American Interests 

and UN Reform

REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE 

ON THE UNITED NATIONS

UNCORRECTED PAGE PROOFS.
The views expressed in this report are those solely of the authors. They do not 

necessarily reflect views of the United States Institute of Peace.

United States Institute of Peace

1200 17th Street NW

Washington, DC 20036

© 2005 by the Endowment of the United States Institute of Peace. All rights 

reserved.

First published 2005

Printed in the United States of America

The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American 

National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed 

Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1984.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Task Force on the United Nations.

 American interests and UN reform : report of the Task Force on the United 

 Nations.

 p. cm.

 Includes bibliographical references.

 1. United Nations—Evaluation. 2. United Nations—Reorganization—Evaluation.

 3. United Nations—Management—Evaluation. 4. United States—Foreign 

 relations—2001- 5. International relations. 6. Task Force on the United 

 Nations. I. Title: American interests and United Nations reform. II. United States 

 Institute of Peace. III. Title.

JZ5005.T37 2005

352.11’3--dc22 2005049250
CONTENTS

Foreword, by Newt Gingrich and George Mitchell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

1. American Interests and the United Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

2. Saving Lives, Safeguarding Human Rights, and Ending Genocide . . . . . . . . . . 27

3. In Need of Repair: Reforming the United Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

4. Deterring Death and Destruction: Catastrophic Terrorism and 

the Proliferation of Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Weapons. . . . . . . . . . . . 63

5. War and Peace: Preventing and Ending Conflicts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

6. Helping People and Nations: Development and Humanitarian Assistance . . . 105

Appendixes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127

List of Acronyms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141

Members of the Task Force on the United Nations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144

v

FOREWORD

This report on the United Nations is a call for action. It is a call for concrete action 

now. In December 2004, the U.S. Congress, at the behest of Representative Frank 

Wolf, chairman of the House Subcommittee on Appropriations for Commerce, 

Justice, and State, mandated the establishment of a bipartisan Task Force on the 

United Nations. The legislation stipulated that the Task Force, to be organized by 

the U.S. Institute of Peace, should report to Congress within six months with its 

conclusions and recommendations on how to make the United Nations more effective in realizing the goals of its Charter. Task Force members, experts, and staff have 

worked energetically to carry out this mandate. This has involved extensive research, 

numerous interviews and meetings with individuals and organizations, and factfinding missions around the world (see Appendix A).

This report represents the results of the Task Force’s efforts. It is worth underscoring that the Task Force focused on the United Nations from the perspective of 

American interests and America’s international responsibilities. This is an important 

distinction. At the same time, core American interests in security, peace, stability, 

democracy, and human rights are those shared by many other countries around the 

world.

If we are to see the United Nations recover from its present difficulties, American 

leadership will be indispensable in effecting change. The time has come for the 

United Nations to embrace change and reconfirm its place in today’s transformed 

international environment. We are struck by the United Nations’ own receptivity 

to needed reforms, but they must be real and must be undertaken promptly. An 

effective United Nations is in the interests of the United States, but there is nothing exclusive about the United Nations as regards American interests. The United 

Nations is one of the tools that America, our allies, and other democracies use 

cooperatively on the basis of our shared values.

The United States is now facing—and must engage with—an altered international 

environment that is demanding in terms of both challenges and opportunities. 

Prospects for the continued extension of democracy are significant, but American 

leadership will remain essential to realizing the positive possibilities for change. All 

Americans have a vital stake in maintaining international peace and security and 

promoting universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental 

freedoms. All Americans can be proud of our country’s role in extending liberty 

around the world. That is why the United States, in its own interests, must lead the 

United Nations toward greater relevance and capability in this new era. That is the 

guiding purpose of this Task Force.

The challenges facing the United States and other nations today are also acutely 

dangerous. Acts of aggression and genocide are international facts of life, not 

matters of widespread conflict and violence that characterized the twentieth century. 

The present example of Darfur, Sudan is just the latest instance of such gross inhu-
vi

manity. Terrorists actively seek weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, 

biological, and chemical devices. Those behind the attacks on the United States on 

September 11, 2001, seek to obtain and use such terrible weapons against us and 

their other adversaries.

