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UNITED STates institute of peace

© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

“The stalemate in Kirkuk 

has destabilizing consequences. Kirkuk has repeatedly disrupted progress on key 

political issues at the national 

level, and its unsettled status 

complicates security arrangements and the delivery of 

public services in the province.”

May 13, 2010 

Finding Common Ground: Kirkuk as 

a Special Governorate

Summary

•	 Iraq’s March 2010 elections delivered a surprising virtual tie in the ethnically mixed and strategically important province of Kirkuk, making it an opportune time for fresh thinking on how to 

address persistent disputes over its status. 

•	 The focus thus far has been on a winner-take-all permanent resolution to the status of Kirkuk. 

It may be more productive to consider models which give local authorities a direct role in 

designing potential compromises on the province, clarify serious governance and security 

ambiguities that have developed on the ground; do not require any party to definitively forgo 

their ultimate aspirations for Kirkuk, and are compatible with the Iraqi Constitution. 

•	 Article 123 of the Iraqi Constitution, which allows the federal government and provincial 

councils to delegate powers back and forth by mutual consent, offers a framework that Iraqis 

may wish to employ to negotiate a deliberately open-ended special governorate status for 

Kirkuk that meets these criteria.

Introduction

Iraq’s March 2010 elections delivered an unexpected result on the national level, but their biggest 

surprise came in the ethnically mixed governorate, or province, of Kirkuk. In contrast to the previous national elections, in which the Kurdistan Alliance won over 50 percent of the vote in Kirkuk 

and no other list received more than 14 percent, the 2010 polls returned a virtual tie between the 

secular Iraqiya List and the Kurdistan Alliance.1 

Home to a mix of Kurds, Arab and Turkomen, Kirkuk sits at the center of an Arab-Kurdish territorial dispute that stretches through northern Iraq. Elections in Kirkuk have been closely watched 

because they serve as an indicator of how Iraq’s second largest oil producing province might vote 

in a constitutionally required referendum to determine whether it joins the Kurdistan region, 

remains under the administration of Baghdad or becomes an autonomous region. 

None of these options has obtained consensus, and the closeness of the 2010 electoral results 

raises the prospect of a divisive 51 to 49 result if a referendum were to be held today—making it 

an opportune time to consider compromise alternatives on Kirkuk’s status.2

 

Existing Options

Each of the basic options for Kirkuk’s status are associated with either Kurds (joining the Kurdistan 

region), Arabs (maintaining ties to Baghdad), or Turkoman (autonomous region). 

Sean Kane

E-mail: skane@usip.org

Phone: 202.429.3891

peaceBrieF31
© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

Finding Common Ground: Kirkuk as a Special Governorate

page 2 • PB 31 • May 13, 2010

Kurds present their claim to Kirkuk in terms of reversing the deep historical injustice of Ba’athist 

ethnic cleansing in the province. They emphasize the need to implement Article 140 of the 

constitution, which sets out a three-step process of “normalizing” Kirkuk’s population, conducting 

a census to determine its inhabitants and holding a referendum on its joining the Kurdistan region. 

In contrast, Arabs view Kirkuk as a mini-Iraq and any changes to its status as heralding the partition 

of the country. When framed in these competing zero-sum narratives, it is difficult for Arabs and 

Kurds to make concessions on their preferred resolution to Kirkuk’s status. 

Meanwhile, Iraqi Turkomen advocate for making Kirkuk an autonomous region to protect their 

culture against encroachment from larger groups. The Turkoman-backed model, where Kirkuk 

would manage its own affairs, is sometimes viewed as a possible compromise. However, it too has 

failed to attract consensus at least in part because it would block Kurdish ambitions. Specifically, 

Iraq’s federal system allows governorates, like Kirkuk, to join existing autonomous regions, like 

the Kurdistan region. It does not allow two autonomous regions to merge.3 If Kirkuk became an 

autonomous region it would be precluded from joining the Kurdistan region—a bitter defeat for 

the Kurdish political parties. 

Continued Stalemate Could Lead to Serious Problems

The stalemate in Kirkuk has destabilizing consequences. Kirkuk has repeatedly disrupted progress 

on key political issues at the national level, and its unsettled status complicates security arrangements and the delivery of public services in the province. 

Day-to-day governance in the province is politicized due to the fact that the provision of 

services and security can be seen to establish facts on the ground. In particular, since 2003, 

Kirkuk has developed dual and sometimes competing administrative arrangements between the 

federal government and Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). In several areas of the nationally 

administered Kirkuk, the KRG now provides funding for infrastructure and reconstruction projects, 

schools, clinics and salaries for ministry officials and teachers. Similarly, security arrangements for 

Kirkuk have been effectively split between the Iraqi Army, Kurdish peshmerga, Iraqi Police, Kurdish 

asayesh (secret police) and Awakening Councils.4

From one perspective the dual arrangements in Kirkuk can be seen as practical local problemsolving.5

 However, competing service and security arrangements also have the potential to be 

profoundly destabilizing in the context of persistent disagreement over Kirkuk’s status. In the 

current political stalemate, the parties have an incentive to continually press for advantage on the 

ground and barter on Kirkuk in national politics. 

