### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs N ove mb er 12, 200 8

HOME R T . R IVER S v. STA TE OF TEN NES SEE

Appeal from t he Circuit Court for Har deman County Nos. 05-01-0137; 06-01-0198 J. We ber Mc Craw, Judge

No. W2008-00508-C CA-R 3-PC - Filed April 21, 2009

Th e pe tit ion e r, Ho me r T . Ri ve rs , a pp e a ls f ro m th e Ha

rd e ma n Coun ty Cir c uit Cou rt ’s de nia l of his petition for pos t -c o n viction relief f rom his guilty pl ea c onvictions on one count of de livery of a schedule II controlled substance (coc aine) , a Class B felony, and one count of simple possession of a Schedule VI c ontrolled substance (marijuana ), a Class A misdemea nor. On a ppeal, the pe titioner argue s that he re ceive d the ineff ective a ssistance of counsel and that counsel’s ineffe ctive assistanc e rendere d h i s g u i l ty pleas unknowing and involuntary. A fter r eviewing the r ecor d, we a ffirm the judgment of the post-convic tion court.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f R igh t; Judg me nt of th e Ci r c uit

Co ur t A ff

ir me d.

D. K EL LY T HOMAS , J R ., J., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which J OS EP H M. T I P TO N , P.J., and A LA N E. G LE NN , J., joined.

Ga ry F. A ntric a n, Di stric t Pu bli c De fe nd e r; a ndPe ri a nn Ho ug hto n, As sis ta nt D ist ri c t Pu bli c De fe nd e r, fo r the app e lla nt, Ho me r T . Ri ve rs

.

Rob e rt E. Coo pe r, Jr
., At torne y G e ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; Sop hia S. L e e , A ssi sta nt A tto rn e y G e ne ra l; D. Michae l Dunavant, District Attorney Gene ral; and Joe L. VanD yke, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.

OP IN ION

At the petitioner’s Ja nuary 11, 2006 guilty plea he aring, the State summarized the pr oof that it w ou ld h a ve pr e se nte d h a d Ca se No . 0 5- 01 -0 13 7 g on e to t ri a l:

This was an indictment for delivery of Schedule II, coc aine, .5 gr ams or more . Had this matter gone to [trial], the State would have introduc ed proof that on or about the 15th of July, 2005, of

fice rs with the We st Tennessee Judicial Drug Ta sk Force met-2-

with Special Agent Da vid Murphy of the Mississippi B ureau of Na rcotics r egar ding

a coc aine buy that M.B.N. had done on or about the 14th of Febr uary 2005.

It appe ars that [ the] Mississippi B ureau of Nar cotics had done a coc aine buy with a conf

idential informant. Un k nowingly, they had cr ossed the state line f rom Benton County, Mississ ippi, into Har deman Count y, Tenne ssee, where the buy was made. The buy was r ecor ded, turne d over to the Te nnessee officia ls. The controlled

su bs ta nc e ha d be e n tes te d both in Mis sis sip pi an d in Ten ne sse e

. Th e re is a t e st r e su lt from both labs showing .57 gra ms f rom Mississ ippi; .5 grams fr om Tennesse e, base d

on the a mou nt u se d in the te sti ng . But thi s b uy , in fa c t, d id t ake pla c e he re in Har deman County . . . .

In ca se No. 06-01- 0198, the petitioner wa s char ged via criminal information with one count of simple possession of marijuana . The State noted that the char ge re sulted when a Har deman County sheriff’s de puty pulled over a vehicle be longin g t o the petitioner, who w as wa nted on an outstanding warr ant. “W hen [the petitioner] e xited the vehicle , a small bagg[ie ] o f a g re en lea fy pla nt m a te ri a l” wh ic h late r t e ste d to be mari juana “ wa s f ou ndin the se a t.” Th e pe tit ion e r p le d g uil ty to both offense s as cha

rged in the indictment. Although the petitioner’s guilty plea a gree ment and the judgments resulting from these guilty pleas a re a bsent from the re co rd, according to the plea hearing transcr i p t t h e t ri al court sentence d the petitioner to eight yea rs’ probation as a Range I

, sta nd ardof

fe nd e r f or the c oc a ine de liv e ry c on vic tio n a nde le ve n mo nth s, tw e nty -n ine da ys ’ pr ob a tio n f

or the mari jua na po sse ssi on . T he tria l c ou rt re vo ke d th e pe tit ion e r’ s c ommun ity

corr ections probation f

rom a previous case and order ed that the petitioner’s sentenc es in the instant matter be serve d consec utively to each othe r and to the prison sentence the petitioner would ser ve as the re sult of his probation being revoke d.