On June 26, 2005, the United Nations will observe the sixtieth anniversary of the 

signing of its Charter in San Francisco. The United States, under the leadership of 

Presidents Roosevelt and Truman, played a major role in 1945 in bringing about 

the creation of the United Nations. The stated goals and principles of the Charter 

embody and reflect American interests and values now just as then. They are as 

relevant in 2005 as they were in 1945.

The United States pursues its interests in international affairs, including issues of 

peace, stability, trade, and national security, in collaboration with others wherever 

possible. Our actions are usually often more effective when they are taken in concert 

with others. At the same time, the United States can, and sometimes must, act 

independently if collective efforts cannot be achieved or are ineffective. The United 

States advances its interests through a range of multilateral arrangements, with 

both established organizations and ad hoc coalitions. A strong and effective United 

Nations can be an important instrument for the pursuit of the American goals of 

freedom and security. In this sense, the goals enshrined in the UN Charter—partic

-

ularly those regarding international peace and security, and the promotion of respect 

for fundamental human rights—have never been more significant.

The world of 2005, however, is not that of 1945. Challenges to security are taking 

new and more lethal forms. There is an urgent need for international organizations 

that are effective and credible. Collective international efforts are necessary to deal 

with terrorism, nuclear proliferation, human rights abuses, international conflict 

and genocide, natural disasters and the spread of infectious diseases, and economic 

deprivation and poverty. The United Nations, as well as regional organizations, can 

be important vehicles for dealing with these challenges.

Just as the United States today is restructuring its domestic institutions to deal with 

the realities of the post-9/11 world, so too must the United Nations transform 

itself. As it approaches its sixtieth anniversary, the United Nations needs reform and 

reinvigoration. Otherwise, the organization risks declining credibility, and its own 

future will be at risk. Millions of lives are at stake on these issues. These are the 

challenges on which this Task Force on the United Nations has focused its work.

The legislation establishing the Task Force (see Appendix B) specified that it should 

be made up of twelve members and should consist of experts from the American 

Enterprise Institute, the Brookings Institution, the Center for Strategic and 

International Studies, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Hoover Institution, 

and the Heritage Foundation. In consultation with Representative Frank Wolf, the 

principal sponsor of the legislation, the U.S. Institute of Peace solicited nomina

-

tions for Task Force members from these organizations. The members of the Task 

A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M
vii

Force are a diverse and bipartisan group of distinguished Americans from a variety 

of professions and backgrounds. We, the authors of this foreword, agreed to cochair the Task Force. Other members include Wesley K. Clark, Wesley K. Clark and 

Associates; Edwin Feulner, the Heritage Foundation; Roderick Hills, Hills & Stern; 

Donald McHenry, Georgetown University; Danielle Pletka, American Enterprise 

Institute; Thomas R. Pickering, the Boeing Company; Anne-Marie Slaughter, 

Princeton University; A. Michael Spence, Oak Hill Capital Partners; Malcolm 

Wallop, Heritage Foundation Asian Studies Center; and R. James Woolsey, Booz 

Allen Hamilton. The senior advisors to the Task Force are Charles Boyd, Business 

Executives for National Security, and J. Robinson West, PFC Energy.

This report is a consensus document. Members nonetheless reserve the right to 

offer additional comments and recommendations as individuals apart from the Task 

Force.

Richard H. Solomon, president of the United States Institute of Peace, oversaw 

the organization of the Task Force and its efforts, under the leadership of its executive director, George Ward, and staff members Gary Matthews, Sloan Mann, and 

Heather Sensibaugh. Special recognition is also due to Lee Feinstein, Council on 

Foreign Relations, and William Sanders, American Enterprise Institute, for their 

essential role in finalizing the report.

In chairing the Task Force, we have drawn on our long involvement in international affairs, which includes our respective services as Speaker of the House of 

Representatives and as Majority Leader of the U.S. Senate. Although Task Force 

members were nominated by the specified organizations, they have participated in 

the work of the Task Force as individuals, not in any organizational capacity. Task 

Force members and senior advisors are listed at the end of the report.

The Task Force was organized around five substantive areas, or Task Groups:

• Preventing and ending conflicts and building stable societies.

• Preventing and responding to genocide and gross human rights violations.

• Preventing catastrophic terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass 

destruction.

