Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1701-JT-205 | July 18, 2017 Page 1 of 19

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Cynthia Phillips Smith

Lafayette, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Abigail R. Recker

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Termination 

of the Parent-Child Relationship 

of J.C.M., J.O.M., and J.M.J. 

(Minor Children),

And

J.J. (Mother),

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

The Indiana Department of 

Child Services,

Appellee-Petitioner.

July 18, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

79A02-1701-JT-205

Appeal from the Tippecanoe 

Superior Court

The Honorable Faith A. Graham, 

Judge

The Honorable Tricia Thompson, 

Magistrate

Trial Court Cause Nos.

79D03-1604-JT-39, 79D03-1604-

JT-40, & 79D03-1604-JT-41

Riley, Judge.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

[1] Appellant-Respondent, J.J. (Mother), appeals the trial court’s Order 

terminating her parental rights to her three minor children, J.C.M., J.O.M., and 

J.M.J. (collectively, the Children).

[2] We affirm.

ISSUE

[3] Mother raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as follows: Whether the 

Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) presented clear and convincing 

evidence to support the termination of Mother’s parental rights.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[4] Mother and J.M. (Father)1 are the biological parents of three sons: J.C.M., 

born March 30, 2008; J.O.M., born April 15, 2011; and J.M.J., born January 6, 

2013. Mother also has three older sons from prior relationships: L.M.S., born 

July 10, 2001; Jh.M.J., born September 13, 2004; and Jha.M.J., born February 

11, 2006.2

 Father and Mother are not married, but Mother stated that they 

were involved in an on-again/off-again relationship for about six years. 

 

1 Father’s parental rights to the Children were terminated on December 27, 2016. Father does not participate 

in this appeal.

2

 Although L.M.S., Jh.M.J., and Jha.M.J. were involved in the protective proceedings initiated by DCS, 

they are not subject to this appeal. Facts pertaining to the Children’s older siblings are included where 

appropriate.
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[5] On March 10, 2014, the Tippecanoe County office of DCS received a report 

alleging that Mother’s six children were victims of neglect. In addition, the 

reporting source claimed that L.M.S. and J.C.M. had been observed with black 

eyes, which they purportedly received at the hands of Father. It was further

alleged that Mother instructed the children not to speak about what happens in 

their home. Concerns were also noted regarding the children’s use of 

inappropriate language and their exposure to drug use. On March 11, 2014, 

DCS received a second report concerning the six children. This time, it was 

alleged that a few of the children had missed “a concerning amount” of school, 

and an allegation of domestic violence in the home was raised. (DCS Exh. 3, 

Vol. I, p. 10). Additionally, J.C.M. was overheard telling people that he and 

the other children smoke marijuana and drink alcohol with Father and that 

Father forces the children to have sex with each other.

[6] Following these allegations, DCS contacted Mother and requested to interview 

the children; however, Mother refused to cooperate without a court order. 

Accordingly, on March 11, 2014, the trial court held a hearing and issued an 

order to allow DCS to interview the children. Six-year-old J.C.M. disclosed to 

DCS that Mother and Father use a belt to punish them, and that his black eye

was the result of being hit with a belt. J.C.M. also divulged that Father had 

“choked out” nine-year-old Jh.M.J. (DCS Exh. 5, Vol. I, p. 11). Eleven-yearold L.M.S. had bruises on his arm for which he did not provide an explanation, 

but Mother admitted that they were the result of her “smack[ing] him.” (DCS 

Exh. 5, Vol. I, p. 9). L.M.S. and Jh.M.J. added that, as punishment, the 
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children are forced to “do squats.” (DCS Exh. 5, Vol. I, p. 9). Eight-year-old 

Jha.M.J. informed DCS that Mother had instructed him and his siblings not to 

discuss what happens in their home at the threat of being taken away from their 

family. The children advised DCS that Father does not live in their home, but 

he visits occasionally. Almost-three-year-old J.O.M. and one-year-old J.M.J. 

were not interviewed due to their young age. When DCS spoke with Mother, 

she voiced her displeasure over the “system” becoming involved with her 

family and reported that she had been doing her best to manage her children’s 

“out of control” behaviors. (DCS Exh. 5, Vol. I, p. 9). On March 12, 2014, 

DCS filed a petition alleging all six children to be Children in Need of Services 

(CHINS).

