PEACEW RKS

AFGHANISTAN MEDIA ASSESSMENT

opportunities and challenges for peacebuilding

Eran Fraenkel, PhD

Emrys Schoemaker, MA

Sheldon Himelfarb, PhD

[ [
Photo credit: Emrys Schoemaker, 

November 2007, Kabul, Afghanistan

The views expressed in this report are 

those of the authors alone. They do 

not necessarily reflect views of the 

United States Institute of Peace.

United States Institute of Peace

1200 17th Street NW, Suite 200

Washington, DC 20036-3011

Phone: 202.457.1700

Fax: 202.429.6063

E-mail: usip_requests@usip.org

Web: www.usip.org

Peaceworks No. 68. First published 

2010.

© 2010 by the United States Institute 

of Peace

About the Report

This report was commissioned by the United States 

Institute of Peace’s Center of Innovation for Media, 

Conflict, and Peacebuilding. It assesses Afghanistan’s 

media sector through a new tool developed by USIP, 

which combines elements of a traditional media 

assessment with conflict analysis. Following extensive 

field assessment in Afghanistan, the authors convened a wide array of media and Afghanistan experts 

in Washington, D.C., to identify key opportunities 

and challenges for using media more extensively and 

effectively for peacebuilding.

About the Authors

Eran Fraenkel is an expert and instructor in metrics 

and evaluation with more than twenty-eight years of 

experience in international peacebuilding media. He 

is best known for his work on broadcast media, having produced numerous programs such as Naashe 

Maalo, an award-winning children’s TV program on 

intercultural understanding and conflict prevention 

in Macedonia. Emrys Schoemaker is a strategic 

and development communications specialist with 

particular expertise in leveraging new media for 

peacebuilding. He is an authority in designing and 

implementing national and local awareness and 

communication strategies and has worked with various government and United Nations agencies, as 

well as with international and local nongovernmental 

organizations, throughout the Middle East. Sheldon 

Himelfarb is an associate vice president at USIP and 

executive director of the Center of Innovation for 

Media, Conflict, and Peacebuilding. He has managed peacebuilding programs in numerous conflicts, 

including Bosnia, Iraq, Angola, Liberia, Macedonia, 

and Burundi. Himelfarb received the Capitol Area 

Peace Maker award from American University. 
Peaceworks • december 2010 • no. 68

CONTENTS

Summary ... 3

Introduction ... 5

 I: Media in Afghanistan ... 7

Working Hypothesis ... 9

Field Interviews ... 9

Information Insecurity ... 10

Media Outlets ... 15

Regulatory Environment ... 19

Economy ... 20

International Support for Afghan Media ... 21

Media Training ... 22

Media and Community Outreach ... 22

A New Development Approach ... 23

II: Recommended Media Interventions ... 25

Media as a Tool ... 27

Media as a Target ... 33

Conclusion ... 38

[ We suggest . . . 

funding media . . . 

interventions with 

specific timeframes 

during which 

donors invest in 

the production of 

contents that support 

specific social change 

objectives defined by 

Afghans. ]

3

AFGHANISTAN MEDIA ASSESSMENT

Summary 

■ The primary obstacle to state building in Afghanistan is the historical and ongoing inability 

of Afghans to establish a mutually acceptable balance of power between any central government and periphery communities and institutions. By serving as an interlocutor for centerperiphery relations, the media could help transform state building from a zero-sum conflict 

to a positive-sum process in which disagreements are resolved peacefully.

■ International donor support for Afghanistan’s media has had two primary goals. The shortterm goal has been to counteract the effects of insurgent communications in order to win the 

hearts and minds of the Afghan people. The long-term goal has been to create a free and 

independent media sector that will continue to function after donor support has ended. 

■ Although millions of dollars have been invested in the development of the Afghan media 

sector and the growth of private media since 2001 is considered one of Afghanistan’s 

greatest success stories, neither of these donor goals is being met. 

■ Donor support for Afghan media has led to the growth of radio and television outlets 

that are almost entirely dependent on foreign funding—direct and indirect.

■ Recent strategic communications policies have neither diminished nor adequately countered the presence of extremist voices in Afghanistan. Despite some examples to the 

contrary, Taliban communications continue to affect the lives of ordinary Afghans, 

whereas many communications by and from Western sources do not.

■ Neither short- nor mid-term analysis of the Afghan economy—ranked the third poorest in 

the world by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP)—foresees the growth of 

a market able to sustain Afghanistan’s domestic media sector without foreign financing.

■ The limited impact of Western communications endeavors, in conjunction with the predicted continued weakness of the Afghan economy, reveals an urgent need for a dramatic 

shift in the media strategies and goals pursued by the United States and its allies. 

■ First and foremost, donors should invest primarily in the Afghan media’s production and 

dissemination of socially constructive contents rather than in building media institutions 

or infrastructure that the Afghan economy cannot support. For these contents to be 

received as authentic and credible, they must reflect the vulnerabilities and priorities that 

Afghans themselves have identified as vital. 

■ Donors should make a multiyear funding commitment to the media in Afghanistan. 

Support should be allocated to both terrestrial and wireless media through a transparent 

and competitive process developed jointly by donors and Afghan media experts. 

Aggressively supporting the dissemination of socially constructive contents through new 

outlets will permit access to both geographic and demographic segments of the population not adequately served by current media outlets.

■ Donors should support media institutions and infrastructure when that support would 

facilitate the production and dissemination of socially constructive contents, and without 

the expectation that these institutions or structures will become self-sustaining. 

■ As often and as intensively as possible, media interventions should be accompanied by 

face-to-face community outreach activities that provide Afghans an opportunity to put 

into practice ideas and options that the media have brought to their attention. 

■ The United States and its allies should coordinate their media-support strategies and 

work formally with the Afghan media sector to enhance its credibility. In particular, 

military involvement in media production and dissemination should be wholly restructured to avoid excessive financial and editorial interference. 

5

AFGHANISTAN MEDIA ASSESSMENT

Introduction

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, international development agencies have considered the media a key tool in building or rebuilding fragile societies. Accordingly, donors have invested 

significant resources in the media as a mechanism to prevent, resolve, or mitigate conflict; to 

promote a sense of shared national purpose; and to underpin an open society. During the Taliban period, the only media in Afghanistan were Radio Sharia and a few government-produced 

religious publications. Television was banned, and telephone service was so bad that people 

who could afford to make international calls would travel to Pakistan to do so. On the heels of 

a war that ousted the Taliban, international investment in Afghanistan’s communication technologies spurred an aggressive build-out of TV, radio, print, and Internet outlets. The development approach largely entailed an open-ended investment in media infrastructure, institutions, 

and personnel. Hopes soared that donor investment would propagate a free and independent 

media sector that would support great social and political change for the benefit of Afghans. 

Nine years later, these hopes have given way to disappointment. In the face of continuing 

violent conflict, political instability, and widespread, intractable poverty, dreams of a free and 

independent media sector in Afghanistan go unrealized. It is essential, therefore, to reassess the 

media landscape and reevaluate how the media can best be employed as a tool for peacebuilding in Afghanistan. 

The findings and recommendations presented in this report are the result of a new methodology created by USIP to design media interventions in fragile environments. The Intended 

Outcomes Needs Assessment (IONA) is a systematic process that integrates conflict and media assessments. The IONA 

■ seeks to understand the media as they operate in the current social, economic, and 

political context;

■ factors into its conclusions contextual elements that facilitate or hinder particular media 

interventions;

■ identifies outcomes (objectives) and the means to attain them precisely. Outcomes are 

defined as specific changes in the knowledge, attitudes, and behaviors of target groups 

in society; 

■ makes explicit how outcomes are tied to specific activities; and

■ enables better coordination among implementing organizations by providing a coherent, 

integrated approach to planning media interventions that includes a common language 

and common metrics. 

By combining a situational assessment with a more conventional media assessment, the 

IONA equips development practitioners and funders with tools to design media interventions that have the greatest chances of success. (The USIP methodology will be described in a 

forthcoming publication.)

The IONA, as applied in Afghanistan, began with two months of desk research in 2009, 

which resulted in a working hypothesis. Desk research was followed by five weeks of formal 

interviews with more than 100 respondents in Kabul, Jalalabad, and Bamyan. Respondents 

included individuals from Afghan national and local government, U.S. and European diplomatic corps and development-aid staff, Afghan and international NGOs, Afghan civil society organizations, Afghan and international research and survey organizations, Afghan media 

professionals, international media development practitioners, formal and informal education 

specialists, district development council members, and local community members and leaders. Approximately 25 percent of the respondents were women, primarily from the media. In 
 6

PEACEWORKS 68

addition, informal interviews took place with taxi drivers, shopkeepers, guesthouse workers, 

Afghan and foreign security personnel, and various foreign experts encountered socially, as well 

as the numerous foreign journalists reporting on the run-off presidential elections that were 

scheduled to occur while the assessment was being conducted. By the end of the fieldwork 

period, the assessment team had assembled a rich body of information to ground proposed 

media interventions in the realities of Afghan culture and conflict. 

Like many of the Afghans we met, we believe the media are not fulfilling their potential as 

a means to help Afghanistan transition peacefully out of conflict. To help the media function 

in this important role, the current development strategy must make a fundamental shift. We 

therefore have strongly recommended that funders replace their focus on open-ended development of the media sector with closed-ended, content-driven interventions. In other words, we 

suggest surrendering the strategy of funding media for an undetermined time with the hopes 

that they will someday, somehow become “free and independent,” and instead fund interventions with specific timeframes during which donors invest in the production of contents that 

support specific social change objectives defined by Afghans. Part I of this report presents a 

synthesis of our desk and field research using the IONA, and it forms the justification for the 

specific recommendations for Afghan media offered in part II. 

 

The media are not 

fulfilling their potential 

as a means to help 

Afghanistan transition 

peacefully out of conflict. 
7

AFGHANISTAN MEDIA ASSESSMENT

IMedia in Afghanistan [ [

9

AFGHANISTAN MEDIA ASSESSMENT

Working Hypothesis

The working hypothesis posited that the conflict in Afghanistan is rooted in a historical, 

ongoing inability of Afghans to establish a mutually acceptable relationship between the central government and periphery communities. 

Historically, the central government in Kabul has been associated with the domination of 

one identity group—most commonly the Pashtuns—over all others. Pashtuns perceive political power going to allies of the Western Coalition Forces, namely the Tajiks and Uzbeks of 

the Northern Alliance. Non-Pashtuns just as vehemently complain of the “re-Pashtunization” 

of the state and government, with only symbolic inclusion of non-Pashtuns. A common view 

is that the government in Kabul does not represent the interests of any group other than the 

one holding power. 

In addition, the central government historically has not been able to provide sufficient 

security and services to the majority of people in Afghanistan. Therefore, rather than rely on 

the state for services, which is seen as distant from—if not hostile to—their interests, Afghans 

have put their trust in their local identity-based communities. The result is that identity-based 

loyalties on the periphery are pitted against the central government’s attempts to exercise nationwide political and military power. Since the fall of the Taliban regime, Afghans have been 

increasingly disenchanted with center-based politics and have lent even greater legitimacy to 

peripheral or nonstate actors who can meet their needs. 

