[Cite as Meisner v. Walker, 2016-Ohio-215.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

Gregory Meisner, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : 

 No. 15AP-671 

v. : ( C.P.C. No. 14JU-04-4497) 

Juliet Walker, : (ACCELERATED CALENDAR) 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on January 21, 2016 

 

Dennis E. Horvath, for appellee. 

Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP, Eugene B. Lewis and 

Jessica A. Mager, for appellant. 

 

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, 

Division of Domestic Relations, Juvenile Branch 

DORRIAN, P.J. 

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Juliet Walker ("Walker"), appeals from a judgment of 

the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, Juvenile 

Branch, denying her objections to a magistrate's decision. For the reasons that follow, we 

reverse. 

{¶ 2} Walker and plaintiff-appellee, Gregory Meisner ("Meisner"), are the parents 

of two minor children. On April 2, 2014, Meisner filed a complaint requesting that he be 

named the permanent and temporary residential parent and legal custodian of the minor 

children. In the alternative, Meisner sought an order for permanent and temporary 

shared parenting. Meisner also sought an order requiring Walker to pay child support and 

other relief. On the same day that he filed his complaint, Meisner filed a motion for 

temporary orders allocating parental rights and responsibilities with respect to the 
No. 15AP-671 2 

children. Walker filed an answer requesting that she be named the temporary and 

permanent legal custodian of the children and that Meisner be ordered to pay child 

support. Walker also filed a motion for temporary orders allocating parental rights and 

responsibilities, including parenting time and the payment of child support and other 

expenses. In May 2014, Meisner filed a motion for shared parenting and a proposed 

shared-parenting plan. Walker filed multiple motions to compel discovery, including a 

motion for an order compelling Meisner to permit a real estate appraiser to inspect his 

home and assess its value. 

{¶ 3} On July 21, 2014, the magistrate issued a temporary order ("July 2014 

temporary order") providing that Meisner and Walker were both designated as the 

temporary residential parents and legal custodians of the children. The July 2014 

temporary order also set forth a temporary parenting time schedule designating when 

Meisner would exercise parenting time. It provided that neither party would pay child 

support, that Meisner would maintain medical insurance for the children, and that both 

parties would equally pay extraordinary health care expenses for the children. Walker 

filed objections to the July 2014 temporary order, asserting that there was no evidence to 

support the parenting time order and that Meisner should be ordered to pay child 

support. The magistrate issued an amended decision and temporary order on 

December 19, 2014 ("December 2014 amended temporary order"), denying Walker's 

motion to compel an inspection of Meisner's home and amending the parenting time 

schedule set forth in the July 2014 temporary order. Walker then filed objections to the 

December 2014 amended temporary order, asserting that the magistrate erred by not 

including the rental value of Meisner's home in the calculation of his income and by 

relying on statutory child-support deviation factors. On April 6, 2015, the magistrate 

issued a second amended decision and temporary order ("April 2015 amended temporary 

order"), providing that neither party would pay child support to the other parent. Walker 

filed objections to the April 2015 amended temporary order, again asserting that the 

magistrate erred by not including the rental value of Meisner's home in the calculation of 

his income and that the magistrate's findings regarding Meisner's contributions to the 

care of the children were not supported by the record. 
No. 15AP-671 3 

{¶ 4} The trial court issued a decision on June 12, 2015 ruling on Walker's 

objections to the magistrate's order. The trial court denied Walker's motion to compel an 

inspection of Meisner's home. The trial court also denied Walker's objections to the 

parenting-time provisions of the temporary orders and the denial of child-support 

payments to Walker. Further, the trial court adopted Meisner's proposed sharedparenting plan. 

{¶ 5} Appellant appeals from the trial court's order, assigning three errors for this 

court's review: 

1. The Juvenile Court erred to the prejudice of Defendant 

when it approved and adopted Plaintiff's shared parenting 

plan. 

2. The Juvenile Court erred to the prejudice of Defendant 

when it denied and dismissed her claim for child support. 

3. The Juvenile Court erred to the prejudice of Defendant 

when it denied her motion to compel Plaintiff to permit an 

inspection of his free house to determine its rental and sales 

value for child support. 

{¶ 6} We begin by addressing the issue of this court's jurisdiction because 

Meisner argues that the appeal must be dismissed for lack of a final, appealable order. 

{¶ 7} This court has jurisdiction to review final orders of lower courts. Ohio 

Constitution, Article IV, Section 3(B)(2). An order is final and appealable if it meets the 

requirements of R.C. 2505.02 and, if applicable, Civ.R. 54(B). Eng. Excellence, Inc. v. 

Northland Assoc., L.L.C., 10th Dist. No. 10AP-402, 2010-Ohio-6535, ¶ 10. Appellate 

courts use a two-step analysis to determine whether an order is final and appealable. 

First, the court determines if the order is final pursuant to R.C. 2505.02. Second, the court 

determines whether Civ.R. 54(B) applies and, if so, whether the order contains a 

certification that there is no just reason for delay. Id.

{¶ 8} This court has previously held that temporary child-support orders 

ordinarily are not final, appealable orders. See Hibbs v. Hibbs, 10th Dist. No. 08AP-93, 

2008-Ohio-5621, ¶ 6; Kelm v. Kelm, 93 Ohio App.3d 686, 689 (10th Dist.1994). "Because 

a temporary support order is provisional in nature, subject to modification at any time, it 

does not determine the ultimate rights of the parties involved." Kelm at 689. In this case, 
No. 15AP-671 4 

the July 2014 temporary order provided that neither party would pay child support. The 

magistrate considered this issue a second time in the April 2015 amended temporary 

order and again ruled that neither party would be required to pay child support. To the 

extent the trial court adopted the magistrate's temporary orders by denying Walker's 

objections, the trial court's order was not final and appealable with respect to child 

support. Accordingly, Walker's second assignment of error is moot, and we decline to 

address it. 

