Stakeholder Report 2011

Defense Security Service

Stakeholder Report 2011 3

Iam pleased to present our agency’s third annual Stakeholder Report, and my first 

since becoming the DSS Director on Dec. 5, 

2010. I am excited about the future of DSS 

and look forward to joining our stakeholders in 

forging a stronger partnership. 

Since the inaugural issue of the Stakeholder 

Report, DSS has found this document to 

be a tremendous tool in sharing successes, 

priorities and initiatives with employees as well 

as our Government and Industry Stakeholders. 

Whether you are new to the agency and 

industrial security or well acquainted with the 

history and mission of DSS, I’m sure you will find 

something of interest in these pages. 

For instance, you may have a general 

understanding of how the Defense Industrial 

Security Clearance Office (DISCO) processes 

clearances, but it’s also useful to know how 

incident reports are generated and processed. 

You’ll learn how we stood up a fusion effort 

within our Counterintelligence Directorate this 

year and experienced success in “connecting the 

dots” among our subject matter experts. This 

report also showcases several counterintelligence 

case studies and identifies lessons learned that 

will assist us in taking concrete steps toward 

improvement and success. 

I encourage you to read the report to gain 

a better understanding of just how much 

DSS has transformed in the past few years. 

I’m confident you will also gain a better 

understanding of our goals for the future.

Stanley L. Sims

Director, DSS

Stanley L. Sims, DSS Director

Director’s Message
4 Defense Security Service

The three divisions of the shield 

refer to the three 

basic requirements 

of all investigations: 

observation, patient 

inquiry, and careful 

examination of the 

facts.

The eagle, adopted 

from that used in the 

seal of DoD, alludes 

to keenness of 

vision, strength, 

and tenacity that 

symbolizes DSS.

The three arrows, 

also adopted from 

the seal of DoD, 

refer to the Armed 

Services, comprising the 

military components of DSS. In crossing over 

and protectively covering the Pentagon, these 

arrows represent the DoD wide aspects of the 

DSS mission.

The color dark blue, the National color, 

represents the United States, and the color 

light blue represents DoD, the shade of blue 

being used by the Defense Department. The 

pattern indicates the integral unity of the 

U.S., DoD, 

and DSS. The 

color gold (or 

yellow) is symbolic of 

zeal and achievement.

On a white disc within a border of blue with 

gold outer rim is the shield of DSS in full color 

blazoned above a wreath of laurel and olive 

proper (as depicted on the DoD seal). Inscribed 

at top of the white disc is “Defense Security 

Service” and in the base, in smaller letters, is 

“United States of America,” all letters gold.

The laurel and olives symbolize merit and 

peace; the color white signifies “deeds worthy 

of remembrance.”

DSS Seal
Stakeholder Report 2011 5

DoD Directive No. 5105.42

The charter for the Defense Security Service, (Department of Defense Directive Number 

5105.42), was re-issued and signed by William Lynn, Deputy Secretary of Defense on Aug. 3, 

2010. This document serves as the formal statement of the DSS mission and the authorities for 

DSS activities. 

The DSS charter directive states:

 The DSS, as the DoD Cognizant Security Office for industrial 

security, shall manage and administer the DoD portion of 

the National Industrial Security Program (NISP) for the DoD 

Components and, by mutual agreement, other U.S. Government 

(USG) departments and agencies; provide security education 

and training products and services; administer the industrial 

portion of the DoD Personnel Security Program (PSP), except 

for those cases that DSS refers to the Defense Office of Hearings 

and Appeals (DOHA); provide authorized counterintelligence 

(CI) services; and manage and operate the associated programspecific information technology (IT) systems. The DSS shall also 

support DoD efforts to improve security programs and processes.”

The August 2010 charter directive replaces the reissuance of the DSS Charter and was the first 

in over ten years. 

DSS Charter

“ 
6 Defense Security Service

History

Key dates in the history of the Defense Security Service

1965:

On March 8, 1965, the Defense Industrial 

Security Clearance Office (DISCO) was 

established when more than 115 Army, 

Navy and Air Force clearance activities 

were merged into one facility.

1972:

On Jan. 1, 1972, the Defense Investigative 

Service (DIS) was established. DIS was 

created in response to President Richard M. 

Nixon’s approval of proposals suggesting the 

reorganization of the national intelligence 

community and the creation of an “Office 

of Defense Investigation” to consolidate 

Department of Defense (DoD) personnel 

security investigations (PSI). 

1976:

In 1976, DIS received Congressional direction 

to phase out all military personnel and 

become a totally civilian agency.

1984:

On Jan. 1, 1984, the Defense Industrial Security 

Institute in Richmond was redesignated as the 

Defense Security Institute. 

1980:

On Oct. 1, 1980, the Industrial Security 

Program, the Key Asset Protection Program, 

the Arms, Ammunition and Explosives 

Security Program and the Defense Industrial 

Security Institute were transferred to DIS 

from the Defense Logistics Agency.

1993: 

On Jan. 6, 1993, President George H.W. 

Bush signed Executive Order 12829, 

establishing the National Industrial 

Security Program (NISP). This program 

was intended to replace not only 

the DISP, but also the industrial 

security programs of the Central 

Intelligence Agency, the Department 

of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission. 

In May 1993, DIS established 

a counterintelligence (CI) office to 

foster the integration of CI with the 

DIS security countermeasure mission.
Stakeholder Report 2011 7

1995:

On April 1, 1995, the National Industrial 

Security Program Operating Manual 

(NISPOM) was promulgated as directed 

by EO 12829. The NISPOM provides 

baseline standards for the protection of 

classified information released or disclosed 

to contractors in connection with classified 

contracts under the NISP. 

On April 19, 1995, the Alfred P. Murrah 

Building in Oklahoma City was bombed 

killing 168 people, including DIS employees 

Bob Westberry, Larry Cottingham, Peter 

DeMaster, Jean Johnson and Larry Turner of 

the Oklahoma City Investigative Field Office. 

DIS dedicated two living memorials to them 

– an Oklahoma Red Bud Tree at the DSS 

Headquarters building and a cherry tree at 

the Tidal Basin in Washington, D.C.

2003:

On Feb. 4, 2003, the Commission of the 

Council on Occupational Education (COE), 

a national accrediting authority recognized 

by the Department of Education, granted 

accreditation to the Defense Security 

Service Academy. The DSS Academy was 

reaccredited in 2009.