We further hypothesized that Afghan media could contribute to defining a viable relationship between the center and the periphery by exploring the needs of each, informing citizens 

about paths taken by local and central authorities in developing center-periphery relations, 

creating public forums in which to discuss center-periphery relations, and holding government at all levels accountable for its actions. By serving as interlocutors for center-periphery 

relations, the media could make a significant contribution to the peacebuilding process in 

Afghanistan. The media could also inform Afghan communities about one another’s needs and 

aspirations, if the will and the capacity to do so were present.

Field Interviews

Fieldwork sought to confirm or refine the working hypothesis and to discover (1) what Afghans identify as their most pressing problems and needs and what they desire for the future; (2) how Afghans see change taking place over time, including obstacles to achieving the 

changes they desire; and (3) how media can be used to effect those changes. 

Fieldwork upheld the essential accuracy of the working hypothesis. In addition, Afghan respondents indicated that the tension between the center (political interests) and the periphery 

(identity-based interests) results from a complex set of vulnerabilities that must be addressed 

in order for Afghanistan to move out of conflict. 

Afghans agree that their country is in transition, although they have widely divergent views 

of what the country is transitioning from. Depending on whom one asks, Afghans say the 

country is transitioning from 

■ a distant but glorious past in which Afghanistan was home to unconquered, honorable, 

and religiously devout tribes and clans; 

■ a moderately distant past (monarchy period), neither glorious nor inglorious, that was 

characterized by a fair degree of stability but also by the domination of Pashtuns over 

other tribes and clans;
 10

PEACEWORKS 68

■ a more recent and less glorious past (Soviet period), when Afghanistan was occupied by 

a foreign and godless power, but which guaranteed Afghans education, healthcare, and 

other basic necessities; 

■ a most recent, and, by most accounts, inglorious past (Taliban period), during which 

Islam was used to justify imposing onerous burdens on a majority of Afghans, but which 

eliminated corruption and nepotism, limited violent tribal rivalries, and provided predictable—albeit harsh—justice.

Despite differing views of the past, Afghans seem largely in agreement about the present: 

namely, that nine years after the fall of the Taliban, Afghans find themselves living in a state 

of persistent insecurity. 

Afghans seek a future characterized by amniyat, a term used by both Dari and Pashto 

speakers to mean “holistic peace and security.” Respondents made clear that the peace and 

security connoted by amniyat is not synonymous with military or physical security to Afghans 

in any community, regardless of its level of violence. Rather, the security sought by Afghans 

requires improvements in a range of conditions that, together, will make it possible for them 

to live a proper or good Afghan life. The Afghan sense of amniyat closely resembles what the 

UNDP Human Development Report defines as human security: freedom from fear (of physical, sexual, or psychological abuse; violence; persecution; or death) and from want (of gainful 

employment, food, and health).1

Respondents most frequently identified the following eight areas of vulnerability:

1. governance and politics

2. economy

3. physical safety

4. religion

5. education

6. honor and respect

7. gender

8. information

Information insecurity is an aspect of other vulnerabilities reported by Afghans, and it suggests an important role for the media in Afghanistan’s development. 

Information Insecurity

Respondents across communities consistently expressed frustration and a sense of helplessness regarding their power to make choices that will meaningfully improve their lives. According to respondents, a major hurdle to constructive change is that Afghans must make 

crucial decisions about the future of their country, communities, and families based on information from sources they do not trust, or on information from trusted sources that may 

not be factual.

Afghans are exposed to numerous sources of information, both domestic and international, 

only a few of which they consider trustworthy. For Afghans, there is a clear connection between trust and security. Afghans reject certain information because they do not trust the 

source, and that mistrust further increases their sense of insecurity. There is a general sense that 

certain information and ideas are communicated deliberately to convince Afghans of things 

that benefit the communicator and not the public receiving the communication. Such communications can come from the Taliban, the international community, the government, nonprofit 

organizations, or from various members of other communities.
11

AFGHANISTAN MEDIA ASSESSMENT

Respondents stressed that they place a higher premium on the source of information than 

on the veracity of any specific piece of information. In other words, information obtained from 

a member of a trusted group is inherently trustworthy by virtue of the informant’s group membership. Information coming from other groups is by definition less trustworthy. This is a key 

reason that most domestic media operate along ethno-linguistic lines. Pashtuns, for example, 

consume and trust Pashtun media, whereas Hazaras consume and trust Hazara media. Pashtuns consider Hazara media untrustworthy, and vice versa; likewise for other communities. By 

this logic, it is difficult for a good idea to come from an untrustworthy source. Afghans turn to 

trusted sources for information even if those sources do not always possess empirically accurate 

information. At the same time, respondents regularly referred to the lack of sufficient or sufficiently accurate knowledge about the needs and interests of people outside their immediate 

community, and they desired this information. 

Afghan perceptions of media content are based on their decades of exposure to propaganda. 

In the Afghan experience, most media represent vested interests conveying highly subjective content. Afghan media are highly fragmented by tribal, religious, linguistic, and political identities. 

Most people we spoke with believe that Afghan broadcasters have specific agendas defined by 

their ethnic and national affiliation. For example, the Pajhwok News Agency is regarded as being anti-Kabul government, Tolo as being influenced by foreign powers (particularly the United 

States), and the Afghan Voice Agency (AVA) as being supported by the Iranian government. 

And most people know which local radio stations are heavily influenced by the Taliban. 

Programs seen as promulgating a Western political agenda are identified as propaganda, 

much as former Soviet or Taliban programs were. Afghans especially mistrust information 

from military associations. Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) strategic communications 

are viewed as representing Western security interests. Likewise, messages in military communications—from the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) newspaper to radio-ina-box—are generally dismissed. It is a common joke that the ISAF newspaper is known to 

make excellent kebab wrapping2

 and that radio-in-a-box broadcasts serve only as a source 

of entertainment, while their messages are ignored. In short, when the origin of information 

coming from radio or TV is clear, Afghans will not hesitate to decide whether they are going 

to trust it and accept it, or mistrust and reject it. Because knowing the source of information 

is key to deciding whether to trust it, Afghans do not trust anonymous mass media. Hence, 

personalizing the media through greater local input could change audience perceptions of the 

trustworthiness of the media. 

Foreign Influence

Mistrust of media due to perceived foreign influence is a theme that came up in various contexts and forms. Media are identifiably foreign when their messages explicitly come from foreign sources or when they are carried on foreign channels. Many respondents, both in and 

outside the media sector, indicated their own and wider public perception of Iran’s negative 

impact on the Afghan media landscape. Iran’s influence was said to range from financially supporting sympathetic Afghan media (described as “Shi’a” media),3

 to opening cultural centers 

that distribute videos and other pro-Iranian materials, to sending Iranian broadcast and print 

materials to Afghans living in border zones. Likewise, Pakistani influence on Afghanistan is 

seen as pernicious along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, where Afghans are able to receive 

Pakistani broadcasts. To counter this, Killid Radio in Jalalabad, for example, takes Pakistani 

feeds from the Internet, but before re-broadcasting the news, revises the language to remove 

It is a common joke that 

the ISAF newspaper is 

known to make excellent 

kebab wrappingand that 

radio-in-a-box broadcasts 

serve only as a source of 

entertainment.
 12

PEACEWORKS 68

words that are seen as deliberately inflammatory of religious sentiments. For example, Pakistani sources would refer to deaths from violence as “martyrdom,” whereas Killid would refer 

to the same deaths as “military casualties.”4

Afghans report that many foreign entertainment programs convey ideas and behaviors that 

contravene Afghan norms. “Bollywood” programs fill the airwaves, as do Indian pop music videos, soap operas, and talent shows. Afghans have a love/hate relationship with these programs. 

High on the list of offensive media are Indian soap operas and music videos, in which women 

dance, flirt, and otherwise expose themselves to men in direct violation of Afghan norms concerning modesty and gender. Despite the litany of offenses recited by most Afghans regarding 

the ways these programs threaten Afghan culture and values, these programs—especially soap 

operas—have huge followings.

Many Afghans express the need to defend their threatened values. As illustrated by the 

unsuccessful attempt to ban the Indian soap opera Tulsi, there is a conflict between the principle of freedom of expression and free media, and the desire to uphold Afghan cultural and 

religious values. This tension remains unresolved.5

Information of Western provenance may be also problematic in Afghanistan, even when 

it does not concern security and politics. Much donor-sponsored information presented to 

the public pertains to the country’s reconstruction and development. But, as Afghan civil society members reported to the assessment team, these communications leave Afghans feeling 

as though they are the objects rather than the subjects of development. That is, rather than 

engaging Afghans in deciding which kinds of development programs should be undertaken, 

they feel development activities are “done to them” from the top down. Afghan respondents 

gave several examples of informational vulnerability in this area, such as not knowing which 

development plans are prioritized, where development funds are going to be spent, or how 

a community could qualify for development assistance. According to one respondent, media 

are usually poorly educated about development and inform the public about development 

activities based on insufficient or inaccurate information. This creates misguided, unmanageable, and ultimately frustrated public expectations because Afghans come to understand 

development as an outcome and not as a process. Unfulfilled expectations create mistrust 

between public and national and international governments. Ultimately, the media create 

conflict between managed expectations (development based on shared information and consultation) and unmanaged expectations (development based on inaccurate information and 

lack of consultation). 

Religious Influence

The assessment team heard repeatedly that the opinions of religious leaders (mullahs, specifically) affect the production, broadcast or publication, and attitudes of audiences toward 

particular media programs. Mullahs have declared certain programs (such as the Indian soap 

opera Tulsi) to be haram (forbidden, unclean). They have attempted to ostracize or even banish 

individuals who have publicly expressed opinions or written about subjects that mullahs find 

objectionable. Responses to mullahs’ opinions have varied considerably. In certain instances, 

the public has supported the mullah, and the offending journalist has had to choose between 

repenting or leaving his community. In other cases the public has either disregarded the mullah’s edicts or has openly declared its disagreement with the cleric’s opinion.6

Media practitioners as well as members of various civil society organizations recounted to 

the assessment team that the success of their efforts depends on the public’s perception that they 

Much donor-sponsored 

information . . . leaves 

Afghans feeling as 

though they are the 

objects rather than the 

subjects of development. 
13

AFGHANISTAN MEDIA ASSESSMENT

adhere to popular Muslim values and norms. The extent to which media formally need to recognize Islam is still unclear. In any event, the assessment team understood that to gain the trust of 

the wider public, which is mostly rural and highly traditional, media producers must be sensitive 

to the “basket of norms” that constitute the general practice of Islam in Afghanistan.7

Taliban Influence

Afghans respondents made the point repeatedly that to accept and trust the media they want 

“more of their own contents,” particularly on television. This means more than having an authentic Afghan face reading a script. Rather, Afghans maintain that authenticity requires a 

combination of emotional truth and empirical truth. Emotional truth is difficult to define 

exactly, and it has local variations. As stated to us, Afghans would sooner “accept something 

that is emotionally true and empirically false, than accept something that is empirically true 

but emotionally false.”8

Indeed, respondents explained that the effectiveness of Taliban communications lies in their 

ability to convey both empirical and emotional truth. In many areas controlled by the Taliban 

there is usually a local FM radio station that broadcasts predominantly religious programming, 

including popular call-in shows that provide answers to questions on religious tenets and conduct. These programs are popular, and they reflect Afghans’ desire to uphold religious belief and 

practice. Beyond faith-based contents, the Taliban spread and propagate rumors through Talibancontrolled media. A particularly effective example was the rumor spread to convince Afghans 

that a planned vaccination campaign was actually a Western conspiracy to sterilize Afghans.9

The ability of the Taliban to spread such rumors lies in the overall authenticity of the Taliban voice and the usual credibility of Taliban information. Authenticity comes from the fact 

that contents are in local languages and reflect local concerns, and because information coming 

from Taliban media is backed up by action. This is particularly the case regarding threats, active 

naming and shaming, and night letters, whose pronouncements are enforced. Respondents 

cite congruence between what they hear on Taliban media and what they experience in their 

everyday lives. Unless this congruence is disrupted, the authenticity and credibility of Taliban 

media will be hard to counter. Afghans are not convinced by promises of security and justice to 

be delivered—eventually—by the Afghan government or the international community. They 

are convinced, however, by the harsh but predictable justice meted out by Taliban mullahs. 