• Ensuring the effectiveness, integrity, transparency, and accountability of the UN 

system.

• Fostering economic development and reducing poverty.

Following the provisions of the legislation, the specified organizations were 

requested to nominate experts with competencies in the above areas. Task Force 

members were also asked to focus their attention on one or two of the thematic 

F O R E W O R D
viii

areas noted above. A list of the five Task Groups with members and experts involved 

in each is also provided at the end of this report.

The sixtieth anniversary of the founding of the United Nations provides a window 

of opportunity for reform. The difficulties confronting the organization today 

provide the rationale and incentive to make the United Nations more effective 

in meeting the high purposes of its Charter. It is very important to emphasize, 

however, that this opportunity to revitalize the United Nations will not last for long. 

All who want an effective and credible United Nations must act now.

This Task Force report is direct in its analysis and identification of problems. It is 

also direct in making actionable recommendations, which can and should be implemented apace—and not become tied up in an overly ambitious package that never 

gets delivered.

Finally, based on our long experience as legislators, we believe that there must be 

continuing congressional oversight of UN management and implementation of 

reforms in view of the significant American interests and substantial U.S. funding 

involved in the work of this organization. That is the premise of this report, with 

its specific action recommendations, which is hereby submitted formally to the 

Congress.

Newt Gingrich George Mitchell

Washington, D.C.

June 2005 

A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M
American Interests and UN Reform

REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE UNITED NATIONS

ERRATA SHEET

June 15, 2005

p. v-vi: Acts of aggression and genocide are international facts of life. The present

example of Darfur, Sudan is just the latest instance of such gross inhumanity.

p. vii: Malcolm Wallop, Frontiers of Freedom

p. 4: Genocide and war crimes are occurring in the Darfur region of Sudan despite

the fact that the Security Council has passed several mild resolutions calling for

action.

p. 15: Supporting inclusion of language in all Chapter VII Security Council

Resolutions calling on member-states, regional organizations, and any other

parties to voluntarily assess the relevant capabilities they can contribute to

enforcement of the Resolution.

p. 18: The U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) should annually report to

Congress on all U.S. Contributions, both assessed and voluntary, to the United

Nations. Moreover, given the problem of duplication within the UN system, the

new COO should be charges with analyzing programs and mandates to verify

that they do not overlap with other mandate, programs, or entities in the UN

system.

p. 25: Enhance the predictability and coherence of U.S. support of UN assistance.

Place greater emphasis on external evaluation of UN development and

humanitarian programs.

p. 26: Strengthen the UN relationship with the World Bank.

pp. 59 – 60: The final version of Table 2 will contain “red text” as noted. “All

contributions noted are from U.S. fiscal year 2004 except for ... [“IAEA;

” “UN Regular Budget, 362, 362;” “ILO;” “ICAO;” “WIPO;” “WHO;”

“WMO;” and “FAO”].
1

American Interests 

and the United 

Nations
2 A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M

A fundamental interest of the United States government is to ensure the safety of 

the American people and of our democratic allies, and to preserve, protect, and 

extend the nation’s commitment to liberty and prosperity. The United States took 

the lead after World War II in establishing a network of global institutions aimed 

at making America more secure by preventing another conflict and serving, in 

President Roosevelt’s words, as a “Good Neighbor” by helping other people achieve 

safety, health, prosperity, and freedom.

It was that generation’s belief that a better, more prosperous and freer world was a 

better world for America. The United States and its fellow democracies established 

the Bretton Woods institutions, the International Monetary Fund and the World 

Bank, to reduce poverty and human suffering, stimulate economic growth and 

opportunity, and prevent the sort of economic instability that had fueled conflict in 

the past. The UN’s founders were “determined to save succeeding generations from 

the scourge of war,” and to “reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights.”

Since then, three generations of Americans have demonstrated not only a strong 

preference for sharing the costs, risks, and burdens of global leadership, but also 

an acute recognition that action in coordination and cooperation with others is 

often the only way to get the job done. Americans have a history of joining indi

-

vidual interests into cooperative actions. In addition to leading the effort to found 

the United Nations and sustaining and supporting the organization as its largest 

contributor, Americans have worked to bring together nations and institutions to 

improve security and the quality of life for Americans and for others. The terror

-

ist attacks of 9/11 have served to reinforce the interrelated nature of the world’s 

problems. Today we are acutely aware that millions dying from hunger, disease, and 

violence, and facing a future without hope, are not simply humanitarian concerns 

but national security challenges as well.

