Hazel Smith

Overcoming Humanitarian

Dilemmas in the DPRK

(North Korea)

Briefly . . .

• In 1995 the DPRK (north Korean) government appealed to the international community for assistance to cope with gross food shortages, which threatened starvation for

its people.

• UN humanitarian agencies that had had some relationship with the DPRK since the

1980s—the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the World Food Program (WFP)— responded to these appeals and became fully operational and resident

in the country after 1995.

• Prior to the crisis of the mid-1990s, the DPRK had no experience of working with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) except for periodic links with the Red Cross and

through its hosting of small delegations such as the American Friends Service Committee.

• The UN agencies and the NGOs had little knowledge of the politics, economy, culture,

or society of the DPRK prior to their involvement in emergency assistance to the

country.

• The DPRK government had a parallel lack of knowledge and understanding of the conventional requirements for international humanitarian assistance.

• Humanitarian agencies found common difficulties in the constraints placed by the

government on monitoring, assessment, and evaluation and faced a dilemma about

whether or on what terms to continue.

• Agency responses varied considerably, according to a multiplicity of factors, including country of origin, mandate, and type of donor.

• The majority perspective was that confidence building and a process of mutual comprehension had taken place and continues to evolve between the DPRK government

and the humanitarian agencies.

www.usip.org

SPECIAL REPORT

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SPECIAL REPORT 90 July 2002

ABOUT THE REPORT

This report examines the diversity of humanitarian

agency responses to working in the Democratic 

People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)—north Korea—

and proposes a set of recommendations for 

agencies and governments.

Hazel Smith worked for the UN World Food Program

in the DPRK from August 2000 to July 2001. Smith

is currently a senior fellow in the Jennings

Randolph Program for International Peace at the

Institute. A much earlier version of this report was

written for a workshop on “Minimum Conditions for

Operating in the DPRK” organized by the Centre for

Humanitarian Dialogue (CHD), Geneva, in December

2001. The views presented herein are the views of

the author and not necessarily of CHD.

The information in this report comes from United

Nations, governmental, and non-governmental organization (NGO) reports on humanitarian activity 

in the DPRK and the results of an e-mail and telephone survey of major humanitarian actors that

have operated and continue to operate in the

DPRK. The survey was carried out by the author 

in October and November 2001.

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Institute of

Peace, which does not advocate specific policies.

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE

CONTENTS

Introduction 2

The Crisis 2

The Government’s Response 2

The Scope and Scale of the Effort 4

Mutual Incomprehension 6

Agency Concerns 7

Humanitarian Principles 7

Agency Responses 8

Humanitarian Coordination13

Change13

Humanitarian Dilemma14

Conclusion15

Recommendations15
• Although difficulties remain, the process of dialogue has facilitated an improvement

in humanitarian agency working conditions. 

• Humanitarian assistance continues to save lives and therefore multilateral and bilateral humanitarian agencies should continue to supply much-needed assistance.

• Donor governments should build on the channels opened by humanitarian assistance

to further develop policies of constructive engagement, confidence building, and the

slow but essential formation of trust that is crucial for bringing human and international security to the Korean peninsula.

Introduction

International humanitarian agencies have been working in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)—north Korea—since 1995. Working conditions have not been easy and

some of the agencies that have chosen to end operating in the DPRK, as a reaction to the

constraints on their operations, have generated widespread publicity for their position. This

publicity has generally masked the fact that only a tiny minority of international agencies

supported the withdrawal approach. Many more have chosen to carry on delivering assistance—arguing that they are meeting humanitarian need, that conditions for humanitarian work in the DPRK are improving, and that a process of confidence building is occurring

with the DPRK government. 

The focus of this paper is not the case for or against humanitarian assistance, but the

core humanitarian dilemma for those working in the DPRK. Given the acceptance by all

agencies of widespread humanitarian need, but given also the constraints placed upon

humanitarian operations, on what terms should the agencies continue with humanitarian assistance to the people of the DPRK?

The Crisis

In the mid-1990s the DPRK suffered from a series of natural disasters that both destroyed

food crops and exacerbated the structural economic decline that had been taking place

since at least the late 1980s. By the early to mid-1990s the DPRK could not feed its population by its own production, and did not have the resources to purchase food from

abroad. In addition, lack of locally produced inputs and the wherewithal to purchase

them contributed to nationwide deterioration in the socioeconomic infrastructure,

including (although not confined to) the transport, energy, health, education, and welfare sectors.

The Government’s Response

The DPRK government had initially responded to the growing crisis with various self-help

initiatives that included encouraging innovation in the workplace, recycling of all used

material, the cultivation of marginal agricultural land, the organization and support of

population movement toward land where food could be obtained, and the ever more

extensive use of human labor in place of equipment and machinery that was no longer

available in the country. In 1995, after massive floods destroyed up to three million tons

of emergency grain reserves, the government was forced to appeal to the United Nations

humanitarian agencies and non-governmental organizations for assistance.

According to figures produced jointly by the government and the United Nations

Development Program (UNDP), gross domestic product (GDP) declined by about 50 percent between 1993 and 1996, representing a drop in per capita income to $481. Acute

2

ABOUT THE INSTITUTE

The United States Institute of Peace is an 

independent, nonpartisan federal institution 

created by Congress to promote the prevention,

management, and peaceful resolution of international conflicts. Established in 1984, the Institute

meets its congressional mandate through an 

array of programs, including research grants, 

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programs from high school through graduate

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United States and confirmed by the Senate.

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

Chester A. Crocker (Chairman), James R. Schlesinger

Professor of Strategic Studies, School of Foreign Service,

Georgetown University • Seymour Martin Lipset (Vice

Chairman), Hazel Professor of Public Policy, George

Mason University • Betty F. Bumpers, Founder and 

former President, Peace Links, Washington, D.C. 

• Holly J. Burkhalter, Advocacy Director, Physicians for

Human Rights, Washington, D.C. • Marc E. Leland, Esq.,

President, Marc E. Leland & Associates, Arlington, Va. 

• Mora L. McLean, Esq., President, Africa-America Institute, New York, N.Y. • María Otero, President, ACCION

International, Boston, Mass. • Barbara W. Snelling, former State Senator and former Lieutenant Governor, Shelburne, Vt. • Harriet Zimmerman, Vice President, American

Israel Public Affairs Committee, Washington, D.C.

MEMBERS EX OFFICIO

Lorne W. Craner, Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor • Douglas J. Feith, Under

Secretary of Defense for Policy • Paul G. Gaffney II, Vice

Admiral, U.S. Navy; President, National Defense University • Richard H. Solomon, President, United States

Institute of Peace (nonvoting)
3

food shortages threatened the lives of millions, particularly the most vulnerable—

children, women, the elderly, and the sick. Starvation followed for hundreds of thousands.