1997:

On Nov. 25, 1997, DIS was redesignated 

as the Defense Security Service in order 

to reflect the agency’s broader mission 

and functions, including the industrial 

security, personnel security, security 

education, and training missions. 

2009:

On Jan. 15, 2009, the Deputy Secretary of Defense 

signed a memorandum directing DSS to focus 

on meeting 21st century industrial security and 

counterintelligence needs by enhancing and expanding 

the NISP and reinvigorating the Security Training and 

Awareness Program. 

2005:

On Feb. 20, 2005, DoD transferred the 

personnel security investigations (PSI) 

functions performed by DSS to the 

Office of Personnel Management (OPM). 

2007:

On Dec. 18, 2007, the Director of DSS 

was named the functional manager for 

DoD Security Training.

1999:

On July 21, 1999, the Defense 

Security Service Academy was 

formally established.
8 Defense Security Service

Organizational Overview

Scope of the DSS Mission:

13,333 active, cleared facilities in the National Industrial Security Program (NISP)

Clear and inspect facilities

•	 9,448 inspections 

•	 1,279 new facility clearances granted

•	 18,438 accredited systems in industry

•	 Conduct inspections on behalf of DoD 

and 23 federal partners

Adjudicate Industry Security 

Clearances (DISCO)

•	 1 million cleared contractor personnel

•	 247,444 adjudication actions

•	 19.7 days average to process 90% 

clearances

Fund NISP Personnel Security Investigations 

•	 Estimated $211 million expended in FY10

•	 Budget for FY11 is $234.1 million

Mitigate Foreign Ownership Control or 

Influence (FOCI) in Cleared Industry

•	 588 FOCI facilities 

•	 278 FOCI mitigation agreements

Perform Counterintelligence Functions

•	 201 known or suspected illicit 

collectors identified within industry

•	 7,002 CI Suspicious Contact Reports 

•	 660 Intelligence Information Reports

DoD Functional Manager 

for Security Training

•	 127,633 course completions in FY10

•	 356,679 course completions FY05-FY10 

(1044% increase)

•	 149 course completions by sponsored 

foreign nationals

•	 Catalog of 68 courses serving DoD 

and Industry

•	 62% increase in course catalog since 

FY05

Professionalization

•	 Develop Certification Program for 

DoD Security Professionals

•	 Facilitate the DoD Security Training 

Council

All data is FY10 year-end data.
Stakeholder Report 2011 9

DSS Locations

Capital Region, 

Arlington, VA

Linthicum, MD

Crystal City, VA

Chantilly, VA

Northern Region, 

Boston, MA

Groton, CT

Shelton, CT

Andover, MA

Boston, MA

Detroit, MI

Fort Snelling, MN

Mt. Laurel, NJ

Picatinny Arsenal, NJ

Syracuse, NY

Watervliet-Arsenal, NY

Williamsville, NY

Cincinnati, OH

Cleveland, OH

Dayton, OH

Fort Indiantown Gap, PA

McClure, PA

Philadelphia, PA

Sewickley, PA

Milwaukee, WI

Western Region, 

San Diego, CA

Anchorage, AK

Phoenix, AZ

Tucson, AZ

Camarillo, CA

Cypress, CA

Encino, CA

Pasadena, CA

San Diego, CA

Sunnyvale, CA

Travis Air Force Base, CA

Colorado Springs, CO

Denver, CO

Honolulu, HI

Albuquerque, NM

Seattle, WA

Bountiful, UT

Southern Region, 

Irving, TX

Huntsville, AL

Homestead, FL

Hurlburt Field, FL

Jacksonville, FL

Melbourne, FL

Orlando, FL

Tampa, FL

Smyrna, GA

Chicago, IL

Kansas City, KS

St. Louis, MO

Gulfport, MS

Charlotte, NC

Raleigh, NC

Offutt Air Force Base, NE

Oklahoma City, OK

Charleston, SC

San Antonio, TX

Irving, TX

Hampton, VA

Virginia Beach, VA

* DSS Field Offices

* DSS Resident Offices
10 Defense Security Service

Achievements

DSS continually assesses the effectiveness of its oversight 

of the industrial security program 

to ensure the most robust 

mechanisms for the protection 

of classified information in 

industry are in place. DSS 

achieved a number of notable 

successes during FY10 and is 

particularly proud of the following:

•	 DSS Counterintelligence 

referrals resulted in more than 

200 investigations or operations by 

federal law enforcement and intelligence 

agencies (an increase of over 300 percent 

from FY09).

•	 Decreased the average time needed to 

process a Foreign Ownership Control or 

Influence (FOCI) case from 256 days to 

120 days. 

•	 Decreased the FOCI case backlog (cases 

over 120 days old) from 93 to 23 cases.

•	 Established tailored inspections for 

FOCI facilities and completed the first 

corporate-wide reviews.

•	 Continued to implement the Facilities 

of Interest List (FIL) to prioritize and 

tailor inspections to ensure the most 

sensitive technologies 

are protected. DSS 

completed all FIL I 

and FIL II category 

security reviews.

•	 Created a DSS 

Operations Analysis Group

to identify gaps in information 

about NISP personnel and 

industrial security clearances, 

and maximize collaboration 

across the agency in filling these gaps.

•	 Initiated nationwide beta 

testing of the Security Fundamentals 

Professional Certification, which is the 

first of four Security Professional Education 

Development (SPēD) Certifications. The 

beta testing will provide data needed 

to finalize the scores and exam for the 

formal launch of the program.

•	 Sponsored a DoD Security Manager’s 

Conference attended by more than 500 

security professionals from across the 

Department of Defense. 

•	 Completed the programmatic control 

transition of the information technology 

systems supporting personnel security 

investigations to the Defense Manpower 

Data Center.
Stakeholder Report 2011 11

Achievements

Tailored Inspections

All facilities cleared under the NISP are required 

to undergo periodic security inspections 

by DSS. To create a more efficient process 

and dispel the perception that DSS conducts 

“checklist” inspections, DSS continues to refine 

its inspection methodology. 

The goal of a security inspection should be an 

integrated visit from DSS to the right facility 

at the right time with appropriate resources 

resulting in a more effective, meaningful 

inspection.

As a part of the inspection evolution, DSS is 

now conducting corporate-wide inspections of 

companies with multiple facilities under Foreign 

Ownership Control or Influence (FOCI). This 

approach gives both DSS and the company 

a big picture view of the security status of its 

cleared facilities.