Americans have always hoped that the United Nations would play a major role in 

the pursuit of a better world. This bipartisan Task Force, established by the United 

States Congress, has joined together to do what we can to help the United Nations 

realize more fully the aims of its Charter, in the firm belief that an effective United 

Nations is in America’s interests. We were asked to address this subject solely from 

an American perspective. We have done so. We do not presume to speak to or for 

others. The people of every other country will make their own decisions. However, 

we believe that the hopes and aspirations that the American people have for the 

United Nations are widely shared. In this regard, the Task Force notes that it under

-

takes this effort at a time of growing consensus on the imperative for reform at the 

United Nations, and in light of important reports on reform by the High-Level 

Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, and the secretary-general’s own report, 

In Larger Freedom.

As important stakeholders in the institution, Americans are vested in a United 

Nations that embodies values of honesty, decency, and fair play. An honest, decent, 

and just headquarters for effective multilateralism will serve the American people 

well, not because they expect the United Nations to turn into a world government, 
A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D T H E U N I T E D N A T I O N S

3

but because it can serve as a valuable instrument for promoting democratic political 

development, human rights, economic self-sufficiency and the peaceful settlement 

of differences.

From the perspective of the U.S. government, the United Nations has the poten

-

tial to carry out a number of critical roles that support our foreign policy interests, 

goals, and values.

Legitimacy. For many of the world’s people, the United Nations has carried the 

stamp of legitimacy and consensus. Americans have differing views about the 

importance of a United Nations’ seal of approval. This partly reflects the reality that 

the United Nations is one of many international options for a powerful nation such 

as the United States. For many other nations, however, the United Nations is the 

one place where they can debate with other countries, including the United States, 

as equals.

Thus, in certain instances a decision by the United Nations, including the legally 

binding decisions of the Security Council under Chapter VII, may be more accept

-

able to other governments than pressure from any single nation or group of nations. 

In this respect, the United Nations as a universal organization can help to bring about 

changes in the actions or positions of a government that would otherwise be difficult 

for that government to accept. Of course, the reverse can also be true, as was the case 

in March 2003, when the Security Council failed to reach consensus over Iraq.

Diplomatic Offices. There are instances where the United Nations is able to step in 

to mediate conflicts or broker disputes where a national government or governments 

may not be able to do so as effectively. Similarly, where an outcome is perceived to 

have received the endorsement of the United Nations, governments and interna

-

tional organizations may be more willing to lend support to that outcome, whether 

in the form of money, troops, or humanitarian support.

Special Expertise. The United Nations and related agencies and bodies possess a 

range of expertise and capacity. This includes expertise in preparing transitional 

states for elections and election monitoring, assisting the displaced and the world’s 

refugees, providing and coordinating emergency humanitarian relief, preventing the 

spread of disease, and improving the health and extending and improving the qual

-

ity of life of the world’s poor.

Leverage. When the United Nations and its institutions work effectively, with a 

focus on the practical, the organization can be an effective “cost multiplier.” At its 

best, the United Nations can obviate national rivalries to help achieve humanitar

-

ian aims. Ideally, the United Nations can also facilitate burden sharing in instances 

where the United States might otherwise have to bear the bulk of the burden. THE CHALLENGE

The American public’s support for the ideals of the UN Charter is traditionally 

strong, but their view of the institution has been shaken in recent years following 

the Security Council’s failure to reach agreement on Iraq and revelations of UN 
4 A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M

mismanagement and scandal. The institution’s credibility has also suffered over time 

by the overall performance of certain UN bodies, including, at times, the General 

Assembly and the Human Rights Commission, and of such highly publicized meet

-

ings as the 2001 UN World Conference against Racism in Durban, where illiberal 

and antidemocratic interests prevailed.