It is impossible to obtain accurate information on the number of “excess deaths” (deaths

in excess of normal mortality) due to starvation, malnutrition, and related causes during

what is now understood as the worst years of crisis, between 1995 and 1998. Figures have

been cited ranging from 220,000, which was a number calculated from governmental

statements on changing death and birth rates, to three million, which appears to have

been arrived at by combining worst case scenarios. Whatever the number, the scale of

death and suffering was evidence of a humanitarian disaster. The crisis was nationwide and

severe malnutrition among children was observed everywhere, including in Pyongyang.

From the late 1990s, the government has prioritized for food distribution the military and workers engaged in industries designed to rebuild the economy. What is left of

the main October harvest is shared through the remnants of the public distribution system until the harvest runs out, usually by December or January of each year. The population in provinces with less arable land, such as in the northeast, have been in the main

more vulnerable than others, except where they have access to alternative coping strategies such as formal and informal trade with China and access to the sea for fishing.

Agricultural Policy

Since 1995, the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) has carried out, in conjunction

with the government and the UN World Food Program (WFP), biannual food and crop

assessments in the DPRK. The FAO/WFP surveys, compiled from satellite data, government

information, discussions with humanitarian agencies, and field visits, have shown that

annual food production is insufficient to meet needs. Annual cereal production remains

at a low level with a decline in production since the start of the FAO/WFP surveys in 1995.

On the more positive side, the most recent FAO/WFP crop assessment, of October 2001,

indicates a 38 percent increase in cereal production compared to the very difficult previous year, with some indication of structural improvements, although the report also indicates a continuing large aggregate food deficit. The report states that a grave food crisis

can only be averted in 2002 through continuing international assistance.

The improvements in agriculture evidenced in 2001 came about through the coordinated action, since 1998, of the government and the international community, including

donor governments and international development and humanitarian agencies, which

have been jointly implementing the UNDP-led Agricultural Recovery and Environmental

Plan (AREP). The plan involves more use of double cropping; the diversification of cereal

crops, notably through greater use of potato as a staple; and international technical

cooperation. Also important has been the provision of fertilizer by south Korea, since the

DPRK has a small amount of agricultural land (18 percent of the total) and is heavily

dependent on the use of fertilizer, chemicals, and, given the difficult topography, 

electricity-fed irrigation, which requires scarce fuel.

Food Security Policies

Humanitarian agencies, donors, and government share the broad conclusions of the

FAO/WFP that food security cannot realistically be obtained only through the reorientation of agricultural policy, although marginal improvements can continue. Food

security will only come about if the economy is revived so the country can both buy the

inputs it needs to produce food and earn the hard currency it needs to buy food on international markets. Currently, export earnings remain minimal—around $500 million dollars a year. In addition, the scale of the capital necessary to resuscitate the economy

will entail foreign capital investment, which will have to come from the multilateral

financial institutions and the neighboring countries of Japan or the Republic of Korea

(ROK). Neither China nor the European Union has a major interest in providing signifiAcute food shortages threatened

the lives of millions, particularly

the most vulnerable—children,

women, the elderly, and the sick.

Starvation followed for hundreds

of thousands. 

The population in provinces

with less arable land, such as 

in the northeast, have been 

in the main more vulnerable

than others.
4

cant investment in the DPRK. The United States, even given more harmonious political

relations, is also unlikely to be a major provider of support for economic recovery.

Support from multilateral institutions such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, which would effectively require United States approval, would be contingent

on a change of policies by the DPRK government in the direction of more political freedom and more transparency. Another major source of potential export earnings is from

reparations that Japan will pay on a similar basis to those paid the Republic of Korea in

the 1960s, as recompense for the destruction and suffering caused by the Japanese occupation of the first half of the 20th century. The amount and timing of such payments is

entirely related to the outcome of normalization talks between Japan and the DPRK, currently stalled owing to a lack of agreement on missiles and the broader security environment including the alleged kidnapping and abduction of Japanese nationals. South

Korean business continues to invest in the DPRK—mainly for reasons of national pride

and as an aid to peacebuilding—but only in relatively small amounts. Significant investment from south Korea is likely to occur only when the political relationship between

North and South becomes more stable.

Another source of export earnings for the DPRK is missile technology, although the

United States, Japan, and other countries are anxious to prevent the proliferation of

both missiles and missile technology and are working to prevent such exports. In October 2000, DPRK-U.S. talks on security issues, including a missiles agreement, which

would likely have opened the doors to cautious western economic involvement in the

DPRK, developed to the extent that Secretary of State Madeline Albright visited

Pyongyang, but the talks have since broken down. Until international talks on a nonproliferation agreement are revived and an agreement on missiles and security

obtained, it seems unlikely that the external investment that is necessary to revive the

economy will be forthcoming.

The Scope and Scale of the Humanitarian Effort

In 1995, multilateral, bilateral, and non-governmental humanitarian agencies responded

to the crisis through the provision of large-scale assistance, and they continue seven

years later to provide “emergency” or humanitarian assistance, although in 2002 most of

the agencies are attempting to incorporate some form of development or rehabilitation

into their humanitarian programs. Few external observers are aware of the sheer immensity and diversity of the humanitarian effort. Total U.S. food aid since 1995, for instance,

amounts to 1.8 million metric tons, valued at $591 million, with the United States donating around 40 percent of total food aid in 2001. 

Since the first international humanitarian responses to the crisis, the composition of

the international humanitarian community in terms of the types of agencies and their

geographical provenance has been diverse. In addition, some agencies are resident while

many more are non-resident. The wide variety of organizations helps to explain the diversity of perspectives on humanitarian involvement in the DPRK. On the other hand, if

methods of operation and mandates have varied, sectors of assistance have remained

more or less the same. The most substantial sector of foreign assistance remains that of

direct food aid, although agriculture and health are now also supported.

A Changing Humanitarian Community

There have been two main changes in the composition of the international humanitarian

community between 1995 and 2002. The first is the move from a negligible in-country

presence to, relatively speaking, a substantial residential presence, including governmental, multilateral, and non-governmental agencies. The second and related change is

the start of work by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the DPRK. NGO methods

Support from multilateral 

institutions such as the World

Bank and the Asian Development Bank, which would

effectively require United States

approval, would be contingent

on a change of policies by the

DPRK government in the

direction of more political freedom and more transparency.

Few external observers are

aware of the sheer immensity

and diversity of the humanitarian effort.

