Filed 10/27/20 P. v. Jackson CA2/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. 

ALEX JACKSON,

Defendant and Appellant.

      B300276

      (Los Angeles County

      Super. Ct. No. MA059722)

APPEAL from a post-conviction order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Lisa M. Chung, Judge. Affirmed.

Deborah L. Hawkins, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, 

for Defendant and Appellant. 

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney 

General, Scott A. Taryle and Allison H. Chung, Deputy Attorneys 

General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

A jury convicted Alex Jackson of second degree murder, for which 

he received a prison sentence of 15 years to life. He appeals from a 

denial of his petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code1 section 

1170.95 (petition), for relief under Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. 

Sess.) (SB 1437), which established a procedure for resentencing of a 

defendant convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and 

probable consequences theory if the defendant could no longer be 

convicted of murder based on recent amendments to sections 188 and 

189. Appellant contends the trial court failed to adhere to the 

statutorily mandated procedure when it denied his petition without 

appointing him counsel, and without opposition from the prosecutor. 

We disagree. After receiving opposition to the petition from the 

prosecution, the court granted appellant’s request for appointed

counsel, and counsel filed a reply. Thereafter, the trial court found 

there was no basis for relief under section 1170.95 as a matter of law. 

We find no error, and affirm. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND2

In early May 2013, while on a morning walk in Littlerock, Pamela 

Devitt was attacked and severely injured by at least four of appellant’s 

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 Our factual narrative is drawn from our opinion in the prior appeal in 

this matter. (People v. Jackson (April 18, 2016, B259906) [nonpub. opn.], 

2016 WL 1583600 (Jackson).) We granted appellant’s request and take 

judicial notice of the record in Jackson. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).)
3

pit bulls. Devitt died in an ambulance en route to the hospital. 

(Jackson, supra, 2016 WL 1583600 at pp. *1–*2.) 

Appellant lived on a large lot in Littlerock and cultivated 

marijuana and psilocybin for sale. He regularly took in stray dogs 

(including five to 10 pit bulls) abandoned in the desert. The dogs 

guarded the fenced property, protecting appellant’s drug production and 

sales operation. In the 14 months preceding Devitt’s murder, dogs that 

escaped from appellant’s yard committed multiple attacks in which at 

least nine people and/or their horses were injured. (Jackson, supra, 

2016 WL 1583600 at pp. *1–*3.) Appellant watched at least two of 

those attacks as they took place, but did little or nothing to contain or 

control his dogs. (Id. at pp. *2–*3.) Numerous complaints were lodged 

with the sheriff’s and animal control departments, and appellant was 

warned repeatedly to contain the dogs. (Id. at pp. *1–*3.) Locals 

offered appellant materials to secure his fence, and he claimed to have 

twice added material to his picket fence to make it more structurally 

sound and prevent the dogs from escaping. (Id. at p. *2.) Most, if not 

all, of the attacks occurred after appellant claimed to have reinforced 

the fence. (Id. at p. *3.) 

After Devitt was killed, the dogs were removed from appellant and 

deputies discovered his marijuana and psilocybin operation. (Jackson, 

supra, 2016 WL 1583600 at p. *3.)
4

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

At trial, appellant was charged with murder (§ 187, subd. (a)); 

assault with a deadly weapon (he threw a rock at someone the dogs had 

attacked) § 245, subd. (a)(1)); cultivating marijuana (Health & Saf.

Code, § 11358); possession of marijuana for sale (Health & Saf. Code, 

§ 11359); and possession for sale of a controlled substance (psilocybin) 

(Health & Saf. Code, § 11378). A jury found appellant guilty of second

degree murder and guilty on all other counts, except for assault with a 

deadly weapon. He was sentenced to 15 years to life for the murder 

conviction. (Jackson, supra, 2016 WL 1583600 at p. *3.) We affirmed 

the judgment. (Jackson, at p. *7.) 

On February 25, 2019, appellant, then self-represented, filed a 

form petition for resentencing. He checked boxes stating he met the 

requirements of section 1170.95 for relief under SB 1437 and attached 

an explanatory paragraph. 