[7] On April 7, 2014, the trial court held an initial hearing on DCS’ CHINS 

petition. DCS was authorized to refer the family for services and certain 

conditions were implemented in order to allow Mother to keep the children in 

her custody. Following the hearing, Mother and the children submitted to drug 

screens. Mother and the three youngest Children all tested positive for cocaine 

and marijuana. The three oldest children were unable to be tested because their 

hair was too short. Based on the positive drug screens, on April 16, 2014, DCS 

removed the children from Mother’s custody. The three oldest children were 

placed in foster care, whereas the three youngest Children were placed in the 

home of their paternal grandparents in Grant County, Indiana. The paternal 

grandparents “provide a very welcoming, loving, stable environment to the 

[C]hildren” and intend to adopt them. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 166).
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[8] On May 21, 2014, the trial court adjudicated the six children CHINS. On June 

9, 2014, following a dispositional hearing, the trial court issued a dispositional 

order, granting wardship of the children to DCS. In conjunction therewith, the 

trial court issued a Parental Participation Decree, which required Mother to, in 

pertinent part: contact DCS at least twice per month; obtain and maintain safe 

housing suitable for the children; refrain from consuming or possessing any 

controlled substances or alcohol; submit to random drug screens upon request; 

obtain and maintain a legal and stable source of income; enroll in any services 

referred by DCS and follow all recommendations from any assessments or 

evaluations; and obey the law. More specifically, and in accordance with DCS’ 

recommendations, Mother was required to participate in supervised visits with 

the children, participate in home-based case management and follow all 

recommendations; participate in a substance abuse assessment and follow all 

recommendations; participate in a domestic violence assessment and follow all 

recommendations; and participate in a parenting assessment/parenting 

education and follow all recommendations.

[9] At first, Mother’s participation was minimal, but by the end of 2014, she 

“became visibly serious about making necessary changes.” (DCS Exh. 6, Vol. 

I, p. 57). In early 2015, DCS was considering returning the children to 

Mother’s care for a trial-home visit. Mother was actively engaged with her 

home-based case management, participating in therapy, and regularly attending 

visitation with the children. Her interactions with the children were 

appropriate, and a loving bond was evident. Also, Mother was involved in a 
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substance abuse program and was making strides, as indicated by periods of 

sobriety. Moreover, Mother had been successful in maintaining housing, and

while she changed jobs throughout the case, Mother was consistently employed 

to the extent that she was able to support herself. Nevertheless, when the time 

came to transition the children into the home, Mother declined. Mother 

indicated “that she felt as though she was not quite ready yet, she wanted to 

finish some services that she was participating in.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 121).

[10] Thereafter, Mother was unable to maintain the positive progress she had made.

Mother relapsed in her marijuana use, and although she occasionally had 

negative drug screens, Mother consistently reverted to marijuana to cope with 

stress and being overwhelmed. The children—especially the oldest three—

displayed disturbing behaviors and were shifted around to different foster 

homes. Eventually, in order to make visitations more manageable, Mother 

began spending time with the three oldest children apart from the youngest 

Children. Mother was “inconsistent” in “her belief in her ability to provide for 

all six of the children.” (DCS Exh. 6, Vol. II, p. 94). 

[11] Also, DCS and Mother’s service providers were concerned about Mother’s 

apparent ongoing relationship with Father and the dangers that such a 

relationship posed to both Mother and the children. During conversations with 

the children, it was discovered that Father had been present during some visits. 

Even more concerning, in April of 2015, Father “kicked in” Mother’s back door 

while the children were in the home, and “a dispute” ensued. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 

50). Father was subsequently arrested for this incident, and Mother eventually 
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obtained a protective order against him. However, even after Father was 

incarcerated for this occurrence, and notwithstanding the protective order, the 

jail phone logs indicate that Father and Mother continued to communicate.