The wide variety of organizations helps to explain the

diversity of perspectives on

humanitarian involvement 

in the DPRK.
5

of operation differ according to geographical origin. South Korean and Japanese NGOs

are non-residential. United States NGOs have been mainly non-residential (with the partial exception of health and food aid monitors in-country in parts of 1998, 1999, and

2000). European NGOs have been mainly residential. (It is a condition of funding of the

European Community’s Humanitarian Office that there is a resident presence.) So far the

Canadian NGOs have operated as non-residents.

Multilateral and Bilateral Agencies

From 1995, UN resident missions were consolidated, expanded, and shifted in focus from

non-residential to residential. The key agency for development assistance was UNDP, the

“oldest” of the resident agencies, having established an office in 1980, which also

helped, among other things, to organize and implement humanitarian assistance in the

“cross-over” from relief to rehabilitation. WFP established an office in November 1995,

UNICEF in January 1996, and the World Health Organization (WHO) in late 1997. UN

agencies in DPRK have expanded their presence since 1995 with, by 2002, in-country

international representation from the UN Family Planning Association, a national officer

employed by FAO in-country, and regular visiting missions from smaller UN agencies, for

example, the World Tourism Organization.

In July 1997, the Swiss Disaster Relief Unit (SDR) opened an office in Pyongyang, followed in August by the European Commission, which established an office with six international staff members (four from the commission’s Food Security Unit and two from

ECHO, the European Community Humanitarian Aid Office). The major bilateral agency

operating in the DPRK in 2002 is SDC, the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (under which the old SDR is now subsumed). In addition, the Italian Development

Cooperation has had a resident presence in Pyongyang for a couple of years. 

The Resident NGO Community

A number of NGOs including Caritas and Medecins sans Frontieres (MSF) visited the DPRK

from 1995 on to provide immediate aid and make assessments of need. The first NGO residency was established in 1997 when the International Federation of the Red Cross

(IFRC) set up an office in Pyongyang along with six other non-governmental agencies.

These were Children’s Aid Direct (CAD), Concern Worldwide, Cooperazione e Sviluppo

(CESVI), Deutsche Welthungerhilfe—known in English as German Agro Action (GAA),

Medecins du Monde (MDM), and MSF. In 1998 Action Against Hunger, Help Age International, Oxfam, and Cap Anamur also became resident. 

The NGO community has fluctuated in number since then. Five have left and six have

arrived. Since 1997, additions to the resident NGO community have been Adventist

Development Relief Agency or ADRA (Switzerland), PMU Interlife (the Swedish Pentecostal mission, Pingst Missionens Utveck), Campus fur Christus (Switzerland), and in

2000, two new French NGOs, Handicap International and Triangle. In 2001 Hungarian

Baptist Aid established what it calls “semi-residential” status.

Of the five resident agencies that decided to leave DPRK, three voiced concerns that

they were not reaching the most vulnerable children and that the difficulties and constraints they faced prevented adequate assessment, monitoring, and evaluation. One

agency, Oxfam, was particularly concerned with constraints on adequate monitoring and

assessment, not of beneficiaries, but of the water facilities it was testing. There were

also problems for some programs in obtaining funds for the DPRK operations.

The Non-Resident NGOs

At least four groups of non-resident NGOs have also assisted DPRK, none of these groups

being mutually exclusive. Two groups (with overlapping membership) operate through a

Of the five resident agencies

that decided to leave DPRK,

three voiced concerns that they

were not reaching the most 

vulnerable children and that the

difficulties and constraints they

faced prevented adequate

assessment, monitoring, 

and evaluation.
6

semi-resident presence in the DPRK. The first are those who coordinate their activities

through the NGO-funded Food Aid Liaison Unit (FALU) of the WFP. The second are those

NGOs from the United States that have coordinated their activities through the Private

Voluntary Organization Consortium (PVOC). A third group operates through sister NGOs,

some of which are resident in the DPRK and some of which are not. A fourth group operates bilaterally, directly with the DPRK government, and includes south Korean, Japanese, and United States–based NGOs.

FALU was set up in 1997 by Caritas, the Canadian Foodgrains Bank (CFGB), Action for

Churches Together (ACT)/Church World Service, World Vision International (WVI), ADRA,

Food for the Hungry, and Mercy Corps International. In 2002, members are Caritas, CFGB,

ACT, and WVI. FALU currently employs one DPRK-based international officer and two

national officers who undertake monitoring, evaluation, and reporting on behalf of its

constituent NGOs. 

PVOC was established in 1997 and was comprised of ADRA, Amigos Internacionales,

CARE, Catholic Relief Service, Church World Service, Korean-American Sharing Movement,

Latter Day Saints Charities, Mercy Corps, and World Vision. PVOC monitors were based in

DPRK in 1998 with UNICEF, and in 1999-2000 with WFP. Three Korean speakers were

employed in a team whose numbers changed but comprised around eight people. The

PVOC team exited the country when the potato seed project and the Food for Work activities, which its member NGOs had supported, came to an end in 2000. 

The third group of NGOs—mainly of U.S. origin—work with international counterparts, for instance the American Red Cross supports the IFRC. U.S. agencies like the

Eugene Bell Foundation and the Institute on Strategic Reconciliation work in tandem

with south Korean counterparts as well as the DPRK authorities.

Some non-resident NGOs choose to work bilaterally. These include AmeriCares, the

American Friends Service Committee, and Mercy Corps (in addition to its work within the

PVOC).

Japanese NGOs, which have been assisting the DPRK since 1995, have tended to work

closely with the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan, a long-established

organization with close ties to the DPRK government. Japanese NGOs include the Association to Send Eggs and Bananas to the Children of the DPRK, Caritas-Japan, the Relief

Campaign Committee for Children, and the National Christian Council in Japan.

South Korean NGOs have also assisted the DPRK and their numbers and activities

have grown since they first started work in late 1995. Agencies include the Korean Sharing Movement, Iussaran Association, World Vision, Join Together Society, and the Korean People’s Welfare Foundation. In June 2001, 26 south Korean NGOs were donating

humanitarian assistance to the DPRK.

Of the non-resident NGOs, two U.S.-based NGOs have decided that they will no

longer operate in the DPRK, citing operational constraints including the inability to

conduct adequate assessment, monitoring, and evaluation. These are CARE and

Catholic Relief Services (CRS). In contrast, south Korean NGOs have tried to encourage a greater participation from international non-governmental agencies in the

DPRK.

A Background of Mutual Incomprehension

The DPRK is probably the most closed society in the world and prior to the food emergency of the 1990s very little reliable information was available about the country. The

government viewed all data through a national security prism which considered that

even basic micro socio-economic statistics could be useful to its adversaries. The agencies thus had a double handicap. First, they had no basic information other than that

provided by the government or that could be gleaned from the rare publication that

attempted to offer some objective analysis of the country from the little data available.