Indeed, disputes over Kirkuk have threatened to derail successive Iraqi elections and Kirkuk has 

cast a shadow over the drafting of national oil legislation. Kirkuk will almost certainly complicate 

the ongoing government formation process. However, given the repeated Arab-Kurdish military 

conflicts in Kirkuk over the last four decades, the greatest risk posed by the lack of an agreed 

framework to address the province’s status is that constant probing for advantage on the ground 

will escalate into fighting as the buffering presence of U.S. troops is withdrawn. 

In tandem with efforts to resolve its status, it is therefore a priority to develop a process for stabilizing the governance and security structures in Kirkuk. Kirkukis themselves want to see current 

ambiguities clarified and are dismayed that national committees on Kirkuk have not contained 

local representation. This is important not just from a democratic consent standpoint but also 

because, by virtue of having to live with each other, Kirkukis are generally more flexible than their 

national counterparts. 
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Finding Common Ground: Kirkuk as a Special Governorate

page 3 • PB 31 • May 13, 2010

A Special Governorate

The finely balanced 2010 elections in Kirkuk indicate that no group is likely to achieve its preferred 

arrangement for the province without offending a large part of the population. Along with the 

unpredictable situation on the ground, the elections call for fresh thinking on how to address 

Kirkuk’s status. 

The focus thus far has been on a permanent resolution to the status of Kirkuk. The options put 

forward by the parties would result in clear winners and losers in an environment where there is a 

probability that the losers could resort to violence. 

It may be more productive to instead consider models that could help stabilize governance and 

security in the province, travel some way towards meeting each community’s core interests on 

status, and do not require any party to definitively forego their ultimate aspirations for Kirkuk. In 

this vein, Article 123 of the Iraqi Constitution offers a framework that Iraqis may wish to employ to 

allow Kirkuk to emerge as a “special governorate.” 

In general, Article 123 was drafted to allow the federal government and provincial councils to 

delegate powers back and forth by mutual consent.6

 In the case of Kirkuk, this article might be 

applied to develop a flexible special governorate model wherein:

•	 Through mutual agreement, Kirkuk could maintain significant administrative ties with 

Baghdad, institutionalize some of the de facto links that have developed with the KRG since 

2003, and be given the autonomy to protect local language and cultural traditions. 

•	 By remaining a governorate, Kirkuk would be capable at a later stage of becoming an independent region, or joining the Kurdistan region, or reverting to an ordinary governorate, 

meaning that the full range of final status options would stay on the table. 

•	 Since the application of Article 123 requires the consent of the implicated province, Kirkuki 

authorities would be directly involved in designing Kirkuk’s status. 

The Article 123 mechanism also has the advantage of being firmly grounded in the Iraqi 

Constitution and poses no contradiction to Article 140. Specifically, there is nothing in a special 

governorate status for Kirkuk that is inconsistent with normalization efforts continuing in the 

province, a census being conducted, or a referendum on its permanent status ultimately being 

held. In fact, if the political will to organize a referendum on Kirkuk does emerge, its result would 

supersede a negotiated agreement to make Kirkuk a special governorate.

Finally, it should be noted that the concept of both Baghdad and Erbil playing a role in administering Kirkuk has been previously proposed by the United Nations and subsequently explored 

in a Washington Institute of Near East Studies report.7 This Peace Brief furthers the discussion on 

the U.N. “dual nexus” model by introducing the concept of a dual status that deliberately avoids 

precluding each group’s preferred option for Kirkuk’s future—thus lowering the political costs 

of compromise. The special governorate model also strategically seeks to provide a direct role in 

the process for Kirkukis, who are believed to be more pragmatic on the province’s future status as 

compared to their national counterparts.

Mechanics of Article 123

The application of Article 123 to Kirkuk would require two steps. First, the Iraqi Parliament must 

pass an Article 123 framework law to generally regulate how special authorities can be transferred 

to governorates. Subsequently, a specific agreement on Kirkuk must be negotiated under the 

framework law. While complex, this mechanical two-step has international precedent, for example 

with Spain’s Self-Governing Communities.8
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Finding Common Ground: Kirkuk as a Special Governorate

page 4 • PB 31 • May 13, 2010

Strictly speaking, since Kirkuk is under the national administration, any Article 123 arrangement 

for the province should be a bilateral agreement between Baghdad and Kirkuk. However, in 

keeping with political realities, the exceptional treatment Kirkuk receives in the Iraqi Constitution 

and other laws, and the de facto role that the KRG already plays in the province, the framework law 

should also require KRG participation in the negotiation of an Article 123 agreement on Kirkuk. 

The Kurdish political parties, by virtue of their likely participation in any new national government 

coalition, would also be involved in drafting the Article 123 legislation and any special arrangements it foresees for Kirkuk. 

It is beyond the scope of this sketch to elaborate the full range of subjects an Article 123 

framework law would need to cover, but it would at a minimum need to define:

•	 Who is empowered to negotiate an agreement on behalf of the Iraqi government and the 

relevant governorate.

•	 How any resulting agreements are to be ratified by the relevant governments.

•	 Procedures for modifying or terminating the agreement.

•	 Exceptional requirements or procedures for Article 123 agreements on Kirkuk governorate.

Similarly, the follow-on agreement negotiated between Baghdad, Erbil and Kirkuk to make 

Kirkuk a special governorate would need to address:

•	 What powers, for example education, public sector hiring and increased budgetary control, 

would be immediately delegated to Kirkuk.

•	 What additional powers would be transitioned over time, including related to security, as 

Kirkuk demonstrates the governance capacity and institutions to administer them.

•	 What role the Kurdistan region would play in providing certain services to Kirkuk or in 

certain geographic areas of Kirkuk.

•	 How those authorities transferred to Kirkuk are transitioned and funded.

Conclusion

It is vital to Iraq’s future that major disputes, such as Kirkuk’s status, be addressed through political 

and constitutional means. At the same time, the closely divided 2010 election results in Kirkuk 

underscore that the pursuit of winner-take-all solutions in the province will likely result in continued stalemate. The danger is that in the meantime the situation the ground will deteriorate and 

claims to Kirkuk might be pursued by other means. 

This Peace Brief is intended to help Iraqis explore how to break the Kirkuk impasse by applying 

Article 123 of the Iraqi Constitution to address serious governance ambiguities in the province and 

negotiate a deliberately open-ended special governorate status for Kirkuk. By not removing any 

permanent status options from the table, the special governorate model seeks to allow all parties 

to game some measure of victory without any having to confront definitive defeat. 

Endnotes

1. Iraqiya received 38 percent of the vote and the Kurdistan Alliance won 37 percent (provisional, 

uncertified results). 

2. It is assumed supporters of the Kurdistan Alliance, Kurdish opposition party Gorran and smaller 

Kurdish parties would vote in favor of Kirkuk joining the Kurdistan region while secular, Arab and 

Turkoman parties would vote against. Kurdish parties totaled just under 50 percent of the March 

2010 vote—suggesting an extremely close referendum result.
© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

United States 

Institute of Peace

1200 17th Street NW

Washington, DC 20036

202.457.1700

www.usip.org

About This Brief

This Peace Brief was written by 

Sean Kane, Iraq Program officer in 

the Center of Post-Conflict, Peace 

and Stability Operations at the 

United States Institute of Peace. In 

his previous capacity at the United 

Nations, he conducted significant 

field research on Kirkuk’s history 

and administrative arrangements.

USIP provides the analysis, training and 

tools that prevent and end conflicts, 

promotes stability and professionalizes 

the field of peacebuilding.

For media inquiries, contact the office 

of Public Affairs and Communications, 

202.429.4725

3. The 2006 Iraqi Law on Executive Procedures to Form Regions sets out the steps for a governorate to “join” an existing region. The penultimate draft of the legislation also included provisions for the merger of regions, but these were dropped, indicating that Iraqis considered and 

rejected this possibility.

4. United Nations District Analysis Summaries for Kirkuk governorate. These reports detail service 

and security arrangements in Kirkuk, but are not publicly available. 

5. This argument, along with a case for formalizing Kirkuk’s dual arrangements can be found in 

Michael Knights and Ahmed Ali, “Kirkuk in Transition: Confidence Building in Northern Iraq,” The 

Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus #102, April 2010.

6. Article 123 reads in full: “Powers exercised by the federal government can be delegated to the 

governorates or vice versa, with the consent of both governments, and this should be regulated 

by law.”

7. See “Kirkuk in Transition: Confidence Building in Northern Iraq,” in particular pgs. 20-26 and 42-43. 

8. Under Spain’s 1978 Constitution, Self-Governing Communities are given a standard set of powers, but through an “organic act” of the national parliament can be transferred additional powers. 

Self-Governing Communities are also given the ability to reach cooperation agreements where they 

provide each other services, although these may be subject to the approval of the national courts. 

Finding a Common Ground: Kirkuk as a Special Governorate

page 5 • PB 31 • May 13, 2010