Events of the past fifteen years have challenged the United Nations and its memberstates to adapt to dramatically different dangers and demands: the problem of 

failed states, the emergence of catastrophic terrorism, the need for effective action 

to prevent genocide, and the promotion of democracy and the rule of law. In some 

cases, UN bodies and institutions lack authority or effective machinery to deal with 

these new dangers and challenges. Against this backdrop is the demand for greater 

accountability, transparency and efficiency, and a corresponding shift in the UN’s 

mission from convener of meetings to coordinator of action—from talk shop to 

actor.

In proposing sweeping reform of the United Nations, the Task Force notes that the 

United Nations is a body composed of individual nation-states, and regrets that 

too often member-states have found it convenient to lay blame for failures solely 

on the United Nations in cases where they themselves have blocked intervention 

or opposed action by the United Nations. On stopping genocide, all too often 

“the United Nations failed” should actually read “members of the United Nations 

blocked or undermined action by the United Nations.”

That said, the United Nations shares the blame for inaction. Until and unless it 

changes dramatically, the United Nations will remain an uncertain instrument, both 

for the governments that comprise it and for those who look to it for salvation. • Genocide and war crimes are occurring in the Darfur region of Sudan. Although 

the Security Council has passed several mild resolutions calling for action. 

However, neither the United Nations as an institution nor its member-states indi

-

vidually have been successful in stopping the killing. To the contrary, there has 

been a consistent effort to avoid describing the mass murders honestly because 

that description would impel actions many members want to avoid.

• Many UN peace operations, or UN civilian missions supported by “coalitions 

of the willing” under national or regional command—from Namibia to Sierra 

Leone, Cambodia to Macedonia to Kosovo—have helped to provide stability 

and promote political and economic development. Nonetheless, there have also 

been tragic failures. In some cases, such as Sierra Leone and East Timor, prog

-

ress in strengthening missions came only after rebels effectively challenged peace 

agreements and peacekeepers, and local inhabitants were subjected to vicious 

attacks resulting in large-scale loss of life. Moreover, mass killings in Rwanda and 

Srebrenica, Bosnia took place while UN peacekeepers stood by. In both cases, 

local populations had legitimate expectations of protection by the international 

community.
A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D T H E U N I T E D N A T I O N S

5

• The relatively recent establishment of the Office of the High Commissioner for 

Human Rights has elevated the importance of human rights. But the credibility 

of the Human Rights Commission has eroded to the point that it has become a 

blot on the reputation of the larger institution. In 2005, seven of the fifty-three 

countries sitting on the Human Rights Commission were listed by Freedom 

House as the world’s “worst of the worst” abusers of human rights.

• Democracies and nations moving toward democracy represent a growing propor-

tion of the UN’s member-states, but they have yet to organize themselves effec

-

tively within the United Nations system to promote common interests and 

values. Democratic states sacrifice fundamental interests, such as human rights, in 

favor of regional solidarity. The so-called Non-Aligned Movement, a product of 

Cold War divisions, remains as a major impediment to economic development, 

protection of human rights, and the promotion of democracy.

• Contrary to the equality of rights for all nations enshrined in the UN Charter, 

Israel continues to be denied rights enjoyed by all other member-states, and 

a level of systematic hostility against it is routinely expressed, organized, and 

funded within the United Nations system.

• The United Nations has failed to undertake anything approaching the sweeping 

reforms needed for effective operation of the institution.

Without fundamental reform, the United Nations’ reputation will suffer, reinforcing 

incentives to bypass the UN in favor of other institutions, coalitions, or self-help. THE REMEDIES

The elements of a reform program to make the United Nations more effective in 

today’s world are not difficult to identify. They are elaborated in this report. The 

challenge is to make a reform process take hold, given the way member nations of 

the organization have come to do business at the United Nations. This Task Force 

has concluded that concerted leadership by the United States in helping unify 

action by the world’s democracies is the essential mechanism needed to make the 

United Nations more relevant and effective. Implementing true reform will require 

a 365-day-a-year effort to win key arguments and to organize a broad coalition of 

democracies that conclude that the future of international institutions depends on 

adopting reforms that implement the highest standards of honesty, accountability, 

and transparency. This is a complex process because each democracy has its own 

interests and its own traditions. Developing a habit of working together on key 

issues will take substantial effort on the part of the United States. However, the 

centrality of the rule of law, human rights, and economic development can unite 

differing democracies.

