PEACEW RK

S

UNITED STATES

INSTITUTE OF PEACE

Dismantling the DPRK’s 

Nuclear Weapons Program

A Practicable, Verifiable Plan of Action

David Albright and 

Corey Hinderstein
Library of Congress Control Number: 200591665

Peaceworks No. 54. First published January 2006.

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors alone.

They do not necessarily reflect views of the United States Institute of Peace.

United States Institute of Peace

1200 17th Street NW, Suite 200

Washington, DC 20036-3011

Phone: 202-457-1700

Fax: 202-429-6063

www.usip.org
Contents

	 Summary	 1

	 Acknowledgments	 5

1.	 Introduction	 7

2.	 Cooperative Verified Dismantlement	 11

3. 	Possible Dismantlement Approaches	 15

4.	 Four Key Disarmament Tasks	 21

5. 	Ensuring the Absence of Undeclared Nuclear Material and Facilities	 43

6. 	The Special Role of Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs	 47

7. 	 Findings and Recommendations	 49

	 Notes	 53

	 About the Authors	 56

	 About the Institute	 57

Summary

Verified dismantlement of the nuclear weapons program of the Democratic People’s Republic of

Korea (DPRK) can be accomplished successfully. Although difficulties abound in reaching an

agreement with the DPRK to achieve this goal, the methods and steps involved in the dismantlement process are well understood.

Because this goal remains vital to U.S. and international security, the United States has joined

with China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea in working toward verified denuclearization of the

Korean peninsula with the cooperation of the DPRK. These six nations have launched a series

of negotiations, called the Six-Party Talks, aimed at resolving the crisis over the DPRK’s nuclear

program. These nations are also attempting to create a plan to dismantle the DPRK’s program

in a manner with which all the nations can feel secure.

The states intend to implement cooperative verified dismantlement, which requires a state to

voluntarily dismantle a nuclear program in cooperation with a verification body or organization. The goal of verified dismantlement is to obtain high confidence that the program no

longer exists and that reconstitution will be difficult and likely to be detected relatively quickly

or at least long before significant quantities of banned items are produced. In this sense, the

dismantlement is called irreversible. The DPRK would conduct the actual dismantlement, and

a verification organization would verify that the dismantlement has occurred.

In the process of negotiating a verified dismantlement plan, both the DPRK and the United

States have made proposals that are unacceptable to one another due primarily to a lack of

confidence in the other’s veracity. A middle ground must be found to move forward with this

important task.

The United States originally called its proposal the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement (CVID) of the DPRK’s nuclear program. Under this proposal, once the DPRK had

dismantled its nuclear program and permitted thorough monitoring, it could expect a range

of economic and energy benefits and security guarantees from the United States and its allies.

In its proposal, the DPRK stated its willingness to scrap its nuclear weapons program in a stepby-step approach if it first received a list of security guarantees and substantial economic and

energy benefits. However, most of the DPRK’s public statements have focused on an offer to

freeze its nuclear program in return for benefits, with actual dismantlement to come later in

the process. In addition, the DPRK has rejected the complete elimination of its civil nuclear

programs and insisted on the completion of a large electricity-generating nuclear reactor, a

step strongly opposed by the United States.

In September 2005, the six parties issued a statement in which they agreed that the goal of

the Six-Party Talks is the verified denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. In that agreement,

the DPRK committed to abandon its nuclear weapons and all nuclear programs and the other

parties agreed to actions such as giving energy aid and working toward normalization of


relations. The agreement does not address many key disputed issues, such as the timing of

dismantlement and rewards, how dismantlement will be verified, the scope of programs to be

abandoned, and the future of the DPRK’s civil nuclear programs. These issues will be addressed

during subsequent rounds of talks.

This report outlines an approach that attempts to address the disagreements that the United States

and the DPRK have with each other’s proposals. This third proposal, called “progressive dis­mantlement,” aims to allow a more informed discussion of the process of verified dismantlement.

The proposal involves three phases that would gradually denuclearize the Korean peninsula

and bring the DPRK into compliance with both the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and

North-South agreements. Verification would occur throughout the process, and incentives

and security guarantees would also be implemented in stages linked to the dismantlement

and verification steps.

This approach takes into account the underlying suspicions of the parties to an agreement.

U.S. officials worry that the DPRK would cheat and hide key nuclear materials or facilities. The

DPRK leadership likely suspects the other parties’ commitment to rewards and their motivations for conducting certain verification activities. The progressive dismantlement model recognizes the initial lack of trust among the parties and allows confidence building through the

successful implementation of initial cooperative steps. Verified dismantlement is more likely to

succeed in a positive and cooperative climate.

This report discusses the three main nuclear programs subject to dismantlement and the

procedures and actions necessary to verify their dismantlement. It also discusses the challenge of bringing the DPRK into compliance with the NPT. All told, then, four tasks must be

undertaken:

n Task 1: Halting plutonium production, separation, storage, and waste-processing facilities.

n Task 2: Achieving verified dismantlement of any nuclear weapons and the irreversible,

verifiable dismantlement of the set of facilities involved in researching, developing, testing,

and manufacturing nuclear weapons.

n	 Task 3: Dismantling any uranium enrichment activities and the facilities to research, develop,

test, and make enrichment equipment, such as gas centrifuges.

n	 Task 4: Implementing the DPRK-IAEA safeguards agreement and bringing the DPRK into

compliance with the NPT after it rejoins the treaty.

All four tasks will require the verification organization to conduct a range of activities to

ensure that dismantlement has occurred and that sensitive items are destroyed or shipped out

of the DPRK, as well as to gain confidence in the absence of undeclared materials, equipment,

and facilities. The pace and outcome of the process will depend primarily on the DPRK’s transparency and cooperation with the verification organization.

 Summary
The report concludes that the best choice for a verification organization is the International

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) supplemented by nuclear experts from the nuclear weapons

states, a plan called IAEA Plus. This approach has the advantage of using the expertise the

IAEA has gained through routine safeguards activities and experiences in Iraq, Iran, South

Africa, and Libya and the special resources and expertise of the nuclear weapons states.

The report emphasizes that the DPRK must be cooperative with and transparent to the verification organization and the other parties to any agreement. Such commitment will likely

depend on the DPRK’s belief that its vital interests are served by an agreement to verifiably

dismantle its nuclear weapons program. Because of the suspicions that exist between the

DPRK and the other participants in the Six-Party Talks, a goal of the negotiators should be to

find ways to gradually improve the political and security atmosphere between the DPRK and

the other parties. An improved atmosphere can ease the verification process and the task of

developing confidence that the DPRK is not hiding portions of its nuclear program.

The report shows that verification should start early in the implementation phase of any

agreement. Delays in implementing verification could make it more difficult to achieve confidence that the DPRK is dismantling its programs according to its commitments.

During the verification process, inspector rights of access will be critical. As a result, U.S. negotiators should encourage the DPRK to grant unrestricted access to sites as deemed necessary

by the verification organization, with the understanding that the DPRK can take reasonable

steps to protect vital secrets in programs that are not covered by a dismantlement agreement.

This report discusses how these concerns can be balanced under a vigorous verification plan.

The United States should modify its position on future DPRK civil nuclear programs. It has

already accepted an exemption for the use of radioisotopes in nuclear medicine and civil

industries. The continuation and expansion of such civil programs is vital to any nation and

may contribute to effective dismantlement by providing jobs for displaced nuclear scientists

and technicians. The fate of nuclear electricity generation programs is more controversial, but

any construction work on a nuclear reactor is unlikely before the DPRK has accomplished

verified dismantlement. In addition, if a power reactor is built at some future date, IAEA

inspections can provide adequate verification against potential misuse of this reactor.

Although achieving cooperative verified dismantlement has many possible pitfalls and trials,

the outcome is of the utmost importance for the security of the international community. If

the Six-Party Talks can come to an agreement, then a realistic process to denuclearize the

DPRK will be under way for the first time. All members of the Six-Party Talks should set this

goal as their highest priority.

Summary 

Acknowledgments

This report is the result of work carried out during several years at the Institute for Science

and International Security (ISIS). It has been made possible by the generous financial support

of the Ploughshares Fund, the Asia Foundation, the Prospect Hill Foundation, the Ford

Foundation, and the United States Institute of Peace.

The authors gratefully acknowledge the contributions made to the development of the underlying verification approach by André Buys, Robert Kelley, Mitchell Reiss, Svein Thorstensen,

Bernard Wishard, Jon Wolfsthal, and Houston Wood III. The list of people in government and

international organizations who have greatly assisted our efforts is longer, but these people

prefer to remain anonymous.

We would also like to thank the many participants at a series of workshops in China, Japan,

South Korea, Germany, and the United States who were instrumental in developing the information and findings of this report. Critical to this effort was a series of intensive discussions

with DPRK officials about the verified dismantlement of the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program

that spanned more than two years.

We would especially like to thank Joel Wit for his central contribution to this effort and his

constant encouragement to further develop and widely disseminate our findings.

We also give special thanks to Paul Stares, head of the Research and Studies program at the

United States Institute of Peace, and to Nigel Quinney for his production assistance.



1

Introduction

The nuclear weapons program of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) remains

at the center of U.S. and international security concerns. Whether or not it is the reality, the

perception that the DPRK has a growing number of nuclear weapons poses an increasing

challenge to the U.S. government and governments in the region.

The current size and status of the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program are unknown. DPRK

officials have often stated since February 2005 that the DPRK has nuclear weapons, but they

have refused to say how many or whether the weapons could be delivered by ballistic missile,

which is the most threatening delivery system to Japan and the United States. DPRK officials

have also declared that the state is developing its nuclear weapons capabilities, including

increasing the quantity and improving the quality of its nuclear arsenal.1 The officials refuse,

however, to explain what this statement means in practice. Despite these uncertainties, the

DPRK is increasingly believed to have at least a few nuclear weapons and the plutonium to

make several more. Debate continues on whether these weapons can be launched successfully on ballistic missiles such as the Nodong missile.

Unclassified information and some publicly available U.S. intelligence assessments suggest

that the DPRK could have separated enough plutonium for three to nine nuclear weapons.2

In April 2004, it may have discharged enough plutonium in irradiated fuel from its 5-megawatt electric reactor to allow it to build two to four more nuclear weapons. It could separate

the plutonium from this newly discharged fuel by the middle of 2006. These assessments,

however, remain highly uncertain.

Currently, the DPRK has the capability to produce enough new plutonium for roughly one to

two more nuclear weapons per year in its 5-megawatt electric reactor at the Yongbyon

nuclear center. The DPRK’s reported uranium enrichment program may eventually give it the

capability to make enough highly enriched uranium for several nuclear weapons per year. If

the DPRK finishes its 50-megawatt electric reactor at Yongbyon, this reactor could produce

enough plutonium for ten nuclear weapons each year.

A U.S. priority is convincing the DPRK to dismantle its nuclear program in a verifiable, irreversible manner. The United States has joined with China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea in

working toward a verified denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, which is a goal DPRK

officials say they share. These six nations have launched a series of negotiations, called the

Six-Party Talks, aimed at resolving the crisis over the DPRK’s nuclear program.

At the June 2004 meeting, the DPRK and the United States each made proposals that were

unacceptable to the other. Initial discussions confirmed that arriving at an agreement to verifiably dismantle the DPRK’s program will be complicated. The scope of the agreement, the

timing of various steps, and the benefits that accrue to the DPRK will require complicated

negotiations. The six parties met again in late July 2005 for the first time in more than a year,


 Dismantling the DPRK’s Nuclear Weapons Program

and in September 2005, they agreed on a set of principles for future discussions, including

that “the goal of the Six-Party Talks is the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula

in a peaceful manner.”3

Significantly, the DPRK committed to “abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear

programs and returning, at an early date, to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear

Weapons and to IAEA safeguards.” For its part, the United States “affirmed that it has no

nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula and has no intention to attack or invade the DPRK

with nuclear or conventional weapons.” The statement confirmed the DPRK’s right to peaceful

uses of nuclear energy, without defining the scope of such acceptable uses. Other issues, such

as normalization of relations, resolving outstanding issues between the DPRK and Japan, economic cooperation, energy assistance, and the negotiation of a lasting peace on the Korean

peninsula, were acknowledged, but the relationship and timing of these efforts with the denuclearization process is yet to be negotiated. The parties did agree to take steps on all agreedupon issues according the principle of “commitment for commitment, action for action.”4

A key challenge that has faced the negotiators is agreeing on a set of steps to irreversibly dismantle the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program. The United States proposed in July 2004 a frontloaded process, whereby the DPRK would declare and relinquish its plutonium, enriched uranium, and any nuclear weapons. After taking these initial steps, the DPRK would submit to

intrusive inspections and monitoring and receive a set of economic, political, and security benefits.5 The U.S. approach is heavily influenced by the manner in which Libya recently dismantled

its secret nuclear weapons program and invited the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

to verify its dismantlement and compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

The DPRK proposed first establishing a “freeze” on its plutonium program, which would be

accompanied by a range of benefits. Despite evidence gathered by the United States and

other countries, the DPRK has denied having a uranium enrichment program. At an unspecified future date, the DPRK would dismantle its nuclear weapons program in conjunction with

a verification arrangement.