[12] In the summer of 2015, Mother was still struggling with her sobriety, but she 

had completed all required assessments, completed her substance abuse 

treatment program, was participating in weekly therapy sessions, and 

consistently visited with the children. Because of the need to keep the case 

moving forward and the fact that reuniting Mother with all six children in the 

necessary timeframe did not seem feasible, it was determined that the three 

oldest boys would be transitioned to their maternal grandmother’s care under a 

guardianship so that DCS could shift focus to help Mother reunify with the 

Children. Accordingly, on August 8, 2015, L.M.S., Jh.M.J., and Jha.M.J. 

moved to Memphis, Tennessee, to reside with their maternal grandmother.

[13] Two weeks after the oldest boys moved to Tennessee, Mother was arrested and 

charged with operating while intoxicated endangering a person, a Class A 

misdemeanor; operating while intoxicated with a blood alcohol concentration 

of at least 0.15, a Class A misdemeanor; resisting law enforcement, a Level 6 

felony; possession of a synthetic drug with a prior possession conviction, a 

Class A misdemeanor; failure to stop after an accident with an unattended 

vehicle, a Class B misdemeanor; and disorderly conduct, a Class B 

misdemeanor. Mother subsequently pled guilty to driving while intoxicated 

with a blood alcohol concentration of at least 0.15, a Class A misdemeanor; 

possession of a synthetic drug with prior possession conviction, a Class A 
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misdemeanor; and failure to stop after accident with unattended vehicle, a 

Class B misdemeanor. Mother received an aggregate sentence of 730 days, of 

which 180 days were ordered to be served through Community Corrections 

with the remaining 545 days suspended to probation. As a result of her 

criminal conviction, Mother lost her subsidized housing and moved in with a 

friend. She additionally lost her driving privileges.

[14] Also in August of 2015, Mother and Father were involved in another domestic 

dispute. DCS received information that “[Father] broke into [Mother’s] home, 

kept her from leaving the house, he and [Mother] w[ere] in the bathroom 

fighting, he—he beat on [Mother] and she was—she reported that she was only 

able to get away when she told [Father] that the children were coming for a 

visit.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 123). According to Mother, however, “it was a domestic 

dispute on both parts, it wasn’t . . . just all [Father].” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 52). The 

police were called in response to the incident, and Mother sustained a black eye 

and several scratches. Father was convicted of numerous charges as a result of 

this incident and received a four-year sentence.

[15] Mother’s growing frustration with DCS and her service providers resulted in 

her refusal to cooperate. Mother failed to maintain regular contact with DCS, 

and she failed to appear for all drug screens. Visits were cut short due to 

Mother’s erratic behavior and aggression towards service providers, and Mother 

was discharged from therapy and case management services due to her noncompliance. DCS also discovered that Mother was having conversations with 

the Children about the progress of the case, which triggered negative behaviors 
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in the Children—particularly J.C.M., who was repeatedly suspended from 

school and from riding the school bus.

[16] On April 20, 2016, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights to 

the Children. On July 15, 2016, and September 20, 2016, the trial court 

conducted a hearing on DCS’ termination petition. On December 27, 2016, the 

trial court issued an Order for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights. In 

terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Children, the trial court concluded, 

in part, that “[t]here is a reasonable probability the conditions that resulted in 

removal of the [C]hildren from the parents’ care or the reasons for continued 

placement outside the home will not be remedied”; “[c]ontinuation of the 

parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the [C]hildren”; and 

“it is in the best interests of [the Children]” to terminate Mother’s parental 

rights. (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, pp. 19-20).

