2012), and the McAllister law review article, auditor 

independence is critical to ensuring accurate and reliable independent third-party auditing.87

The literature on designing independent third-party programs includes peer-reviewed 

empirical studies emphasizing the importance of establishing criteria and features for auditor 

independence to promote accurate audit reports, including those summarized briefly below. 

While it is not necessary that all audits be conducted only by independent third parties, when 

independent third-party auditing is necessary and appropriate, the literature indicates that, without

sufficient safeguards to ensure auditor independence, auditors are more likely to provide lenient 

or biased audit reports that can fail to accurately identify problems and violations by the regulated 

entity. 

One such study is a randomized control design field experiment in the State of Gujarat in 

India.88 This study revealed weaknesses in the existing third-party regulatory audit system and the 

potential for a series of market-based alterations to dramatically improve auditor accuracy. In 

India, Gujarat Pollution Control Board regulates more than 20,000 industrial plants. From the 

universe of audit-eligible plants located in two populous and heavily polluted industrial regions, 

the researchers identified a study sample of 473 randomly-selected plants, stratified by region.

Half of the plants were randomly assigned into a control group. The other half of the plants, also 

randomly assigned, were informed by the State of changes to their audit regulation that included 

the following: plants would be randomly assigned auditors they were required to use (i.e., they 

could no longer choose their own auditors); auditors would be paid from a central pool rather than 

 

86 ACUS; Administrative Conference Recommendation 2012-7; Agency Use of Third-Party Programs to 

Assess Regulatory Compliance (Adopted December 6, 2012) at 3-4. 

https://www.acus.gov/recommendation/agency-use-third-party-programs-assess-regulatory-compliance.

87

 See, e.g., Lesley K. McAllister. Jan. 2012. Regulation by Third-Party Verification. 53 B.C.L REV. 1, pp. 

3, 39-40.

88

 Esther Duflo et al., Truth-Telling By Third-Party Auditors And The Response of Polluting Firms: 

Experimental Evidence From India, 128 Q. J. OF ECON. 4 at 1499-1545 (2013).
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by the plant for which they worked; auditor fees were set in advance at a flat rate (high enough to 

cover pollution measurement and give the auditor a modest profit); a random sample of each 

auditor’s pollution readings would be verified with follow-up visits to the audited plants by an 

independent technical agency; in year two of the experiment, the third-party auditors were 

informed that their pay would be linked to their reporting accuracy as measured by the technical 

agency’s follow-up visits. The researchers found that, under the status quo system, the third-party 

auditors systematically reported false pollution levels just below the applicable regulatory 

standard (also known as strategic misreporting) but the experimental changes significantly 

improved the truthfulness of the third-party auditors’ reports, even for auditors operating in both 

markets who audited firms in both the control and treatment groups. Also, and importantly, once 

the plants understood that their auditors would henceforth be reporting more accurately to the 

State, they reduced their actual pollution emissions.

A pair of 2013 studies of independent third-party vehicle emission testing in New York 

also considered factors impacting third-party independence. This research was based on millions 

of emission test results from thousands of test facilities.

89 The authors’ findings include that there 

is a relationship between testing facilities’ opportunities to “cross sell” other products and 

services to car owners and the test results. The researchers found that, in pursuit of customer 

loyalty, facilities with more cross-selling opportunities were incentivized to “pass” cars that 

facilities with fewer cross-selling opportunities would not.90

Further evidence suggests that many, if not most, of some types of financial audits are 

flawed due to insufficient auditor competence, independence, and/or lack of public transparency. 

 

89

 Victor Manuel Bennett, et al. August 2013. Customer-Driven Misconduct How Competition Corrupts 

Business Practices. Management Science Vol. 59, No. 8, pp. 1725-1742.

http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Pages/item.aspx?num=43347 and

Lamar Pierce and Michael W. Toffel. Sept.-Oct. 2013. The Role of Organizational Scope and Governance 

in Strengthening Private Monitoring. Organization Science Vol. 24, No. 5, pp. 1558-1584.

90

 Lamar Pierce and Michael W. Toffel. Sept.-Oct. 2013. The Role of Organizational Scope and 

Governance in Strengthening Private Monitoring. Organization Science Vol. 24, No. 5, at 1575.

http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/11-004.pdf
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Third-party auditing is a linchpin of financial reporting. But when the Public Company 

Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) released its third annual report on audits of broker-dealers 

registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the PCAOB found audit 

deficiencies in portions of 70 of the 90 audits. Independence problems were found in 21 on the 90 

audits where, contrary to SEC rules, firms helped with the bookkeeping or preparation of the 

financial statements they audited.91

In 2014, the New York State Department of Financial Services (NYDFS) fined 

PricewaterhouseCoopers (“PwC”) Regulatory Advisory Services $25 million, suspended it for 24 

months from accepting consulting engagements at regulated financial institutions, and required it 

to implement a series of reforms after PwC improperly altered a report submitted to regulators on 

sanctions and anti-money laundering compliance at Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi (BTMU). Under 

pressure from BTMU executives who received an advance draft of its report to review, PwC 

edited the report, and in the final version of the report which was sent to regulators, a number of 

key provisions were deleted or otherwise significantly edited.92

These recommendations, studies, and reports emphasize the importance of designing 

independent third-party programs to embody auditor independence by building in appropriate 

criteria and processes for third-party independence. They identify a range of available design 

elements to promote such independence. EPA consulted this literature in developing today’s 

proposed independent third-party compliance auditing program.

Industry recognizes the benefits of third-party auditing programs and have established 

programs and standards for third-party audits for some types of operations, many of which are 

 

91

 PCAOB. Aug. 18, 2014. Third Progress Report on PCAOB Inspections of Broker and Dealer Auditors 

Shows Continued High Number of Findings. 

http://pcaobus.org/Inspections/Documents/BD_Interim_Inspection_Program_2014.pdf

92

 Press Release: NYDFS Announces PwC Regulatory Advisory Services Will Face 24-Month Consulting 

Suspension; Pay $25 Million; Implement Reforms After Misconduct During Work At BTMU. Aug. 18, 

2014. http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/press/pr1408181.htm
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also subject to the RMP rule.93 These programs also demonstrate industry’s understanding that, in 

appropriate circumstances, third-party auditing can provide benefits and results above those 

available through self-auditing alone. In addition, these programs and standards illustrate the 

range and variety of structural design elements that can be, and are, employed in third-party 

programs to address auditor competence and independence, auditor certification, the audit 

process, auditor reporting, recordkeeping, and the public disclosure of audit results and associated 

information. 

Some industry groups, such as SOCMA and the Center for Offshore Safety (COS), 

require certain types of third-party audits for their members. SOCMA members are U.S. 

companies engaging in the manufacturing or handling of synthetic and organic chemicals. Active 

members have a mandatory requirement to participate in ChemStewards®, a program intended to 

promote continuous performance improvement in batch chemical manufacturing. The program 

offers a three-tiered approach to participation. Each tier includes a third-party verified 

management system.94 The COS strategy for promoting safety and protection of the environment 

includes third-party auditing and certification of the COS member company’s SEMS and 

accreditation of the organizations (Audit Service Providers) providing the audit services. The 

third-party audits are intended to ensure that COS member companies are implementing and 

maintaining SEMS throughout their deepwater operations.95

ACC members are required to participate in a Responsible Care management system 

described by ACC as including, identifying, and acting to address potential hazards and risks 

associated with their products, processes, distribution and other operations. One of Responsible 

Care’s program elements is a product safety code consisting of eleven management practices 

 

93

 EPA has not formally evaluated these programs and standards or their outcomes. This discussion is not a 

formal Agency review or endorsement of them.

94

 SOCMA. 2015. See http://www.socma.com/ChemStewards/. 

95

 COS. 2013. See http://www.centerforoffshoresafety.org/auditInfo.html. 
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through which chemical manufacturers are encouraged to evaluate, demonstrate and continuously 

improve their product safety performance while making information about chemical products 

available to the public.96 Responsible Care also has a process safety code consisting of seven 

management practices through which chemical manufacturers commit to safe operation of their 

chemical processes. According to ACC, 

the Responsible Care Process Safety Code differs from regulatory standards that, 

by necessity, focus on process safety at an individual facility. ACC contends that 

the Process Safety Code is more universal—it addresses issues across a division or 

corporation, and includes a company commitment to set process safety 

expectations, define accountability for process safety performance and allocate 

adequate resources to achieve performance expectations.97

The Responsible Care management system process includes mandatory certification, by auditors 

described by ACC as accredited and independent, to ensure the program participants have a 

structure and system in place to measure, manage and verify performance.98

The API, in collaboration with industry partners, has developed a Process Safety Site 

Assessment Program (PSSAP). According to API, the program is intended to provide for the 

assessment of API member sites’ process safety systems by third-party teams of independent, 

industry-qualified process safety expert assessors. Using industry-developed protocols, API 

describes the process safety site assessments as evaluating the quality of written programs and 

effectiveness of field implementation for the following process safety areas that will be evaluated: 

Process Safety Leadership; MOC; Mechanical Integrity (focused on fixed equipment); Safe Work 

Practices; Operating Practices; Facility Siting; Process Safety Hazards; and HF Alkylation/RP 

 

96

 ACC. 2013. Responsible Care Product Safety Code. 

http://responsiblecare.americanchemistry.com/Responsible-Care-Program-Elements/Product-Safety-Code.

97

 ACC. 2013. Responsible Care Process Safety Code. 

http://responsiblecare.americanchemistry.com/Responsible-Care-Program-Elements/Process-Safety-Code.

98

 Certification must be renewed every three years, and companies can choose one of two certification 

options. RCMS® certification in intended to verify that a company has implemented the Responsible Care

Management System. RC14001® certification combines Responsible Care and ISO 14001 certification. 

See http://responsiblecare.americanchemistry.com/Responsible-Care-Program-Elements/ManagementSystem-and-Certification and http://responsiblecare.americanchemistry.com/Responsible-Care-ProgramElements/Process-Safety-Code/Responsible-Care-Process-Safety-Code-PDF.pdf. 
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751. The assessment teams produce reports that identify observations that site personnel should 

consider further but do not provide written recommendations.99

1. Applicability of Third-Party Audit Requirements

Currently, there are approximately 12,000 stationary sources with Program 2 and/or 

Program 3 processes. The proposed rule would not require all of these RMP facilities to use thirdparty auditors when conducting compliance audits under Subpart C or D. Instead, EPA is 

proposing that owners or operators be required to perform third-party compliance audits at their 

facilities only under the following two conditions. 

Under the first condition, a third-party compliance audit would be required in lieu of an 

internal compliance audit if there has been an accidental release from an RMP facility meeting 

the five-year accident history criteria as described in §68.42(a). The existing five-year accident 

history criteria include accidental releases from covered processes that resulted in deaths, injuries, 

or significant property damage on-site; or deaths, injuries, property damage, evacuations, 

sheltering in place, or environmental damage offsite. EPA and other implementing agencies 

would learn about accidents meeting the five-year accident history criteria because such accidents 

must be included within a facility’s RMP within six months of the accident, in accordance with 

§68.195(a). Following such an accident, the RMP facility’s owner or operator would be required 

to engage a third-party auditor to conduct a compliance audit for the source. Pursuant to 

§§68.58(h) and 68.79(h), the third-party audit and associated report shall be completed, and

submitted to the implementing agency pursuant to §68.59(c)(3) or §68.80(c)(3) as follows, unless 

a different timeframe is specified by the implementing agency: within 12 months of when the 

third-party audit is required pursuant to §68.58(f) and/or (g) or §68.79(f) and/or (g); or within 

three years of completion of the previous compliance audit, whichever is sooner.

 

99

 API. 2015. PSSAP. http://www.api.org/certification-programs/process-safety-site-assessment-programs.
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The second condition is if an implementing agency has made a determination that a thirdparty audit at an RMP facility is necessary, based on information about the facility or a prior 

third-party audit at the facility. Information about an RMP facility that would lead to such a 

determination could be obtained from sources including an inspection of a facility by the 

implementing agency’s representatives. Relevant information to support the determination may 

include evidence of significant non-compliance with the prevention program requirements of

Subpart C or D of Part 68. Significant non-compliance includes deficiencies relating to a previous

third-party audit (i.e., failure to meet the competency, independence, or impartiality criteria of 

§68.59(b) or §68.80(b)).

If such a determination is made, the implementing agency must provide a written notice 

to the owner or operator of the facility stating the reasons for the determination that a third-party 

audit must be performed. The proposed rule provides for an opportunity for the owner or operator 

to provide information and data to the implementing agency and to consult with the implementing 

agency about the need to perform a third-party audit at the facility source before the 

implementing agency representatives make a final determination. EPA seeks comment on these 

proposed third-party audit applicability requirements. 

2. Alternative Options for Third-Party Audit Applicability Criteria

EPA considered requiring third-party compliance audits for a larger universe of regulated 

facilities. We considered whether to require third-party compliance audits for all facilities with 

processes subject to Program 3 requirements at least every three years. We also considered 

whether to require third-party compliance audits for all facilities with processes subject to

Program 2 or Program 3 requirements every three years. However, because EPA views facilities 

that have had accidents or significant non-compliance as presenting higher risks to surrounding 

communities, the Agency is proposing to limit the applicability of this provision to these 

facilities.
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EPA seeks comments and suggestions on the proposed third-party audit applicability 

requirements and whether to eliminate or further limit applicability of this provision. For 

example, EPA could consider limiting the provision to only Program 3 facilities that have had 

accidents or to only facilities that have had major accidents with offsite impacts. EPA seeks 

comments on this alternative approach and to define and characterize “major accidents with 

offsite impacts.” Alternatively, EPA could revise this provision to reduce its impact on small 

businesses. When providing suggested alternatives, please include suggestions for how to 

improve compliance with auditing provisions.

EPA also seeks comment on whether there are other criteria that could require RMP 

facilities to perform third-party compliance audits. For example, a third-party audit could be 

required if an owner or operator of a facility were to learn or know of a condition or conditions at 

its facility suggesting a concern for, or potential risk of, future accidents. Such conditions would 

need to be objective and reasonably ascertainable by the facility owners or operators, the 

implementing agency, and the public. 

EPA also seeks comment on the benefits and costs of proposing additional requirements 

for third-party compliance audits and recommendations for appropriate conditions suggesting a 

concern for, or potential risk of, future accidents. 

3. Proposed Third-Party Audit Requirements

a. Compliance Audit (§§68.58 and 68.79)

In order to prevent accidents and ensure compliance with Part 68 requirements, EPA is 

proposing to require certain RMP facilities to perform third-party audits. The proposed changes to 

§§68.58 and 68.79 would add this requirement for both Program 2 and Program 3 processes, 

under certain conditions. 

EPA proposes new paragraphs §§68.58(f) and 68.79(f) which describe when a third-party 

audit is required. Pursuant to these paragraphs, the next required compliance audit for an RMP 
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facility shall be a third-party audit when one of the following conditions apply: (1) an accidental 

release, meeting the criteria in §68.42(a), from a covered process has occurred; or (2) an 

implementing agency requires a third-party audit based on non-compliance with the requirements 

of this subpart, including when a previous third-party audit failed to meet the competency, 

independence, or impartiality criteria of §68.59(b) or §68.80(b). The purpose is to help reduce the 

risk of future accidents by requiring an objective auditing process to determine whether the owner 

or operator of the facility is effectively complying with the prevention program requirements of 

Part 68.

EPA proposes new paragraphs §§68.58(g) and 68.79(g), Implementing agency 

notification and appeals, which describe the procedure for when a third-party audit is required by 

an implementing agency. Pursuant to these paragraphs, if an implementing agency makes a 

preliminary determination that a third-party audit is necessary, the implementing agency will 

provide written notice to the facility owner or operator stating the reasons for the implementing 

agency’s determination. The owner or operator has an opportunity to provide information to, and 

to consult with, the implementing agency. The implementing agency then provides a final 

determination to the owner or operator. If the final determination requires a third-party audit, the 

owner or operator shall comply with the requirements of §68.59 and/or §68.80, but also may 

choose to appeal the final determination. After the appeal is considered, the implementing agency 

will provide a written, final decision on the appeal to the owner or operator.

EPA proposes new paragraphs §§68.58(h) and 68.79(h), which describe the schedule for 

conducting third-party audits. The audit and associated report shall be completed, and submitted 

to the implementing agency as follows, unless a different timeframe is specified by the 

implementing agency: (1) within 12 months of when any third-party audit is required; or (2) 

within three years of completion of the previous compliance audit, whichever is sooner.

b. Third-party Audits (§§68.59 and 68.80)
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EPA is proposing new §§68.59 and 68.80, which include the requirements for both thirdparty audits, and third-party auditors.

Sections 68.59(a) and 68.80(a) state that owners or operators shall engage a third-party 

auditor to evaluate compliance with the provisions of this subpart in accordance with the 

requirements of this section when the criteria of §68.58(f) or §68.79(f) are met. 

EPA is proposing, in §§68.59(b) and 68.80(b), that owners and operators of RMP 

facilities subject to these requirements determine and document the competency, independence, 

and impartiality of their auditors. These sections require that the facility owners or operators be 

responsible for self-determining and documenting that their third-party auditors are competent 

and independent pursuant to the criteria listed in §68.59(b)(1)-(3) or §68.80(b)(1)-(3), by 

requiring specific provisions and safeguards in their contracts and relationships with their thirdparty auditors. 

EPA seeks comment as to whether the requirement that owners and operators of RMP 

facilities be responsible for determining and documenting the competency, independence, and 

impartiality of their auditors is appropriate.

Alternative Option for Third-Party Auditor Selection and Accreditation

EPA also considered an alternative approach, such as requiring auditors to have 

accreditation from a recognized auditing body or EPA. Most independent third-party regulatory 

compliance verification programs require the qualifying third-parties to apply for and receive 

accreditation from a qualified external party to ensure competency and independence. Such an 

external accreditation approach can add rigor to the process of confirming the competence and 

independence of the auditors but it also adds procedures and costs. Therefore, while EPA is not 

proposing that the Agency itself will accredit third-party auditors, EPA seeks comment on 

whether to require additional accreditation criteria and how to best establish and structure an 

accreditation program within the context of the RMP rule.
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Auditor Competence 

Third-party compliance verification programs should establish criteria and standards for 

auditor competence. Typically, such criteria and standards combine specified minimum levels of 

education, knowledge, experience, and training. EPA is proposing to require in proposed 

§§68.59(b)(1)(i) – (iv) and 68.80(b)(1) (i) – (iv) that third-party auditors be:

 knowledgeable with the requirements of Part 68;

 experienced with the facility type and processes being audited and the applicable 

recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices (RAGAGEP);

 trained or certified in proper auditing techniques; and 

 be a licensed Professional Engineer (PE), or include a licensed PE on the audit team. 

EPA is proposing to require a PE as part of the audit team in an attempt to identify 

competent auditors that also have an ethical obligation to perform unbiased work. EPA seeks 

comment on whether these criteria are appropriate and sufficient to ensure third-party auditors are 

competent to perform high-quality compliance audits. EPA also seeks comment on whether the 

proposal to require that a third-party auditor, or a member of the audit team, be a licensed PE is 

appropriate and whether there are enough licensed PEs to conduct third-party audits for the 

universe of facilities that may become subject to these requirements. Are there other

qualifications who might be appropriate for RMP auditors in lieu of a PE? 

As required by section 609(b) of the RFA, the EPA convened a Small Business 

Advocacy Review (SBAR) Panel to obtain advice and recommendations from small entity 

representatives (SERs) that potentially would be subject to the rule's requirements. As part of the 

SBAR Panel process, SERs suggested to the SBAR panel that EPA consider subsitituting other 

qualified personnel such as: degreed chemists, degreed chemical engineers, Certified Safety 

Professionals (CSP), Certified Industrial Hygienists (CIH), Certified Fire Protection Specialists

(CFPS), Certified Hazardous Materials Managers (CHMM), Certified Professional 
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Environmental Auditors (CPEA) or Certified Process Safety Auditors (CPSA). EPA also seeks 

comment regarding potentially relevant and applicable consensus standards and protocols that 

might apply to the audits and be built and/or incorporated by reference into the rules. These may 

include relevant and applicable American National Standards Institute, American Society for 

Testing and Materials International, European Committee for Standardization, International 

Organization for Standardization (ISO), and National Institute of Standards and Technology 

(NIST) standards. 

Auditor Independence and Impartiality

Proposed §§68.59(b)(2)(i) – (vi) and 68.80(b) (2)(i) – (vi) set forth the independence and 

impartiality requirements for third-party auditors and audit teams. These include that third-party 

auditors: 

 act impartially when performing all third-party audit activities;

 receive no financial benefit from the outcome of the audit, apart from payment for the 

auditing services;

 not have conducted past research, development, design, construction services, or 

consulting for the owner or operator within the last 3 years;

100

 not provide other business or consulting services to the owner or operator, including 

advice or assistance to implement the findings or recommendations in an audit report, 

for a period of at least 3 years following submission of the final audit report;

 ensure all personnel involved in the audit sign and date a conflict of interest 

statement; and

 ensure all personnel involved in the audit do not accept future employment with the 

owner or operator of the facility for a period of at least 3 years following submission 

 

100

 For purposes of this requirement, consulting does not include performing or participating in third-party 

audits pursuant to §68.59 or §68.80. 
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of the final audit report. For purposes of this requirement, employment does not 

include performing or participating in third-party audits pursuant to §§68.59 or 68.80.

As part of the SBAR Panel process, SERs raised concerns about the extent of the 

independence criteria and suggested this might limit the availability of qualified auditors. 

Specifically, SERs asked how to apply the independence criteria to a company that employs 

personnel who previously worked for or otherwise engaged in consulting services with the 

facility. Audit firms with personnel who, before working for the firm, performed services for the 

owner or operator as an employee, contractor or consultant, meet the rule’s independence criteria 

when such personnel do not participate on, manage, or advise the audit teams. Additionally, 

employees of an auditing firm are not prohibited from accepting future employment with the 

owner/operator as long as they were not directly involved in performing or managing the audit. 

Another concern raised by SERs is ensuring that third-party auditors do not pose a 

terrorism concern or release information that could compromise facility security or CBI. EPA 

agrees that chemical facility security is a priority and seeks comments on the impacts a thirdparty auditor may have on a facility’s security and whether there is a need to specify security 

protections or whether existing non-disclosure and contractual agreements should handle this 

independently.

EPA seeks comment on whether the proposed auditor independence criteria are 

appropriate and sufficient. If not, we seek comment on how best to adjust the criteria for 

maximum auditing effectiveness and efficiency, including comments or suggestions on how to 

provide more flexibility in the auditor independence criteria, or whether to eliminate the 

requirement for independence. EPA also seeks comments on whether the proposed 3-year 

timeframe to separate the audit from other business arrangements with the owner or operator is 

appropriate.
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Furthermore, EPA is requesting comment on whether the proposed auditor independence 

criteria should be modified so as to not exclude a retired employee from auditing a former 

employer’s facility if the employee’s sole continuing financial attachment to the owner or 

operator is an employer-financed or employer-managed retirement plan. While EPA is concerned 

such attachments could provide the auditor with incentives to ensure the facilities they audit are 

not financially negatively impacted by their audits, it could also, as a practical matter, limit the 

available pool of otherwise qualified and competent auditors. EPA seeks comment on the 

potential magnitude of such incentives and how to address this concern in the rule.

Finally, EPA requests comment on whether to propose streamlined independence criteria

for small facilities (i.e., based on the size of the facility) including comments or suggestions on 

how to streamline the requirements.

Auditor Policies and Procedures

Proposed §§68.59(b)(3) and 68.80(b)(3), if finalized, would require that owner or 

operators of RMP regulated facilities ensure that third-party auditors have written policies and 

procedures to ensure that all personnel comply with the competency, independence, and 

impartiality requirements of these sections. EPA seeks comment on these proposed provisions.

Alternative Options for Auditor Qualifications

EPA considered including alternative options in the proposed rule for owners and 

operators of stationary sources who cannot, despite best efforts, find a third-party auditor meeting 

all of the independence criteria. Two specific options were considered. 

Under the first option, owners and operators of RMP facilities, in addition to selfselecting their third-party auditors pursuant to the specified independence criteria, would also 

self-determine when it is impossible or impractical to hire such auditors and self-select their 

alternative auditors. Under this option, the owner or operator would be required to inform the 

implementing agency and the public of the alternative auditors, which could be accomplished by 
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providing and/or publicly posting information on the alternative auditors and how they were 

selected. The information could describe the steps taken to identify auditors meeting all of the 

rule’s independence criteria, the identities and competencies of the alternative auditors, the 

regulatory independence criteria that the alternative auditors were unable to meet and why, and 

any steps taken to address or limit the impacts of the auditors’ lack of independence on the 

outcomes and reliability of their audits.

Under the second option, owners and operators who, despite best efforts, could not find 

auditors meeting all the rule’s independence criteria would be authorized to identify specific 

alternative auditors to the implementing agency and petition it for approval to engage those 

auditors. This approach would include a requirement for auditors not fully satisfying the rule’s 

independence criteria to prepare and implement Conflict of Interest Mitigation Plans similar to 

those required by the California Air Resources Board (CARB) under its Regulation for the 

Mandatory Reporting of GHG Emissions,101 with associated reporting, recordkeeping, and due 

process procedures. Under this option, if, despite best efforts, an owner or operator cannot find a 

third-party auditor meeting all of the criteria in §68.59(b) or §68.80(b), the owner or operator 

would be required to request approval, in writing, to the implementing agency to use an 

alternative third-party auditor. The implementing agency would then be required, within a 

specified timeframe, to approve or disapprove the proposed request and provide notice of its 

decision to the owner or operator. The owner or operator’s request to use an alternative thirdparty auditor would include a description of the owner or operator’s efforts to find an independent 

third-party auditor, identification of the proposed alternative third-party auditor (including the 

same information required pursuant to this rule for a fully qualified auditor), identification of the 

specific independence requirements the proposed alternative third-party auditor meets and does 

 

101

 CARB. July 23, 2015. Verification of GHG Emissions Data Reports. 

http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/reporting/ghg-ver/ghg-ver.htm.
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not meet, and an organizational chart of the proposed alternative third-party auditor and related 

entities with brief descriptions of the primary nature of the work each performs.

The owner or operator’s request to use an identified alternative third-party auditor would 

also include a Conflict of Interest Mitigation Plan demonstrating the steps the auditor would take 

to mitigate its inability to fully meet the independence requirements in §68.59(b) or §68.80(b). 

These steps could include ensuring that any individual or organizational component of the auditor 

with conflicts of interest or impartiality concerns is removed from the audit and/or isolated from 

the individuals or organizational component conducting the audit, an explanation of how and why 

the amount and nature of work previously performed should not be deemed to undermine the 

auditing team’s credibility and lack of bias, and descriptions of any other adjustments or 

circumstances taken to address actual or potential sources for conflicts of interest, with an 

appropriate certification signed and dated by a senior owner or operator official.

If, pursuant to this option, the implementing agency approves the alternative third-party 

auditor, it would provide written notice to the owner or operator and, upon receipt of the 

approval, the owner or operator may engage the alternative auditor to conduct the audit under this 

section. If the implementing agency does not approve the identified alternative auditor, the 

implementing agency would provide a written notice to the owner or operator stating the reasons 

for the decision. Within a specified timeframe after receipt of such written notice, the owner or 

operator would be required to submit the name of another proposed auditor for the implementing 

agency’s consideration. In the alternative, the owner or operator would be able to appeal the 

implementing agency’s decision pursuant to the applicable agency’s processes. 

EPA considered but did not propose other third-party auditor independence safeguards 

than those included in proposed §68.59(b)(2) or §68.80(b)(2). Examples include mandating the 

random assignment of auditors, paying them from a central pool of auditing funds, or requiring 

mandatory periodic auditor rotation after a specified period of time. Nor has EPA proposed 
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provisions requiring owners and operators to provide advance notice to the implementing agency 

of third-party auditor site visits to enable the implementing agency to accompany and observe the 

third-party auditors on such visits.102 EPA seeks comment on these alternative approaches.

EPA further seeks comment on whether there are any other alternative approaches to 

third-party auditor qualifications EPA should consider prior to issuing a final action. For 

example, EPA could, in the final rule, allow for audits to be performed by auditors with some 

potential conflicts of interest (e.g., employees of parent company, affiliates, vendors/contractors 

that participated in developing the facility’s RMP, etc.) and/or allow a person employed at the 

facility who is a registered PE to conduct the audit. If such approaches are adopted in the final 

rule, the Agency could seek to place appropriate restrictions on auditors and auditing using third 

parties with less than full independence from their client facilities in an effort to increase 

confidence that the auditors will act appropriately when performing their activities under the 

RMP rule. The purposes of such provisions could include ensuring that auditor personnel who 

assess a facility’s compliance with the RMP rule do not receive any financial benefit from the 

outcome of their auditing decisions, apart from their basic salaries or remuneration for having 

conducted the audits. EPA also specifically requests commenters to identify any supportive 

literature or data as EPA is presently not aware of literature or data showing that such provisions 

are effective in counteracting biases due to lack of impartiality or independence. 

There may be other options, in addition to the approaches taken in the proposed thirdparty compliance auditing program or identified above, that can also increase owner or operator 

 

102

 Compare proposed 40 CFR 770.7(a)(3)(iv) of EPA’s proposed Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) 

formaldehyde in wood products third-party program proposed rule: “(3) Responsibilities. EPA recognized 

Laboratory ABs must fulfill the requirements in paragraphs (b)(3)(i) through (xiii) of this section: ... (iv) 

Upon request, allow EPA representatives to accompany its assessors during an on-site assessment to 

observe the audit of a TPC.” Formaldehyde; Third-Party Certification Framework for the Formaldehyde 

Standards for Composite Wood Products, 78 FR 34796, June 10, 2013. http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR2013-06-10/pdf/2013-13254.pdf
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flexibility without compromising audit accuracy. EPA seeks comment on such alternative 

auditor/auditing approaches. 

If non-independent or limited independence third-party auditing, second-party auditing, 

or enhanced self-auditing is authorized, EPA seeks comment on how best to structure such 

auditing to maximize auditor independence and accurate auditing outcomes given the lack of 

complete independence. EPA also seeks suggestions for what steps a facility should be required 

to take if third-party auditors who meet the proposed independence and competence criteria are 

not available. If RMP facilities are allowed, in the final rule, to use enhanced self-auditing in lieu 

of independent third-party auditing, examples of the types of restrictions that could be placed on 

such self-auditing to potentially improve auditor impartiality and auditing outcomes appear in the 

U.S. and CARB v. Hyundai Motor Company, et al. Consent Decree.

103

Third-Party Audit Report

Proposed §§68.59(c) and 68.80(c), if finalized, would require owners or operators of 

stationary sources to ensure that their third-party auditors prepare and submit audit reports. 

Proposed §§68.59(c)(1) and 68.80(c)(1), if finalized, would include requirements for the scope 

and content of these reports, including a statement to be signed by the third-party auditor 

certifying that the third-party audit was performed in accordance with the requirements of 

Subpart C or D. Proposed §§68.59(c)(1) and 68.80(c)(1), if finalized, would also require that the 

final third-party audit reports must identify any adjustments made by the third-party auditor to 

any draft third-party audit reports provided to the owners or operators for their review or 

comment. EPA believes that these provisions are important to minimize third-party compliance 

audit bias. EPA’s intent in allowing for owners and operators to receive and comment on draft 

third-party compliance audit reports with these additional requirements is to promote factual and 

informative final third-party compliance audit reports without compromising their accuracy and 

 

103

 U.S District Court of D.C. November 11, 2014. Decree of Consent U.S California Air Resources Board 

v. Hyundai et al. http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-11/documents/hyundai-kia-cd.pdf
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independence. EPA seeks comment, however, on whether we should also require draft third-party 

compliance audit reports to be submitted to the implementing agency at the same time, or before, 

such reports are provided to the owners and operators and whether such a requirement would be 

further effective in minimizing potential third-party compliance audit bias. 

Proposed §§68.59(c)(2) and 68.80(c)(2), if finalized, would include requirements for the 

retention of reports and records by the third-party auditors. Proposed §§68.59(c)(3) and 

68.80(c)(3), if finalized, would require the audit report to be submitted to the implementing 

agency at the same time, or before, it is provided it to the owner or operator. Finally, EPA is 

proposing in §§68.59(c)(4) and 68.80(c)(4) that the audit report and related records cannot be 

claimed as confidential attorney work products even if the auditors are themselves, or managed 

by or report to, attorneys. EPA seeks comment on these proposed requirements.

Other Owner or Operator Obligations

Proposed §§68.59(d)(1) and 68.80(d)(1), if finalized, would require owners or operators, 

as soon as possible, but no later than 90 days after receiving the final audit report, to determine an 

appropriate response to each of the findings in the audit report, and develop and provide to the 

implementing agency a findings response report. This findings response report would include: a 

copy of the final audit report; an appropriate response to each of the audit report findings; a 

schedule for promptly addressing deficiencies; and a statement, signed and dated by a senior 

corporate officer, certifying that appropriate responses to the findings in the audit report have 

been identified and deficiencies were corrected, or are being corrected, consistent with the 

requirements of subpart C or D of 40 CFR part 68. The requirement to determine appropriate 

responses to findings is similar to existing compliance audit requirements that require the owner 

or operator to “promptly determine and document an appropriate response to each of the findings 

of the compliance audit.” EPA seeks comment on these proposed requirements and whether we 

should provide flexibility on the timeframe for developing the findings response report. 
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EPA also considered prescribing a timeframe within which deficiencies must be 

corrected, rather than rely on “promptly” address deficiencies. However, EPA was unable to 

identify an appropriate timeframe given the variety of possible site-specific actions that an owner 

or operator may take to address audit findings. EPA seeks comment on whether to keep this 

approach or substitute a specific number of days and, if the latter, what is a reasonable time 

period to specify and why.

Proposed §§68.59(d)(2) and 68.80(d)(2), if finalized, would require the owner or operator 

to implement the schedule and address deficiencies identified in the audit findings response 

report, and document the action taken to address each deficiency, along with the date completed. 

Proposed §§68.59(d)(3) and 68.80(d)(3), if finalized, would require the owner or operator to 

provide a copy of documents required under paragraphs (d)(1) and (d)(2) to the owner or 

operator’s audit committee of the Board of Directors, or other comparable committee, if one 

exists. EPA seeks comment on these proposed requirements. 

Proposed §§68.59(e) and 68.80(e), if finalized, would require the owner or operator to 

retain records at the stationary source, including: the two most recent third-party audit reports, 

related findings response reports, documentation of actions taken to address deficiencies, and 

related records; and copies of all draft third-party audit reports. The owner or operator shall 

provide draft third-party audit reports, or other documents, to the implementing agency upon 

request. For proposed §68.59(e) (Program 2 third-party audit recordkeeping provision), these 

requirements, if finalized, would not apply to any documents that are more than five years old

(for Program 3 third-party audit records, as for the existing Program 3 compliance audits, the 

owner or operator would be required to retain records to support the two most recent audits). EPA 

seeks comment on these proposed requirements. 

C. Safer Technology and Alternatives Analysis (STAA)

1. Meaning of STAA 
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Safer technology and alternatives refer to risk reduction strategies developed through 

analysis using a hierarchy of process risk management strategies (or hierarchy of controls), which 

consists of those which are inherent, passive, active, and procedural.

104 This philosophy can be 

applied initially to all design phases and then continuously throughout a process’s life cycle by 

identifying and assessing hazards and developing a control strategy. STAA includes concepts 

known as IST or inherently safer design (ISD), which are those strategies that permanently reduce 

or eliminate the hazards associated with materials and operations used in a process. IST, ISD,

and inherent safety are interchangeable terms that are used in the literature and in the field. The 

four major inherently safer strategies are:

 Minimization–using smaller quantities of hazardous substances;

 Substitution–replacing a material with a less hazardous substance;

 Moderation–using less hazardous conditions or a less hazardous form, or designing 

facilities that minimize the impact of a release of hazardous material or energy; and

 Simplification–design facilities to eliminate unnecessary complexity and make 

operating errors less likely.

The hierarchy establishes that inherently safer options (e.g., minimization, substitution, 

moderation, and simplification) are preferable and occupy the top of the hierarchy. Passive 

strategies (process and equipment design) are preferable to active ones such as engineering 

controls (automatic digital or mechanical system controls), which are preferable to procedures or 

administrative options (controls requiring human action). However, risk reduction of a process 

hazard may also be achieved by using a combination of strategies, known as layers of protection. 

EPA is proposing to require analysis of safer technology and alternatives as part of the PHA for a 

subset of Program 3 processes.

2. Inherently Safer Technology (IST)

 

104

 CCPS. 2009. Inherently Safer Chemical Processes: A Life Cycle Approach, 2

nd ed., American Institute 

of Chemical Engineers, CCPS New York, Wiley.
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A July 2010 DHS report prepared by the CCPS described IST as a philosophy and an 

iterative process, including eliminating a hazard, reducing a hazard, substituting a less hazardous 

material, using less hazardous process conditions, and designing a process to reduce the potential 

for, or consequences of, human error, equipment failure, or intentional harm.