Principles of transparency and

accountability demanded by

agencies were therefore

antithetical to the operating 

of the state. 
Second, requests for what was seen by the agencies as standard baseline data were often

seen by the government as unnecessarily intrusive, and as seeming to ask for information

that could be made available to enemy states. Principles of transparency and accountability demanded by agencies were therefore antithetical to the operating of the state.

Humanitarian Agency Concerns

The DPRK did not present the classic problems for humanitarian agencies in that personal safety for workers has never been an issue. Instead, from early 1997, NGOs and the key

UN agencies of WFP and UNICEF began to express concerns that they were not permitted

unimpeded access to beneficiaries to assess need and impact of assistance, and to monitor the distribution of aid. Agencies were also concerned with the reliability and quality

of information they received from the government. The substantive concerns of many

humanitarian agencies focused on two related areas—whether aid was reaching the most

vulnerable of the population, and the restrictions on direct access to beneficiary or potential beneficiary groups. Not all the agencies have voiced these concerns and the agencies

that have voiced these concerns have not shared them to the same degree. 

Humanitarian Principles

In 1998, in an attempt to clarify with the government what the humanitarian agencies

viewed as appropriate and essential principles for humanitarian operations in the DPRK,

humanitarian agencies issued a collective set of “humanitarian principles.” These were

initially worked out with DPRK officials and were first issued in November 1998 and

amended in April 1999 and March 2001:

• knowledge about the overall humanitarian situation in the country according to

assessed needs

• assurance that humanitarian assistance reaches sectors of the population in greatest need

• access for assessment, monitoring, and evaluation

• distribution of assistance only to areas where access is granted

• protection of the humanitarian interests of the population

• support to local capacity building

• beneficiary participation in program planning and implementation

• adequate capacity in terms of international staff

• meet the health and safety needs of the international humanitarian community

Humanitarian agencies have also issued three consensus statements on humanitarian

operations in the country. The humanitarian principles are monitored through a series of

benchmarks developed by the in-country humanitarian/development working group comprised of all the resident humanitarian agencies. Progress on the benchmarks is regularly

recorded in reports on implementation of the United Nations’ annual Common Humanitarian Assistance Plan, which is coordinated by the UN Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).

The nine humanitarian principles express broad areas in which the agencies wish to

see progress and serve as a baseline for individual and collective agency negotiations

with the government. A set of indicators has been developed by OCHA in order to record,

in detail, achievements and constraints in respect to the implementation of the humanitarian principles. These are regularly updated, and the most recent report shows gradual

improvements in some areas, continuing constraints in others, and some deterioration in

a small number of areas.

7

The substantive concerns of

many humanitarian agencies

focused on two related areas—

whether aid was reaching 

the most vulnerable of the population, and the restrictions on

direct access to beneficiary or

potential beneficiary groups.
Agency Responses to Working Conditions

Agency responses to working conditions in the DPRK varied considerably according to a

multiplicity of factors, including type of agency and country of origin, agency mandate,

and type and nature of donor. In so far as generalizations can be made, differing views

were held by the multilateral and bilateral governmental agencies; the south Korean and

Japanese NGOs; U.S. NGOs; European, Canadian, and Australian agencies; and the two

international federations of NGOs, Caritas and the IFRC. European agency reactions

showed a range of views and these are discussed in some detail in this report because

of the publicity some of them generated, not because they are the most substantial

providers of assistance to the DPRK.

Governmental Agencies: Bilateral and Multilateral

The bilateral and multilateral organizations engage in continuous negotiations with the

DPRK government to try to improve the standard and quality of humanitarian operations in the DPRK. SDC, for instance, which operates in specified counties to support

agricultural recovery, tries to include capacity building and training in all its projects

and has been successful in implementing training programs in and out of the country.

Full-time international staff work with farmers, the Academy of Agricultural Sciences

and the Ministry of Agriculture, and the Flood Damage Rehabilitation Commission

(FDRC) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. SDC has also engaged in food distribution,

most recently of frozen beef, and its monitors claim to have had exceptional access to

institutions and beneficiaries.

The UN World Food Program has responded to the information challenges by developing an elaborate monitoring and assessment system based on the county as the unit

of analysis. The new WFP county database allows for systematic collection, organization,

and comparison of population, agricultural, nutritional, and gender-based data—using

qualitative and quantitative inputs from government as well as staff observations and

interviews. The continuing problem here remains the accuracy of the data supplied. WFP

has five sub-offices that are more or less permanently staffed throughout the year and,

although monitoring visits still require a week’s notice and are still sometimes cancelled

without adequate explanation, some flexibility has been achieved in the ability of emergency officers in the field to vary schedules. Geographical access has increased to 163

counties out of 206, with the most recent becoming open in October 2001. About 400

visits take place a month to county officials, children’s institutions, hospitals, Food for

Work sites, and beneficiaries’ homes. 

The quality of information from visits is variable. Many county officials and institution directors are keen to share information with international staff but there are also

those who either offer minimal information or information that does not appear accurate. Very often the quality of the information correlates directly to the quality of relationship the international officer has developed over the months or years with the

Korean counterparts with whom they are working. Generally, conversations with beneficiaries appear less open than conversations with officials. Since family visits tend to

involve up to seven or eight visitors, and the beneficiary is unlikely to have had any previous contact with foreigners (and since many adult beneficiaries are women), it is

inhibiting to talk to strangers, particularly men, about personal issues such as breastfeeding or nutrition habits. It could also be because they are prevented from responding freely by DPRK officials. 

WFP and UNICEF have a high proportion of female emergency officers, which helps in

this environment because of the need to gear aid toward pregnant and nursing women

and small children and the consequent high preponderance of beneficiary interviewing

that necessitates inquiry into women’s private affairs. Agencies need to continue to

ensure that sufficient female staff are employed. WFP has also held a number of work8

Agency responses to working

conditions in the DPRK varied

considerably according to a multiplicity of factors, including

type of agency and country of

origin, agency mandate, and

type and nature of donor.

Many county officials and institution directors are keen to

share information with international staff but there are also

those who either offer minimal

information or information that

does not appear accurate.
shops on nutrition and food for provincial medical personnel, care workers, and officials

that were widely commended by Korean and international participants. 

Conditions for staff in the field are still difficult, as they are for all agency staff. Outside Pyongyang, staff may not leave their accommodation unaccompanied. Visa restrictions and delays in visa processing also remain a problem for WFP. WFP is involved in

continuous negotiations with the government, almost on a daily basis, to try to reduce

constraints to the humanitarian program. The view of the WFP representative, who is also

UN humanitarian coordinator in the DPRK, is that “at the beginning, knowledge about the

DPRK in general and of the humanitarian situation in particular was extremely limited.