On March 25, 2019, the prosecution filed a 19-page opposition, in 

which it devoted 18 pages to the argument that section 1170.95 was 

unconstitutional. In the remaining page, the prosecution argued 

appellant was not eligible for relief under section 1170.95 because, 

notwithstanding his claim to the contrary, the record demonstrated he 

was the actual killer, not an accomplice, and his conviction of second 

degree murder was based on implied malice, as demonstrated by the 

jury instructions. 

The trial court—the judge who had presided over the trial—

appointed counsel, who filed a lengthy reply brief on appellant’s behalf 
5

on June 16, 2019. That brief was devoted solely to the argument that 

section 1170.95 was constitutional.

3

At a July 8, 2019 hearing on the petition, the parties submitted on 

the papers, without argument. The court denied the petition on the 

ground that appellant was not entitled to relief under section 1170.95 

as a matter of law. The court rejected the argument that section 

1170.95 (SB 1437) was unconstitutional. Turning to the substance of 

the petition, the court noted it had reviewed the terms of section 

1170.95, its notes from trial and the instructions given to the jury. The 

court found appellant had failed to establish a prima facie case showing 

his eligibility for relief because he was not tried under either the felony 

murder rule or the natural and probable consequences doctrine.

4 The 

court noted its findings were made over the objection of defendant’s 

counsel, who claimed (for the first time at the hearing) that, at the time 

he filed the reply brief, he lacked complete material regarding the 

3 In his reply brief in support of the petition, appellant’s appointed 

counsel noted the brief was “solely addressed to the issue of the 

constitutionality of [section 1170.95],” but he reserved the right to address 

“any issues, facts, or law that may bear on, or relate, to [appellant’s] 

eligibility” for relief under that statute. As we discuss, infra, the record 

establishes as a matter of law that appellant is not entitled to relief. 

Therefore, the failure of counsel in the trial court to brief this issue is 

immaterial to the outcome of this appeal.

4 Independently, the court also found appellant failed to make a prima 

facie showing of eligibility because he had been a “major participant” who

“act[ed] with reckless indifference to human life.” We need not discuss this 

alternative basis, because (as we explain) no theory of vicarious liability was 

involved in this case.
6

issues at trial, and had “reserve[d] the right to respond” on the merits. 

This timely appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

In his opening brief on appeal, appellant maintains the trial court 

erred in denying his petition for resentencing, because his petition 

alleged a prima facie case for resentencing, which the court denied 

without granting his request for appointed counsel, and without 

receiving opposition from the prosecution. As our summary of the 

procedural history demonstrates, the contention is based on a 

misstatement of the record. The trial court, in fact, appointed counsel 

and received opposition from the prosecution and reply briefing from 

appointed counsel.5 In any event, the trial court’s ruling must be 

upheld, because, as a matter of law, appellant is not entitled to relief.

I. Statutory Principles and the Standard of Review

“[SB] 1437 [effective Jan. 1, 2019] was enacted to ‘amend the 

felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine,

. . . to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not 

the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major 

participant of the underlying felony who acted with reckless 

indifference to human life.’ (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) [SB]

5 In his reply brief on appeal, appellant concedes that the trial court 

granted his request for counsel, but fails to explain his initial 

misrepresentation.
7

1437 achieves these goals by amending section 188 to require that a 

principal act with express or implied malice and by amending section 

189 to state that a person can only be liable for felony murder if (1) the 

‘person was the actual killer’; (2) the person was an aider or abettor in 

the commission of murder in the first degree; or (3) the ‘person was a 

major participant in the underling felony and acted with reckless 

indifference to human life.’ (§ 189, subd. (e), as amended by Stats. 

2018, ch. 1015, §§ 2, 3.)” (People v. Cornelius (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 54, 

57 (Cornelius), review granted March 18, 2020, No. S260410.) 