Even in areas not under insurgent control, the Taliban is able to exert influence over both 

the mass media and telecommunications. For instance, radio stations have been threatened 

and even shut down for carrying programming deemed offensive to Islam. Taliban pressure 

also has effectively forced cell phone operators to shut down their transmission towers at night. 

Limiting access to information has had a visibly negative impact on Afghans’ ability to interpret different versions of events and to communicate. 

The ability of the Taliban to influence Afghan behavior and attitudes is of concern to the 

international community. Most attempts to counter Taliban media have consisted of paying 

radio stations to broadcast PRT content (usually music and messages from the commander), 

extending existing Western-backed media efforts (for example, Internews recently launched a 

Pashto-language service that includes Pashto versions of its nationwide magazine show and a 

news service), or engaging in various kinds of strategic communications. Anecdotal evidence 

from Afghans and foreigners is very convincing that Western efforts have yet to win the hearts 

and minds of the Afghan people.
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PEACEWORKS 68

From Insecurity to Amniyat

Respondents expressed a pressing need to gain or regain the ability to make sound choices 

in order to restore amniyat. At the same time, they consistently expressed frustration and 

a sense of helplessness regarding their power to make these critical choices for themselves. 

Interviewees expressed two conflicting opinions about whether their desired changes could 

be achieved. At one end of the spectrum is a prevailing sense of disempowerment that leaves 

Afghans without confidence that they can effect change at all. At the other end are specific 

opinions, which, in combination, point to the possibility of achieving desired change. 

For example, Afghans attribute many of the insecurities they are experiencing to the illegitimacy of the government, which is viewed as corrupt, discriminatory, dependent on foreign 

support, and the like. Although respondents had ideas about how one or another source of 

illegitimacy could be addressed, their overall sense was that there was little chance the array of 

challenges could be addressed in the holistic way needed to obtain a legitimate government. 

The same view pertains to other kinds of change desired by interviewees, such as overcoming 

poverty. Respondents stressed that meaningful change can be accomplished only by looking 

holistically at clusters of issues and finding the right mix of solutions to address the cluster as 

a whole, not merely its individual components. Furthermore, before acting on any particular 

issue, Afghans need to define for themselves what constitutes a particular cluster and what appropriate blend of solutions can address it. 

Underlying the numerous manifestations of vulnerability is a generalized sense of mistrust 

among the country’s various communities. To paraphrase an interviewee, Afghans see life as 

“zero sum”; no one benefits unless someone else loses. Respondents were in basic agreement 

that establishing the trust necessary for Afghans to work together on meeting their shared needs 

depends on exchanging ideas and opinions and considering mutually acceptable options. The 

process begins with creating communication channels for all Afghans that are seen as unbiased 

and therefore worthy of their trust. Respondents said it is time to formulate a new all-Afghan 

identity; a sense of belonging that would be based on mutual interests and a plus-sum rather 

than zero-sum attitude. 

The IONA works in this capacity by characterizing problems identified by Afghans as 

specific knowledge, attitudes, and behaviors. 

■ Knowledge is what people in the target society know to be true based on cognitive rather 

than emotional responses. 

■ Attitudes are what a people in the target society believe. These are often the reasons why 

certain knowledge is deemed important or why people engage in certain behaviors. 

■ Behaviors are what people in the target society do. Behavior is knowledge and attitudes 

made manifest in context, though not always with deliberate intent.

The intended outcomes or goals of media interventions are similarly defined as specific 

knowledge, attitudes, and behaviors that respondents would like to see come about. When 

discussing education insecurity, for example, respondents remarked that educated Afghans, 

particularly those returning from voluntary or involuntary time abroad, often face hostility as purveyors of foreign ideas. Rather than being welcomed back to their communities 

with their educational accomplishments applauded, returnees often bear the label khariji

(foreigner). The degree of “foreignness” imputed depends partially on the country in which 

the returnee had spent time, the length of time spent away, and the actual period spent 

away (during or following the Taliban period). Respondents who had returned from Iran, 

Pakistan, or various Western countries had similar reports. Irrespective of the details, most 
15

AFGHANISTAN MEDIA ASSESSMENT

respondents who returned from abroad described some level of alienation from Afghans 

who had stayed in country.

For their part, many educated Afghans express a patronizing attitude toward their illiterate 

and mostly rural co-nationals, whom they blame for the backwardness of the country and its 

inability to progress. But progress is not a goal in itself for the majority of Afghans. Rather, 

their goal is the restoration of amniyat, with which secularism—promulgated by modern education—is often at odds.

Table 1 juxtaposes statements of knowledge, attitudes, and behaviors that characterize educational insecurity with these same aspects transformed into conflict-ameliorating outcomes of 

media interventions. (A fuller discussion of this and other interventions is in part 2.)

Virtually all respondents agreed that the media could play an important role in meeting 

the needs they articulated. However, a look at Afghan media in its broader context shows that, 

despite modest improvements in the media sector since the fall of the Taliban, Afghans do not 

yet have access to the trustworthy information they need to help their country transition to 

peace and stability.

Media Outlets

The government of Afghanistan has the only broadcast system that covers the entire country—

Radio Television Afghanistan (RTA). Five multichannel media groups dominate the spectrum 

of private media (see table 2), and there are more than one hundred private FM stations in 

Afghanistan. Nevertheless, unreliable or nonexistent electricity is still a problem in large swaths 

of Afghanistan. Only 42 percent of Afghans have access to electricity, and it is rarely continuous, 

making it impossible to rely on communication technologies that require steady power.10

Radio

Seventy-seven percent of radio audiences are rural and 23 percent are urban, paralleling the 

population as a whole. Approximately half (48 percent) of the population listens to the radio 

every day, with 18 percent listening several times a week.11 (See table 3 for listening habits.)

According to BBC research, radio attracts listeners from all age and ethnic groups, and audiences consist of approximately equal numbers of men and women.12 Men listen to the radio 

more than women do. Women tend to listen individually, whereas men often listen to radio in 

groups, especially to political programs which they then discuss among themselves. Men tend 

to listen to radio in the morning and evening, whereas women listen mostly during the day, 

when men are not home and they can choose what they want to hear. However, should men 

take the family radio with them when they leave the house, women, especially those in rural 

areas, may be left devoid of access to any media, becoming further isolated from information 

and public discussion of issues that concern them. 

Although radio is the most commonly used medium, respondents stated its value and 

credibility as a source for local news are limited.13 Its limited credibility is explained in part by 

the low quality of local programming. Most news bulletins are only a few minutes long, for 

example, and do not include field reporting or interviews with people affected by the issues.14 

Journalists in insecure areas may face dangers that limit their ability to conduct in-depth 

reporting. In addition, media resources for investigative journalism are scarce, and journalists 

themselves lack experience in investigative reporting. As a result, the closer to home an issue is, the more Afghans turn to trusted sources of information about it—that is, to personal 

Despite modest 

improvements . . . since 

the fall of the Taliban, 

Afghans do not yet have 

access to the trustworthy 

information they need 

to help their country 

transition to peace 

and stability.
 16

PEACEWORKS 68

relationships. In one survey, only 24 percent of respondents said they turned to radio for local 

news; the majority obtained local news by talking with people they trust, such as family and 

friends (20 percent); neighbors, shura (community council) members, and elders (11 percent); 

and district officials and mullahs (10 percent).15

In contrast, Afghans consistently cite foreign radio services, the BBC and VOA in 

particular, as their most trustworthy sources of news.16 Although Afghans mistrust foreign 

news sources emanating from within the country, according to both Afghans and Western 

experts, their trust in broadcasts by the BBC and VOA is a vestige of the Soviet and Civil 

War periods, when these shortwave broadcasts were the only source of information other 

than the Kabul government. 

Television

Although radio dominates in rural areas, television is the primary source of information for 

urban audiences.17 Similar percentages of people in urban and rural areas report owning a radio 

(89 percent and 85 percent, respectively), but TV ownership is much higher in urban areas than 

in rural areas (89 percent and 26 percent, respectively). 

Rates of daily TV viewership range from 95 percent in Mazar to 6 percent in Kunduz.18

Satellite TV is increasingly popular—and increasingly affordable—in Afghanistan. In 2008, 

more than ten shops in Kandahar were selling satellite receivers at a cost of 5,000–6,000 Afghanis (including installation), which is 5 to 6 months’ salary for an average Afghan civil servant. Although satellite is available wherever a dish is mounted, cable is more popular in urban 

areas because it is cheap, simple to connect, and has a greater number of channels. 

Although TV audiences are growing, trends in radio access have remained consistent since 

2002, suggesting that TV is complementing rather than replacing radio in the media mix consumed by Afghans. Respondents in all three cities noted that, because the number of television 

Table 1. Educational insecurity problems and outcomes 

Problem Outcome

Knowledge Afghans who stayed may not have 

had exposure to many ideas that 

could benefit Afghanistan.

Those who stayed will learn about 

beneficial ideas from abroad.

Afghans educated abroad have 

ideas about how to help Afghanistan progress that may not be 

culturally acceptable.

Returnees will learn which ideas 

they bring from abroad may not be 

immediately welcomed by those 

who stayed.

Attitude Afghans who stayed look down on 

those who left, and may ostracize 

them with terms like khariji.

Individuals, families, and communities will develop an understanding 

of and empathy for members of 

other communities who have emigrated and returned.

Afghans who left see those who 

stayed as holding back Afghanistan’s 

development.

Returnees and those who stayed 

will begin to overcome their mutual 

mistrust.

Behavior Afghans who stayed summarily 

reject ideas proposed by those who 

left, and vice versa.

Returnees and those who stayed 

will consider ideas proposed by 

each other on their merits, not 

reject the ideas outright because 

they distrust the source.
17

AFGHANISTAN MEDIA ASSESSMENT

sets is still relatively small, watching TV is a group activity, involving groups of men in certain 

social settings or families at home.

Although RTA has the broadest reach of any television broadcaster and in some areas is the 

only signal available, the vast majority of Afghans consider RTA the voice of the central government rather than the voice of the nation. RTA fails both to address intergroup suspicions 

and to decrease already volatile levels of mistrust. Afghan media practitioners regard RTA as 

a means to preemptively silence any voice that questions the religious, military, or political 

establishment. Given Afghan attitudes toward centralized government generally, and toward 

the current government specifically, it comes as no surprise that the medium with the largest 

footprint attracts the smallest audience. 