Also, knowledge by the DPRK of international agencies and NGOs, and how they worked

and raised resources, was also extremely limited. I believe that the dramatically increased

knowledge that we have gained about the country, its situation, and our understanding

of the reasons underlying the crisis are very valuable in itself, together with the increased

understanding from the DPRK side, and the lessening of mutual suspicions. Our knowledge

of the coping mechanisms and of the relative vulnerabilities of people in both geographic terms as well as urban/rural, has increased the effectiveness of our programmes”

(David Morton, UN humanitarian coordinator, e-mail to author, October 2001).

UNICEF found “significant improvements . . . in the partnership with the government”

but still noted constraints, including restricted movement and limited access to target

population, indirect access to counterparts, limited feedback on end use of supplies,

inadequate focus on skills development by the government, and lack of disaggregated

data on children and women (UNICEF, “UNICEF Response to the Humanitarian Crisis in

DPR Korea,” Report to 3rd International NGO Conference, Seoul, June 2001).

South Korean and Japanese NGOs

In general, south Korean and Japanese agencies consider that they are responding to

humanitarian need and at the same time are contributing to the peace process on the

Korean peninsula. This is different from the approach of some of the European NGOs,

which want to address humanitarian needs but argue that humanitarian work should be

separated from political or stability concerns. South Korean and Japanese agencies argue

that they are responding to a demonstrated overwhelming need for emergency assistance—and they place less emphasis upon detailed in-country monitoring of distribution and rigorous assessment of impact. Some south Korean NGOs working in the

agricultural sector, however, have been able to follow up on projects with counterparts

in the Ministry of Agriculture, the Academy of Agricultural Sciences, county officials, and

farm management committees.

Of the 8,000 south Koreans who visited the DPRK in 2000/2001, many were involved

in humanitarian support to the DPRK. Obvious advantages arise to south Korean counterparts because of language facility, although one negative aspect is that it is sometimes

difficult for south Koreans to travel outside Pyongyang. South Korean and Japanese agencies have more or less accepted that it is impossible to have a resident presence until political agreements are reached between their governments and the DPRK government. Some

of these agencies work bilaterally and some coordinate with multilateral agencies.

United States NGOs

United States NGOs have stated that they are responding to humanitarian need although

there has been widespread discussion in and out of humanitarian circles about how U.S.

humanitarian assistance can also contribute to improving the general atmosphere of

relations between the DPRK and the United States. U.S. NGOs, through the PVOC, had

resident monitors for lengthy periods of time in 1998, 1999, and 2000. In 1998 and 1999

these monitors stayed in hotels along with other international visitors, but in 2000 U.S.

monitors had to stay in a government guest house separate from the rest of the inter9

“The dramatically increased

knowledge that we have gained

about the country, its situation,

and our understanding of the

reasons underlying the crisis are

very valuable in itself, together

with the increased understanding from the DPRK side,

and the lessening of mutual 

suspicions.”
national community. The U.S. NGOs were permitted to employ Korean speakers. Travel

plans had to be approved a week in advance but once on site, according to a U.S. General Accounting Office paper (“U.S. Bilateral Food Assistance to North Korea Had Mixed

Results,” June 2000), on-the-spot visits to projects, distribution centers, project participants, and homes were normally permitted.

The PVOC responded to the concern of having to give one week’s notice of visits by

increasing the number of monitoring activities, reporting to the General Accounting

Office that their monitoring activities exceeded those in other countries. While the PVOC

was in-country it continued to negotiate with the DPRK government on ways of improving access, having more security over visas, and improving the ability of the PVOC to

conduct needs assessments. In 2000 at the close of the PVOC program, one PVOC agency,

CARE, decided to withdraw from the consortium. It stated that the food crisis was not

as severe as previously and it would have chosen to work in rehabilitation efforts except

that, “despite a nearly four-year dialogue with the north Korean government regarding

the importance of access, transparency and accountability, . . . the operational environment in north Korea has not progressed to a point where CARE feels it is possible to

implement effective rehabilitation programs. For that reason, CARE will withdraw from

the consortium by June 30, 2000” (CARE press release, April 4, 2000).

The American Friends Service Committee (AFSC)—which is involved in the agricultural

sector and works bilaterally in the DPRK—monitors its assistance by making visits to

farms two or three times a year. AFSC works directly with local farm managers and views

this method as part of trust-building between the two partners—concluding that, as a

result of this approach, positive relationships with Korean counterparts have developed

and grown over time. AFSC also found this to be the experience of other NGOs working

in DPRK over a long period of time. ACT remarks that “the minimum conditions for

humanitarian aid should always be based in the Code of Conduct [for the International

Red Cross and Red Crescent movement and NGOs].”

Other NGOs such as the American Red Cross work through international affiliates, which

take the lead in monitoring and evaluation. The United Methodist Committee for Relief

Work (UMCOR), which also works with international partners, remarks that “we do not have

a policy or a standard that we've established to measure situations against. Our giving to

the DPRK is pushed mainly by donors (as is most of our giving)” (Rev. Kristen L. Sachen,

e-mail to author, October 2001).

U.S. NGOs have also received some criticism, discussed in the General Accounting

Office report of June 2000, for poor management of programs and failure to respond to

DPRK willingness to actively engage in monitoring and evaluation of seed potato production at eight farms. The DPRK government also had some difficulty in discerning why

the donated food for Food for Work programs from the U.S. government was channeled

through the PVOC, when the vast majority of United States assistance was channeled

through WFP and when the PVOC still had to continue to use WFP logistical support to

implement its nominally separate Food for Work projects. In this respect, DPRK representatives were reported as saying that they accepted monitoring for the sake of food

assistance but were less happy with food assistance for the sake of monitoring.

European, Canadian, and Australian Agencies

There have been a wide variety of responses from European, Canadian, and Australian

agencies to concerns that agencies are limited in their activities in the DPRK. Some

agencies choose to continue to negotiate with the DPRK government and to try to build

long-term relationships in order to facilitate cooperation. These include GAA, Children’s

Aid Direct, CESVI, Campus fur Christus, Concern Worldwide, and PMU Interlife. Cap Anamur was involved in a major conflict with the government when its country director

accused the government of human rights violations in December 2000—although the

agency itself decided to stay in the DPRK and disavowed its outgoing country director.

10

The PVOC responded to the 

concern of having to give one

week’s notice of visits by

increasing the number of monitoring activities, reporting to

the General Accounting Office

that their monitoring activities

exceeded those in other

countries.