[17] Mother now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

I. Standard of Review

[18] Mother challenges the trial court’s termination of her parental rights. It is wellestablished that “[a] parent’s interest in the care, custody, and control of his or 

her children is ‘perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests.’” In re 

G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1259 (Ind. 2009) (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 

57, 65 (2000)). In fact, the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution protects “the traditional right of parents to establish a home and 
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raise their children.” Id. Yet, “parental rights are not absolute and must be 

subordinated to the child’s interests.” S.L. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 997 

N.E.2d 1114, 1122 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted) 

(quoting In re I.A., 934 N.E.2d 1127, 1132 (Ind. 2010)). Parental rights may be 

terminated if the “parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental 

responsibilities.” In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d at 1259-60. Nevertheless, the 

termination of a parent-child relationship is “an extreme measure and should 

only be utilized as a last resort when all other reasonable efforts to protect the 

integrity of the natural relationship between parent and child have failed.” K.E. 

v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 39 N.E.3d 641, 646 (Ind. 2015) (internal quotation 

marks omitted).

[19] When reviewing a trial court’s termination of parental rights, our court does not 

reweigh evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses. In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d at 

1260. Rather, we “consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that 

are most favorable to the judgment.” Id. In addition, the trial court in the 

present case issued specific findings of fact and conclusions thereon. As such, 

we apply the two-tiered standard of review set forth in Indiana Trial Rule 

52(A): “[f]irst, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and 

second we determine whether the findings support the judgment.” Id. We 

“shall not set aside the findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous, and due 

regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility 

of the witnesses.” Ind. Trial Rule 52(A). We will find clear error only “if the 

findings do not support the trial court’s conclusions or the conclusions do not 
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support the judgment.” In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d at 1260 (quoting Bester v. Lake 

Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005)).

II. Termination Statute

[20] To support the termination of a parent’s rights, DCS must prove, in pertinent 

part, that a child has been removed from the home for a certain period of time, 

and

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

 (i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that 

resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for placement 

outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

 (ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of 

the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of 

the child.

 (iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been 

adjudicated a [CHINS].

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of 

the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). DCS must prove each element by clear and 

convincing evidence. In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d at 1260.

[21] On appeal, Mother does not specifically challenge any of the trial court’s 

findings; rather, she essentially asserts that the trial court’s findings, and the 

evidence supporting them, are insufficient to uphold the trial court’s 

conclusions regarding the elements of the termination statute. Mother concedes 

that DCS has established that the Children have been removed from her care 

for the requisite timeframe and that there is a satisfactory plan in place for the 
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Children’s care. Thus, Mother argues that DCS failed to prove that there is a 

reasonable probability either that the conditions that resulted in the Children’s 

removal and ongoing placement out of the home will not be remedied or that 

the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the Children,3

and that termination is in the Children’s best interests. We will address each 

element in turn.

A. Remediation of Conditions

[22] In determining whether there is a reasonable probability that conditions will not 

be remedied, we must identify what conditions led to the Child’s “placement 

and retention” outside of the home and subsequently determine whether there 

is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied. K.T.K. v. 

Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1231 (Ind. 2013). In making these 

decisions, “the trial court must judge a parent’s fitness as of the time of the 

termination proceeding, taking into consideration evidence of changed 

conditions—balancing a parent’s recent improvements against habitual 

pattern[s] of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of 

future neglect or deprivation.” In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014) 

(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bester, 839 

 

3

 Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive; thus, DCS need only prove one of the 

three elements listed. See In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 220-21 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. dismissed. In this 

case, DCS did not allege that the Children have been twice adjudicated CHINS. Therefore, the relevant 

inquiry is whether DCS established the existence of a reasonable probability either that the conditions

resulting in the Children’s removal or continued placement outside the home will not be remedied or that the 

continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the Children’s well-being.
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N.E.2d at 152; K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231). “Habitual conduct may include 

‘criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide 

support, and lack of adequate housing and employment.’” K.E., 39 N.E.3d at 

647. DCS “is not required to provide evidence ruling out all possibilities of 

change; rather, it need only establish that there is a reasonable probability that 

the parent’s behavior will not change.” A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 987 

N.E.2d 1150, 1157 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted), 

trans. denied.