Cell Phones

The use of mobile phones has exploded in Afghanistan, and there are now five major cell phone 

companies. In 2008, more than 70 percent of Afghans were covered by mobile phone recepTable 2. Top five private media groups in Afghanistan

Group Description

Ariana Television 

Network/AWCC 

This group operates two satellite TV channels, one of which is 

relayed by terrestrial transmitters in a number of cities. Ariana 

radio is broadcast from Kabul and relayed by local FM transmitters. Ariana is the second most popular TV channel. Most 

content is in Dari, but it broadcasts news in Dari, Pashto, and 

English. It also has a multilingual subtitle ticker tape for all programs. The network is owned by Ehsan Baya; some believe it to 

be influenced by Iran. 

Moby Group Moby Group owns Tolo TV, Lemar, and Arman FM. Arman is 

broadcast from Kabul and relayed by local transmitters. Tolo 

TV is the most popular channel in Afghanistan, with programs 

predominantly in Dari. Lemar broadcasts mainly in Pashto. The 

Moby Group is owned by the Mohseni brothers, and is perceived by some to have both Western and Iranian influences. 

Many Pashtuns see Tolo as having anti-Pashtun interests, which 

the owners deny. 

Saba Media 

Organization

Saba is associated with Coordination of Humanitarian Relief 

(CHA), a longstanding Afghan NGO. In early 2008, Saba established a national TV station. It also operates Radio Nawa, which 

is broadcast from Kabul and relayed by local transmitters. Saba 

is perceived to be influenced by the West. 

Killid Group Killid is a trading arm of Development Humanitarian Services for 

Afghanistan (DHSA), another longstanding Afghan NGO. The 

group publishes Killid Weekly and Mural and owns Killid Radio, 

a network with studios in Kabul, Herat, and Kandahar. Radio 

Killid is broadcast from Kabul and relayed by local FM transmitters; however, Killid also has local studios that are capable of 

replacing some of the network programs with locally generated 

content. Killid is perceived to be influenced by the West. 

Noor Television 

Network

Noor Television was set up in 2007. It broadcasts a mix of Dari, 

English, and Pashto. It is believed to be influenced by Iran, as 

well as supportive of and supported by Abdullah Abdullah. 
 18

PEACEWORKS 68

tion, and, according to the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology, there 

are now nearly 3,000 communications towers across the country (a 100 percent increase since 

2007).19 An estimated 6 million people subscribed to cell phone service in 2008. User numbers 

are increasing at a rate of 300,000 per month and will continue to grow rapidly.20 The ability of 

Afghans to use cellular technology is limited by the bandwidth available and by the sophistication of the tools that Afghans can access or afford. The vast majority of Afghans can afford only 

the most basic cell phone with voice and text messaging capacities. 

Afghans value mobile phone access highly and resent any interference in cellular network 

access. In March 2008, the Taliban began attacking cell phone towers, asserting that the towers 

were being used by international forces to track insurgent movements. After Taliban attacks 

on several towers caused almost $2 million in damage, Afghanistan’s four major mobile phone 

companies began cutting service across the south. Public anger at the reduction in service 

forced Taliban spokesman Zabiullah Mujahid to admit that it may have been a poor tactic.21

There is a fair balance between male and female cell phone users (38 percent and 33 percent, respectively). Forty percent of users are 15–24 years old, and most live in urban areas 

(85 percent in Kabul, and 72 percent across all urban areas). Only 26 percent of users live in 

rural areas.22 The vast majority of mobile phone use is for voice calls. However, Afghans also use 

their phones to play games and send and receive text messages. About 50 percent of subscribers 

use their phones to take photos and listen to the radio (see figure 1). 

Table 3. Radio listening habits in Afghanistan, 2008

Frequency Overall (%) Males (%) Females(%)

Daily 48 58 38

Never 20 13 26

Weekly 18 18 17

Monthly 5 4 7

Source: Afghanistan Media and Information Survey, 2008.

Listening Patterns

Media producers in Afghanistan describe two ways to listen: shunidan and gush dadan. Although both terms translate as “to listen,” they connote different kinds of attention. Shunidan 

is parsed as “unfocused listening” and is associated with radio because radio programs tend 

to be background for other activities. Gush dadan, in contrast, is parsed as “focused listening” 

and is associated with television viewing because of the concentrated attention TV demands 

of its audience. Consequently, despite its greater reach, radio has less impact than television 

on audiences who have access to both. Radio producers suggest that for their programs to be 

compelling, they need to engage their listeners in gush dadan.23
19

AFGHANISTAN MEDIA ASSESSMENT

Internet

Internet access in Afghanistan is estimated to be up to 2 percent, and access is almost exclusively in urban areas.24 According to a Pakistani entrepreneur who was in Afghanistan to develop a new 3-G network, Kabul is the only place where network development is at all feasible. 

And even there, the rate of penetration will be very slow because of cost, technical limitations, 

low literacy rates, and the like.25 However, as prices fall and mobile Internet accessibility increases (through Wi-Max and GPRS), Internet use will continue to expand. 

Growing access to the Internet has led to the mushrooming of online blogging. One study 

reported that 20,000 bloggers writing in Dari or Pashto were active in Afghanistan in 2008. 

The study suggests that the majority blog in Dari partly because their blogs can be read by 

Iranians.26

Print Media

Though the Ministry of Information and Culture reports approximately 700 print publications in circulation in 2009, print media remain of limited significance, primarily because of 

the extremely low literacy levels among adults.27 Afghan adult literacy rates are estimated to be 

28 percent, with female literacy at only 29 percent of the male literacy rate.28 Limited distribution channels also mean that few publications are available nationally. 

Regulatory Environment

Afghan media regulation remains restrictive. Although most media are privately owned, 

there is little editorial freedom. The 2009 Mass Media Law contains eight restrictions on 

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Receive 

information 

from news provider

Take/send 

photographs

Send or receive Listen to radio

text messages

Play games

Percent of

users

Figure 1. Afghans’ mobile phone use by function
 20

PEACEWORKS 68

content, including anything considered to be against Islamic values or damaging to national 

security interests, which remain undefined. The government has threatened to ban television programs for contents deemed to be contrary to Afghan religious or cultural values.29

Media professionals regularly have to evaluate whether their work is sufficiently Islamic, 

or risk censure for being anti- or un-Muslim. For example, the staff of Nargis, the women’s 

radio station in Jalalabad, stated that everything they do is “informed by Islam,” although 

Nargis does not consider itself a religious station.30 The staff implicitly recognize the religious vulnerability they would otherwise face in pursuing topics vital to women. Similarly, 

the founder of a new educational publication in Kabul explained that to avoid censure 

he had to provide the “Muslim” rationale for any topic he discussed before he could openly assert its general value.31 Respondents frequently mentioned the need to reform the 

2009 Mass Media Law, and promoting such reform has been an ongoing effort by the 

international community. 

The safety and protection of journalists, as enshrined in Afghan law, have not been enforced 

by the Afghan police and judiciary. Reporters Without Borders noted that in December 2009 

Noorin TV journalist Nasto Naderi was attacked and beaten by members of the National 

Directorate of Security (NDS). Abdul-Ahad, a correspondent for the UK Guardian, together 

with two local journalists, was abducted and held for several hours, during which they were 

beaten. Reporters Without Borders commented that “although a complaint was filed by the 

TV station and the two journalists, no measures have been taken against their assailants.”32

Media unions have called for greater efforts by the Afghan government to prosecute harassment, intimidation, and violence against media professionals, and for the government and 

NDS to stop harassing media professionals. In January 2008, Afghan journalist Sayed Parwez 

Kambakhsh was sentenced to death for downloading and distributing allegedly anti-Islamic 

materials. His reprieve in 2009 took place only after efforts from Afghan media, human rights 

activists, and the international community. 

The 2009 Mass Media Law maintains central government control over RTA, despite provisions in the 2001 Bonn Agreement for RTA to become an independent public broadcasting 

network. Some officials within the Ministry of Information already favor this shift, because, 

realistically speaking, the media in Afghanistan are already largely out of the government’s 

control, due to the rapid growth of private radio and TV. 

Economy

Underlying the state of Afghan media is the weakness of the Afghan economy. According 

to the Asian Development Bank, in 2009 Afghanistan was the poorest country not only in 

Central Asia, but in the entire Asia-Pacific region. In terms of human deprivation, the UNDP 

Human Poverty Index ranks Afghanistan last among 135 countries on the basis of short average lifespans, widespread insecurity, a weak system of governance, inadequate healthcare and 

education, poor public services, limited employment opportunities, and widespread poverty 

among a large segment of the population. Despite development gains since the fall of the Taliban regime, two-thirds of Afghans live below or just above the country’s official poverty line 

indicator of US$1.25 per day.33

Respondents in this assessment were quite vocal about the financial vulnerabilities of the 

Afghan media. The Killid Group and Moby Group, both based in Kabul, claim to be financially self-sustaining and are by all accounts the most successful commercial Afghan media. Yet 

both groups make money by working on foreign donor–sponsored projects and by broadcast-
21

AFGHANISTAN MEDIA ASSESSMENT

ing programs produced or commissioned by Western governmental agencies.34 The manager 

of Killid Radio in Jalalabad explained to the assessment team that his station was able to survive because of subsidies it receives from the parent Killid Group. Likewise, in Jalalabad, Shaiq 

TV and to some extent Nargis are both underwritten by their owners’ Internet café enterprises 

and other sources of income unrelated to the operation of the television or radio stations.35

Given the country’s endemic poverty, neither consumers nor producers will have the 

resources to create an advertising market that will wean the media from their reliance on 

foreign donors.In this environment, private ownership of media should not be confused with 

economic independence.

International Support for Afghan Media

It is well documented that overall donor support for Afghanistan media has been in inverse 

proportion to donor involvement in Iraq since 2002. The Afghan media sector was among the 

casualties of the initial tectonic shift in priorities from Afghanistan to Iraq. Even at its peak, 

funding for Afghan media was significantly less than analogous budgets in Iraq, Kosovo, and 

Bosnia. When Iraq displaced Afghanistan as a priority for the United States and Europe, 

donor support for Afghanistan shrank exponentially, including support for the media. Radio 

stations, especially, that had been established with development funds and that relied on foreign support to operate were forced to downsize or to cease operating altogether. This pattern 

has changed somewhat under the Obama administration, which has shifted attention back to 

Afghanistan. Nonetheless, despite an increase in funding as of late 2009, the Afghan media 

sector’s health remains poor. Donors tend to support only a few channels, and many of these 

channels have very specific audiences. 

Despite the documented increase in the number of media producers and broadcasters, 

other indicators of the vitality and sustainability of Afghanistan’s media have not kept pace. For 

instance, in 2009 the number of television stations skyrocketed from twelve to twenty within 

six months as the country was gearing up for presidential elections.36 That same year, however, 

Afghanistan also reached its lowest level of press freedom since 2002, according to rankings 

from Reporters Without Borders.37

This assessment revealed that these apparently contradictory phenomena reflect unrealistic donor expectations for media still functioning amid violent conflict and guided by media 

development strategies in need of dramatic revision. Although there is an expansive media environment in Afghanistan, with television, radio, cell phones, and increasing Internet penetration, the market cannot support all mass media platforms. It is aspirational rather than realistic 

for donors to expect to produce free and independent media during this fluid and unstable 

transition period when (1) there is not yet an economy able to support independent or forprofit media, and (2) the regulatory environment still imposes insurmountable and arbitrary 

restrictions on the media’s ability to function. 