On J une 26, 2006, the petit ioner filed a ti mely pro se petition for post-conviction re lief. In the petition, the petitioner allege d that counsel re ndere d ineffe ctive assistanc e by, among other things, failing to proper ly investigate t he case, coerc ing the petit ioner int o pleading guilty, failing
to c ha lle ng e the tria l c ou rt ’s jurisd ic tio n, a nd faili ng to f ile mot ion s to su pp re ss e vid e nc e , d ism iss the indictments against him, and inspect t h e g ra n d jury minutes. The petitioner a lso alleged that

c ou ns e l’ s in e ff

e c tiv e a ssi sta nc e re nd e re d h is g uil ty p le a s u nk no wi ng a ndinv olu nta ry . T he po stconviction court summarily dism issed the petition for fa ilure to state a col o rable claim for r elief. The pe titioner appea led, and c oncluding that t h e petiti on did state a c olorable c laim, this court

rema nded the c ase to t h e p o s t -convic tion court for the appointment of counse l and an e videntiary hearing. Ho m er T

. R ivers v. State, No. W 2006-01607-CCA-R3-PC, 2007 WL 1610095, at *1-2 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 1, 2007).

The pe titioner’s post-conviction counsel filed an amende d post-conviction petition which made se vera l additional allegations, including: (1) counse l f ailed to communicate with the petitioner and fa iled to investigate the allegations against the petitioner; (2) c oun s el fa i l ed to interview witnesses and de velop a tria l strategy; (3) c ounsel failed t o ex p l ai n that the petitioner would, fo llo wi ng his gu ilt y ple a s, be pla c e d o n s up e rv ise d p ro batio n w hic h w ou ld b e se rv e d c on se c uti ve ly to the sentenc e for his probation vi olation; (4) the trial court im proper ly sentenc ed the petitioner; (5) counsel “ did not obtain a waiver of appe al as to [the pe titioner’s] sente nce” ; and (6) counsel “ did not-3-

develop a theory of de fense other than that [the petiti oner] should plead.” Howeve r, on appe al the petitioner make s only the gener al ar guments that counsel provide d ineffe ctive assistanc e and that his gu il ty p le a s w e r e u n k n o w in g a n d in v o lu n ta r y

. W e w il l l im it

o u r r e v ie w o f

th e e vidence
prese nted at the Ja nuary 30, 2008 e videntiary he aring a ccor dingly.

Evidentiary He aring Te stimony

The pe titioner testified that he ha d asked c ounsel wh et h er t h e Tennessee authorities wer e

awa re of the Mississi ppi authorities “coming to m y house and ge tting me on a drug buy,” c ounsel ha d r e pli e d th a t th e Te nness e e a uth oriti e s w e re a wa re of the inv e sti gatio n. Th e pe tit ion e r a lso

c la ime d th a t c ou ns e l told him that a Ten ne sse e Bur e a u of In ve sti gatio n (T BI ) ag e nt wa s p re se nt w ith the Mississi ppi police when he was a rre sted. He said that he later learned, upon revie wing the re cord in this case, that “Tennesse e didn’t know [anything] about it [until] four months after it happened. So I fee l [counsel] lied to me.”

Th e pe tit ion e r s a id tha t c ou ns e l to ld h im that w e re the c a se to g o to tr ia l, th e S ta te wo uld push for a

twenty-ye ar prison s en t en ce , and that betwe en this potential sentence and the e vidence against him, pleading guilty was in his best interest. He sa id that he enter ed his guilty pleas based upon counsel’s a dvice. The petitioner testified that he met with counsel s ever al times befor e pleading guilty but that counsel provided him e rrone ous advice

. He claimed that he wa s unawa re of the simple po sse ssi on c ha rg e a ga ins t hi m be fo re he ple d to it a ndthat c ou ns e l ne ve r i nf orme d h im what a “ criminal i nformation” e ntailed. He a lso claimed that counse l incorre ctly told him t hat upon pl ea d i n g g u i l t y , “I was going to get eight year s but it was going to be suspended, that I w ouldn’t have to be on paper s or nothing f or it”; the petitioner adde d, “I didn’t know I was going to be on no eight year s’ paper

. If I knew that, I wouldn’t have [pled guilty].” The petitioner admitted that he tol d th e trial c ou rt

that he wa s satis fi e d w ith c ou ns e l’ s r e pr e se ntatio n b ut that he didso be c a us e “that’s what [counsel] told me to do . . . .”