“[S]ection 1170.95 . . . allows a ‘person convicted of felony murder 

or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory [to] file a 

petition with the court that sentenced the petitioner to have the 

petitioner’s murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any 

remaining counts.’ (§ 1170.95, subd. (a).) . . . [A]ll three of the following 

conditions must be met: ‘(1) A complaint, information, or indictment 

was filed against the petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed 

under a theory of felony murder or murder under the natural and 

probable consequences doctrine. [¶] (2) The petitioner was convicted of 

first or second degree murder following a trial . . . . [¶] (3) The 

petitioner could not be convicted of first or second degree murder 

because of changes to [s]ection 188 or 189 [effective beginning Jan.

2019].’ [Citation.]” (Cornelius, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 57, citing 

§ 1170.95, subd. (b)(1).)

The Legislature intended a three-step evaluation for a section 

1170.95 petition. (People v. Verdugo (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 320, 328, 
8

332–333 (Verdugo), rev. granted March 18, 2020, S260493; People v. 

Torres (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1168, 1177, review granted June 24, 2020, 

S262011 [“subdivisions (b) and (c) of [section 1170.95] require the trial 

court to make three separate determinations”].) At the initial stage, 

“[i]f any of the required information is missing and cannot be readily 

ascertained by the court, ‘the court may deny the petition without 

prejudice to the filing of another petition and advise the petitioner that 

the matter cannot be considered without the missing information.’ 

(§ 1170.95, subd. (b)(2).) [¶] If the petition contains all required 

information, section 1170.95, subdivision (c), prescribes a two-step 

process for the court to determine if an order to show cause should 

issue: ‘The court shall review the petition and determine if the 

petitioner has made a prima facie showing that the petitioner falls 

within the provisions of this section. If the petitioner has requested 

counsel, the court shall appoint counsel to represent the petitioner. The 

prosecutor shall file and serve a response . . . and the petitioner may file 

and serve a reply . . . . If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing 

that he or she is entitled to relief, the court shall issue an order to show 

cause.’” (Verdugo, at p. 327; see People v. Nguyen (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 

1154, 1165–1166 (Nguyen) [§ 1170.95, subd. (c), provides for two prima 

facie reviews].) 

In determining whether the petitioner has made a prima facie 

showing that he or she is entitled to relief under section 1170.95, 

subdivision (c), “[t]he trial court should not evaluate the credibility of 

the petition’s assertions, but it need not credit factual assertions that 
9

are untrue as a matter of law—for example, a petitioner’s assertion that 

a particular conviction is eligible for relief where the crime is not listed 

in subdivision (a) of section 1170.95 as eligible for resentencing. . . . [I]f 

the record ‘contain[s] facts refuting the allegations made in the petition

. . . the court is justified in making a credibility determination adverse 

to the petitioner.’ [Citation.] However, this authority to make 

determinations without conducting an evidentiary hearing pursuant . . .

is limited to readily ascertainable facts from the record (such as the 

crime of conviction), rather than factfinding involving the weighing of 

evidence or the exercise of discretion.” (People v. Drayton (2020) 47 

Cal.App.5th 965, 980 (Drayton); accord, Nguyen, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th 

at pp. 1165–1166.)

“[O]ur analysis of the trial court’s order focuses on the trial court’s 

interpretation of section 1170.95(c), and we therefore review its order de 

novo.” (Drayton, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 981; see ZB, N.A. v. 

Superior Court (2019) 8 Cal.5th 175, 188–189 [questions of statutory 

interpretation are reviewed de novo]; Verdugo, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 328, fn. 8 [the appellate court’s principal task in interpreting a 

statute is to determine Legislative intent and give effect to the law’s 

purpose].) We independently review whether the trial court properly 

interpreted and fulfilled its duty under the statute. (See Greene v. 

Marin County Flood Control & Water Conservation Dist. (2010) 49 

Cal.4th 277, 287 [questions of law are reviewed de novo].)
10

The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying the Petition

Here, the record of appellant’s conviction establishes that none of 

the theories of vicarious liability implicated by section 1170.95—the 

natural and probable consequences theory of aiding and abetting, and 

felony murder where the defendant is neither the actual killer nor a 

direct aider and abettor—were involved. As we explained in our opinion 

affirming appellant’s conviction of second degree murder, “The second 

degree murder instruction given to the jury required the People to prove 

beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) ‘The defendant committed an act or 

failed to do a required act that caused the death of another person;’ and 

(2) ‘When the defendant acted or failed to do a required act, he had a 

state of mind called malice aforethought.’” (Jackson, supra, 2016 WL 

1583600 at p. *3.)