The IONA also highlighted an urgent need for U.S. and international government, private, 

and nonprofit entities to coordinate media strategies in Afghanistan. Currently, the needs and 

goals of various interests may work at cross-purposes. The U.S. military, for example, purchases 

airtime to counter extremist propaganda and disseminate information. However, military use 

of Afghan media contributes to the media sector’s financial dependency and undermines the 

overall effort to develop media credibility. The most credible objections to extremist messages 

will come from Afghans themselves, and these will strengthen and spread as Afghanistan develops a healthy media sector that supports the free exchange of ideas. A more positive role for 

The Afghan media sector 

was among the casualties 

of the initial tectonic 

shift in priorities from 

Afghanistan to Iraq. 
 22

PEACEWORKS 68

the military is protecting communications and media assets from predation and destruction by 

armed spoilers until the Afghan government is able to assume this responsibility.

Despite these conditions, donor support for Afghan media remains crucial.

Media Training

The international development community has offered the Afghan media various training 

on topics such as basic journalism skills, the use of editing technologies, and managing media 

as a commercial enterprise. These trainings are intended to ameliorate the plethora of weaknesses and obstacles the media face to becoming free and independent. Afghan media have to 

contend with the criteria of funders paying for the trainings, which are directly or indirectly 

Western governments and development agencies. This situation, combined with the tense and 

unstable conditions in which the Afghan media must operate, has led to mixed outcomes. 

Some trainings help practitioners develop skills and also provide trainees with opportunities to use the skills. Internews has provided trainings in journalism and media management to 

people who then have applied their skills in the approximately forty radio stations of the Salam 

Watandar network that Internews established in Afghanistan. These trainings have created a 

cadre of media practitioners and have spun off two noteworthy media institutions: the Pajhwok News Agency and Nai, which counts itself the country’s leading domestic media-training 

organization.38 At the same time, Internews has trained an indeterminate number of individuals who are not presently working in the media or are working as freelancers, at best. Similarly, 

the Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR) provides training in specific areas of print 

journalism, which the trainees then are supposed to take back to their outlets. These journalists 

tend to be located in areas of particularly intense conflict, with a large concentration in Kandahar Province over the past three years.

This assessment found that media trainings have not addressed many needs identified by 

respondents. For example, respondents said that professional training provided by Western media development organizations has not strengthened the trainees’ professional ethos in the face 

of their strong ethnic or tribal affiliations. Second, because deference to authority is a deeply 

rooted cultural and political habit, Afghan media practitioners still diminish their own journalistic integrity by failing to challenge official sources of information. Third, the assessment team 

was told repeatedly that Afghans are dissatisfied with media contents. Programming is generally described as skewed toward particular political interests; ethnic, tribal, or religious groups; 

or language communities. Domestic entertainment contents are often seen as uninteresting, 

whereas foreign programs are considered culturally or religiously inappropriate. Afghan dissatisfaction with media contents could be addressed with training that facilitated the production of 

local contents based on local criteria. But such training is not taking place at present. 

Media and Community Outreach

None of the current or planned media interventions encountered by the assessment team included any community outreach components. The majority of media development organizations pay little if any attention to bolstering the impact of their efforts by developing a deliberate, structural relationship between on-air components and off-air activities. In contrast, many 

organizations attempting to achieve behavior-change objectives—whether conserving natural 

resources or addressing high-risk sexual behavior—understand that the media are an essential 

tool for multiplying the effectiveness of their work.39 
23

AFGHANISTAN MEDIA ASSESSMENT

The success of media interventions for social change is often correlated directly with the 

extent to which a program has focused on community outreach. The series Soul City in South 

Africa offers a striking example of this. After five years, Soul City had achieved measurable 

changes in knowledge, attitudes, and behaviors regarding sexuality largely because it had allocated substantial resources to community outreach to amplify the authenticity of the ideas 

conveyed by its TV program.40 Just as it is a recognized best practice among organizations such 

as Soul City or UNIFEM to reinforce on-the-ground activities with media programs, it is 

incumbent on Afghan mass media organizations to incorporate community-based activities to 

increase their programming’s relevance and credibility. 

A New Development Approach

Virtually all respondents agreed that the media could play an important role in developing 

mutual respect among communities, providing trustworthy information, and helping to stabilize society and support the peacebuilding process. However, given the state of Afghan media 

and its larger social context, the current media development approach will not help Afghans 

achieve these ends. 

Timetables for Transition

Missing from the discourse on media in transition—and from transition discourse in general—are identifiable timeframes for specific benchmarks of change. Documents intended 

to guide transitional processes too often include timeframes that are either undefined or 

open-ended. In response to a shortfall of concrete outcomes due to ambiguous milestones, 

a number of thinkers and policy advisers have insisted on setting specific parameters for 

specific kinds of transitional aid.41Development-aid strategists—media specialists among 

them—can make better decisions about what to undertake when they know how much time 

they have been allotted to achieve their objectives. 

Setting multiyear benchmarks for meeting transitional objectives is a pointless exercise 

without the resources required to achieve them. Since the preponderance of media support 

in Afghanistan comes from U.S. foreign-aid allocations, it is essentially impossible for media 

developers dependent on U.S. funding to plan programs extending beyond the fiscal year in 

which their funding began. Whereas U.S. government agencies will entertain multiyear proposals, they stress their inability to guarantee that future funding will be available even if a 

multiyear program has been approved. Until this changes, development-aid strategists will be 

constrained in making decisions about what activities to undertake because they will not know 

how much money actually will be allocated to achieve their objectives. 

Realistic Goals for Foreign Support 

Given Afghanistan’s social and economic realities, foreign support for the media cannot create conditions that allow for the emergence of free and independent media. There is no leverage to eliminate the various factional interests and controls over the media environment, 

and the current economic conditions will not allow the media to sever their dependence on 

foreign donors or domestic power-holders. These conclusions are borne out by the state of the 

media in Afghanistan over the last nine years. 

Therefore, we recommend the following approach:
 24

PEACEWORKS 68

1. Foreign donors should define realistic objectives for support to media in Afghanistan, 

which have been constrained by 

• donor conventions surrounding the development of “free and independent” media,

• the practice of short-term funding with expectations of achieving long-term 

outcomes. 

2. As long as Afghanistan is in political and economic transition, and while most media 

outlets continue to depend on foreign support for their survival, donor investments in the 

Afghan media sector should focus on

• changing the objective from creating free and independent media to producing 

contents that address a broad range of Afghan concerns;

• reframing the time needed to achieve media objectives by making multiyear funding 

commitments, with an emphasis on achieving short-term interventions rather than 

long-term media sector development;

• increasing access to media and information for the widest spectrum of the Afghan 

population;

• improving the ability of media producers to develop specific contents;

• reducing some systemic obstacles in the media environment that prevent media 

from operating freely.

We offer concrete programming and sector development suggestions in the next section.
25

AFGHANISTAN MEDIA ASSESSMENT

IMedia in Afghanistan [ [ II Recommended Media [ Interventions [

27

AFGHANISTAN MEDIA ASSESSMENT

The IONA ensures that proposed media activities are both purposeful and possible. By purposeful, we mean that the media interventions address specific problems, which comprise 

clearly defined knowledge, attitudes, and behaviors that people in the target society identify as 

priorities and desire to change. Outcomes are also defined in terms of changes in knowledge, 

attitudes, and behaviors. 

By possible, we mean that the IONA indicated that the desired societal changes expressed 

by respondents can indeed be achieved through media interventions, as the media currently 

exist, or through activities that aim to change the media sector itself. In other words, the recommendations take into account the realities of the local media sector, its limitations, and 

projected trends.

We divided the recommendations into two types: those in which the media are the tool of 

the intervention and those in which the media themselves are the target of the intervention. If 

an intervention can achieve its intended outcomes by using existing media capacities, the media 

are the tool. If achieving an objective requires transforming the media or media environment, 

the media are the target of the intervention. We strongly urge undertaking media-as-target interventions only when they would support specific media-as-tool interventions. The exceptions 

to this principle are interventions to change the regulatory and enabling environment.

The proposed programs are national in scope; however, the formats can be adapted to address local needs via local media. One of the first and most crucial elements of the process of 

designing a local or national program is to work closely with audiences to identify their specific 

needs and to involve them in the creation of contents that address those needs in authentic 

and credible terms.

Media as a Tool 

1. Serialized TV or Radio Drama: Afghan Odysseus

Respondents said that educated Afghans, particularly those returning from voluntary or involuntary time abroad, often face hostility as purveyors of foreign ideas. Rather than being 

welcomed back to their communities with their educational accomplishments applauded, returnees often bear the label khariji (foreigner). This episodic series will be based on the experiences of Afghans who have been displaced both internally and internationally by war during 

the last thirty years. 

Target 

Audience

General Afghan population, with a special focus on communities with 

high numbers of returnees

Format Serialized drama on television or radio

Broadcast 

Component

Television: weekly 30-minute drama

Radio: twice weekly 15-minute episodes

Outreach 

Components

Excerpts can be used to promote dialogue in community-reconciliation 

programs. 

Excerpts can be used as teaching materials in schools.

Interactive radio programs can supplement the radio or TV drama to increase audience involvement and broaden the scope of discussion about 

issues raised in the drama.

The stories can be transformed into comics or other graphic forms suitable for underliterate and younger audiences.
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PEACEWORKS 68

Outcomes Knowledge 

Returnees will better 

understand the experiences of those who 

stayed.

Those who stayed 

will better understand 

the experiences of 

returnees.

Those who stayed will 

learn about beneficial 

ideas from abroad. 

Returnees will learn 

which ideas they bring 

from abroad may not be 

immediately welcomed 

by those who stayed.

Older generations will 

learn about contributions young people can 

make to communities.

Youths, especially returnees, will learn about 

age-based respect.

Attitudes

Individuals, families, 

and communities will 

develop an understanding of and empathy 

with members of other 

communities who have 

migrated and returned.

Returnees and those 

who stayed will develop 

greater empathy with 

and respect for each 

other.

Returnees and those 

who stayed will begin to 

overcome their mutual 

mistrust.

Behavior

Returnees and those 

who stayed will consider ideas proposed 

by the other on their 

merits, not reject 

the ideas outright 

because they were 

proposed by a mistrusted group. 

Returnees and those 

who stayed will 

identify and practice 

old and new ways of 

showing respect.

Returnees and those 

who stayed will 

identify and practice 

cooperative ways 

of solving issues of 

mutual concern. 

2. Reality TV: All-Afghan Youth Cricket Team 

Afghan youths from diverse backgrounds currently lack opportunities to share positive experiences that contribute to their sense of a common good. This reality TV program uses cricket 

to create such a domain of shared experiences. Although cricket is not the Afghan national 

pastime, its popularity has risen phenomenally as the Afghan National Cricket Team has made 

its way up the ranks of international cricket. Team captain Raees Ahmadzai, now a publicly 

recognized sports figure, has capitalized on his stature to bring together girls and boys for 

cricket training in Kabul, with funding from the British government. He has already agreed to 

participate in this television program and outreach activities.