105 It stated that 

there is no clear boundary between IST and passive, active, and procedural risk management 

strategies. CCPS further stated that ISTs are relative and can only be described as inherently 

safer when compared to a different technology, including a description of the hazard or set of 

hazards being considered, their location, and the potentially affected population. Because an 

option may be inherently safer with regard to some hazards and inherently less safe with regard to 

others, the decision process must consider the entire life cycle, the full spectrum of hazards and 

risks, and the potential for transfer of risk from one impacted population to another. This report 

also noted that there is currently no consensus on either a quantification method for IST or a 

scientific assessment method for evaluation of IST options. The report states that risk can be 

reduced by many methods, including ISD, but those methods must include the full spectrum of 

risk reduction approaches (passive, active, and procedural risk management systems). Few

technologies will be inherently safer with respect to all hazards, and other approaches will usually

be required to manage the full range of hazards and risks. As an example, the report points out 

that an IST with respect to a catastrophic release hazard may conflict with methods to minimize 

other hazards, such as theft or diversion of materials, contamination of product, or degradation of 

infrastructure. It may not address other hazards at all, or it may create new hazards.

3. EPA’s Past Approach to STAA

The RMP rule already embodies most aspects of the hierarchy of controls. For example, 

§68.67 (PHA) requires owners and operators of Program 3 processes to address process hazards 

 

105

 CCPS. July 2010. Final Report: Definition for IST in Production, Transportation, Storage, and Use. 

Prepared by: CCPS, American Institute of Chemical Engineers, New York, New York for Chemical 

Security Analysis Center, Science & Technology Directorate, U.S. DHS Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD. 

http://www.aiche.org/ccps/documents/definition-inherently-safer-technology.
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using engineering and administrative controls. In most cases, the rule’s requirements for 

compliance with RAGAGEP should ensure that equipment and processes are properly designed,

using appropriate passive, active, and procedural controls. The RMP rule also encourages passive

and active mitigation for releases by allowing a source to account for such mitigation techniques 

in its OCA (see §§68.25 and 68.28). However, the rule does not contain any explicit requirement 

for owners and operators to address the first tier of the hierarchy of controls – i.e. inherent safety.

Although the current rule does not include IST requirements, EPA has recognized the 

importance of considering IST for improving process safety. The preamble of the 1995 

supplemental NPRM for the Risk Management Program recognized “that there are many 

opportunities to make processes inherently safer without large scale adoption of new technologies 

(60 FR 13533, March 13, 1995). EPA also noted in the preamble to the 1996 final RMP rule, 

“Application of good PHA techniques often reveals opportunities for continuous improvement of 

existing processes and operations without a separate analysis of alternatives” (61 FR at 31674, 

June 20, 1996). The structure of the applicability provisions of the RMP rule, with TQs, 

encourages minimizing the presence of regulated substances in processes and encourages sources 

to continue to examine and adopt viable alternative processing technologies, system safeguards, 

or process modifications to make new and existing processes and operations inherently safer.

EPA’s existing guidance on the “general duty clause” in CAA section 112(r)(1) states that, “The 

owners and operators should try to substitute less hazardous substances for extremely hazardous 

substances or minimize inventories when possible. This is usually the most effective way to

prevent accidents and should be the priority of a prevention program.”106

In the 1996 final RMP rule, EPA decided not to mandate IST analysis, stating that “EPA 

does not believe that a requirement that owners or operators conduct searches or analyses of 

 

106

 EPA, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response and Office of Enforcement and Compliance 

Assurance. May 2000. Guidance for Implementation of the General Duty Clause, CAA Section 112(r)(1). 

EPA 550-B00-002. 

http://www2.epa.gov/rmp/guidance-implementation-general-duty-clause-clean-air-act-section-112r.
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alternative process technologies for new or existing processes will produce significant additional 

benefits.” (61 FR 31688, June 20, 1996). However, since 1996 EPA has seen that advances in 

ISTs and safer alternatives are becoming more widely available and are being adopted by some 

companies. Voluntary implementation of some ISTs has been identified through surveys and 

studies and potential opportunities have been identified through EPA inspections and CSB 

incident investigations. EPA now believes that there is a benefit in requiring that some facilities 

evaluate whether they can improve risk management of current hazards through potential 

implementation of ISTs or risk management measures that are more robust and reliable than ones 

currently in use at the facility. While EPA believes that facilities should look for additional 

opportunities to increase safety, we believe that the facility owners or operators are in the best 

position to identify which changes are feasible to implement for their particular process. As a 

result, EPA is not proposing to require that a facility implement a particular technology or design.

In addition, in CAA Section 112(r) enforcement cases, facility owners or operators have 

occasionally entered into consent agreements involving implementation of safer alternatives. For 

example, a food processor in San Francisco had a release of anhydrous ammonia from its 

refrigeration system in 2009, resulting in evacuation of the facility and several neighboring 

businesses and hospitalization of 17 people. As part of a consent decree, the facility owner or 

operator converted the anhydrous ammonia refrigeration system to a safer technology that uses 

glycol and less ammonia, along with implementing other safety measures and system upgrades.107

Following community complaints and a 2011 EPA inspection, the owner or operator of a 

fertilizer facility chose to remove a total of 99,000 pounds of anhydrous ammonia from the 

facility, thus reducing the risk to the surrounding population.108 In another case, the owner or 

 

107

 EPA News Release. January 31, 2012. South San Francisco Food Processing Factory Will Pay Nearly 

$700,000 in Penalties, Spend $6 Million to Update Refrigeration System Safety. 

http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/0/1c6b8ee238fd17d185257996005b892f.

108

 EPA News Release. August 14, 2013. Abilene Products Co., Inc., Agrees to $90,660 Settlement for 

Violations of CAA at Abilene, Kan., Fertilizer Facility. 

http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/0/8BB676093B7826FF85257BC7006B3E4C.
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operator of a dairy company agreed to reduce the anhydrous ammonia inventory and improve 

release detection equipment at two facilities after two anhydrous ammonia releases in 2005 and 

2007 (the latter causing nine people to spend a night in the hospital) and after EPA identified 

CAA violations.109 The owner or operator of a Connecticut metal finishing facility that used 

chlorine gas for treatment of cyanide waste agreed to implement a project to eliminate the use of 

chlorine by substituting liquid sodium hypochlorite after EPA found violations of accident 

prevention regulations.110 A release from one of the chlorine cylinders at the facility could 

potentially have impacted offsite public receptors in a densely populated area.

111 Thus, EPA’s 

historic approach to STAA under CAA section 112(r) has resulted in chemical plant operators 

introducing safer technology and alternatives through implementation of existing rule provisions 

that address most of the hierarchy of controls, but the Agency has not mandated the use or 

analysis of IST alternatives. 

4. Public Input on STAA

Public feedback and input to the Working Group established to oversee EO 13650, 

showed there was broad agreement among facility owners and operators, plant workers, 

community members, and environmental and union organizations of the benefits of implementing

safer alternatives where feasible. There was, however, no consensus about the role of government 

in the implementation of safer technologies and alternatives. Industry representatives are wary 

about process design and operational decisions, including choices of IST, being imposed through 

 

109

 EPA News Release. October 1, 2012. Settlement with Suiza Dairy Corporation for Violations at 

facilities in Puerto Rico will make facilities safer, benefit nearby communities. 

http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/0/319D803456BF7B0885257A8A005A4238.

110

 EPA Region 1. January 20, 2014. Consent Agreement and Final Order- In the Matter of: Metal 

Finishing Technologies, LLC Docket Number: CAA-01-2013-0073. 

http://yosemite.epa.gov/OA/RHC/EPAAdmin.nsf/Filings/3A95FA64BDE7026C85257C8600214551/$File/

CAFO%20CAA-01-2013-0073.pdf.

111

 EPA Region 1. September 30, 2013. Administrative Complaint - In the Matter of: Metal Finishing 

Technologies, LLC Docket Number: CAA-01-2013-0073. 

http://yosemite.epa.gov/OA/RHC/EPAAdmin.nsf/Filings/1BE4A3485C3E1E6B85257C1C0021490D/$File

/CAA-01-2013-0073%20Complaint.pdf. 
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regulations. Process design and operational decisions are technically complex and often difficult 

to regulate. Conversely, many labor and environmental justice representatives believe the Federal 

government should have a larger role in encouraging IST, with particular emphasis on the 

opportunity to reduce the vulnerability of residents and workers from incidents.112

a. Pending Petition on IST

In July of 2012, a coalition representing 54 organizations and individuals petitioned EPA 

to use its rulemaking authority under CAA section 112(r)(7)(A), “to require the use of IST, where 

feasible, by facilities that use or store hazardous chemicals.” The petitioners also requested that 

pending completion of such rulemaking, that EPA should 

revise its guidance concerning the enforcement of the CAA general duty clause, 

section 112(r)(1), 42 U.S.C. §7412(r)(1), to make clear that the duty to prevent 

releases of extremely hazardous substances includes the use, where feasible, of 

safer technologies to minimize the presence and possible release of hazardous 

chemicals.

113

The petitioners stated that many Americans remain at risk of injury or death from the unforeseen 

release of harmful chemicals from nearby industrial parks, water treatment plants, etc., and that 

the DHS CFATS, which impose security measures on facilities presenting a high risk of 

vulnerability to releases of hazardous substances, do not cover water treatment facilities, many of 

which use and store significant quantities of chlorine gas. 

The petitioners cited specific threats or accidents as examples of risks that, in their view,

should have been addressed by taking steps to eliminate or minimize extremely hazardous 

 

112

 Chemical Facility Safety and Security Working Group. May 2014. EO13650 Report to the President –

Actions to Improve Chemical Facility Safety and Security – A Shared Commitment. EPA, the Department 

of Labor (DOL), DHS, the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Department of Agriculture (DOA), and the

Department of Transportation. Washington, DC.

https://www.osha.gov/chemicalexecutiveorder/final_chemical_eo_status_report.pdf.

113 Greenpeace et al. July 25, 2012. Petition to Prevent Chemical Disasters from Rick Hind of Greenpeace, 

Richard Moore of Los Jardines Institute and Scott Nelson of Public Citizen sent to EPA Administrator Lisa 

Jackson, EPA, Washington, DC, www.documentcloud.org/documents/404584-petition-to-epa-to-preventchem-disasters-filed.html.
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substances114 where feasible. Examples they cited include a 2009 explosion at a refinery in 

Corpus Christi, Texas, that resulted in the release of more than a ton of hydrogen fluoride, with a 

much larger release being narrowly avoided.115 A 2008 explosion and fire at a Bayer CropScience 

facility in West Virginia narrowly missed causing a breach in piping on the top of an 

aboveground tank of methyl isocyanate (MIC), which the petitioners claimed, if breached, would 

have resulted in a deadly release of the same chemical responsible for the Bhopal, India 

disaster.116 They also identified a 2007 propane explosion and fire at a refinery in Texas that 

resulted in the release of nearly three tons of chlorine gas, with deaths and injuries avoided only 

by prompt evacuation of workers. The CSB, which reported the chlorine release as 5,332 pounds, 

recommended the refinery replace chlorine used as a biocide in cooling water treatment with 

inherently safer materials, such as sodium hypochlorite, at all its refineries.

117 The petitioners also 

cited several examples where readily available IST approaches have already been used, such as 

 

114

 This not intended to specifically reference the extremely hazardous substances listed under §302 of 

EPCRA. Section 112(r)(1) of the CAA provides a purpose and general duty to prevent the accidental 

release and to minimize the consequence of any release of any regulated substances promulgated by EPA 

under §112(r)(3) (40 CFR part 130) and for “any other extremely hazardous substance.” Although the term 

“any other extremely hazardous substance" is not defined, the legislative history of the 1990 CAAA

indicate that the term would include any agent "which may or may not be listed or otherwise identified by 

any Government agency which may as the result of short-term exposures associated with releases to the air 

cause death, injury or property damage due to its toxicity, reactivity, flammability, volatility, or 

corrosivity.” See: http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2013-10/documents/gdcregionalguidance.pdf.

115 Petitioners are referring to an accident at the CITGO Refinery in Corpus Christi, Texas. For more 

information on this accident, see CSB. December 9, 2009. CITGO Refinery HF Release and Fire, Corpus 

Christi, Texas. Final Report, Urgent Recommendation. http://www.csb.gov/citgo-refinery-hydrofluoricacid-release-and-fire/.

116 CSB. January 2011. Investigation Report: Pesticide Chemical Runaway Reaction Pressure Vessel 

Explosion, Bayer CropScience, LP, Institute, West Virginia, August 28, 2008. Report No. 2008-08-I-WV, 

pp. 88-89, http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/19/Bayer_Report_Final.pdf.

117 CSB. July 9, 2008. Investigation Report: LPG Fire at Valero-McKee Refinery, Sunray, Texas, February 

16, 2007. Report No. 2007-05-I-TX. http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/19/CSBFinalReportValeroSunray.pdf.
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substitution of liquid bleach or ultraviolet light for chlorine in water disinfection118, 119 and the use 

of alternatives to replace HF in gasoline refining.120

b. National Academy of Sciences (NAS) and CSB Investigation Findings

A 2012 report from the NAS that examined the 2008 Bayer CropScience accident in West 

Virginia and community concerns surrounding MIC (and other highly toxic materials), found that 

inherently safer process assessments can be valuable components of PSM that can help facility 

personnel consider the full range of options in process design.121 The NAS report found that while 

Bayer and previous owners of the site incorporated some considerations of IST, these companies 

"did not perform systematic and complete inherently safer process assessments on the processes 

for manufacturing MIC or the carbamate pesticides at the Institute site.” Thus, large amounts of 

MIC, phosgene, and other toxic materials were produced or stored at the site for decades.

The NAS also found that industry as a whole lacks a common understanding of what is 

needed to identify inherently safer processes and accurately quantify their benefits, including the 

potential for reduced emergency preparedness costs. The NAS panel noted that the goal of ISD is 

not only to prevent an accident, but also to reduce the consequences of an accident should one 

occur, thus allowing emergency preparedness planners to focus on more readily manageable 

scenarios.

NAS found that inherently safer process assessments will not always result in a clear, 

well-defined, and feasible path forward. Although one process alternative may be inherently safer 

 

118

 Orum, Paul and Rushing, Reece. March 2, 2010. Leading Water Utilities Secure Their Chemicals.

Center for American Progress, Washington, DC. 

https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/news/2010/03/02/7538/leading-water-utilities-securetheir-chemicals/. 

119 M. McCoy. November 9, 2009. Clorox to Stop Using Chlorine. Chemical & Engineering News.

http://cen.acs.org/articles/87/i45/Clorox-Stop-Using-Chlorine.html.

120 Morris, J. and Hamby, C. May 19, 2014. Use of toxic acid puts millions at risk. Center for Public 

Integrity. Washington, DC. http://www.publicintegrity.org/2011/02/24/2118/use-toxic-acid-puts-millionsrisk.

121

 NAS. 2012. Summary- The Use and Storage of MIC at Bayer CropScience. pp. 3, 7. 

http://dels.nas.edu/resources/static-assets/materials-based-on-reports/reports-in-brief/MIC-SummaryFinal.pdf.
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with respect to one hazard—toxicity of byproducts, for example—the process may present other 

hazards, such as an increased risk of fire or more severe environmental impacts. Choosing 

between options for process design involves considering a series of tradeoffs and developing 

appropriate combinations of inherent, passive, active, and procedural safety systems to manage 

all hazards.

A 2011 analysis of 63 CSB accident investigation reports, studies and bulletins by 

Canadian university researchers identified over 200 examples of recommendations for risk 

reduction measures from the hierarchy of controls that apply to the prevention of accidents or 

consequence mitigation. Thirty-six percent of the examples involved inherent safety, 8% involved 

passive engineered safety, 14% involved active engineered safety and 42% involved procedural 

safety. ISD items were observed to be equally split among the four primary ISD principles of 

minimization, substitution, moderation and simplification.122

The CSB has released reports for two recent accidents that the Board indicated could have 

been avoided if safer technologies had been employed. CSB found that the use of a safer material, 

such as high-chromium steel, would have prevented the accelerated corrosion and failure of 

carbon steel involved in the equipment rupture at the Tesoro Refinery in Anacortes, Washington,

in 2010, which resulted in an explosion and fire that killed seven employees.123 One

recommendation from this CSB accident investigation was that EPA should revise the RMP rule 

to require the documented use of inherently safer systems analysis and the hierarchy of controls 

to the greatest extent feasible when facilities are establishing safeguards for identified process 

hazards. CSB also cited the failure to use more corrosion resistant high-chromium steel as a factor 

 

122 Paul R. Amyotte, Dustin K. MacDonald, Faisal I. Khan. September 2011. An analysis of CSB 

investigation reports concerning the hierarchy of controls. Process Safety Progress. Volume 30, Issue 3, pp. 

261–265. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/prs.10461/abstract

123 CSB. May 2014. Investigation Report: Catastrophic Rupture of Heat Exchanger, Tesoro Anacortes 

Refinery, Anacortes, Washington, April 2, 2010. Report 2010-08-I-WA.

http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/7/Tesoro_Anacortes_2014-May-01.pdf.
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in the 2012 Chevron Refinery accident in Richmond, California, which released hydrocarbons 

that ignited, endangering 19 employees.124

c. State and Local IST Programs

Some state and local governments have included inherent safety requirements in their 

regulations. An IST Review Rule was adopted under the New Jersey TCPA program in May 

2008.125 It requires IST reviews of all facilities covered by the TCPA by evaluating, at a 

minimum, the four IST principles: minimization, substitution, moderation, and simplification. 

NJDEP defined “IST” to mean “the principles or techniques that can be incorporated in a covered 

process to minimize or eliminate the potential for an Extraordinarily Hazardous Substance 

release.”126

The rule includes a checklist developed under the direction of the New Jersey Domestic 

Security Preparedness Task Force. The NJDEP allows any available IST analysis method to be 

used to perform the IST review, but discusses two methods which are commonly used: (1) 

integrating IST into the facility’s PHA study and (2) reviewing and completing a checklist 

containing a number of practical inherent safety considerations. 127 The NJDEP also requires an

IST review report that includes: 

 Information on the review team (name, position, qualifications, etc.); 

 IST analysis method used; 

 IST already present in the process; 

 Additional IST identified; 

 

124

 CSB. January 2014. Regulatory Report: Chevron Richmond Refinery Pipe Rupture and Fire, Chevron 

Richmond Refinery #4 Crude Unit, Richmond, California, August 6, 2012. Report No. 2012-03-I-CA. 

http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/19/CSB_Chevron_Richmond_Refinery_Regulatory_Report.pdf.

125

 NJDEP. March 29, 2012. NJDEP Title 7, Chapter 31 TCPA Program Consolidated Rule Document. 

Pages 17, 66 -68. http://www.state.nj.us/dep/rpp/brp/tcpa/downloads/conrulerev9_fonts.pdf.

126

 NJDEP uses the term “Extraordinarily Hazardous Substance” to describe the substances that are subject 

to the NJ TCPA.

127

 NJDEP, Bureau of Release Prevention. January 15, 2015. Guidance for TCPA, IST Review, Rev. 1. 

http://www.nj.gov/dep/rpp/brp/tcpa/downloads/IST_guidance.pdf .
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 IST to be implemented, and a schedule for their implementation; and 

 A list of IST determined to be infeasible. 

A facility owner or operator must determine an identified alternative’s feasibility, and must 

provide written justification based on both qualitative and quantitative evaluations of 

environmental, human health and safety, legal, technological, and economic factors if it decides 

not to implement it. The ACC noted that NJDEP’s definition of inherent safety allowed “add-on” 

safety equipment and included routine safety improvements that are not part of the inherent safety

concept as defined by CCPS and others.128 NJDEP visited every regulated facility and reviewed 

the IST report with the facility staff. A January 2010 report prepared by the NJDEP to summarize 

the Department’s review of 85 IST reports indicated that approximately 48% of facilities reported 

that they had implemented or scheduled to implement IST measures as a result of conducting the 

IST review.129

California’s Contra Costa County’s ISO130 and the City of Richmond, California’s ISO131

require owners and operators of stationary sources to consider ISS in the development and 

analysis of mitigation systems resulting from a PHA for each covered process, and in the design 

and review of new processes and facilities. Contra Costa County’s CC ISO defined ISS as 

“ISD strategies” as discussed in the latest edition of the CCPS publication, 

“Inherently Safer Chemical Processes,”

132 and to mean feasible alternative 

equipment, processes, materials, lay-outs, and procedures meant to eliminate, 

minimize, or reduce the risk of a major chemical accident or release by modifying 

a process rather than adding external layers of protection. Examples include, but 

 

128 ACC. October 29, 2014. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0694 on Risk Management Program 

RFI, pg. 25.

129 NJDEP. January 15, 2010. IST Implementation Summary. 

http://www.nj.gov/dep/rpp/brp/tcpa/downloads/IST_SUMWEB.pdf

130 Contra Costa County CA. 2006. ISO Code, Title 4 – Health and Safety, Division 450 – Hazardous 

Materials and Wastes, Chapter 450-8 – Risk Management. Contra Costa County, California pp. 5, 21-22. 

http://cchealth.org/hazmat/pdf/iso/2006_iso_official_code_complete.pdf.

131 The Richmond ISO is identical to the Contra Costa County ISO except it does not include the 2006 

amendments made to the Contra Costa ISO which require a safety culture assessment, a human factors 

program, management of change for maintenance, health and safety positions, and a security vulnerability 

analysis. CCHS. July 26, 2011.ISO. City of Richmond Annual Performance Review and Evaluation Report. 

CCHS, Contra Costa County, CA. http://cchealth.org/hazmat/pdf/iso/iso_report_richmond.pdf.

132

 CCPS. 2009. Inherently Safer Chemical Processes: A Life Cycle Approach, 2

nd ed., American Institute 

of Chemical Engineers, CCPS New York, Wiley.
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are not limited to, substitution of materials with lower vapor pressure, lower 

flammability, or lower toxicity; isolation of hazardous processes; and use of 

processes which operate at lower temperatures and/or pressures.

The Contra Costa County ISO requires that the stationary source must select and 

implement ISS to the greatest extent feasible and as soon as administratively practicable. If a 

stationary source concludes that implementation of an ISS is not feasible, the stationary source 

must document the basis for this conclusion in meaningful detail. Contra Costa County requires 

the documentation to include sufficient evidence to demonstrate to CCHS’s satisfaction that 

implementing the ISS is not feasible and the reasons for this conclusion. A claim that 

implementation of an ISS is not feasible cannot be based solely on evidence of reduced profits or 

increased costs. A February 2013 report prepared by CCHS on their ISO program indicated that 4 

of 7 facilities covered under the ordinance’s ISS provision implemented at least one inherently 

safer measure within the previous year.133 The February 2014 CCHS ISO report134 indicated that 

3 of the 7 facilities reported three or more ISS implemented during the last reporting year. In the 

city of Richmond, California, as of July 2011, the two facilities covered by the Richmond ISO 

had implemented 62 safer alternative measures involving ISSs.

135 In June 2014, the Contra Costa 

County ISO requirements were expanded to require evaluation and documentation of ISS analysis 

for new projects and processes and for existing processes, whenever major changes resulting from 

incident investigation recommendations, root cause analysis, or MOC review indicate that change 

could reasonably result in a major chemical accident or release. 

d. Industry and Trade Association Input

 

133

 CCHS. February 26, 2013. Annual Performance Review and Evaluation-ISO. 

134

 CCHS. December 9, 2014. Annual Performance Review and Evaluation-ISO. 

http://cchealth.org/hazmat/pdf/iso/iso-report.pdf.

135

 CCHS. July 26, 2011. ISO. City of Richmond Annual Performance Review and Evaluation Report. 

http://cchealth.org/hazmat/pdf/iso/iso_report_richmond.pdf.
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Numerous trade associations (ACC,

136 SOCMA,137 Independent Petroleum Association of 

America [IPAA] and American Exploration & Production Council [AXPC],

138 API,139

Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies [AMWA],

140 National Association of Chemical 

Distributors [NACD],

141 National Association of Manufacturers [NAM],142 CGA,143 Chlorine 

Institute [CI],

144 AFPM,145 Chemical Safety Advocacy Group [CSAG]146), one company, Axiall 

Corporation,

147 and the Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center [MKOPSC],148) noted in their 

comments on EPA’s RFI, that IST is only one of many approaches that may be employed to 

achieve risk reduction. They also noted that identification and evaluation of a safer alternative is 

not an off-the-shelf concept, but requires a holistic and often complex evaluation involving 

various factors. The commenters also indicated that IST decisions must be process-, site-, and 

hazard-specific, technically and economically feasible, and avoid shifting risk. These commenters 

stated that a regulatory program focused exclusively on eliminating a safety hazard would 

 

136

 ACC. October 29, 2014. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0694 on Risk Management Program 

RFI, PDF pp. 16-28 of 189. 

137

 SOCMA. October 29, 2014. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0560 on Risk Management 

Program RFI, pp. 3-6. 

138

 IPAA and AXPC. October 29, 2014. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0584 on Risk 

Management Program RFI, pp. 21-24. 

139

 API. October 29, 2014. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0624 on Risk Management Program 

RFI, pp. 24-26. 

140

 AMWA. October 29, 2014. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0639 on Risk Management 

Program RFI, pp. 1-7. 

141

 NACD. October 29, 2014. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0614 on Risk Management 

Program RFI, pgs. 6-7. 

142

 NAM. October 29, 2014. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0625 on Risk Management 

Program RFI, pg. 2. 

143

 CGA. October 29, 2014. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0633 on Risk Management Program 

RFI, pg. 4.

144

 CI. October 29, 2014. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0642 on Risk Management Program 

RFI, pgs. 7-8. 

145

 AFPM. October 29, 2014. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0665 on Risk Management 

Program RFI, pgs. 35-38. 

146

 CSAG. October 29, 2013. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0691 on Risk Management 

Program RFI, pgs. 38-21. 

147

 Axiall Corp. October 29, 2013. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0549 on Risk Management 

Program RFI, pg. 5. 

148

 MKOPSC. October 29, 2014. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0543 on Risk Management 

Program RFI, pgs. 101-108. 
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overlook other important considerations and risks that must be factored into an evaluation of a 

process change. They further contended that improper implementation of a seemingly safer 

alternative may lead to undesired consequences. The commenters argued that because an option 

may be inherently safer with regard to some hazards and inherently less safe with regard to 

others, decisions about the optimum strategy for managing risks from all hazards are required.

In their comments on the RFI, AMWA140 also stated that decisions to select the most 

appropriate water treatment methods are best made by water utility managers based on a variety 

of factors. Most importantly, they stated, these managers should also determine which chemical 

will most effectively make water safe for public consumption and achieve compliance with the 

requirements of the Safe Drinking Water Act.

149 According to AMWA, allowing Federal officials 

to “second-guess” these local decisions – with a focus on minimizing potential terror attack 

consequences offsite, rather than ensuring the appropriate treatment and safety of drinking water 

– could lead to inadequately treated water and even detriments to public health. AMWA also 

stated that if utilities were simply instructed to consider whether an alternative might be 

appropriate for them, the costs could be relatively small. But, in AMWA’s view, if this analysis 

were required to include numerous prescribed steps, calculations and justifications for subsequent 

decisions, then costs could quickly escalate beyond what is reasonable and affordable. 

MunicpalH2O, a Risk Management Program/PSM compliance consultant for the 

water/wastewater treatment industry, commented that implementing these changes is very 

expensive and cost prohibitive. The commenter suggested that if a new requirement is placed on 

regulated water and wastewater facilities to perform an analysis of safer technology and 

alternatives, those facilities that have previously completed an analysis of safer technology and 

 

149

 AMWA. October 29, 2014. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0639 on Risk Management 

Program RFI, pgs. 4-5.
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alternatives for their operation should be allowed to utilize their already completed analysis and 

be exempt from any future requirement in this area.150

The American Water Works Association (AWWA) stated that it has found that options 

often classified as inherently safer may in fact have impacts that counter other Federal initiatives 

associated with the nation’s transportation systems, energy consumption, and carbon dioxide 

emissions.151 Because of these risk tradeoffs, critical factors and variables, AWWA maintained 

that the choice of disinfectant should lie with qualified local officials, who are best acquainted 

with the specifics of their local situation.

NACD stated that requiring manufacturers to hold smaller quantities of hazardous 

materials on site would exhaust their limited inventories faster.141 The commenter also indicated 

that distributors would need to deliver hazardous chemicals to these facilities more frequently, 

thereby significantly increasing the number of miles driven to deliver the same amount of product 

and ultimately increasing and shifting risk to the public roadways. In addition, NACD suggested 

there is a higher risk of incident during product loading and unloading, and that more shipments 

would increase the number of times chemicals must be loaded and unloaded, thereby increasing 

risk. NACD also stated that fixed-site risks are more manageable than those with a transportation 

component.

5. Proposed Revisions to Regulatory Text

Based on the considerations discussed above, EPA is proposing to modify the PHA 

provisions in §68.67 to require analysis of potential safer technology and alternatives that would 

include, in the following order of preference: IST or ISD, passive measures, active measures, and 

procedural measures. EPA is limiting the proposed provisions to Program 3 processes in the 

petroleum and coal products manufacturing (NAICS 324), chemical manufacturing (NAICS 325), 

 

150

 MunicipalH2O. October 28, 2103. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0588 on Risk 

Management Program RFI, pgs. 6-7. 

151

 AWWA. October 29, 2103. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0648 on Risk Management 

Program RFI, pgs. 3-5.
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and paper manufacturing (NAICS 322) sectors for reasons discussed in Section IV.C.6. STAA 

Applicability.

EPA is also proposing to require owners or operators to evaluate the feasibility of 

implementing any IST or ISD considered. EPA believes a feasibility analysis of any considered 

IST or ISD is necessary to ensure the facility owner or operator seriously considers whether IST 

or ISD modifications could further reduce risks and prevent accidents at the facility. 

EPA is not proposing to require sources affected by this provision to implement an 

evaluated IST or ISD. The decision to implement such measures must consider the numerous 

factors related to processes, facilities, and society at large. Improper implementation of a 

seemingly safer alternative may lead to undesired consequences. This decision should be based 

on a careful analysis and take into account: the chemicals present and their associated hazards; 

the operations and process conditions involved; consequences to workers, nearby populations and 

the environment; and the types of equipment used that are specific to the facility’s process. The 

analysis may consider the potential to shift risk between populations, locations, environmental 

media (air, water land), etc.

a. Definitions (§68.3)

EPA is proposing to add several definitions that relate to a STAA in §68.3. EPA is adding 

these definitions to describe risk reduction strategies that the owner or operator may use when 

considering safer technology and alternatives. 

First, EPA is proposing that IST or ISD would mean risk management measures that 

minimize the use of regulated substances, substitute less hazardous substances, moderate the use 

of regulated substances, or simplify covered processes in order to make accidental releases less 

likely, or the impacts of such releases less severe. 

Second, EPA is proposing a definition for “passive measures” that would mean risk 

management measures that use design features that reduce the hazard without human, 
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mechanical, or other energy input. Examples of passive measures include pressure vessel designs, 

dikes, berms, and blast walls. 

The third risk reduction measure that EPA is proposing to define is “active measures.” 

These involve engineering controls that rely on mechanical, or other energy input to detect and 

respond to process deviations. Examples of active measures include alarms, safety instrumented 

systems, and detection hardware (such as hydrocarbon sensors). 

Lastly, “procedural measures” would mean risk management measures such as policies, 

operating procedures, training, administrative controls, and emergency response actions to 

prevent or minimize incidents. Examples of procedural measures may include administrative 

limits on process vessel fill levels, procedural steps taken to avoid releases, etc.

In order to evaluate the ISTs and ISDs considered, EPA is proposing to define “feasible”

to mean capable of being accomplished in a successful manner within a reasonable period of 

time, taking into account economic, environmental, legal, social, and technological factors. 

Environmental factors could include consideration of risks transferred elsewhere if a new risk 

reduction measure is adopted. EPA requests comment on these proposed definitions. 

Furthermore, EPA requests comment on whether the term “feasible” is appropriate to characterize 

the viability of IST alternatives being considered. Is there another term, such as “practicable,” 

that may be more appropriate?

b. Process hazard analysis (PHA) (§68.67)

EPA is proposing to modify the PHA provisions by adding paragraph (c)(8) to §68.67, to 

require that the owner or operator of a facility with Program 3 processes in NAICS codes 322, 

324, and 325 address safer technology and alternative risk management measures applicable to 

eliminating or reducing risk from process hazards. EPA is proposing to add paragraph (c)(8)(i) to 

specify that the analysis include, in the following order of preference: IST or design, passive 
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measures, active measures, and procedural measures. The owner or operator may evaluate a 

combination of risk management measures to reduce risk. 

EPA is also proposing to add paragraph (c)(8)(ii) to require that the owner or operator 

determine the feasibility of the IST or ISD considered. The results of the feasibility analysis must 

be documented as part of the current PHA requirements in §68.67(e), which requires the owner or 

operator to document actions to be taken and resolution of recommendations. 

The PHA must be updated and revalidated every five years in accordance with paragraph 

§68.67(f) and as such, this provides the owner or operator opportunities to evaluate the feasibility 

of IST or ISD considered since the last PHA review. EPA believes that five year revalidation will 

give the owner or operator the opportunity to identify new risk reduction strategies, as well as 

revisit strategies that were previously evaluated to determine whether they are now feasible. EPA 

seeks comment on these proposed revisions. Additionally, EPA requests comment on whether to 

require STAA documentation be submitted to EPA and/or the implementing agency.

6. STAA Applicability

EPA is proposing to limit the applicability of the STAA provisions to sources in the 

petroleum and coal products manufacturing (NAICS 324), chemical manufacturing (NAICS 325), 

and paper manufacturing (NAICS 322) sectors for two reasons. First, EPA believes that while 

most sectors regulated under 40 CFR part 68 could identify safer technology and alternatives, 

sources involved in complex manufacturing operations have the greatest range of opportunities to 

identify and implement safer technology, particularly in the area of inherent safety. These sources 

generally produce, transform, and consume large quantities of regulated substances under 

sometimes extreme process conditions and using a wide range of complex technologies. 

Therefore, such sources can often consider the full range of inherent safety options, including 

minimization, substitution, moderation, and simplification, as well as passive, active, and 

procedural measures. This contrasts with regulated sources that simply sell or distribute a 
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particular regulated substance, such as bulk anhydrous ammonia. Although such sources may also 

have opportunities to identify and implement IST, the existence of such sources is predicated on 

handling and distributing a specific regulated substance. Therefore, their opportunities to 

implement certain IST strategies such as substitution or minimization may be limited. Similarly, 

sources involving relatively simpler chemical processes may have opportunities to implement 

chemical substitution strategies but may be limited in their ability to apply moderation and 

simplification strategies. 

Second, EPA notes that RMP facilities in the three selected sectors have been responsible 

for a relatively large number of accidents, deaths, injuries, and property damage.152 EPA 

compared the number of RMP accidents that occurred between January 1, 2004, and December 

31, 2013, reported by twelve industry sectors to the number of facilities in each sector. Each 

sector was comprised of industries based on similar operations involving the RMP substances and 

complexity. The twelve sectors were: petroleum and coal products manufacturing (NAICS 325), 

paper manufacturing (NAICS 322), chemical manufacturing (NAICS 324), food and beverage 

manufacturing (NAICS 311, 312), other manufacturing (all other NAICS 31-33), agricultural 

chemical distributors (NAICS 11, 42491), chemical/petroleum wholesalers (NAICS 4246, 4247), 

other wholesalers (all other NAICS 423, 424), warehouses (NAICS 493), water 

supply/wastewater treatment (NAICS 22131, 22132, 924), oil/gas extraction (NAICS 211) and 

all other (NAICS 211 (except 22131 and 22132), 44, 45, 48, 54, 56, 61, 72). The sector accident 

rates (number of accidents divided by the number of facilities in each sector) ranged from 1.08 to 

0.04. Three sectors have significantly higher accidents rates as compared to other sectors: 1.08 

(petroleum and coal products manufacturing), 0.66 (paper manufacturing) and 0.36 (chemical 

manufacturing). The petroleum and coal products manufacturing accident rate was 6-27 times 

higher, the paper manufacturing accident rate was about 4-6 times higher, and the chemical 

 

152 EPA. January 27, 2016. Technical Background Document for Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Risk 

Management Programs under the Clean Air Act, Section 112(r)(7).
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manufacturing accident rate was 2-9 times higher than other sectors. Therefore, implementation 

of safer technology and alternatives by these facilities in the pulp/paper manufacturing, chemical 

manufacturing, and petroleum refining sectors may prevent serious accidental releases in the 

future.

EPA seeks comment on whether the proposal to limit the STAA provisions to Program 3 

regulated processes in NAICS 322, 324, and 325 is appropriate. EPA also seeks comment on 

whether the Agency should further limit applicability of the STAA provisions to apply only 

during the design stage of new processes or facilities. As part of the SBAR panel process, SERs 

cited limitations with flexibility to evaluate alternatives for custom formula blends and 

compliance with FDA approval requirements and, therefore, requested that EPA consider 

eliminating this provision and/or exempting batch toll manufacturers from this requirement-. EPA 

seeks comment on these alternatives.

7. Guidance on Evaluating Safer Technologies and Alternatives

Some owners or operators have already made process changes considered to be 

inherently safer, but others may not have sufficient information available to effectively assess 

whether their existing processes can incorporate inherently safer measures. To assist owners or 

operators with evaluating options for safer alternatives, EPA and OSHA developed a chemical 

safety alert in June 2015 illustrating the concepts, principles and examples of safer technology 

and alternatives to make industry more aware of this information, while providing sources of 

information for further investigation and review.153

EPA and OSHA have said owners or operators may use any available methodology or 

guidance to conduct their STAA, such as approaches discussed by CCPS (e.g., Hazard and 

 

153

 EPA and OSHA. June 2015. Chemical Safety Alert: Safer Technology and Alternatives. EPA 550-F15-503. https://www2.epa.gov/rmp/chemical-safety-alert-safer-technology-and-alternatives
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Operability Study (HAZOP), What-If?, Checklist, Consequence-based methods),154 the NJ TCPA 

IST guidance materials,155 the Inherently Safer Systems Checklist provided by Contra Costa 

Hazardous Materials Program,156 or the information on OSHA’s webpage, “Transitioning to Safer 

Chemicals: A Toolkit for Employers and Workers.”