Each team consists of an Industrial Security 

Representative, Information Systems Security 

Professional, Field Counterintelligence Specialist, 

and a Senior Action Officer specializing in 

FOCI. DSS developed a standardized FOCI 

Inspection Action Plan which detailed preinspection research/actions. Completion of the 

Action Plan ensures that all team members 

are informed of current FOCI issues at the 

company. 

Information from the inspection is shared with

the company senior leadership and security 

team on a regular basis. The information 

includes results of the inspection, notable best 

practices, serious NISP findings and any FOCI 

issues. The purpose is to provide feedback on 

the compliance record of the company from 

the previous quarter.

Feedback from the first round of corporatewide inspections was extremely positive, and 

company senior leadership appreciated DSS 

efforts in developing trends across facilities. 

DSS began tailored inspections of FOCI 

facilities first because there are approximately 

588 cleared facilities with FOCI considerations. 

FOCI oversight is complex and DSS wanted to 

ensure consistency across FOCI facilities. DSS 

will develop a similar inspection methodology 

for freight forwarding companies and trusted 

foundry and Arms, Ammunition and Explosives 

(AA&E) facilities.
12 Defense Security Service

Achievements

DSS expands financial analysis capability

The globalization of the economic market 

has resulted in a spider web of complex 

financial mechanisms, which can mask foreign 

ownership, control or influence on cleared 

companies. To get a clearer picture of a 

company’s status and financial condition, the 

Assessment and Evaluation (A&E) Division of 

the Industrial Policy and Programs Directorate 

(IP) is looking more closely at companies’ 

financial relationships.

The A&E Division is conducting financial 

assessments on business entities seeking and 

currently performing work on DoD classified 

contracts to expand awareness of possible 

foreign influence. Since DSS has traditionally 

relied largely on information provided by the 

company through self-reporting, DSS may not 

have the most current information needed to 

make a sound assessment. 

In performing the assessments, the A&E Division:

• Reviews company audited financial 

statements to verify self-reported 

financial information

• Validates initial and periodic company 

self-reported financial and ownership 

information through open source and 

Government-owned database research;

• Identifies complex financial instruments 

and relationships that may impact FOCI 

thresholds, e.g., derivative instruments; 

hedge funds; managed accounts; 

sovereign wealth funds; private equity 

investment; funds-of-funds; and, “off 

balance sheet transactions” 

Much of the information that DSS now 

analyzes is pulled from Government regulatory 

agencies and commercially available sources. 

Additionally, the A&E Division will use classified 

U.S. Government data integration platforms 

to identify and evaluate complex financial 

relationships to clarify or uncover the source 

of a cleared company’s capital.

When looking at the condition of cleared 

companies, DSS analysts search out key 

indicators that determine whether a company 

is financially vulnerable or has undergone a 

material change without notifying DSS. If a U.S. 

company is being, or is likely to be, bought by 

a foreign entity, the A&E analysis allows DSS to 

assess whether the U.S subsidiary is capable of 

operating as a viable business entity separate 

from the foreign owner.

To expand its capabilities, the A&E Division 

has entered into agreements or formed 

partnerships with the Defense Contract 
Stakeholder Report 2011 13

Achievements

Management Agency, to share financial data 

on business entities seeking and currently 

performing on DoD classified contracts; and 

the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense 

for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, 

Industrial Policy Directorate, to share industrial 

base financial analyses, merger and acquisition 

assessment and the impact of new investment 

instruments on determining FOCI.

DSS has also held discussions with the Securities 

and Exchange Commission’s Division of 

Investment Management, on the impact of new 

financial regulatory laws for hedge funds and 

private equity firms. And, DSS is working with 

the U.S. Treasury Department on information 

sharing arrangements, as well as with the 

Recovery Accountability & Transparency Board 

(RATB), to routinely integrate consideration of 

that organization’s database information into 

the FOCI and facility clearance process.

 We are now in a new and more 

complex era, but the partnership 

with industry is just as critical to 

our security today. It must be 

nurtured and encouraged. We 

need direct dealings and honest 

dialogue between industry leaders 

and those of us in the Department.”

William J. Lynn III

Deputy Secretary of Defense

“ 
14 Defense Security Service

Achievements

New Guide for Field Office Chiefs

DSS Field Office Chiefs (FOCs) must have 

a fundamental understanding of industrial 

security and the DSS mission and also 

manage personnel, resources and schedules. 

Visits conducted under the Staff Assessment 

Visit (SAV) program found that each Field 

Office was being run differently. While the 

DSS Industrial Security Operating Manual 

provides detailed internal instructions for DSS 

personnel on providing NISP oversight and 

services, no formal guidance existed related 

to managing a Field Office. Help arrived for 

FOCs in the form of a Standard Operating 

Procedure (SOP) for FOCs. The first version 

was issued in September 2009 and established 

the fundamental principles and practices for 

all FOCs to follow. It also established uniform 

management standards for DSS Industrial 

Security personnel. 

The goal of the SOP is to state management 

principles and procedures by drawing on the 

best practices established by offices that have 

demonstrated consistent success. The SOP 

is not intended to be a “management by the 

numbers” guide. The initial SOP was updated 

in April 2010 and will continue to be revised 

as industrial security policies and regulations 

affecting office management change. 

On a practical level, the SOP includes a 

wide range of topics including employee 

performance appraisals, managing workflow, 

documenting overtime, maintaining a correct 

badge, and credential inventory. However, 

the majority of the document is devoted to 

setting internal standards and procedures to 

manage oversight of the National Industrial 

Security Program. 
Stakeholder Report 2011 15

Achievements

DSS launches SF-328 review

In 2008, DSS stood up the Foreign Ownership, 

Control or Influence (FOCI) Analytic Division 

(FAD) to ensure all available information was 

analyzed and applied prior to determining the 

proper risk mitigation strategy for companies 

with FOCI. Central to this effort is the 

analysis of the Certificate Pertaining to Foreign 

Interests (SF-328) submitted by all companies 

upon entry into the National Industrial Security 

Program (NISP). 

Normally, DSS Field Offices collect the SF328s and supporting documentation and only 

those packets that have identified or suspected 

of undisclosed FOCI are forwarded to the 

Headquarters FOCI Operations Division. In 

May 2010, the FAD, in conjunction with the DSS 

Field Operations Directorate, initiated a beta test 

with four field offices in which all SF-328 packets, 

regardless of the responses, were forwarded to 

the FAD for analysis. 