Target 

Audience

Youths (female and male), their families, and communities across 

Afghanistan

Format Weekly 30-minute TV episodes

Broadcast 

Component

TV episodes following the selection of cricket players from all provinces 

of Afghanistan; selection would be made by members of the Afghan 

National Cricket Team, led by captain Raees Ahmadzai 

TV episodes showing training of selected players and formation of the 

All-Afghan Youth Cricket Team

TV broadcasts of games between youth teams

Outreach 

Components

Players not selected for the team would be organized to help create or 

restore sports fields in the provinces involved in the project.

Organized “peace sports activities” would be held in newly created 

sports fields.

TV programs could document the process of people identifying a common goal and working together to achieve it (e.g., building sports fields).
29

AFGHANISTAN MEDIA ASSESSMENT

Outcomes Knowledge

Individuals, families, 

and communities will 

learn more about 

one another’s cultural 

identities.

Project participants 

will learn skills for 

dealing with complex social situations, 

including conflict, 

which they can apply 

on and off the field.

Attitudes

Individuals, families, 

and communities will 

develop greater trust 

in other communities through youths 

engaging in this 

program. 

Viewers will develop 

a level of pride in 

and identification 

with the all-Afghan 

cricket team.

Project participants 

will become accepting of people from 

different backgrounds, both on 

and off the field.

Young viewers will 

perceive project 

participants from 

communities other 

than their own as 

role models. 

Behavior

Youth participants, their 

families, and their communities will engage in 

public discussion about 

ways to improve trust. 

Afghans will support the 

all-Afghan youth team 

because it represents various communities in the 

country. 

Project participants will 

become proactive advocates of pluralism in Afghanistan and will apply 

their skills in addressing 

various contentious issues 

off the field. 

3. Television Documentary Film Series: Role Models

Afghans say that they are open to learning from other people with whom they can identify. This series of short documentaries presents examples of how some Afghan communities 

have addressed particular problems and explores how these communities can serve as positive 

examples for others. 

Target 

Audience

General Afghan population

Format Short documentary films

Broadcast 

Component

Television: weekly 30-minute segments

Outreach 

Components

Audience will be invited to provide feedback on each program, and on 

a regular basis the broadcast will focus its discussions on how successes 

can be replicated elsewhere in Afghanistan. 

Communities or individuals who have emulated a role model featured in 

a program may become the subject of a subsequent episode to illustrate 

to the audience how the options shown on the program can produce 

demonstrable benefits.
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PEACEWORKS 68

Outcomes Knowledge

Communities will learn 

more about one another through examples 

of successful problem 

solving.

Viewers will learn specific problem-solving 

techniques through 

examples of the successful application of 

those techniques.

Individuals and communities will learn that 

they share problems 

and possible problemsolving options with 

others from different 

backgrounds.

Attitudes

Individuals and communities will gain 

confidence that they 

have the capacity to 

solve problems.

Individuals and communities will gain 

respect for and trust in 

other individuals and 

communities that have 

succeeded in solving 

problems.

Behavior

Afghans will find ways 

to address obstacles 

to meeting shared 

needs. 

Individuals and communities will apply 

lessons learned 

from positive role 

models to their own 

problems.

Individuals and communities will share 

their positive and 

negative problemsolving experiences 

with one another.

Communities will take 

advantage of publicly 

supported problemsolving instruments, 

such as the National 

Solidarity Program.

4. Participatory Radio Satire: “Everybody Knows That . . .”

Given the tendency of Afghans to accept information based on its source, rumor is powerful 

in Afghanistan. Rumor can be transmitted rapidly and widely via cell phone. This interactive 

radio satire examines the role of rumors and exploits the use of cell phones by the audience to 

engage listeners and to address issues of informational insecurity. 

Target 

Audience

General Afghan population, leaders, and decision makers

Format Radio drama and live call-in program

Broadcast 

Component

Twice weekly 15-minute episodes, every other episode with unresolved 

issue for audience to address

Once monthly live call-in discussion with listeners

Outreach 

Components

The audience will help to create the narrative, along the lines of forum 

theater.

Every other episode will end with a situation that a character must address. 

The audience is asked to suggest what the character ought to do by sending text messages or making a free cell phone call. Based on suggestions 

and the program’s curriculum, the team will produce several alternative 

endings to the situation. Listeners will hear these alternative endings and 

then vote for the ending they think is most appropriate and provide a brief 

explanation of their choice.

Once every 4 weeks, the drama takes a break for a discussion among 

listeners about the suggestions that were made and how the audience has 

responded to them.
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AFGHANISTAN MEDIA ASSESSMENT

Outcomes Knowledge

Afghans will understand 

the power of rumor and 

its potential for negative impact.

Afghans will learn to 

differentiate the trustworthiness of a source 

of information from the 

trustworthiness of the 

information itself.

Afghans will learn how 

to create and prioritize 

options for problem 

solving based on available information.

Afghans will learn to 

seek out information 

they need in order to 

define and address a 

problem.

Afghans will learn specific ways of addressing their informational 

vulnerabilities.

Attitudes

Individuals and communities will gain confidence that they have 

the capacity to solve 

problems.

Afghans will accept 

options for problem 

solving that come from 

sources that may have 

been considered untrustworthy in the past.

Individuals and communities will accept 

that they share both 

problems and possible problem-solving 

options with others 

who are from different 

backgrounds.

Behavior

Afghans will verify facts 

before responding to 

rumors. 

Afghans will look more 

critically at all information to assess its 

trustworthiness.

Afghans will use available technology (cell 

phones) to verify or 

counter rumors. 

5. Investigative and Participatory Radio Talk Show: Face the Nation

Respondents conveyed a deep mistrust of authorities, particularly from the government. This 

program combines investigative journalism with moderated audience participation before, 

during, and after the broadcast. The program could be adapted for local, provincial/district, or 

national audiences. 

Target 

Audience

General Afghan population, decision makers

Format Weekly investigative report, moderated call-in, and live interview program

Broadcast 

Component

10-minute investigative report on topic of the week

Presentation of listener questions and opinions by program moderator

Interview of guest by program moderator

Call-in questions to guest from listeners

Discussion of responses received to listener comments and questions from 

previous program
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PEACEWORKS 68

Outreach 

Components

The public will be invited to suggest a topic of the week for an investigative report and to suggest which guest should be invited to appear on air.

Listeners will call in to pose questions to the guest during the broadcast. 

Listeners will participate in deciding how the guest will address the problem off the air and within a specific timeframe.

The radio station will assign a reporter to investigate whether the guest is 

taking action. 

Anyone who wishes to may receive regular text message updates from 

the reporter on steps that have or have not been taken before the guest 

returns to face the nation a second time.

Listeners again question the guest about the results that have or have not 

been achieved.

Outcomes Knowledge

Afghans will learn to 

demand information 

needed to define and 

address a problem.

Afghans will learn 

to demand accountability from people in 

leadership positions. 

Afghans will know 

which of their needs 

are or are not being met by Afghan 

officials.

Individuals will learn 

that they share both 

problems and possible problem-solving 

options with others 

who are from different 

backgrounds.

Afghans will learn to 

use media as an effective tool for creating accountability.

Attitudes

Afghans will gain confidence in their ability 

to demand accountability from people in 

authority.

Individuals will gain 

trust in other members of the public who 

offer viable problemsolving options.

Afghans will become 

convinced of the 

benefits of seeking alternative approaches 

to solving seemingly 

intractable problems.

Behavior

Afghans will increase 

their direct involvement in defining 

and using the media 

through greater access to and use of 

cell phone and other 

wireless technologies.

Afghans will look 

more critically at information or answers 

to problems given by 

people in positions of 

authority.

Afghans will cooperate to influence key 

leaders and opinion 

makers to work for a 

secure environment. 

6. Community Problem Solving on Radio: Shura on the Air

Shuras are considered among the most effective problem-solving mechanisms operating in 

Afghanistan today. Shuras have grown rapidly in kind and in number over the last few years. 

Because some shuras have had specialized training in resolving particular kinds of conflicts, not 

all community councils operate in a like manner. Through the radio, listeners can learn about 

the diverse ways in which shuras address a range of security vulnerabilities. 

Target 

Audience

General Afghan population, community leaders, shura members
33

AFGHANISTAN MEDIA ASSESSMENT

Format Irregular schedule and length, depending on the types of shuras that 

agree to participate

Broadcast 

Component

Taped broadcasts of community council deliberations

Outreach 

Components

Not applicable.

Outcomes Knowledge

Afghans will learn how 

other communities use 

shuras to solve problems.

Communities will learn 

new techniques that their 

own shuras can use to 

address problems.

Attitudes

Shuras will be accepted 

by communities as 

mechanisms for solving 

a range of problems.

Afghans will respect and 

value problem-solving 

techniques that come 

from sources they may 

not have considered in 

the past.

Behavior

Local shuras will practice new problemsolving techniques.

Communities will use 

shuras to respond 

to a range of local 

problems.

Media as a Target 

1. Increase Pashto-Language Programming

Violence and violent conflict occur predominantly in Pashtun lands, where the Taliban have 

a heavy media presence. Dari-language media dominate, and there is a need for credible, authentic, intra-Pashtun discourse about the causes, drivers, and possible solutions to conflict to 

counterbalance the current Pashto discourse of victimization.

Requirements Investing in RTA’s Pashto programming to provide relevant, credible 

content 

Investing in Shamshad’s Pashto programming to improve its quality 

Investing in Pashto-language radio broadcasting, including setting up new 

transmitters and ensuring their security

Outcomes Knowledge

Pashtun audiences will 

know they have access 

to credible sources of 

information produced 

by Pashto media 

practitioners.

Pashtun audiences will 

have alternatives to 

information produced or 

offered by the Taliban.

Attitudes

Pashtun audiences will 

feel Dari media bias is 

reduced.

Trust in Taliban media 

will be reduced by providing credible Pashto 

alternatives.

Sense of Pashtun 

victimization will be 

reduced.

Behavior

New Pashto media will 

be consumed by Pashtun audiences.

Pashtun will have 

informed conversations 

among themselves 

about community 

needs.

Pashtun media practitioners will produce 

more and higher quality Pashto-language 

media.
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PEACEWORKS 68

2. Support Investigative Journalism

Journalists lack training in general reporting skills as well as in investigative reporting skills. 

Once trained, journalists often have no opportunity to apply their skills because of physical danger or threats, or because media organizations have limited resources for investigative 

reporting. 

Requirements Funding training in investigative journalism techniques for media organizations and independent journalists 

Subsidizing mid- to long-term residential international-media mentoring 

that will support and protect journalists

Outcomes Knowledge

Journalists will gain 

investigative reporting 

skills.

Audiences will gain indepth knowledge about 

critical social and political issues.

Media practitioners will 

know they are safe from 

harassment.

Attitudes

Audiences will believe 

they have the right 

to understand issues 

beyond the official or 

superficial level that has 

characterized reporting 

to date.