Whatever negotiated approach is taken to dismantle the DPRK’s nuclear program, adequate

verification of its conditions will be critical. Verification must be performed in a manner that

provides high confidence that the DPRK has dismantled its nuclear program completely, has

not continued undeclared nuclear activities, and has come into full compliance with the NPT.

As a result, any verification arrangement will need to be robust to be effective.

Unlike the cooperative, verified nuclear dismantlement in South Africa and Libya, the verification process in the DPRK could be severely challenged by the DPRK’s extreme secrecy about

its nuclear and military programs and its belief that a state of war remains between it and its

neighbors and the United States. The success of this effort will depend on the DPRK becoming open and transparent to those tasked with verifying a dismantlement agreement. During

the initial period of the IAEA’s inspections under the NPT in 1992, the DPRK took several steps

that demonstrated its openness with the IAEA.6 However, at critical moments, particularly
Introduction  

when confronted with discrepancies in its declarations to the IAEA, it withheld cooperation,

which precipitated a crisis. Although the DPRK initially demonstrated its ability to provide

adequate openness during this IAEA process, it subsequently showed a defensiveness that has

made progress on verifying the NPT impossible since then.

If the current effort to verifiably dismantle the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program is to succeed,

the DPRK will have to be sufficiently transparent to allow the verification process to work.

Finding the correct balance between intrusiveness and effectiveness could prove to be one of

the toughest obstacles to negotiating an agreement.

A decision by the DPRK to allow adequate verification should be interpreted as the DPRK calculating that the political and economic benefits ultimately offered in the Six-Party Talks are

worth the security costs of abandoning its nuclear weapons program. Even with such a decision, the DPRK would likely remain suspicious and could possibly seek to hide some of its

nuclear activities, perhaps as a hedge in case of a breakdown in the agreement. To reduce the

likelihood of this undermining the agreement, a goal of the negotiators should be to find ways

to gradually improve the political and security atmosphere between the DPRK and the other

parties. Although adequate verification could be accomplished even with tensions remaining

between the DPRK and other parties, strengthening the political and security atmosphere during the cooperative dismantlement process could significantly ease the verification process and

the task of developing confidence that the DPRK is not hiding portions of its program.

Despite the difficulties, verified dismantlement of the DPRK’s nuclear weapons and fissile materials production programs can be accomplished. This report discusses the technical and practical steps needed to achieve that goal. However, the report does not go into detail on the

confidence-building and economic and security initiatives that can help alleviate the DPRK’s

excessive secrecy and mistrust and improve its perceived political and security situation. A goal

of this report is to lay the basis for a verified dismantlement agreement that, despite real

doubts, all members of the Six-Party Talks can conclude best serves the interests of all.

Cooperative Verified Dismantlement

In broad terms, cooperative verified dismantlement requires a state to voluntarily dismantle a

nuclear program in cooperation with a verification body or organization. The process is

termed “cooperative” to contrast it with the UN Security Council dismantlement resolutions

applied to Iraq after the 1991 Persian Gulf War.

The goal of verified dismantlement is to obtain high confidence that the program no longer

exists and that reconstitution is difficult and likely to be detected relatively quickly or at least

long before significant quantities of banned items can be produced. In practice, the state

conducts the actual dismantlement and a verification organization verifies that the dismantlement has occurred. The verification organization may also assist the state in the destruction

of some program elements, if required.

Dismantlement may involve the destruction of key items in-country or their transport to

another state able to secure or destroy them. The DPRK may agree to send certain key items

overseas to provide additional confidence that the dismantlement is irreversible. In this case,

the verification organization also needs to verify that the items are located or have been

destroyed in this other state. Plutonium and enriched uranium are expected to be sent overseas; operating nuclear facilities would likely be dismantled in the DPRK.

Although the recent case of Libya can provide useful lessons, the Libyan nuclear program

was far smaller than the DPRK’s; did not involve relatively large, operational facilities; and

did not produce any nuclear weapons. In addition, Libya faced a far different security environment, which reduced its incentives to hold back information or concessions. The DPRK

would likely remain deeply suspicious of the motives and actions of its neighbors and the

United States during the negotiation and implementation of an agreement. Thus, the DPRK

may insist on a confidence-building period prior to taking irreversible steps to dismantle its

nuclear weapons program.

Who verifies the actual dismantlement of nuclear programs is a negotiable topic. Although

the IAEA is usually selected as the organization to verify nuclear dismantlement, as in the

cases of Libya and South Africa, other possibilities exist and may be favored by negotiators in

the case of the DPRK. Negotiations may result in the creation of another verification organization or a mandate to bolster the IAEA’s inspection rights and expertise in nuclear areas beyond

that found in its safeguards department. Different models for the verification organization

may also be needed to accomplish different tasks. In any case, an agreement would likely

need to include a procedure whereby the verification organization would report to the parties

of the agreement.

2 11
12 Dismantling the DPRK’s Nuclear Weapons Program

The many candidates for the verification organization include

n	 a specific organization created by the United States, other acknowledged nuclear weapons

states (NWS), and other states in the region;

n	 “IAEA Plus,” which would involve the IAEA safeguards department supplemented by

experts or assistance from key member-states (variants of this model were used in Libya

and South Africa); and

n	 a bilateral or regional inspection agency.

In the case of verifiably dismantling any DPRK nuclear weapons and associated nuclear weaponization program, nuclear weapons experts from the NWS will be expected to play a critical

role. The verification organization will need to assess sensitive nuclear weapons information

and equipment. These experts could be formed into a separate organization or assigned to the

IAEA safeguards department. The latter step was followed in the case of South Africa after it

declared in 1993 that it had built nuclear weapons. A variant of this approach was also used

more recently in Libya by the IAEA. Although the DPRK remains highly suspicious of the IAEA,

DPRK officials seem to prefer an international verification organization rather than a system

dominated by U.S. experts. Nonetheless, the United States may insist on having its own

experts play a lead role in the verification process. It may want to create a nuclear dismantlement and inspection arrangement similar to the recent U.S.-British effort in Libya. In that case,

as in any other model, the group should coordinate closely with the IAEA.

No matter what organization verifies the dismantlement process, the IAEA safeguards department will be responsible for verifying that the DPRK is in compliance with the NPT. As a result,

any effort to create a separate verification organization should be fully aware that the IAEA will

also need to be involved in the verification process and will independently make a determination

whether the DPRK has come into compliance with the NPT and its safeguards agreement.

Dismantlement could occur either prior to the onset of verification activities or concurrent

with verification. Concurrent dismantlement and verification is the preferred option because

it would likely result in greater confidence. Accomplishing adequate verification after the dismantlement of a program is possible but more difficult and can take longer. Nonetheless, the

IAEA was able to establish that South Africa had dismantled its entire nuclear weapons program, even though the verification started several years after the dismantlement took place.

Based on experiences in Libya and South Africa, the most important prerequisite for a verification process to work is that the state believe that verified dismantlement is in its vital interests. According to former members of the South African nuclear weapons program, verified

dismantlement is unlikely to succeed without such a belief.

The DPRK has to fulfill many specific prerequisites for the successful verification of the dismantlement of nuclear programs. Full transparency and cooperation will mean granting the

verification organization a series of rights, including
n	 permitting broad access to sites and facilities;

n	 providing detailed declarations;

n allowing access to records, including program documents, procurement data, and possibly

personnel records;

n	 allowing interviews with program staff and officials; and

n	 permitting environmental sampling at declared sites and elsewhere.

In addition, the DPRK will need to allow inspectors access to military sites, a step it has resisted

in the past. Procedures will need to be developed that permit the DPRK to protect sensitive,

nonnuclear items without compromising the effectiveness of an inspection.

In general, the verification organization is expected to need more extensive rights than established under the IAEA Model Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540).7 Because the process of

verified dismantlement occurs during a finite period of time, these extraordinary rights could

be established on a temporary basis.

The verification organization will require equipment that goes beyond the range of equipment

typically used during safeguards. The “toolbox” of verification equipment should be negotiated ahead of time, as DPRK officials often are suspicious of equipment they don’t understand

or use themselves. There should be a mechanism, however, for the verification organization

to add new types of equipment or import additional equipment, if required.

On the other hand, the verification organization must make several commitments to the

DPRK. It must

n	 possess extensive knowledge about the type of program to be dismantled;

n	 have the tools to ensure with a high degree of confidence that the program is dismantled,

especially the ability to establish the completeness of any declaration; and

n	 act in a professional and fair manner and protect sensitive information.

Ensuring the irreversibility of the dismantlement process is essential. To achieve irreversibility,

the DPRK will need to destroy certain facilities, equipment, and documents or ship certain

items overseas. Ongoing monitoring of certain nonnuclear or dual-use activities and personnel may be necessary.

To make the process less costly and facilitate reemployment of personnel, the dismantlement

process should involve the conversion of parts of the program to other viable purposes.

Nuclear programs often involve equipment and skills that can be converted to nonproscribed

activities. The goal should be to create economically viable alternatives or enable the gradual

transfer of program personnel to other allowed activities. In the case of the DPRK, parties to

the Six-Party Talks should explore opportunities for joint ventures. Cooperative threat reduction (CTR) programs in the former Soviet Union provide a useful model for many possible

activities in the DPRK.8

Cooperative Verified Dismantlement 13
14 Dismantling the DPRK’s Nuclear Weapons Program

Ongoing monitoring of certain nonnuclear activities will likely be necessary once the dismantlement process is completed, particularly if some activities are converted to civilian purposes. In

any case, any remaining nuclear materials will require ongoing monitoring. The IAEA safeguards department is the best choice to conduct ongoing monitoring of nuclear and nonnuclear activities or facilities.

Many countries will likely be suspicious that the DPRK has not declared all its nuclear materials

or facilities to the verification organization. A negative can never be proved; thus, a verification organization cannot prove that there are no undeclared materials or facilities. Instead, the

verification organization will develop a set of procedures and actions that over time will allow

it to develop confidence that undeclared activities do not exist in the DPRK. As part of this

process, the verification organization will need to investigate many accusations and follow up

its own leads about undeclared activities. The DPRK will need to accept such activities by the

verification organization as part of dismantling its programs and coming into compliance with

the NPT.

The creation of a dismantlement program in the DPRK will be part of a larger agreement

involving the DPRK, the United States, and other states or international organizations. These

negotiations will focus on creating the basic responsibilities, rules, and procedures for the

dismantlement process for both the state and the verification organization.

Funding of the dismantlement and conversion processes should be established during these

negotiations. Both the DPRK and the verification organization will require funds to accomplish

their goals. In addition, any CTR-type activities will require funds.

The actual resources and number of personnel required by a specific verification organization

will vary. The core effort is estimated to require a few dozen specialists and a budget of

several million dollars a year. Shipping materials and equipment out of the DPRK would involve

additional costs. The process of dismantling the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program could be

achieved within a year or two, although the entire process of conversion and building confidence about the lack of undeclared activities could take several more years.

These core activities will need to be supplemented by support from IAEA member-states.

Critical support activities will include the analysis of an expected large number of environmental samples, the supply of inspection equipment, the provision of procurement information

about the DPRK’s overseas suppliers, and member-state intelligence information about activities in the DPRK. Of particular importance will be the supply of procurement information

learned through investigating the network led by the Pakistani engineer Abdul Qadeer Khan,

the father of Pakistan’s gas centrifuge program who illegally sold centrifuges to Iran, Libya,

and the DPRK.

Conversion costs could easily exceed tens of millions of dollars, based on similar programs

conducted in the former Soviet Union and South Africa. This activity will require the participation of the verification organization to fulfill its mandate, but the specific conversion activities

should be funded from another source.
Possible Dismantlement Approaches

The Six-Party Talks have so far been unable to agree upon a verified dismantlement approach.

All parties to the talks have agreed that the ultimate goal is the denuclearization of the Korean

peninsula, but only initial proposals have been presented.

In 2004, the United States and the DPRK each described the outlines of an agreement reflecting primarily their own interests. These proposals are mere sketches of a practical agreement

with many details purposely left out to allow for negotiation, and neither proposal has been

accepted by the other side.

This report outlines a more detailed approach that attempts to bridge, at least partially, the differences in the U.S. and DPRK proposals. This third proposal, called progressive dismantlement,

aims to allow a more informed discussion of the process of verified dismantlement.

The U.S. Proposal 

The United States has, in the past, called its proposal the complete, verifiable, and irreversible

dismantlement (CVID) of the DPRK’s nuclear program.9 Once the DPRK had dismantled its

nuclear program under this proposal, it could expect a range of economic and energy benefits

and security guarantees from the United States and its allies.