[23] In this case, DCS became involved over allegations of neglect and physical 

abuse, as well as substance abuse and domestic violence. Although a safety 

plan was initially put in place for the Children to remain in Mother’s care, they 

were removed from her custody after Mother and the Children all tested 

positive for cocaine and marijuana. Thereafter, as indicated in the trial court’s 

findings, the Children remained wards of DCS based on Mother’s unresolved

substance abuse, her continued contact with Father, her seeming inability to 

handle the needs of all six children, and her failure to fully cooperate with DCS 

and complete the recommended services. Mother now asserts that “[t]he facts 

in this case show [that she] made substantial progress. Flawless participation is 

not required.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 14). She argues that she, in fact, remedied

the reasons for the Children’s removal because she

attended drug treatment and was seventy days sober at the time 

of the second day of [the termination] hearing in this matter. She 

also obtained a protective order against [Father][.] Mother also 

received counseling for the domestic violence. . . . She also 
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crafted a safety plan to deal with any issues of domestic violence. 

. . . Father was no longer a threat at the time of the termination 

[hearing] as he was incarcerated at the Department of 

Correction[].

(Appellant’s Br. p. 14) (internal citations omitted). With respect to her struggle 

to maintain sobriety during the pendency of the case, Mother blames DCS for 

refusing to provide in-patient drug treatment and thus claims that she “should 

not be penalized” for DCS’ failure to provide sufficient services. (Appellant’s 

Br. p. 15).

[24] Mother’s argument is tantamount to a request that we reweigh evidence, which 

we will not do. The evidence establishes that nearly two and one-half years 

elapsed between the Children’s removal and the termination hearing. During 

that time, Mother failed to improve her position to the point of being able to 

care for the Children. At the time of the termination hearing, Mother did not 

have housing or transportation, she was unemployed, and she was incarcerated. 

Furthermore, Mother testified that she did not have any plans for where she 

would live upon her release, even though she stated that she only had thirtythree days left to serve. Most significantly, Mother admitted during the 

termination hearing that she was not yet capable of caring for the Children. 

Mother suggested that the Children remain with their paternal grandparents 

and that she be given additional time to implement the necessary changes.

[25] Despite completing the substance abuse program recommended by DCS and 

independently engaging in follow-up services, Mother used marijuana 
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throughout the pendency of the case. DCS acknowledged that Mother 

requested in-patient treatment; however, as a matter of policy, DCS explained 

that it does not refer parents to in-patient treatment for marijuana issues. 

Regardless, the onus was on Mother—not DCS—to remedy her substance 

abuse issues. See In re B.H., 44 N.E.3d 745, 752 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (“[I]t 

is well established that DCS is not required to provide services before 

commen[c]ing termination proceedings.”), trans. denied. As to Mother’s claim 

that she had been sober for seventy days preceding the termination hearing, it is 

well-settled that the trial court is free to disregard efforts “made only shortly 

before termination and to weigh more heavily Mother’s history of conduct prior 

to those efforts.” K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1234. 

[26] The trial court found that “Mother has not demonstrated an ability to protect 

herself from Father’s violence[,] let alone the [C]hildren.” (Appellant’s App. 

Vol. II, p. 18). During the CHINS investigation, Mother admitted to causing 

some of the bruises observed on the children, but the brunt of the physical abuse 

was indisputably committed by Father. Yet, despite court orders to the 

contrary, Mother maintained communication with him and permitted (or 

acquiesced to) his presence during her visits with the Children. While Mother 

should not bear blame for the domestic violence perpetrated against her, we 

find that her continued voluntary contact with Father is indicative of Mother’s 

inability to put the best interests and safety of the Children ahead of her own 

desires.
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[27] Moreover, although Mother participated in services at certain points 

throughout her case, even reaching a point where DCS believed that she was 

prepared for a trial home visit with all six children, Mother declined to have the 

children returned to her care and subsequently failed to maintain the progress 

that she had achieved. DCS re-referred Mother for therapy and case 

management services multiple times during the case, but Mother was 

consistently discharged for non-compliance. As the trial court found, “[f]or 

over two (2) years, all imaginable services have been offered and parents have 

either failed to participate consistently or to make substantial progress in those 

services.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 19). Furthermore, the trial court aptly 

noted that both parents failed to “ma[k]e the children a priority” and instead 

“continue[d] to focus on drugs and each other rather than reunification with the 

children.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 19). Accordingly, we find that there is 

sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s determination that there is a 

reasonable probability that the conditions which resulted in the Children’s 

removal and continued placement out of the home will not be remedied.4

B. Best Interests of the Children

[28] The purpose of terminating a parent-child relationship is to protect the child, 

not to punish the parent. In re C.C., 788 N.E.2d 847, 855 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), 