DPRK representatives were

reported as saying that they

accepted monitoring for the

sake of food assistance but

were less happy with food 

assistance for the sake 

of monitoring.
11

ADRA has sometimes had confrontational relations with the government but remains in

the DPRK despite funding shortages for its DPRK program. Other agencies, including MSF,

Action Against Hunger (Action Contre la Faim), and Oxfam, have withdrawn from operating in the DPRK, citing restrictions on activities. MDM and Help Age International also

withdrew, although funding difficulties reportedly contributed to their decisions. Save

the Children also had a presence in the DPRK via nutritionists seconded to UNICEF but

withdrew because they were concerned about the manner in which UNICEF distribution

of high-energy milk was taking place. Canadian and Australian agencies have been nonresident and they have reported relatively good cooperation with the DPRK government.

Diverse Perspectives 

Children’s Aid Direct reports an improvement in the conditions of humanitarian involvement in the DPRK; they describe “the minimum conditions for humanitarian involvement

in the DPRK as an evolving situation. We accept that to date these conditions have not

fully been met, but we see a slow but continuing move towards meeting these conditions. Our levels of access, a fundamental issue, have increased during the time that we

have worked in the DPRK, as has the level of cooperation we have received from the

FDRC” (Tim Bainbridge, e-mail to author, November 2001).

German Agro Action, in a paper reviewing European NGO activity in the DPRK between

1995 and 2000, noted that, while conditions were difficult, in terms of access to reliable

information and access to target groups for monitoring and evaluation, there had been

noticeable improvements over the period. Freedom of movement had increased and, compared to 1997 [the first year of GAA residence], “a definite positive difference for our work

can be noted.” The GAA paper went on to say that the “confidence that has been carefully built up by all sides involved through the years is an asset too valuable to be given

up even in times of difficulties of finding funds for innovative approaches” (Andreas von

Ramdohr, German Agro Action, “Experiences in Agriculture in DPRK: Perspectives from

European NGOs,” Report to 3rd International NGO Conference, Seoul, June 2001).

Speaking on behalf of Concern Worldwide, CAD, and GAA to an international conference

of NGOs working in the DPRK in 2000, CAD emphasised that “it is easier to leave than to

stay on,” adding that “we have a presence on the ground and are learning and understanding ourselves the system and culture that people we work with live in. We accept the

constraints but we are also looking for ways to overcome them. . . . Difficulties can be

worked through and we need to continue to work along the path of mutual understanding

and cooperation” (Rebecca Sirrell, Children’s Aid Direct, “The Relationship between European Non-Government Organisations and the European Union in the Context of Aid Assistance and DPR Korea,” Report to 3rd International NGO Conference, Seoul, June 2001).

MSF was resident in the DPRK from July 1997 until September 1998. MSF was concerned that it was not reaching the most vulnerable children and was not able to 

conduct a nutritional survey in the counties in which it worked. The current MSF position is that there is “no humanitarian space whatsoever” for work in the DPRK. MSF currently is working with Korean refugees inside China along the DPRK border and also

looking at the work of the humanitarian agencies that continue to work in the DPRK.

From their interviews with DPRK citizens in China, MSF is concerned that international

food assistance is not reaching any of the vulnerable in the northern province of North

Hamgyong, a remote mountainous province with little arable land that is generally considered the worst-off in terms of food and other shortages and in terms of the population’s coping strategies. MSF commented that it is difficult for them to assess change in

the conditions of working within the DPRK because they have not worked in the country for over three years. In September 1998, when MSF left the DPRK, they called for “all

donor governments to review their aid policies towards DPRK to demand that it is more

accountable and that the north Korean government ensures that humanitarian agencies

can freely and impartially assess needs, deliver aid, have direct access to the population

”Our levels of access, a

fundamental issue, have

increased during the time that

we have worked in the DPRK, as

has the level of cooperation we

have received from the FDRC.”

“Confidence that has been 

carefully built up by all sides

involved through the years is an

asset too valuable to be given

up even in times of difficulties

of finding funds for innovative

approaches.”

The current MSF position is 

that there is “no humanitarian

space whatsoever” for work 

in the DPRK. 
and assess the effectiveness of their programs” (MSF, “MSF Calls on Donors to Review

Their Aid Policy towards DPRK,” press release, September 30, 1998).

Action Against Hunger worked in the DPRK for just over two years, from January 1998

to March 2000. They carried out nutritional support programs and a water rehabilitation

program in North Hamgyong. Action Against Hunger also carried out support for cereal

production in farms in the “breadbasket” provinces of South Pyongan and South Hamgyong. Action Against Hunger carried out detailed agricultural surveys on the farms in

South Pyongyan, detailed nutritional and attendance surveys in nurseries in North Hamgyong, and a survey of water quality in North Hamgyong. 

Action Against Hunger results showed that the incidence of malnutrition was not high

in the nurseries and attendance was low compared to the number of registered children.

On the other hand, malnutrition was high in the provincial residential children’s institutions (baby homes and orphanages). This led Action Against Hunger to be concerned

about the existence of a group of children who were not attending children’s institutions

and were not therefore receiving international food. In order to reach these children,

Action Against Hunger proposed setting up soup kitchens in Chongjin, the provincial

capital. The government agreed to this but did not agree to the monitoring protocol proposed by Action Against Hunger. The Action Against Hunger view as of February 2000

was that information, particularly related to numbers of beneficiaries, could not be verified and food aid was not reaching the most vulnerable. They called for another international nutritional survey to be carried out, similar to that conducted in 1998.

Oxfam left the DPRK in December 1999, after a series of negotiations with the government on monitoring water quality. The country director of the Oxfam program felt

that the government finally had agreed to almost all that Oxfam had requested by the

time Oxfam left the DPRK but the decision to allow access was too late to make a difference to the decision taken (author’s interview with Oxfam country director,

Pyongyang, December 1999).

The major Canadian humanitarian agency involved in the DPRK, the Canadian Foodgrains Bank, which has supplied assistance since 1996, argues that monitoring works relatively well in the DPRK and finds that the quality of monitoring “would exceed the

average monitoring of CFGB program[s].” A priority for CFGB is for the international

humanitarian community to carry out another nutrition survey similar to the one carried

out in 1998, so agencies can gain accurate information about the nutritional status of

children and make some assessment of the impact of food aid donated since 1998.

Although noting the inherent danger in comparisons to other operations, CFGB says that

“the provision of humanitarian assistance is [a] messy business which requires the

weighing of options between ‘less than ideal’ approaches. . . . In comparison with some

other contexts, the concerns in the DPRK do not come close to the diversions and human

rights violations of other contexts” (Marv Frey, e-mail to author, November 2001).