Insofar as the instruction referred to a failure to do an act, we 

noted that the trial court failed to expressly define the legal duty that 

would make a failure to act an actus reus for second degree murder. We 

explained that duty as follows: “If an animal creates a foreseeable risk 

of injury to others, the owner ‘has a duty to anticipate the harm and to 

exercise ordinary care to prevent the harm. [Citation.]’” (Jackson, 

supra, 2016 WL 1583600 at p. *4.) Assuming (without deciding) the 

failure to define this duty was error, we found the error harmless: “The 

evidence established that appellant had notice his dogs were jumping 

over his fence, attacking passersby, and that he failed to exercise 

ordinary care by failing to remedy the situation. In closing, the 

prosecutor argued to the jury that ‘[i]t is the owner’s job to keep us 
11

safe[,]’ when the owner knows that his dogs are dangerous, and have 

attacked people. Thus, in the absence of the assumed error—the failure 

to define the relevant duty in the murder instruction—it is not 

reasonably probable that a different result would have been reached. 

The evidence left no doubt that defendant owed a duty to take 

reasonable precautions to control his dangerous dogs, that he failed to 

do so, and that his failure caused the victim’s death.” (Jackson, supra, 

2016 WL 1583600 at p. *4.)

We further found the evidence sufficient to support the jury’s 

finding of implied malice: “Under the malice aforethought instruction, 

the jury was required to find that appellant acted with implied malice 

if: (1) ‘He intentionally committed an act or failed to do a required act;’

(2) ‘The natural and probable consequences of the act or failure to do a 

required act were dangerous to human life;’

[6] (3) ‘At the time he acted 

or failed to do a required act, he knew his act or failure to do a required 

act was dangerous to human life;’ and (4) ‘He deliberately acted with 

conscious disregard for human life.’ [¶] In this case, the requirement of 

intent to commit an act or intentional failure to do a required act 

element was satisfied by the following evidence: appellant’s awareness 

of the attempted attacks by his dogs; awareness that his fence was 

inadequate to keep the dogs from reaching persons who came close to 

the property; related failure to take any other steps from preventing the 

6 We note that jury was instructed on natural and probable consequences 

only in terms of causation for implied malice. The jury was not instructed on 

the natural and probable consequences doctrine as it relates to aider and

abettor liability.
12

dogs from jumping over the fence; efforts to hide the dogs; denial of 

owning them; and motive for doing so—his illegal marijuana operation 

on the property. The natural and probable consequences of his failure 

to keep his dogs from jumping the fence were dangerous to human life 

was shown by evidence that when the dogs jumped the fence, they 

attacked horseback riders, and then on May 9, 2013, the dogs fatally 

attacked the victim. Appellant knew his failure to keep the dogs from 

jumping his fence was dangerous to human life because he was on 

notice the dogs had caused injuries to the horses, and on at least one 

occasion, to a rider. Finally, it is reasonable for the jury to have found 

that appellant acted with conscious disregard for human life. He was 

on notice that the pit bulls had attacked horseback riders, he knew his 

failure to keep the dogs from jumping the fence was dangerous to 

human life, and still he made a deliberate decision to do nothing. 

Because he was engaged in an illegal activity, he had a reason to keep 

people away from his property. Furthermore, there is evidence he was 

trying to hide the fact that he had pit bulls and at times denied he had 

pit bulls, which shows his consciousness of guilt.” (Jackson, supra, 2016 

WL 1583600 at p. *5.)

In short, the record establishes, as a matter of law, that the jury 

convicted defendant of second degree murder on a theory implied 

malice, based on his personal acts or failure to act resulting in the death 

of a human being. No theory of vicarious liability implicated by section 

1170.95 was involved. Thus, defendant is not entitled to relief as a 

matter of law, and the trial court’s ruling is affirmed. 
13

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

WILLHITE, J.

We concur:

MANELLA, P. J.

CURREY, J.