By reviewing all of the SF-328s with the additional 

analytical resources at its disposal, the FAD 

identified discrepancies between actual and 

reported FOCI information in approximately 

29 percent of the cases examined. While not 

all of the discrepancies were serious and not 

all of these cases ultimately required mitigation, 

the results were sufficient to justify changing 

procedures so that all SF-328s will be sent to 

the FAD for analysis in the future. This action 

reduces the workload of Industrial Security 

Representatives (ISRs) and Regional Senior 

Action Officers and will serve to validate the 

company-supplied information relied upon 

by DSS in making industrial security oversight 

decisions. 

Once the new process is fully implemented, 

ISRs will continue to be the principal players in 

the process, and this process should not create 

additional requirements for field personnel. Upon 

completion of the FAD’s review, the ISR is notified 

of the results of the review. If no unreported 

or reported FOCI requiring mitigation is found, 

the process of granting an FCL will continue as 

usual and the facility will be cleared if it meets all 

other facility clearance requirements. When the 

FAD finds FOCI requiring mitigation, the normal 

headquarters mitigation process starts. In cases 

where cross-directorate issues are found, the 

case will be forwarded to the DSS Operations 

Analysis Group for action.

The beta test results indicate enhanced 

scrutiny of SF-328s will further ensure FOCI 

is identified and will likely result in more 

mitigation actions. With full implementation, 

the FAD is actively identifying and monitoring 

FOCI, which will help ensure that FOCI is 

identified and properly mitigated.
16 Defense Security Service

Achievements

Incident Reports 

Paragraph 1-302 a., National Industrial Security 

Program Operating Manual (NISPOM), 

February 28, 2006, states: “Adverse Information. 

Contractors shall report adverse information 

coming to their attention concerning any of 

their cleared employees.”

This NISPOM paragraph sets forth the 

requirement that cleared facilities report 

adverse information concerning their cleared 

employees — including persons nominated 

by the facilities for clearances — to DSS, 

specifically to the Defense Industrial Security 

Clearance Office (DISCO). The requirement 

is simply stated, but the action taken behind 

the scenes by the DISCO adjudicators is a 

precise, complex process that can result in the 

suspension of a cleared contractor’s eligibility 

for access to classified information. Once a 

person has been submitted for a clearance or 

eligibility has been granted, DISCO depends 

on the cleared contractor facility to provide 

information that may impact on the status of 

an employee’s clearance. 

Adverse information, also known as an 

“incident report,” should be submitted by 

the company’s Facility Security Officer via the 

Joint Personnel Adjudication System (JPAS). 

However, government agencies can also 

report the information via JPAS, and persons, 

including co-workers or other sources may, 

and do, provide adverse information to DISCO 

directly via email, postal mail or telephonically. 

Once entered into JPAS, the incident report 

flags an individual’s JPAS record. Typical incident 

reports cover such things as driving under the 

influence, formal criminal charges or financial 

problems. They can be very specific and 

detailed or very vague. In the latter case, it is 

incumbent upon the adjudicator to flush out 

the details and decide on a course of action. 

When a DISCO adjudicator receives the 

incident report, he/she typically takes one of 

three actions:

1. Favorably adjudicates the issue. For 

example, when an individual’s wages are 

garnished for child support in a state that 

requires an automatic garnishment and 

there are no other indicators of financial 

problems, the red flag is removed from the 

individual’s record and no further action is 

taken.

2. Requests that the investigative 

service provider (usually OPM) open an 

investigation into the incident. For instance, 

in a case where an individual was recently 

arrested, the DISCO adjudicator will 
Stakeholder Report 2011 17

Achievements

normally take no further action until the 

law enforcement investigation is completed 

and a final review is conducted of the facts 

surrounding the reported incident. In this 

case, the individual still retains his eligibility, 

but his JPAS record has a red flag reflecting 

the pending nature of an incident report.

3. Suspends the clearance eligibility and 

requests an investigation. This interim 

suspension is taken by the DSS Director 

in very serious incidents, such as when an 

individual is convicted of a serious crime or 

has shown a clear disregard for procedures 

governing the handling of classified 

information. The case could still ultimately 

be favorably adjudicated, but until that time, 

all access to classified information must be 

suspended by the Facility Security Officer. 

DISCO receives about 8,000 incident reports 

a year and typically recommends about 120 

interim suspensions a year to the DSS Director. 

All actions, to include incident reports that 

were favorably adjudicated, are tracked in 

JPAS. This paper trail assists an adjudicator 

in identifying the development of trends or 

anomalies. For instance, an individual may have 

had incidents reported at multiple companies, 

but unless an adjudicator can see each incident, 

connections cannot be found. A minor incident 

at one company may not be of concern, but 

when similar incidents occur at three separate 

companies, they begin to form a pattern of 

suspicious or inappropriate behavior.

The Adjudicative Process

Personnel security adjudicators adhere to the 

whole-person concept and the Adjudicative 

Guidelines when making personnel clearance 

eligibility decisions. Adjudicators receive 

specialized training on how to interpret and apply 

the Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining 

Eligibility for Access to Classified Information. 

When weighing a decision, DISCO adjudicators 

have a number of resources at their disposal. For 

instance, they are required to query the Defense 

Central Index of Investigations (DCII) for other 

investigations. They also routinely coordinate 

with other investigative and adjudicative agencies. 

The process may take up to six months or more 

because adjudicators can only make decisions 

after they receive all appropriate and relevant 

information. 

The job of an adjudicator is very detail-oriented 

and can involve sifting through voluminous 

data. DISCO finds derogatory information at 

various levels of seriousness in approximately 

90 percent of the cases it reviews. 
18 Defense Security Service

Achievements

“The adjudicative process is the careful weighing 

of a number of variables known as the whole 

person concept. Available, reliable information 

about the person, past and present, favorable and 

unfavorable, should be considered in reaching 

a determination. In evaluating the relevance of 

an individual’s conduct, the adjudicator should 

consider the following factors: 

1. The nature, extent, and seriousness of 

the conduct.

2. The circumstances surrounding the 

conduct, to include knowledgeable 

participation.

3. The frequency and recency of the 

conduct.

4. The individual’s age and maturity at the 

time of the conduct.

5. The voluntariness of participation.

6. The presence or absence of rehabilitation 

and other pertinent behavioral changes.