On cross-examination, the pe titioner acknow ledged that he had seve ral prior felony convictions, including a 2004 convic tion for aggr avate d assault, convi ctions in 2001 for fe lony

wea pons possession and eva ding arre st, and a 1997 c onviction for voluntary ma nslaughter. The
pe tit ion e r a gr e e d th a t hi s c ri min a l r e c or d w ou ld h a vema de him e lig ibl e fo r s e nte nc ing a s a mul tip le offe nder w ould had he be en convic ted at trial, whe rea s he was sentenc ed as a Range I of

fende r upon his guilty plea. He acknowledge d that he re ceive d probation for the instant offe nses, but he did not vie w th e s e s e n te n c e s f

a v o r ab ly b e c a u s e h e w a s n o w in c ar c e r a te d f o r v io lati n g h is p r o b a ti on, a sentenc e which r esulted fr o m h i s g u i l ty pleas in the instant matter. The petitioner insisted that counsel did not tell him about the tests performed on the drugs he sold to the c onfidential informa nt or about the c onfidential informa nt being prepa red to testify for

the State at trial.

Counsel, who repr esente d the petitioner in thi s ca s e as well as in some of the petitioner’s
pr e vio us ma tte rs , te sti fi e d th a t he ha d “ [m ]u lti ple conve rs a tio ns ” wi th the pe tit ion e r p ri or to h is guilty plea beca

use the plea

“also e ntailed a [ community co rr ec t i o n s] sentenc e which he rec eived in 2004 which was eight year s . . . [for] aggra vated a ssault for shooting his cousin in the shoulder.” Counsel said he believe d that t h e p eti tioner’s c riminal rec ord could ha ve made him eligible to be ind ic te d a s a Ran ge II I of fe nd e r but that he wa s in dic te d a s a Ra ng e II of

fe nd e r andse nte nc e d a s a-4-

Range I of

fende r following his guilty plea. Counsel testi fied that he communicated the substance of the guilty plea ne gotiations to t he petitioner, noting that they “ always ha d an o p en line of

c omm un ic a tio n.

. . . We di scus se d th is m a tte r i n g re a t de ta il.

. . . [ Th e pe tit ion e r] a sk e d me
sp e c if ic a lly wh e the r or no t he wo uld ha ve to s e rv e tim e ; w hat, i f h e ple d g uil ty, wo uldbe the re su lt of his [community corr ections] violation.” Counsel a lso note d that he re viewed the plea a gree ment

“ lin e by li ne” with the pe tit ion e r andthat th e pe tit ion e r “ kn e w that he wa s g oin g to re c e ive so me incar cer ation time” for his c ommunity correc tions viol ation.

Cou ns e l a dd e d th a t th e pe tit ion e r’ s te st im ony a bo ut n ot u nd e rs ta nd ing the na tur e of his
pr ob a tio na

ry se nte nc e s w a s n ot c re dib le giv e n that th e pe tit ion e r “ ha s sp e nt a larg e ma jority of his adult and his minor life on probation and understands when you plead to a fe lony what the re sult is.” He a lso noted that during the plea c o l l o q u y , h e s t ated on the rec ord that the pe titioner would be incar cer ated fo r hi s community corre ctions violation and that his probationary se ntence s in the instant matter would not begin until after he s er v ed h i s s entence for the pre vious conviction. On

cross-e xamination, he adde d that he explained these conseque nces to the petitioner bef ore he enter ed his guilt y plea.

Cou ns e l te sti fi e d that he e xp la ine d the jurisd ic tio na l is su e s to the pe tit ion e r andthat he tol d the pe tit ion e r tha t th e c on fi de nti a l in fo rm a nt w a s p re pa re d to te stify for th e Sta te a t tria l. H e a lso said that he e xplained the r esults of the drug tests to the petitioner. On c ross-examination, counsel

sa id tha t he did no t sp e c if ic a lly te ll the pe tit ion e r that Mi ssi ssi pp i auth oriti e s c ou ld c ro ss the state line and make an ar

rest in Tenne ssee, a lthough he did explain to the petitioner “ who was involved in the case and how the c ase c ame a bout.”