{¶ 9} Similarly, discovery orders are generally not final, appealable orders. 

Randall v. Cantwell Mach. Co., 10th Dist. No. 12AP-786, 2013-Ohio-2744, ¶ 6. See also 

Curtis v. Adult Parole Auth., 10th Dist. No. 04AP-1214, 2005-Ohio-4781, ¶ 12 ("Discovery 

orders are generally interlocutory and, as such, are neither final nor appealable, especially 

those that deny discovery."). Compare Autumn Health Care of Zanesville, LLC v. 

DeWine, 10th Dist. No. 14AP-593, 2015-Ohio-2655, ¶ 6 (noting that discovery orders 

requiring a party to produce privileged or confidential information are final and 

appealable). The December 2014 amended temporary order denied Walker's motion to 

compel an inspection of Meisner's home, and this ruling remained consistent in the April 

2015 amended temporary order. To the extent the trial court adopted the magistrate's 

temporary orders by denying Walker's objections, the trial court's order was not final and 

appealable with respect to the denial of Walker's motion to compel an inspection of 

Meisner's home. Accordingly, Walker's third assignment of error is moot, and we decline 

to address it. 

{¶ 10} Walker's first assignment of error asserts that the trial court erred by 

adopting Meisner's shared-parenting plan. Although the July 2014 temporary order set 

forth a shared-parenting schedule, it does not appear that any of the magistrate's 

temporary orders formally adopted Meisner's proposed shared-parenting plan. Thus, the 

trial court appears to have gone beyond the temporary orders by adopting Meisner's 

shared-parenting plan, and it is necessary to consider whether the trial court's order is 

final and appealable with respect to adoption of the shared-parenting plan. 

{¶ 11} R.C. 3109.04(D)(1)(d) states that "[n]o provisional shared-parenting decree 

shall be issued in relation to any shared-parenting plan approved under [R.C. 

3109.04(D)(1)(a)(i)-(iii)]." The statute further provides that "[a] final shared-parenting 
No. 15AP-671 5 

decree issued under this division has immediate effect as a final decree on the date of its 

issuance, subject to modification or termination as authorized by this section." R.C. 

3109.04(D)(1)(d). Thus, to the extent the trial court order adopted Meisner's proposed 

shared-parenting plan, it constituted a final order. See Riley v. Riley, 11th Dist. No. 2004-

Ohio-5302, ¶ 17 ("R.C. 3109.04(D)(1)(d) provides that no provisional shared-parenting 

decree may be issued in relation to any shared-parenting plan filed with a final divorce 

decree. Thus, any shared-parenting decree incorporated into the final divorce decree is a 

final, appealable order."); Lepore v. Breidenbach, 1st Dist. No. C-140310, 2015-Ohio2929, ¶ 19 ("Both the decree of legal separation and the decree of shared-parenting were 

final, appealable orders."). Although the trial court order lacked "no just reason for delay" 

language pursuant to Civ.R. 54(B), the Supreme Court of Ohio has held that "the absence 

of Civ.R. 54(B) language will not render an otherwise final order not final." General Acc. 

Ins. Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. America, 44 Ohio St.3d 17, 21 (1989). Accordingly, to the extent 

the trial court order imposed a shared-parenting plan, it was a final, appealable order. 

{¶ 12} Having concluded that the trial court's order constitutes a final, appealable 

order with respect to the shared-parenting order, we turn to Walker's first assignment of 

error in which she asserts that the trial court erred by adopting that plan. We review a 

trial court's decision to adopt a shared-parenting plan for abuse of discretion. WolfSabatino v. Sabatino, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-1161, 2011-Ohio-6819, ¶ 78; Graham v. 

Harrison, 10th Dist. No. 08AP-1073, 2009-Ohio-4650, ¶ 12. An abuse of discretion occurs 

where the trial court's attitude is "unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable." Blakemore 

v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). 

{¶ 13} Pursuant to R.C. 3109.04(G), either parent or both parents may request 

shared parenting and file a shared-parenting plan for the exercise of shared parenting. 

R.C. 3109.04(D) sets forth the procedures to be used by the court in awarding shared 

parenting. Although those statutory provisions do not expressly refer to conducting a 

hearing, this court has previously held that, when the custody of children is disputed, 

evidence must be taken, and if testimony is taken it must be sworn. Wolf-Sabatino at 

¶ 82. See also Kelm v. Kelm, 10th Dist. No. 03AP-472, 2004-Ohio-1004, ¶ 15-18 (holding 

that trial court abused its discretion by effectively terminating shared-parenting plan 

without conducting an evidentiary hearing on motion to modify or terminate shared-
No. 15AP-671 6 

parenting plan). In this case, Meisner and Walker each requested to be named the legal 

custodian of the children, thus establishing that custody was disputed. Under these 

circumstances, the trial court abused its discretion by adopting Meisner's proposed 

shared-parenting plan without conducting a hearing. 

{¶ 14} Accordingly, we sustain Walker's first assignment of error. 

{¶ 15} For the foregoing reasons, we sustain Walker's first assignment of error and 

decline to address her second and third assignments of error as moot. The judgment of 

the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, Juvenile 

Branch, is reversed, and this cause is remanded to that court for further proceedings in 

accordance with law and consistent with this decision. 

Judgment reversed; cause remanded.

TYACK and HORTON, JJ., concur. 

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