7. The motivation for the conduct.

8. The potential for pressure, coercion, 

exploitation, or duress.

9. The likelihood of continuation of 

recurrence.”

Adjudicative 

Guidelines:

A: Allegiance to the United States. 

B: Foreign influence. 

C: Foreign preference. 

D: Sexual behavior. 

E: Personal conduct. 

F: Financial considerations. 

G: Alcohol consumption. 

H: Drug involvement. 

I: Psychological conditions. 

J: Criminal conduct. 

K: Handling protected information

L: Outside activities. 

M: Use of information technology 

 systems.
Stakeholder Report 2011 19

Achievements

Staff Assessment Visits bring consistency to Field Offices

During a three-month period in 2010, teams 

from the Industrial Security Field Operations 

(ISFO) Quality Assurance Program visited 

field offices in each region to conduct staff 

assessment visits (SAV). The SAV process 

involved conducting internal interviews, facility 

folder reviews, and research in the Industrial 

Security Facilities Database followed by 

discussions with cleared contractor 

representatives. The intent of the 

SAVs is to achieve inspection 

consistency across DSS. 

During the visits, 

the ISFO team 

i m p l e m e n t e d 

a standardized 

assessment process 

and trained DSS regional 

employees to guarantee 

consistent assessments 

across the country. These 

initial assessments were 

conducted by teams of five 

to eight people from regions 

other than that of the office 

being assessed. 

During the visits, the team 

members conducted one-onone mentoring and training in the 

SAV process so that each region would have 

the knowledge to conduct visits in the future.

SAV results are furnished to the ISFO Quality 

Assurance Office for a DSS-wide analysis with 

the intent of identifying best practices and 

areas that might require process improvements 

or guidance revision, and to measure and 

evaluate the effectiveness of the regional 

inspection process.
20 Defense Security Service

Achievements

New Industrial Security courses 

better train IS Representatives for the field

The DSS Industrial Security Mentoring Program 

and Industrial Security Specialist Course 

(ISSC) were initially established in 2001. The 

mentoring program was designed to ensure 

new IS Reps could quickly gain knowledge 

about their roles and responsibilities through a 

structured program of on the job training and 

workbook exercises that would prepare them 

to attend the instructor-led ISSC held at the 

DSS Academy. 

As DSS transforms to meet the security 

challenges of today and the future, training must 

also change. As part of this transformation and 

as new employees are brought on board, IS Reps 

and Information System Security Personnel 

(ISSP) are expected to be more productive 

sooner and develop knowledge and capabilities 

more quickly.

With those goals in mind, the DSS Academy 

(DSSA) developed the Fundamentals of 

Industrial Security Levels 1 and 2 (FISL-1 and 

FISL-2). FISL-1 replaces the mentoring program, 

while FISL-2 is designed to replace the ISSC.

FISL-1 is significantly more structured and 

challenging than the mentoring program and 

provides an increased level of accountability 

for students, their supervisors, and the DSS 

Academy staff. It is a blended learning experience 

that incorporates independent actions (reading, 

web-based training courses, writing assignments, 

quizzes, and exams) with team actions (ridealongs and observed participation). It also 

involves the Field Office Chief, a lead advisor, 

other members of the Field Office, and a DSS 

Academy instructor. Nearly 50 students are 

currently enrolled in FISL-1, and they complete 

the course in approximately five to six months. 

Upon completion of FISL-1, students should be 

able to conduct non-complex survey actions 

and conduct inspections of non-complex, nonpossessing facilities independently. These new 

IS Reps and ISSPs should be productive before 

they attend the instructor-facilitated (FISL-2) 

course at the Academy. The curriculum of FISL2 builds upon the performance, knowledge, and 

skills learned and employed in FISL-1. Sixtythree students have completed FISL-2 to date.
Stakeholder Report 2011 21

Achievements

Center for the Development of Security Excellence (CDSE)

In March 2010, the Director of the Defense 

Security Service (DSS) formally established 

the Center for Development of Security 

Excellence (CDSE). The CDSE will conduct 

security education, training and professional 

development functions and be responsible for 

administering the DoD Security Professional 

Education Development Program (SPēD), 

the DoD Personnel Security Adjudicator 

Certification Program, and for carrying out 

security training program assessments and 

development functions. 

DoD Instruction 3305.13, “DoD Security Training,” 

assigns the Director, DSS, as the functional 

manager responsible for the execution and 

maintenance of DoD security training. The DSS 

Future Options Study expanded on the 2007 

DoD Instruction and specifically suggested the 

development of a “Security Community Center 

of Excellence.” On January 15, 2009, the Deputy 

Secretary of Defense directed DSS to carry out 

the recommendations of the Future Options 

Study to include “reinvigorating the Security 

Education Training and Awareness Program.”

The CDSE will assume the training previously 

provided by the Academy in addition to its other 

missions and functions serving the security 

education, training, and professionalization 

requirements of the DoD and cleared industry. 

The DSS Academy’s focus will shift to the 

training and education of the internal DSS 

industrial security workforce. 

In addition, while the CDSE will continue the 

missions and functions of the Defense Security 

Service’s security education, training and awareness 

missions, the Center will also add the following:

• Professional development throughout the 

career of DoD security personnel

• Certification of security professionals 

through the Security Professional Education 

Development (SPēD) Program and the DoD 

Personnel Security Adjudication Program

• Graduate-level courses and higher 

education opportunities aimed to develop 

leaders of the DoD security community

• Repository for DoD security resources

• Forum for enhanced communication 

within the DoD security community

• Consulting support for the DoD 

community

The CDSE reaches customers through a variety 

of methods, including classroom and web-based 

training and forums including conferences and 

events, mailing lists, and the internet. 
22 Defense Security Service

Achievements

Training Down Under

The Center for Development of Security 

Excellence (CDSE) delivered the Introduction 

to Special Access Programs (SAPs) Course to 

14 Australian citizens in August in Canberra, 

Australia. This was the culmination of a long 

coordination process that started in February 

2010 with the endorsement of the U.S./

Australian Defense Counsel in response to 

a request from the Australian Department 

of Defence for the United States to provide 

training assistance. This international effort was 

the first of its kind for the CDSE.

The training was provided to Australian 

personnel in support of the Joint Strike Fighter 

(JSF) Program. The goals were to provide 

more cost effective training and establish 

the staff needed to honor approved security 

commitments for joint U.S./Australian programs.