Although details of the U.S. negotiating position remain secret, the United States presented

an offer at the third round of Six-Party Talks held in Beijing in late June 2004. In this offer,

the United States, in coordination with South Korea and Japan, offered political and economic incentives or “corresponding steps” to the DPRK in return for the dismantlement of

its nuclear program.10

The U.S. proposal was discussed in the summer of 2004 by Assistant Secretary of State for

East Asian and Pacific Affairs James A. Kelly before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.11

He testified that as a first step the proposal called for the DPRK to commit to dismantling all

its nuclear weapons programs.

The parties would then agree on a detailed implementation plan requiring

n	the supervised disabling, dismantlement, and elimination of all nuclear-related facilities and

material;12

n	the removal from the DPRK of all nuclear weapons and weapons components, centrifuge

and other nuclear parts, fissile material and fuel rods;13 and

n	 a long-term monitoring program.

3 15
16 Dismantling the DPRK’s Nuclear Weapons Program

During a short initial preparatory period, of perhaps three months’ duration, which would

precede the dismantlement and removal phase, the DPRK would

n	 provide a complete listing of all its nuclear activities and cease operation of all its nuclear

activities;

n	 permit the securing of all its fissile material and the monitoring of all fuel rods; and

n	 permit the publicly disclosed and observable disablement of all nuclear weapons, weapons

components, and key centrifuge parts.

These actions by the DPRK would be subject to international verification. The exact verification arrangements and organization are not specified in the U.S. proposal.

As the DPRK carried out the above steps, the non-U.S. parties would “take some corresponding steps.” These steps, however, would be temporary and reversible until dismantlement had

been completed.

Non-U.S. parties would provide heavy fuel oil to the DPRK upon agreement of the overall

approach, including the DPRK’s agreement to dismantle all nuclear programs in a permanent,

thorough, and transparent manner subject to effective verification.

Upon acceptance of the DPRK declaration, the involved parties, including the United States,

would

n	 provide provisional multilateral security assurances, which would become more enduring as

the process proceeded;

n	 begin a study of the DPRK’s energy needs and nonnuclear ways to meet them; and

n	 begin a discussion of the steps necessary to lift remaining economic sanctions on the DPRK

and on the steps necessary to remove the DPRK from the U.S. State Department’s list of

state sponsors of terrorism.

The U.S. proposal does not define all portions of the DPRK’s nuclear program that would be

covered by dismantlement requirements. Programs to produce and separate plutonium, enrich

uranium, or make or stockpile nuclear weapons are included. Exemptions are expected to

include nuclear energy programs involving medical isotopes and radioactive sources used in

nonnuclear industries and agriculture. The United States is expected to oppose the operation

of the small Russian-supplied research reactor at Yongbyon and restarting the light water

reactor (LWR) project that was established under the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework.

The U.S. proposal is unclear about which organization or group would conduct the monitoring during the dismantlement and removal phases. U.S. officials have expressed support for

the early involvement of the IAEA, although they have not stated whether the IAEA would be

the only verification organization.14
Possible Dismantlement Approaches 17

The DPRK Proposal

The DPRK has stated its willingness to scrap its nuclear weapons program in a step-by-step

approach if it first receives a list of security guarantees and substantial economic and energy

benefits. However, most of the DPRK’s public statements have focused on an offer to freeze

its nuclear program in return for benefits, with actual dismantlement to come later in the

process.15

The DPRK proposed a package solution at the third round of the Six-Party Talks in June 2004

based on what it calls the principle of “word for word” and “action for action.” As a first step,

the DPRK proposed the “reward for freeze,” which means that the DPRK would freeze all

nuclear weapons–related facilities and their output if the United States would

n	 abandon its “hostile policy”;

n	 lift its economic sanctions and blockade against the DPRK;

n	remove the DPRK from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism; and

n	 participate in the provision of energy assistance equivalent to 2 million kilowatts through

the supply of heavy fuel oil or electricity.16

Although the DPRK mainly views the hostile policy of the United States as centered on perceived threats of attack, including with nuclear weapons, it also singles out CVID as an example

of this hostile policy.17

The DPRK views its proposed initial step as a way to build mutual confidence with the United

States. As part of the initial stage, the DPRK has stated, the United States would have to

participate directly in the provision of rewards. Such participation does not have to be large,

but it must be tangible, according to DPRK officials.18

In the past, the DPRK did not clearly indicate the exact facilities and activities that would be

subject to a freeze. In fact, it sometimes stated that the 5-megawatt electric reactor might be

classified as a civil facility not subject to the freeze.19 The DPRK stated in 2004 its intention to

freeze all facilities related to nuclear weapons and the products that result from their operation, as well as to refrain from producing, transferring, or testing more nuclear weapons.20

The DPRK has said it wants to keep a civil nuclear program but said most of its nuclear program is weapons related, according to Kelly’s Senate testimony.21

In the September 2005 statement, the DPRK committed for the first time to abandon all

nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs. Nonetheless, North Korea is expected to

continue certain nuclear activities, such as those associated with medical and industrial radioisotopes. Beyond these activities, the parties do not appear to have agreed upon which programs will be exempted and allowed as nonbanned nuclear activities.

The DPRK has stated that “freeze for rewards” would be the first step toward eventual

nuclear dismantlement.22 A statement by the DPRK Foreign Ministry published by KCNA on

June 28, 2004, said, “The DPRK’s proposal for ‘reward for freeze,’ the first-phase action for a
18 Dismantling the DPRK’s Nuclear Weapons Program

package solution based on the principle of simultaneous actions, is the only way of seeking a

step-by-step solution to the nuclear issue as it took into consideration the present conditions

in which there is no confidence between the DPRK and the U.S.”23 However, the DPRK has

not discussed subsequent steps in any detail. The September 2005 statement does not

address timing.

With respect to the NPT, the DPRK has also been vague. The DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman

was quoted by KCNA on July 14, 2004, saying the DPRK “will naturally return to NPT if the

Korean peninsula is denuclearized and those fundamental elements, which compelled the

DPRK to pull out of the treaty, are consequently removed.”24 As part of the September 2005

agreement, the DPRK committed to “returning at an early date to the [NPT] and to IAEA safeguards.”25 However, they have not described concretely a path to accomplish such a goal.

DPRK officials recognize that verification would be an important part of any agreement, but

they have emphasized that verification would be determined by the scope of the agreement

and the scope would need to be determined first. The DPRK has also been ambiguous about

the organization conducting the verification, the intrusiveness of any verification arrangement, and the activities subject to verification.

Progressive Dismantlement

The U.S. and DPRK proposals provide a starting point to construct a model agreement that

can serve as the basis of a discussion of possible verified dismantlement arrangements.

Although this proposal draws upon discussions with officials involved in the Six-Party Talks, it

is meant to be illustrative and not authoritative.

The proposal involves three phases, the implementation of which would gradually denuclearize

the Korean peninsula and bring the DPRK into compliance with both the NPT and North-South

agreements to ban uranium enrichment and reprocessing facilities. Actions would move progressively from temporary disablement to irreversible dismantlement to removal of key items.

Verification would occur throughout the process. Incentives and security guarantees would

likewise be implemented in stages linked to dismantlement and verification steps.

This approach takes into account the underlying suspicions of the parties to an agreement.

U.S. officials will worry that the DPRK will cheat and hide key nuclear materials or facilities.

The DPRK leadership will likely suspect the other parties’ commitment to rewards and the

motivations for conducting certain verification activities. The progressive dismantlement

model recognizes the initial lack of trust among the parties and allows confidence building

through the successful implementation of initial cooperative steps. Verification is more likely

to succeed in a positive and cooperative climate.
Possible Dismantlement Approaches 19

Phase One: Freeze, Declare, Disable, and Verify

The first phase would be focused on freezing nuclear activities in the DPRK for up to a year

and developing comprehensive declarations of key nuclear programs, activities, and materials.

No nuclear material or key items would be removed during this phase.

Priorities in this phase would be the plutonium program, any enrichment programs, and

nuclear weaponization programs. The actions taken would include cessation of key activities,

presentation of comprehensive declarations by the DPRK, securing and sealing facilities and

key items, including nuclear material and weapons, and effective monitoring of all nuclear

programs. In addition, actions would be taken to temporarily disable key nuclear facilities and

items such as nuclear weapons.

Verification would be done by the IAEA or a special group created for this purpose and would

include the use of a range of tools such as seals, cameras, and environmental sampling. The

verification organization would evaluate DPRK declarations to ensure that they are correct and

make at least preliminary determinations about their completeness. The organization should

also work to build confidence that the DPRK is complying with the freeze. The DPRK would also

gain confidence that the verification organization is acting consistently with the agreement.

The DPRK would declare and present to the verification organization all its plutonium

stocks, to be placed under monitoring. It would do the same with any nuclear weapons and

components.

The verification organization would account for all these items during this phase. Nego­ti­a­tors

would need to decide whether the fissile material in the nuclear weapons should be presented

to the verification organization in the shape of weapon components or in other forms.

In addition, the DPRK would declare its entire complex of facilities and activities to produce

and separate plutonium and to research, develop, test, manufacture, and deploy nuclear

weapons. Members of the verification organization would visit all these facilities.

This phase would also include declarations on any uranium enrichment activities or establishing that such activities did not take place. Any enriched uranium would be presented to the

verification organization. Questions about the DPRK’s uranium enrichment activities would

need to be addressed during this phase, although final resolution could occur after plutonium

issues were settled.

Rewards would occur at the start of this phase, as well as later in the process upon presentation of a complete declaration. The principal reward would be the provision of heavy fuel oil

or other energy supplies. For example, in July 2005 South Korea offered to provide the DPRK

with 2 million kilowatts of electricity if it agreed to give up its nuclear weapons program. In

addition, the DPRK should receive provisional security assurances from the United States and

its partners. The DPRK should also be aware of the incentives and guarantees it would receive

in the next phase.
Phase Two: Verified Dismantlement and Removal of Key Items

This phase would last one or two years and would focus on the verified, irreversible dismantlement of the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program. Key items and materials would be removed

from the DPRK during this phase. The verification organization would conduct rigorous

activities to ensure that dismantlement was complete and verified. It would also accelerate the

process of ensuring the absence of undeclared materials, equipment, and facilities.

At the beginning, plutonium, either in separated or unseparated form, would be removed

from the DPRK. Plutonium production and separation facilities would be irreversibly dismantled or disabled. The verification organization would conduct a thorough accounting of all

plutonium in the DPRK.

Key nuclear weapons components would then be removed from the DPRK and the weaponization complex would be dismantled or disabled. Verification would need to show that the

DPRK had declared all its weaponization activities and nuclear weapons.

Any enrichment facilities or activities would be irreversibly dismantled, and any uranium hexafluoride and enriched uranium would be removed from the country. Centrifuge components,

drawings, and single-use equipment would be destroyed or removed from the DPRK, and

uranium conversion facilities would be dismantled. Certain facilities, equipment, or activities

might be shifted to nonbanned uses, but single-purpose nuclear facilities would generally be

dismantled or permanently disabled.

The DPRK would receive major benefits in this phase. These benefits would include additional

security guarantees, economic assistance, compensation, diplomatic recognition, and its

removal from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list. This phase would also include a range of

initiatives modeled on cooperative threat reduction actions taken in other states.

The DPRK would be expected to keep certain civil nuclear energy programs. Civil nuclear

energy assistance in the areas of medical isotopes and other radioactive sources for nonnuclear industries and agriculture could be expanded in this phase.

Phase Three: Long-Term Monitoring and NPT Compliance

During this phase, which would be indefinite and could overlap phase two, the DPRK would

come into compliance with the NPT and establish long-term monitoring programs of its

remaining nuclear energy programs and other programs that use equipment or personnel

from dismantled programs.

The principal verification organization during this phase would be the IAEA. The DPRK would

have already ratified the Additional Protocol and taken other steps to increase the effectiveness of IAEA inspections. For example, it could announce a policy to grant the IAEA unrestricted access to sites in the DPRK.

The resumption of the LWR project could occur in this phase, as well as the provision of additional economic assistance.

20 Dismantling the DPRK’s Nuclear Weapons Program
Four Key Disarmament Tasks

An agreement to verifiably dismantle the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program would need to

identify the specific nuclear programs that require dismantlement. Negotiators would be

expected to identify specific items subject to dismantlement and agree on a set of verification

steps to ensure irreversible dismantlement of these items. Although negotiators would agree

on many verification rights and procedures in general terms, they would also need to define

the rights and procedures for specific nuclear programs. This section discusses the three main

nuclear programs expected to be subject to dismantlement in an agreement and the additional task of bringing the DPRK into compliance with the NPT.

n Task 1: Dealing with the plutonium production program. This task focuses on plutonium production, separation, storage, and waste processing facilities. The principal aim will

be to verifiably and irreversibly halt plutonium production and separation activities. The

verification organization will need to verify DPRK statements about its past such activities.