 

4 As there is sufficient evidence of a reasonable probability that conditions will not be remedied, we need not 

address the alternative element of Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) regarding whether the 

continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the Child’s well-being. See In re A.K., 924 

N.E.2d at 220-21 (discussing that because Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the 

disjunctive, only one of the listed factors need be established).
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trans. denied. Thus, while “[c]lear and convincing evidence need not reveal that 

the continued custody of the parent . . . is wholly inadequate for the child’s very 

survival[,] . . . it is sufficient to show . . . that the child’s emotional and physical 

development are threatened by the respondent parent’s custody.” K.T.K., 989 

N.E.2d at 1234-35 (first and fourth alterations in original) (quoting Bester, 839 

N.E.2d at 148). When considering whether termination would be in a child’s 

best interests, the trial court must “look beyond the factors identified by [DCS] 

and . . . look to the totality of the evidence.” A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d at 1158. “The 

trial court need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that the 

child’s physical, mental and social development is permanently impaired before 

terminating the parent-child relationship.” K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235. It is 

well established that “[p]ermanency is a central consideration in determining 

the [child’s] best interests.” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting In re G.Y., 904 

N.E.2d at 1265).

[29] Mother contends that the trial court’s determination that termination of her 

rights is in the best interests of the Children cannot stand because

[i]t is clear that [she] has made some strides in both her personal 

stability and her ability to parent her [Children]. Mother is 

bonded to her [C]hildren. The [C]hildren have a relationship 

with their Mother, and it would not be in their best interests to 

have their relationship with their biological parent severed. Case 

law does not require that persons be model parents.

(Appellant’s Br. p. 18).
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[30] It is well established that “the recommendation by both the [DCS] case 

manager and child advocate to terminate parental rights, in addition to 

evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, is 

sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the 

child’s best interests.” A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d at 1158. Here, DCS opined that the 

Children’s best interests would be served by terminating Mother’s rights. DCS 

discussed Mother’s ongoing struggle with sobriety and her failure “to utilize the 

services to the best of her ability to become rehabilitated. [Mother] continued 

to struggle with her relationship with [Father], continually putting the 

[C]hildren in jeopardy.” (Tr. Vol. II, pp. 144-45). The Children’s courtappointed special advocate (CASA) agreed that Mother’s parental rights should 

be terminated. Noting Mother’s unresolved issues, the CASA testified that “the 

[C]hildren need to have stability and they need to have a home and they need 

permanency. So we just can’t wait for [Mother] to get there.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 

168). According to the CASA, the Children are bonded to their paternal 

grandparents, and they “follow the rules and regulations of the home[.] . . . It’s 

a very nice home; big yard, lots of age appropriate toys.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 166).

[31] Although she preferred a situation in which the paternal grandparents could 

obtain a guardianship in lieu of the termination of her rights, even Mother 

agreed that the Children’s interests required remaining in the care of their 

paternal grandparents. Admirably, Mother recognized the upheaval she caused 

in the Children’s lives, and she stated that she did not “want to cause them 

anymore than what they’ve already been through. . . . I don’t want them to 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1701-JT-205 | July 18, 2017 Page 19 of 19

encounter anything else that is not positive, uplifting. I want to help them grow 

into positive young men.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 63). Therefore, we find that DCS 

presented sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s determination that 

termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interests.

CONCLUSION

[32] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that DCS presented sufficient evidence to 

support the trial court’s Order terminating Mother’s parental rights to the 

Children.

[33] Affirmed.

[34] Najam, J. and Bradford, J. concur