Although the course was conducted at the 

unclassified level, Australia provided a SAPaccredited environment to conduct the training, 

which highlighted to students the importance 

of such training. It also allowed students to 

gain first-hand knowledge of the experience of 

being employed in a SAP facility.

The Australian Program Manager met with 

CDSE personnel following course completion 

and recognized the course as “a good model 

for the future” that resulted in significant 

savings for the Australian government because 

it involved the right people at the right time. 

The Australian Program Manager anticipates 

requesting training for an additional 15 people 

in FY11. Other courses may also be requested 

to include parts of the SAP curriculum, the 

Security Awareness for Educators (SAFE) 

course, and a risk management course. 
Stakeholder Report 2011 23

Achievements

Security Professional Education Development Program

 Create a defense intelligence 

workforce training program that 

provides the skills and flexibility 

to leverage all intelligence and 

security capabilities against the full 

range of mission requirements.”

Priority III.1.C under Strategic Goal III

Defense Intelligence Strategy, 2008

In the 2008 Defense Intelligence Strategy, the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence 

(USD(I)) noted the relationship between the 

skills of the defense and national intelligence 

workforce and the quality of intelligence 

products. The Strategy set goals to “... acquire, 

retain, develop, train, educate, equip, and 

employ the total workforce effectively and 

efficiently in support of defense and national 

intelligence requirements.”

To accomplish these goals, the DoD Security 

Training Council (DSTC), chaired by DSS, 

launched the Security Professional Education 

Development Program (SPēD). The SPēD 

Program is intended to ensure a common set 

of competencies among security practitioners 

and to promote interoperability, facilitate 

professional development and training, and 

develop a workforce of certified security 

professionals. 

The individual components across the 

Department are responsible for designating 

which positions will require the SPēD 

Certification. When fully deployed, SPēD will 

provide a clear path to success for security 

professionals. It will outline training options, 

job aids, tools, certifications, and certificates 

based on the career decisions of the security 

workforce. The SPēD Certification Program is 

based on functions performed; it is not based 

on occupational titles or pay grades. 

DSS and the DSTC relied on subject matter 

experts in the various security disciplines 

(physical, personnel, industrial and information) 

to design the program. They collectively 

answered several questions: What skills 

should be defined? How should the program 

be structured? What knowledge should 

practitioners have at various stages of their 

careers? 

The program has four certifications of increasing 

scope and complexity: 

“ 
24 Defense Security Service

Achievements

• Security Fundamentals Professional 

Certification (SFPC)

• Security Asset Protection Professional 

Certification (SAPPC)

• Security Program Integration 

Professional Certification (SPIPC)

• Security Enterprise Professional 

Certification (SEPC) 

From September to December 2010, over 900 

security practitioners participated in a Beta 

Test of the Security Fundamentals Professional 

Certification. DSS will use the results to set 

baseline test standards, finalize the test structure, 

and ensure that it meets outside accreditation 

standards. 

The first certification, SFPC, will be operational 

in early 2011. DSS personnel are looking at 

test sites across the country — most likely 

education centers already established on existing 

military installations — to administer the test. 

Participants need to register for the program 

using DSS’s online registration ENROL system. 

Once established, participant progress will be 

monitored and followed by DSS personnel. 

The other three SPēD certifications are in 

development and the SAPPC is scheduled for 

beta testing during FY11. 

Certification candidates have a wide variety of 

resources designed to inform and assist them 

through the certification program, including a 

certification handbook, online training courses, 

a certification online resource tool, and a 

diagnostic examination.

Like most certification programs, the SPēD 

Certification Program has a certification 

maintenance requirement. Once certified, 

participants will have to earn a designated 

number of professional development units 

(PDUs) every two years. PDUs can be earned 

through a variety of professional development 

activities including taking security training courses, 

attending security conferences, etc.

The SPēD Certification Program will be phased 

in over a five-year period across the Department. 

Ultimately, the program will include specialty 

certifications such as Special Access Programs, 

Research Technology Protection, etc. 

 We must recognize there 

is no ‘normal’ anymore. What 

once was routine is anything but. 

And what once was unusual is 

becoming all too routine.”

Adm. Mike Mullen

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

“ 
Stakeholder Report 2011 25

Achievements

Management of Legacy Personnel 

Security IT Systems Transferred

This past year DSS transferred programmatic 

control of the Joint Personnel Adjudication 

System (JPAS), Defense Central Index 

of Investigations (DCII), the Secure Web 

Fingerprint Transmission (SWFT), and the 

“improved Investigative Records Repository” 

(iIRR) to the Defense Manpower Data Center 

(DMDC). The transfer was directed by the 

Deputy Secretary of Defense in a January 15, 

2009 memorandum. Control and responsibility 

for iIRR and SWFT transferred in May, JPAS in 

June, and DCII in July. 

To ensure the transfer was transparent to the 

users of the systems with no interruption in 

service, DSS and DMDC signed a Memorandum 

of Agreement in February 2010 and established 

a six-month transition period for the systems. 

The transition period was necessary as JPAS is a 

large, complex system with over 116,000 users. 

This also applied to the other three systems as 

they had unique technical items to address for 

their respective transitions. 

DSS still continues to operate the systems, 

performing ongoing maintenance, and 

implementing system enhancements as provided 

by DMDC. DSS also still provides Call Center/

Help Desk user inquiry and assistance. These 

remaining functions will transition to DMDC in 

CY2011. DMDC personnel have “shadowed” 

DSS personnel, program managers and 

contractors for the transitioned functions to gain 

a detailed understanding of 

the systems procedures 

and processes 

for performing 

maintenance and 

upgrading systems 

components and 

applications. The 

original MOA is being 

amended to incorporate 

other items during the 

remaining transition period.
26 Defense Security Service

New Direction for Counterintelligence

In FY10, DSS continued to emphasize the 

agency’s work with industry to support national 

security, secure the nation’s technological 

base, and oversee the protection of classified 

information in the hands of cleared contractors. 

DSS and its Counterintelligence (CI) Directorate 

recognized the need to encourage timely 

reporting of illicit foreign attempts to collect 

technology or information from cleared 

contractors. The CI Directorate continued 

to refine its mission and strategy to identify 

potentially unlawful penetrators of the cleared 

industrial base. 