The DPRK will need to allow the removal of plutonium and irradiated fuel.

n Task 2: Dealing with the nuclear weaponization program. This task focuses on any

nuclear weapons and the means to research, develop, test, and manufacture them. It

involves the verified dismantlement of any nuclear weapons and the irreversible, verifiable

dismantlement of the set of facilities involved in researching, developing, testing, and

manufacturing nuclear weapons.

n Task 3: Dealing with the uranium enrichment program. This tasks focuses on the

dismantlement of any uranium enrichment activities and the facilities to research, develop,

test, and make enrichment equipment, such as gas centrifuges.

n Task 4: Implementing the DPRK-IAEA safeguards agreement and bringing the 

DPRK into compliance with the NPT. The DPRK will need to rejoin the NPT and come

into compliance with it, including implementing the Additional Protocol.

All these tasks will require the verification organization to conduct a range of activities to gain

confidence in the absence of undeclared materials, equipment, and facilities. This process

could take years. Its outcome will depend primarily on the DPRK’s transparency and cooperation with the verification organization.

4 21
22 Dismantling the DPRK’s Nuclear Weapons Program

Task 1: Cooperative Verified Dismantlement of the Plutonium Program

The purpose of this task is to account for all plutonium in the DPRK, remove it from the DPRK,

and verifiably dismantle, in an irreversible manner, the DPRK’s program to make and separate

plutonium. This task focuses on the DPRK’s plutonium and its gas-graphite reactor program

at the Yongbyon nuclear site. The main facilities in the gas-graphite program are

n	 a 5-megawatt electric reactor;

n	 a radiochemical laboratory;

n	 a fuel fabrication complex;

n	 a 50-megawatt electric reactor and 200-megawatt electric reactor; and

n	 nuclear waste sites.26

Although questions remain about undeclared materials and facilities, this program is the best

known of all DPRK nuclear programs. It was subject to intense IAEA investigations during

1992 and 1993 and frozen and monitored by the IAEA from 1994 until December 2002 under

the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework. The main facilities are subject to continuing scrutiny by

overhead surveillance. In addition, independent experts visited several key sites in early 2004

and were briefed by DPRK experts about plutonium production and separation activities since

the IAEA monitors left in late 2002.27

Plutonium Stock

The DPRK’s plutonium stock and its

means to produce and separate plutonium have been extensively studied.28

Prior to the restart of the 5-megawatt

electric reactor (figure 1) in early 2003,

the DPRK had an estimated stock of

30–40 kilograms of plutonium.29 With

the restart of the reactor, this stock has

been growing at a rate of about 5–7

kilograms of plutonium each year.

Unclassified reports, confirmed by commercial satellite imagery obtained by

the authors, indicate that the DPRK shut

down the reactor in April 2005, likely to

unload the fuel.30 The reactor is estimated to have contained 10–15 kilograms of additional plutonium at that

time, bringing the total plutonium

stock to about 40–55 kilograms.

The plutonium must be separated from

the irradiated fuel before it can be used Figure 1. The 5-Megawatt Reactor at Yongbyon, September 11, 2005

Source: DigitalGlobe—ISIS.
Four Key Disarmament Tasks 23

in nuclear weapons. Prior to 2003 and the unfreezing of the

Yongbyon site, the DPRK was estimated to have up to 10

kilograms of plutonium in separated form, although this

approximation was a “worst-case” estimate that was subject to continuing scrutiny and controversy.31 This plutonium

would have been separated in the radiochemical laboratory

(figure 2) prior to about 1992. The worst-case estimate was

that the DPRK separated, but did not declare to the IAEA,

approximately 8–9 kilograms of plutonium produced in the

5-megawatt electric reactor. Some U.S. intelligence agencies believed that the DPRK also separated and did not

declare up to another 1–2 kilograms of plutonium produced

in the Russian-supplied IRT research reactor at Yongbyon.

Other U.S. intelligence agencies believed the amount of

plutonium produced in the IRT reactor was no more than a

few hundred grams. The IAEA also independently arrived at

this smaller estimate.32 In any case, a reasonable estimate is

that no more than about 10 kilograms of plutonium were

separated prior to 1994, when the Agreed Framework froze all plutonium activities at the

Yongbyon site.33

In its assessments, the CIA has focused on the estimate of 8–9 kilograms of separated plutonium. In interviews, CIA officials involved in these assessments have stated that there is a

better than even chance that the DPRK separated this plutonium, although the basis for this

specific judgment can be debated.34 Nonetheless, after taking account of estimated losses,

the CIA concluded that this is enough separated plutonium for one or perhaps two nuclear

weapons. However, assuming losses of 20 percent, which is reasonable for an initial effort,

the DPRK would have been unlikely to have enough plutonium for more than one nuclear

weapon, needing approximately 4–5 kilograms of plutonium per weapon.

Until 2003, the bulk of the plutonium produced by the DPRK remained in almost 8,000 irradiated fuel rods stored in a pond near the 5-megawatt electric reactor and subject to monitoring by the IAEA. These rods contained an estimated 27–29 kilograms of plutonium.35

Since restarting the radiochemical laboratory in 2003, the DPRK may have reprocessed most

of the 8,000 irradiated fuel rods stored under the Agreed Framework. The DPRK states that

it has reprocessed all the fuel rods, but this statement remains unconfirmed.36 Nonetheless, a

reasonable conclusion is that the DPRK has separated a significant amount of plutonium from

these rods, an estimated 15–28 kilograms. The lower estimate reflects confidence that at least

many rods have been reprocessed, with the amount separated highly unlikely to be lower than

this value. The upper bound is the amount that results if all the rods have been reprocessed,

with only small losses of plutonium during the entire process.

Figure 2. The Radiochemical Laboratory at

Yongbyon, September 11, 2005

Source: DigitalGlobe—ISIS.
24 Dismantling the DPRK’s Nuclear Weapons Program

It is unknown if the DPRK has started reprocessing the fuel that is believed to have been

unloaded from the 5-megawatt reactor in the spring of 2005. The DPRK is likely to store the

irradiated fuel in water for a few months prior to its reprocessing to allow its radioactivity and

heat to decline. Afterward, all the fuel could be reprocessed within six to twelve months.

Assuming that the recently unloaded fuel has not yet been separated, the DPRK has about

15–38 kilograms of separated plutonium. At 4–5 kilograms of plutonium per weapon, this

plutonium is enough for three to nine nuclear weapons.

If the DPRK separated the 10–15 kilograms of plutonium from recently discharged fuel, it

would have in total 25–53 kilograms of separated plutonium. It could build about five to

thirteen nuclear weapons from this plutonium.

In August 2005, Japanese media reported that U.S. satellites had detected a plume at the

5-megawatt electric reactor, indicating the reactor had been refueled and operation had

resumed. A September 11, 2005, satellite image of the 5-megawatt reactor shows a steam

plume from the cooling tower, indicating that the reactor has resumed operation.

Uncertainties surround how much fresh uranium fuel the DPRK has in stock, although the

DPRK is reported to have enough to refuel the 5-megawatt electric reactor one to two more

times using fresh fuel fabricated prior to 1994 (figure 3). However, the amount of fuel fabricated since the freeze ended, in 2002, is unknown.

DPRK officials recently stated that construction of the 50-megawatt and 200-megawatt electric

reactors had restarted. Media reports state that at the beginning of July 2005 a mobile crane

was moved to the site of the 50-megawatt electric reactor.37 A September 11, 2005, satellite

image of the 50-megawatt electric reactor construction site showed new activity, though not

the resumption of large-scale construction. Visible in the image is a new road surface at the

site and possibly a mobile crane. Because of the long period of inactivity at these reactor sites

and the effect of the weather on the unfinished reactors, the completion of these reactors

would likely take years. If finished, the 50-megawatt electric reactor could produce enough

plutonium annually for roughly ten nuclear weapons.

Step-by-Step Approach for Verified Dismantlement of the DPRK’s 

Plutonium Program

This section outlines the major steps necessary to verifiably dismantle the DPRK’s plutonium

program, focusing on the facilities and activities of the key nuclear sites at Yongbyon.

Although significant difficulties are expected in implementing any plan to dismantle the plutonium program, the steps required to shut down, disable, seal, monitor, and eventually dismantle or decommission the key facilities are relatively well understood.

Unlike the later sections of this report that discuss DPRK nuclear weapons and uranium enrichment programs, about which much less is known, this section concentrates on a range of

relatively well-understood facilities and activities involved in plutonium production and sepa-
Four Key Disarmament Tasks 25

ration. Tasks 2 and 3 focus on the process whereby the verification organization implements

a verified dismantlement plan targeted at programs that are much less understood than the

plutonium program. The approach taken in the discussion of Tasks 2 and 3, which frames the

dismantlement process without knowing specific facilities or activities, also informs and supplements the Task 1 discussion.

Shutdown and Temporary Disablement. After the DPRK shuts down key facilities, the

verification organization will need to ensure that they are disabled. During the freeze under

the Agreed Framework, the DPRK maintained the facilities so that it could quickly restart the

reactor and reprocessing plant. In a new agreement focused on irreversible dismantlement,

the facilities would not be maintained in such a manner. Initially, disablement steps could be

temporary, such as turning off and then removing fuel from the reactor. The radiochemical

laboratory could be shut down, process lines emptied, and power cables disconnected. In the

following phases of an agreement, more permanent disablement measures would need to be

taken. The goal would be to significantly impair the ability of the

DPRK to restart the reactor or

reprocessing plant.

The DPRK will need to decide, in

consultation with the other parties to the agreement and the

verification organization, the best

way to store discharged fuel from

the 5-megawatt electric reactor

to delay corrosion of fuel cladding

and ease verification. Discharged

fuel should also be stored in a

manner that will facilitate its

transportation out of the DPRK.

Presentation of Plutonium. The DPRK would be expected to present all of its plutonium

in the initial phase of an agreement. This plutonium could be in many forms, including unirradiated powder or metal, irradiated fuel or sludge, and various chemical forms found a

reprocessing plant.

How much plutonium the DPRK turned over would have a significant impact on the subsequent activities of the verification organization. For example, if the DPRK relinquished 45

kilograms of plutonium in both separated and irradiated forms, the verification organization

would likely conclude preliminarily that the DPRK had turned over most of its plutonium,

although this conclusion would require stringent verification. However, if it presented only 30

kilograms of plutonium, the verification organization could not conclude that the DPRK had

relinquished all of its plutonium. In the unexpected case that the DPRK presented a large

amount of plutonium, such as 80 kilograms, the verification organization would need to

Figure 3. The Fuel Fabrication Complex at Yongbyon, September 11, 2005

Source: DigitalGlobe—ISIS.
26 Dismantling the DPRK’s Nuclear Weapons Program

determine why the estimated stock of plutonium was so far from the actual total. In either of

these last two cases, the verification effort would likely take longer.

Initial Monitoring. The verification organization will need to monitor the closing and temporary disablement of all key facilities. It will also need to secure and seal the plutonium

presented by the DPRK.

Declaration. The DPRK must declare its activities associated with making and separating

plutonium. There are two periods—post-2002 and pre-1994—that require detailed treatment. A potentially difficult issue is how to treat the outstanding issues between the IAEA

and the DPRK in 1992 and 1993 concerning the inconsistencies in the DPRK declaration about

the quantity of plutonium that it possessed. Although the priority in the initial period may be

post-2002 activities, the earlier period will need treatment before any plutonium is removed

from the DPRK. A decision will need to be made as to whether to clarify these issues in the

initial declaration or deal with them in a later version.

The declaration should include details of the production and separation of plutonium, a list of

facilities involved in such activities currently or in the past, and a detailed history of this program, including major political and technical milestones. It also needs to include planned

future goals and timelines and a description of the manufacturing entities involved in making

key components of the major facilities.

Because of their value for forensic work, the DPRK should declare all its nuclear waste sites

and provide information about the waste stored at these sites. The verification organization

should have the right to access and take samples from waste sites.

With regard to activities since December 2002, the declaration should answer the following

questions:

n	 What has been the fate of the irradiated fuel that was discharged from the 5-megawatt

electric reactor in 1994 or since the freeze ended in 2002?

n	How much of this irradiated fuel has been reprocessed?

n	How much plutonium has been separated from this irradiated fuel?

n	How much plutonium remains in irradiated fuel?

n	Has the IRT reactor operated?

n	 What is the current stock of fresh fuel for the 5-megawatt electric reactor?

n	How much uranium has been mined?

As mentioned above, the DPRK has stated that it has reprocessed all the fuel rods discharged

in 1994, although this statement has not been verified. The DPRK has not made any statement about the status of the fuel rods discharged in 2005. In any case, a declaration should

discuss the fuel rods in detail, including their plutonium content. It should also provide records

of the movement of irradiated rods.
Four Key Disarmament Tasks 27

Verification of the Declaration. This is a major step that will take approximately one year

to accomplish, assuming full DPRK cooperation. The verification organization will need to

conduct a wide range of activities to verify the correctness and completeness of the DPRK

declaration, including accessing all these sites, taking measurements and samples, and interviewing key DPRK personnel and government officials.

With regard to any fuel discharged from the 5-megawatt electric reactor, the DPRK should

provide sufficient access and information so that the verification organization can verify DPRK

statements about the plutonium content of the discharged fuel rods. Specific measures could

include providing operating records and burnup information about each fuel rod and allowing

the verification organization to take measurements of any remaining irradiated fuel rods. This

will require the DPRK to provide information not previously shared.