Media outlets, including their reporters and 

managers, will believe 

it is their right and responsibility to provide 

in-depth reporting on 

issues.

Behavior

Media outlets will 

engage in investigative 

reporting on a consistent basis.

Afghans will make 

decisions informed by 

investigative reports.

Afghans will lend 

increasingly less credibility to rumors. 

3. Transform Afghan Radio and Television (RTA) into an Independent 

Public Broadcast Network 

There is no independent source of information that serves all Afghans adequately and impartially, addresses Afghanistan as one nation and promotes national identity, and seeks to promote the public interest rather than private profit. Transforming RTA into an independently 

governed public service network would be a tangible indication of the Afghan government’s 

commitment to informational inclusivity, transparency, and accountability. We recognize the 

efforts already made by the international community to achieve this transformation and make 

this recommendation in support of these and any future efforts to make RTA a medium that 

authentically meet the needs of the Afghan people. 

Requirements Revising the 2009 Mass Media Law

Establishing a viable funding mechanism for an independent public broadcasting network

Establishing a mutually acceptable governance mechanism for an independent broadcasting network

Instituting coordination among all international donors and governments
35

AFGHANISTAN MEDIA ASSESSMENT

Outcomes Knowledge

Afghans will know they 

are represented equally 

and fairly in the new 

public broadcasting 

system.

Afghans will know that 

information coming from 

the public broadcasting 

system is balanced and 

impartial.

Attitudes

Afghans will come to 

regard public broadcasting as credible and 

authentic.

Afghans will gradually develop a sense of 

shared national identity. 

Behavior

Audiences will rely on 

the public broadcaster 

for information, in addition to local and foreign 

media.

The medium will 

become a venue for 

addressing issues of 

common concern and 

for helping prevent the 

escalation of disputes 

into open conflict. 

The public broadcasting system will become 

financially and operationally sustainable.

4. Reform the 2009 Mass Media Law 

This law not only contains all the restrictions of its previous version, but also has introduced 

new stipulations that limit Afghan media from functioning as an independent voice in society. 

The law uses ambiguous language, is not transparent, is inconsistently applied, and it is biased 

toward protecting the government rather than the media.

Requirements Instituting coordination among all international donors and governments

Reviewing the relationship between religion and state

Reviewing the definition of “national security”

Outcomes Knowledge

Afghan journalists, 

editors, and government 

will know what the Mass 

Media Law does and 

does not permit.

Afghan media practitioners, the public, and the 

government will know 

that the government is 

unable to arbitrarily censor the media. 

Attitudes

Afghan journalists will 

gain confidence in their 

freedom to report on 

controversial issues. 

Afghans will have 

greater confidence that 

the media constitute an 

independent, neutral 

body.

Afghans will have 

greater trust in the 

government as an institution that follows and 

upholds the law.

Behavior

The Mass Media Law 

will be revised to accommodate the needs 

of the media and 

Afghan society.

Afghan journalists and 

editors will not selfcensor their findings.

The Afghan government will protect rather 

than harass media 

professionals. 

Afghans will make 

decisions based on 

information perceived 

as being credible and 

not influenced by 

government.
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PEACEWORKS 68

5. Create a Public Service Production Trust Fund 

Currently, there are insufficient resources for the production of public service messages. The 

suggested trust fund is a way for donors to support public service program development and 

production through a competitive process that would reduce duplication of effort. The trust 

fund would have specific goals and would define the purposes for which donor monies could 

be used (e.g., to increase understanding between different groups, gender, health, education, 

etc.). The trust fund would be administered by a professional trust fund board consisting of 

Afghan media experts and civil society representatives. Applications would be anonymous to 

prevent conflicts of interest.

Requirements Instituting coordination among all international donors and 

governments

Establishing an Afghan-led administration of the trust fund with neutral oversight and transparent allocation 

Obtaining a substantial commitment of resources over a sufficiently 

long period

Outcomes Knowledge

The Afghan public 

will know more 

about issues that 

will benefit them 

(specific issues 

defined by trust 

fund goals).

Afghan media will 

know how to obtain 

funding for programs that meet Afghan public service 

needs.

Attitudes

Afghans will view the 

trust fund as a viable 

mechanism to support social change.

Afghan media 

practitioners will 

have greater faith 

in the international 

community’s commitment to independent media.

Afghan media 

companies will have 

a greater incentive 

to consider and produce public interest 

content.

Afghan media organizations will feel less 

beholden to specific 

interest groups.

Afghan audiences 

will perceive media 

contents as credible 

and authentic.

Behavior

Afghan media will 

compete to receive 

support for public 

service 

programming.

Radio stations and 

television channels 

will use more airtime 

to broadcast public 

interest content.

Afghan media 

organizations 

will produce and 

disseminate credible and authentic 

programming. 

6. Expand the Use of Wireless Technologies 

A. Cell Phone Microenterprise: “Mobile Men”

This initiative will expand access to mobile communications by providing micro grants to men 

(and, where possible, to women) to buy cell phones to use in microenterprises. The grantees 

would then rent airtime and Internet access to customers in their communities. Following the 

successful example of the Grameen Foundation’s “Mobile Ladies” (Bangladesh), this proposed 

intervention aims to extend access to communication technologies into rural areas (especially 
37

AFGHANISTAN MEDIA ASSESSMENT

southern Afghanistan) by taking advantage of the commission-based airtime rental service 

offered by Roshan, Afghanistan’s leading cellular services provider. 

Requirements Providing micro grant funds for phones

Providing technical training for grant recipients

Outcomes Knowledge

Afghans will know 

they can access information that was previously unavailable.

Afghans will have 

a greater range of 

information sources 

to guide judgments 

and choices.

Elites will know they 

cannot dominate 

communications and 

messages in their 

communities.

Participants will 

be trained to use 

Internet-enabled cell 

phones to operate a 

small business.

Attitudes

Afghans will feel 

they have access to 

information needed 

to make sound 

choices.

Marginalized communities will feel 

less isolated.

Behavior

Marginalized 

communities will 

expand their sphere 

of contacts and 

knowledge.

Microenterprise 

participants will 

actively promote the 

use of their communications skills and 

technology in their 

communities. 

A wider range of 

people within marginalized communities will use new 

communications 

technologies to address their needs. 

B. Cell Phone Journalism: Mobile News

This intervention will allow cell phone users to receive news updates in the form of text messages and recorded voice messages. Users will call a toll-free number or answer an automatically dialed call to hear a specially produced news package. A key part of the news package 

will be the inclusion of (moderated) citizen journalism content, giving ordinary Afghans the 

chance to hear fellow Afghans’ voices. The program is modeled on the successes of the Jasmine News Wire (JNW) in Sri Lanka, which uses conflict resolution principles to shape the 

headlines, and on Telenor Pakistan, which provides BBC news bulletins as a call-in cell phone 

service. Mobile News intends to dispel the reliance on rumors and gossip and to mitigate the 

attitudes and behaviors that rumors tend to produce. 

Requirements Providing opportunities for Afghans to serve as citizen journalists 

Training in conflict-sensitive reporting (including advice from JNW and 

Telenor Pakistan) for participating media and citizen journalists

Forming an editorial and management committee consisting of credible 

professionals from across the Afghan spectrum to maintain the standards 

of the contents provided, to prevent abuse by ideologues and propagandists of any sort, and to oversee the operation

Distributing cell phones with video and photographic capacity via various mechanisms such as prize-based competitions, etc.

Entering agreements with TV broadcasters to carry citizen reports, much 

like CNN’s iReport

Establishing partnerships with cell phone providers to design incentive 

mechanisms (such as airtime credit), free numbers for text messages and 

calls, and distribution of multimedia-capable phones
 38

PEACEWORKS 68

Outcomes Knowledge

Afghans will learn citizen journalist skills.

Afghans will develop 

skills in conflict-sensitive reporting.

Media practitioners 

will develop skills as 

editors and managers 

of citizen-journalism 

programs.

Afghans will know 

they have a range of 

information sources to 

guide judgments and 

choices.

Attitudes

Afghans will be less 

susceptible to the 

influence of rumor.

Afghans will feel 

more confident about 

making informed 

decisions.

Afghans will gain 

trust in information 

coming from sources 

that were previously not considered 

trustworthy. 

Behavior

Mainstream media will use stories 

coming from citizen 

journalists.

Afghans will engage 

in citizen-journalism 

programs established 

by mainstream media.

Afghans will make 

decisions based on 

information from a 

range of sources.

Conclusion

Nine years after the fall of the Taliban regime, Afghan society is still in the throes of a transition 

from a theocratic system to a new form of social and political organization. A major engine of 

this transition has been the involvement of the international community, whose primary tool 

for driving the process has been military. Although Afghans initially accepted the use of force 

to make certain aspects of the transition possible, the dominant sentiment in the country now 

is that insecurity is as high as it has ever been. Afghans do not have enough trust in either the 

Kabul government or the intentions of foreigners to rely on either for meeting their needs. This 

assessment has explored the Afghanistan media landscape and has suggested ways in which 

the media may play a more significant and effective role in this transition. 

Afghan media are themselves in transition from decades of suppression to operating with 

various degrees of freedom. Most media remain in the hands of political or ethno-tribal factions who use the media to advance their narrow interests. This includes RTA, which is controlled by the executive branch of the central government. Furthermore, although there have 

been some improvements in the Afghan economy since 2001, the country remains at the bottom of UNDP’s Human Development Index. 

Nevertheless, the international community has been attempting to support the development of “free and independent media” in Afghanistan. We have argued that, given Afghanistan’s current social, political, and economic conditions, the media cannot be expected to develop into free and independent entities, regardless of the kinds or level of foreign support. 

We therefore strongly recommended that donors consider a major shift in their media support 

strategy: replacing their focus on open-ended development with a focus on closed-ended interventions. Open-ended development has been defined as investment in media institutions 

and structures with an undetermined timeframe to become free and independent. Closedended intervention has been defined as a specified timeframe during which donors invest in 

the media’s production of contents that support specific social change objectives determined 

by Afghans.

We share the opinion held by many of the respondents in this assessment that the media 

could play a significantly more powerful role in Afghanistan’s peaceful transition to a future 

that Afghans envision for themselves. To support this transition, media activities must be based 
39

AFGHANISTAN MEDIA ASSESSMENT

on a sound assessment that considers both the purpose of and the possibility of implementing 

specific initiatives amid ongoing conflict.

A media strategy for Afghanistan cannot be encumbered with the expectation that, in one 

of the world’s poorest nations, TV and radio will successfully emulate foreign models of profitdriven media. Rather, support for the media should be driven by a vision of helping Afghans 

get the information they need to stabilize their fragile society and go about their daily lives 

with a sense of well-being. 

Notes

1. Daud S. Saba and Omar Zakhilwal, Security with a Human Face: Challenges and Responsibilities, Afghanistan 

National Human Development Report (Islamabad: UNDP, 2004).

2. We had kebab served to us several times wrapped in the ISAF newspaper, whose better paper quality makes 

it more resistant to absorbing grease. 

3. Objections to Iran’s impact on Afghan media came from Hazaras, who are Shi’a, as well as from Sunnis, 

indicating that this position was not based exclusively on the respondent’s religious identity.