Australia’s involvement with the DPRK is via the Australian Centre for International

Agricultural Research. This agency funds training for DPRK scientists and administrators

in Australia, and its programs do not involve “cash injections” into the DPRK. The agency

reports that “so far we are optimistic that the minimum conditions for assistance

obtain.” The agency adds, “The most critical ‘minimum condition’ for us is a preparedness on the part of the DPRK to exchange agricultural research knowledge freely and to

have unfettered access to all agreed sites, facilities, information, equipment and records

pertaining to agreed agricultural R and D projects. So far we have plenty of positive indications that this will be achieved, and only one or two minor negative indications”

(Michael Brown, e-mail to author, November 2001).

Caritas and IFRC

Caritas is a confederation of 154 Catholic-based agencies and IFRC is a federation of

national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies. Both raise funds through their constituent

12

The Action Against Hunger 

view as of February 2000 was

that information, particularly

related to numbers of beneficiaries, could not be verified

and food aid was not reaching

the most vulnerable.

“The provision of humanitarian

assistance is [a] messy business

which requires the weighing of

options between ‘less than

ideal’ approaches. . . . In

comparison with some other

contexts, the concerns in the

DPRK do not come close to the

diversions and human rights

violations of other contexts.” 
organizations and therefore represent international constituencies in their work in the

DPRK. Caritas is far and away the biggest NGO involved in the DPRK, having contributed

some US$27 million between 1995 and 2001.

Caritas considers that while operating conditions can be difficult in the DPRK, they

are much improved since the start of their operations in 1995, and part of that improvement is due to the process of building up trust through continuous dialogue. Caritas has

experienced a good deal of flexibility on monitoring visits, including variations from

schedules in the field. Within the Caritas network, Caritas-Germany argues for more beneficiary input but, after six years of involvement, the Caritas view overall is that, as articulated by Caritas–Hong Kong, the liaison agency for the network, continued engagement

with the DPRK is necessary and appropriate. “Withholding aid would not only be morally wrong, it would also not solve any problems. Closing the door now means much greater

difficulty in reopening it in the future—and with [an open door comes] the possibility

of the same level of communication, or of gradually developing an even better [level of

communication]” (Kathi Zellweger, “North Korea Continues to Be a Challenge for Aid

Agencies,” mimeo, Hong Kong, March 20, 2000).

IFRC must also give one week’s notice of visits. IFRC has not found any evidence of

diversion of its supplies and has found evidence of efficient and effective distribution of

drugs and equipment. In 2001, the IFRC completed a review of its activities within the

DPRK that has not yet been made public but that includes an assessment of monitoring

and assessment capabilities. IFRC appears to be of the view that while the quality of information on different aspects of the program varies, much of the information provided is

usable, although some areas could be improved in both data collection and organization

and in monitoring (author’s telephone interview with IFRC desk officer, November 2001).

Humanitarian Coordination

The agencies share their experiences and, where possible coordinate their negotiating

positions with the government on the issue of the conditions for humanitarian work. Coordination tales place out of the country as well as inside the DPRK. Out of country, in 1997

a widely attended meeting, organized by UNICEF with a position paper written by Save

the Children, was held in Geneva. The three international conferences organized by the

NGOs working in DPRK were widely attended, by UN agency representatives as well as by

other interested parties. In 2001, a meeting coordinated by the Centre for Humanitarian

Dialogue brought humanitarian agencies together to discuss these same issues. In country, all resident agencies participate in regular inter-sectoral meetings and inter-agency

meetings take place weekly. Joint assessments of need and impact take place more regularly than previously, with agencies now also permitted to visit other agencies’ projects.

Change

There is a large area of agreement among the agencies as to the need for improved monitoring and assessment. The majority of those who continue to work in the DPRK and

have worked there for some time note change in a positive direction. MSF, after having

left the country in 1998, sees no room for improvement short of policy change, which in

practice would probably amount to a change of government. A number of agencies consider that the DPRK is expected to operate to a higher standard in terms of aid distribution, assessment, and evaluation than most other governments where large-scale

assistance takes place.

Some features of monitoring and assessment remain the same, particularly in that

travel must still be organized one week in advance. One change is that there is more

access to more institutions. In 1998, for instance, MSF was not permitted to see 

“Withholding aid would not

only be morally wrong, it would

also not solve any problems.”

13

Joint assessments of need and

impact take place more regularly

than previously, with agencies

now also permitted to visit

other agencies’ projects.
children in the orphanages in Pyongsong. In 2000/2001, however, the humanitarian

agencies were able to organize a working group that surveyed all the provincial institutions, including baby homes, orphanages, and boarding schools, and then collated and

recorded information from all the agencies. 

Another change is in terms of the ability to share information. In 1997/1998 MSF had

signed a protocol with the government where they agreed not to share information collected with other agencies. Agencies in 2000/2001 regularly shared information formally through the inter-sectoral working groups and informally through regular interaction. 

The quality of information has also improved, although it still needs to improve further. An international/national nutrition survey took place in 1998 and the government

has recently agreed that another will take place in 2002. In addition, the newly established WFP information base provides a potentially invaluable tool for the whole international humanitarian community.

The major concern not yet addressed, however, is the inability to assess whether the

most vulnerable groups are receiving adequate assistance. At present, 43 of the counties,

which contain about 18 percent of the population, are not accessible to the humanitarian

community. In addition, children not attending nurseries or schools would not necessarily

receive international assistance, as food aid is channelled through children’s institutions.

There is still a concern shared by many agencies that unhealthy children observed in the

country may not be receiving food through the international aid distribution.

Most of the agencies would agree with Action Against Hunger that malnutrition is not

high in the children’s institutions compared to 1997, when the agencies first entered the

country. They would also agree that the worst cases of malnutrition are seen in the

provincial residential children’s institutions and that these are being used as nutritional

rehabilitation centers for children. This is why many of the agencies—governmental and

NGO—are concentrating activities in these institutions. The change in this respect is

that resident agencies have continued to call for another nutritional survey, to which the

government has now agreed.

In terms of the conditions for international staff, UN Humanitarian Coordinator David

Morton points out that there have been some improvements. “Although there is a long

way to go, we should recall that in 1995, the very few international staff were confined

to the Koryo Hotel and field travel was undertaken by train. Nowadays we have over 100

UN and NGO staff, and WFP has five sub-offices outside Pyongyang, and staff are traveling by vehicle every day” (e-mail to author, October 2001).

Resolving the Humanitarian Dilemma

The humanitarian dilemma for the agencies has been, given the acceptance by all agencies of the widespread need for humanitarian aid but given also the constraints placed

upon humanitarian operations, on what terms should the agencies continue with humanitarian assistance to the people of the DPRK.

The minority view on whether conditions permit humanitarian operations in the DPRK

is that expressed by MSF, that there is “no humanitarian space whatsoever in the DPRK.”