If the DPRK has reprocessed a significant fraction of the 8,000 fuel rods discharged in 1994

and those discharged in 2005, the verification organization will need to verify the number of

unreprocessed rods and the amount of plutonium, uranium, and waste separated from the

fraction of the rods that were reprocessed. It will also need to see and verify the separated

plutonium.

In addition, the verification organization will need to conduct activities at the radiochemical

laboratory, such as reviewing operating and material accounting records, taking samples from

waste tanks and swipe samples at a range of locations, and interviewing key personnel.

Verification could be difficult without a full declaration of all plutonium separation activities,

including a resolution of prior issues from 1992 and 1993.

Removal of Plutonium. The removal of all plutonium in the DPRK is critical to an irreversible

dismantlement plan. Separated plutonium can be removed quickly, whereas irradiated fuel

may require additional cooling and packaging before it can be removed safely. In addition,

fresh uranium fuel or metal may also be subject to removal or disablement. Some items,

such as heavily corroded or damaged irradiated fuel, may remain in the DPRK for ultimate

disposal.

Determining the Absence of Undeclared Materials and Facilities. The verification organization will need to determine that the DPRK has declared its entire plutonium program.

Making this determination could require several years and involve visits or inspections to sites

outside the Yongbyon nuclear site. The verification organization would also conduct various

nuclear forensic activities at the Yongbyon site and perhaps elsewhere. (See chapter 5 for a

more extensive discussion of this issue.)

Dismantlement or Permanent Disablement and Decommissioning of Individual Facilities.

Because facilities in the plutonium program, particularly the 5-megawatt electric reactor and

the radiochemical laboratory, have extensive radioactive contamination, the priority in later

phases would be on decommissioning these facilities rather than removal of their equipment

outside the DPRK.
28 Dismantling the DPRK’s Nuclear Weapons Program

The permanent disablement of the 5-megawatt electric reactor could involve removing and

destroying the fuel loading and unloading machine. After several years, the reactor could be

entombed with concrete or disassembled.

The radiochemical laboratory would be subject to more permanent disablement in later

phases of an agreement. Steps to achieve this could include removing key tanks, pipes, or

equipment and destroying these items. In the longer term, the facility would be decommissioned. Single-use equipment would be verifiably destroyed or otherwise rendered unusable.

Much of the equipment is radioactively contaminated and cannot be salvaged in any case.

The DPRK should give the verification organization sensitive designs, documents, and blueprints. The verification organization would either destroy the records or ship them overseas.

The fuel for the gas-graphite reactors has been made in the fuel fabrication complex, which

was not maintained during the freeze under the Agreed Framework. In the initial phase of an

agreement, these facilities would also be shut down, temporarily disabled as necessary, and

monitored. Irreversible disablement and decommissioning would follow. Some dual-use equipment could be reassigned to nonbanned programs, although even this equipment may be

radioactively contaminated and may need to be destroyed or otherwise disposed of.

The 50- and 200-megawatt electric reactors were never finished. In the longer term, these

facilities could be demolished and key equipment destroyed or converted to nonbanned,

monitored uses.

Specialized manufacturing equipment used to make reactor components, reprocessing plant

equipment and components, and fuel fabrication equipment would also need to be destroyed

or monitored against future misuse. Much of this equipment could be located away from the

Yongbyon site.

Task 2: Cooperative Verified Dismantlement of Nuclear Weapons 

and the Nuclear Weaponization Program

The purpose of this task is to verifiably eliminate nuclear weapons and the means to research,

develop, test, and manufacture them. The dismantlement must occur in an irreversible manner,

which requires the destruction of any nuclear weapons, key components, and certain equipment, as well as the conversion and monitoring of other equipment, facilities, and personnel.

Characteristics of the DPRK Nuclear Weapons Program

Little is known about the DPRK’s nuclear weaponization program or its nuclear arsenal.

However, estimates of the number of DPRK nuclear weapons can be derived from estimates

of its stock of plutonium. In addition, available information, including statements from defectors, suggests that the DPRK has worked on mastering the manufacture of nuclear weapons

for more than two decades, implying that it has created a complex of facilities to research,

develop, test, and manufacture nuclear weapons.
Four Key Disarmament Tasks 29

Information, however, is scarce on the number, type, and deliverability of any DPRK nuclear

weapons. In addition, media reports have discussed possible test sites that could be involved

in testing high explosives components of nuclear weapons or in conducting a full-scale

nuclear test.38 There is a dearth of solid information on facilities that make up the DPRK’s

nuclear weaponization complex. As a result of uncertainties about the DPRK’s nuclear weapons and the facilities to make them, the discussion in this section is more general than in the

previous section on the plutonium program.

The DPRK’s nuclear weapons program can be defined broadly, based on programs in other

countries. It is likely focused on building an implosion-type nuclear weapon, which is a formidable undertaking, particularly if the weapon must fit on a ballistic missile. Its program would

be expected to involve at least several hundred scientists, engineers, and technicians.

The program will need to design and build an extensive array of research, development, and

testing facilities. It will also need manufacturing sites to make many of the components of

nuclear weapons.

The DPRK would need to accomplish a range of tasks to build an implosion-type nuclear

weapon, including

n	theoretical calculations and computer codes;

n	 preparation of high explosives;

n	 experiments in preparing and using high explosives in the nuclear weapon;

n	 preparation and purification of metallic uranium or plutonium, including melting and

casting of metals and quality control of these activities;

n	 obtaining or manufacturing necessary electronics, including items to produce and supply

energy, arming and fusing systems, and safety systems;

n	 developing, testing, and manufacturing neutron initiators; and

n	testing subsystems or mock-ups of a nuclear weapon or device.

Accomplishing these tasks would require a range of nuclear weaponization facilities, including

n	 nuclear and nonnuclear component manufacturing sites;

n	 high explosives test sites;

n	 nuclear weapon assembly facilities;

n	 nuclear weapon storage vaults; and

n	 underground test sites.

Close coordination would be required between the nuclear weapons program and the programs responsible for delivery systems, such as ballistic missiles and associated reentry vehicles. The overall weight and size of the nuclear weapon largely define its delivery mode.

Typically, a weapon needs to weigh less than one tonne to be carried by a ballistic missile.
30 Dismantling the DPRK’s Nuclear Weapons Program

Dismantlement Options

There are two options for dismantling nuclear weapons in the DPRK. The first is concurrent

dismantlement and verification, a strategy extensively researched in the context of U.S.-

Russian nuclear arms control agreements. Its implementation in the DPRK should be technically straightforward. The second option is one in which dismantlement occurs before verification, the strategy followed by South Africa when it dismantled its nuclear weapons. The

success of this strategy will depend on the DPRK creating extensive, verifiable records of its

dismantlement of any weapons.

Key to this verification task will be access to sensitive information. The preferred option is

for the verification organization to have access to detailed nuclear weapons design information, with its distribution within the verification organization carefully limited to prevent its

spread. If the DPRK does not want to allow the verification organization access to such

information, the verification process will be much more difficult. However, such an approach

can still be successful.

The verification organization will need to implement steps to reduce the likelihood or ease of

reconstituting a nuclear weapons program. Vital to this effort is to ensure that ongoing

monitoring is established and effective.

The verification organization will also need to take a set of actions to provide adequate assurance of the absence of hidden weapons or nuclear weapons sites. This effort will be aided by

parallel efforts to ensure that all of the DPRK’s plutonium and enriched uranium has been

accounted for and turned over to the verification organization.

Step-by-Step Plan for Concurrent Dismantlement and Verification of a Nuclear 

Weapons Program

This section outlines a series of steps involved in verifiably dismantling a nuclear weaponization program and the nuclear weapons produced by the program; the actual steps may differ

in practice. Many details of these steps need to be developed before they can be implemented

in an actual situation.

The first step is for the DPRK to produce a comprehensive declaration of its nuclear weaponization program, reflecting initial discussions with the verification organization and tours of

the facilities. The declaration should include details of nuclear weapons development, production, and deployment, as well as a list of all the nuclear weapons or explosive devices built by

the DPRK.

It should list and describe the main weaponization sites, including the research and development facilities, component manufacturing sites, high explosives test sites, nuclear weapons

assembly facilities, nuclear weapons storage vaults, and underground test sites. The verification organization will need to visit sites associated with the program in the past and any sites

now involved in providing key items or assistance to the weaponization program. The declaration needs to include a history of the program, including a chronology of major political and
Four Key Disarmament Tasks 31

technical milestones of the program and the strategy for deploying and using nuclear weapons. It should also include planned future goals and timelines.

The United States has proposed that during the initial stage all nuclear activities cease, nuclear

materials be secured, and all nuclear weapons and weapons components be disabled.39 During

this initial phase, disablement could be temporary. For example, removing the fissile material

(figure 4) from a weapon would disable it. In addition, the verification organization could

remove a key battery from a weapon and weld in a pipe, or it could remove arming and fusing

equipment (figure 4). For weaponization facilities, a range of options could be pursued that

would temporarily disable the facility. At a high explosives component manufacturing facility,

for example, high explosives presses could be made inoperable.

Next, the verification organization must develop a coherent technical understanding of the

nuclear weaponization program in close consultation with the state. The verification organization needs to understand the origin, scope, accomplishments, and timing of the program. This

understanding should be based on a detailed study of the declaration, a review of documents,

visits to key sites, and discussions with program officials, scientists, and technicians. The verification organization will also need to incorporate information learned elsewhere that may

supplement or contradict DPRK statements. Any discrepancies in the DPRK’s declaration need

to be addressed in this step.

The DPRK will then need to develop a plan for dismantlement or removal of key items from

the country. The government may form a senior experts’ committee to investigate methods

to dismantle the program and draw up a schedule. It should develop its plans in consultation

with the verification organization.

Separately, the verification organization must develop its own plan to achieve effective and

timely verification of the dismantlement. For example, the verification organization will need

to ensure that all laboratory, development, testing, and manufacturing facilities involved in the

program have been fully decommissioned and abandoned or converted to a permitted use.

The verification organization should develop its plans in consultation with the DPRK.

The DPRK and the verification organization will need to agree on a plan that incorporates the

concerns of each party. Key agreements would include the exact items subject to destruction,

removal, conversion, or ongoing monitoring. Careful records of dismantlement activities

should be developed and maintained by both parties.

Based on the joint plan, the state would dismantle the program and convert equipment and

materials to nonproscribed uses. Items that could not be converted to nonproscribed uses

would need to be destroyed, rendered harmless, or removed from the DPRK. In this model,

buildings or facilities would not, in general, be subject to destruction.

The DPRK’s nuclear weapons contain plutonium or highly enriched uranium and possibly other

nuclear materials such as natural uranium or depleted uranium. These materials, particularly

any plutonium or highly enriched uranium, should be converted into non-weapons-usable
32 Dismantling the DPRK’s Nuclear Weapons Program

shapes and carefully subjected to materials protection, control, and accounting procedures.

The fate of other nuclear materials in the weaponization program, such as natural uranium,

depleted uranium polonium-210, tritium, or deuterium, should also be carefully tracked by the

verification organization.

Any fissile material assigned to the nuclear weaponization program requires special care. At a

minimum, the verification organization will need to carefully verify the accounting of all the

fissile material assigned to the nuclear weapons program. The bulk of the effort to verify that

the DPRK has declared all its fissile material will occur in the tasks focused on the DPRK’s

plutonium and uranium programs. However, a careful verification of the plutonium and uranium assigned to the nuclear weapons program could provide important information relevant

to the broader verification effort to determine the completeness of the DPRK’s declaration of

all its plutonium or enriched uranium.

Included in the destruction plan

would be major nonnuclear weapons

components. Destruction is accomplished by smashing, cutting, burning, or other methods to disable the

item against future use.

Certain manufacturing and testing

equipment may be rendered unusable for future use in a nuclear

weapons program. Rendering a

machine tool unusable may involve

destroying or sending overseas

special fixtures or computer programs that enable a machine to

make weapons components. Some

dual-use equipment may need to

remain subject to monitoring.

Designs, documents, and blueprints

will need to be destroyed or removed

from the DPRK. The destruction

method may involve burning.

Because documents are easily reproduced, this step must be viewed as

largely symbolic by the verification

organization. However, it remains

important as a benchmark of cooperation and compliance. Figure 4. Schematic of a Fission Weapon
Four Key Disarmament Tasks 33

Facilities and remaining equipment or materials would be converted to alternative, allowed

uses. The purpose would be to continue to employ program personnel in productive work,

and a priority would be placed on creating economically viable programs or joint ventures. For

example, clean-room facilities could be converted to allowed high-technology uses and

machine tools could be assigned other industrial uses.

Ongoing monitoring of certain nonnuclear activities may be necessary for an extended

period. Nuclear material from weapons will certainly require ongoing monitoring until it is

removed from the DPRK.

At the end of the agreed-upon process, the verification organization would reach and

announce the conclusion that the nuclear weapons program had been dismantled according

to the agreed-upon plan. The organization would also state that ongoing monitoring had

been successfully implemented.

The entire verified dismantlement of nuclear weapons and the nuclear weaponization program can be accomplished in about one year. Another year or two may be required to develop

assurance about the absence of any undeclared activities or items. Some of the timing will

depend on the dynamics and success of the overall verification effort.

The above steps outline a process for the concurrent dismantlement and verification of a nuclear

weapons program. Special considerations will be necessary by the DPRK if it pursues dismantlement before verification, as South Africa did. In such a case, the DPRK should conduct the dismantlement with the ultimate verification goal in mind, including keeping careful records of the

dismantlement of the weapons and weaponization complex. Although verification can occur

successfully after dismantlement, this effort is more difficult and might take much longer to

accomplish. In particular, reaching a conclusion that the program has been completely dismantled and accounted for may take the verification organization significantly longer.

Special Considerations in Dismantling Nuclear Weapons

Special procedures will be needed to dismantle the nuclear weapons themselves. Even if

removal is the agreed-upon option, the weapons will likely be removed piecemeal. Weapons

experts from the verification organization will likely need access to sensitive information about

the DPRK’s nuclear weapons.

Some key steps will be to inventory parts of nuclear weapons; develop procedures to implement the dismantlement of the weapons; decide the fate of nuclear materials, such as converting plutonium weapon components into non-weapons-usable metal billets; decide the

fate of nonnuclear components, i.e., which to destroy, scrap, or reuse; and create a set of

detailed records of the dismantlement process.

The DPRK will create an inventory of all parts in weapons, underground test devices, cold

devices, component or weapons testing programs, and in the weapons testing, development,

and production pipeline. The individual components can be organized into various categories,
34 Dismantling the DPRK’s Nuclear Weapons Program

including nuclear components, electrical and electronic parts, explosives components, mechanical parts, and support equipment for the weapons.

The DPRK and the verification organization will need to reach agreement on which nonnuclear components to destroy, scrap, or use for other purposes. In general, the state would

be expected to want to retain more components for future use than the verification organization would accept. These negotiations should occur early in the process.

For the actual dismantlement of nuclear weapons, the state will need to select a dismantlement site and create the necessary infrastructure. An existing nuclear weapons assembly site

is a logical choice. The DPRK and the verification organization will develop detailed procedures to conduct and oversee the dismantlement process, including careful material control

and accounting procedures for nuclear materials and careful records of the origin and destination of the various nonnuclear parts. Figure 5 is a chart of how dismantlement of nonnuclear

components could be organized, based on procedures followed by South Africa in dismantling its nuclear weapons.

Figure 5. Disposition of Nonnuclear Components of Nuclear Weapons Subject to Verifiable Dismantlement

Source: ISIS.
Four Key Disarmament Tasks 35

Task 3: Verifiable Dismantlement of the Uranium Enrichment 

Program

The purpose of this task is to account for all enriched uranium in the DPRK, remove it from

the DPRK, and verifiably dismantle the DPRK’s program to make enriched uranium. Although

the DPRK may have other enrichment methods, the main enrichment program appears to use

gas centrifuges. The dismantlement must occur in an irreversible manner, which requires

n	the removal of any enriched uranium, uranium hexafluoride feed material, and major precursors of uranium hexafluoride, such as uranium tetrafluoride;

n	the destruction or removal of any centrifuges, centrifuge components, and certain equipment; and

n	the conversion and monitoring of other equipment and facilities.

Uncertainties about the DPRK’s Gas Centrifuge Program

Little public information exists about the scope, status, and key facilities of the DPRK’s gas

centrifuge enrichment program. Complicating any discussion is the fact that DPRK officials

regularly deny having any uranium enrichment program. U.S. officials retort that not only does

the program exist, but the DPRK admitted having it. In October 2002, U.S. government officials confronted the government in Pyongyang with a U.S. intelligence assessment that the

DPRK had a gas centrifuge program, which is used to make enriched uranium, and was progressing from having a research and development program to building a production plant

involving thousands of centrifuges. According to U.S. statements, DPRK’s First Vice Minister

Kang Sok Ju told the visiting U.S. delegation that the hostile policy of the U.S. administration

had left the DPRK no choice but to pursue such a program.40

During the first half of 2004, revelations emerged that the illicit smuggling network headed

by Abdul Qadeer Khan, the founder of Pakistan’s nuclear program, had sold about 20 gas

centrifuges, centrifuge designs, and other types of key technical assistance to the DPRK.

Pakistan president Pervez Musharraf said publicly in September 2005 that Khan had given

centrifuge designs and whole centrifuges to the DPRK.41 As a result of this information, an

increasing number of governments have concluded that the DPRK has a gas centrifuge enrichment program. Kyodo News reported in early October 2004 that China had stated to other

members of the Six-Party Talks that “there was at least an attempt [by the DPRK] for enrichment.”42 Until the revelations about the Khan network, a senior European intelligence official

interviewed for this report could plausibly explain known DPRK purchases of materials and

equipment usable in a centrifuge program as destined for other countries, such as Iran or

Pakistan. He said that the DPRK has often bought items for other countries as a way to earn

hard currency. However, he said that based on newer information he now believes the DPRK

has established a gas centrifuge program.43

Publicly available indications of the size of a DPRK gas centrifuge plant include two procurement efforts involving DPRK intermediaries in 2001 and 2002. DPRK procurement agents

attempted to obtain from Europe high-strength aluminum tubing, believed by experts to be
36 Dismantling the DPRK’s Nuclear Weapons Program

slated for the stationary outer casing of a

centrifuge.44 Figure 6 is a schematic of a

centrifuge similar to that believed to be

sought by the DPRK, which shows the

location of the outer casing. Pakistan calls

this centrifuge the “P2.”45 The first order

involved enough tubing for several hundred outer casings, which may have been

intended for single-test centrifuges and a

test cascade. In total, the agents wanted

to purchase about 220 tonnes of tubing,

enough for an estimated 4,000 P2 centrifuges. However, the orders were stopped

before any of the tubing reached the

DPRK. During the same period, the DPRK

obtained from Russia 150 tonnes of aluminum tubing with similar or the same

dimensions as the ones in the German

orders.46 Combined, the orders would

have contained enough tubing for almost

7,000 P2 centrifuge outer casings.

Khan provided Libya plans for a centrifuge plant containing 6,000 P2 centrifuges arranged to

make weapons-grade uranium and may have also provided the DPRK with these plans.

Assuming reasonable losses, the two orders of tubing above would be appropriate for such

a plant. Such a plant would be able to produce about 150 kilograms of weapons-grade

uranium per year. If each weapon requires about 20 kilograms of weapons-grade uranium, the

plant could produce enough material for about seven or eight nuclear weapons per year.

Despite a growing consensus on the existence of a gas centrifuge program, governments and

experts differ on the status of such a program. Despite the importance of the aluminum tubing to the debate, it is important to remember that this type of aluminum tubing is relatively

easy to procure internationally. Little evidence has emerged of DPRK procurement of large

numbers of more sensitive centrifuge components. Thus, several key questions remain. Is the

DPRK actively building a gas centrifuge plant able to make enough highly enriched uranium

for several nuclear weapons per year? If so, how soon could the plant be finished? Or has the

program stalled with the arrest of key players in the Khan network and increased scrutiny of

the DPRK’s procurements?

Characteristics of a Gas Centrifuge Program

For the purposes of discussion here, a gas centrifuge program must be defined broadly. Such

a program requires commitment and resources and involves a large number of personnel. It

needs to go through several stages to build an operational gas centrifuge facility, including

Figure 6. Diagram of a P2-Type Gas Centrifuge

Source: D. Albright and M. Hibbs, “Iraq’s Shop-Till-You-Drop Nuclear

Program,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 48, no. 3 (April 1992):

32–33.
n	the development of a prototype centrifuge;

n	the creation of research and development facilities;

n	the domestic and foreign procurement of necessary items;

n	the construction of centrifuge manufacturing capabilities, facilities, and supporting

infrastructure;

n	the production of uranium hexafluoride;

n	the construction of an experimental centrifuge cascade and pilot plant;

n	the construction of production-scale cascades; and

n	the creation of an infrastructure to maintain and improve centrifuges.

Typically, proliferant states’ gas centrifuge programs have depended on extensive foreign

procurement. The verification organization will need access to procurement information from

the DPRK, and IAEA member-states should agree to provide supplier information. With procurement information, the verification organization will have significantly better success at

both properly defining the scope of the gas centrifuge program and ensuring that parts of it

are not hidden.

Step-by-Step Plan for Concurrent Dismantlement and Verification of a 

Gas Centrifuge Program

This section discusses a series of specific steps that would lead to the verifiable dismantlement

of a gas centrifuge program where dismantlement and verification occur concurrently. The

steps are similar to those discussed in the section on weaponization, but have been modified

to account for a gas centrifuge program. As discussed in the prior section, these steps will need

further development before they can be implemented in an actual situation.

The DPRK must produce a comprehensive declaration of its gas centrifuge program. The declaration should include details of centrifuge design, development, manufacturing, and operation. It needs to list and describe its main centrifuge sites, including the research, development, testing, and manufacturing facilities and any sites with operational centrifuges. It needs

to include a history of the program, including a chronology of major political and technical

milestones of the program. It should also include major planned future goals and timelines.

The declaration should provide detailed information about the foreign procurement of key

items for the centrifuge program. The DPRK will need to allow visits to its centrifuge and

centrifuge-related main sites and access to key people in the program.

The DPRK will also need to shut down its centrifuge and centrifuge-related facilities and allow

for monitoring and temporary disablement. At a centrifuge plant, shutdown would include

emptying any cascades of uranium hexafluoride and turning off the centrifuges. Disablement

could include removing power supplies and placing them under separate seal or welding or

bolting canisters into the feed-and-withdrawal stations in any cascades. At centrifuge component manufacturing and centrifuge assembly sites, the DPRK will need to stop operations and

temporarily disable the equipment. At uranium conversion facilities, the DPRK will need to

stop operations, temporarily disable the facilities, and permit monitoring.

Four Key Disarmament Tasks 37
38 Dismantling the DPRK’s Nuclear Weapons Program

The DPRK will need to present to the verification organization any uranium assigned to or

enriched in the centrifuge program, including any uranium at uranium conversion facilities.

The verification organization will need to account for this material and ensure that it represents all the material actually assigned to this program.

The verification organization will need to develop a coherent technical understanding of the

origin, scope, and timing of the centrifuge program in close consultation with the state. This

understanding should be based on a detailed study of the declaration; a review of documents; and discussions with program officials, scientists, and technicians.

The DPRK will need to develop a comprehensive plan to dismantle its program or allow the

removal of key items. The government may form a senior experts’ committee to investigate

methods to dismantle the program and draw up a schedule. The DPRK should develop its

plans in consultation with the verification organization.

The verification organization must develop its own plan to verify the dismantlement of the

program. The organization must identify actions that would be necessary to take in order to

achieve effective and timely verification. The verification organization should develop its plans

in consultation with the DPRK. This plan must detail the steps necessary for ensuring that

items are destroyed or converted to nonprohibited uses and developing confidence that secret

centrifuge activities or capabilities do not exist.

The DPRK and the verification organization will need to agree on a plan that incorporates the

concerns of each party. Key agreements would include which nuclear materials, equipment,

and other types of materials will be removed from the DPRK or be subject to destruction,

conversion, or long-term monitoring in the DPRK. Careful records of dismantlement activities

should be developed and maintained by both parties.

Based on the joint plan, the DPRK would dismantle the program and convert equipment and

materials to other, nonproscribed uses. Many items would need to be converted to other uses.

While many items would be destroyed, buildings or facilities would not, in general, be subject

to destruction. At this point, agreed-upon items would be sent overseas from the DPRK.

Included in the destruction plan would be whole centrifuges, major centrifuge components,

and cascade equipment. Destruction is accomplished by smashing, cutting, or other methods

to disable the item against future use. If the number of centrifuges is relatively small, they can

be sent overseas. Examples of the kinds of centrifuge components subject to destruction are

shown in figures 7 and 8.

Certain centrifuge manufacturing equip­ment may be rendered unusable for future use in a

centrifuge program. Rendering a machine tool unusable may involve destroying special fixtures

or computer programs that enable the machine to make centrifuge components. Alternatively,

some of these items may be sent overseas. Sensitive designs, documents, and blueprints should

be sent overseas or destroyed, possibly by burning. Although ensuring the destruction of all
Four Key Disarmament Tasks 39

records is impossible, such a step

nonetheless helps develop confidence

that the state intends to comply.

The verification organization would

witness the entire process of dismantlement and conversion. It would

implement the agreed-upon program

that would be used to verify the dismantlement of the program.

The verification organization will need

to ensure that the DPRK is not hiding

portions of its centrifuge program. To

achieve this goal, the verification

organization will need to use its rights

fully and it may need to conduct a

series of inspections throughout the

country. In this effort, procurement

information from both the DPRK and

supplier states may be critical in

reaching a final determination.