Over the course of the year, CI and industrial 

security personnel worked together to increase 

CI awareness in industry and to encourage 

suspicious contact reporting. Each report 

the agency receives from industry makes a 

difference. In FY09, federal investigative or 

intelligence agencies opened 45 investigations 

or operations based on industry reporting to 

DSS; in FY10, reports to DSS led to over 200 

opened cases. 

The case studies below highlight three 

FY10 threats to the cleared contractor 

base, and illustrate how DSS collected the 

threat information and turned it over to 

law enforcement agencies in record time. 

Historically, this process 

took anywhere from 

six to twelve months; 

but as the cases show, 

DSS has improved its 

ability to identify, collect, 

analyze, and disseminate actionable information 

to other government agencies while increasing 

analytic proficiency and reducing case backlogs.

Case Study #1:

A cleared contractor received an unsolicited 

email request from a foreign entity requesting a 

quote for several export-controlled armaments 

for an unnamed Middle Eastern client. Because 

the request was unsolicited and was not 

received through foreign military sales channels, 

the cleared contractor reported the incident 

to the local DSS office. Less than two months 

later, a U.S. government agency was able to 

open an investigation based on the information 

DSS provided.

DSS analysis revealed prior industry reporting 

concerning the requestor and connected 

the subject to another suspicious collection 

attempt under a fake name or alias. Further 

analysis discovered a known terrorist had 

previously used that name in email traffic. 

Case Studies
Stakeholder Report 2011 27

Case Studies

Case Study #2:

A foreign entity phoned a cleared contractor 

attempting to purchase export-controlled 

aeronautics technology. The individual claimed 

to be calling on behalf of an unidentified associate 

seeking the price and delivery information 

for several aeronautic systems. The cleared 

contractor considered the incident suspicious 

given the contact was unsolicited and the 

requestor withheld the end-user information. 

The cleared contractor reported the request 

to the local DSS office and in less than three 

months, a U.S. government agency opened an 

investigation based on the information DSS 

provided. 

DSS analysis of the case revealed that the 

requestor’s official business address, residences, 

and business partners were inconsistent with 

the information provided with the initial 

request. Based on these findings, DSS CI 

determined that the request was likely a third 

party technology transfer attempt. 

Case Study #3:

A foreign person, claiming to be a professor 

at an East Asian university, requested several 

export-controlled software systems through a 

cleared company’s public website.

The cleared company reported the incident 

to the local DSS office and a U.S. government 

agency opened an investigation less than three 

months after the incident occurred. DSS analysis 

of the case led to the discovery of several 

relevant published papers regarding aeronautic 

systems and their military applications. 

Research into the foreign university confirmed 

its involvement in military research and 

development for an East Asian government. 

Further analysis connected the foreign university 

to illicit purchase requests for sensitive U.S. 

technology and attempts to obtain research 

positions within several U.S cleared facilities. 
28 Defense Security Service

Case Studies

DISCO Cases of Interest

The following are unique or unusual cases DISCO reviewed in the past year:

Case Study #1: 

DISCO initiated and received results of a 

periodic reinvestigation. The adjudicator 

found a cause for concern and asked DSS 

counterintelligence (CI) personnel to review 

the incident. DSS CI in turn coordinated 

with a law enforcement agency which had 

additional information on the individual. 

The individual’s clearance eligibility was 

suspended and the facility was advised of the 

interim suspension of the eligibility and the 

need for the individual to be denied access 

to classified information. Due to privacy 

issues, the company was not privy to details 

of the incident. 

Case Study #2: 

A husband and wife were the key management 

personnel of a cleared company. A former 

government employee hired by a cleared 

company bribed other government officials 

with gifts to obtain work for the company. 

The individuals’ clearances were suspended 

until the company’s facility clearance was 

terminated. In this case, DISCO learned of 

the situation from third-party sources which 

identified the company, the individuals, and 

the government customer.

Case Study #3: 

DISCO recommended suspending an 

individual’s interim clearance eligibility based 

on information that surfaced during the 

course of a personnel security investigation. 

The case involved a native born U.S. citizen 

who exhibited a pattern of questionable 

behavior. The citizen visited a foreign country 

on multiple occasions and initiated contact 

with foreign nationals including unauthorized 

association with suspected or known agents 

of a foreign intelligence service that created 

a potential conflict of interest between the 

interests of a foreign organization and the 

United States. 

The adjudicator was unable to view the 

security concerns as having been mitigated 

based on what was known at the time. 

Once the personnel security investigation is 

complete, a decision on the final clearance 

eligibility will be made. 
Stakeholder Report 2011 29

Case Studies

DSS Operations Analysis Group fosters collaboration 

and sharing of information

To improve the security of classified U.S. 

technologies and information under the 

purview of the National Industrial Security 

Program (NISP), DSS must ensure that 

information is shared across the agency. The 

DSS Operations Analysis Group, established 

within the CI Directorate, was created to 

maximize collaboration across the agency, identify 

gaps in information, and implement solutions 

using an approach that fosters interdependent 

processes between all DSS elements. 

During daily, on-site operations meetings, 

subject matter experts from Industrial Security 

Field Operations (IO), Industrial Policy and 

Programs (IP), Counterintelligence (CI) and 

the Defense Industrial Security Clearance 

Office (DISCO), discuss unique and complex 
30 Defense Security Service

Case Studies

security or intelligence issues that impact on 

DSS operations and policy. 

The discussions are designed to reduce the 

risks posed by foreign directed collection or 

internal threats to technologies, information, 

and personnel. By tapping subject matter 

experts, DSS ensures that each expert brings a 

unique perspective and a deep understanding 

of the issues within his or her area of expertise. 

To date, three facility clearances have been 

terminated and 18 personnel security clearance 

eligibilities have been suspended based 

on Operations Analysis Group review and 

recommended action. The following case 

studies are four examples of how the group 

has added value by taking seemingly unrelated 

pieces of information and connected them to 

form a comprehensive look at a problem.

Case Study #1: No Cleared Key 

Management Personnel

On June 1, 2010, a cleared facility formally 

removed its Director from his position amid 

allegations of financial mismanagement. On June 

30, 2010, the facility security officer (FSO) of 

the facility notified DSS that he was resigning 

that same day from the facility. As a result, there 

would not be any cleared key management 

personnel (KMPs) at the facility (required by 

paragraph 2-104 of the National Industrial 

Security Program Operating Manual (NISPOM)).