157 CCPS provides guidelines for what should 

be provided in an inherent safety analysis and provides example rationales for why inherent 

safety review recommendations were rejected.158 Examples for why inherent safety review 

recommendations may not be feasible, include when the recommendation:

 Is in conflict with existing Federal, state and local laws.

 Is in conflict with RAGAGEP.

 Is economically impractical, such that the process unit would stop being fiscally 

feasible. This can include consideration of:

o Capital investment;

o Product quality;

o Total direct manufacturing costs;

o Operability of the plant; and/or

o Demolition and future clean-up and disposal cost.

 Would have a negative social impact. Some examples could include an unacceptable 

visual or noise impact on the community, or increased traffic congestion.

 

154

 CCPS. 2009. Inherently Safer Chemical Processes: A Life Cycle Approach, 2

nd ed., American Institute 

of Chemical Engineers, CCPS New York, Wiley.

155

 NJDEP, Bureau of Release Prevention. January 15, 2015. Guidance for TCPA, IST Review. 

http://www.nj.gov/dep/rpp/brp/tcpa/downloads/IST_guidance.pdf. See also NJWEC. May 5, 2008. New 

Rule for IST Review by NJDEP. http://www.njwec.org/PDF/Factsheets/CS_IST_FactSheet.pdf.

156

 Contra Costa Hazardous Materials Program. June 15, 2011. ISS Checklist (extracted from IST 

Checklist found in the CCPS Inherently Safer Chemical Processes, 2nd ed., with incorporation of additional 

considerations). http://cchealth.org/hazmat/pdf/iso/attachment_c.pdf.

157

 OSHA. Transitioning to Safer Chemicals, a Toolkit for Employers and Workers. 

https://www.osha.gov/dsg/safer_chemicals/index.html.

158

 CCPS. 2009. Inherently Safer Chemical Processes: A Life Cycle Approach, 2

nd ed. American Institute 

of Chemical Engineers, CCPS. New York, Wiley, 2009. Pgs. 200-202.
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 May violate a license agreement that cannot be modified, and so must remain in 

effect.

 May decrease the hazard, but would increase the overall risk.

 Provides less risk reduction than an alternative recommendation.

8. Alternative Options

As an alternative option, EPA is seeking comment on whether to require facility owners 

or operators to implement any of the feasible options identified in the facility’s analysis. This 

option would rely on the owner or operator to select the specific technology or design to 

implement. EPA seeks comment on the factors EPA should consider when determining whether 

to require implementation of feasible options.

EPA evaluated the NJDEP125 and CCHS134 IST analysis programs as possible models to 

use in the Risk Management Program requirements. EPA seeks comment on whether we should 

include the following in our proposed STAA provisions:

 Aspects of the NJDEP’s program, such as more prescribed documentation of STAA;

or 

 Other aspects of CCHS’s program, such as requiring ISS analysis during the design 

of new processes, for PHA recommendations, or for major changes from an incident 

investigation recommendations, root cause analysis or MOC review that could 

reasonably result in a major chemical accident or release.

Finally, EPA seeks comment on whether either EPA or a third-party should create a 

“clearinghouse” of safer technology and alternatives that allow source owners or operators to 

share useful information and/or consult to identify technologies to evaluate for their process. We 

note that the concept of a clearinghouse has drawn support in comments on the RFI from state 

and local officials, labor and environmental stakeholders, academics, and industry 
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representatives.159 One mechanism of collecting relevant information could be the National 

Working Group on Chemical Safety and Security’s best practices website,

160 which collects and 

shares chemical safety and security best practices, including safer alternatives. Alternatively, EPA 

could require submission of STAA analyses, or information from those analyses, directly to EPA, 

and develop its own website. The information shared on such a website may include practicable 

risk reduction measures that could be applied at various facilities to mitigate threats to the public, 

worker, health, environment, and facility during the production, transport, and use of chemicals. 

D. Stationary Source Location and Emergency Shutdown

Serious accidents often highlight numerous safety concerns and emphasize the need to 

consider existing regulations, industry standards, recommended practices and guidance to reduce 

risks of future incidents. Two issues of particular importance include the location of stationary 

sources and their emergency shutdown capabilities.

1. Stationary Source Location

The location of stationary sources, and the location and configuration of regulated 

processes and equipment within a source, can significantly affect the severity of an accidental 

release. The location of the stationary source in relation to public and environmental receptors 

may exacerbate the impacts of an accidental release, such as blast overpressures or concentrations 

 

159 AMWA. October 29, 2014. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0639 on Risk Management 

Program RFI, p. 3; BlueGreen Alliance. October 27, 2014. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0579 

on Risk Management Program RFI. p. 6. www.bluegreenalliance.org; BWD. October 24, 2014. Comment 

No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0654 on Risk Management Program RFI. p. 3. Beaver Water District 

(BWD), Lowell, Arkansas; CCHS. October 28, 2014. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0546 on 

Risk Management Program RFI, p. 8; CPCD. October 29, 2014. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-

0644 on Risk Management Program RFI, pgs. 16, 18-19; MKOPSC. October 29, 2014. Comment No. 

EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0543 on Risk Management Program RFI, p. 105; Tickner, J. October 29, 2014. 

Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0688 on Risk Management Program RFI. p. 6. University of 

Massachusetts, Lowell, Massachusetts; TURI. October 29, 2014. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-

0328-0539 on Risk Management Program RFI. Toxics Use Reduction Institute (TURI), University of 

Massachusetts, Lowell, Massachusetts. p. 5; United Steelworkers. October 29, 2014. Comment No. EPAHQ-OEM-2014-0328-0547 on Risk Management Program RFI, p. 5.

160

 OSHA. 2014. EO13650 Best Practices. 

https://www.osha.gov/chemicalexecutiveorder/LLIS/index.html.
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of toxic gases, or conversely may allow such effects to dissipate prior to reaching receptors. The 

lack of sufficient distance between the source boundary and neighboring residential areas was a 

significant factor in the severity of several major chemical accidents, including, among others, the 

Bhopal disaster161 and the recent West Fertilizer accident. In the Bhopal disaster, most of the 

deaths and injuries occurred in a residential area that had grown up next to the plant. In the West 

Fertilizer accident, an apartment complex and a nursing home located approximately 450 feet and 

600 feet, respectively, from the source of the explosion were heavily damaged, resulting in 3

public fatalities (a total of 15 people were killed in the explosion). The explosion also caused over 

260 injuries, as well as damage to over 350 homes and three schools located near the plant.162 

Facility designers have long recognized the potential benefits of adding buffer or safety 

zones (i.e., controlled areas separating the public and other facilities from the consequences of 

process incidents) when selecting the location for new chemical facilities. For existing facilities, 

owners have sometimes compensated nearby residents to relocate away from the facility 

boundary in order to create a buffer zone where one did not previously exist, or where adjacent 

residential areas had been developed after the facility itself was constructed. 

The selection of locations of processes and process equipment within a stationary source 

can impact the surrounding community not only by the proximity of the accidental release to 

offsite receptors near the facility boundary (e.g., people, infrastructure, environmental resources) 

but also by increasing the likelihood of subsequent releases from other nearby processes 

compromised by the initial release. The 1984 disaster at the PEMEX liquefied petroleum gas 

(LPG) tank farm in San Juan Ixhuatepec, Mexico, illustrates the potential for such effects. In this 

accident, an LPG pipeline rupture resulted in a large ground fire that spread to nearby LPG 

 

161

 Lees, Frank P. 1996. Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, Volume 3, 2nd ed. Appendix 5 Bhopal. 

Butterworth-Heinemann, Oxford, Great Britain.

162

 CSB. January 2016. Final Investigation Report, West Fertilizer Company Fire and Explosion, West, 

TX, April 17, 2013. Report 2013-02-I-TX, pp. 13, 30, 49, 53, 54. 

http://www.csb.gov/west-fertilizer-explosion-and-fire-/.
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storage vessels, initiating a series of massive explosions. The cascading explosions and fires 

ultimately destroyed the entire facility and many nearby residences, resulting in over 500 

fatalities and thousands of severe injuries.163

In the United States in 2007, a large fire at the Valero McKee refinery in Sunray, Texas, 

resulted in the release of chlorine gas and sulfuric acid from an adjacent process, which prevented 

responders from entering the area and extinguishing the fire for more than two days.164

At West Fertilizer, the Risk Management Program-regulated anhydrous ammonia process 

was located near the AN storage area. Although the AN explosion did not cause any catastrophic

failure of the ammonia storage vessels, the potential for a release existed. A 1994 explosion 

involving AN solution at Terra Industries in Port Neal, Iowa, which killed four workers, also 

damaged on-site ammonia tanks, creating an ammonia cloud that resulted in the evacuation of 

2,500 people.165

The PSM standard and RMP rule both require that facility siting be addressed as one 

element of a PHA (see 29 CFR 1910.11 9(e)(2) and (3)(v)), and 40 CFR 68.67(c)). While EPA 

has not provided any guidance on how to adequately address stationary source siting in the PHA, 

RMP facility owners or operators can refer to industry guidance on siting considerations. The 

following publications provide guidance on facility siting:

 API Recommended Practice 752, Management of Hazards Associated With Location 

of Process Plant Buildings, 3rd Edition, December 2009;

 API Recommended Practice 753, Management of Hazards Associated with Location 

of Process Plant Portable Buildings, First Edition, June 2007;

 

163 Lees, Frank P. 1996. Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, Volume 3, 2nd ed. Appendix 4 Mexico 

City. Butterworth-Heinemann, Oxford, Great Britain.

164

 CSB. July 9, 2008. Investigation Report: LPG Fire at Valero-McKee Refinery, Sunray, Texas, February 

16, 2007. Report No. 2007-05-I-TX. http://www.csb.gov/valero-refinery-propane-fire/.

165 EPA, Region 7, Emergency Response and Removal Branch (Kansas City, KS). January 1996. Chemical 

Accident Investigation Report: Terra Industries, Inc., Nitrogen Fertilizer Facility, Port Neal, Iowa (January 

1996). http://archive.epa.gov/emergencies/docs/chem/web/pdf/cterra.pdf.
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 CCPS Guidelines for Evaluating Process Plant Buildings for External Explosions, 

Fires, and Toxic Releases, Second Edition, 2012; and 

 CCPS Guidelines for Facility Siting and Layout (2003).

The first three references listed above focus on providing guidance and best practices on 

establishing the location of occupied buildings within a facility, but generally do not address the 

potential risks to offsite receptors associated with the location of the facility or processes within 

the facility, nor do they consider the potential for releases caused by natural hazards that may 

occur in particular locations. The CCPS Guidelines for Facility Siting and Layout address both 

external factors influencing site selection, as well as factors internal to the source that could 

influence site layout and equipment spacing.

At this time, EPA is not proposing any additional requirements for location of stationary 

sources. EPA seeks comment on whether such requirements should be considered for future 

rulemakings, including the scope of such requirements, or whether the Agency should publish 

guidance.

2. Emergency Shutdown

In addition to properly locating stationary sources in relation to surrounding receptors, 

and locating processes within sources so as to minimize the possibility of cascading release 

events, accidents such as these highlight the importance of being able to quickly and safely shut 

down processes where accidental releases are occurring or may imminently occur. The RMP 

regulation requires owners and operators of stationary sources to develop and implement written 

operating procedures for the safe and timely emergency shutdown of Program 2 and 3 processes, 

to ensure operator training for these procedures, and for maintaining the mechanical integrity of 

emergency shutdown systems. However, the regulation does not explicitly require that all covered 

processes must include emergency shutdown systems.
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EPA encourages owner and operators of stationary sources to consider location of 

stationary sources and process equipment and the adequacy of emergency shutdown systems at 

their facilities to determine if changes are necessary to both reduce risks of an accidental release 

and ensure that procedures are in-place to mitigate those effects. Emergency shutdown or putting 

a process into a safe operation mode in the event of an emergency is a preventive safeguard to 

address hazard(s) identified as part of hazard review or PHA. Thus, the hazard review required 

under §68.50 or the PHA required under §68.67 should identify the use of this safeguard, when 

appropriate. 

At this time, EPA is not proposing any additional requirements for emergency shutdown 

systems. However, EPA seeks comment on whether such requirements should be considered for 

future rulemakings, including the scope of such requirements, or whether the Agency should 

publish guidance.

V. Emergency Response Preparedness Requirements

A. Emergency Response Program Coordination with Local Responders

Subpart E of the RMP rule, the emergency response provisions, applies to facilities with 

Program 2 or 3 processes. These provisions require owners or operators of regulated facilities

with Program 2 or 3 processes to coordinate with local response authorities and in some cases 

develop an emergency response program in accordance with §68.95 to address how the owner or 

operator of the facility will respond to accidental releases.

166 The rule requires the owner or 

operator to prepare and implement an emergency response program to protect public health and 

the environment, unless the stationary source is included in the community emergency response 

plan developed under section 303 of Emergency Planning & Community Right-to-Know Act 

(EPCRA) (for sources with regulated toxic substances) and has coordinated response actions with 

 

166 Owners or operators of stationary sources with Program 1 processes are required to coordinate 

emergency response procedures with local emergency planning and response organizations under 

§68.10(b)(3)). This proposal would not affect that requirement. 
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the local fire department (for sources with only regulated flammable substances). An owner or 

operator that needs to develop an emergency response program (i.e., be a “responding” facility), 

will need to include the following elements in that program: 

 An emergency response plan;

 Procedures for the use of emergency response equipment and for its inspection, 

testing, and maintenance;

 Training for employees; and

 Procedures to review and update the emergency response plan to reflect changes 

at the stationary source and ensure that employees are informed of changes. 

The emergency response plan must also be coordinated with local response authorities.

An owner or operator of a facility who is relying on local responders to respond to an 

accidental release (i.e., a “non-responding” facility) when the stationary source has been included 

in the community emergency response plan developed under section 303 of EPCRA (for sources 

with regulated toxic substances) or has coordinated response actions with the local fire 

department (for sources with only regulated flammable substances, and without regulated toxic 

substances) is not required to develop an emergency response program. However, the owner or 

operator must also ensure that appropriate notification mechanisms are in place to notify 

emergency responders when there is a need for a response.

Risk Management Program regulated facilities must indicate within their RMP whether 

or not they are a responding facility (i.e., by indicating compliance with mandatory elements of 

emergency response plans required in §68.95(a)(1)). Our review of the RMP*Info database has 

indicated that the majority of RMP facilities claim to be non-responding facilities.167 However, 

during facility inspections, EPA has often found that facilities either are not included in the 

 

167

 EPA. January 27, 2016. Technical Background Document for Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Risk 

Management Programs under the Clean Air Act, Section 112(r)(7).
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community emergency plan or have not properly coordinated response actions with local

authorities.168,169,170 State and local response officials echoed this concern during listening 

sessions conducted under EO 13650, and in feedback provided to EPA in conjunction with the 

RFI.171,172 This problem occurs with both responding and non-responding facilities, but it is 

particularly troublesome for non-responding facilities, because if the facility itself does not 

maintain the capability to respond to emergencies, and local authorities are not able to respond, 

then a proper response to an accidental release at the facility may not occur or may be 

significantly delayed. Also, when local responders are unfamiliar with the hazards of the facility, 

they may not be prepared to safely respond. 

Poor coordination between chemical facilities and local emergency responders has been 

identified as a factor contributing to the severity of chemical accidents. For example, following 

the August 2008 explosion and fire at the Bayer CropScience facility in Institute, West Virginia, 

the CSB found that lack of effective coordination between facility and local responders prevented 

responding agencies from receiving timely information updates about the continually changing 

conditions at the scene, prevented a public shelter-in-place order from reaching the local 

community, and may have resulted in toxic exposure to on-scene public emergency responders. 

 

168

 EPA Press Release. July 20, 2011. National Chemical Company will Upgrade Facilities and Pay Fine 

to Settle Clean Air Violations.

http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/1e5ab1124055f3b28525781f0042ed40/9884f5d5e5e6368c85257

8d300642a3e!OpenDocument

169

 EPA Press Release. February 13, 2013. Koch Nitrogen Company to Pay $380,000 Civil Penalty for 

CAA Violations at Facilities in Iowa and Kansas.

http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/d0cf6618525a9efb85257359003fb69d/a9537cb213c0371985257

b1100738628!OpenDocument

170

 EPA Press Release. May 27, 2014. EPA Moves to Improve Emergency Planning at Facilities in NJ and 

NY; Inspections Focus on Information on Chemical Hazards Needed by First Responders during 

Emergency Responses.

http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/0/C6DB6A8A0918857F85257CE5005FEE24

171

 Gablehouse, T. October 28, 2014. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0679 on Risk 

Management Program RFI, PDF pp. 5-6, NASTTPO, Denver, CO.

172

 Elder, M., October 29, 2014. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0641 on Risk Management 

Program RFI, Oklahoma Hazardous Materials Emergency Response Commission (OHMERC).
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Additionally, facility authorities initially prevented local responders from gaining access to the 

site of the incident.

173

The April 17, 2013 accident at West Fertilizer resulted in the deaths of 12 first 

responders. During its investigation of the accident, the CSB found that the LEPC did not include 

the facility in the community emergency response plan.

174

Another example is the August 2002 accidental chlorine release at the DPC Enterprises 

facility in Festus, Missouri, that resulted in sixty-three people from the surrounding community 

seeking medical evaluation at the local hospital for symptoms of respiratory distress. The CSB 

investigation found that the DPC emergency response plan did not provide clear guidance on 

when facility emergency response personnel should respond to a release or when response by an 

offsite community hazardous materials response team is required. The CSB also found that 

coordination between local emergency planning and response entities and DPC was insufficient 

to ensure that the emergency plan would provide for timely community notification and 

mitigation of the release.

175

CAA Section 112(r) clearly anticipated that the Risk Management Program regulation 

would require regulated stationary sources to develop an emergency response program and 

provide for a response to releases of regulated substances. Section 112(r)(7)(B)(ii) states that the 

regulations shall require the owner or operator to “provide a prompt emergency response to any 

such releases in order to protect human health and the environment,” and that the RMP shall 

include 

 

173 CSB. January 2011. Investigation Report: Pesticide Chemical Runaway Reaction Pressure Vessel 

Explosion, Bayer CropScience, LP, Institute, West Virginia, August 28, 2008. Report No. 2008-08-I-WV, 

http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/19/Bayer_Report_Final.pdf

174

 .

CSB. January 2016. Final Investigation Report, West Fertilizer Company Fire and Explosion, West, TX, 

April 17, 2013. Report 2013-02-I-TX, pgs. 201-203. 

http://www.csb.gov/west-fertilizer-explosion-and-fire-/.

175 CSB. May 2003. Investigation Report: Chlorine Release, DPC Enterprises, L.P., Festus, Missouri, 

August 14, 2002. Report No. 2002-04-I-MO. http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/19/DPC_Report.pdf
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a response program providing for specific actions to be taken in response to an 

accidental release of a regulated substance so as to protect human health and the 

environment, including procedures for informing the public and local agencies 

responsible for responding to accidental releases, emergency health care, and 

employee training measures. 

Accordingly, in the preamble discussion of the 1996 final RMP rule, EPA explained that 

the option to be a non-responding facility was contingent on local community responders’ ability 

to appropriately respond to the stationary source’s hazards.

The final rule also provides relief for sources that are too small to respond to 

releases with their own employees; these sources will not be required to develop 

emergency response plans provided that procedures for notifying non-employee 

emergency responders have been adopted and that appropriate responses to their 

hazards have been addressed in the community emergency response plan 

developed under EPCRA (42 U.S.C. 11003) for toxics or coordinated with the 

local fire department for flammables. (61 FR 31673, 31698, June 20, 1996.)

EPA recognizes that some sources will only evacuate their employees in the event 

of a release. For these sources, EPA will not require the development of emergency 

response plans, provided that appropriate responses to their hazards have been 

discussed in the community emergency response plan developed under 42 U.S.C. 

11003 for toxics or coordinated with the local fire department for flammables. (61 

FR 31681, June 20, 1996.) 

Because many sources covered by this rule may be too small to handle emergency 

response themselves, EPA has provided, in this new section, the actions they must 

take if they will not respond to releases. Specifically, for sources with regulated 

toxic substances, the source must be addressed in the community emergency 

response plan developed under EPCRA section 303. Sources with regulated 

flammable substances must coordinate response actions with the local fire 

department. These sources must also establish a mechanism to contact local 

emergency responders. Sources that do not meet these requirements must comply 

with EPA’s emergency response program requirements. (61 FR 31712, June 20, 

1996.)

EPA also explained this point in the RMP Guidance:

176

If your employees will not respond to accidental releases of regulated substances, 

you need not comply with the emergency response plan and program requirements 

provided you coordinate with local response agencies to ensure that they will be 

prepared to respond to an emergency at your facility.

 

176

 General Guidance on Risk Management Programs for Chemical Accident Prevention (40 CFR Part 68), 

EPA-550-B-04-001, April 2004, p. 8-1. http://www2.epa.gov/rmp/guidance-facilities-risk-managementprograms-rmp#general
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These excerpts from the 1996 final rule and RMP Guidance indicate that from its inception, the 

RMP rule has required that owners and operators of regulated sources must either meet the full 

emergency response program requirements of §68.95 or ensure that local responders are capable 

of responding to releases at the source. In spite of this fact, the history of poor emergency 

response coordination during accidental releases, EPA’s findings during compliance inspections, 

and recent feedback provided to EPA’s RFI and during EO 13650 listening sessions indicate that 

many regulated sources have not provided for an adequate emergency response.

1. Proposed Revisions to Emergency Response Coordination Requirements 

EPA proposes to amend the rule requirements to clarify the obligations of the owner or 

operator of the stationary source to coordinate emergency response with local authorities. In order 

to provide clarity, EPA is proposing to reorganize Subpart E to address the applicability 

provisions for responding and non-responding sources in §68.90, describe required coordination 

activities in new §68.93, and include a new requirement in §68.95 for owners or operators of 

responding stationary sources to review and update their emergency response program at least 

annually. 

EPA is proposing to reorganize §68.90 to specifically describe the applicability of the 

emergency response program requirements for non-responding and responding facilities in 

paragraphs (a) and (b), respectively. 

The proposed revisions to §68.90 paragraph (a) describe the applicability provisions for 

non-responding facilities. The owner or operator of a stationary source need not comply with the 

emergency response program requirements in §68.95 provided that after conducting coordination 

activities required under the proposed §68.93, the local response authorities and the owner or 

operator of the stationary source determine that local public emergency response capabilities are 

adequate to respond to accidental releases at the stationary source; appropriate mechanisms are in 

place to notify emergency responders when an accident occurs; and the LEPC or equivalent local 
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response authorities have not requested in writing that the owner or operator develop an 

emergency response program for the stationary source in accordance with §68.95. 

Section 68.90 paragraph (b) describes applicability provisions for responding facilities.

The owner or operator of the stationary source would be required to comply with the emergency 

response program requirements of §68.95 when the outcome of the annual coordination activities 

with local response authorities required under §68.93 indicates that local public emergency 

response capabilities are not adequate to respond to accidental releases of regulated substances at 

the stationary source. If, as a result of the annual coordination, the facility owner or operator must 

develop an emergency response program in accordance with §68.95, the owner or operator should 

develop the program as soon as reasonably practicable. The owner or operator would also be 

required to comply with §68.95 upon receiving a written request to do so from the LEPC, local 

fire department, or other local emergency response officials having jurisdiction. 

EPA believes that it is appropriate to provide a mechanism for the local emergency 

response officials to request that the owner or operator of the stationary source comply with the 

emergency response program requirements of §68.95 because it is the presence of the source and 

its attendant hazards that create a risk to the surrounding community of accidental releases. 

Therefore, in the event that the outcome of the coordination activities with local response 

authorities indicates that local public emergency response capabilities are not adequate, the 

ultimate burden of providing for an appropriate response to releases of regulated substances from 

the source should rest with the owner or operator. This philosophy is consistent with the general

duty clause of CAA section 112(r)(1), which among other things requires the owner or operator to 

minimize the consequences of accidental releases that do occur.

EPA is proposing to add §68.93 to clarify emergency response coordination activities and 

require that these activities be documented and occur annually. Section 68.93 would require the 

owner or operator of a stationary source with a Program 2 or 3 process to coordinate with local 
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response authorities to ensure that appropriate resources and capabilities are in place to respond to 

an accidental release of a regulated substance. As part of the coordination, the owner or operator 

and the local response authorities would work together to determine who will respond if an 

incident occurs, and what would be an appropriate response. Paragraph (a) would require 

coordination to occur at least annually, and more frequently if necessary, to address changes at 

the source; in the source’s emergency action plan; in local authorities’ response resources and 

capabilities; or in the local community emergency response plan. Paragraph (b) would require the 

owner or operator to document coordination with local authorities, including the names of 

individuals involved and their contact information (phone number, email address, and 

organizational affiliations), dates of coordination activities, and the nature of coordination 

activities. The proposed paragraph (c) specifies who should be involved in the coordination for 

both stationary sources with regulated toxic and flammable substances. If a stationary source 

involves a regulated toxic substance, then the source must be included in the community 

emergency response plan developed under EPCRA.

EPA also proposes to revise §68.95 to ensure that notification procedures include 

notifications to Federal, Tribal, and state agencies and to require that emergency response plans 

be updated at least annually. Specifically, EPA is revising §68.95(a)(1)(i) to add a reference to 

Federal and state agencies. EPA is also proposing to revise §68.95(a)(4) to specify that the owner 

or operator review and update the program annually or more frequently if necessary (e.g., to 

incorporate lessons learned from incident investigations, or if changes occur in emergency 

notification systems, local responder organizations, stationary source hazards, or other critical 

emergency response planning information). EPA is also proposing to revise §68.95(c) to replace 

local emergency planning committee with the acronym LEPC.
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Additionally, EPA is proposing to revise §68.3 to add LEPC for local emergency 

planning committee. The term is used throughout the rule and means the LEPC as established 

under 42 U.S.C. 11001(c).

Finally, EPA is proposing to revise §68.12 (General requirements) to be consistent with 

these proposed coordination requirements. EPA is proposing revisions to Program 2 requirements 

under §68.12(c) in which EPA would renumber paragraph §68.12(c)(4) and (c)(5) as §68.12(c)(5)

and (c)(6). New paragraph §68.12(c)(4) would specify the owner or operator’s requirements to 

coordinate response actions with local emergency planning and response agencies as provided in 

§68.93. EPA is proposing similar revisions to Program 3 requirements under §68.12(d). EPA 

would renumber paragraph §68.12(d)(4) and (d)(5) as §68.12(d)(5) and (d)(6). New paragraph 

§68.12(d)(4) would specify the owner or operator’s requirements to coordinate response actions 

with local emergency planning and response agencies as provided in §68.93.

EPA believes that these proposed amendments clarify existing obligations and prevent 

situations where neither regulated stationary sources nor local authorities are prepared to 

appropriately respond to accidental releases at the source. EPA recognizes that an appropriate 

response – even for responding facilities – may sometimes involve evacuation of facility 

employees, evacuation or sheltering of nearby residents, and implementation of other defensive 

measures to prevent harm to workers, responders, and the public. However, planning for such 

situations should occur in advance, so that either the source or local responders are prepared to 

implement response measures that are appropriate to the hazards of the stationary source. 

If local public responders are not capable of responding to accidental releases at a 

stationary source, the owner or operator can continue to satisfy the applicable requirements of 

Subpart E (Emergency Response) in a number of different ways beyond training and equipping 

the source’s own employees to respond to releases. For example, EPA has observed situations 

where stationary source owners or operators supplement their on-site response capability using 
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response contractors, or via mutual aid agreements with other nearby sources. In the RMP 

Guidance, EPA explained that this may be the most appropriate course of action to comply with 

the emergency response requirements of Subpart E, particularly for small sources with few 

employees:

177

EPA recognizes that, in some cases (particularly for retailers and other small 

operations with few employees), it may not be appropriate for employees to 

conduct response operations for releases of regulated substances. For example, it 

would be inappropriate, and probably unsafe, for an ammonia retailer with only 

one full-time employee to expect that a tank fire could be handled without the help 

of the local fire department or other emergency responder. EPA does not intend to 

force such facilities to develop emergency response capabilities. At the same time, 

you are responsible for ensuring effective emergency response to any releases at 

your facility. If your local public responders are not capable of providing such 

response, you must take steps to ensure that effective response is available (e.g., 

by hiring response contractors).

Such arrangements would continue to be acceptable to the Agency as a means to meet a 

facility’s emergency response program obligations. Alternatively, stationary source owners or 

operators can work with local emergency response officials to identify gaps in local responder 

capabilities, and assist local authorities in supplementing those capabilities, as appropriate, by 

providing the equipment or training needed to allow local public responders to prepare for and 

carry out an appropriate response to accidental releases at the source. Close and ongoing 

coordination between stationary source owners or operators and local responders will allow such 

capability gaps to be quickly identified and corrected and appropriate response plans to be 

developed. Coordination will also assist local responders in complying with other Federal, state, 

and local emergency preparedness, planning, and response requirements, such as planning 

requirements under EPCRA, training requirements under the OSHA Hazardous Waste Operations 

and Emergency Response standard (29 CFR 1910.120), and other applicable requirements.

 

177

 See General Guidance on Risk Management Programs for Chemical Accident Prevention (40 CFR Part 

68), EPA-550-B-04-001, April 2004, page 8-1. http://www2.epa.gov/rmp/guidance-facilities-riskmanagement-programs-rmp#general
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As part of the SBAR Panel process, SERs expressed frustration with the requirement to 

coordinate with local emergency response officials because some LEPCs are not active or do not 

have sufficient resources to fully implement EPCRA requirements. SERs requested clarification 

on how to comply with coordination requirements when facility owners or operators make good 

faith efforts to coordinate with local emergency response officials who do not respond to 

coordination attempts. EPA recommends that these coordination attempts be documented and 

maintained at the facility. However, if the LEPC is inactive and has not developed a community 

emergency response plan or has not included the facility in the plan (for toxic substances), or the 

owner or operator is unable to coordinate response actions with the local fire department (for 

flammable substances), then the owner or operator must develop an emergency response program 

in accordance with §68.95. 

EPA seeks comment on this approach. Will the proposed amendments contribute to 

improvements in emergency response planning and coordination? Are there additional practices 

that EPA should consider that significantly improve planning and coordination? Should EPA 

further clarify what is necessary for RMP facility owners or operators to adequately coordinate 

their emergency response program with local authorities? Should coordination activities and 

emergency plan updates be required annually, or is some other frequency appropriate? How 

should disagreements between local authorities and the source owner or operator concerning 

which party should provide for an emergency response to releases of regulated substances at the 

source be resolved? When an LEPC makes a written request for the owner or operator to comply 

with the emergency response program requirements of §68.95, should the LEPC be required to 

provide a rationale for the request that meets certain criteria, to ensure that the request is

reasonable? If so, what criteria should be established?

2. Alternative Options
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EPA considered an alternative that would require owners and operators of all stationary 

sources with Program 2 or Program 3 processes to comply with the full emergency response 

program requirements of §68.95. Under this option, RMP facilities would still be required to 

perform the annual local coordination and to document activities described previously. However, 

it would eliminate the flexibility of the current rule and require all Program 2 and 3 facilities to be 

“responding” facilities. EPA did not propose this approach because it does not consider the 

existing capabilities of local responders and shifts to the regulated stationary sources the burden 

associated with developing and maintaining an appropriate and effective emergency response 

capability from local responders in communities that may have adequate capabilities. 

Additionally, EPA believes that this approach would place an unnecessary burden on small 

facilities.

EPA seeks comment on this alternative approach and whether there are any other 

alternative options that EPA should consider prior to issuing a final action. 

B. Facility Exercises 

Exercising an emergency response plan is critical to ensure that response personnel 

understand their roles, that local emergency responders are familiar with the hazards at the 

facility, and that the emergency response plan is appropriate and up-to-date. It ensures that 

personnel are properly trained and lessons learned from exercises can be used to identify future 

training needs.

Poor emergency response procedures during some recent accidents have highlighted the 

need for facilities to conduct periodic emergency response exercises. For example, the CSB’s 

investigation of the April 2004 vinyl chloride monomer (VCM) explosion at the FPC USA in 

Illiopolis, Illinois, found that the facility’s failure to rehearse a response to a large VCM release 

made the consequences of the accident significantly worse, and likely contributed to the deaths of 
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operators at the facility.

178 The CSB found that after the VCM release began, and despite 

knowingly working directly over a toxic and highly flammable VCM cloud, two operators did not 

put on protective breathing apparatus, activate emergency alarms, or evacuate the facility, 

contrary to emergency response actions outlined in facility emergency procedures. These 

operators consequently died as a result of injuries received during the ensuing explosion.

Failure to conduct emergency exercises involving local authorities may also have resulted 

in injuries and fatalities to local responders. As previously indicated, 12 local responders died as a 

result of injuries received during the West Fertilizer explosion, and the CSB investigation report 

findings show that inadequate emergency planning contributed to the severity of the accident and 

that responders were not sufficiently aware of the risks at the facility.

179 According to accident 

history information obtained from EPA’s RMP national database, accidents occurring between 

2004 and 2014 resulted in at least 44 responder injuries and 2 additional fatalities.180 The 2002 

accident involving a chlorine release at DPC Enterprises in Festus, Missouri, resulted in 66 

people seeking medical attention at the local hospital, including 63 members of the community 

surrounding the facility. The CSB’s investigation found that DPC’s emergency response plan had 

inadequate procedures for training and drills, and that these deficiencies resulted in DPC’s 

inadequate preparation for a large uncontrolled chlorine release.181 In 2003, another DPC 

Enterprises facility in Glendale, Arizona, had an accident involving a large chlorine release. In 

that accident, 11 Glendale police officers responding to the accident were exposed to chlorine and 

required medical treatment. The CSB’s investigation found that police officers responding to the 

 

178

 CSB. March 2007. Investigation Report: VCM Explosion, FPC., Illiopolis, Illinois, April 23, 2004; 

Report No. 2004-10-I-IL. http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/19/Formosa_IL_Report.pdf.

179

 CSB. January 2016. Final Investigation Report: West Fertilizer Company Fire and Explosion, West, 

TX, April 17, 2013. Report No. 2013-02-I-TX, pp. 14, 116-117, 200-204, 241-242.

http://www.csb.gov/west-fertilizer-explosion-and-fire-/.

180

 EPA. January 27, 2016. Technical Background Document for Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Risk 

Management Programs under the Clean Air Act, Section 112(r)(7).

181

 CSB. May 2003. Investigation Report: Chlorine Release, DPC Enterprises, L.P., Festus, Missouri, 

August 14, 2002. Report No. 2002-04-I-MO. http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/19/DPC_Report.pdf.
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accident to assist in evacuation of nearby residents entered the hazardous area without any 

respiratory protection. The CSB recommended that the Glendale fire and police departments 

schedule periodic hazardous materials incident drills to ensure safe and effective responses to 

future hazardous materials incidents.182

On April 12, 2004, a runaway chemical reaction at MFG Chemical, Inc., in Dalton, 

Georgia, resulted in the release of toxic vapor clouds of allyl alcohol and allyl chloride into the 

surrounding community. The accident resulted in the evacuation of more than 200 families and 

medical treatment for 154 people, including 15 responders. The CSB found that MFG did not 

train or equip employees to conduct emergency mitigation actions, and that local emergency 

response agencies did not adequately prepare for responding to emergencies involving hazardous 

chemicals. The CSB recommended that the facility obtain equipment and provide emergency 

response training to employees, and that local agencies conduct drills for emergencies at fixed 

facilities.

183

Other EPA and Federal agency programs require exercises as an element of their 

emergency response programs. For example, under the Oil Pollution Prevention regulation (40 

CFR part 112), facilities subject to the Facility Response Plan (FRP) provisions are required to 

conduct exercises, including evaluation procedures (§112.21). FRP facility owners and operators 

are encouraged to follow the National Preparedness for Response Exercise Program (PREP) 

Guidelines,

184 which were developed to provide a mechanism for compliance with EPA, U.S. 

Coast Guard (USCG), and U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI) exercise requirements for oil 

pollution response. The PREP guidelines include both internal and external exercise components. 

 

182

 CSB. February 2007. Investigation Report: Chlorine Release, DPC Enterprises, L.P., Glendale, 

Arizona, November 17, 2003. Report No. 2004-02-I-AZ. http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/19/DPC2-_Final.pdf.

183

 CSB. April 2006. Investigation Report: Toxic Chemical Vapor Cloud Release, MFG Chemical, Inc., 

Dalton, Georgia, April 12, 2004. Report No. 2004-09-I-GA. 

http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/19/MFG_Report.pdf.

184

 USCG, EPA, and DOI. August 2002. National PREP Guidelines.

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/uscg/prep_gid.pdf.
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Internal exercises include notification exercises, emergency procedure exercises, spill 

management team tabletop exercises, and equipment deployment exercises. External exercises 

include area exercises that include members of the response community, and governmentinitiated unannounced exercises. 

Other examples include exercises that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), 

in conjunction with the Federal Emergency Management Agency, requires commercial nuclear 

power plant operators to perform with state and local governments. These exercises evaluate both 

on-site and offsite emergency response capabilities. The NRC requires all nuclear reactor

emergency plans to address the necessary provisions for coping with radiological emergencies at 

each facility in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q), Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and for commercial 

nuclear power reactors only, 10 CFR 50.47(b). Reactor operators are required to train personnel 

and perform emergency preparedness exercises in order to to test the adequacy of the plans, 

ensure personnel are familiar with their duties, and maintain response capabilities.