The verification process would focus

on ensuring the accuracy and completeness of any DPRK declaration

that the centrifuge program produced

enriched uranium. It would use internationally accepted methods, including material balance, accounting procedures, and environmental sampling, to verify any declaration.

Three scenarios need to be considered. The first case is if no enriched uranium was produced.

The second case is the production of a small quantity consistent with research and development activities. The third, and most difficult, case is the production of larger amounts of

enriched uranium.

Facilities and certain equipment or materials should be evaluated jointly to decide what to

convert to alternative, allowed uses. The purpose would be to continue to employ program

personnel in productive work, with the priority being to create economically viable programs

or joint ventures. For example, clean-room facilities could be converted to allowed hightechnology uses, and machine tools could be assigned other industrial uses.

Ongoing monitoring of certain nonnuclear activities may be necessary. Nuclear material will

require ongoing monitoring.

Figure 7. Assembled Bottom End Cap of a Gas Centrifuge

and a Cup. The cup is part of the bottom bearing of a

centrifuge.

Source: IAEA Action Team.

Figure 8. Components of a Gas Centrifuge. Components

include, from left to right, a portion of the bottom bearing,

the bottom end cap, and the top cap (second from right).

Source: IAEA Action Team.
40 Dismantling the DPRK’s Nuclear Weapons Program

At the end of the agreed-upon process, the verification organization would reach and

announce the conclusion that the program had been dismantled according to the agreedupon plan and ongoing monitoring had been successfully implemented.

Task 4: Bringing the DPRK into Compliance with the NPT

The successful resolution of the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula will include the DPRK

rejoining the NPT and coming into compliance with its safeguards agreement. The IAEA

would be expected to undertake a range of actions to verify the DPRK’s compliance with

these agreements.

The IAEA has preliminarily defined many of its planned inspection activities in the DPRK,

although it has not released these plans publicly. It earlier conducted extensive preparations

for the resumption of inspections under the schedule established by the Agreed Framework.

Prior to the end of IAEA monitoring activities at Yongbyon in 2002 and the subsequent

demise of the Agreed Framework, the IAEA had regular discussions with the DPRK on preserving historical information, including data, reports, and operating records from the DPRK’s

nuclear facilities that would be needed during future inspections.

The timing of the resumption of IAEA inspections under the NPT will need to be determined

during negotiations at the Six-Party Talks. The verification goals can be accomplished more

effectively and efficiently if the DPRK allows NPT-type inspections to start early in the process

of dismantlement, particularly if the verification organization is the IAEA. The DPRK, nonetheless, may insist that these IAEA inspections be distinct from the verification of dismantlement. If the verification organization is not the same as the IAEA, these groups will need to

carefully coordinate their activities. Even in the case of two verification organizations, the

dismantlement process would proceed more quickly if the IAEA was involved early on.

The IAEA should be prepared to inform the DPRK of what its inspections will involve, particularly given all the changes in international safeguards during the past decade. Since the

Agreed Framework was signed in 1994, the IAEA has strengthened its safeguards system

significantly to make it more difficult for nonnuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT

to hide nuclear activities from inspectors. Its experiences in Iran, Libya, and South Africa have

led to many changes in its inspections.

If the IAEA is to determine that the DPRK has come into compliance with the NPT, the DPRK

must demonstrate its commitment to transparency by implementing the Additional Protocol.

The Additional Protocol is becoming an international norm and is viewed increasingly as the

minimum standard of internationally accepted and adequate inspections. It has been accepted

by many countries, including South Korea, Japan, Taiwan-China, the European Union, Iran,

and Libya. Several of these parties, including Iran and Libya, have also allowed the IAEA to

exercise more extensive inspection activities than those specified in the Additional Protocol.
Four Key Disarmament Tasks 41

An important part of the IAEA’s inspection process under the Additional Protocol is developing confidence in the absence of undeclared nuclear activities. As a result, the IAEA would

seek to determine, using broader declarations and greater access granted under the Additional

Protocol, that the DPRK does not have either undeclared stocks of plutonium or enriched

uranium or undeclared facilities able to make them. Such inspections would complement and

strengthen verification activities established during the dedicated dismantlement phases.

The IAEA needs to continue preparing for its safeguards work to resume in the DPRK. It will

need to reevaluate information and data collected during the original set of inspections in

1992 and 1993 and assess information obtained afterward and learned through the verifiable

dismantlement process, no matter what organization performs those verification tasks. It will

have to prepare for the implementation of new inspections and once again do the basic work

of comparing the DPRK’s declarations to other information to establish whether these declarations are correct and complete.

IAEA members will need to provide political, financial, and technical assistance to the IAEA as

it prepares to carry out its mission in the DPRK. These types of inspection efforts are resource

intensive and occur against a background of limited funding for the IAEA in general.

Ensuring the Absence of Undeclared 

Nuclear Material and Facilities

An important element in any negotiated verification regime in the DPRK will be creating measures whereby the verification organization develops confidence in, or credible assurances of,

the absence of undeclared nuclear material or activities. This process is by its very nature timeconsuming. As a result, in each of the four tasks discussed above, the verification organization

will devote considerable time and resources to developing this confidence. Exactly how long

the verification organization will need to complete these tasks will depend on the DPRK’s

cooperation and willingness to take steps to enhance its transparency.

In Libya and South Africa, for example, the governments committed to allowing IAEA access

anywhere and providing additional information in documents and interviews with a wide

range of officials, scientists, and technicians. These commitments went beyond those

required by the NPT and were critical in enabling the IAEA and the international community

to develop confidence in the absence of undeclared materials and facilities in these states.

Likewise, the DPRK should be encouraged to make a similar range of commitments that

further its transparency.

To earn the confidence of the verification organization, the DPRK will be requested to provide

broader declarations that include more detailed information than typically provided under

IAEA safeguards agreements. The verification organization will ask the state for permission to

examine a variety of records and conduct its own interviews of key DPRK program personnel.

It may ask for foreign procurement information from the DPRK and other states. The verification organization will also ask to visit sites to take environmental samples and have follow-up

questions and requests.

In addition, the verification organization may seek access to a range of sites not listed in a DPRK

declaration. The main reason that the verification organization might make such a request

would be if it needed to resolve a question relating to the correctness or completeness of the

DPRK’s declared information. The basis for such a question could be results from environmental sampling, open source or third-party information, foreign procurement data, or inconsistencies in declarations or statements.

The DPRK has sensitive military sites that the verification organization may need to inspect.

As a result, the DPRK will need to agree during the Six-Party Talks or other negotiations that

the verification organization will have access to military and other sensitive sites.

The DPRK, however, may view some sites as too sensitive to allow inspections. If the DPRK

refuses access to a site, it will need to satisfy the verification organization in other ways

that no undeclared materials or activities have been associated with the site. Under the

IAEA Additional Protocol, for example, if a state is “unable” to provide access, the state

5 43
44 Dismantling the DPRK’s Nuclear Weapons Program

must “make every reasonable effort to satisfy Agency requirements, without delay,

through other means.”47

However, a priority is preventing the DPRK from invoking this condition except in extraordinary circumstances. Toward this goal, the negotiators will need to impress upon the DPRK the

necessity of the verification organization visiting sensitive sites, such as military facilities. More

importantly, efforts at the Six-Party Talks and afterward to create a favorable political and

security climate between the DPRK and the United States and its allies could have a significant

impact on the DPRK’s willingness to allow intrusive inspections.

In the negotiation of the verification arrangements, the DPRK and the other parties to the

agreement may want to develop procedures for “managing access” by the verification organization to prevent the dissemination of proliferation-sensitive information, meet safety and

physical protection requirements, protect proprietary or commercially sensitive information, or

protect national security secrets. The international community has extensive experience in

designing managed-access arrangements that can ensure the absence of undeclared activities

while protecting state secrets. However, such arrangements cannot preclude the verification

organization from gaining credible assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material

and activities at a location.

To protect its secrets at a military site, for example, the DPRK may cover or otherwise hide

sensitive nonnuclear-related equipment to prevent its being seen or otherwise characterized

by the verification organization. The DPRK may want some of its officials to be present when

the verification organization is at the site. These limitations on the inspections should not

inordinately delay the granting of access to the verification organization, allowing the operators time to remove or destroy items.

To effectively accomplish its goal, the verification organization will also need to conduct certain

activities at these sites. In particular, it will need to take environmental samples, use radiation

detection and measurement equipment, and perhaps gain access to records and officials.

At some point, the verification organization and the parties to the dismantlement agreement

will have to make a determination that they have enough confidence in their understanding

of the DPRK’s nuclear program to conclude that the DPRK has dismantled its nuclear weapons

programs and is unlikely to have undeclared nuclear materials or facilities.

The verification organization will be primarily responsible for making this determination, using

a wide variety of information and experiences that would be expected from several years of

intensive verification in the DPRK. Such a determination would require a finding that the

DPRK’s declarations are correct and complete or at least a finding of no indications or evidence that such declarations are not complete. Such findings are bound to include

some uncertainty, but any uncertainties should be shown to be small enough to justify the

determination.
The verification organization would be expected to draw upon the IAEA’s experiences in other

countries, particularly Libya and South Africa, in making such a determination. After two successful verified dismantlement experiences, the IAEA is capable of reaching a conclusion on

verified dismantlement using proven tools and methods.

After the verification organization has made such a determination, the parties to the agreement will need to ratify this determination. The agreement should include a mechanism for the

parties to meet and discuss the conclusions of the verification organization, including such

important matters as the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and facilities. If the verification organization is IAEA Plus, the IAEA Board of Governors could also pass a resolution in

support of such a determination. A UN Security Council resolution could add credibility.

As discussed in Task 4, the search for undeclared nuclear activities will not end with a conclusion by the verification organization about the DPRK’s dismantlement of its nuclear weapons

program and its compliance with the NPT. The IAEA, as part of ensuring continued compliance with the NPT, will investigate any evidence of undeclared materials or facilities on an

ongoing basis, making annual determinations about this issue as part of routine safeguards.

Undeclared Nuclear Material and Facilities 45

The Special Role of Cooperative 

Threat Reduction Programs

The DPRK is being asked to sacrifice most of its existing nuclear programs. These programs

enjoy extensive resources, contain large infrastructures, and employ thousands of scientists,

engineers, technicians, and other specialists. The states requesting this sacrifice have an interest in assisting the DPRK in reducing the negative consequences of this large transformation

of its nuclear establishment. Such assistance could also provide the DPRK nuclear establishment with a powerful incentive to cooperate with nuclear disarmament and prevent the

future leakage of dangerous knowledge from its program.

Cooperative threat reduction programs have had a significant impact on the conversion of

WMD programs to peaceful programs in Russia and the former Soviet states. The United

States is also pursuing CTR programs in Libya and Iraq. These U.S.-led CTR programs have

focused on dismantling weapons of mass destruction and their associated infrastructures,

combining and securing stocks of weapons and related materials, redirecting professionals to

non-weapons work, increasing transparency and building trust, and supporting cooperation

that can prevent proliferation.

Some of these objectives, including dismantlement and increased transparency, would be

included in a negotiated verifiable dismantlement program in the DPRK. However, it is important to develop other CTR activities in the DPRK during the dismantlement process, either as

part of a negotiated agreement, such as a mandated benefit to the DPRK, or negotiated later

on a bilateral basis.

One of the key issues for the DPRK is the thousands of people who will need to find new jobs.

The DPRK can be expected to resist an agreement that requires it to give up all the human

resources devoted to its nuclear weapons program without assistance in re-employing them.

Therefore, projects intended to transition the program personnel to viable nonbanned projects would be a benefit to the DPRK.

A key focus for transition work could be expansion of the DPRK’s civilian nuclear energy applications in the medical, industrial, and agricultural fields, all areas with substantial but decayed

capabilities. These civil nuclear energy projects could serve to employ many scientists and technicians and could be a significant benefit to the people of North Korea whose nuclear medical,

industrial, and agricultural programs have fallen behind programs around the world in status.

The DPRK has stated that it intends to continue its civil nuclear energy programs, and CTR

projects could focus on legitimate nuclear fields that pose no military danger.

Although most CTR projects would be run by states in cooperation with the DPRK, the IAEA

could play an important role in providing peaceful, allowed nuclear assistance through its

technical cooperation program. As a result, it is a priority that the DPRK rejoin the IAEA, which

it left in 1994.

6 47

7

Findings and Recommendations

Verified dismantlement of the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program can be accomplished successfully. It can be done at a fair cost and in a reasonable amount of time. To work, it must

be carried out by a verification organization that is technically competent, professional, and

politically fair using a verification process that has the political support of all concerned

parties. The DPRK must be cooperative with and transparent to the verification organization

and the other parties to any agreement. Such commitment will likely depend on the DPRK’s

belief that its vital interests are served by an agreement to verifiably dismantle its nuclear

weapons program.

States involved in an agreement will need to settle on realistic, effective verification arrangements. In particular, they should avoid unnecessarily intrusive verification requirements that

would be seen by the DPRK as attempts to uncover secrets related to sensitive programs that

are not subject to this agreement.