On July 1, 2010, DSS personnel met with the 

new senior management official (who was 

also serving as the new FSO) to advise and 

assist with the protection of sensitive DoD 

information. During this meeting, the new 

senior management official provided DSS 

with three suspicious documents linked to the 

former senior management official.

On July 19, 2010, the DSS Operations Analysis 

Group received the suspicious contact reports 

that were submitted in response to the 

suspicious documents. In less than two weeks, 

DSS personnel addressed the suspicious 

documents and counterintelligence concerns 

linked to the former senior management 

official and coordinated with both the Industrial 

Security Field Office to terminate the facility 

clearance and with the Defense Industrial 

Security Clearance Office to also terminate 

appropriate personnel clearances.

This case depicts how DSS connected the 

dots beginning with a facility request for an 

“advise and assist” visit and ended with an 

investigation by another government agency 

into the former senior management official. 

Case Study #2: Jumping Companies

In September 2008, a cleared facility terminated 
Stakeholder Report 2011 31

Case Studies

a Subject’s employment based on several 

security violations that occurred between July 

and September 2008. In October 2008, this 

facility entered an incident report and noted 

the Subject’s termination in the Joint Personnel 

Adjudication System (JPAS). The entries about 

the subject in JPAS effectively prevented a 

second cleared facility from reinstating the 

Subject’s access to classified information 

without an additional background investigation.

In May 2009, a third cleared facility hired the 

subject. A personnel security investigation was 

initiated as part of the Subject’s employment, 

during which it was discovered he was collecting 

proprietary and sensitive information on the 

company’s projects. In February 2010, this 

third cleared facility terminated the Subject’s 

employment.

In July 2010, the Subject began working 

for a fourth cleared facility. DSS reinstated 

the Subject’s clearance in error. When the 

individual received word of his reinstated 

clearance, he contacted his immediate past 

employer inquiring about reemployment, as 

he now had a clearance. This facility contacted 

DSS, concerned that the individual had received 

a clearance.

The Operations Analysis Group discovered 

that the individual’s clearance had been 

reissued in error. DISCO corrected the 

Subject’s JPAS entry in August 2010 to 

reflect that he was ineligible for access 

to classified information until the security 

issues related to his conduct were resolved. 

The other government agency’s investigation 

into the individual’s activities is continuing. 

This case depicts how a Subject tried to move 

from one cleared company to another to gain 

a Secret clearance, even though he committed 

multiple security violations.
32 Defense Security Service

Case Studies

Case Study #3: CEO Investigated

In 985, a federal law enforcement agency 

arrested the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 

of a company. The CEO was subsequently 

convicted of illegally selling electronic 

eavesdropping equipment. 

In the late 1990s, the CEO and his company 

were both subjects of an industrial espionage 

investigation. The law enforcement agency 

involved in that investigation informed DSS 

that there was a new open investigation 

concerning the CEO related to terrorism 

financing allegations. 

The DSS Operations Analysis Group provided 

the Defense Industrial Security Clearance 

Office (DISCO) with the information and 

DISCO suspended the CEO’s personnel 

security clearance eligibility. 

The suspension of the individual’s clearance 

eligibility meant there were no cleared key 

management personnel (KMP) at the company. 

Without cleared KMP, the facility is ineligible for 

a facility clearance and the facility’s clearance 

was therefore terminated by DSS at the 

request of the facility’s new CEO.

This case depicts cross-agency coordination 

involving a cleared contractor and facility 

with ties to industrial espionage and a likely 

foreign terrorist organization.

Case Study #4: Outside Referral

During a 2007 interview for employment with 

a government agency (Agency 1), the Subject 

admitted to removing classified information 

from his office while he was interning at 

another government organization in 2004 

(Agency 2). 
Stakeholder Report 2011 33

Case Studies

The Subject, who was asked to reproduce 

classified documents while working at Agency 

2, even though he did not have the necessary 

clearance, stated he took the classified 

information home as a souvenir.

Agency 1 advised the Subject to return the 

classified information and did not hire him. 

The Subject returned most of the classified 

information; however, 10 documents are still 

unaccounted for. 

Subsequently, Agency 1’s Office of Security 

submitted this information as a hotline tip to a 

DoD criminal investigative agency in June 2010. 

While validating the information, that agency 

discovered that the Subject was cleared and 

was working for a contractor cleared under 

the NISP. DSS received the information in 

June 2010. 

The DSS Operations Analysis Group referred 

this case to several law enforcement agencies 

in July 2010. Based on the information and 

the severity of the mishandling of classified 

information while he worked for Agency 2, 

DSS suspended the Subject’s clearance.

The investigation is continuing, and DSS is 

supporting the law enforcement investigations 

with relevant information. This case 

depicts cross-agency coordination, leading 

to an investigation/operation by other 

Government agencies.
34 Defense Security Service

DSS Priorities & Future

For the coming year, DSS will continue to enhance and expand its oversight of the 

National Industrial Security Program and reinvigorate 

the Security Education, Training and Awareness 

Program. Our priorities are the following:

• Renew and strengthen the partnership 

between Government and Industry 

Stakeholders for the betterment of 

national security in this evolving security 

environment

• Continue to provide support to the 

cleared industrial base to ensure it is 

effective in detecting and mitigating 

threats

• Develop and implement a coordinated 

cybersecurity strategy across DSS and 

support industry in its efforts to deter 

cyberattacks

• Continue timely resolution of FOCI 

cases and provide enhanced FOCI 

oversight and analysis

• Establish an Insider Threat Program 

within DSS

• Complete BRAC-mandated moves to 

Marine Corps Base Quantico, Va., and 

Fort George G. Meade, Md., with no 

degradation of service

• Continue development and 

implementation of the DoD Security 

Professional Education Development 

(SPēD) Certification Program 

• Expand tailored inspection program 

to freight forwarders and Arms, 

Ammunition, & Explosives (AA&E) 

facilities

• Develop a procedure to standardize the 

security rating process nationwide in 

order to reduce subjectivity and increase 

consistency

• Reestablish an overseas industrial 

security presence

• Continue integration of 

counterintelligence into all aspects of 

DSS operations

In short, our intelligence community 

needs to work as one integrated team that 

produces quality, timely, and accurate 

intelligence. And ... this is a tough task.”

Barack H. Obama

President of the United States

“ 
The editorial content of this publication was prepared, edited, and approved by the Director, Defense 

Security Service. The views and opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of 

Defense. To comment, contact the DSS Public Affairs Office at (703) 325-9471 or email ocpa@dss.mil.