The pos t -c onviction court ente red a n order denying the petitioner r elief. I n the orde r, the post-conviction court found t hat t he petiti oner did not rec eive the ine ffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel and that the petit ioner “knowingly and volunt arily entered a plea, . . . understood the significa nce and conse quence s of the plea and sente nce. . . . The petitioner wa s not coerc ed into entering a plea.” Th e pe tit ion e r s ub se qu e ntl y f ile d a tim e ly n oti c e of

app e a l.

ANALY SIS

The burden in a post- conviction proc eedingis on the petitioner to prove his g rounds for r elief by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e. Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-30- 110(f)

. On appe al, we a re bound by the trial court’s finding s of fac t unle ss w e conclude that the evidenc e in the re co rd p re ponderates ag ainst those finding s. Fields v. State, 40 S

. W

. 3d 450, 456 (Tenn. 2001)

. B e c a us e the y re late to mix ed que s ti o n s o f

la w an d f a c t, w e r e v ie w th e tr ia l c o u rt’ s c o n c lu s io n s a s to w h e th e r c o unsel’s
pe rf or manc e wa s d e fi c ie nt a

nd wh e the r t h a t d e fi c ie nc y

wa s p re jud ic ia l un de r a

de no vo sta

nd ard wi th no presumption of cor

rec tness. I d. at 457.

Under the Six th Amendment to the United States Constitut ion, when a c laim of ineff ective assistance of counse l is made, the burde n is on the petitioner to show (1) that counsel’s pe rfor mance was de ficient a

nd (2) that the defic iency was pre judicial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,-5-

687 (1984); see L ockhar

t v. Fre twell, 506 U.S. 364, 368-372 (1993). I n other wor ds, a showing that

c ouns e l’ s p e rf

or manc e fa lls be low

a re a so na ble sta nd ard is n ot e no ug h; ra

the r, the pe tit ion e r m

us t also show that but f

or the substandard perf

ormanc e, “the result of the proce eding would have be en differ ent.” Strickland, 466 U .S. at 694. Th e Str ic kla nd sta nd a rd has been app lied

to t he ri g ht t o counsel unde r ar

ticle I , section 9 of the Tenne ssee Constit ution. State v. Melson, 772 S.W .2d 417, 419 n.2 (Tenn. 1989) . I n the context of a guilty plea a s in this c ase, the ef fec tive assistance of counsel is rele vant onl y to the extent that itaff ects the voluntariness of the plea. There fore , to satisfy the sec ond prongof Strickland

, the pe tit ion e r mus t sh owthat “ the re is a re a so na ble pr ob a bil ity that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on goingto trial.” Hi ll v . L oc kh art , 4 74 U. S. 5 2, 59 (1 98 5) ; se e a lso Wal ton v. State , 966 S.W. 2d 54 , 55 ( Te nn . Cr im. App. 1997).

I n this case, the post-c onviction court ac cre dited the testimony of counse l, who t estified that he explained the natur e of the case ag ainst the petitioner, par ticularl y t he jurisdictional issues

a sso c iate d w iththe c a se , a s we ll a s the le ng th and mann e r o f s e nte nc e s to wh ic h th e pe tit ion e r w ou ld be exposed wer e he to plea d g uilty . Although in this post-conviction case the pe titioner expresses di s p l ea s ure w ith his guilty pleas a nd resulting sentenc es, the re cord r efle cts that at the guilty plea hear ing the petitioner wa s made a war e of the sentenc es he would face and that he stated that he

un de rs too d th e se nte nc e s. Th e re c or d re fl e c ts that had the pe tit ion e r be e n co nv ic te d at tri a l, h e wo uld ha ve f a c e d s e n t e n c e s o f i n c ar c e r a t i o n a s a R an g e I I o f f e n d e r ; h o w e v e r , c o u n s e l an d t he Sta te

n ego t i at eda p l ea agr ee m en t u n d er wh i ch t h e pe t i t i o n er wo u l d b e se n t en ce d t o p ro b at i o nas a R an ge Ioffe nder—a

n ag ree ment about which the pe titioner did n o t co m p lain at the plea hear ing. G iven the evidenc e, we ag ree with the post-conviction cour t’s conclusion that the petiti oner did not re ceive the ineff ective a ssistance of c ounsel and that the pe titioner’s g uilty pleas we re know ing a

nd voluntary . We theref

ore de ny the petitioner re lief.

CONCLUSION

Up on c on sid e ratio n o f the fo re go ing and th e re c or d a s a wh ole , th e jud gme nt o f the po stconviction court is affirmed.

___________ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___________ D. KELLY THOMAS, JR., JUDGE