This view is explicitly critical of the majority view that conditions need improving but that

they are gradually moving in the right direction. The majority view, implicitly critical of

the minority view, is expressed by the humanitarian coordinator when he argues that the

process of continuing to try to engage with the DPRK is necessary.

“Essentially, the minimum conditions are not yet achieved here, but we know that there

is a very serious crisis that affects millions of people. We have no doubt that our aid has saved

many, many lives. We do not have the luxury of choice that allows us to say ‘we will not operate because minimum conditions are not reached’—we have to remain engaged and persevere, and work towards achieving those conditions. The minimum conditions will certainly

not be achieved if we all simply pull out” (David Morton, e-mail to author, October 2001).

Agencies in 2000/2001 regularly

shared information formally

through the inter-sectoral 

working groups and informally

through regular interaction.

14

The major concern not yet

addressed, however, is the 

inability to assess whether the 

most vulnerable groups are

receiving adequate assistance.

“We know that there is a very

serious crisis that affects

millions of people. We have no

doubt that our aid has saved

many, many lives.”
In practice, the humanitarian dilemma is never fully resolved but instead humanitarian agencies, as they do in all countries in which they operate, make the best of

the circumstances in which they work: continuing to deliver much-needed aid and at

the same time continuing to negotiate with the government to improve operating

conditions.

Conclusion

This report has sought to draw attention to the variety of humanitarian agency involvement in the DPRK and the diversity of response to the difficult working conditions in the

country. Most of the agencies, whether they are UN agencies or NGOs, have decided to

continue providing humanitarian aid to north Korea—primarily for the simple reason

that it saves lives. Second, although agencies cannot monitor all aspects of aid distribution, their assessment from impact and evaluation studies is that international assistance reaches hungry people and people in need. No agency, currently or historically,

reports systematic diversion of humanitarian aid to the military.

Humanitarian assistance is also valued—explicitly by some and implicitly by others—

because it facilitates an increase in knowledge and in confidence and trust building

between the DPRK and the outside world. Knowledge of the country is increased because

to fulfil their mandates most agencies must be transparent and accountable to their donors

and therefore must both obtain information and report back to their constituencies. Public knowledge about the DPRK is thus generated, which can contribute to a more realistic

and less stereotypical understanding of the DPRK, thus making for better informed, more

nuanced, and more sophisticated policies. Confidence and trust building are developed as

agencies and the DPRK government find ways of resolving conflict and of reaching compromise despite interests and priorities that are often difficult to reconcile. The opening of

these channels of dialogue thus demonstrates that dialogue and negotiation can help to

provide mechanisms for conflict resolution. In addition, while most agencies agree that

humanitarian assistance should never be granted solely for diplomatic or political 

reasons—but only as a response to humanitarian need—once channels of communication

have been established they can facilitate further engagement and dialogue. This is particularly pertinent in the case of the DPRK when its major donors (the Republic of Korea,

Japan, and the United States) are also its main political adversaries.

Most humanitarian agencies have therefore concluded that they should remain

engaged with the DPRK but that the DPRK government also has a responsibility to make

improvements to the conditions for humanitarian work. Donors should explore ways of

building on the trust established between agencies and the DPRK government to both

help improve the conditions for humanitarian workers in the DPRK and to re-enter into

wider processes of mutually respectful engagement about other economic issues. Donor

governments might well learn some lessons about dealing with the DPRK in general from

the success of humanitarian agencies in finding ways to resolve disputes through patient

negotiations and through building a climate where dialogue, not bellicose rhetoric,

becomes the modus operandi of conflict resolution.

Recommendations

To Humanitarian Agencies

• Continue to respond to the attested humanitarian need for food aid, agricultural rehabilitation, health sector support, and water and sanitation improvements.

• Continue to negotiate with the DPRK government to improve conditions for humanitarian operations, especially the field conditions for humanitarian workers.

The humanitarian dilemma is

never fully resolved but instead

humanitarian agencies . . .

make the best of the

circumstances in which they

work: continuing to deliver

much-needed aid and at the

same time continuing to negotiate with the government to

improve operating conditions.

15
• Reinforce the move toward incorporating capacity-building into programs and projects.

• Continue efforts to explain the reasons, techniques, and benefits of internationally

acceptable standards for monitoring, evaluating, and reporting—including the differences between needs, outcome, and impact analysis.

• Share “best practices” in terms of the lessons learned from successful experiences of

programs that have incorporated meaningful assessment and evaluation.

• Maintain a gender balance in the employment of international officers.

To the DPRK Government

• Improve the facilitation of professional assessment of needs and evaluation of the

impact of humanitarian assistance through, for instance, joint (government/international) implementation of nutrition and health assessment surveys, provision of more

accurate and timely data, and increased flexibility in permitting unscheduled visits to

beneficiaries in the field.

• Improve working conditions for international humanitarian workers by permitting

two-way radio communication between field workers in remote offices and Pyongyang

headquarters and by permitting more freedom of movement for workers employed in

these outlying offices.

To Donor Governments

• Continue to support humanitarian efforts in the DPRK.

• Explore the use of channels of dialogue opened through humanitarian agencies as a

model for successful conflict resolution with the DPRK in other areas.

For more information on this topic, 

see our web site (www.usip.org), 

which has an online edition of 

this report containing links to related

web sites, as well as additional

information on the subject.

United States 

Institute of Peace

1200 17th Street NW

Washington, DC 20036

Abbreviations

ACT Acton for Churches Together

ADRA Adventist Development Relief

Agency

AFSC American Friends Service Committee

AREP Agricultural Recovery and

Environmental Plan

CAD Children’s Aid Direct

CARE Cooperative for Assistance and

Relief Everywhere

CESVI Cooperazione e Sviluppo

CFGB Canadian Foodgrains Bank

CRS Catholic Relief Service

DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of

Korea (north Korea)

ECHO European Community Humanitarian Aid Office

FALU Food Aid Liaison Unit, WFP

FAO Food and Agriculture Organization

FDRC Flood Damage Rehabilitation

Commission (Ministry of Foreign

Affairs)

GAA German Agro Action (Deutsche

Wlthungerhilfe)

IFRC International Federation of the

Red Cross

MDM Medecins du Monde

MSF Medecins sans Frontieres

NGO non-governmental organization

OCHA Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, UN

PMU Pingst Missionens Utveck

(Swedish Pentecostal mission)

PVOC Private Voluntary Organization

Consortium

ROK Republic of Korea (south Korea)

SDC Swiss Agency for Development and

Cooperation

SDR Swiss Disaster Relief (now

subsumed under SDC)

UMCOR United Methodist

WFP World Food Program

WHO World Health Organization

WVI World Vision International

UNDP United Nations Development

Program

UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund