alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
TELEPHONE CONTACT SUMMARY

Brick and Structural Clay Products

FROM: Richard Marinshaw

RTI International

DATE OF CONTACT: July 10, 2009

ORGANIZATION CONTACTED:

The Belden Brick Company (Belden)

225 East Main Street

Sugarcreek, OH 44681

PERSON CONTACTED:

Brad Belden, Corporate Manager - Occupational & Regulatory Services

330-852-2424

PURPOSE OF CONTACT:

To obtain additional information on the operation of kilns P801, 802 and 803.

SUMMARY OF CONTACT:

Mr. Belden was contacted for information regarding kilns P801, P802, and P803. 

These kilns are classified as small kilns (production capacity less than 10 tons/hr) and are 

ducted to a common control system that consists of a spray dryer followed by an 

electrostatic precipitator (ESP). The kilns were tested in August 2003 for hydrogen 

fluoride (HF), hydrochloric acid (HCl), particulate matter (PM), and other pollutants. 

However, the results of the test were rejected by the Ohio Environmental Protection 

Agency (Ohio EPA) due to improper filter temperatures in the sampling train. Since 

then, the kilns have been tested for sulfur dioxide (SO2), but not for HF, HCl, or PM. Mr. 

Belden stated that the Ohio EPA does not require Belden to test for those pollutants, and 

they have no plans to do so. 

When asked about the operational status of the kilns, he stated that two of the 

three kilns are now in operation. Regarding the costs for the 2003 emission tests, Mr. 

Belden indicated that he did not have that information.
# Subpart 3443.1—General

**Parent topic:**PART 3443—CONTRACT MODIFICATIONS

## 3443.107 Contract clause.

The contracting officer must insert a clause substantially the same as the clause at 3452.243–70 (Key personnel) in all solicitations and contracts in which it will be essential for the contracting officer to be notified that a change of designated key personnel is to take place by the contractor.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Robert L. Rogers, Jr., Appellant.

(Appeal No. 1.)

[715 NYS2d 353]

—Judgment unanimously affirmed. Counsel’s motion to be relieved of assignment granted *(see, People v Crawford,*71 AD2d 38). (Appeal from Judgment of Supreme Court, Monroe County, Ark, J. — Criminal Possession Controlled Substance, 5th Degree.) Present — Pigott, Jr., P. J., Pine, Hayes, Wisner and Kehoe, JJ.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<CIK>                         0001020186
<NAME>                        CAPITAL BEVERAGE CORPORATION
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1
<CURRENCY>                                     U.S.DOLLARS

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                                 JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                   SEP-30-2000
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                1
<CASH>                                         230,963
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  804,393
<ALLOWANCES>                                   40,000
<INVENTORY>                                    821,177
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               2,148,743
<PP&E>                                         310,929
<DEPRECIATION>                                 42,447
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 3,260,515
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          966,169
<BONDS>                                        0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       2,679
<OTHER-SE>                                     1,690,354
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   3,260,515
<SALES>                                        13,245,279
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               13,245,279
<CGS>                                          11,298,642
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  11,298,642
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               2,686,180
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             (40,190)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (652,402)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (652,402)
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (652,402)
<EPS-BASIC>                                    (0.28)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  (0.28)



</TABLE>
# Subpart 549.5 - [Reserved]

**Parent topic:**Part 549 - Termination of Contracts
Editorial Note on Part 49
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 49 appear at 85 FR 75672, Nov. 25, 2020.

§ 49.23 Emergency authority policies and procedures. ( a ) *Emergency policies and procedures required.* A swap data repository shall establish policies and procedures for the exercise of emergency authority in the event of any emergency, including but not limited to natural, man-made, and information technology emergencies. Such policies and procedures shall also require a swap data repository to exercise its emergency authority upon request by the Commission. A swap data repository's policies and procedures for the exercise of emergency authority shall be transparent to the Commission and to market participants whose SDR data resides at the swap data repository.
( b ) *Invocation of emergency authority.* A swap data repository's policies and procedures for the exercise of emergency authority shall enumerate the circumstances under which the swap data repository is authorized to invoke its emergency authority and the procedures that it shall follow to declare an emergency. Such policies and procedures shall also address the range of measures that it is authorized to take when exercising such emergency authority.
( c ) *Designation of persons authorized to act in an emergency.* A swap data repository shall designate one or more officials of the swap data repository as persons authorized to exercise emergency authority on its behalf. A swap data repository shall also establish a chain of command to be used in the event that the designated person(s) is unavailable. A swap data repository shall notify the Commission of the person(s) designated to exercise emergency authority.
( d ) *Conflicts of interest.* A swap data repository's policies and procedures for the exercise of emergency authority shall include provisions to avoid conflicts of interest in any decisions made pursuant to emergency authority. Such policies and procedures shall also include provisions to consult the swap data repository's chief compliance officer in any emergency decision that may raise potential conflicts of interest.
( e ) *Notification to the Commission.* A swap data repository's policies and procedures for the exercise of emergency authority shall include provisions to notify the Commission as soon as reasonably practicable regarding any invocation of emergency authority. When notifying the Commission of any exercise of emergency authority, a swap data repository shall explain the reasons for taking such emergency action, explain how conflicts of interest were minimized, and document the decision-making process. Underlying documentation shall be made available to the Commission upon request.
[76 FR 54575, Sept. 1, 2011, as amended at 85 FR 75661, Nov. 25, 2020]
### §286b–8. Grant payments, records, and audit

(a) Payments under grants made under sections 286b–3, 286b–4, 286b–5, 286b–6, and 286b–7 of this title may be made in advance or by way of reimbursement and in such installments as the Secretary shall prescribe by regulation after consultation with the Board.

(b)(1) Each recipient of a grant under this subpart shall keep such records as the Secretary shall prescribe, including records which fully disclose the amount and disposition by such recipient of the proceeds of such grant, the total cost of the project or undertaking in connection with which such grant is given or used, and the amount of that portion of the cost of the project or undertaking supplied by other sources, and such other records as will facilitate an effective audit.

(2) The Secretary and the Comptroller General of the United States, or any of their duly authorized representatives, shall have access for the purpose of audit and examination to any books, documents, papers, and records of such recipients that are pertinent to any grant received under this subpart.

(July 1, 1944, ch. 373, title IV, §477, as added Pub. L. 99–158, §2, Nov. 20, 1985, 99 Stat. 863.)
#### § 1304.10 Preservation of records.

MCC shall preserve all correspondence pertaining to the requests that it receives under this part, as well as copies of all requested records, until disposition or destruction is authorized pursuant to Title 44 of the United States Code or the General Records Schedule 4.2 of the National Archives and Records Administration. MCC shall not dispose of or destroy records while they are the subject of a pending request, appeal, or lawsuit under the FOIA.
From: Stoneman, Chris

Sent: Wednesday, February 26, 2014 8:55 AM

To: DScott@bwenergylaw.com

Cc: Rothery, Deirdre

Subject: RE: Tribal Minor Source permitting question - Oil and Gas 

MNSR deadline 

extension

Hello Mr. Scott:

This email is in response to your email of February 24, 2014 that was 

forwarded to me by EPA Region 

8. We are treating your questions as comments under our proposed rule 

entitled “General Permits and 

Permits by Rule for the Federal Minor New Source Review Program in Indian 

Country” that was 

published on January 14, 2014. We normally respond to comments in the 

context of taking final action 

on a proposed rule. We will add your questions to the body of comments to 

which we will respond. You 

are, of course, welcome to submit more comments as well. The comment 

period extends to March 17, 

2014.

Thank you for your interest in this rulemaking.

Chris Stoneman 

From: Scott, David [mailto:DScott@bwenergylaw.com] 

Sent: Monday, February 24, 2014 3:13 PM 

To: Paser, Kathleen 

Subject: Tribal Minor Source permitting question 

Kathleen, I’m an attorney in Denver with a few clients with oil/gas 

interests on tribal lands in Utah, ND and 

elsewhere. We have been following the rule proposed in December to 

extend the permitting deadline for 

true minors on Indian lands for 12-18 months. We are concerned that 

given the tight deadline, EPA may 

not be able to complete the extension by the original Sept. 2014 

deadline. Do you anticipate that the 

extension will be implemented in time, or if not will EPA be requiring 

operators to pursue individual permits 

by that deadline since a general permit is likely to be unavailable? 

Any light you can shine on this issue would be helpful. There have been 

a variety of rumors circulating 

about this issue among certain operators, so any clarity you can provide 

would be well received. I am not, 

at this point, authorized to disclose which operators we represent on 

this issue. 
If you would prefer to discuss over the phone, please don’t hesitate to 

contact me at the number below, 

Dave 

David Scott | Beatty & Wozniak, P.C. 

Attorney 

216 Sixteenth Street, Ste. 1100 

Denver, CO 80202-5115 

303-407-4445 

www.bwenergylaw.com 

Energy in the Law

Confidentiality: This Beatty & Wozniak, P.C email, its attachments and 

data ('email") are intended to be Confidential and may 

contain Attorney-Client Communications or Work Product. If you are not 

the intended recipient or may have received this message 

in error, notify the sender immediately and permanently delete the email 

and all copies thereof from any drives or storage media 

and destroy any printouts. Any use or distribution of any of the 

information in this email is Strictly Prohibited. 

Federal Tax Advice Disclaimer: This email is not tax advice and is not 

intended be used for the purpose of avoiding federal tax 

penalties or promoting, marketing or recommending to another party any 

matters addressed herein. IRS Circular 230.
#### In the Matter of the Claim of Hector Ghirardi, Respondent, against Mack Manufacturing Corporation et al., Appellants, and Special Disability Fund, Respondent. Workmen's Compensation Board, Respondent.

Appeal from a decision and award of the Workmen’s Compensation Board. Claimant was hired by the Mack Manufacturing Corporation as an electrician in October, 1943. At this time a company physician who examined claimant found that he was suffering from “ essential hypertension ” and noted in the company records *906that his blood pressure was 190/90. He also noted in the company records that claimant was “ advised to go to own doctor regarding blood pressure ”. Notwithstanding this notice the claimant was hired, and six years later, in 1949, while drilling a hole in a truck he struck his head and suffered a cerebral thrombosis and left hemiplegia. There is further proof that before this accident claimant came frequently to the first aid room complaining to the company nurse of headaches and told her on one occasion that he had high blood pressure. There is no dispute in the record that this high blood pressure, which itself is not disputed, is a permanent physical impairment. There is evidence that while the accident brought on the paralysis, it was essentially caused by the blood pressure. The board has held that the claim does not come within paragraph (d) of subdivision 8 of section 15 of the Workmen’s Compensation Law under which the employer or carrier would be entitled after 104 weeks of payment to reimbursement from the Special Disability Fund where the result of the accident is aggravated because of a pre-existing permanent physical impairment. The finding of the board on which such right to reimbursement was avoided is that claimant was “not suffering from any permanent condition due to a previous accident or disease * * * which was or was likely to be a hindrance or obstacle to employment” and further that “Any alleged condition or disability ” which “ he may have had ” was “ not known to, nor considered by ” the employer at the time of hiring. There is no substantial evidence in support of these factual conclusions when the record is viewed as a whole. Decision and award reversed, on the law, and the claim remitted to the board, with costs to the appellants against the Workmen’s Compensation Board. Foster, P. J., Bergan, Coon, Halpern and Imrie, JJ., concur.
I 

112TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 3947 

To suspend temporarily the duty on Disperse Yellow 184:1. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

FEBRUARY 7, 2012 

Mr. WATT introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee 

on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To suspend temporarily the duty on Disperse Yellow 184:1. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. DISPERSE YELLOW 184:1. 

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Subchapter II of chapter 99 of 

5 the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States is 

6 amended by inserting in numerical sequence the following 

7 new heading: 

‘‘ 9902.01.00 Disperse Yellow 184:1, (2H1-Benzopyran-2-one, 3-(5- 

chloro-2-benzoxazolyl)-7- 

(diethylamino)-) (CAS No. 

35773–43–4) (provided for in 

subheading 3204.11.35) ........ Free No change No change On or before 

12/31/2014 ’’. 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 3947 IH

1 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

2 subsection (a) applies to articles entered, or withdrawn 

3 from warehouse for consumption, on or after the 15th day 

4 after the date of the enactment of this Act. 

Æ 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-6740

EDWIN REEVES HAZEL, III,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

C. MCELVOGUE, Captain,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Anderson. Richard Mark Gergel, District 

Judge. (8:10-cv-00524-RMG)

Submitted: August 18, 2011 Decided: August 23, 2011

Before WILKINSON, DAVIS, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Edwin Reeves Hazel, III, Appellant Pro Se. Eugene P. Corrigan, 

III, Harry V. Ragsdale, CORRIGAN & CHANDLER, LLC, Charleston, 

South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Edwin Reeves Hazel, III, appeals the district court’s 

judgment adopting the magistrate judge’s report and 

recommendation granting summary judgment to Appellee Captain C. 

McElvogue, and dismissing Hazel’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006)

complaint. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible 

error. Accordingly, we deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis 

and dismiss the appeal for the reasons stated by the district 

court. Hazel v. McElvogue, No. 8:10-cv-00524-RMG (D.S.C. Apr. 

25, 2011). We grant McElvogue’s motion to strike certain 

affidavits from the docket. We dispense with oral argument 

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented 

in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

DISMISSED
Opinion filed August 8 , 2013



### In The 

# Eleventh Court of Appeals

______ _ ___ No. 11

- 13

- 00 130

- C R

__________ TORY LEVON KIRK , Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee

On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 5
Dallas County , Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F

- 0962440

- L

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N O N M O T I O N F O R R E H E A R I N G On July 11, 2013, this court granted the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction that was filed by Tory Levon Kirk, and we dismissed t hi s appeal for want of jurisdiction. The State has filed a combination motion for rehearing and
State’s brief in which the State (1) contends that this court erred in dismissing the appeal for want of juris diction and (2) attempts to assert for the first time its right

t o cross

- appeal under T EX

. C ODE C RIM

. P ROC

. A NN

. art. 44.01(c) (West Supp.2 2012 ). We write to address the jurisdiction of this court over the State’s cross

appeal. In its motion/brief, the State asserts in a cross

- issue that it “now challenges the validity of the May 17 order granting a new trial on punishment and asks this
Court to reverse that order.” The State did not file a notice of appeal from the May 17 order granting a new trial. See id. § 44.01(a)(3) , (d) (authorizing the State to appeal an order that “grants a new trial” if the prosecuting attorney timely files a notice of appeal with in twenty days of the order). Thus, any right to appeal that the State may have is limited to A rticle 44.01(c)
, which provides that the State “is
entitled to appeal a ruling on a question of law if the defendant is convicted in the case and appeals the judgment.” When a defendant has i nvoked this court’s jurisdiction and the State raises a cross

- point concerning a question of law, as provided for in Article 44.01(c), the State is not required to file its own notice of appeal. Pfeiffer v. State , 363 S.W.3d 594, 597 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012 ) ; see Mizell v. State , 119 S.W.3d 804 , 806

– 07 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)

. However, because the State did not file a notice of appeal as provided for in Article 44.01(a)(3) and (d) and because , as addressed in our original opinion, this court lost jurisdictio n over the defendant’s appeal when the trial court granted the new trial on punishment and restored the case to the position it was in after the
de fendant was found guilty, we are of the opinion that we have no jurisdiction over the State’s attempted cross

- appeal under Article 44.01(c)

. Without jurisdiction, we have no authority to address the State’s challenge to the May 17 order granting a
new tri al on punishment. See State v. Bates , 889 S.W.2d 3 06, 311 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).3 We dismiss the State’s cross

- issue for want of jurisdiction, and we deny the State’s motion for rehearing.

PER CURIAM

August 8, 2013 Do not publish. See T EX

. R

. A PP

. P. 47.2(b). Panel consists of: Wright, C.J., McCall, J., and Willson, J.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 04-2349
In Re: PHILIP M. KLEINSMITH,
Petitioner.
On Petition for Writ of Mandamus. Submitted: December 16, 2004 Decided: December 20, 2004 Before MICHAEL, KING, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges. Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion. Philip M. Kleinsmith, Petitioner Pro Se. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).- 2 - PER CURIAM: Philip M. Kleinsmith petitions for writ of mandamus. He seeks an order enjoining the district court from requiring pro bono service as a condition of membership in the court’s Bar. Mandamus relief is available only when the petitioner has a clear right to the relief sought. See In re First Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. , 860 F.2d 135, 138 (4th Cir. 1988). Further, mandamus is a drastic remedy and should only be used in extraordinary circumstances. SeeKerr v. United States Dist. Court , 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976); In re Beard , 811 F.2d 818, 826 (4th Cir. 1987). Mandamus may not be used as a substitute for appeal. See In re United Steelworkers , 595 F.2d 958, 960 (4th Cir. 1979). The relief sought by Kleinsmith is not available by way of mandamus. Accordingly, we deny the petition for writ of mandamus. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED
§ 127.10 Civil penalty. ( a ) ( 1 ) The Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs is authorized to impose a civil penalty, as follows: ( i ) For each violation of 22 U.S.C. 2778, an amount not to exceed the greater of $1,238,892 or the amount that is twice the value of the transaction that is the basis of the violation with respect to which the penalty is imposed;
( ii ) For each violation of 22 U.S.C. 2779a, an amount not to exceed $1,028,998, or five times the amount of the prohibited incentive payment, whichever is greater; and
( iii ) For each violation of 22 U.S.C. 2780, an amount not to exceed $1,224,787.
( 2 ) The civil penalty may be either in addition to, or in lieu of, any other liability or penalty which may be imposed.
( b ) The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls may make: ( 1 ) The payment of a civil penalty under this section or
( 2 ) The completion of any administrative action pursuant to this part 127 or 128 of this subchapter a prior condition for the issuance, restoration, or continuing validity of any export license or other approval.
[58 FR 39316, July 22, 1993, as amended at 62 FR 67276, Dec. 24, 1997; 71 FR 20550, Apr. 21, 2006; 77 FR 16642, Mar. 21, 2012; 81 FR 36793, June 8, 2016; 82 FR 3170, Jan. 11, 2017; 83 FR 237, Jan. 3, 2018; 83 FR 2738, Jan. 19, 2018; 84 FR 9959, Mar. 19, 2019; 85 FR 2022, Jan. 14, 2020; 86 FR 7807, Feb. 2, 2021; 87 FR 1074, Jan. 10, 2022; 88 FR 1507, Jan. 11, 2023; 89 FR 702, Jan. 5, 2024]