Some state and local regulations also require emergency response exercises. For example, 

the New Jersey TCPA, which incorporates the requirements of 40 CFR part 68, contains certain 

additional provisions imposed under state law, including a requirement for regulated facilities to 

perform at least one emergency response exercise per calendar year. Non-responding facilities are 

required to invite at least one outside responding agency designated in the emergency response 

plan to participate in the exercise, and employees of the facility are required to perform their 

assigned responsibilities for all emergency response exercises. Owners or operators of all other 

facilities are required to perform at least one full scale emergency response exercise in which the 

emergency response team as well as containment, mitigation, and monitoring equipment are 

deployed at a strength appropriate to demonstrate the adequacy and implementation of the plan.

185

 

185

 NJDEP, Title 7, Chapter 31 Toxic Catastrophe Prevention Act Program, Consolidated Rule Document, 

Section 7:31-5.2; http://www.state.nj.us/dep/rpp/brp/tcpa/downloads/conrulerev9_no%20fonts.pdf
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In comments received from the Agency’s recent RFI, the National Association of 

Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) Title Three Program Officials 

(NASTTPO), which represents members of State Emergency Response Commissions (SERCs), 

Tribal Emergency Response Commissions (TERCs), and LEPCs, has encouraged EPA to require 

RMP facilities to conduct exercises that include local first responders and realistic accident 

scenarios.

186

In addition to specific Federal and state requirements for conducting exercises and the 

NASTTPO comments, industry guidelines recommend conducting exercises. The CCPS 

Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety recommend periodically testing the adequacy of 

emergency response plans and level of preparedness of responders, including contractors and 

local response agencies.187

In the original proposed RMP rule (58 FR 54190, October 20, 1993), EPA had included 

within the emergency response program provisions a proposed requirement for regulated sources 

to conduct emergency exercises. In the final RMP rule (61 FR 31668, June 20, 1996), EPA 

decided not to finalize this requirement (and several other additional emergency response 

program provisions), for two reasons. First, the Agency decided to limit the emergency response 

program requirements to the minimum requirements contained in CAA section 112(r)(7) in order 

to avoid inconsistency with other emergency response planning regulations. Second, the Agency 

indicated that the additional requirements were already addressed in other Federal regulations and 

therefore, sources were already doing them. However, EPA’s experience with implementing the 

RMP rule over nearly two decades, along with incidents such as those described above, indicate 

that many regulated sources do not regularly conduct emergency exercises that involve local 

 

186

 Gablehouse, T. October 28, 2014. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0679 on Risk 

Management Program RFI, PDF pg 5-6, NASTTPO, Denver, CO.

187

 CCPS. 2007. Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety. American Institute of Chemical Engineers, 

CCPS, NY, Wiley. pp. 513, 524-526, 538-540.
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response authorities. The Agency now believes that adding this provision to the regulation will 

likely reduce the severity of some accidents that do occur.

1. Proposed Exercise Program Requirements

In order to further improve coordination with community responders and ensure that both 

facility personnel and local responders have practice responding to accidental releases at RMP 

facilities, EPA is proposing to require most regulated facilities to perform exercises as an element 

of the emergency response program identified under Subpart E. Proposed §68.96 would require 

both responding and non-responding RMP facilities with any Program 2 or 3 process to perform 

emergency exercises. 

a. Notification Exercises

EPA proposes a new paragraph §68.96(a) to require facilities with any Program 2 or 

Program 3 process to annually perform an exercise of the source’s emergency notification system. 

This exercise would include contacting the Federal, Tribal, state, and local public emergency 

response authorities, and other external responders that would respond to accidental releases at 

the source. The purpose of these notifications is to ensure facility personnel understand how to 

initiate the notification system and to test the emergency contact information to ensure it is up-todate. As part of the notification exercise, the individual making the notifications should clearly 

indicate that the call is part of an exercise to test the notification system. The owner or operator 

would be required to document these notification exercises and maintain a written record of each 

exercise conducted for a period of five years. The owner or operator would also be required to 

provide copies of the report to local response officials, and to make the report available to the 

public in accordance with §§68.205 and 68.210.

As non-responding facilities will rely on local authorities to respond to accidental 

releases at the source, EPA believes that the proposed facility notification exercises will be an 

important supplement to the existing requirement for local emergency plan exercises under 
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EPCRA section 303(c)(9), which requires local emergency plans to include methods and 

schedules for exercising the plan. Responding facilities will be required to meet additional field 

and tabletop exercise requirements below, which in many cases will also involve the participation 

of local authorities. Notifications to Federal, state, and local officials conducted as part of the 

field or tabletop exercise may also serve to meet the annual notification exercise requirements 

provided that the owner or operator documents these notification exercises. 

EPA is also proposing to modify §68.95(a)(1)(i) to clarify that the emergency response 

program should include procedures for performing appropriate notifications to Federal and state 

emergency response agencies, as well as the public and local emergency response agencies, about 

accidental releases. This could include, for example, any required notifications to the National 

Response Center, as required by section 103(a) of CERCLA, and/or notifications to the SERC as 

required by section 304 of EPCRA. 

b. Responding Facility Field and Tabletop Exercises

EPA is proposing a new paragraph §68.96(b) to require responding facilities to develop 

and implement an emergency response exercise program that uses the emergency response plan 

required under §68.95(a)(1). EPA is proposing to require two types of exercises– field exercises 

and tabletop exercises. The owner or operator would be required to coordinate with local public 

emergency response officials in planning and conducting exercises, and invite local officials to 

participate in exercises. However, participation in an exercise by local responders is not required 

for a facility to comply with the exercise provisions.

i. Field Exercises

Field exercises involve the actual performance of emergency response functions during a 

simulated accidental release event. Field exercises involve mobilization of firefighters and/or 

hazardous materials response teams, activation of an incident command structure, deployment of 

response equipment, evacuation or sheltering of facility personnel as appropriate, and notification 
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and mobilization of law enforcement, emergency medical, and other response personnel as 

determined by the scenario and the source’s emergency response plan.188

Section 68.96(b)(1) would require the owner or operator to conduct an emergency 

response field exercise involving the simulated accidental release of a regulated substance at least 

once every five years and within one year of any accidental release meeting the criteria in 

§68.42(a). If the facility is required to conduct a field exercise as a result of an RMP reportable 

accident, then this would effectively reset the timeframe for when the next five-year field exercise 

is due. 

EPA is proposing that the scope of the field exercises would include tests of:

 procedures for informing the public and the appropriate Federal, state, and local 

emergency response agencies about an accidental release; 

 procedures and measures for emergency response after an accidental release of a 

regulated substance including evacuations and medical treatment; 

 communications systems; 

 mobilization of facility emergency response personnel; 

 coordination with local emergency responders; 

 equipment deployment, and 

 other actions identified in the source’s emergency response plan, as appropriate. 

ii. Tabletop Exercises

Tabletop exercises are discussion-based exercises without the actual deployment of 

response equipment. During tabletop exercises, responders typically assemble in a meeting 

location and simulate procedural and communications steps for response to a simulated accidental 

release, as determined by the scenario and the source’s emergency response plan. 

 

188

 EPA. May 1988. Guide to Exercises in Chemical Emergency Preparedness Programs, OSWER 88006.
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In §68.96(b)(2) EPA is proposing to require the owner or operator to annually conduct an 

emergency tabletop exercise involving the simulated accidental release of a regulated substance, 

except during years when field exercises are conducted. The scope of a tabletop exercise would 

include tests of: 

 procedures for informing the public and the appropriate Federal, state, and local 

emergency response agencies about an accidental release; 

 procedures and measures for emergency response after an accidental release of a 

regulated substance including evacuations and medical treatment; 

 identification of facility emergency response personnel and responsibilities; 

 coordination with local emergency responders; 

 procedures for the use of emergency response equipment, and other actions identified 

in the source’s emergency response plan, as appropriate.

c. Exercise Reports & Program Updates

EPA is proposing in §68.96(b)(3) to require the owner or operator to evaluate each 

exercise and prepare a written report within 90 days of the exercise. The report would include:

 a description of the exercise scenario;

 names and associations of each exercise participant;

 an evaluation of the results of the exercise including lessons learned;

 recommendations for improvement or revisions to the emergency exercise program 

and emergency response program; and 

 a schedule to promptly address and resolve recommendations. 

The report would also include an evaluation of the adequacy of coordination with local 

emergency response authorities, and other external responders, as appropriate. Section 

68.96(b)(3) would also require the owner or operator to update the emergency exercise program 

and emergency response program at least annually, and more frequently if necessary to 
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incorporate recommendations and lessons learned from emergency response exercises, incident 

investigations, or other available information. The owner or operator would also be required to 

provide schedules of exercises and copies of exercise reports to local response officials, and to 

make exercise reports available to the public in accordance with §§68.205 and 68.210. Exercise 

reports would be maintained for five years.

d. Updates to §68.12 (General requirements)

EPA is proposing to revise §68.12 (General Requirements) to be consistent with these 

proposed exercise requirements. EPA is proposing to revise the Program 2 and Program 3 

requirements under §68.12 by renumbering paragraph §68.12(c)(4) as §68.12(c)(5) (for Program 

2) and §68.12(d)(4) as §68.12(d)(5) (for Program 3), adding a reference to exercise requirements,

and correcting citations to subpart E.

EPA is aware that while not all facilities regulated under the RMP rule conduct 

emergency exercises, many do, and the Agency believes that exercises conducted in accordance 

with other Federal, state, or local requirements, or exercises conducted in conjunction with a 

facility’s trade association membership or code of practice, etc., may be used to satisfy the new 

requirements to the extent those exercises address the specific regulatory provisions contained 

herein.

EPA seeks comment on this approach. Are there additional exercise provisions that EPA 

should consider to improve the ability of RMP facility personnel and local authorities to respond

to accidental releases? Are annual exercises sufficient or should EPA consider alternative 

frequencies? What information regarding exercises would be most helpful to the public while 

maintaining a balance for security?” Some SERS expressed concern that local emergencies could 

force a facility to postpone an exercise. EPA seeks comments on how best to address emergency 

postponement and rescheduling of exercises. EPA also seeks comment on whether to eliminate 

the requirement for tabletop and field exercises. 
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2. Alternative Options

EPA considered two alternative approaches to requiring emergency exercises. The first 

alternative option would also require responding and non-responding facilities to conduct an 

annual emergency notification system exercise. However, under this option responding facilities 

would additionally be required to conduct only annual tabletop exercises; emergency field 

exercises would not be required. This alternative option would be a lower cost option for 

responding facilities, as field deployment of the source’s equipment and personnel would not be 

required. However, it may also result in less realistic and less effective emergency exercises.

The second alternative approach considered by EPA would contain the same provisions 

for notification exercises as in the proposed option, but would require responding facilities to 

conduct field exercises annually, instead of tabletop exercises. This approach would be similar to 

the New Jersey TCPA emergency exercise provisions, and provide for a comprehensive test of all 

systems under the emergency exercise program for responding facilities. However, the costs of 

this approach would be significantly higher than the proposed approach.

EPA seeks comment on these alternative approaches and whether there are any other 

alternative options that EPA should consider prior to issuing a final action. 

VI. Information Availability Requirements

Ensuring that communities, local planners, local first responders, and the public have 

appropriate chemical facility hazard-related information is critical to the health and safety of the 

responders and the local community. Throughout the many public meetings and outreach efforts

related to EO 13650, LEPCs, first responders, and members of the public stated that chemical 

facility information and data-sharing efforts need significant improvement.

189 Specifically, 

LEPCs and first responders want to have access to the most relevant chemical hazard and risk 

 

189

 Chemical Facility Safety and Security Working Group. May 2014. EO 13650 Report to the President –

Actions to Improve Chemical Facility Safety and Security – A Shared Commitment, pgs. 93-94. 

https://www.osha.gov/chemicalexecutiveorder/final_chemical_eo_status_report.pdf
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information for their needs, in a user-friendly format, to better support planning and preparedness 

efforts. Community residents, operators of community facilities (such as daycares and nursing 

homes) and organizations consistently noted that they need basic information regarding chemical 

risks at facilities, presented in a clear and consistent manner, so that they can effectively 

participate in preparedness and planning to address such issues as effective emergency 

notification procedures, evacuation, and sheltering in place. In response to these issues, EPA is 

proposing ways to enhance information sharing and collaboration between chemical facility 

owners and operators, tribal and local emergency planning committees, first responders, and the 

public, in a manner that balances security and proprietary considerations. Some public 

commenters responding to EPA’s RMP RFI elaborated the need for more public access to 

information about the RMP facilities. The Center for Science and Democracy (CSD) stated that 

public access to information is key to enabling communities to hold facility owners and operators 

accountable for reducing risks as much as possible, and for being prepared should an accident 

occur. According to CSD, facility owners and operators should be responsible for ensuring that 

appropriate measures are in-place to handle an emergency and should be fully communicating 

with local authorities on the development of community emergency response plans that include 

chemical facilities.190

NASTTPO requested EPA consider providing information on emergency planning and 

exercises, audit reports, and RMP Executive summaries that include information such as accident 

histories, and names of RMP-regulated substances.

191

Oklahoma Hazardous Materials Emergency Response Commission (OHMERC) also 

commented and requested posting of chemical information including an RMP summary along 

 

190 CSD. October 20, 2014. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0424 on Risk Management Program

RFI, pgs.2-3. 

191 Gablehouse, T. October 28, 2014. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0679 on Risk 

Management Program RFI, PDF p. 2, 4, & 6, NASTTPO, Denver, CO.
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with Tier2 information on a company website at a minimum. They also requested making the 

following information available to LEPCs: the facility emergency response plan, accident history, 

along with OCA.

192

The MKOPSC stated that most of the information is already available online and from 

LEPCs and need not be provided on a website. But MKOPSC noted that LEPCs can utilize the 

information to understand the risk in the communities and involve local facilities, local officials, 

SERCs, local citizens and EPA to have dialogues to improve regulatory compliance and promote 

safety. MKOSPSC also believes it is also important to let the public understand how the facilities 

address the hazard present in their community and keep the risk at or below the “acceptable 

level.” When local citizens have adequate information and knowledge, facility owners and 

operators may be motivated to continuously improve their safety in response to community 

pressure and oversight.193

CCHS noted that requiring facility owners or operators to make this information available 

on the company website would promote improved regulatory compliance, because the more 

willing a facility is to be open and transparent the greater that company is willing to address 

issues that relate to safety.194 The United Steel Workers (USW) stated that making unrestricted 

RMP information publicly available would increase compliance, as it enables communities to 

hold facilities accountable and gives facilities greater incentive to strengthen safety measures and 

to comply with regulations.195 The Coalition to Prevent Chemical Disasters (CPCD) believes that 

schools located within vulnerability zones of RMP facilities need to have chemical disaster drills 

in place, but that many schools are unaware of any risks. In CPCD’s view, not informing

 

192 Elder, M., October 29, 2014. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0641 on Risk Management 

Program RFI, p. 3, OHMERC.

193 MKOPSC. October 29, 2014. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0543 on Risk Management 

Program RFI, pgs. 162, 165. 

194 CCHS. October 28, 2014. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0546 on Risk Management 

Program RFI pg. 13. 

195 USW. October 29, 2014. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0547 on Risk Management 

Program RFI, pg. 6. 
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communities about chemical risks reduces their ability to prepare for potential disasters involving 

specific chemical releases. CPCD argues that first responders need to know what chemicals they 

are facing and what emergency equipment to use. CPCD believes that information, such as 

compliance audits and incident investigation reports, should be disclosed to LEPCs and that with 

this information, active LEPCs can better include local communities in emergency planning and 

training.196 CPCD made reference to testimony made six years prior to the West disaster by a 

former CSB chairperson about her concern for 

a lack of chemical emergency preparedness that our investigations have found 

among many communities where accidents strike. Preventing accidents and 

mitigating their impact requires an active partnership between communities and 

industrial facilities. If that partnership is missing, the stage is set for a potentially 

severe impact on the community.197

Poor communication between facility personnel and first responders, as well as poor 

communication between facility personnel and communities, has been shown to contribute to the 

severity of chemical accidents. One example is the Bayer CropScience explosion that occurred in 

Institute, West Virginia, in 2008. According to the CSB, 

The Bayer fire brigade was at the scene in minutes, but Bayer management 

withheld information from the county emergency response agencies that were 

desperate for information about what happened, what chemicals were possibly 

involved...The Bayer incident commander, inside the plant, recommended a 

shelter in place; but this was never communicated to 911 operators. After a few 

hours of being refused critical information, local authorities ordered a shelter in 

place, as a precaution.198

 

196 CPCD. October 29, 2014. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0644 on Risk Management 

Program RFI, pgs. 36-37. 

197 CSB. July 10, 2007. CSB News Release: CSB Chairman Merritt Describes the Lessons from Five Years 

of Board Investigations to Senate Committee, Urges Additional Resources and Clearer Authorities for 

Federal Safety Efforts.

http://www.csb.gov/csb-chairman-merritt-describes-the-lessons-from-five-years-of-board-investigations-tosenate-committee-urges-additional-resources-and-clearer-authorities-for-federal-safety-efforts/

198

 CSB. January 20, 2011. CSB issues report on 2008 Bayer Cropscience explosion: finds multiple 

deficiencies led to runaway chemical reaction; recommends states create chemical plant oversight 

regulation. http://www.csb.gov/csb-issues-report-on-2008-bayer-cropscience-explosion-finds-multipledeficiencies-led-to-runaway-chemical-reaction-recommends-state-create-chemical-plant-oversightregulation/
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Improper communication between the facility and the first responders during the accident led to a 

delay in implementing a public shelter-in-place order for the local community, and may have 

resulted in toxic exposure to on-scene public emergency responders. 

After a release of HF from the Citgo Refinery in Corpus Christi, Texas, in July 2009, 

nearby residents complained of headaches, nausea, and respiratory issues, though Citgo claimed 

that the toxic cloud stopped at the plant fence line. According to reports, neighbors could see the 

flames and smoke coming from the refinery, but they were unable to get information on the 

accident and potential risks to their community.199

The previous examples and public comments demonstrate the need for better 

communication of the potential risks associated with accidental releases at stationary sources. 

However, in making information more readily available EPA must also recognize and balance the 

associated security concerns because the public sharing of certain specific facility information 

and any associated vulnerabilities has the potential to aid terrorists in planning an attack. The 

RMP rule was published in 1996, before many computer-based and other information-sharing 

methods were widely used. At the time of initial publication of the rule, EPA expected 

information to be disclosed to the public through disclosure of the entire RMP. After the 

CSISSFRRA was enacted on August 5, 1999, EPA restricted access to OCA data for the public 

and government officials to minimize the security risks associated with posting the information 

on the internet (65 FR 48108, August 4, 2000). Governmental officials continue to have 

electronic access to OCA information, subject to certain restrictions, while the public may view 

OCA information only at Federal Reading Rooms around the country and only for a limited 

number of RMPs at any one time. The non-OCA portions of the RMPs are available from EPA to 

the public either through Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, by inspection at Federal 

 

199

 Morris, Jim and Chris Hamby, Center for Public Integrity. February 24, 2011; Updated May 19, 2014. 

Fueling Fears-Use of toxic acid puts millions at risk. http://www.publicintegrity.org/2011/02/24/2118/usetoxic-acid-puts-millions-risk
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Reading Rooms, or from a person’s SERC, LEPC, or related state or local government 

agencies.200

EPA is proposing to require certain information to be made available, upon request, to 

LEPCs and emergency response officials to help them to understand the potential risks at RMP 

regulated facilities, as well as to aid them in emergency planning and response activities. EPA is 

also proposing to amend the information sharing provisions for the public to make existing 

information more easily accessible to neighboring communities to encourage them to prepare for 

an emergency. EPA also believes that the revisions will likely contribute to the prevention of 

future chemical accidents. Cognizant of the spirit and intent of the CSISSFRRA, the proposed 

revisions do not disclose the substance or form of information subject to restriction under CAA 

112(r)(7)(H) or 40 CFR part 1400.

EPA has two objectives for improving public information sharing provisions of the RMP 

rule. The first is to ensure that local emergency response and planning officials have the 

information they need to prepare for an emergency response to an accidental release at a 

stationary source. This includes determining what information is appropriate to improve 

community emergency response plans and ensure the safety of the local responders and the 

community. EPA must also determine the appropriate frequency for updating this information to 

avoid overwhelming local planners while ensuring information is current. While developing 

emergency response plans, LEPCs and facility owners or operators should also involve local 

citizens to help them understand the appropriate actions they should take in the event of an 

accidental release. This may reduce public panic and enable residents to act quickly and 

appropriately to protect themselves.

 

200

 See 40 CFR Part 1400: Accidental Release Prevention Requirements; Risk Management Programs 

Under the CAA Section 112(r)(7); Distribution of OCA Information (65 FR 48108, August 4, 2000).

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2000-08-04/pdf/00-19785.pdf
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The second objective is to help improve public awareness of risks in their communities 

and provide information on where they can learn more about preparedness and community 

emergency response plans. Any publicly available information should be in a format that is easily 

accessible. The goal is to encourage residents to learn about community emergency response 

plans and understand what actions they need to take during an emergency to protect themselves. 

EPA is proposing to add provisions for sharing information, upon request, with LEPCs

and/or emergency response officials and revise the existing provisions for sharing information 

with the public. EPA is also proposing that facility owners and operators conduct public meetings 

within 30 days of an RMP reportable accident to discuss chemical hazards present at facilities and 

provide information on accidental releases. These meetings can provide opportunities for 

facilities to engage the public to address concerns following an accidental release and explain 

how facilities will prevent future accidents. 

A. Proposed Public Disclosure Requirements to LEPCs or Emergency Response Officials

EPA is proposing to add requirements to Subpart H-Other Requirements that apply to all 

facilities regulated under the RMP rule, including facilities with Program 1 processes. EPA 

proposes to add §68.205 to require owners and operators to provide information to local 

emergency responders and LEPCs upon request. If information required under this proposal is 

already available to the public on a company website, the owner or operator may comply by 

providing the website link to the first responders and LEPC. Paragraph §68.205(a) would require 

that the RMP be accessible to local emergency responders and LEPCs in the exact same manner 

as the current requirement under §68.210(a). A reference to 42 U.S.C. 7414(c), which covers 

information and reports (such as the RMP) required under section 42 U.S.C. 7412, is included to 

show the authority under which the non-OCA portion of an RMP shall be available to the public, 

except for any information that would divulge methods or processes entitled to protection of CBI

or trade secrets. This reference is already part of the current §68.210(a). A reference to 40 CFR 
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part 1400 has been added to address the disclosure restrictions under CSISSFRRA (i.e., 

restrictions on the disclosure of OCA information). EPA is not changing its policy regarding

OCA information. The reference to 40 CFR part 1400 only clarifies the statutory obligations that 

relate to securing this information.

Under paragraph §68.205(b), EPA would require the owner or operator to develop

summaries of specific chemical hazard information for all of their regulated processes and 

provide this information, upon request, to the LEPC or local emergency response officials as part 

of their emergency response coordination efforts. The facility should make information available 

in a manner that is understandable and avoids technical jargon. The information should be 

conveyed without revealing CBI or trade secret information. The information must adequately 

explain the findings, results, or analysis being provided. 

The specific information that must be provided to LEPCs or emergency response officials

upon request is outlined below:

Information on Regulated Substances. Information related to the names and quantities of 

regulated substances at the source (paragraph §68.205(b)(1)). This only applies to regulated 

substances held in a process above the TQ.

Accident History Information. The facility’s accident history information required under 

§68.42 (paragraph §68.205(b)(2)).

Compliance Audit Reports. Summaries of compliance audit reports required under 

§§68.58 and 68.59 (for Program 2 processes), or §§68.79 and 68.80 (for Program 3 processes), as 

applicable (paragraph §68.205(b)(3)). The audit report summary shall include:

 The date of the report;

 The name and contact information of the auditor and the facility contact person;

 A brief description of the audit findings;

 An appropriate response to each of the findings; and
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 A schedule for addressing each of the findings.

Incident Investigation Reports. Summaries of incident investigation reports required 

under §68.60(d) (for Program 2 processes) or §68.81(d) (for Program 3 processes), as applicable 

(paragraph §68.205(b)(4)). The incident investigation report summary shall include:

 A description of the incident and events leading up to it, including a timeline;

 A brief description of the process involved;

 The names and contact information of personnel on the investigation team;

 The direct cause, contributing cause, and root cause of the incident; 

 The on-site and offsite impacts;

 The emergency response actions taken; 

 Any recommendations; and

 A schedule for implementing recommendations, as applicable.

Inherently Safer Technologies (IST). For each process in NAICS codes 322, 324, and 

325, a summary of the IST or ISD identified in accordance with §68.67(c)(8) that the owner or 

operator has implemented or plans to implement (paragraph §68.205(b)(5)). The owner or 

operator shall update this summary as part of the calendar year submission if any of the summary 

information has been revised as a result of the safer technology analysis that is conducted as part 

of the update to the PHA prepared in accordance with §68.67(f). The calendar year submission 

should also identify whether any revisions were incorporated. The IST/ISD summary shall 

include, at a minimum:

 The RMP process ID and process description, if provided, of the process affected;

 A brief description of the IST or ISD and which type of measure best characterizes it: 

minimization, substitution, modernization, or simplification;

 The names of the regulated substance(s) whose hazard, potential exposure, or risk 

was or will be reduced as a result of the implementation and whether the substance is 
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listed as toxic or flammable. If the chemicals affected are a mixture of flammable

substances, the name “flammable mixture” may be used, instead of the individual 

flammable substance names; and

 The dates of implementation or planned implementation. 

Exercises. Information on emergency response exercises conducted under §68.96, 

including, at a minimum, schedules for upcoming exercises, reports for completed exercises, and 

other related information (paragraph §68.205(b)(6)).

EPA believes that summary information on findings from incident investigations, 

compliance audits, exercises, and IST employed can demonstrate to local emergency response 

officials how a facility is improving its management of chemical risks and assist local emergency 

planners to understand and better prepare for these risks when developing community emergency 

response plans. Furthermore, EPA believes that disclosing information related to IST can help 

responders and planners to prioritize and allocate response resources. For example, IST 

implementation information may be relevant for emergency response personnel who are

maintaining response capabilities to address a specific hazard that would no longer apply once an 

IST is implemented (such as by substituting a less hazardous chemical for an RMP-regulated 

substance).

Table 6 below summarizes the information to be developed under §68.205(b) and 

identifies the applicable program level for each provision. The owner or operator need only 

provide upon the LEPC’s request information developed for this provision that is applicable to 

the program-level for each regulated process at the facility. For example, owners or operators of 

Program 2 processes must provide information on regulated substances in accordance with 

§68.205(b)(1), accident history information in accordance with §68.205(b)(2), compliance audit 

report summaries to LEPC or emergency response officials in accordance with §68.205(b)(3), 

incident investigation report summaries in accordance with §68.205(b)(4), and exercise schedules 
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and report summaries in accordance with §68.205(b)(6). Owners and operators of Program 3 

processes must provide all of the above information, as well as the IST information required 

under §68.205(b)(5). Owners and operators of Program 1 processes would be required to provide

only information on regulated substances in accordance with §68.205(b)(1) and accident history 

information in accordance with §68.205(b)(2).

Table 6: LEPC Disclosure Information

Information to be provided, upon request, to LEPCs or emergency 

response officials in §68.205.

Program Level(s) 

ApplicabilityProgram 1, 2, or 3

(b)(1) Information on regulated substances 1, 2, 3

(b)(2) Accident history information 1, 2, 3

(b)(3) Compliance audit report summaries 2, 3

(b)(4) Incident investigation report summaries 2, 3

(b)(5) IST summary 3*

(b)(6) Exercise schedules and report summaries 2, 3

* Applies only to Program 3 facilities in NAICS codes 322, 324, and 325.

Submission Dates and Updates. According to §68.205(c), EPA is proposing that the 

owner or operator update summary information every calendar year, including all applicable 

information that was revised since the last submission, and provide this information upon request. 

Classified Information. EPA is proposing to add §68.205(d) to address protection of 

classified information from disclosure. This provision is identical to the current §68.210(b). 

Confidential Business Information. EPA is proposing to add the acronym CBI to §68.3 

and to add §68.205(e) to describe the process for claiming and handling CBI. EPA is proposing 

that an owner or operator asserting a CBI claim for information requested by an LEPC or local 

emergency response official under this section should submit a sanitized version to the LEPC or 

emergency response officials, and submit to EPA both the sanitized version and a version 

containing the CBI along with a substantiation of the CBI claim at the time it is asserted. This 

process for assertion and substantiation of CBI claims is the same as that required in §§68.151 

and 68.152 for information contained in the RMP. As provided under §68.151(b)(3), an owner or 

operator of a stationary source may not claim five-year accident history information as CBI. As 
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provided in §68.151(c)(2), an owner or operator of a stationary source asserting that a chemical 

name is CBI shall provide a generic category or class name as a substitute in its submission. 

An owner or operator should be aware that anything they send to their LEPC in 

accordance with §68.205(e) becomes public information. For any information claimed as CBI 

when submitted to EPA and later submitted to the LEPC, the CBI claim regarding such 

information is waived. Therefore, if an owner or operator wants to maintain the confidentiality of 

information, when submitting such information to the LEPC, they should submit a sanitized 

version.

With these proposed requirements, EPA intends to ensure that LEPCs and emergency 

response officials have information on chemical hazards at regulated facilities and are better 

prepared to understand and prepare for risks to the communities and emergency responders. EPA

encourages local emergency response officials to coordinate with owners or operators of 

regulated facilities and participate in emergency response exercises as time and resources allow. 

LEPC and local emergency response officials should use the information identified in §68.205(b)

to assist in revising the community emergency response plan developed under 42 U.S.C 11003

and related purposes. 

EPA seeks comment on this approach. Will the proposed requirements improve the 

community emergency planning and preparedness? Is there additional information that should be 

shared with LEPCs or emergency response officials? For example, should EPA require the full 

safer technologies and alternatives analysis to be submitted to the LEPC? EPA also seeks 

comment on whether to require less information to be shared (e.g., limit incident investigation 

information to incidents with offsite impacts). Some SERs suggested that information be limited 

to a one page summary of each significant chemical hazard and suggested including only the 

following elements: the name of the substance, its properties, its location, and recommended 

firefighting and emergency response measures. EPA seeks comment on this narrowed approach. 
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Should EPA require owners or operators to periodically submit information to the LEPC or local 

responders, and if so, what timeframe should EPA consider? Is the proposed timeframe for 

updating information sufficient to ensure information is up-to-date? Should EPA specify a 

standard format for summary information in order to make it easier for local officials to interpret 

the information (e.g., specify a summary template for information on regulated substances, 

compliance audits reports, incident investigation reports, IST)?

B. Proposed Revisions to Requirements for Information Availability to the Public

Under paragraph §68.210(a), EPA is proposing to add a reference to 40 CFR part 1400 to 

address CSISSFRRA disclosure restrictions (i.e., for OCA information). EPA is not changing its 

policy regarding OCA information. The reference to 40 CFR part 1400 only clarifies the statutory 

obligations that relate to securing this information. 

EPA is proposing to redesignate the current paragraph §68.210(b) that addresses the nondisclosure of classified information by the Department of Defense or other Federal agencies or 

their contractors as §68.210(e). 

EPA is proposing a new paragraph (b) to require the owner or operator of a stationary 

source to distribute certain chemical hazard information for all regulated processes to the public 

in an easily accessible manner. EPA is proposing to require the owner or operator to distribute the 

following information, as applicable:

 Names of regulated substances held in a process above TQs;

 Safety Data Sheets (SDSs) for all regulated substances held above TQs at the facility;

 The facility’s accident history required under §68.42;

 Information concerning the source’s compliance with §68.10(b)(3) or the emergency 

response provisions of Subpart E, including: 

o Whether the source is a responding stationary source or a non-responding 

stationary source; 
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o Name and phone number of local emergency response organizations with which 

the source last coordinated emergency response efforts, pursuant to §68.180; and 

o For sources subject to §68.95, procedures for informing the public and local 

emergency response agencies about accidental releases.

 Information on emergency response exercises required under §68.96, including 

schedules for upcoming exercises, reports for completed exercises as described in 

§68.96(b)(3), and any other related information; and

 LEPC contact information, including LEPC name, phone number, and website

address as available.

EPA believes that providing this information to the general public will allow people that 

live or work near a regulated facility to improve their awareness of risks to the community and to

be prepared to protect themselves in the event of an accidental release. EPA also thinks that 

requiring facilities to provide summary information on the facility’s emergency response plans 

and emergency exercises to the public, will provide assurance to the community that the facility is 

adequately prepared to properly handle a chemical emergency, should it arise. An additional 

benefit of sharing exercise schedules is to avoid unnecessary public alarm when exercises are 

conducted. 

The facility owner or operator can make all the required information available to the 

public in a variety of ways. For example, the owner or operator could comply by making the 

information available on the facility or company website, if one is available. If the facility doesn’t 

have a website, the owner or operator could establish one. Alternatively, there are free or low cost 

internet platforms, file sharing services, and social media tools that are designed to share 

information with the public. As another option, the facility could make the information available

in hard copy at publicly accessible locations such as a public library or a local government office. 

If the facility has the means to handle public visitors, it could choose to make the information 
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available at the facility location. The facility could alternatively provide the information by email, 

upon request. EPA encourages the facility owner or operator to coordinate information 

distribution with the LEPC or local emergency response officials to determine the best way to 

reach public stakeholders. 

EPA seeks comment on this approach. Is there additional information that should be 

shared with the public? For example, should EPA require the STAA proposed under §68.67(c)(8), 

or a summary of that analysis, be shared with the public? Alternatively, should EPA further limit 

the information elements proposed? For example, how should EPA limit the disclosure of 

information in exercise reports that might reveal security vulnerabilities about the facility or 

emergency responders? Should EPA not require disclosure of names of individuals involved in 

exercises or facility security vulnerabilities revealed by the exercise? Is there an alternative way 

to improve community preparedness for safety purposes while balancing the security concerns to 

limit a terrorist’s ability to use the information for an attack? Is there other information that 

community residents and operators of community facilities (such as schools, nursing homes, 

daycares) need in order to participate in emergency preparedness planning, particularly as it 

relates to effective incident notification, sheltering in place, and evacuation?EPA also seeks 

comment on the feasibility of these various options for providing information to the public and 

requests suggestions for other ways that the data could be made available. Lastly, EPA seeks 

comment on any challenges facility owners or operators would have in providing the information 

or challenges public stakeholders would have in obtaining the information. In order to inform the 

public of the location of the information, EPA is proposing to require under §68.160(b) that the 

facility report in their RMP the location or means of public access to the information proposed to 

be disclosed under this subsection. 
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Submission Dates and Updates. EPA is proposing that the owner or operator shall update 

and submit information required under §68.210(b) every calendar year, including all applicable 

information that was revised since the last update. 

Confidential Business Information. In §68.210(f), an owner or operator asserting CBI 

shall submit a sanitized version of the information required under this section to the public. 

Assertion of claims of CBI and substantiation of CBI claims shall be in the same manner as 

required in §§68.151 and 68.152 for information contained in the RMP required under subpart G. 

As provided in §68.151(c)(2), an owner or operator of a stationary source asserting that a 

chemical name is CBI shall provide a generic category or class name as a substitute. If an owner 

or operator has already claimed CBI for a portion of the RMP, then that claim still applies for the 

disclosure elements here. The owner or operator should provide a sanitized version as described 

in the RMP*eSubmit User’s Manual.

201

EPA seeks comment on this approach. Will the proposed requirements improve the knowledge 

sharing between regulated facilities and the public? Is there additional information that should be 

shared with the public stakeholders? Should EPA only require information to be shared upon 

request by the public? Alternatively, should EPA further limit the information we are proposing 

to be required, such as requiring only a one page summary that addresses chemical hazard 

information and emergency response measures? EPA could alternatively eliminate some of the 

required information elements or further limit information, such as by limiting accident history 

information to only those with offsite impact. Some SERs asked whether the existing RMP data 

or the RMP executive summary available to the public through existing sources (FOIA, Federal 

Reading rooms or other public sources who have compiled the data) are adequate to meet the 

information needs of the public. 

 

201

 See EPA. March 2014. RMP*eSubmit Users Manual. http://www2.epa.gov/rmp/rmpesubmit-usersmanual.
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Public Meetings. When the CSISSFRRA was enacted in 1999, it included a section that

required owners or operators of all facilities regulated under the RMP rule to hold a public 

meeting within 180 days of enactment.202 The purpose of the public meeting was to describe and 

discuss the local implications of the RMP on the community. Two or more stationary sources 

were allowed to conduct a joint meeting, while small businesses were allowed to instead post a 

summary of their OCA information no later than 180 days after enactment. 

In paragraph §68.210(d)EPA is proposing to require regulated facilities that have any 

accident meeting the five-year accident history criteria of §68.42 to hold a public meeting within 

30 days after the accident. This provides an opportunity for the owner or operator of the RMP 

facility to inform the community about the accident including, at a minimum, the information 

reportable under §68.42. This includes information on:

 When the accident occurred; 

 The nature of the accident including initiating event and contributing factors if 

known; 

 Chemicals involved and quantities released; 

 Weather conditions, if known; 

 On-site and offsite impacts; 

 Emergency response notifications; and

 Operational or process changes that resulted, thus far, from investigation of the 

release. 