4. Interview, Mohammad Shafeiq Hamdard, manager, RKG Nangahar (Radio Killid Group), October 2009. 

5. Despite being criticized for its offensive contents, Tulsi was cited by the majority of respondents as the most 

widely watched program on television in Afghanistan. This paradox brings up two issues confronting social 

science research, including media assessments. First is the need to compare what respondents say against 

what they do. In the case of Tulsi, respondents’ attitudes and behaviors regarding the program are contradictory. Accordingly, it is necessary to explore the reasons for respondents’ declarations and behaviors. Producers 

of media for social change too often are quick to declare their programs a success because they are widely 

watched. Audience share is clearly important, but it is more critical to discover whether the audience is 

watching because of a lack of choice or for reasons having to do with the objectives that program is trying to 

achieve.

6. These represent only a few of respondents’ examples of mullahs attempting to influence the way media 

operate in Afghanistan.

7. This phrase is from Muhammad Naim, a community leader interviewed in Bamyan, October 2009.

8. This juxtaposition was articulated by Dr. Muhammad Akbar during a conversation in Kabul in October 

2009. 

9. The same rumor, also spread via cell phones, took hold in Kosovo in 2000–2001. 

10. Kabul acquired full electrical service only in late 2008 and even now does not have reliable power. Outside 

the cities, electricity is very sketchy or nonexistent. In Kabul, despite the improvement in the electricity 

supply, the team experienced sporadic power shortages and saw that many people still keep gas-powered 

generators in case of longer blackouts.

11. Afghanistan Media and Information Survey, undated copy of presentation to Commander of International 

Security Assistance Force, Kabul, Afghanistan, August 2008.

12. BBC Trust, Afghanistan Media Survey, prepared by D3 Systems, Inc., and ACSOR-Surveys 2007–08.

Available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/assets/files/pdf/review_report_research/ar2007_08/afghanistan_research.pdf. 

13. Asia Foundation, Afghanistan in 2009: A Survey of the Afghan People (Kabul: Asia Foundation, 2009). The 

Asia Foundation’s measurements of media use found that radio and television are both used for national and 

international news. However, for local news, or to validate information from the mass media, 20 percent of 

people in rural areas and 9 percent of urban dwellers turn to friends, family, and neighbors. 

14. Communication for Stabilisation, feasibility study for the UK Department for International Development by 

Media Support Solutions, Annex 1: Media Mapping in Helmand and Kandahar, February 2008.

15. Afghanistan Media and Information Survey, 2008. 

16. Afghanistan DeepDive: A Strategic Communications Seminar, presented by Broadcasting Board of Governors 

and U.S. Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Research conducted by D3 Systems and 

ACSOR Survey, with information from the August 2008 BBG-State/INR national survey. SLIDE 28. 

Afghans rate the trustworthiness of foreign news broadcasters as follows: BBC: 64 percent, VOA Radio 

Ashna: 54 percent, REFERL Radio Azadi: 51 percent.

17. BBC Trust, Afghanistan Media Survey.

18. Afghanistan Media and Information Survey, 2008. The higher rates found in Mazar were likely due to the 

availability of reliable electricity at the time the survey was conducted. 

19. Ministry of Communications and Information Technology, A Summary of Achievements in 1386 (March 21, 

2007–March 20, 2008) (Kabul: Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2008). 
 40

PEACEWORKS 68

20. Nick Fielding, Internet Media Strategy in Afghanistan (London: UK Department for International 

Development, July 2008).

21. Associated Press, “Taliban May Regret Strikes on Cell Phone Towers,” MNBC, March 26, 2008. 

22. Afghanistan DeepDive: A Strategic Communications Seminar, 2008. 

23. Interview, Najiba Ayubi, general director, Killid Radio, Kabul, October 2009.

24. Fielding, Internet Media Strategy in Afghanistan.

25. Interview with Ayaz Khan, independent wireless telecommunications entrepreneur, Kabul, October 2009. 

26. Fielding, Internet Media Strategy in Afghanistan.

27. Interview with Deputy Minister Rashidi Mobarez, Kabul, October 2009.

28. 2009 UNDP Human Development Report, http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/country_fact_sheets/

cty_fs_AFG.html (accessed August 25, 2010).

29. Tolo TV broadcasts the Indian soap opera Tulsi, which, like much other media programming from India, is 

frequently cited as violating Afghan religious and cultural norms. Nonetheless, Tulsi is one of the most 

widely watched programs in the country. At one point, the Afghan Government tried to have Tulsi taken off 

the air, but Tolo resisted, citing freedom of expression. Afghans interviewed for the assessment, however, are 

convinced that Tulsi has remained on air because of Western threats to withhold aid to Kabul if the ban were 

upheld.

30. Interview, Nargis senior reporter, Jalalabad, October 2009.

31. Interview, Shahabuddin Terakhil, independent educational journalist and former news director of Noor TV 

in Kabul, Kabul, October 2009.

32. Reporters Without Borders, “Three Reporters Freed But Physical Attacks on Journalists Continue,” 

December 17, 2009, http://en.rsf.org/afghanistan-three-reporters-freed-but-physical-17-12-2009,35370 

(accessed July 15, 2010).

33. Asian Development Bank, Afghanistan: Fact Sheet (April 2009), http://www.adb.org/Documents/FactSheets/AFG.pdf. 

34. Stations belonging to the Salam Watandar network generate income by pooling the revenues brought in 

through the Salam Watandar program they are all required to air for three hours per day. Both Internews 

and radio station personnel concede, however, that this income is insufficient to maintain these stations 

financially and that their main sources of revenue are broadcasting programs commissioned by Western 

agencies or selling airtime to Western agencies. 

35. Interviews with Mohammad Shafeiq Hamdard, manager of RKG Nangahar, and Shafiquallah Shaiq, president of the Shaiq Network, Jalalabad, October 2009.

36. Some of these new TV stations were created opportunistically by political actors wanting to support their 

own election agendas and ambitions. See Rahilla Zafar, “Afghanistan’s Media Battleground,” (n.d), http://

knowledge.insead.edu/Afghanmediabattleground081226.cfm (accessed September 26, 2010).

37. According to Reporters Without Borders, in 2002, Afghanistan ranked 104 among 139 countries surveyed, 

with a total “press freedom” score of 35.5. In 2009 the country ranked 149 of 175 countries, with a score of 

54.25 The higher the score, the lower the level of press freedom. The Press Freedom Index is accessible at 

http://en.rsf.org/. 

38. Internews, “Diversifying Newsrooms, Expanding Coverage,” June 2009, http://www.internews.org/

bulletin/afghanistan/Afghan_200906.html (accessed July 15, 2010).

39. For example, in Laos the Wildlife Conservation Society collaborates with the outreach team of Lao 

National Radio to educate and entertain rural and urban people about threats facing the country’s internationally significant biodiversity. See Santi Saypanya and Renae Stenhouse, “Mass Media Community 

Outreach: Using the National Radio for Biodiversity Conservation in Lao PDR” (paper presented at the 

annual meeting of the North American Association for Environmental Education, October 8, 2006) 

http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p124620_index.html (accessed July 15, 2010). Also see Boima 

Kpuagor, Josiphine Jamiru, Abdulqadir Omar, and Sara Casey, “HIV/AIDS KAP and Community 

Outreach in a Post-Conflict Setting in Kenema District, Sierra Leone,” http://www.rhrc.org/resources/

general_reports/con03/pdf/sonianavani.pdf.

40. For a fuller exploration of how Soul City exemplifies an integrated approach to changing social norms, see 

UNIFEM, “Community Mobilization, Outreach and Mass Media,” http://www.endvawnow.org/?menboys&menusub=59&id=29 (accessed July 15, 2010).

41. For instance, in Sustainable Security in Afghanistan: Crafting an Effective and Responsible Strategy for the 

Forgotten Front, the authors offer short-term (18 months), mid-term (3–5 years), and long-term (5–10 

years) parameters for different kinds of results. http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/03/pdf/

sustainable_afghanistan.pdf.
 3

About the Institute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan 

institution established and funded by Congress. Its goals are to 

help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, promote post-conflict 

peacebuilding, and increase conflict management tools, capacity, and 

intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering 

others with knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct 

involvement in conflict zones around the globe.

Board of Directors

J. Robinson West (Chair), Chairman, PFC Energy, Washington, D.C. • 

George E. Moose (Vice Chairman), Adjunct Professor of Practice, The 

George Washington University, Washington, D.C. • Anne H. Cahn,

Former Scholar in Residence, American University, Washington, D.C. • 

Chester A. Crocker, James R. Schlesinger Professor of Strategic Studies, 

School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. •

Kerry Kennedy, President, Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and 

Human Rights • Ikram U. Khan, President, Quality Care Consultants, 

LLC., Las Vegas, Nev. • Stephen D. Krasner, Graham H. Stuart Professor 

of International Relations at Stanford University • Jeremy A. Rabkin,

Professor of Law, George Mason University, Fairfax, Va. • Judy Van Rest,

Executive Vice President, International Republican Institute, 

Washington, D.C. • Nancy Zirkin, Executive Vice President, Leadership 

Conference on Civil Rights, Washington, D.C. 

Members Ex Officio

Michael H. Posner, Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, 

and Labor • James N. Miller, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of 

Defense for Policy • Ann E. Rondeau, Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy; President, 

National Defense University • Richard H. Solomon, President, United States 

Institute of Peace (nonvoting)
4 Looking for Justice United States Institute of Peace • 1200 17th Street NW • Washington, DC 20036 • usip.org 

The media sector can play a key role in helping fragile nations 

transition out of conflict. International agencies acknowledge this 

potential and invest considerable resources in trying to establish 

media outlets that are editorially free and financially independent. 

Typically, donors do not establish a timeframe in which to achieve 

a free and independent media sector in any fragile nation. This 

open-ended approach to media development has been tried in 

Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban, and, after nearly a decade, 

it has failed to yield anticipated results. A new media assessment 

tool developed by USIP combines elements of a traditional media 

assessment with a conflict analysis to provide a concrete and 

realistic understanding of how media can advance social stability 

and peace in any nation in conflict. The authors assessed the 

Afghanistan media sector using this tool, and they present their key 

findings and recommendations in this report. Based on their holistic 

assessment, the authors recommend a fundamental shift in the 

approach to media development in Afghanistan. They urge funders 

to move away from an open-ended strategy of creating a free and 

independent media sector. In its place, the authors recommend 

that funders support specific content-driven interventions that promote social stability objectives as defined by Afghans themselves. 

Peaceworks • december 2010 • no. 68 

Related Links 

■ Crowdsourcing Crisis Information in Disaster-Affected Haiti by Jessica 

Heinzelman and Carol Waters (Special Report, October 2010)

■ Blogs and Bullets: New Media in Contentious Politics by Sean Aday, Henry 

Farrell, Marc Lynch, John Sides, John Kelly, and Ethan Zuckerman 

(Peaceworks, September 2010)

■ Advancing New Media Research by Sean Aday, Henry Farrell, Marc Lynch, 

and John Sides (Special Report, September 2010)

■ Preventing Media Incitement to Violence in Iraq by Theo Dolan (Peace Brief, 

April 2010)

■ Media and Peacebuilding in Afghanistan by Sheldon Himelfarb (Peace Brief, 

March 2010)