Calls to eliminate all vestiges of the DPRK’s nuclear energy program appear at this point to be

unrealistic. The DPRK is likely to insist on the continuation of many aspects of its civil nuclear

energy programs, such as radioisotope use in nuclear medicine, isotope production for civil

applications, and civil nuclear research. The continuation and expansion of such efforts may

in fact contribute to effective dismantlement by providing jobs for displaced nuclear scientists

and technicians. The fate of nuclear electricity generation programs, particularly the LWR

project, wherein the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization builds two nuclear

power reactors in the DPRK, is more controversial. Their resumption will be unlikely before the

DPRK has dismantled its nuclear weapons program.

If the LWR project is resumed at some future date, IAEA inspections can provide adequate

verification against potential misuse of these reactors, particularly if safeguards include realtime camera surveillance of the reactor and any spent fuel storage areas.

The necessary foundation for a verified dismantlement effort can be laid through detailed

negotiations by informed parties that recognize the scope and stakes of such an effort.

Because verification will be central to any agreement and complicated to negotiate, the parties must focus on it early in the negotiation process. The exact rights of the verification

organization are expected to be a major issue. A primary goal of the negotiations is to find

an optimal, effective verification arrangement that satisfies all parties.

Verification will need to start early in the implementation phase of any agreement. Delays in

implementing verification could make it more difficult to achieve confidence that the DPRK is

dismantling its programs according to its commitments. In addition, verification will play a key

role in testing whether the DPRK is sincere in its commitments to dismantle.

49
50 Dismantling the DPRK’s Nuclear Weapons Program

A key test of any verification arrangement will be how the DPRK reacts to requests from

the verification organization. Will the DPRK interpret any requests narrowly or be hostile to

these requests? Will it cooperate in addressing any concerns or requests of the verification

organization?

Although many verification organizations have been discussed, the best alternative for the

verification organization is IAEA Plus, which is the IAEA safeguards department supplemented

by experts from IAEA member-states. Other parties may want to take part directly in the

verification process, as occurred in Libya, but giving the IAEA responsibility for verification

poses the fewest problems and offers the most advantages.

In any case, the IAEA would be responsible for determining that the DPRK comes into compliance with the NPT. Thus, efficiency alone argues that the IAEA be given primary responsibility

for the more straightforward tasks of verifying dismantlement of the DPRK’s key nuclear

weapons programs and long-term monitoring of dual-use items remaining after the dismantlement process. Making IAEA Plus responsible for verification will also help to avoid competing and possibly conflicting verification efforts.

To carry out dismantlement responsibilities in the DPRK, the IAEA will need rights beyond

traditional safeguards and the Additional Protocol. Although an agreement reached during

the Six-Party Talks or another suitable negotiating forum would detail these additional powers, the IAEA may also need UN Security Council approval to carry out this new mandate.

An agreement should also include a method, separate from the usual process of quarterly

Board of Governors meetings, by which the parties review the efforts of a special entity within

the IAEA. One possibility is for the parties to form a temporary oversight body responsible for

the verification organization.

If the IAEA is not given lead responsibility, the negotiators will need to carefully work out the

transfer of authority from the verification organization to the IAEA for long-term monitoring

and the determination of whether the DPRK is in compliance with the NPT and its safeguards

obligations.

During the verification process, rights of access will be critical. The DPRK should be encouraged to grant unrestricted access to sites as deemed necessary by the verification organization, with the understanding that the DPRK can take reasonable steps to protect vital secrets

in programs that are not covered by a dismantlement agreement.

DPRK declarations will be extremely important to the verification process. If the experience of

other cases is a guide, the DPRK may not provide adequate declarations initially. Nonetheless,

the DPRK should be expected to supplement its declarations and provide additional information as the verification process progresses. Though a comprehensive initial declaration would

help build confidence, lack of an acceptable first declaration should be seen not as noncompliance but as part of the process.
Findings and Recommendations 51

A reasonable approach needs to be developed for deciding when to dismantle key items in

place and when to send them overseas. Nuclear material such as plutonium and enriched

uranium should be removed. But not everything can or needs to be removed. In addition,

certain items could be useful in nonbanned programs.

The verification organization will likely need several years to develop adequate confidence that

the DPRK has fully dismantled its programs and does not have undeclared nuclear materials

or facilities. Knowing when that point has been achieved could be one of the most difficult

tasks facing the verification organization. Because of the importance of this issue, however,

the agreement should include a process for the parties to agree collectively that such a point

has been reached.

Despite all the difficulties, an agreement to verifiably dismantle the DPRK’s nuclear weapons

program remains vital to U.S. and international security. If the United States and its allies have

the political will, they can achieve such an agreement. Although the entire verification process

will likely take several years, the positive impact of dismantlement would be felt almost immediately. DPRK nuclear facilities would be disabled and monitored. Nuclear material would be

declared, sealed, and verified. Any nuclear weapons would be disabled and monitored. These

steps go far beyond the freeze under the Agreed Framework. Relatively early in the process,

the DPRK would send out its most threatening nuclear material and start the process of verifiably dismantling its key nuclear weapons facilities. For the first time, a realistic process to

denuclearize the DPRK would be under way. All members of the Six-Party Talks should set this

goal as their highest priority.

Notes

1.	See, for example, “DPRK Warns of Stronger Nuclear Deterrence,” China People’s Daily, March

20, 2004.

2.	Authors’ assessment. For more information, see www.isis-online.org.

3.	Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks Beijing, September 19, 2005.

4.	Ibid.

5.	James A. Kelly, assistant secretary for East Asian and Pacific affairs, U.S. Department of State,

“Dealing with the DPRK’s Nuclear Programs,” statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,

Washington, D.C., July 15, 2004, available at http://ntinitiative.org/e_research/official_docs/dos/

dosJuly15_04.pdf.

6.	David Albright and Kevin O’Neill, eds., Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle (Washington,

D.C.: ISIS, 2000).

7.	“Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International

Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards,” available at

www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1997/infcirc540c.pdf.

8.	For more information on CTR activities in the former Soviet Union, see, for example, the

Nuclear Threat Initiative’s resource page at www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/forasst/nunn_lug/

overview.htm.

9.	See, for example, Larry A. Niksch, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program,”

CRS Issue Brief for Congress. Updated March 25, 2005, available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/

organization/46412.pdf.

10.	Kelly, “Dealing with the DPRK’s Nuclear Programs.”

11.	 Ibid.

12.	The United States did not define the term “disabling,” but the basic idea of disablement is to

apply an action that will interfere, in either a temporary or an irreversible way, with the use of the item.

13.	Fissile material was not explicitly defined by Kelly, but it is assumed for the purposes of this

discussion to include plutonium, highly enriched uranium, and low-enriched uranium, but not

necessarily natural or depleted uranium.

14.	Joint Statement.

15.	“DPRK Tables Proposal to Freeze Nuclear Programs,” People’s Daily Online,

February 27, 2004.

16.	Statement by HE Mr. Choe Su Hon, Head of Delegation of the DPRK at the General Debate of

the Fifty-ninth UN General Assembly, September 27, 2004.

17.	 Ibid.

18.	Communication with the authors, 2004.

53
54 Dismantling the DPRK’s Nuclear Weapons Program

19.	Communication with the authors, 2004.

20.	DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman on Six-Party Talks, June 28, 2004.

21.	Kelly, “Dealing with the DPRK’s Nuclear Programs.”

22.	DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman on Six-Party Talks, June 28, 2004.

23.	Ibid.

24.	“Foreign Ministry Spokesman on DPRK’s Stand on Nuclear Freeze and Way of Verification,”

Korean Central News Agency, July 14, 2004.

25.	Joint Statement.

26.	More information about these sites, including satellite images of them, can be found on

the ISIS website, www.isis-online.org. See also Albright and O’Neill, Solving the North Korean 

Nuclear Puzzle.

27.	Dr. Siegfried S. Hecker, “Visit to the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center in North

Korea.” Testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, January 21, 2004, available at

www.fas.org/irp/congress/2004_hr/012104hecker.pdf.

28.	Albright and O’Neill, Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle.

29.	ISIS Assessment; see also “ISIS Estimates of Unirradiated Fissile Material in de Facto Nuclear

Weapon States, Produced in Nuclear Weapon Programs.” Revised June 30, 2005, available at www.

isis-online.org/global_stocks/end2003/de_facto_nws.pdf.

30.	View the imagery at www.isis-online.org/images/dprk/yongbyon_images.html.

31.	Albright and O’Neill, Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle.

32.	Interviews by authors, 2004.

33.	Albright and O’Neill, Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle.

34.	See, for example, ibid.

35.	Ibid.

36.	Richard Roth, “US Doubts North Korea’s Claims.” www.cnn.com. October 2, 2003. Available

at www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/east/10/01/nkorea.nukes.

37.	Nobuyoshi Sakajire, “North Korea Brings in Crane Vehicle in Nuclear Construction Site

Probably Six Party Talks in Mind,” Asahi Shimbun, July 19, 2005, morning edition; translation by FBIS.

38.	See, for example, David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “Fresh Concerns of Atomic Moves by

North Korea,” New York Times, September 12, 2004, A1.

39.	Paul Kerr, “US Unveils Offer at North Korea Talks,” Arms Control Today, July–August 2004.

40.	Kelly, “Dealing with the DPRK’s Nuclear Programs.”

41.	See, for example, David E. Sanger, “Pakistan Leader Confirms Nuclear Exports,” New York 

Times, September 13, 2005, A10.
Notes 55

42.	See, for example, Yoo-Seong Hwang, “China Admits ‘The DPRK Make an Attempt to Enrich

Uranium,’” Dong-A Ilbo, October 4, 2004.

43.	Interview with the authors, 2004.

44.	The tubing had dimensions consistent with an old European gas centrifuge developed in

Germany in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Abdul Qadeer Khan and his associates are known to

have stolen this design in the mid-1970s and later deployed it within Pakistan as the “P2” centrifuge.

The type and dimensions of the tubes correspond closely to the type and dimensions of tubes made

by SCOPE, the Malaysian company contracted by the Khan network to make a range of aluminum P2

centrifuge parts for Libya.

45.	See, for example, David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, “Unraveling the A. Q. Khan and

Future Proliferation Networks,” Washington Quarterly 28, no. 2 (Spring 2005): 111–128.

46.	“North Korea Imports Nuclear Materials from Russia,” BBC Monitoring International Reports,

June 5, 2005.

47.	Model Protocol.
About the Authors

David Albright, a physicist, is founder and president of the Institute for Science and

International Security (ISIS), a nonprofit, nonpartisan institution integrating technical, scientific,

and policy research aimed at stopping the spread of nuclear weapons, bringing about greater

transparency of nuclear activities worldwide, and achieving deep reductions in nuclear arsenals. He has published numerous assessments of secret nuclear weapons programs throughout

the world and has been cited often in the media and appeared frequently on television and

radio. He is coauthor of Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996: World Inventories, 

Capabilities, and Policies and Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle. From 1992 until 1997,

he cooperated actively with the IAEA Action Team focusing on analyses of Iraqi documents and

past procurement activities. In June 1996, he was the first nongovernmental inspector of the

Iraqi nuclear program.

Corey Hinderstein is the deputy director of ISIS. Her work includes key research and analytical contributions to state-specific proliferation assessments and case studies, including

using commercial satellite imagery as a research tool.

56 Dismantling the DPRK’s Nuclear Weapons Program
About the Institute

United States Institute of Peace

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan federal institution created by

Congress to promote the prevention, management, and peaceful resolution of international conflicts.

Established in 1984, the Institute meets its congressional mandate through an array of programs,

including research grants, fellowships, professional training, education programs from high school

through graduate school, conferences and workshops, library services, and publications. The Institute’s

Board of Directors is appointed by the President of the United States and confirmed by the Senate.

Chairman of the Board: J. Robinson West

Vice Chairman: María Otero

President: Richard H. Solomon

Executive Vice President: Patricia Powers Thomson

Vice President: Charles E. Nelson

Board of Directors

J. Robinson West (Chairman), Chairman, PFC Energy, Washington, D.C.

María Otero (Vice Chairman), President, ACCION International, Boston, Mass.

Betty F. Bumpers, Founder and former President, Peace Links, Washington, D.C.

Holly J. Burkhalter, Director of U.S. Policy, Physicians for Human Rights, Washington, D.C.

Chester A. Crocker, James R. Schlesinger Professor of Strategic Studies, School of Foreign Service,

Georgetown University

Laurie S. Fulton, Williams and Connolly, Washington, D.C.

Charles Horner, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute, Washington, D.C.

Seymour Martin Lipset, Hazel Professor of Public Policy, George Mason University

Mora L. McLean, Esq., President, Africa-America Institute, New York, N.Y.

Barbara W. Snelling, former State Senator and former Lieutenant Governor, Shelburne, Vt.

Members ex officio

Michael M. Dunn, Lieutenant General, U.S. Air Force; President, National Defense University

Barry F. Lowenkron, Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor

Peter W. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

Richard H. Solomon, President, United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting)

57


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