EPA expects that, in some cases, sources will have completed the incident investigation 

required under §68.60 or §68.81 prior to holding the public meeting. This would allow the owner 

or operator to share appropriate information about the accident with the local community. 

 

202 Chemical Safety Information, Site Security and Fuels Regulatory Relief Act, Public Law 106-40, 

August 5, 1999. See http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-113/pdf/STATUTE-113-Pg207.pdf.
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However, in some cases, such as for complex, protracted investigations, the source may need to 

hold a public meeting prior to completing the incident investigation. In such cases, the owner or 

operator should consider holding a second public meeting after completing the incident 

investigation. Additionally, a public meeting must be held after accidents that destroy a process or 

stationary source or cause the process or source to be subsequently decommisioned. Stationary 

sources may combine public meetings with LEPC meetings or other events as long as those 

events/meetings are available for public participation.

Public meetings must also address other relevant chemical hazard information such as 

that described in §68.210(b) and any other appropriate information that may improve safety and 

emergency preparedness activities in the community. The facility representative should describe 

the risks that are associated with the facility, and what the facility is doing to protect the public 

from those risks. In addition, the facility personnel should relay information that would assist the 

public to prepare for accidental releases. For example, at the meeting, the facility representative 

should discuss the process for public emergency notification, procedures for sheltering in place or 

evacuating, and where to obtain further updates on the status of an emergency incident. The 

discussion should also address how the public can access community emergency response plans 

and identify what the community may expect to see during a field exercise.

As part of the SBAR panel process, several SERs questioned the value of having any 

public meetings and noted that, when held in the past, public meetings were not well attended.

203

Some SERs suggested altering the requirement to allow for the request of a public meeting if an

LEPC or community felt it was necessary. Additionally, SERs expressed concern about the 

requirement to hold public meetings 30 days after an accident; the SER suggestions included 

expanding the timeframe from 60 days to 9 months. SERs also indicated that many small business 

 

204

 OSHA Fact Sheet- Hazard Communication Standard Final Rule.

https://www.osha.gov/dsg/hazcom/HCSFactsheet.html.
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may still be handling the aftermath of accidents, conducting incident investigations, and arranging 

audits in this time period, with limited attention to devote to educating the public. 

EPA seeks comment on the proposed approach and whether there are other options that 

EPA should consider for public meetings. For example, should EPA require regular public 

meetings rather than only after an accident subject to reporting requirements under §68.42? 

Should EPA require public meetings upon request by LEPCs, emergency responders or the 

public? Alternatively, should the public meeting requirement be restricted to an RMP reportable 

accidents with offsite impacts? Instead of requiring a public meeting after RMP reportable 

accidents, should EPA require owners and operators to meet only with LEPCs and emergency 

responders? If EPA finalizes the requirement to hold post-accident public meetings, should EPA 

extend the required timeframe to hold the meeting beyond 30 days (e.g. to 90 days), in order to 

give the owner or operator more time to learn about accident causal factors and prepare for a 

public meeting? If so, what extended timeframe should EPA choose and should EPA require the 

implementing agency to approve any extensions?

C. Alternative Options

EPA considered an option to require all facilities to hold public meetings at least once 

every five years (and within 30 days after an accident) to share chemical hazard information 

described under §68.210(b) and any other appropriate information that may improve safety and 

emergency preparedness activities in the community. However, EPA did not propose this 

requirement as our preferred option because of concerns raised by the SBAR panel process that 

periodic public meetings are often sparsely attended.

EPA also considered limiting the requirement for periodic and post-accident public 

meetings to only Program 2 and Program 3 facilities; however, EPA did not propose this option 

as our preferred option because even though accidents at Program 1 facilities should not have 

significant public impacts, some communities near these facilities may still be interested in 
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understanding the risks at the facility and the procedures and controls that are in place to limit 

offsite impacts. Additionally, if a Program 1 facility does have an RMP reportable accident with 

offsite impacts, EPA believes they should be held to the same standard as other facilities and be 

required to hold a public meeting within 30 days of the incident to provide additional information 

on the accidental release. Nevertheless, EPA is interested in receiving public feedback on whether 

EPA should consider requiring periodic public meetings and whether the requirement should be 

limited to Program 2 and 3 facilities. 

EPA is also considering an option for supporting the public disclosure provisions with a 

“score card” or a “grade” system that could be provided by an independent third-party. The score 

or grade would be made available to the LEPCs and public to demonstrate the facility’s 

compliance with the RMP rule. This method could be used either instead of or in addition to what 

EPA is proposing. EPA requests information and recommendations on how to develop such a 

program, including the types of scoring criteria that should be used and any other issues that the 

Agency should consider when developing such a system. 

EPA seeks comment on these alternative approaches and whether there are any other 

alternative options that EPA should consider for future actions. 

VII. Risk Management Plan Streamlining, Clarifications, and RMP Rule Technical 

Corrections

A stationary source subject to the RMP rule is required to submit a RMP in a method and 

format specified by the EPA, pursuant to §68.150(a). The CAA and 40 CFR Subpart G require 

that the RMP indicate compliance with the regulations at 40 CFR part 68 and also include 

information regarding the hazard assessment, prevention program, and emergency response 

program. The RMP also includes stationary source registration information, such as name, 

location and contact information. The EPA may review RMPs for information gathering, 

inspection preparation, errors in submissions, and changes requiring a correction or re-submission 
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of the RMP. The CAA requires that RMPs be made available to states, local entities responsible 

for planning or responding to accidental releases at the source, the CSB, and the public. As a 

result, the information provided in an RMP is intended to be easily understood, thus encouraging 

the public, local entities, and governmental agencies to interact with stationary sources on issues 

related to accident prevention and preparedness.

The RMP format consists of a combination of check-off boxes, yes/no answers, 

numerical entries, and write-in information pertaining to the data best describing the various 

elements of the risk management program at a source. The nine sections of an RMP are:

Registration Information; Toxics Worst Case; Toxics Alternative Release; Flammables Worst 

Case; Flammables Alternative Release; Accident History; Prevention Program: Program Level 3;

Prevention Program: Program Level 2; and Emergency Response. Data elements in these sections 

address compliance with each of the rule elements. Some sections may not be applicable to all 

stationary sources, as some sections apply only to processes with certain program levels, and 

some apply only to certain types of regulated substances (toxics or flammables). The RMP also 

includes an Executive Summary, which allows stationary sources to provide a brief description of 

the source’s prevention and preparedness activities as they relate to covered processes, in a 

format that is easy to understand.

Based on feedback received from the regulated community and EPA’s own experience, 

EPA is proposing to revise several data elements in Subpart G and to make technical corrections 

to the RMP rule. The following sections provide an overview of the proposed revisions.

A. Deletions from Subpart G

EPA is proposing to delete data elements that do not effectively assist the Agency in 

evaluating compliance with the RMP rule. EPA is also proposing to delete some data elements 

because the information can be obtained through improved coordination with Federal, state, and 

local agencies resulting from EO 13650, such as information currently required by 
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§§68.160(b)(13) (the date of the last safety inspection of the stationary source by a Federal, state, 

or local government agency) and 68.160(b)(19) (OSHA Voluntary Protection Program status).

EPA is proposing to delete other data elements because we believe an on-site inspection or formal 

information request are better ways to evaluate compliance with these Risk Management Program 

requirements (for example, some data elements pertaining to training, contractor safety, and 

maintenance/mechanical integrity). By removing several RMP data elements, EPA expects that 

the regulated community will find it easier to comply with Subpart G requirements. In addition to 

burden relief for the regulated community, EPA expects that removing several RMP data 

elements will reduce the number of errors in RMPs submitted to the Agency.

B. Revisions to Subpart G

EPA is proposing to revise existing provisions in Subpart G as follows: 

 Modernize requirements to include electronic contact information if it exists, such as 

e-mail addresses and website homepages; 

 Revise provisions to remove a portion of select data elements that would be better 

evaluated during an on-site inspection or information request; 

 Provide consistency with RMP*eSubmit; 

 Provide more consistency in the data collected for similar data elements in the 

Program 2 and 3 prevention programs; and

 Replace data elements that were not effective in demonstrating a stationary source’s 

compliance with the rule, with one that will demonstrate compliance. 

Data elements that require a date to demonstrate compliance can become irrelevant 

during the typical five-year RMP resubmission cycle. An example is a stationary source that 

submitted an RMP to the EPA on January 8, 2015, that included an annual operating procedures 

review date of January 1, 2015, in its RMP in accordance with §68.175(f). Assuming the 

stationary source will not have any changes that would require a resubmission of the RMP and 
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the stationary source will not voluntarily correct the RMP with newer annual standard operating 

procedure (SOP) review dates, the January 1, 2015, annual SOP review date does not provide 

compliance information for years 2016 - 2019. As a result, the annual SOP review date in this 

example only provides compliance information for 2015. Because the dates of most recent review 

or update of a process safety element in an RMP do not always reflect compliance with regulatory 

requirements, EPA is proposing to replace most of these dates with the RMP Certifying Official’s

attestation that the stationary source complies with each Risk Management Program requirement. 

Data elements for which the last review or revision dates are being replaced include:

 For Program 2 and 3: safety information, operating procedures, training 

programs, maintenance procedures, changes triggering review of any of the 

previous data elements or the hazard review/PHA; 

 For Program 3 only: MOC, pre-startup review, employee participation plans, hot 

work permit procedures, contractor safety procedures and performance; and,

 For sources with Emergency Response Programs: emergency response plans and 

emergency response training of employees. 

EPA will still require the date of the most recent hazard review or PHA or their update 

(required every 5 years), date of most recent compliance audit (required every 3 years), and date 

of most recent incident investigation (required only when an incident occurs). These data 

elements are not updated as frequently as the other program elements, and are therefore more 

likely to indicate current compliance with regulatory requirements. 

C. Additions to Subpart G

In addition to removing and revising several RMP data elements, EPA is proposing to 

add several RMP data elements in Subpart G based on the proposed rule requirements discussed 

in this notice. This includes new data elements to address compliance with:

 Third-party audit requirements, 
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 Root cause analysis requirements as part of incident investigations;

 IST analysis requirements in the PHA;

 Emergency response preparedness requirements including information on local 

coordination and emergency response exercises; and 

 Information sharing provisions.

By adding these data elements to the RMP requirements in Subpart G EPA will be able to 

evaluate a stationary source’s compliance with these proposed rule requirements once they are 

finalized. 

D. Proposed Amendments and Technical Corrections

1. Proposed Revisions to §68.160 (Registration)

EPA is proposing to delete and reserve:

 §68.160(b)(13) - The date of the last safety inspection of the stationary source by a 

Federal, state, or local government agency and the identity of the inspecting agency; 

and

 §68.160(b)(19) - OSHA Voluntary Protection Program status (Optional).

EPA is proposing to revise:

 §68.160(b)(1) by removing the method for obtaining latitude and longitude (but keep 

the rest of §68.160(b)(1));

 §68.160(b)(4) by requiring an email address for the owner or operator, if that person 

has an e-mail address, rather than making it optional;

 §68.160(b)(5) by removing “position” and requiring an email address for the person 

with overall responsibility for RMP elements and implementation, if that person has 

an e-mail address (rather than making it optional);
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 §68.160(b)(9) by adding “equivalent” to clarify that the number of full-time 

employees means full-time equivalent employees to be consistent with

RMP*eSubmit;

 §68.160(b)(12) by adding the phrase “and if so” to clarify that if the stationary source 

has a CAA Title V operating permit, then the RMP plan must include the permit 

number;

 §68.160(b)(14) by requiring an email address for the contractor who prepared the 

RMP (if any), if the contractor has an e-mail address;

 §68.160(b)(15) by requiring an email address for the source or parent company, if the 

source or parent company has an e-mail address;

 §68.160(b)(16) by requiring a source internet address, if the source has an internet 

address;

 §68.160(b)(17) by requiring a phone number at the source for public inquiries, if the 

source has a public inquiries phone number; 

 §68.160(b)(18) by requiring the name, phone number, e-mail address, and internet 

address for the LEPC, if the LEPC has such information available; and

 §68.160(b)(20) by changing facility to stationary source in subparagraphs (b)(20)(ii) 

and (b)(20)(iv).

EPA is proposing to add the following RMP data elements that relate to the information 

sharing provisions being proposed in this notice:

 §68.160(b)(21) would require an attestation that chemical hazard-related information 

is available to the LEPC or emergency response officials, as set forth in §68.205;

 §68.160(b)(22) would require an attestation that chemical hazard-related information 

is available to the public, as set forth in §68.210; and
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 §68.160(b)(23) would require the date of most recent public meeting, as set forth in 

§68.210(d).

2. Proposed Revisions to §68.170 (Prevention Program/Program 2)

EPA is proposing to delete the requirement in §68.170(k) which identify the date of the 

most recent change that triggered a review or revision of safety information, the hazard review, 

operating or maintenance procedures, or training.

EPA is proposing to revise:

 §68.170(a) by changing the reference to paragraph (k) to paragraph (j) because we 

are proposing to delete paragraph (k). 

 §68.170(d) by reorganizing into subparagraphs (d)(1) and (d)(2). EPA is proposing to 

replace the date of the most recent review or revision of the safety information with 

an attestation that the safety information requirements, in §68.48, are implemented. 

EPA is also proposing to move the requirement to list all Federal and state 

regulations, industry specific and established company or stationary source design 

codes and standards that are applicable, and the requirement to identify those 

followed, into subparagraph (d)(2).

 §68.170(e) by reorganizing the date of completion of the most recent hazard review 

or hazard review update to §68.170(e)(1) and removing from §68.170(e)(1), the 

requirement to identify an expected date of completion of any changes resulting from 

the hazard review;

 §68.170(f) by replacing the date of the most recent review or revision of operating 

procedures with an attestation that the operating procedures requirements, in §68.52, 

are implemented;

 §68.170(g) by replacing the date of the most recent review or revision of training 

programs with an attestation that training requirements, in §68.54, are implemented. 
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EPA is also proposing to delete the requirements to identify the types of training 

provided and competency testing used in subparagraphs (g)(1) and (g)(2);

 §68.170(h) by replacing the date of the most recent review or revision of 

maintenance procedures and the date of the most recent equipment inspection or test 

and the equipment inspected or tested with an attestation that the maintenance 

requirements, in §68.56, are implemented;

 §68.170(i) by reorganizing into subparagraphs. EPA would add an attestation that the 

compliance audit requirements of §68.58 are implemented in subparagraph (i)(1) and 

move the requirement to identify the date of the most recent compliance audit to 

subparagraph (i)(2). EPA would remove the requirement to identify the date of 

completion of any changes resulting from the compliance audit; and, in subparagraph 

(i)(3), add a requirement that the owner or operator identify whether the most recent 

compliance audit was a third-party audit, pursuant to §§68.58 and 68.59; and 

 §68.170(j) by reorganizing into subparagraphs. EPA would add an attestation that the 

incident investigation requirements, in §68.60, are implemented in subparagraph 

(j)(1) and move the date of the most recent incident investigation into subparagraph 

(j)(2). EPA would delete the requirement to identify the expected date of completion 

of any changes resulting from the investigation, and, in subparagraph (j)(3), would 

add a requirement that the plan indicate whether root cause analyses have been 

completed for all accidents and incidents that are subject to the requirements of 

§68.60.

3. Proposed Revisions to §68.175 (Prevention Program/Program 3)

EPA is proposing to delete paragraph §68.175(p) because we are addressing the data 

elements for contractor safety procedures in paragraph (o).

EPA is proposing to revise the following provisions:
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 §68.175(a) by changing the reference to paragraph (p) to paragraph (o) because we 

are proposing to combine the data elements in paragraphs (p) and (o) that show 

compliance with the requirements for contractor safety procedures. 

 §68.175(d) by reorganizing into subparagraphs (d)(1) and (d)(2). EPA is proposing to

replace the date of the most recent review or revision of the safety information with 

an attestation that the PSI requirements, in §68.65, are implemented. EPA is also 

proposing to move the requirement to list all Federal and state regulations, industryspecific and established company or stationary source design codes and standards 

that are applicable, and the requirement to identify those followed, into subparagraph 

(d)(2);

 §68.175(e) by reorganizing existing requirements into subparagraphs (e)(1) and 

(e)(2) and adding new requirements addressing safer technology and alternatives in 

new subparagraph (e)(2). Subparagraph (e)(1) would apply to information on the 

PHA or PHA update and revalidation information. EPA would move the date of 

completion of the most recent PHA or update and require the plan identify the 

technique used to §68.170(e)(1)(i). EPA would delete the requirement to identify the 

expected date of completion of any changes resulting from the PHA. Additional PHA 

information would move to subparagraph (e)(1)(ii)-(vi). EPA would add

subparagraph (e)(2) to address requirements for safer alternatives including: an 

attestation that the PHA address safer technology and risk management measures, as 

required in §68.67(c)(8); whether any IST or ISD were implemented and if so, the 

technology category that describes the IST or ISD (i.e., substitution, minimization, 

simplification, and/or moderation);
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 §68.175(f) by replacing the date of the most recent review or revision of operating 

procedures with an attestation that the operating procedures requirements, in §68.69, 

are implemented;

 §68.175(g) by replacing the date of the most recent review or revision of training 

programs with an attestation that training requirements, in §68.71, are implemented.

EPA is also proposing to delete the requirements to identify the types of training 

provided and competency testing used in subparagraphs (g)(1) and (g)(2);

 §68.175(h) by replacing the date of the most recent review or revision of 

maintenance procedures and the date of the most recent equipment inspection or test 

and the equipment inspected or tested with an attestation that the mechanical integrity 

requirements, in §68.73, are implemented;

 §68.175(i) by replacing the date of the most recent change that triggered MOC

procedures and the date of the most recent review or revision of MOC procedures

with an attestation that the MOC requirements, in §68.75, are implemented;

 §68.175(j) by replacing the date of the most recent pre-startup review with an 

attestation that the pre-startup review requirement, in §68.77, are implemented;

 §68.175(k) by reorganizing into subparagraphs. EPA would add an attestation that 

the compliance audit requirements of §68.79 are implemented in subparagraph (k)(1)

and move the requirement to identify the date of the most recent compliance audit to 

subparagraph (k)(2). EPA would remove the requirement to identify the expected 

date of completion of any changes resulting from the compliance audit; and, in 

subparagraph (k)(3), add a requirement that the owner or operator identify whether 

the most recent compliance audit was a third-party audit, pursuant to §§68.79 and 

68.80;
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 §68.175(l) by reorganizing into subparagraphs. EPA would add an attestation that the 

incident investigation requirements, in §68.81, are implemented in subparagraph 

(l)(1) and move the date of the most recent incident investigation into subparagraph 

(l)(2). EPA would delete the requirement to identify the expected date of completion 

of any changes resulting from the investigation; and, in subparagraph (l)(3), would 

add a requirement that the plan indicate whether root cause analyses have been 

completed for all accidents and incidents that are subject to the requirements of 

§68.81;

 §68.175(m) by replacing the date of the most recent review or revision of employee 

participation plans with an attestation that employee participation requirements, 

§68.83, are implemented;

 §68.175(n) by replacing the date of the most recent review or revision of hot work 

permit procedures with an attestation that the hot work permit requirements, in 

§68.85, are implemented; and

 §§68.175(o) and 68.175(p) by replacing the date of the most recent review or revision 

of contractor safety procedures and the date of the most recent evaluation of 

contractor safety performance with an attestation in §68.175(o) that the contractor 

safety requirements, in §68.67, are implemented.

4. Proposed Revisions to §68.180 (Emergency Response Program)

Subpart G §68.180 contains the emergency response program data elements that must be 

included in the RMP. Although the data elements in §68.180 are intended to help identify 

whether stationary source personnel will respond to an accidental release of a regulated 

substance, the existing data elements do not clearly distinguish between responding stationary 

sources and non-responding stationary sources. As a result, many non-responding stationary 

sources are submitting RMPs to the EPA with errors, because they appear to be answering 
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questions that were only meant to be answered by responding sources. Consequently, the RMP

data do not indicate with certainty, whether a stationary source is a responding or non-responding 

stationary source.

The proposed revisions to add emergency response exercises and revise local

coordination provisions of the rule are intended to improve coordination with local response 

authorities and to bolster emergency response capabilities and preparedness for accidental

releases. Because of the proposed regulatory changes to subpart E- emergency response, and due 

to the difficulty in distinguishing between responding and non-responding facilities in Subpart G 

§68.180, the EPA is proposing to completely revise and reorganize Subpart G §68.180 into the 

following three parts: requirements for (1) all non-responding and responding stationary sources, 

(2) non-responding stationary sources, and (3) responding stationary sources. The EPA believes 

that splitting Subpart G §68.180 into three parts will aid facilities’ understanding of the reporting 

requirements, reduce errors in submitted RMPs, and improve compliance with the RMP 

requirements. The proposed revisions to Subpart G §68.180 will also improve EPA’s ability to 

evaluate a facility’s compliance with the proposed Emergency Response Program requirements. 

EPA is proposing to revise:

 §68.180(a) by deleting the phrase “the following information.” The text in 

subparagraphs (a)(1) through (a)(3) would be reorganized and/or replaced. 

Subparagraph (a)(1) would require the RMP to identify the name, organizational 

affiliation, phone number, and e-mail address of local emergency planning and 

response organizations with which the stationary source last coordinated emergency 

response efforts, pursuant to §68.10(b)(3) or §68.93. Subparagraph (a)(2) would 

require the RMP to identify whether coordination with the local emergency response 

organizations is occurring at least annually, pursuant to §68.93(a). Subparagraph 

(a)(3) would require the RMP to identify a list of Federal or state emergency plan 
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requirements to which the stationary source is subject. EPA would delete 

subparagraphs (a)(4) through (a)(6);

 §68.180(b) by replacing the current text with a requirement to identify whether the 

facility is a responding or non-responding stationary source, pursuant to §68.90. EPA 

would reorganize the paragraph into subparagraphs as follows:

o Subparagraph (b)(1) would apply to non-responding stationary sources. In 

subparagraphs (b)(1)(i) through (b)(1)(iii) the owner or operator would be 

required to identify whether the owner or operator has confirmed that local 

responders are capable of responding to accidental releases at the source, whether 

appropriate notification mechanisms are in place, and whether a notification 

exercise occurs at least annually.

o Subparagraph (b)(2) would apply to responding stationary sources. In 

subparagraphs (b)(2)(i) through (b)(2)(v) the owner or operator would be 

required to identify whether the LEPC or local response entity requested that the 

stationary source be a responding facility; whether the stationary source complies 

with requirements in §68.95; whether a notification exercises occurs at least 

annually, as required in §68.96(a); whether a field exercise is conducted every 

five years and after any RMP reportable accident, pursuant to §68.96(b)(1)(i); 

and whether a tabletop exercise occurs at least annually, except during the 

calendar year when a field exercise is conducted, as required in §68.96(b)(2)(i). 

EPA is proposing to delete §68.180(c), which requires the owner or operator to list other 

Federal or state emergency plan requirements to which the stationary source is subject. 

5. Technical Corrections

a. Proposed revisions to §68.10 (Applicability)
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EPA is proposing to correct a typographical error in §68.10(b)(2). Section 68.10(b)(2) 

uses the term public receptor and indicates that public receptor is defined in §68.30; however the 

term public receptor is defined in §68.3, not §68.30. The proposed rule language corrects this 

typographical error.

b. Proposed revisions to §68.48 (Safety information)

EPA is proposing to remove the word “material” from the term Material Safety Data 

Sheet in §68.48(a)(1) to conform with OSHA’s revised terminology for SDS. In 2012, OSHA

made changes to its Hazard Communication Standard at 29 CFR 1910.1200 in order to align with 

the UN Globally Harmonized System of Classification and Labelling of Chemicals (GHS), 

Revision 3 (77 FR 17574, March 26, 2012). One change was the change in nomenclature from 

“Material Safety Data Sheets” to “Safety Data Sheets.” Consequently, OSHA made this change to 

the PSM standard at 1910.119(d)(1)(vii) (78 FR 9311, February 8, 2013). Chemical producers 

and users must comply with new SDS requirements by June 1, 2015.204 In order to be consistent 

with OSHA and the UN GHS, EPA is proposing to replace “Material Safety Data Sheet” with 

“Safety Data Sheet” in §68.48(a)(1).

c. Proposed revisions to §§68.54 and 68.71 (Training)

The RMP rule requires initial and refresher training for employees operating a Program 2 

or Program 3 covered process. Since the inception of the rule, however, there has been confusion 

on the types of employees that are considered workers operating a covered process. Although 

“employee” is not defined in §68.3, EPA has traditionally interpreted an employee to be any 

worker that is involved in operating a process, including supervisors. This is consistent with the 

OSHA definition of employee set forth at 29 CFR 1910.2(d) in which an employee means an 

employee of an employer who is employed in a business of his employer which affects 

commerce. 

 

204

 OSHA Fact Sheet- Hazard Communication Standard Final Rule.

https://www.osha.gov/dsg/hazcom/HCSFactsheet.html.
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EPA has noted during facility inspections that some owners and operators are confused 

about how the existing training requirements apply to supervisors involved in process operations.

If a supervisor is involved in decision-making for process operations, such as making changes to 

operating parameters, developing or approving operating procedures, or conducting emergency 

operations, then EPA expects that the supervisor receives initial and refresher training appropriate 

to the supervisor’s responsibilities. In such cases, the training of a supervisor might not need to be 

as extensive as that of an operator, but EPA expects that the supervisor training would include 

process operations for which the supervisor might have decision-making authority. For this 

reason, EPA is proposing to clarify that the training requirements in §§68.54 and 68.71 (for 

Program 2 and Program 3 facilities, respectively) apply to supervisors who are involved in 

operating a covered process by adding paragraph (e) to indicate that the term employee includes 

supervisors.

Similarly, the EPA realizes that there may be other employee types involved in operating 

a covered process besides operators. For example, process engineers and maintenance technicians 

may occasionally be involved in process operations. The degree of involvement for these other 

employee types may vary greatly. Therefore, EPA is proposing to revise §68.54(d) to clarify that 

the requirement applies to employees involved in operating a process. For employees other than 

operators and supervisors, EPA expects that initial and refresher training will be appropriate to 

the employee’s responsibilities in operating the process. 

Finally, EPA believes that Program 3 requirements in §§68.71(a) and 68.71(b) provides 

clearer regulatory language regarding the applicability of employees subject to initial and 

refresher training requirements than the similar Program 2 requirements §§68.54(a) and 68.54(b). 

Specifically, §§68.71(a) and 68.71(b) indicates that initial and refresher training is required for 

employees “involved in” operating a covered process. Because EPA believes that this language 
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can better facilitate compliance for Program 2, the EPA is proposing to add similar language for 

Program 2 facilities at §§68.54(a) and 68.54(b). 

d. Proposed revisions to §68.65 (PSI)

EPA is proposing to revise §68.65(a) in order to remove irrelevant text regarding the 

timeframe for initial development of PSI and to more clearly demonstrate that PSI must be kept 

up-to-date. The EPA believes that these proposed changes will help Program 3 facilities to better 

comply with PSI requirements.

EPA is proposing to revise §68.65(a) to remove the phrase “In accordance with the 

schedule set forth in §68.67.” This language appears to have been adopted from OSHA’s PSM 

PHA completion schedule of May 1994 to May 1997 and is not relevant to the RMP rule because 

the compliance date of June 21, 1999 is after OSHA’s PSM PHA completion schedule. 

Additionally, the only schedule currently referenced in §68.67 is in §68.67(e), which pertains to a 

written schedule of PHA corrective actions. Because §68.67(e) does not pertain to when a PHA 

must be completed, EPA is proposing to remove the phrase “In accordance with the schedule set 

forth in §68.67” from §68.65(a). 

Furthermore, EPA is proposing to add the phrase: “and shall keep PSI up-to-date.” EPA 

has always intended that PSI be kept up-to-date for Program 3 facilities. Updated PSI is necessary 

to properly update or revalidate the PHA every 5 years as required by §68.67(f). PSI items that 

that need to be kept up-to-date include, but are not limited to, piping and instrumentation 

diagrams, SDSs, hazard information, and changes to the design of the process. Although PSI must

be updated for Program 3 facilities through MOC requirements in §68.75(d), EPA believes that 

the proposed change makes it clearer that PSI must be kept up-to-date. This proposed change also 

ensures consistency with the safety information requirement for Program 2 facilities, where 

§68.48(a) indicates “The owner or operator shall compile and maintain the following up-to-date 
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safety information...” EPA expects that revising §68.65(a) in this manner will further clarify the 

requirement that PSI must be completed prior to conducting a PHA.

Finally, in order to be consistent with OSHA and the GHS, EPA is proposing to replace 

“Material Safety Data Sheet” with “Safety Data Sheet” in the note to §68.65(b). 

e. Proposed revisions to §68.130 List of substances

EPA is proposing revisions to Tables 1, 2, and 4 in §68.130 as follows:

Table 1 to §68.130- List of Regulated Toxic Substances and TQs for Accidental Release 

Prevention. EPA is proposing to correct a typographical error in the Chemical Abstracts Service 

(CAS) number (no.) for allyl alcohol in Table 1 in §68.130. The incorrect CAS no. of 107-18-61 

for allyl alcohol would be corrected to 107-18-6. 

Table 2 to §68.130, List of Regulated Toxic Substances and TQs for Accidental Release 

Prevention. In order to make the list of CAS nos. easier to search, EPA is proposing to rightjustify the column of CAS nos. in Table 2 in §68.130. This will match the alignment of the CAS 

nos. in other tables in §68.130.

Table 4 to §68.130-List of Regulated Flammable Substances and TQs for Accidental 

Release Prevention. EPA is proposing to correct a typographical error to a CAS no., right justify 

the first CAS nos. column and delete the second CAS nos. column. 

Table 4 in §68.130 currently has two columns with CAS nos. In the left column of CAS nos., 

EPA is proposing to correct the CAS no. for 1, 3-Butadiene, to read 106-99-0, instead of 196-99-

0. In addition, we are proposing to right-justify the left column of CAS nos. in Table 4 to make it 

easier for users to read and find the CAS no. associated with a particular regulated substance. 

EPA is also proposing to remove the second column of CAS nos. (i.e., the CAS nos. column that 

appears after the chemical name column) because it is redundant. 

f. Proposed revisions to §68.200 (Recordkeeping)
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EPA is proposing to revise §68.200 to clarify that records must be maintained at the 

stationary source. 

VIII. Compliance Dates

The initial Risk Management Program rule applied 3 years after promulgation of the rule 

on June 20, 1996, which is consistent with the last sentence of CAA section 112(r)(7)(B)(i). The 

provisions of this proposal modify terms of the existing rule, and, in some cases, clarify existing 

requirements. The statute does not directly address when amendments should become applicable. 

Therefore, in modifications to §68.10, EPA is proposing to:

 Require compliance with emergency response coordination activities within one year 

of an effective date of a final rule; 

 Provide up to three years for the owner or operator of a non-responding stationary 

source to develop an emergency response program in accordance with §68.95 

following an LEPC or equivalent’s written request to do so; 

 Comply with new provisions, unless otherwise stated, four years after the effective 

date of the final rule; and 

 Provide regulated sources one additional year (i.e., five years after the effective date 

of the final rule) to correct or resubmit RMPs to reflect new and revised data 

elements. 

EPA is proposing that within one year of the effective date of a final rule, the owner or 

operator of a stationary source comply with emergency response coordination activities in 

§§68.93(a) and 68.93(b). This includes coordinating response needs annually with local 

emergency planning and response organizations to ensure resources and capabilities are in place 

to respond to an accidental release of a regulated substance, and documenting coordination 

activities. EPA believes one year is sufficient to arrange for and document coordination activities. 
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The coordination activities in this proposed rule mostly are clarifications of current requirements 

rather than new provisions.

EPA is also proposing to require three years for the owner or operator of a stationary 

source to comply with emergency response program requirements of §68.95 after receiving a 

written request by an LEPC or equivalent to develop an emergency response program. This 

timeframe is consistent with the time established in the original rule to comply with risk 

management program requirements and submit initial RMPs. 

Additionally, EPA is proposing to provide additional time for compliance with other 

proposed provisions (i.e., third-party compliance audits, root cause analyses as part of incident 

investigations, STAA, emergency response exercises, and information availability provisions). 

For these provisions, the proposed rule requires affected facilities to comply by four years after 

the effective date of the rule. Our reasons for the four year phase for these modified requirements 

are set out below. For the third-party audit,incident investigation root cause analysis, and public 

meeting provisions, this means that for any RMP reportable accident occurring later than four

years after the effective date of the rule, the owner or operator of a source must conduct a thirdparty audit; investigate an incident, including a root cause analysis; and hold a public meeting 

within 30 days of the accident. For any incident that could reasonably have resulted in a 

catastrophic release (near miss), the owner or operator has four years after the effective date of 

the rule to comply with the proposed incident investigation root cause analysis requirements. For 

the STAA, emergency exercise, and information availability provisions, this means that the 

owner or operator must have completed or updated their PHA to include the STAA; conducted a 

notification exercise and at least one tabletop or field exercise; and prepared the required 

information to be provided to the public or, upon request, to theLEPCs. 

EPA is proposing to provide this additional time for several reasons. First, EPA believes 

that for most sources, the incident investigation root cause analysis and emergency response 
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exercise requirements will involve training and program development activities that may 

reasonably require significant time to complete. Second, the extended compliance timeframe will 

allow potential auditors enough time to meet the competency and independence criteria necessary 

to serve as a third-party auditor. Third, for sources subject to the STAA provisions, EPA believes 

that in many cases these sources will prefer to perform a full PHA update when implementing the 

STAA requirements. Sources subject to this provision are among the largest and most complex 

sources regulated under 40 CFR part 68, and therefore PHAs and PHA updates at these sources 

typically require a significant level of effort. Since PHA updates are normally done at five year 

intervals, EPA believes it would be appropriate to allow most sources to adopt these provisions in 

their normal PHA update cycle if they so choose. Sources that performed their most recent PHA 

update immediately prior to the rule publication date would have up to four years to perform their 

next PHA update and adopt the STAA provisions. Most sources could schedule their PHA 

updates to incorporate the new STAA provisions on their normal PHA update schedule. 

Lastly, EPA intends to publish guidance for certain provisions, such as STAA, root cause 

analysis, and emergency response exercises. Once these materials are complete, owners and 

operators will need time to familiarize themselves with the new materials and incorporate them 

into their risk management programs.

EPA is also proposing to provide one additional year for owners or operators to update 

RMPs to reflect proposed new or revised data elements in Subpart G of the rule. The additional 

year will allow owners and operators an opportunity to begin to comply with revised rule 

provisions prior to certifying compliance in the RMP. Additionally, the Agency will need to make 

significant revisions to its online RMP submission system, RMP*eSubmit, to accommodate the 

newly required and revised data elements, and sources will not be able to update RMPs with new 

or revised data elements until the submission system is ready. Also, once it is ready, allowing an 
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additional year for sources to update RMPs will prevent potential problems with thousands of 

sources submitting updated RMPs on the same day.

Examples for compliance and submission dates.

The following examples assume a hypothetical effective date of June 5, 2017 for a final 

rule that includes the proposed provisions in Table 7: Proposed Rule Provisions and 

Corresponding Compliance Dates with corresponding proposed compliance dates.

Table 7: Proposed Rule Provisions and Corresponding Compliance Dates

Rule provision Proposed Compliance 

Date

Hypothetical 

Compliance Date

Initiated after an 

RMP Reportable 

Accident?

Third-party audit Four years after effective 

date June 5, 2021 Yes

Root cause 

analysis 

Four years after effective 

date June 5, 2021 Yes (also required after near misses)

STAA Four years after effective 

date June 5, 2021 No

Emergency 

response 

coordination 

activities

Within one year of 

effective date June 5, 2018 No

LEPC requires 

compliance with 

§68.95 (emergency 

response program) 

Within three years of 

receipt of written request N/A No

Emergency 

response exercises

Four years after effective 

date June 5, 2021

Partially- field 

exercise within one

year

Information 

sharing

Four years after effective 

date June 5, 2021

Partially- public 

meeting within 30 

days

Update RMP Five years after effective 

date June 5, 2022

No (but previously 

existing correction 

requirements of 

§68.195 still apply)

Example 1: Proposed provisions that would apply to a non-responding stationary source

Source A (see Table 8) is a non-responding stationary source with a regulated process 

subject to Program 2 requirements. Source A’s owner submitted the latest RMP update to EPA on 

January 20, 2015 and completed its latest compliance audit on August 11, 2017. The source is 
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not in NAICS 322, 324, or 325, and therefore is not subject to the proposed STAA provisions. 

The source has not had any RMP reportable accidents since the effective date of a final rule.

Table 8: Example 1, Source A

Source A—Program 2, Non-responding Stationary Source

Date of Last RMP Update Last compliance audit Last accident 

January 20, 2015 August 11, 2017 N/A

In this example, the following proposed provisions would apply:

 Annual emergency response coordination activities in accordance with proposed 

§68.93;

 Notification exercises (proposed §68.96(a)); and

 Information availability provisions (proposed §§68.205 and 68.210).

The owner or operator must coordinate response needs with local emergency planning 

and response organizations to ensure resources and capabilities are in place to respond to an 

accidental release of a regulated substance. Coordination activities must occur annually and be 

documented.

Source A is a non-responding facility, and the owner or operator would be required to 

conduct annual notification exercises. The owner or operator would also be required to annually

update information for the LEPC and provide the information upon request, and make certain

information easily accessible to the public.

Finally, beginning 5 years after the rule effective date, the owner or operator must update 

the RMP to include all revised data elements specified in subpart G and §68.42. In this case, the 

owner or operator would update their RMP no later than January 20, 2020 (the source's next 

scheduled five-year update), and again by June 5, 2022 (the required resubmission date for the 

proposed rule).

Table 9: Summary of proposed provisions that would apply to a non-responding 

stationary source summarizes the proposed provisions that would apply to Source A.
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Table 9: Summary of proposed provisions that would apply to a non-responding stationary 

source

Applicable 

Provisions: Timeframe Additional Information When to Complete*

Emergency response 

coordination 

activities

Within one year of 

effective date of a 

final rule. 

Occurs annually

Complete coordination 

activities before June 5, 

2018 and document 

coordination

Notification exercise

By four-years 

after effective 

date.

Occurs annually

Complete first 

notification exercise by

June 5, 2021

Information availability provisions

Information to LEPC

By four-years 

after effective 

date.

Update information

annually. Includes 

information on 

regulated substances; 

accident histories; 

compliance audits; 

incident investigations 

(as applicable) and 

exercises. Provide to 

LEPC upon request.

Develop by June 5, 

2021 and provide upon 

request

Information to the 

public

By four-years 

after effective 

date.

Occurs annually. 

Includes information 

on: regulated 

substances including 

Safety Data Sheets; 

accident history; 

emergency response 

program; exercises; 

and LEPC contact 

information.

Complete first calendar 

year submission by June 

5, 2021

Update RMP By five years after 

effective date

Owner’s next 5-year 

resubmission date 

occurs prior to 

effective date for 

provision, so owner 

must update RMP 

twice.

Update RMP on regular 

schedule (by January 

20, 2020) and again to 

include new information

by June 5, 2022

* Dates are based on a hypothetical scenario including a rule effective date of June 5, 2017.

If the LEPC submits a request to Source A’s owner requesting the source comply with 

the emergency response program requirements of §68.95, then Source A’s owner would have 

three years from the date of the letter to develop and implement an emergency response plan, 

obtain equipment, and train personnel in relevant procedures. 
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Once the owner has developed an emergency response program, the source is a 

responding facility and must also comply with tabletop and field exercise requirements for 

responding facilities. 

Example 2A: Proposed provisions that would apply to a responding stationary source

Source B (see Table 10) is a responding stationary source with a process subject to 

Program 3 requirements. Its latest RMP update was submitted June 30, 2020 (i.e., three years 

after the rule effective date). Its latest compliance audit was performed on April 6, 2020. The 

source is not in NAICS 322, 324, or 325, and therefore is not subject to the proposed STAA 

provisions, and the source has not had any RMP reportable accidents since the effective date of a 

final rule.

Table 10: Example 2A, Source B

Source B—Program 3, Responding Stationary Source

Date of Last RMP Update Last compliance audit Last accident 

June 30, 2020 April 6, 2020 N/A

In this example, the following proposed provisions would apply:

 Annual emergency response coordination activities in accordance with proposed §68.93;

 Emergency response exercises (proposed §68.96); and

 Information availability provisions (proposed §§68.205 and 68.210).

The owner or operator must coordinate response needs with local emergency planning 

and response organizations to ensure resources and capabilities are in place to respond to an 

accidental release of a regulated substance. Coordination activities must occur annually and be 

documented.

Additionally, since Source B is a responding facility, the owner or operator would be 

required to conduct annual notification exercises, annual tabletop exercises (with a field exercise 

substituting for a tabletop exercise once every five years).
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The owner or operator would be required to update information annually and provide the 

infromation upon request, to the LEPC and make information easily accessible to the public. 

Finally, by five years after the rule effective date, the owner or operator must update the 

RMP to include all revised data elements specified in subpart G and §68.42. Table 11: Summary 

of proposed provisions that would apply to Source B summarizes the proposed provisions that 

would apply to Source B.

Table 11: Summary of proposed provisions that would apply to Source B

Applicable 

Provisions: Timeframe Additional Information When to Complete*

Emergency response 

coordination activities

Within one year of 

effective date of a 

final rule. 

Occurs annually

Complete coordination 

activities before June 

5, 2018

Emergency response exercises (proposed §68.96)

Notification exercise Four-years after 

effective date. Occurs annually

Complete first 

notification exercise by

June 5, 2021

Field and tabletop 

exercises

Four-years after 

effective date.

Tabletop exercise 

annually, field 

exercise once every 

five years. No tabletop 

exercises in the year of 

a field exercise

Complete first tabletop 

or field exercise by 

June 5, 2021

Information availability provisions

Information to LEPC Four-years after 

effective date.

Update information

annually. Includes 

information on 

regulated substances; 

accident histories; 

compliance audits; 

incident investigations 

(as applicable) and 

exercises. Provide to 

LEPC upon request.

Develop by June 5, 

2021 and provide upon 

request

Information to the 

public

Four-years after 

effective date.

Occurs annually. 

Includes information 

on: regulated 

substances including 

Safety Data Sheets; 

accident history; 

emergency response 

program; exercises; 

and LEPC contact 

information.

Complete first calendar 

year submission by 

June 5, 2021
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Update RMP By five years after

effective date

Update RMP to 

include new

information by June 5, 

2022

* Dates are based on a hypothetical scenario including a rule effective date of June 5, 2017.

Example 2B: Additional proposed provisions that would apply to a responding stationary 

following an RMP reportable accident. See Table 12 below.

Table 12: Example 2B, Source B

Source B—Program 3, Responding Stationary Source

Date of Last RMP Update Last compliance audit Last accident 

June 30, 2020 April 6, 2020 July 5, 2021

In this example, Source B has an accidental release on July 5, 2021 that meets the 

reporting requirements of §68.42. As a result of the accident, Source B’s owner would be 

required to comply with the following additional proposed provisions:

 Accident history provisions of §68.42 (to report root causes identified during the 

incident investigation); 

 Third-party audit provisions of §68.80; 

 Incident investigation and root cause analysis requirements of §68.81; 

 Field exercise provisions of §68.96(b)(1)(i) (i.e., requiring a field exercise within one 

year of any accidental release required to be reported under §68.42); and 

 Public meeting within 30 days of an RMP reportable accident, pursuant to 

§68.210(d). 

Chronologically, the first provision that would apply is the requirement to host a public 

meeting. Section 68.210(d) requires the owner or operator to hold a public meeting within 30 

days after the accident to inform the public about the accident, including information required 

under §68.42, and other relevant information. 

An incident investigation must be initiated promptly, but no later than 48 hours following 

an incident. The proposed incident investigation provisions would require the owner or operator 
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to complete an incident investigation that includes a root cause analysis and other elements 

specified in §68.81(d), and an incident investigation report, within 12 months of the incident, 

unless the implementing agency approves an extension of time. A summary of the incident 

investigation report must be provided to the LEPC, upon request.

The proposed third-party audit provisions would require the owner or operator to hire a 

third-party auditor to perform a third-party compliance audit and submit an audit report to the 

implementing agency and owner or operator within 12 months of the accident (if the source’s 

next scheduled compliance audit was required sooner than one year following the incident, the 

third-party audit would be required to be completed by the scheduled compliance audit date 

unless the implementing agency approved an extension). The owner or operator must also 

complete an audit findings response report and submit it to the implementing agency within 90 

days of receiving the audit report from the third-party auditor. The owner or operator must also 

provide the audit findings response report, as well as a schedule to address deficiencies identified 

in the audit findings response report and documentation of actions taken to address deficiencies, 

to the owner or operator’s audit committee of the Board of Directors, or other comparable 

committee, if one exists. 

The owner or operator would also be required to conduct a field exercise meeting the 

requirements of §68.96 within one year of the accidental release, and prepare an evaluation report 

within 90 days of completing the exercise. By five years after the rule effective date, the owner or 

operator must update the RMP to include all revised data elements specified in subpart G and 

§68.42. Table 13 summarizes the additional provisions that would apply to Source B following an 

RMP reportable accident (in addition to complying with new requirements triggered by an RMP

reportable accident, the owner or operator must annually coordinate response needs with local 

emergency planning and response organizations, document coordination activities, and comply 

with the other information disclosure provisions as previously described).
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Table 13: Summary of additional proposed provisions that would apply to Source B 

following an RMP reportable accident

Applicable Provisions 

following an RMP 

reportable accident:

Timeframe Additional Information When to Complete*

Public meeting Four-years after 

effective date.

Within 30 days after an 

accident

Hold public meeting 

by August 4, 2021

Incident investigations Four-years after 

effective date.

Initiate within 48 

hours, complete 

investigation and root 

cause analysis within 

12 months

Complete report by 

July 5, 2022

Third-party audit Four-years after 

effective date.

Within 12 months of 

the accident or three 

years of previous audit, 

whichever is sooner

Complete third-party 

audit by July 5, 2022

Complete findings 

response report within 

90 days of completing 

audit.

Field exercise Four-years after 

effective date.

At least once every five 

years, and within one 

year of an RMP 

reportable accident 

Complete field 

exercise by July 5, 

2022

Complete an 

evaluation report 

within 90 days of the 

exercise

Include new accident 

history information in 

RMP

Five-years after 

effective date.

Correct RMP within 6 

months of accident 

(existing requirement); 

report complete 

accident information in 

next five-year RMP 

update

Correct RMP by 

January 5, 2022; report 

complete accident 

information by June 5, 

2025

* Dates are based on a hypothetical scenario including a rule effective date of June 5, 2017.

Example 3: Compliance date example for sources subject to STAA requirements 

Source C (see Table 14) is a petroleum refinery in NAICS 32411. Its latest RMP update 

was submitted on March 31, 2018 (i.e., the year after the rule effective date). Its latest PHA 

revalidation was completed on March 7, 2017 (i.e., approximately three months before the rule 

effective date).

Table 14: Example 3, Source C

Source C—Program 3, NAICS 32411

Date of Last RMP Update Last PHA revalidation

March 31, 2018 March 7, 2017
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Because the source is in NAICS 32411, it is subject to the proposed STAA provisions of 

§68.67(c)(8). Therefore, by four years after the rule effective date, the owner or operator must 

complete a PHA revalidation that addresses safer technology and alternative risk management 

measures, and determine the feasibility of the ISTs and ISDs considered. Under the proposed 

information availability requirements of §68.205, the owner or operator must also submit to their 

LEPC a summary of the ISTs or ISDs implemented or planned, and annually update the summary 

as part of the calendar year submission described in §68.205(c).

By June 5, 2018 the owner or operator of Source C must comply with the new emergency 

response coordination provisions, and by June 5, 2021, the owner or operator must also comply 

with other applicable proposed rule provisions including: third-party audits; incident 

investigations; emergency response exercises; and information availability (including public 

meetings).

By five years after the rule effective date, the owner or operator of Source C must update 

the RMP to include all revised data elements specified in subpart G and §68.42. Table 15:

Compliance date example for sources subject to STAA requirements, summarizes the proposed 

STAA provisions that would apply to Source C.

Table 15: Compliance date example for sources subject to STAA requirements

Applicable 

Provisions: Timeframe Additional Information When to Complete*

STAA Four-years after 

effective date

Occurs every five 

years as part of PHA 

revalidation. 

By June 5, 2021

Information 

availability to LEPC, 

upon request

Four-years after 

effective date

In addition to other 

information 

availability provisions, 

include information on 

IST or ISD to be 

implemented. Update 

every five years as 

part of information to

provide to LEPC upon 

request.

Develop in first 

calendar yearafter 

completion of STAA or 

June 5, 2021, 

whichever is later and 

provide to LEPC upon 

request.

Update RMP Five years after 

rule effective date By June 5, 2022
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* Dates are based on a hypothetical scenario including a rule effective date of June 5, 2017.

IX. Statutory and EO Reviews 

A. EO 12866: Regulatory Planning and Review and EO 13563: Improving Regulation and 

Regulatory Review 

This action is an economically significant regulatory action that was submitted to the 

OMB for review. Any changes made in response to OMB recommendations have been 

documented in the docket. The EPA prepared a Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) of the 

potential costs and benefits associated with this action. This RIA is available in the docket and is 

summarized here (Docket ID Number EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725). 

1. Why EPA is Considering this Action

In response to catastrophic chemical facility incidents in the United States, President 

Obama issued EO 13650, “Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security,” on August 1, 2013. 

The EO establishes the Chemical Facility Safety and Security Working Group (Working Group), 

co-chaired by the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Administrator of EPA, and the Secretary 

of Labor or their designated representatives at the Assistant Secretary level or higher, and 

comprised of senior representatives of other Federal departments, agencies, and offices. The EO 

requires the Working Group to carry out a number of tasks whose overall goal is to prevent 

chemical accidents, such as the explosion that occurred at the West Fertilizer facility in West, 

Texas, on April 17, 2013, which killed 15 people, most of whom were first responders, caused 

multiple injuries, and resulted in extensive building damage to the town. 

Section 6(a)(i) of EO 13650 requires the Working Group to develop options for improved 

chemical facility safety and security that identify “improvements to existing risk management 

practices through agency programs, private sector initiatives, Government guidance, outreach, 

standards, and regulations.’’ Section 6(c) of EO 13650 requires the Administrator of EPA to 

review the Risk Management Program. As part of this effort to solicit comments and information 
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from the public regarding potential changes to EPA’s RMP regulations (40 CFR part 68), on July 

31, 2014, EPA published an RFI (79 FR 44604). 

EPA believes that the RMP regulations have been effective in preventing and mitigating 

chemical accidents in the United States; however, EPA believes that revisions could further 

protect human health and the environment from chemical hazards through advancement of PSM

based on lessons learned. These revisions are a result of a review of the existing Risk 

Management Program and information gathered from the RFI and EO listening sessions, and are 

proposed under the statutory authority provided by CAA section 112(r) as amended (42 U.S.C. 

7412(r)).

2. Description of Alternatives to the Proposed Rule

The RIA analyzed the proposed new requirements and revisions to existing requirements 

as well as several alternatives for each.

Third-Party Audits—(proposed revisions apply to existing §§68.58 and 68.79 and new §§68.59 

and 68.80)

The existing rule requires Program 2 and Program 3 processes to conduct a compliance 

audit at least once every 3 years. The proposed rule would require facilities to contract with an 

independent third-party to conduct the next scheduled compliance audit following an RMP 

reportable accident or after an implementing agency determines that certain circumstances exist 

that suggest a heightened risk for an accident. The third-party would have to be someone with 

whom the facility does not have an existing or recent relationship and who meets specific 

qualification criteria. The low cost alternative would apply only for Program 2 and Program 3 

processes after an RMP reportable accident or at the request of the implementing agency. The 

medium cost alternative would apply every three years for all compliance audits conducted for all 

Program 3 processes. The high cost alternative would apply every three years for all compliance 

audits conducted for Program 2 and Program 3 processes.
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Root Cause Analysis—(proposed revisions apply to §§68.60 and 68.81)

The proposed rule would require facilities to conduct a root cause analysis as part of an 

incident investigation following an RMP reportable accident or an incident that could reasonably 

have resulted in an RMP reportable accident (i.e., “near miss”). A root cause analysis is a formal 

process to identify underlying reasons for failures that lead to accidental releases. These analyses 

usually require someone trained in the technique. The low cost alternative would apply the 

provision only to RMP reportable accidents or near misses in Program 3 processes. The 

medium/high cost alternative would apply to RMP reportable accidents or near misses involving 

Program 2 and Program 3 processes. 

Safer Technology and Alternatives Analysis (STAA)—(proposed revisions apply to §68.67)

Under the proposed rule, facilities in NAICS codes 322 (paper manufacturing), 324 

(petroleum and coal products manufacturing), and 325 (chemical manufacturing) with Program 3 

processes would be required to conduct a STAA for each process as part of their PHA, which 

occurs every 5 years. The STAA includes two parts: the initial analysis to identify alternatives, 

and a feasibility study to determine the costs and assess the reasonableness of implementing 

technology alternatives. The proposed rule is the low cost alternative, which would apply to all 

facilities with Program 3 processes in NAICS codes 322, 324, and 325. The medium cost 

alternative would apply the requirement to all Program 3 processes. The high cost alternative 

would apply the requirement to all Program 3 processes and require facilities to implement 

feasible IST/ISD. .

Coordination Activities—(proposed revisions apply to §§68.90, new 68.93, and 68.95)

Under the proposed rule, all facilities with Program 2 or Program 3 processes would be 

required to coordinate with local response agencies annually to determine response needs and 

ensure that response resources and capabilities are in place to respond to an accidental release of a 

regulated substance. The owner or operator would also be required to document coordination 
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activities. The proposed rule also includes a provision enabling the LEPC or local emergency 

response official to request, in writing, that the RMP-facility owner or operator comply with the 

emergency response program requirements of §68.95. Section 68.95 requires the owner or 

operator to develop an emergency response program that includes an emergency response plan, 

procedures for use, inspection and maintenance of response equipment, training for responding 

employees, and procedures to review and update the program. 

Alternatives to this provision are similar to the proposed requirements. One alternative 

that imposes the same costs as the proposed option would eliminate the option for local officials 

to request that a facility owner or operator comply with the requirements of §68.95. A second 

alternative is a high cost alternative and would require all facilities with Program 2 or Program 3 

processes to comply with §68.95, regardless of local response capability. This would be 

analogous to the requirements under the Oil Pollution Prevention regulation (40 CFR Part 112) 

where all facilities subject to the FRP provisions at §112.20 are required to prepare and 

implement an emergency response plan for oil discharges into navigable waters or adjoining 

shorelines.

Exercises—(proposed revisions apply to new §68.96)

Notification Exercises. All facilities with Program 2 or Program 3 processes would be 

required to conduct a notification exercise annually to ensure that the contact list to be used in an 

emergency is complete, accurate, and up-to-date. 

Tabletop and Field Exercises. The proposed rule would require responding facilities to 

conduct annual exercises of their emergency response plans and invite local emergency response 

officials to participate. Under the low cost alternative, facilities would conduct tabletop exercises 

annually. Under the proposed rule, which is the medium cost alternative, facilities would conduct 

a full field exercise at least once every five years and tabletop exercises annually in the interim 

years. Facilities with an RMP reportable accident would also have to conduct a full field exercise 
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within a year of an RMP reportable accident, but this may not impose any additional burden 

under the medium alternative as it would count as the required field exercise for the next 5-year 

period. Under the high cost alternative, facilities would conduct full field exercises annually.

Information Availability—(proposed revisions apply to new §68.205 and existing §68.210)

The proposed rule would require all facilities to disclose certain chemical hazard 

information to the public. The facility or its parent company, if applicable, would have to make 

the information available in an easily accessible manner, which might be presenting information 

on a company website, posting the information at public libraries, publishing it in local papers, or 

other means appropriate for particular communities and facilities. The information to be disclosed 

includes names of regulated substances at the facility; SDS; accident history information; 

emergency response program information; and LEPC or local response agency contact 

information.

In addition, facility owners or operators would be required to provide information upon 

request to the LEPC or other local response agencies on all of the following that apply to the 

facility: names and quantities of regulated substances; five-year RMP reportable accident history; 

summaries of compliance audit reports; summaries of incident investigation reports; summaries 

of implementation of IST; and information on emergency response exercises, including schedules 

for upcoming exercises. Facilities owners or operators would be required to update this 

information annually. Although EPA did not analyze alternatives for this provision, the different 

applicability for the STAA provision alternatives increases the cost of the medium/high 

alternative for disclosure to the LEPC because more facilities would have to report on that 

analysis.

Public Meeting—(proposed revisions apply to §68.210)

The proposed rule would require facilities to hold a public meeting for the local 

community within 30 days of an RMP reportable accident. The medium cost alternative would 
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require P2 and P3 facilities to hold a public meeting at least once every 5 years and within 30

days of an RMP reportable accident. The high cost alternative would require all facilities (i.e., 

including P1 facilities) to hold a public meeting at least once every 5 years and within 30 days of 

an RMP reportable accident.. 

3. Summary of Costs

Approximately 12,500 facilities have filed current RMPs with EPA and are potentially 

affected by the proposed rule changes. These facilities range from petroleum refineries and large 

chemical manufacturers to water and wastewater treatment systems; chemical and petroleum 

wholesalers and terminals; food manufacturers, packing plants, and other cold storage facilities 

with ammonia refrigeration systems; agricultural chemical distributors; midstream gas plants; and 

a limited number of other sources that use RMP-regulated substances.

Table 16 presents the number of facilities according to the latest RMP reporting as of 

February 2015 by industrial sector and chemical use. 

Table 16: Number of Affected Facilities by Sector

Sector NAICS Codes Total 

Facilities

Chemical Uses

Administration of 

environmental quality 

programs (i.e., 

governments)

924 1,923 Use chlorine and other 

chemicals for treatment

Agricultural chemical 

distributors/wholesalers

111, 112, 115, 

42491

3,667 Store ammonia for sale; some 

in NAICS 111 and 115 use 

ammonia as a refrigerant

Chemical manufacturing 325 1,466 Manufacture, process, store

Chemical wholesalers 4246 333 Store for sale

Food and beverage 

manufacturing

311, 312 1,476 Use (mostly ammonia as a 

refrigerant)

Oil and gas extraction 211 741 Intermediate processing

(mostly regulated flammable 

substances and flammable 

mixtures)

Other 44, 45, 48, 54, 56, 

61, 72

248 Use chemicals for wastewater 

treatment, refrigeration, store 

chemicals for sale

Other manufacturing 313, , 326, 327, 33 384 Use various chemicals in 

manufacturing process, waste 

treatment
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Other wholesale 423, 424 302 Use (mostly ammonia as a 

refrigerant)

Paper manufacturing 322 70 Use various chemicals in pulp 

and paper manufacturing

Petroleum and coal 

products manufacturing 

324 156 Manufacture, process, store

(mostly regulated flammable 

substances and flammable 

mixtures)

Petroleum wholesalers 4247 276 Store for sale (mostly 

regulated flammable 

substances and flammable 

mixtures)

Utilities 221 (except 

22131, 22132)

343 Use chlorine (mostly for 

water treatment)

Warehousing and storage 493 1,056 Use mostly ammonia as a 

refrigerant

Water/wastewater 

Treatment Systems

22131, 22132 102 Use chlorine and other 

chemicals

Total 12,542

Table 17 presents a summary of the annualized costs estimated in the regulatory impact 

analysis. In total, EPA estimates annualized costs of $158.3 million at a 3% discount rate and 

$161.0 million at a 7% discount rate.

Table 17: Summary of Annualized Costs (Millions, 2014 dollars)

Provision 3% 7%

Third-party Audits $5.0 $5.0

Incident Investigation/Root Cause $0.8 $0.8

STAA $34.8 $34.8

Coordination $6.3 $6.3

New Responders* $33.0 $35.6

Notification Exercises $1.4 $1.4

Facility Exercises $60.7 $60.7

Information Sharing (LEPC) $11.7 $11.7

Information Sharing (Public) $4.0 $4.0

Public Meeting $0.4 $0.4

Rule Familiarization $0.3 $0.3

Total Cost+ $158.3 $161.0

* Reflects costs for some facilities to convert from “non-responding” to 

“responding” as a result of improved coordination with local emergency 

response officials.

+Totals may not sum due to rounding.
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The largest average annual cost of the proposed rule is the exercise costs for current 

responders ($60.7 million), followed by new responders ($35.6 million), STAA ($34.8 million), 

and information sharing (LEPC) ($11.7 million). The remaining provisions impose average 

annual costs under $10 million, including coordination ($6.3 million), third-party audits ($5.0

million), information sharing (public) ($4.0 million), notification exercises ($1.4 million), 

incident investigation/root cause analysis ($0.8 million), public meetings ($0.4 million), and rule 

familiarization ($0.3 million).

4. Summary of Potential Benefits

EPA anticipates that promulgation and implementation of this rule would result in a 

reduction of the frequency and magnitude of damages from releases. Accidents and releases from 

RMP facilities occur every year, resulting in fires and explosions, property damage, acute and 

chronic exposures of workers and nearby residents to hazardous materials, and resultant damages 

to health. Although we are unable to quantify what specific damage reductions may occur as a 

result of these proposed revisions, we are able to present data on the total damages that currently 

occur at RMP facilities each year. The data presented are based on a 10-year baseline period, 

summarizing RMP accident impacts and, when possible, monetizing them. EPA expects that 

some portion of future damages would be prevented through implementation of a final rule. Table

18 presents a summary of the quantified damages identified in the analysis.

Table 18: Summary of Quantified Damages

Unit Value 10-Year Total Ave/Year Average/Accident

On-site

Fatalities $8,583,113 $497,820,554 $49,782,055 $328,161

Injuries $50,000 $105,150,000 $10,515,000 $69,314 

Property Damage $2,054,895,236 $205,489,524 $1,354,578 

On-site Total $2,657,865,790 $265,786,579 $1,752,053

Offsite

Fatalities $8,583,113 $8,583,113 $858,311 $5,658 

Hospitalizations $36,000 $6,804,000 $680,400 $4,485 

Medical Treatment $1,000 $14,807,000 $1,480,700 $9,761 

Evacuations $181 $6,992,327 $699,233 $4,609
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Sheltering in Place $91 $40,920,849 $4,092,085 $26,975

Property Damage $11,352,105 $1,135,211 $7,483 

Offsite Total $89,459,394 $8,945,939 $58,971

Total $2,747,325,184 $274,732,518 $1,811,024

EPA monetized both on-site and offsite damages. EPA estimated total average annual onsite damages of $265.8 million. The largest monetized average annual on-site damage was 

avoided on-site property damage, which resulted in an average annual damage of approximately 

$205.5 million. The next largest impact was avoided on-site fatalities ($49.8 million) and injuries 

($10.5 million). 

EPA estimated total average annual offsite damages of $8.9 million. The largest 

monetized average annual offsite damage was from sheltering in place ($4.1 million), followed 

by medical treatment ($1.5 million), property damage ($1.1 million), fatalities ($0.9 million), 

evacuations ($0.7 million), and hospitalizations ($0.7 million).

In total, EPA estimated monetized potential damages of $275 million per year. However, 

the monetized impacts omit many important categories of accident impacts including lost 

productivity, the costs of emergency response, transaction costs, property value impacts in the 

surrounding community (that overlap with other benefit categories), and environmental impacts. 

Also not reflected in the 10-year baseline costs are the impacts of non-RMP accidents at RMP 

facilities and any potential impacts of rare high consequence catastrophes. A final omission is 

related to the information provision. Reducing the probability of chemical accidents and the 

severity of their impacts, and improving information disclosure by chemical facilities, as the 

proposed provisions intend, would provide benefits to potentially affected members of society.

Table 19 summarizes four broad social benefit categories related to accident prevention 

and mitigation including prevention of RMP accidents, mitigation of RMP accidents, prevention 

and mitigation of non-RMP accidents at RMP facilities, and prevention of major catastrophes. 

The table explains each and identifies ten associated specific benefit categories, ranging from 
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avoided fatalities to avoided emergency response costs. Table 19 also highlights and explains the 

information disclosure benefit category and identifies two specific benefits associated with it: 

improved efficiency of property markets and allocation of emergency resources.

Table 19: Summary of Social Benefits of Proposed Rule Provisions

Broad Benefit 

Category Explanation Specific Benefit Categories

Accident Prevention Prevention of future RMP facility 

accidents

 Reduced Fatalities

 Reduced Injuries

 Reduced Property Damage

 Fewer People Sheltered in 

Place

 Fewer Evacuations

 Avoided Lost Productivity

 Avoided Emergency Response 

Costs

 Avoided Transaction Costs

 Avoided Property Value 

Impacts*

 Avoided Environmental 

Impacts

Accident Mitigation Mitigation of future RMP facility 

accidents

Non-RMP accident 

prevention and 

mitigation

Prevention and mitigation of 

future non-RMP accidents at 

RMP facilities

Avoided 

Catastrophes

Prevention of rare but extremely 

high consequence events

Information 

Disclosure

Provision of information to the 

public and LEPCs

 Improved efficiency of property 

markets

 Improved resource allocation

* These impacts partially overlap with several other categories such as reduced health and environmental impacts.

B. Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA)

The information collection activities in this proposed rule have been submitted for 

approval to the OMB under the PRA. The Information Collection Request (ICR) document that 

the EPA prepared has been assigned EPA ICR number 1656.16. You can find a copy of the ICR 

in the docket for this rule, and it is briefly summarized here. 

This ICR would amend a previously approved ICR (1656.15), OMB Control No. 2050-

0144. That ICR covers the risk management program rule, originally promulgated on June 20, 

1996; the current rule, including previous amendments, is codified as 40 CFR part 68. This ICR 

addresses the following proposed information requirements that are part of a proposed revision to 

the rule: 
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(1) Make certain information related to the risk management program available to the 

local community.

(2) Provide information, upon request, to the LEPC and local emergency response 

officials with summaries of certain activities under the risk management program.

(3) Hold a public meeting within 30-days of an accident subject to reporting under 

§68.42.

(4) Hire a third-party to conduct the compliance audit after a reportable release.

(5) Conduct and document a root cause analysis after a reportable release.

(6) Conduct and document an incident investigation, including root cause analysis, after a 

near miss.

(7) Conduct and document a safer technology and alternatives analysis.

(8) Meet and coordinate with local responders to ensure adequate response capability 

exists.

(9) Conduct a notification drill to verify information.

(10) Conduct and document emergency response exercises.

(11) Come into compliance with requirements for developing an emergency response 

program, including developing an emergency response plan, conducting emergency response 

exercises, documenting training, and providing information to the LEPC.

EPA believes that the RMP regulations have been effective in preventing and mitigating 

chemical accidents in the United States. However, EPA is proposing revisions to further protect 

human health and the environment from chemical hazards through advancement of PSM based on 

lessons learned – resulting in better coordination between facilities, LEPC’s, and the public. State 

and local authorities will use the information in RMPs to modify and enhance their community 

response plans. The agencies implementing the RMP rule will use RMPs to evaluate compliance 

with part 68 and to identify sources for inspection because they may pose significant risks to the 
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community. Citizens may use the information to assess and address chemical hazards in their 

communities and to respond appropriately in the event of a release of a regulated substance. 

These revisions are a result of a review of the existing Risk Management Program and are 

proposed under the statutory authority provided by section 112(r) of the CAA as amended (42 

U.S.C. 7412(r)). 

Some of the elements mandated in the regulation for the RMP may require the submittal 

of data viewed as proprietary, trade secret, or confidential. As described above, EPA has adopted 

procedures for sources to claim certain information as confidential business information. EPA 

encourages facilities that have CBI claims to submit substantiation with the RMP.

Respondents/affected entities: In total, this ICR will affect 12,542 facilities and 1,724

LEPCs for the purposes of rule familiarization. Table 20 provides the breakdown of affected 

entities by NAICS and RMP program level.

Table 20: Annual Number of Respondents Subject to New Information Collection 

Requirements under the Final Rule

Sector Program 1 Program 2 Program 3 Totals

NAICS 311 Food Manufacturer 3 11 1,371 1,385

NAICS 312 Beverage/Ice 0 0 91 91

NAICS 322 Pulp and Paper 1 1 68 70

NAICS 324 Petroleum 13 3 140 156

NAICS 325 Chemical 53 64 1,349 1,465

Other Manufacturing 62 73 249 384

NAICS 4246 Chemical Distributors 6 0 327 333

NAICS 4247 Petroleum Distributors 14 0 262 276

NAICS 11, 12, 15, 42491 Agricultural 10 0 3,657 3,667

NAICS 211 Oil and Gas Exploration 310 41 390 741

NAICS 2213 Water/Wastewater* 1 10 91 102

NAICS 221, 222 Utilities 38 72 233 343

NAICS 493 Warehousing 70 0 986 1,056

NAICS 423, 424 Other Wholesale 5 0 297 302

NAICS 92 Governments 15 935 973 1,923

Other 41 62 144 248

Total 642 1,285 10,615 12,542

LEPCs (for Rule Familiarization) 1,724

* Except government owned which appear as NAICS 92 Government.
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Respondent’s obligation to respond: Respondents are mandated to comply with the 

information collection requests outlined in this ICR. Information collection for on-site 

documentation is authorized by CAA sections 112(r)(7)(B)(i) and (ii), which state that “The 

Administrator shall promulgate reasonable regulations and appropriate guidance to provide ... for 

the prevention and detection of accidental releases of regulated substances....” and “The 

regulations ... shall require the owner or operator ... to prepare and implement a risk management 

plan to detect and prevent or minimize accidental releases...” Information collection for 

submitting an RMP is authorized under CAA section 112(r)(7)(B)(iii), which states in relevant 

part that “The owner or operator of each stationary source...shall register a risk management 

plan...with the Administrator before the effective date of the regulations...in such form and 

manner as the Administrator shall, by rule, require...and shall be available to the public under 

section 114(c).” Information collection for on-site documentation and submittal of RMPs is also 

authorized by CAA 114(a)(1).

Estimated number of respondents: 12,542

Frequency of response: Varies from 1-5 years. RMP submissions are mandated every 

five years.

Total estimated burden: 659,001 hours (per year). Burden is defined at 5 CFR 1320.3(b).

Total estimated cost: $5,529,000 annualized capital or operation and maintenance costs. 

An agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a 

collection of information unless it displays a currently valid OMB control number. The OMB 

control numbers for the EPA’s regulations in 40 CFR are listed in 40 CFR part 9. 

Submit your comments on the Agency’s need for this information, the accuracy of the 

provided burden estimates and any suggested methods for minimizing respondent burden to the 

EPA using the docket identified at the beginning of this rule. You may also send your ICR-related 

comments to OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs via email to 
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oria_submissions@omb.eop.gov, Attention: Desk Officer for the EPA. Since OMB is required to 

make a decision concerning the ICR between 30 and 60 days after receipt, OMB must receive 

comments no later than [INSERT DATE 30 DAYS AFTER DATE OF PUBLICATION IN THE 

FEDERAL REGISTER]. The EPA will respond to any ICR-related comments in the final rule.

C. Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA)

Pursuant to section 603 of the RFA, the EPA prepared an initial regulatory flexibility 

analysis (IRFA) that examines the impact of the proposed rule on small entities along with 

regulatory alternatives that could minimize that impact. The complete IRFA is available for 

review in the docket and is summarized here. 

1. Why EPA is Considering this Action

The purpose of this action is to improve safety at facilities that use and distribute 

hazardous chemicals. In response to catastrophic chemical facility incidents in the United States, 

including the explosion that occurred at the West Fertilizer facility in West, Texas, on April 17, 

2013 that killed 15 people, President Obama issued EO 13650, “Improving Chemical Facility 

Safety and Security,” on August 1, 2013. Section 6(a)(i) of EO 13650 requires that various 

Federal agencies develop options for improved chemical facility safety and security, including 

modernizing regulations. As a result, EPA is proposing revisions to the Risk Management 

Program (40 CFR part 68). For more information on EO 13650, see Section II. Background of 

this notice.

2. Objectives of, and Legal Basis for, the Proposed Rule

EPA believes that the RMP regulations have been effective in preventing and mitigating 

chemical accidents in the United States; however, EPA believes that revisions could further 

protect human health and the environment from chemical hazards through the advancement of 

process safety based on lessons learned. These revisions are a result of a review of the existing 

Risk Management Program and information gathered from the RFI and EO listening sessions, and 
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are proposed under the statutory authority provided by CAA section 112(r) as amended (42 

U.S.C. 7412(r)).

3. Estimate of the Number of Small Entities to which the Proposed Rule Will Apply

The RMP rule affects a broad range of sectors (296 separate NAICS codes are listed in 

RMP filings; 240 of these are associated with small entities). The RMP data include facility and 

parent company name as well as the number of full time equivalents (FTE) for the facility and the 

NAICS codes. To develop an estimate of the number of small entities, the analysis required a 

series of reviews of the data to identify the large entities and the small entities that were part of 

small firms owning multiple facilities. The data were reviewed to identify parent companies that 

were clear from the facility name, but not included in the parent company field. That made it 

possible to determine the total FTE for facilities belonging to the same parent company and 

compare that number to the Small Business Administration (SBA) standard (when in FTEs). If 

the total FTE exceeded the standard, all the facilities were classified as large. Where the facilities 

listed different NAICS codes, the analysis applied either the code used for a majority of the 

facilities or, if no single code dominated, the code with the highest threshold. For example, if a 

firm had facilities in sectors where the standards were 500 and 1,000 FTE, the 1,000 FTE 

standards was used to determine if the firm was large. 

For remaining facilities, if there were multiple facilities belonging to a single firm and the 

total FTE approached the threshold or if the name included “USA” or “US holdings,” which 

implied an international company, Internet searches were conducted to identify whether the 

facilities belonged to a firm with other facilities or employees.

The RFA defines small governments as governments of cities, counties, towns, 

townships, villages, school districts, or special districts, with a population of less than fifty 

thousand.205 Most governmental RMP facilities are water and wastewater treatment systems and 

 

205

 5 U.S.C. 602.
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listed a city or county as the owning entity. A check of budgets that were available for some of 

the smallest cities indicated that (1) the systems are sub-agencies of the city/county and (2) obtain 

some revenues from the general fund although most of their revenues are derived from user fees. 

To determine which facilities belong to small governments, the populations for each of cities or 

counties were determined by checking the 2014 estimates from the Census. For special water and 

irrigation districts, their Internet sites were checked for information on the population served. 

Table 21 below presents the number of small and large facilities by program level. 

Table 21: Number of Facilities Owned by Small and Large Entities by Program Level

RMP 

Program

Small

Private

Large 

Private

Small 

Government

Large

Government Total

Program 3 3,545 6,097 451 522 10,615

Program 2 174 176 521 414 1,285

Program 1 213 414 6 9 642

Total 3,932 6,687 978 945 12,542

4. Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping and Other Compliance Requirements of the Proposed 

Rule

Under the proposed rule, all facilities would be required to make certain information 

available to the public and,upon request, to the LEPC or local emergency response officials. 

Program 1 facilities would not likely have to spend more than an hour a year on this disclosure 

because the information disclosed to the public is information every facility should have readily 

available and because the additional information that would be provided, upon request, to the 

LEPC relates to provisions that do not apply to Program 1 facilities. Therefore, the IRFA has not 

considered Program 1 small facilities in the analysis of impacts.

Program 2 and Program 3 facilities would incur the same costs for the other proposed 

provisions except the STAA. Each facility would be required to update information to be

disclosed annually, coordinate with the local responders, and conduct a notification drill annually. 

If the facility is a responder, it would have to hold an annual exercise, including at least one full 
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field exercise every 5 years. Program 3 facilities in NAICS codes 322, 324, and 325 would have 

to conduct an STAA as part their PHA every 5 years.

If a facility has an accident, it would incur costs to hold a public meeting within 30 days 

of an RMP reportable accident. It would also incur additional costs for obtaining a third-party to 

conduct their next scheduled compliance audit and to conduct a root cause analysis as part of the 

incident investigation. Facilities would also be required to conduct root cause investigations of 

near misses. Finally, if a facility has to become a responder, it would incur costs to develop an 

emergency response plan, train personnel to respond, purchase and maintain equipment, and 

conduct exercises. 

Table 22 presents three sets of costs: low year, annualized, and high year (excludes costs 

incurred after an accident or a near miss). Low-year costs represent costs for years in which 

routine annual costs apply. These include costs for coordinating with local responders, conducting 

notification exercises (applies to all Program 2 and Program 3 facilities), conducting tabletop 

exercises (applies only to responders), and updating disclosure information to LEPC and the 

public. High-year costs represent a year in which every applicable provision would occur, except 

costs incurred after an accident or “near miss.” This includes the routine annual costs and periodic 

costs that apply either every 3 or 5 years (i.e., field exercise in lieu of a tabletop exercise, public 

meeting, all public disclosure requirements, and STAA). Because the STAA provisions would 

only apply to a subset of facilities (i.e., those in NAICS 322, 324, and 325), these facilities are 

broken out separately in the last two rows of the table. Complex facilities are those categorized as 

NAICS 324 or 325 and simple facilities are all others. Annualized costs average the low costs 

incurred for four years with the high costs incurred every fifth year.

Table 22: Low, Annualized, and High Year Combined Costs for Small Entities by Group

Low Year Cost Annualized High Year Cost

Program 2 and 

Program 3 facilities 

(excludes Program 3 

Simple Complex Simple Complex Simple Complex
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facilities subject to 

STAA)

Non Responder $548 $903 $1,182 $2,027 $3,217 $5,280 

Responder 0-19 FTE $6,577 $8,969 $7,175 $9,471 $12,347 $20,357 

Responder 20+ FTE $7,711 $10,442 $9,899 $13,490 $18,151 $24,437 

Program 3 facilities 

subject to STAA

Non Responder n/a $903 n/a $6,190 n/a $26,097 

Responder <20 FTE n/a $8,969 n/a $13,635 n/a $41,174 

5. Related Federal Rules 

The Risk Management Program is one of several programs regarding chemical facility 

safety and security. EO 13650 directed Federal agencies to identify ways to modernize policies, 

regulations, and standards to enhance safety and security in chemical facilities. The EO 

established a Chemical Facility Safety and Security Working Group to oversee this effort, which 

is tri-chaired by the EPA, DOL, and DHS. Members of the Working Group (at the management 

and staff level) regularly share information in order to coordinate activities on any work involving 

revisions in regulations, such as revisions to OSHA’s PSM standard and DHS’ CFATS 

regulations. These efforts also serve to avoid unnecessary duplication, overlap and conflicts with 

the Risk Management Program requirements.

OSHA’s 29 CFR 1910.119 PSM standard. Mandated by the CAAA of 1990 and issued in 

1992, the PSM standard sets requirements for the management of highly hazardous substances to 

prevent and mitigate hazards associated with catastrophic releases of flammable, explosive, 

reactive, and toxic chemicals that may endanger workers. The PSM standard covers the 

manufacturing of explosives and processes involving threshold quantities of flammable liquids 

and flammable gasses, as well as 137 other highly hazardous chemicals.

The OSHA PSM standard, similar to the EPA RMP rule, aims to prevent or minimize the 

consequences of accidental chemical releases through implementation of management program 

elements that integrate technologies, procedures, and management practices. The EPA RMP 
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regulation closely tracks the accident prevention measures contained in the OSHA PSM standard 

because Section 112(r)(7)(D) of the CAA requires EPA to coordinate the RMP regulation with 

“any requirements established for comparable purposes” by OSHA. Consequently, the OSHA

PSM standard and EPA RMP regulation are closely aligned in content, policy interpretations, 

Agency guidance, and enforcement. 

Since the inception of these regulations, EPA and OSHA have coordinated closely on 

their implementation in order to minimize regulatory burden and avoid conflicting requirements 

for regulated facilities. For example, owners and operators of RMP covered processes also 

subject to the OSHA PSM standard will generally have met their RMP accident prevention

program obligations if they have properly implemented their PSM program.

Occupational Safety and Health Act General Duty Clause. Section 5(a)(1) of the 

Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) Act requires employers to provide its employees with a 

workplace free from recognized hazards that are causing, or are likely to, cause death or serious 

physical harm.

EPA’s EPCRA regulations (40 CFR 350-372). Following the 1984 release of 

approximately 40 tons of MIC into the air in Bhopal, India, that killed over 3,700 people and the 

1985 leak of 500 gallons of aldicarb oxime from a Union Carbide facility in Institute, West 

Virginia, Congress passed EPCRA in October 1986. The purpose of EPCRA is twofold: (1) to 

encourage and support emergency planning efforts at the state and local levels, and (2) to provide 

the public and local governments with information concerning potential chemical hazards present 

in their communities.

EPCRA created state and local infrastructure designed to (1) prepare for and mitigate the 

effects of a chemical incident and (2) ensure that information on chemical risks in the community 

is provided to the first responders and the public. These state and local entities are the SERCs, 

TERCs, LEPCs, and TEPCs. Representatives on the LEPCs include local officials and planners, 
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facility owners and operators, first responders, health and hospital personnel, environmental 

groups, and citizen/members of the public. 

A central requirement of LEPCs and TEPCs is to develop a local emergency response 

plan. These plans are required to: 

 Identify facilities and transportation routes of extremely hazardous substances and 

assess the risk based on chemical information from facilities; 

 Describe on-site and offsite emergency response procedures; 

 Designate a community coordinator and facility emergency coordinator(s) to 

implement the plan; 

 Describe emergency notification procedures; 

 Describe how to determine the probable affected area and population by releases 

(including identification of critical community receptors and assets); 

 Describe local emergency equipment and facilities and the persons responsible for 

them; 

 Describe evacuation plans;

 Identify the training program for emergency responders (including schedules); and 

 Identify the methods and schedules for exercising emergency response plans.

Under the community right-to-know section of EPCRA, certain facilities that 

manufacture, process, or store any hazardous chemicals are required to submit an SDS or list of 

hazardous chemicals, grouped into hazard categories, to SERCs, TERCs, LEPCs, TEPCs, and 

local fire departments. Under the Hazard Communication Standard, OSHA requires SDSs that 

describe the properties, hazards, and health effects of these chemicals as well as emergency 

response procedures and appropriate personal protection equipment. Facilities must also annually 

report their inventories of all on-site chemicals for which SDSs are required that are stored above 

reporting threshold quantities to SERCs, LEPCs, and local fire departments. LEPCs must use 
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information about chemical inventories at facilities and SDSs in developing their local emergency 

plans; this information must also be available to the public.

CAA Section 112(r)(1) general duty clause. The statute requires facility owners and 

operators to identify hazards; design, maintain and safely operate a facility; and prevent and 

minimize releases of any regulated substances under §112(r)(3) (40 CFR Part 130) and “any other 

extremely hazardous substance.”206

DHS’s 6 CFR part 27 CFATS rule. The CFATS program, established in 2007, regulates 

chemical facilities that present a high level of security risk to ensure they have security measures 

in place to reduce the risks associated with their possession of chemicals of interest (COI). There 

are 325 COI and 137 of the 140 RMP regulated substances are included on the list of COI.

The CFATS program requires the development, submission, and implementation of Site 

Security Plans (SSPs) (or Alternative Security Programs in lieu of SSPs), which document the 

security measures high-risk chemical facilities use to satisfy the applicable risk-based 

performance standards (RBPS) under CFATS. These plans are not “one-size-fits-all,” but indepth, highly customized, and dependent on each facility’s unique circumstances.

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) requirements for 

explosives. ATF is responsible for enforcing Federal explosives laws that govern commerce in 

explosives in the United States, including licensing, storage, recordkeeping, and conduct of 

business. ATF conducts inspections of Federal explosives licensees who manufacture, import, 

sell, or store explosives in the United States to ensure that explosives are managed in accordance 

with Federal law.

6. Description of Alternatives to the Proposed Rule

 

206 Although the term “any other extremely hazardous substance" is not defined, the legislative history of 

the 1990 CAA amendments indicates that the term would include any agent "which may or may not be 

listed or otherwise identified by any Government agency which may as the result of short-term exposures 

associated with releases to the air cause death, injury or property damage due to its toxicity, reactivity, 

flammability, volatility, or corrosivity." See: http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2013-

10/documents/gdcregionalguidance.pdf.
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The RIA analyzed the proposed new requirements and revisions to existing requirements 

as well as several alternatives for each. In most cases, EPA chose regulatory alternatives that had 

reduced impacts on small businesses relative to other alternatives that EPA considered. In this 

section, we discuss each regulatory provision, explain whether and how the proposed provision 

minimizes impacts on small businesses, and discuss additional recommendations resulting from 

the SBAR Panel that could further mitigate small business impacts. EPA has requested comment 

on these recommendations.

Third-Party Audits—(proposed revisions apply to existing §§68.58 and 68.79 and new §§68.59 

and 68.80)

EPA evaluated three options for this provision and selected the lowest cost alternative, 

which would apply the requirement only to sources with P2 and/or P3 processes that have had an 

RMP reportable accident. The other alternatives would have required that all compliance audits 

be conducted by third parties for sources with either P3 processes or P2 and P3 processes. 

Limiting the applicability of this proposed provision to sources that have had RMP reportable 

accidents minimizes its impact to the overall universe of RMP facilities, and particularly to small 

businesses. As indicated in Exhibit 5-25 in the RIA, the estimated cost of the high option ($96.2 

million annualized) is nearly 20 times higher than the estimated costs of the proposed option 

($5.0 million annualized). Furthermore, a majority of the costs for the proposed option would 

likely be borne by large businesses, as historically, most RMP accidents have occurred at 

facilities that do not meet SBA small business criteria. Table 23 shows the percentage of 

accidents from 2004-2013 that occurred at small and large facilities.

Table 23: Percentage of Accidents at Small and Large RMP facilities, 2004 – 2013

Sector

P1 P2 P3

Total

Small Large Small Large Small Large

NAICS 325 - Chemical 

Manufacturing

0 6 1 5 53 465 530
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NAICS 311, 312 -

Food/Beverage 

Manufacturers

0 0 2 0 58 210 270

NAICS 322 –Paper 

Manufacturing 0 0 0 0 9 37 46

NAICS 331, 332, 333, 

334, 336, 339 - Other 

Manufacturing

0 0 4 0 12 27 43

NAICS 11, 12, 15, 

42491 - Agricultural 

Chemical Distributors

0 0 0 0 91 65 156

NAICS 4246, 4247 -

Chemical/petroleum 

wholesale

0 2 0 0 7 29 38

NAICS 4244, 4245 -

Other wholesale

0 0 0 0 7 13 20

NAICS 493 –

Warehouse 0 1 0 0 18 53 72

NAICS 324- Petroleum 

and Coal Products 

Manufacturing

2 6 0 0 15 146 169

NAICS 22131, 22132 -

Water/POTW

0 0 14 20 17 24 75

NAICS 211 - Oil/Gas 

exploration 4 4 1 0 10 34 53

Other 3 7 7 4 7 17 45

Total 9 26 29 29 304 1,120 1,517

While the proposed third party audit provision should have fairly low impact on small 

businesses, the SBAR panel made additional recommendations to further minimize the impacts of 

this provision on small businesses. These include:

<List of SBAR recommendations for Third Party Audits>

Incident Investigation/Root Cause Analysis—(proposed revisions apply to §§68.60 and 68.81)

In this case, EPA considered two potential regulatory options, and proposed the higher 

cost option, which would apply the requirement for an incident root cause analysis to all RMPreportable accidents and near misses involving P2 and P3 processes. The lower cost option would 

apply the requirement to accidents and near misses at only P3 processes. Although the Agency 

chose the higher cost option, this provision is estimated to be one of the least costly provisions of 
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the proposed rule. In fact, the costs for both options considered were nearly indistinguishable – as 

indicated in Exhibit 5-25 in the RIA, both the low and proposed options are estimated to cost 

approximately $0.8 million annually. Therefore, EPA believes that the additional safety benefit of 

requiring owners and operators of P2 processes to also conduct root cause analyses after incidents 

and near misses was warranted.

The SBAR panel also made recommendations to further minimize the impacts of this 

provision on small businesses. These include:

<List of SBAR recommendations for Incident Investigation/Root Cause Analysis>

STAA—(proposed revisions apply to §68.67)

For STAA, EPA examined three potential alternative regulatory options, and chose the 

least costly option. The proposed option, which would apply the STAA requirement to P3 

processes in NAICS 322 (paper manufacturing), 324 (petroleum and coal products 

manufacturing), and 325 (chemical manufacturing), costs $34.8 million annually and is 

approximately half as costly as the medium option ($71.7 million annually), which would apply 

the requirement to all P3 processes, and likely far less costly than the high option, which would 

require implementation of feasible safer alternatives for all P3 processes.

The low-cost STAA option not only minimizes the overall number of sources that are 

subject to it, but is also biased toward larger sources. This is because the three sectors selected for 

regulation under this proposed provision all have a lower percentage of small entities than the 

overall percentage of small entities within the RMP facility universe. As indicated in Table 24, 

approximately 39% of facilities regulated under the RMP regulation are owned by small entities. 

In comparison, NAICS 322 (paper manufacturing) has about 20% RMP-regulated small 

businesses within the sector, while NAICS 324 (petroleum and coal products manufacturing) and 

325 (chemical manufacturing) each have approximately 10% small businesses.
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Table 24: Percentage of Small Businesses in NAICS 322, 324, 325 and Overall

Sector Small Total Percentage 

Small

NAICS 322 –Paper 

Manufacturing 9 46 19.6%

NAICS 324- Petroleum 

and Coal Products 

Manufacturing

17 169 10.1%

NAICS 325 - Chemical 

Manufacturing 54 530 10.2%

All Sectors 4,910 12,542 39.1%

The SBAR panel also made recommendations to further minimize the impacts of this 

provision on small businesses. These include:

<List of SBAR recommendations for STAA>

.

Emergency Response Program Coordination with Local Responders —(proposed revisions apply 

to §§68.90, new 68.93, and 68.95)

The proposed option (medium option) would require all facilities with P2 or P3 processes 

to coordinate with local response agencies annually and document coordination activities. This 

option would also allow the LEPC or local emergency response officials to require that the RMPfacility owner or operator comply with the emergency response program requirements of §68.95. 

EPA considered, but did not propose, the more stringent option of requiring all facilities with P2 

or P3 processes to implement an emergency response program and respond to accidental releases 

at the facility. The proposed option is estimated to cost $6.3 million annually and is far less costly 

than the high option, which would likely have exceeded $100 million annually. Therefore, by 

selecting the medium option, EPA substantially reduced the cost impact for the many small 

entities that may rely on local response organizations to respond to accidental releases at the 

source (see Exhibit 3-8 and Appendix B in the RIA for more information on the number, size, and 

industrial categories of non-responding facilities).
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While EPA does not believe it is necessary to require that all facilities develop an inhouse response capability, the Agency believes that non-responding facilities, even if they are 

small businesses, must still coordinate with local public responders so that they are prepared to 

handle emergencies at the facility. EPA expects that these coordination activities will result in 

some sources, including some small entities, becoming responding facilities, which may involve 

additional costs for those facilities (see section 5.6 of the RIA). EPA believes this is necessary to 

meet the objectives of Clean Air Act section 112(r), which requires the Agency to promulgate 

regulations to (among other things) provide for a prompt emergency response to any accidental 

releases in order to protect human health and the environment. We also note that the 2013 

accident at West Fertilizer, which was one of several accidents that triggered the Executive Order 

that ultimately led to this rule proposal, occurred at a facility that would likely have been 

considered a small entity under the established SBA criteria. The Agency believes it is 

appropriate to require that such facilities conduct adequate emergency coordination, and if 

necessary, develop adequate emergency response capabilities, even if they are small.

The SBAR panel also made recommendations to further minimize the impacts of this 

provision on small businesses. These include:

<List of SBAR recommendations for local coordination>

Exercises—(proposed revisions apply to new §68.96)

Notification Exercises. The proposed rule would require all facilities with P2 or P3 

processes to annually conduct an emergency notification exercise to ensure that their emergency 

contact list is complete, accurate, and up-to-date. This proposed provision is expected to be one of 

the least costly rule provisions at $1.4 million annually (only the incident investigation root cause 

analysis and public meetings provisions are estimated to cost less). Therefore EPA did not 

consider any alternatives to reduce the impact of this provision on small businesses, nor did the 

SBAR panel make any such recommendations.
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Tabletop and Field Exercises.

The proposed option was the medium option, and would require responding facilities to 

conduct a full field exercise at least once every five years and tabletop exercises annually in the 

interim years. This option was substantially less costly than the high option ($61 million vs $104 

million annually), which would require annual field exercises. As this provision only affects 

responding facilities, which tend to more often be large facilities (see Exhibit 3-8 in the RIA), 

EPA has proposed an option that mitigates the impact on small entities. EPA also considered a 

low option that would only require annual tabletop exercises. This option would have saved 

approximately $11 million annually. We did not propose the low option because the Agency 

believes that periodic field exercises are an important component of a comprehensive emergency 

response program. Nevertheless, this was also a recommendation from the SBAR panel and we 

have requested comment on the low option provision in the preamble to the proposed rule.

The SBAR panel also made other recommendations to further minimize the impacts of 

this provision on small businesses. These include:

<List of SBAR recommendations for exercises>

Information Availability—(proposed revisions apply to new §68.205 and existing §68.210)

There are three proposed information disclosure requirements. Under the proposed 

requirements, all facilities would be required to make certain information available to the public. 

Upon receiving a request from their LEPC or local emergency response official, regulated 

facilities would also be required to provide certain information to the LEPC or emergency 

response officials. Lastly, facilities would be required to hold public meetings within 30 days of 

any RMP reportable accident. In the preamble to the proposed rule, EPA has requested public 

comments on whether all regulated facilities should be required to hold a public meeting every 

five years and after an RMP reportable accident, or whether a requirement for periodic and postaccident public meetings should be limited to only P2 and P3 facilities. Although EPA has not 
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proposed specific alternatives to minimize the impact of the information disclosure provisions on 

small businesses, the Agency believes that in general, smaller facilities will bear lower costs to 

comply with these provisions. By requiring certain information disclosure elements (i.e., incident 

investigation and public meeting provisions) only following an RMP reportable accident, EPA is 

minimizing the impact to the overall universe of RMP facilities, and particularly to small 

businesses. Most RMP reportable accidents have generally occurred at facilities that do not meet 

SBA small business criteria (see Exhibit 7-11 in the RIA). Also, small facilities will generally 

have fewer processes, fewer chemicals, fewer accidental releases, etc., on which to provide 

information to LEPCs and the public.

The SBAR panel also made recommendations to further minimize the impacts of this 

provision on small businesses. These include:

<List of SBAR recommendations for Information Disclosure>

7. Small Business Advocacy Review

As required by section 609(b) of the RFA, the EPA also convened a SBAR Panel to 

obtain advice and recommendations from SERs that potentially would be subject to the rule's 

requirements. The SBAR Panel evaluated the assembled materials and small-entity comments on 

issues related to elements of an IRFA. The SBAR report contains the recommendations to the 

EPA Administrator from the three federal panel members (EPA, the Small Business 

Administration Office of Advocacy and the OMB Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs). 

This proposal was informed The small entity comments and the panel report recommendations 

were used in the development of this proposal, as provided in section 609(b) of the RFA. A copy 

of the full SBAR Panel Report is available in the rulemaking docket.

D. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA)

This action contains a Federal mandate under UMRA, 2 U.S.C. 1531–1538, that may 

result in expenditures of $100 million or more for state, local, and tribal governments, in the 
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aggregate, or the private sector in any one year. Accordingly, the EPA has prepared a written 

statement required under section 202 of UMRA. The statement is included in the docket for this 

action and briefly summarized here.

Over the 16 years of implementing the RMP program and, most recently through EO 

13650 listening sessions, webinars, and consultations, EPA has engaged states and local 

communities to discuss chemical safety issues. In the nine EO 13650 Improving Chemical 

Facility Safety and Security listening sessions and webinars, held between November 2013 and 

January 2014, states and local communities identified lack of chemical facility participation and 

coordination in local emergency contingency planning as a key barrier to successful local 

community preparedness. Additionally, EPA has had consultations with states and local 

communities through participation in the NASTTPO annual meetings to discuss key issues 

related to chemical facility and local community coordination and what areas of the RMP 

regulations need to be modernized to facilitate this coordination and improve local emergency 

preparedness and prevention. Key priority options discussed with NASTTPO states and local 

communities included: improving emergency response coordination between RMP facilities and 

LEPCs/first responder and requiring emergency response exercises of the RMP facility plan to 

involve LEPCs, first responders and emergency response personnel.

This action may significantly or uniquely affect small governments. The EPA consulted 

with small governments concerning the regulatory requirements that might significantly or 

uniquely affect them. Through the July 31, 2014, RFI (79 FR 44604), EPA sought feedback from 

governmental entities while formulating the proposed revisions in this action. Additionally, EPA 

participated in ongoing consultations with affected SERs (including small governmental entities)

through the SBAR panel. EPA convened an SBAR panel in accordance with the requirements of 

the RFA, as amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA).

E. EO 13132: Federalism
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This action does not have Federalism implications. The EPA believes, however, that 

these proposed regulatory revisions may be of significant interest to local governments. 

Consistent with the EPA’s policy to promote communications between the EPA and state and 

local governments, and to better understand the concerns of local governments, EPA sought 

feedback through the July 31, 2014, RFI (79 FR 44604). Additionally, consultations with 

governmental entities occurred through the SBREFA process.

F. EO 13175: Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments

This action has tribal implications. However, it will neither impose substantial direct 

compliance costs on federally recognized tribal governments, nor preempt tribal law. EPA will be 

consulting with tribal officials as it develops this regulation to permit them to have meaningful 

and timely input into its development. Consultation will include conference calls, webinars, and 

meetings with interested tribal representatives to ensure that their concerns are addressed before 

the rule is finalized. In the spirit of EO 13175 and consistent with EPA policy to promote 

communications between EPA and tribal governments, EPA specifically solicits comment on this 

proposed rule from tribal officials.

G. EO 13045: Protection of Children from Environmental Health Risks and Safety Risks

This action is not subject to EO 13045 because the EPA does not believe the

environmental health risks or safety risks addressed by this action present a disproportionate risk 

to children. The EPA believes that the proposed revisions to the Risk Management Program 

regulations would further protect human health, including the health of children, through 

advancement of process safety.

H. EO 13211: Actions That Significantly Affect Energy Supply, Distribution or Use

This proposed action is not a ‘‘significant energy action’’ because it is not likely to have 

a significant adverse effect on the supply, distribution, or use of energy. This proposed action is 
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not anticipated to have notable impacts on emissions, costs or energy supply decisions for the 

affected electric utility industry.

I. National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act (NTTAA)

This action involves technical standards. The EPA proposes to require third-party 

auditors to be experienced with applicable RAGAGEP, which include Voluntary Consensus 

Standards as well as other measures, for regulated processes being audited. Numerous different 

standards apply to processes regulated under the proposed rule and their application will vary 

depending on the particular process and chemicals involved. EPA is not proposing to list all the 

various codes, standards and practices that would apply to the wide variety of chemical processes 

covered by this rule as doing so would be impracticable, given that this rule affects sectors across 

many industries and listing the applicable RAGAGEP measures would require the EPA to update 

that list every time there was a change in the industry standards or best practices. The proposed 

rule would require third-party auditors to be familiar with standards applicable to processes they 

audit, and to obtain their own copies of applicable standards where needed. Auditors must be 

knowledgeable of applicable consensus standards because the accident prevention program 

provisions of the existing rule (Subparts C and D) require owners or operators to comply with 

RAGAGEP. Therefore, auditors must be knowledgeable of those practices in order to perform an 

effective audit. EPA seeks comment on this proposed RAGAGEP requirement.

J. EO 12898: Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and 

Low-Income Populations

The EPA believes the human health or environmental risk addressed by this action will 

not have potential disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects on 

minority, low income, or indigenous populations. The results of this evaluation are included in 

the RIA, located in the docket.
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List of Subjects

40 CFR part 68

Environmental protection, Administrative practice and procedure, Air pollution control, 

Chemicals, Hazardous substances, Intergovernmental relations, Reporting and recordkeeping 

requirements.

Dated: ____________________________________________

___________________________________________________

Gina McCarthy,

Administrator.
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For the reasons set out in the preamble, title 40, chapter I, Part 68, of the CFR is amended 

as follows:

PART 68—CHEMICAL ACCIDENT PREVENTION PROVISIONS

1. The authority citation for part 68 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 42 U.S.C. 7412(r), 7601(a)(1), 7661-7661f. 

2. Amend §68.3 to revise the definition of “catastrophic release” and add the following 

definitions in alphabetical order to read as follows:

§68.3 Definitions.

* * * * *

Active measures means risk management measures or engineering controls that rely on 

mechanical, or other energy input to detect and respond to process deviations. Examples of active 

measures include alarms, safety instrumented systems, and detection hardware (such as 

hydrocarbon sensors)

* * * * *

Catastrophic release means a major uncontrolled emission, fire, or explosion, involving one or 

more regulated substances that results in deaths, injuries, or significant property damage on-site, 

or known offsite deaths, injuries, evacuations, sheltering in place, property damage, or 

environmental damage.

CBI means confidential business information.

* * * * *

Feasible means capable of being successfully accomplished within a reasonable time, accounting 

for economic, environmental, legal, social, and technological factors. Environmental factors 

would include consideration of potential transferred risks for new risk reduction measures. 

* * * * *
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Inherently safer technology or design means risk management measures that minimize the use of 

regulated substances, substitute less hazardous substances, moderate the use of regulated 

substances, or simplify covered processes in order to make accidental releases less likely, or the 

impacts of such releases less severe.

* * * * *

LEPC means local emergency planning committee as established under 42 U.S.C. 11001(c).

* * * * *

Passive measures means risk management measures that use design features that reduce the 

hazard without human, mechanical, or other energy input. Examples of passive measures include 

pressure vessel designs, dikes, berms, and blast walls. 

* * * * *

Procedural measures means risk management measures such as policies, operating procedures, 

training, administrative controls, and emergency response actions to prevent or minimize 

incidents.

* * * * *

Root cause means a fundamental, underlying, system-related reason why an incident occurred 

that identifies a correctable failure(s) in management systems. 

* * * * *

Third-party audit means a compliance audit conducted pursuant to the requirements of §§68.59 

and/or 68.80, by an entity (individual or firm) meeting the competency, independence and 

impartiality criteria in those sections.

* * * * *

3. Amend §68.10 as follows:

a. Revise paragraph (a);

b. Redesignate paragraphs (b) through (f) as paragraphs (f) through (j);
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c. Add new paragraphs (b) through (e); and

d. Revise redesignated paragraph (f)(2).

§68.10 Applicability.

(a) Except as provided in paragraphs (b) through (e) of this section, an owner or operator 

of a stationary source that has more than a threshold quantity of a regulated substance in a 

process, as determined under §68.115, shall comply with the requirements of this part no later 

than the latest of the following dates: 

* * * * *

(2) Three years after the date on which a regulated substance is first listed under §68.130; 

(3) The date on which a regulated substance is first present above a threshold quantity in 

a process; or

(4) For any revisions to this part, the effective date of the final rule. 

(b) Within 1 year of [INSERT DATE 1 YEAR AFTER THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF 

THE FINAL RULE] the owner or operator of a stationary source shall comply with the 

emergency response coordination activities in §68.93(a) and 68.93(b).

(c) Within 3 years of the LEPC or equivalent requesting in writing, pursuant to 

§68.90(b)(2), the owner or operator must develop and implement an emergency response program 

in accordance with §68.95.

(d) By [INSERT DATE 4 YEARS AFTER THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE FINAL 

RULE], the owner or operator shall comply with the following provisions promulgated on [Insert 

rule publication date]:

(1) Third-party audit provisions in §§68.58(f), 68.58(g), 68.58(h), 68.59, 68.79(f), 

68.79(g), 68.79(h), and 68.80;

(2) Incident investigation root cause analysis provisions in §§68.60(d)(7) and 68.81(d)(7) 

and the incident root cause category information provision in §68.42(b)(10);
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(3) Safer technology and alternative analysis provisions in §68.67(c)(8);

(4) Emergency response exercise provisions of §68.96, and;

(5) Availability of information provisions in §§68.205, 68.210(b), 68.210(c), and 

68.210(d).

(e) By [INSERT DATE 5 YEARS AFTER EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE FINAL 

RULE], the owner or operator shall comply with the risk management plan provisions of Subpart 

G promulgated on [INSERT PUBLICATION DATE OF FINAL RULE].

* * * * *

4. Amend §68.12 to revise paragraphs (c) and (d) to read as follows:

§68.12 General requirements.

* * * * *

(c) * * *

(4) Coordinate response actions with local emergency planning and response agencies as 

provided in §68.93;

(5) Develop and implement an emergency response program, and conduct exercises, as 

provided in §§68.90 to 68.96; and 

(6) Submit as part of the RMP the data on prevention program elements for Program 2 

processes as provided in §68.170. 

(d) * * * 

(4) Coordinate response actions with local emergency planning and response agencies as 

provided in §68.93;

(5) Develop and implement an emergency response program, and conduct exercises, as 

provided in §§68.90 to 68.9596 of this part; and 

(6) Submit as part of the RMP the data on prevention program elements for Program 3 

processes as provided in §68.175.
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5. Amend §68.42 as follows:

a. Redesignate paragraphs (b)(10) and (b)(11) as paragraphs (b)(11) and (b)(12); and

b. Add a new paragraph (b)(10) to read as follows:

§68.42 Five-year accident history.

* * * * *

(b) * * * 

(10) Categories of root causes identified based on the root cause analysis required in the 

incident investigation in accordance with §68.60(d)(7) or §68.81(d)(7);

* * * * *

6. Amend §68.48 to revise paragraph (a)(1) to read as follows:

§68.48 Safety information.

(a) * * * 

(1) Safety Data Sheets (SDS) that meet the requirements of 29 CFR 1910.1200(g);

* * * * *

7. Amend §68.50 to revise paragraph (a)(2) to read as follows:

§68.50 Hazard review.

(a) * * * 

(2) Opportunities for equipment malfunctions or human errors that could cause an 

accidental release, including findings from incident investigations;

* * * * *

8. Amend §68.54 as follows:

a. Revise paragraphs (a), (b), and (d); and

b. Add new paragraph (e).
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§68.54 Training.

(a) The owner or operator shall ensure that each employee presently involved in 

operating a process, and each employee newly assigned to a covered process have been trained or 

tested competent in the operating procedures provided in §68.52 that pertain to their duties. For 

those employees already operating a process on June 21, 1999, the owner or operator may certify 

in writing that the employee has the required knowledge, skills, and abilities to safely carry out 

the duties and responsibilities as provided in the operating procedures. 

(b) Refresher training. Refresher training shall be provided at least every three years, and 

more often if necessary, to each employee involved in operating a process to ensure that the 

employee understands and adheres to the current operating procedures of the process. The owner 

or operator, in consultation with the employees operating the process, shall determine the 

appropriate frequency of refresher training. 

* * * * *

(d) The owner or operator shall ensure that employees involved in operating a process are 

trained in any updated or new procedures prior to startup of a process after a major change.

(e) For the purposes of this section, the term employee also includes supervisors 

responsible for directing process operations.

9. Amend §68.58 as follows:

a. Revise paragraph (a); and

b. Add new paragraphs (f) through (h).

§68.58 Compliance audits.

(a) The owner or operator shall certify that they have evaluated compliance with the 

provisions of this subpart for each covered process, at least every three years to verify that the 

procedures and practices developed under the rule are adequate and are being followed. When 

required as set forth in paragraph (f), the compliance audit shall be a third-party audit. 
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* * * * *

(f) Third-party audit applicability. The next required compliance audit shall be a thirdparty audit when one of the following conditions apply:

(1) An accidental release meeting the criteria in §68.42(a) from a covered process at a 

stationary source has occurred; or

(2) An implementing agency requires a third-party audit based on non-compliance with 

the requirements of this subpart, including when a previous third-party audit failed to meet the 

competency, independence, or impartiality criteria of §68.59(b).

(g) Implementing agency notification and appeals.

(1) If an implementing agency makes a preliminary determination that a third-party audit 

is necessary pursuant to paragraph (f)(2) of this section, the implementing agency will provide 

written notice to the owner or operator stating the reasons for the implementing agency’s 

determination.

(2) Within 30 days of receipt of such written notice, the owner or operator may provide 

information and data to, and may consult with, the implementing agency on the determination. 

Thereafter, the implementing agency will provide a final determination to the owner or operator.

(3) If the final determination requires a third-party audit, the owner or operator shall 

comply with the requirements of §68.59, pursuant to the schedule in paragraph (h).

(4) Appeals. The owner or operator may appeal a final determination made by an 

implementing agency under paragraph (g)(2) of this section within 30 days of receipt of the final 

determination. The appeal shall be made to the EPA Regional Administrator, or for 

determinations made by other implementing agencies, the administrator or director of such 

implementing agency. The appeal shall contain a clear and concise statement of the issues, facts 

in the case, and any relevant additional information. In reviewing the appeal, the implementing 
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agency may request additional information from the owner or operator. The implementing agency 

will provide a written, final decision on the appeal to the owner or operator.

(h) Schedule for conducting a third-party audit. The audit and audit report shall be 

completed, and the audit report submitted to the implementing agency pursuant to §68.59(c)(3) as 

follows, unless a different timeframe is specified by the implementing agency: 

(1) Within 12 months of when any third-party audit is required pursuant to paragraphs (f) 

and/or (g); or

(2) Within three years of completion of the previous compliance audit, whichever is 

sooner.

10. Add §68.59 to Subpart C to read as follows:

§68.59 Third-party audits.

(a) The owner or operator shall engage a third-party auditor to evaluate compliance with 

the provisions of this subpart in accordance with the requirements of this section when either 

criterion of §68.58(f) is met. 

(b) Auditor qualifications. The owner or operator shall determine and document that the 

auditor and/ or audit team are independent and impartial, and that the auditor’s or audit team’s 

credentials address the following competency requirements: 

(1) Competency requirements. The auditor/auditor team shall be:

(i) Knowledgeable with the requirements of this part;

(ii) Experienced with the stationary source type and processes being audited and 

applicable recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices;

(iii) Trained or certified in proper auditing techniques; and

(iv) A licensed Professional Engineer, or shall include a licensed PE on the audit team.

(2) Independence and impartiality requirements. The auditor/audit team shall:

(i) Act impartially when performing all activities under this section; 
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(ii) Receive no financial benefit from the outcome of the audit, apart from payment for 

the auditing services;

(iii) Not have conducted past research, development, design, construction services, or 

consulting for the owner or operator within the last 3 years. For purposes of this requirement, 

consulting does not include performing or participating in third-party audits pursuant to §§68.59 

or 68.80;

(iv) Not provide other business or consulting services to the owner or operator, including 

advice or assistance to implement the findings or recommendations in an audit report, for a period 

of at least 3 years following submission of the final audit report;

(v) Ensure that all personnel involved in the audit sign and date the conflict of interest 

statement in §68.59(d)(8); and

(vi) Ensure that all personnel involved in the audit do not accept future employment with 

the owner or operator of the stationary source for a period of at least 3 years following 

submission of the final audit report. For purposes of this requirement, employment does not 

include performing or participating in third-party audits pursuant to §§68.59 or 68.80.

(3) The auditor shall have written policies and procedures to ensure that all personnel 

comply with the competency, independence, and impartiality requirements of this section. 

(c) Third-party audit report. The owner or operator shall ensure that the auditor prepares 

and submits an audit report as follows:

(1) The scope and content of each audit report shall: 

(i) Identify the lead auditor or manager, participating individuals, and any other key 

persons participating in the audit, including names, titles, and summaries of qualifications 

demonstrating that the competency requirements in paragraph (b)(1) are met;

(ii) Document the auditor’s evaluation, for each covered process, of the owner or 

operator’s compliance with the provisions of this subpart to determine whether the procedures 
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and practices developed by the owner or operator under this rule are adequate and being 

followed;

(iii) Document the findings of the audit, including any identified compliance or 

performance deficiencies;

(iv) Include a summary of the owner’s or operator’s comments on, and identify any 

adjustments made by the auditor to, any draft audit report provided by the auditor to the owner or 

operator for review or comment; and 

(v) Include the following certification, signed and dated by the auditor or supervising 

manager for the audit: 

“I certify that this RMP compliance audit report was prepared under my direction or 

supervision in accordance with a system designed to assure that qualified personnel 

properly gather and evaluate the information upon which the audit is based. I further 

certify that the audit was conducted and this report was prepared pursuant to the 

requirements of subpart C of 40 CFR Part 68 and all other applicable auditing, 

competency, independence, impartiality, and conflict of interest standards and protocols. 

Based on my personal knowledge and experience, and inquiry of personnel involved in 

the audit, the information submitted herein is true, accurate, and complete. I am aware 

that there are significant penalties for submitting false information, including the 

possibility of fines and imprisonment for knowing violations.”

(2) The auditor shall retain copies of all audit reports and related records for a period of 

five years, and make them available if directed by the owner or operator, to the owner or operator 

and/or the implementing agency.

(3) The auditor shall submit the audit report to the implementing agency at the same time, 

or before, it provides it to the owner or operator.
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(4) The audit report and related records shall not be privileged as attorney-client 

communications or attorney work products, even if written for or reviewed by legal staff.

(d) Third-party audit findings. (1) Findings response report. As soon as possible, but no 

later than 90 days after receiving the final audit report, the owner or operator shall determine an 

appropriate response to each of the findings in the audit report, and develop and provide to the 

implementing agency a findings response report that includes: 

(i) A copy of the final audit report; 

(ii) An appropriate response to each of the audit report findings;

(iii) A schedule for promptly addressing deficiencies; and 

(iv) A certification, signed and dated by a senior corporate officer, or an official in an 

equivalent position, of the owner or operator of the stationary source, stating:

“I certify under penalty of law that the attached RMP compliance audit report was 

received, reviewed, and responded to under my direction or supervision by qualified 

personnel. I further certify that appropriate responses to the findings have been identified 

and deficiencies were corrected, or are being corrected, consistent with the requirements 

of subpart C of 40 CFR Part 68, as documented herein. Based on my personal knowledge 

and experience, or inquiry of personnel involved in evaluating the report findings and 

determining appropriate responses to the findings, the information submitted herein is 

true, accurate, and complete. I am aware that there are significant penalties for submitting 

false information, including the possibility of fines and imprisonment for knowing 

violations.”

(2) Schedule to address deficiencies. The owner or operator shall implement the schedule 

to address deficiencies identified in the audit findings response report in paragraph (d)(1)(iii) and 

document the action taken to address each deficiency, along with the date completed.
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(3) Submission to board of directors. The owner or operator shall immediately provide a 

copy of each document required under paragraphs (d)(1) and (d)(2), when completed, to the 

owner or operator’s audit committee of the Board of Directors, or other comparable committee, if 

one exists.

(e) Recordkeeping. The owner or operator shall retain at the stationary source, the 

following:

(1) The two most recent third-party audit reports, related findings response reports, 

documentation of actions taken to address deficiencies, and related records. This requirement 

does not apply to any document that is more than five years old.

(2) Copies of all draft third-party audit reports. The owner or operator shall provide draft 

third-party audit reports to the implementing agency upon request. This requirement does not 

apply to any draft audit reports that are more than five years old.

11. Revise §68.60 as follows:

a. Revise paragraph (a);

b. Redesignate paragraphs (c) through (f) as paragraphs (d) through (g);

c. Add new paragraph (c); and

d. Revise redesignated paragraphs (d) and (g).

§68.60 Incident investigation.

(a) The owner or operator shall investigate each incident that:

(1) Resulted in a catastrophic release (including when the affected process is 

decommissioned or destroyed following, or as the result of, an incident); or

(2) Could reasonably have resulted in a catastrophic release (i.e., was a near miss).

* * * * *
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(c) An incident investigation team shall be established and consist of at least one person 

knowledgeable in the process involved and other persons with appropriate knowledge and 

experience to thoroughly investigate and analyze the incident.

(d) A report shall be prepared at the conclusion of the investigation. The report shall be 

completed within 12 months of the incident, unless the implementing agency approves, in 

writing, an extension of time. The report shall include:

(1) Date, time, and location of incident;

(2) Date investigation began;

(3) A description of the incident, in chronological order, providing all relevant facts;

(4) The name and amount of the regulated substance involved in the release (e.g., fire, 

explosion, toxic gas loss of containment) or near miss and the duration of the event;

(5) The consequences, if any, of the incident including, but not limited to: injuries, 

fatalities, the number of people evacuated, the number of people sheltered in place, and the 

impact on the environment;

(6) Emergency response actions taken;

(7) The factors that contributed to the incident including the initiating event, direct and 

indirect contributing factors, and root causes. Root causes shall be determined by conducting an 

analysis for each incident using a recognized method; and

(8) Any recommendations resulting from the investigation and a schedule for addressing 

them.

* * * * *

(g) Incident investigation reports shall be retained for five years.

12. Amend §68.65 to revise the first sentence of paragraph (a) and revise the note to paragraph 

(b) to read as follows:
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§68.65 Process safety information. 

(a) The owner or operator shall complete a compilation of written process safety 

information before conducting any process hazard analysis required by the rule, and shall keep 

process safety information up-to-date. * * *

(b) * * * 

* * * * *

Note to paragraph (b): Safety Data Sheets (SDS) meeting the requirements of 29 CFR 

1910.1200(g) may be used to comply with this requirement to the extent they contain the 

information required by this subparagraph.

* * * * *

13. Amend §68.67 to revise paragraph (c) as follows:

§68.67 Process hazard analysis. 

* * * * *

(c) * * *

* * * * *

(2) The findings from all incident investigations required under section 68.81, as well as 

any other potential failure scenarios;

* * * * *

(6) Human factors;

(7) A qualitative evaluation of a range of the possible safety and health effects of failure 

of controls; and 

(8) For processes in NAICS 322, 324, and 325, safer technology and alternative risk 

management measures applicable to eliminating or reducing risk from process hazards.
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(i) The owner or operator shall consider, in the following order of preference, inherently 

safer technology or design, passive measures, active measures, and procedural measures. A 

combination of risk management measures may be used to achieve the desired risk reduction. 

(ii) The owner or operator shall determine the feasibility of the inherently safer 

technologies and designs considered. 

* * * * *

14. Revise §68.71 to add a new paragraph (d) as follows:

§68.71 Training. 

* * * * *

(d) For the purposes of this section, the term employee also includes supervisors with 

process operational responsibilities.

15. Amend §68.79 as follows:

a. Revise paragraph (a); and

b. Add new paragraphs (f) through (h). 

§68.79 Compliance audits.

(a) The owner or operator shall certify that they have evaluated compliance with the 

provisions of this subpart for each covered process, at least every three years to verify that the 

procedures and practices developed under the rule are adequate and are being followed. When 

required as set forth in paragraph (f), the compliance audit shall be a third-party audit. 

* * * * *

(f) Third-party audit applicability. The next required compliance audit shall be a thirdparty audit when one of the following conditions apply:

(1) An accidental release meeting the criteria in §68.42(a) from a covered process at a 

stationary source has occurred; or
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(2) An implementing agency requires a third-party audit based on non-compliance with

the requirements of this subpart, including when a previous third-party audit failed to meet the 

competency, independence, or impartiality criteria of §68.80(b).

(g) Implementing agency notification and appeals. (1) If an implementing agency makes 

a preliminary determination that a third-party audit is necessary pursuant to paragraph (f)(2) of 

this section, the implementing agency will provide written notice to the owner or operator stating 

the reasons for the implementing agency’s determination.

(2) Within 30 days of receipt of such written notice, the owner or operator may provide 

information and data to, and may consult with, the implementing agency on the determination. 

Thereafter, the implementing agency will provide a final determination to the owner or operator.

(3) If the final determination requires a third-party audit, the owner or operator shall 

comply with the requirements of §68.80, pursuant to the schedule in paragraph (h).

(4) Appeals. The owner or operator may appeal a final determination made by an 

implementing agency under paragraph (g)(2) of this section within 30 days of receipt of the final 

determination. The appeal shall be made to the EPA Regional Administrator, or for 

determinations made by other implementing agencies, the administrator or director of such 

implementing agency. The appeal shall contain a clear and concise statement of the issues, facts 

in the case, and any relevant additional information. In reviewing the appeal, the implementing 

agency may request additional information from the owner or operator. The implementing agency 

will provide a written, final decision on the appeal to the owner or operator.

(h) Schedule for conducting a third-party audit. The audit and audit report shall be 

completed, and the audit report submitted to the implementing agency pursuant to §68.80(c)(3) as 

follows, unless a different timeframe is specified by the implementing agency: 

(1) Within 12 months of when any third-party audit is required pursuant to paragraphs (f) 

and/or (g); or
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(2) Within three years of completion of the previous compliance audit, whichever is 

sooner.

16. Add §68.80 to Subpart D to read as follows:

§68.80 Third-party audits.

(a) The owner or operator shall engage a third-party auditor to evaluate compliance with 

the provisions of this subpart in accordance with the requirements of this section when either 

criterion of §68.79(f) is met. 

(b) Auditor qualifications. The owner or operator shall determine and document that the 

auditor and/ or audit team are independent and impartial, and that the auditor’s or audit team’s 

credentials address the following competency requirements: 

(1) Competency requirements. The auditor/auditor team shall be:

(i) Knowledgeable with the requirements of this part;

(ii) Experienced with the stationary source type and processes being audited and 

applicable recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices;

(iii) Trained or certified in proper auditing techniques; and

(iv) A licensed Professional Engineer, or shall include a licensed PE on the audit team.

(2) Independence and impartiality requirements. The auditor/audit team shall:

(i) Act impartially when performing all activities under this section; 

(ii) Receive no financial benefit from the outcome of the audit, apart from payment for 

the auditing services;

(iii) Not have conducted past research, development, design, construction services, or 

consulting for the owner or operator within the last 3 years. For purposes of this requirement, 

consulting does not include performing or participating in third-party audits pursuant to §§68.59 

or 68.80;
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(iv) Not provide other business or consulting services to the owner or operator, including 

advice or assistance to implement the findings or recommendations in an audit report, for a period 

of at least 3 years following submission of the final audit report;

(v) Ensure that all personnel involved in the audit sign and date the conflict of interest 

statement in §68.59(d)(8); and

(vi) Ensure that all personnel involved in the audit do not accept future employment with 

the owner or operator of the stationary source for a period of at least 3 years following 

submission of the final audit report. For purposes of this requirement, employment does not 

include performing or participating in third-party audits pursuant to §§68.59 or 68.80.

(3) The auditor shall have written policies and procedures to ensure that all personnel 

comply with the competency, independence, and impartiality requirements of this section. 

(c) Third-party audit report. The owner or operator shall ensure that the auditor prepares 

and submits an audit report as follows:

(1) The scope and content of each audit report shall: 

(i) Identify the lead auditor or manager, participating individuals, and any other key 

persons participating in the audit, including names, titles, and summaries of qualifications 

demonstrating that the competency requirements in paragraph (b)(1) are met;

(ii) Document the auditor’s evaluation, for each covered process, of the owner or 

operator’s compliance with the provisions of this subpart to determine whether the procedures 

and practices developed by the owner or operator under this rule are adequate and being 

followed;

(iii) Document the findings of the audit, including any identified compliance or 

performance deficiencies;
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(iv) Include a summary of the owner’s or operator’s comments on, and identify any 

adjustments made by the auditor to, any draft audit report provided by the auditor to the owner or 

operator for review or comment; and 

(v) Include the following certification, signed and dated by the auditor or supervising 

manager for the audit: 

“I certify that this RMP compliance audit report was prepared under my direction or 

supervision in accordance with a system designed to assure that qualified personnel 

properly gather and evaluate the information upon which the audit is based. I further 

certify that the audit was conducted and this report was prepared pursuant to the 

requirements of subpart D of 40 CFR Part 68 and all other applicable auditing, 

competency, independence, impartiality, and conflict of interest standards and protocols. 

Based on my personal knowledge and experience, and inquiry of personnel involved in 

the audit, the information submitted herein is true, accurate, and complete. I am aware 

that there are significant penalties for submitting false information, including the 

possibility of fines and imprisonment for knowing violations.”

(2) The auditor shall retain copies of all audit reports and related records for a period of 

five years, and make them available if directed by the owner or operator, to the owner or operator 

and/or the implementing agency.

(3) The auditor shall submit the audit report to the implementing agency at the same time, 

or before, it provides it to the owner or operator.

(4) The audit report and related records shall not be privileged as attorney-client 

communications or attorney work products, even if written for or reviewed by legal staff.

(d) Third-party audit findings. (1) Findings response report. As soon as possible, but no 

later than 90 days after receiving the final audit report, the owner or operator shall determine an 
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appropriate response to each of the findings in the audit report, and develop and provide to the 

implementing agency a findings response report that includes: 

(i) A copy of the final audit report; 

(ii) An appropriate response to each of the audit report findings;

(iii) A schedule for promptly addressing deficiencies; and 

(iv) A certification, signed and dated by a senior corporate officer, or an official in an 

equivalent position, of the owner or operator of the stationary source, stating:

“I certify under penalty of law that the attached RMP compliance audit report was 

received, reviewed, and responded to under my direction or supervision by qualified 

personnel. I further certify that appropriate responses to the findings have been identified 

and deficiencies were corrected, or are being corrected, consistent with the requirements 

of subpart D of 40 CFR Part 68, as documented herein. Based on my personal knowledge 

and experience, or inquiry of personnel involved in evaluating the report findings and 

determining appropriate responses to the findings, the information submitted herein is 

true, accurate, and complete. I am aware that there are significant penalties for submitting 

false information, including the possibility of fines and imprisonment for knowing 

violations.”

(2) Schedule to address deficiencies. The owner or operator shall implement the schedule 

to address deficiencies identified in the audit findings response report in paragraph (d)(1)(iii) and 

document the action taken to address each deficiency, along with the date completed.

(3) Submission to board of directors. The owner or operator shall immediately provide a 

copy of each document required under paragraphs (d)(1) and (d)(2), when completed, to the 

owner or operator’s audit committee of the Board of Directors, or other comparable committee, if 

one exists.
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(e) Recordkeeping. The owner or operator shall retain at the stationary source, the 

following:

(1) The two most recent third-party audit reports, related findings response reports, 

documentation of actions taken to address deficiencies, and related records. This requirement 

does not apply to any document that is more than five years old.

(2) Copies of all draft third-party audit reports. The owner or operator shall provide draft 

third-party audit reports to the implementing agency upon request. This requirement does not 

apply to any draft audit reports that are more than five years old.

17. Amend §68.81 to revise paragraphs (a) and (d) as follows:

§68.81 Incident investigation.

(a) The owner or operator shall investigate each incident that:

(1) Resulted in a catastrophic release (including when the affected process is 

decommissioned or destroyed following, or as the result of, an incident); or

(2) Could reasonably have resulted in a catastrophic release (i.e., was a near miss). 

* * * * *

(d) A report shall be prepared at the conclusion of the investigation. The report shall be 

completed within 12 months of the incident, unless the implementing agency approves, in 

writing, an extension of time. The report shall include:

(1) Date, time, and location of incident;

* * * * *

(3) A description of the incident, in chronological order, providing all relevant facts;

(4) The name and amount of the regulated substance involved in the release (e.g., fire, 

explosion, toxic gas loss of containment) or near miss and the duration of the event;
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(5) The consequences, if any, of the incident including, but not limited to: injuries, 

fatalities, the number of people evacuated, the number of people sheltered in place, and the 

impact on the environment;

(6) Emergency response actions taken;

(7) The factors that contributed to the incident including the initiating event, direct and 

indirect contributing factors, and root causes. Root causes shall be determined by conducting an 

analysis for each incident using a recognized, method; and

(8) Any recommendations resulting from the investigation and a schedule for addressing 

them.

* * * * *

18. Revise §68.90 to read as follows:

§68.90 Applicability.

(a) Non-responding stationary source. The owner or operator of a stationary source need 

not comply with §68.95 of this part provided that:

(1) The coordination activities required under §68.93 indicate that adequate local public 

emergency response capabilities are available to appropriately respond to any accidental release 

of the regulated substances at the stationary source; 

(2) Appropriate mechanisms are in place to notify emergency responders when there is a 

need for a response; and 

(3) The LEPC or equivalent has not requested in writing that the owner or operator 

comply with the requirements of §68.95. 

(b) Responding stationary source. The owner or operator of a stationary source shall 

coordinate response activities as described in §68.93. The owner or operator shall also comply 

with the requirements of §68.95 when: 
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(1) The outcome of the response coordination activities demonstrates that local public 

emergency response capabilities are not adequate to appropriately respond to an accidental 

release of the regulated substances at the stationary source; or

(2) The LEPC or equivalent requests in writing that the owner or operator of the 

stationary source comply with the requirements of §68.95.

19. Add §68.93 to Subpart E to read as follows:

§68.93 Emergency response coordination activities.

The owner or operator of a stationary source shall coordinate response needs with local 

emergency planning and response organizations to ensure resources and capabilities are in place 

to respond to an accidental release of a regulated substance.

(a) Coordination shall occur at least annually, and more frequently if necessary, to 

address changes: at the source; in the source’s emergency action plan; in local authorities’ 

response resources and capabilities; or in the local community emergency response plan. 

(b) The owner or operator shall document coordination with local authorities, including: 

the names of individuals involved and their contact information (phone number, email address, 

and organizational affiliations); dates of coordination activities; and nature of coordination 

activities.

(c) The owner or operator shall coordinate potential response actions as follows:

(1) For stationary sources with any regulated toxic substance held in a process above the 

threshold quantity, the owner or operator shall coordinate potential response actions with the 

LEPC or equivalent and ensure that the stationary source is included in the community 

emergency response plan developed under 42 U.S.C. 11003; and/or

(2) For stationary sources with only regulated flammable substances held in a process 

above the threshold quantity, the owner or operator shall coordinate response actions with the 

local fire department.
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20. Amend §68.95 as follows:

a. Revise paragraph (a)(1)(i); 

b. Revise paragraph (a)(4) by adding a sentence at the end; and 

c. Revise paragraph (c).

68.95 Emergency response program.

(a) * * *

(1) * * *

(i) Procedures for informing the public and the appropriate Federal, state, and local 

emergency response agencies about accidental releases; 

* * * * *

(4) * * * The owner or operator shall review and update the program annually, or more 

frequently if necessary, to incorporate recommendations and lessons learned from emergency 

response exercises and/or incident investigations, or other available information.

* * * * *

(c) The emergency response plan developed under paragraph (a)(1) of this section shall 

be coordinated with the community emergency response plan developed under 42 U.S.C. 11003. 

Upon request of the LEPC or emergency response officials, the owner or operator shall promptly 

provide to the local emergency response officials information necessary for developing and 

implementing the community emergency response plan.

21. Add §68.96 to Subpart E to read as follows:

§68.96 Emergency response exercises.

(a) Notification exercises. At least once each calendar year, the owner or operator of a 

stationary source with any Program 2 or Program 3 process shall conduct an exercise of the 

source’s emergency response notification mechanisms required under §68.90(a)(2) or 

§68.95(a)(1)(i), as appropriate. Owners or operators of responding stationary sources may 
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perform the notification exercise as part of the tabletop and field exercises required in §68.96(b). 

The owner/operator shall maintain a written record of each notification exercise conducted over 

the last five years.

(b) Emergency response exercise program. The owner or operator of a stationary source 

subject to the requirements of §68.95 shall develop and implement an exercise program for its 

emergency response program, including the plan required under §68.95(a)(1). When planning 

emergency response field and tabletop exercises, the owner or operator shall coordinate with local 

public emergency response officials and invite them to participate in the exercise. The emergency 

response exercise program shall include:

(1) Emergency response field exercises. The owner or operator shall conduct a field 

exercise involving the simulated accidental release of a regulated substance (i.e., toxic substance 

release or release of a regulated flammable substance involving a fire and/or explosion).

(i) Frequency. The field exercise shall be conducted at least once every five years, and 

within one year of any accidental release required to be reported under §68.42.

(ii) Scope. The field exercise shall include tests of: procedures to notify the public and the 

appropriate Federal, state, and local emergency response agencies about an accidental release; 

procedures and measures for emergency response actions including evacuations and medical 

treatment; communications systems; mobilization of facility emergency response personnel, 

including contractors, as appropriate; coordination with local emergency responders; equipment 

deployment; and any other action identified in the emergency response program, as appropriate.

(2) Tabletop exercises. The owner or operator shall conduct a tabletop exercise involving 

the simulated accidental release of a regulated substance. The exercise shall involve facility 

emergency response personnel, response contractors, and local emergency response and planning 

officials, as appropriate. 
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(i) Frequency. The owner or operator of a stationary source shall conduct tabletop 

exercises annually, except during the calendar year when a field exercise is conducted.

(ii) Scope. The exercise shall include tests of: procedures to notify the public and the 

appropriate Federal, state, and local emergency response agencies; procedures and measures for 

emergency response including evacuations and medical treatment; identification of facility 

emergency response personnel and/or contractors and their responsibilities; coordination with 

local emergency responders; procedures for equipment deployment; and any other action 

identified in the emergency response plan, as appropriate.

(3) Documentation. The owner/operator shall prepare an evaluation report within 90 days 

of each exercise. The report shall include: a description of the exercise scenario; names and 

organizations of each participant; an evaluation of the exercise results including lessons learned; 

recommendations for improvement or revisions to the emergency response exercise program and 

emergency response program, and a schedule to promptly address and resolve recommendations. 

22. Amend §68.130 as follows:

a. In Table 1, List of Regulated Toxic Substances and Threshold Quantities for 

Accidental Release Prevention [Alphabetical Order—77 Substances], remove the CAS No. 107-

18-61 in the row for Allyl alcohol [2-Propen-l-ol] and replace it with CAS No. 107-18-6;

b. In Table 2, List of Regulated Toxic Substances and Threshold Quantities for 

Accidental Release Prevention [CAS Number Order—77 Substances], in column 1 remove dots 

and right justify the CAS numbers in the column; and

c. In Table 4, List of Regulated Flammable Substances and Threshold Quantities for 

Accidental Release Prevention, [CAS Number Order—63 Substances], in column 1 remove dots 

and right justify the CAS numbers in the column; in column 1 remove CAS No. 196-99-0 in the 

row for 1,3-Butadiene and replace it with CAS No. 106-99-0; and remove the third column (CAS 

No.).
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23. Amend §68.160 to revise paragraph (b) as follows:

§68.160 Registration.

* * * * *

(b) * * * 

(1) Stationary source name, street, city, county, state, zip code, latitude and longitude, 

and description of location that latitude and longitude represent;

* * * * *

(4) The name, telephone number, mailing address, and e-mail address of the owner or 

operator; 

(5) The name and title of the person with overall responsibility for RMP elements and 

implementation, and the e-mail address for that person; 

* * * * *

(9) The number of full-time equivalent employees at the stationary source; 

* * * * *

(12) If the stationary source has a CAA Title V operating permit, and if so, the permit 

number; 

(13) [Reserved];

(14) The name, mailing address, email address, and the telephone number of the 

contractor who prepared the RMP (if any); 

(15) Source or parent company e-mail address (if an e-mail address exists);

(16) Source internet address (if an internet address exists);

(17) Phone number at the source for public inquiries (if a public inquiries phone number 

exists);

(18) LEPC name, phone number, e-mail address, and internet address (if applicable and 

available);
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(19) [Reserved];

(20) * * *

* * * * *

(ii) Corrections under §68.195 or for purposes of correcting minor clerical errors, 

updating administrative information, providing missing data elements or reflecting stationary 

source ownership changes, and which do not require an update and re-submission as specified in 

§68.190(b); 

* * * * *

(iv) Withdrawals of an RMP for any stationary source that was erroneously considered 

subject to this part 68;

(21) Whether chemical hazard information has been provided to the LEPC or emergency 

response officials, pursuant to §68.205;

(22) Location or means of public access for chemical hazard information made available 

to the public, pursuant to §68.210; and

(23) Whether a public meeting has been held following an RMP reportable accident, 

pursuant to §68.210(d).

24. Amend §68.170 as follows:

a. Revise paragraphs (a), (e), (f), and (h);

b. Redesignate paragraph (d) as paragraphs (d)(1) and (d)(2) and revise;

c. Remove paragraphs (g)(1) and (g)(2) and revise paragraph (g);

d. Redesignate paragraph (i) as paragraphs (i)(1) through (i)(3) and revise; 

e. Redesignate paragraph (j) as paragraphs (j)(1) through (j)(3) and revise; and

f. Remove paragraph (k).

§68.170 Prevention program/Program 2.
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(a) For each Program 2 process, the owner or operator shall provide in the RMP the 

information indicated in paragraphs (b) through (j) of this section. If the same information applies 

to more than one covered process, the owner or operator may provide the information only once, 

but shall indicate to which processes the information applies. 

* * * * *

(d)(1) Whether safety information requirements, in §68.48, are implemented.

(2) A list of all Federal and state regulations, industry-specific and established company 

or stationary source design codes and standards that are applicable, and identify those followed, 

to demonstrate compliance with the safety information requirements.

(e) The most recent hazard review or hazard review update information, pursuant to 

§68.50, including: 

(1) The date of completion of the most recent hazard review or hazard review update; 

* * * * *

(f) Whether operating procedure requirements, in §68.52, are implemented.

(g) Whether training requirements, in §68.54, are implemented.

(h) Whether maintenance requirements, in §68.56, are implemented.

(i)(1) Whether compliance audit requirements, in §68.58, are implemented.

(2) The date of the most recent compliance audit. 

(3) Whether the most recent compliance audit was a third-party audit, pursuant to 

§§68.58 and 68.59. 

(j)(1) Whether incident investigation requirements, in §68.60, are implemented.

(2) The date of the most recent incident investigation. 

(3) Whether root cause analyses have been completed for all accidents and incidents that 

are subject to the incident investigation requirements in §68.60.

25. Amend §68.175 as follows:
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a. Revise paragraphs (a), (f), (h) through (j), and (m) through (o);

b. Redesignate paragraph (d) as paragraphs (d)(1) and (d)(2) and revise;

c. Revise paragraph (e) by redesignating paragraphs (e)(1) through (e)(6) as (e)(1)(i) 

through (e)(1)((vi) and adding a new paragraph (e)(2);

d. Remove paragraphs (g)(1) and (g)(2) and revise paragraph (g);

e. Redesignate paragraph (k) as paragraphs (k)(1) through (k)(3) and revise;

f. Redesignate paragraph (l) as paragraphs (l)(1) through (l)(3) and revise; and

g. Remove paragraph (p).

§68.175 Prevention program/Program 3.

(a) For each Program 3 process, the owner or operator shall provide the information 

indicated in paragraphs (b) through (o) of this section. If the same information applies to more 

than one covered process, the owner or operator may provide the information only once, but shall 

indicate to which processes the information applies. 

* * * * *

(d)(1) Whether process safety information requirements, in §68.65, are implemented.

(2) A list of all Federal and state regulations, industry-specific and established company 

or stationary source design codes and standards that are applicable, and identify those followed, 

to demonstrate compliance with the safety information requirements. 

(e)(1)The most recent PHA or PHA update and revalidation information, pursuant to 

§68.67, including: 

(i) The date of completion of the most recent PHA or update and the technique used; 

(ii) Major hazards identified; 

(iii) Process controls in use; 

(iv) Mitigation systems in use; 

(v) Monitoring and detection systems in use; and 
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(vi) Changes since the last PHA. 

(2)(i) Whether the current PHA addresses safer technology and alternative risk 

management measures, as required in §68.67(c)(8).

(ii) Whether any inherently safer technology or design measures were implemented. 

(iii) If any inherently safer technology or design measures were implemented, identify the 

measure and the technology category (substitution, minimization, simplification, and/or 

moderation).

(f) Whether operating procedure requirements, in §68.69, are implemented.

(g) Whether training requirements, in §68.71, are implemented.

(h) Whether mechanical integrity requirements, in §68.73, are implemented.

(i) Whether management of change requirements, in §68.75, are implemented.

(j) Whether pre-startup review requirements, in §68.77, are implemented.

(k)(1) Whether compliance audit requirements, in §68.79, are implemented. 

(2) The date of the most recent compliance audit.

(3) Whether the most recent compliance audit was a third-party audit, pursuant to 

§§68.79 and 68.80. 

(l)(1) Whether incident investigation requirements, in §68.81, are implemented.

(2) The date of the most recent incident investigation. 

(3) Whether root cause analyses have been completed for all accidents and incidents that 

are subject to the incident investigation requirements in §68.81.

(m) Whether employee participation requirements, in §68.83, are implemented.

(n) Whether hot work permit requirements, in §68.85, are implemented. 

(o) Whether contractor safety requirements, in §68.87, are implemented.
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26. Revise §68.180 to read as follows:

§68.180 Emergency response program and exercises.

(a) The owner or operator shall provide in the RMP: 

(1) Name, organizational affiliation, phone number, and e-mail address of local 

emergency planning and response organizations with which the stationary source last coordinated 

emergency response efforts, pursuant to §§68.10(b)(3) or 68.93; 

(2) Whether coordination with the local emergency response organizations is occurring at 

least annually, pursuant to 68.93(a); and

(3) A list of Federal or state emergency plan requirements to which the stationary source 

is subject. 

(b) The owner or operator shall identify whether the facility is a responding stationary 

source or a non-responding stationary source, pursuant to §68.90. 

For non-responding stationary sources, the owner or operator shall identify:

(i) Whether the owner or operator of the stationary source has confirmed that the local 

emergency response entity is capable of responding to accidental releases at the stationary source;

(ii) Whether appropriate mechanisms are in place to notify public emergency responders 

when there is a need for emergency response; and

(iii) Whether a notification exercise occurs at least annually, as required in §68.96(a).

For responding stationary sources, the owner or operator shall identify:

(i) Whether the LEPC or local response entity requested the stationary source to be a 

responding stationary source as required in §68.90(a)(3);

(ii) Whether the stationary source complies with emergency response program 

requirements in §68.95;

(iii) Whether a notification exercise occurs at least annually, as required in §68.96(a);
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(iv) Whether a field exercise is conducted every five years and after any RMP reportable 

accident, pursuant to §68.96(b)(1)(i); and

(v) Whether a tabletop exercise occurs at least annually, except during the calendar year 

when a field exercise is conducted, as required in §68.96(b)(2)(i).

27. Amend §68.190 by revising paragraph (c) to add a sentence at the end as follows:

68.190 Updates.

* * * * *

(c) * * * Prior to de-registration the owner or operator shall meet applicable reporting and 

incident investigation requirements in accordance with §§68.42, 68.60, and/or 68.81.

28. Amend §68.195 as follows:

a. Redesignate paragraph (a) as paragraph (a)(1) and revise; 

b. Add a new paragraph (a)(2).

§68.195 Required corrections.

* * * * *

(a) New accident history information—(1) For any accidental release meeting the fiveyear accident history reporting criteria of §68.42 and occurring after April 9, 2004, the owner or 

operator shall submit the data required under §68.168, except for root cause information required 

in §68.42(b)(10), with respect to that accident within six months of the release or by the time the 

RMP is updated under §68.190, whichever is earlier. 

(2) Root cause information required under §68.42(b)(10) shall be submitted within 12 

months, or by the alternative timeframe provided by an implementing agency, as specified in 

§§68.60(d) or 68.81(d).

* * * * *

29. Revise §68.200 to read as follows:
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§68.200 Recordkeeping.

The owner or operator shall maintain records supporting the implementation of this part 

at the stationary source for five years, unless otherwise provided in subpart D of this part. 

30. Add §68.205 to read as follows:

§68.205 Availability of information to the LEPC or emergency response officials. 

(a) RMP availability. The RMP required under subpart G of this part shall be available to 

local emergency responders and LEPCs under 42 U.S.C. 7414(c) and 40 CFR Part 1400. 

(b) Chemical hazard information. The owner or operator of a stationary source shall 

develop summaries of chemical hazard information for all regulated processes and provide the 

information, upon request, to the LEPC or emergency response officials. Information shall 

include, as applicable: 

(1) Information on regulated substances. Names and quantities of regulated substances 

held in a process.

(2) Accident history information. Provide the five-year accident history information 

required to be reported under §68.42.

(3) Compliance audit reports. Summaries of compliance audit reports developed in 

accordance with §§68.58, 68.59, 68.79, or 68.80, as applicable, updated as part of the calendar 

year submission described in subparagraph (c). The summary shall include:

(i) The date of the report;

(ii) Name and contact information of auditor and facility contact person;

(iii) Brief description of the findings;

(iv) An appropriate response to each of the findings; and 

(v) Schedule for addressing each of the findings, as applicable.

(4) Summaries of incident investigation reports developed in accordance with §§68.60(d) 

or 68.81(d), as applicable. The summary shall include: 
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(i) Description of the incident and events leading up to it, including a timeline;

(ii) Brief description of the process involved; 

(iii) Names and contact information of personnel on the investigation team; 

(iv) Direct, contributing, and root causes of the incident; 

(v) On-site and offsite impacts; 

(vi) Emergency response actions taken;

(vii) Recommendations; and 

(viii) Schedule for implementing recommendations, as applicable.

(5) Inherently safer technology. For each process in NAICS codes 322, 324, and 325, 

provide a summary of the inherently safer technologies (IST) or inherently safer designs (ISD) 

implemented or planned, in accordance with §68.67(c)(8). Update the summary, as part of the 

calendar year submission described in subparagraph (c), and following any revisions prepared in 

accordance with 68.67(f) and indicate when no revisions are incorporated, as applicable. The 

summary shall include:

(i) The RMP process ID and process description, if provided, of the process affected; 

(ii) A brief description of the IST or ISD and which IST/ISD type of measure best 

characterizes it: minimization, substitution, moderation or simplification;

(iii) The name of the RMP regulated substance(s) whose hazard, potential exposure or 

risk was or will be reduced as a result of the implementation and whether the substance is listed 

as a toxic or flammable. If the chemicals affected are a mixture of flammables, the name 

“flammable mixture” may be used rather than the individual flammable substance names; and 

(iv) The date of implementation or planned implementation. 

(6) Exercises. Information on emergency response exercises required under §68.96. The 

information shall include schedules for upcoming exercises, reports for completed exercises as 

described in §68.96(b)(3), and any other related information.
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(c) Submission dates and updates. The owner or operator shall update summary 

information every calendar year, including all applicable information that was revised since the 

last submission, and provide the information upon request.

(d) The disclosure of information classified by the Department of Defense or other 

Federal agencies or contractors of such agencies shall be controlled by applicable laws, 

regulations, or executive orders concerning the release of classified information. 

(e) CBI. An owner or operator asserting CBI for information required under this section 

shall provide a sanitized version to the LEPC or emergency response officials. Assertion of 

claims of CBI and substantiation of CBI claims shall be in the same manner as required in 40 

CFR 68.151 and 68.152 for information contained in the RMP required under subpart G. As 

provided under 40 CFR 68.151(b)(3), an owner or operator of a stationary source may not claim 

five-year accident history information as CBI. As provided in 40 CFR 68.151(c)(2), an owner or 

operator of a stationary source asserting that a chemical name is CBI shall provide a generic 

category or class name as a substitute.

31. Amend §68.210 as follows:

a. Revise paragraph (a); 

b. Redesignate paragraph (b) as paragraph (e) and revise redesignated paragraph (e); and

c. Add new paragraphs (b) through (d) and new paragraph (f).

§68.210 Availability of information to the public.

(a) RMP availability. The RMP required under subpart G of this part shall be available to 

the public under 42 U.S.C. 7414(c) and 40 CFR Part 1400. 

(b) Chemical hazard information. The owner or operator of a stationary source shall 

distribute chemical hazard information for all regulated processes to the public in an easily 

accessible manner, such as on a company website, including, as applicable:

(1) Regulated substances information. Names of regulated substances held in a process.
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(2) Safety data sheets (SDS). SDSs for all regulated substances located at the facility. 

(3) Accident history information. Provide the five-year accident history information 

required to be reported under §68.42.

(4) Emergency response program. Summary information concerning the source’s 

compliance with §68.10(b)(3) or the emergency response provisions of Subpart E, including:

(i) Whether the source is a responding stationary source or a non-responding stationary 

source; 

(ii) Name and phone number of local emergency response organizations with which the

owner or operator last coordinated emergency response efforts, pursuant to §68.180; and

(iii) For sources subject to §68.95, procedures for informing the public and local 

emergency response agencies about accidental releases;

(5) Exercises. The summary information required under §68.205(b)(6). 

(6) LEPC contact information. Include LEPC name, phone number, and web address as 

available. 

(c) Submission dates and updates. The owner or operator shall update and submit 

information required under §68.210(b) every calendar year, including all applicable information 

that was revised since the last update. 

(d) Public meetings. The owner or operator of a stationary source shall hold a public 

meeting to provide information required under §68.42 as well as other relevant chemical hazard 

information, such as that described in paragraph (b), within 30 days of any accident subject to 

reporting under §68.42.

(e) The disclosure of information classified by the Department of Defense or other 

Federal agencies or contractors of such agencies shall be controlled by applicable laws, 

regulations, or executive orders concerning the release of classified information. 
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(f) CBI. An owner or operator asserting CBI for information required under this section 

shall provide a sanitized version to the public. Assertion of claims of CBI and substantiation of 

CBI claims shall be in the same manner as required in 40 CFR 68.151 and 68.152 for information 

contained in the RMP required under subpart G. As provided under 40 CFR 68.151(b)(3), an 

owner or operator of a stationary source may not claim five-year accident history information as 

CBI. As provided in 40 CFR 68.151(c)(2), an owner or operator of a stationary source asserting 

that a chemical name is CBI shall provide a generic category or class name as a substitute.