Today, democracies and countries moving toward democracy make up an increas

-

ing share of the 191 UN member-states. However, democracies are not organized to 

cooperate effectively at the United Nations. The failure of Europe and the United 
6 A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M

States to work closely together is a particular problem. Transatlantic friction and 

division create opportunities for those countries or special interests opposed to 

change to thwart progress at the United Nations.

It is a primary conclusion of this Task Force that the challenges and problems faced 

by the United Nations can be addressed, but only through consistent and concerted 

action by the world’s genuine democracies. Effective and deep reform will result if 

there is a coalition of democracies, the United States centrally among them, that 

want to create a new accountable, transparent, honest, and effective United Nations. 

A successful U.S. effort will also require bipartisanship in Washington’s approach to 

the organization. Continued divisions between and within the parties will cripple 

any serious U.S. government effort to bring about reform at the United Nations. 

Moreover, the executive and legislative branches must be jointly involved in the 

reform process so that there is a unified American position toward the United 

Nations.

UN reform is necessary on a number of levels. First and foremost, it is only right 

that American taxpayers—who foot 22 percent of the United Nations’ “regular” 

budget and billions more in additional UN costs—demand a fully transparent, 

accountable, and effective institution. Reform is also vital to the continued integrity 

of the institution itself. While some institutions within the UN system are effective 

and cost-efficient, many others are bureaucratic and lack effectiveness, accountability, and transparency. On an operational level, the United Nations must change in 

order to meet today’s challenges and the goals articulated in its Charter. Nowhere 

is this more necessary than in crafting effective strategies for preventing and halting 

genocide, mass killing, and major human rights abuses. The American people will 

strongly support a United Nations that is effective in these areas—and will be unfavorably disposed to a United Nations that again fails to deliver.

To make reform of the United Nations a reality, the Task Force calls on the president of the United States, acting through the secretary of state and the national 

security adviser, and working with the Congress, to propose a comprehensive reform 

agenda for the United Nations.

This agenda should include five elements:

• Wide-ranging institutional reforms, without which other reforms will be more 

difficult to implement.

• Concrete steps to make the United Nations a more effective instrument for fighting terror and preventing weapons of mass destruction from falling into the wrong 

hands.

• A strategy and specific measures for improving the capacity to stop genocide, 

mass killings, and human rights violations, including immediate action on 

Darfur.
A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D T H E U N I T E D N A T I O N S 7

• Greatly increased support as a global priority for the effort to bring developing nations out of poverty, including government-to-government assistance and 

private investment, with emphasis on the legal, political, and economic infrastructure that will allow such aid investment to flourish.

• Building capacity to conduct peacekeeping operations.

The Task Force did not recommend reforms requiring revisions to the charter.

PREVENTING GENOCIDE AND HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES

The United States has been an effective voice for the protection and promotion of 

freedom and democracy throughout the world. Americans have paid for their freedom and the freedom of others in blood and treasure through a long series of wars.

The United States government should affirm that every government has a responsibility to protect its own citizens in accordance with the following principles:

• Sovereignty belongs to the people of a country, and governments have a responsibility to protect their people. If a government fails in its primary responsibility 

to protect the lives of those living within its jurisdiction from genocide, mass 

killings, and massive and sustained human rights violations, it forfeits claims 

to immunity from intervention (based on the principle of nonintervention in a 

state’s internal affairs) if such intervention is designed to protect the at-risk population.

• In certain instances, a government’s abnegation of its responsibilities to its own 

people is so severe that the collective responsibility of nations to take action 

cannot be denied. The United Nations Security Council can and should act in 

such cases. In the event the Security Council fails to act, its failure must not be 

used as an excuse by concerned members to avoid protective measures.

The United States government should call on the United Nations Security Council 

and General Assembly to affirm a responsibility of governments to protect their own 

citizens. President Bush articulated such a pledge in a written notation on a document describing the horror of the Rwandan genocide: “Not on my watch.” Future 

presidents should affirm the “Not on my watch” pledge. The United States should 

insist that states asserting an absolutist doctrine of nonintervention explain why 

they are preventing action against the world’s genocidaires. Those engaged in mass 

murder must understand that they will be identified and held accountable.

The Security Council. The Task Force did not reach agreement on the details of 

any Security Council expansion but does consider it very important that any such 

expansion enhance the effectiveness of the Security Council and not in any way 

detract from the Council’s efficiency and ability to act in accordance with the UN 

Charter. In addition, any reforms should extend to Israel, which is treated as a 

second-class citizen at UN headquarters in New York, and excluded from a regional 

grouping in Geneva. 
8 A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M

Darfur. Since the Rwandan genocide of 1994 there has been no clearer case of a 

calculated, government-sanctioned campaign of extermination than the one taking 

place today in the Darfur region of Sudan. The Task Force concurs with President 

Bush and former secretary of state Colin Powell, who have described what is taking 

place in Darfur as “genocide.” A UN-sponsored International Commission of 

Inquiry on Darfur concluded in January 2005 that the government of Sudan and 

the janjaweed rebels had committed crimes against humanity and war crimes, the 

gravity of which “may be no less serious and heinous than genocide.” Calls for UN 

reform ring hollow while killings and war crimes continue with impunity in Darfur. 

The United States government should make clear that responsibility for the geno

-

cide in Darfur rests with the government in Khartoum. Palliative measures to halt 

the immediate loss of life will not constitute a solution. In the long run, the only 

secure protection for the Sudanese people is a democratic Sudan whose government 

respects the rights of all its people.

The United States should assemble a package of assistance for the African Union 

deployment in Darfur that will serve as a “force multiplier.” A logical place to plan 

an assistance package would be North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The 

United States should assist in the establishment of a “no-fly” zone over Darfur. 

We note that this assistance does not contemplate deploying American troops in a 

combat role in Sudan. The United States government should insist that perpetrators 

be held accountable for war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Human Rights. When world leaders met in 1945 at Dumbarton Oaks to hammer 

out a charter for the United Nations, Franklin Roosevelt argued for including in it 

a reference to individual human rights. Despite progress in the advance of human 

rights around the world, the United Nations has not proven to be the effective 

human rights champion that President Roosevelt had hoped it would be. 

Indeed, so distorted has the 53-member Human Rights Commission become that 

countries with appalling, even monstrous, human rights records—Sudan, Syria, 

Zimbabwe, Libya, and Cuba, to name a few—could all be seated there. Today the 

government of Sudan—even as it oversees the perpetration of genocide on its own 

soil—is serving its second consecutive term on the commission!

The Task Force thus recommends that the Human Rights Commission be abol

-

ished. All activities currently under way under mandate of the commission should 

be terminated. This recommendation is in agreement with the secretary-general’s 

own assessment. In its place, the United States government should support the 

establishment of a Human Rights Council, a body ideally consisting of democra

-

cies committed to upholding and promoting the highest standards in human rights 

and coordinating its efforts with the Democracy Caucus and the UN Democracy 

Fund. The United States should support strengthening the Office of the High 

Commissioner of Human Rights.

In addition, the United Nations cannot presume to be an arbiter of human rights 

as long as Israel is discriminated against—excluded from a regional grouping at the 
A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D T H E U N I T E D N A T I O N S

9

UN Office in Geneva and treated as a second-class citizen at UN Headquarters in 

New York. DEVELOPMENT AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

Addressing the needs of the developing world should not be a secondary issue on 

the United Nations’ agenda. It is a key challenge for the one billion people in rich 

nations in their dealings with the more than five billion in poor countries. Nearly 

fifteen million people die each year of infectious and parasitic diseases. It behooves 

us to raise the priority given to development, health, and education worldwide.

Over the past four years, the United States has greatly increased its commitment 

to alleviating suffering and enhancing economic growth and development for the 

40 percent of the world’s population who live in poverty. The United Nations has 

played an important role in such efforts. Its development programs, however, must 

refocus and acknowledge the preponderance of economic evidence demonstrating 

that private investment, and the legal, economic, and political reforms necessary 

for it to flourish, are far more important to advancing and accelerating sustained 

economic growth and development than rendering development assistance through 

government aid transfers. Provision of development aid is not a goal unto itself, but 

a tool to help nations establish the conditions that can attract and make the best 

use of investment and assistance. These conditions include a commitment to open 

markets, good public administration, sound rule of law, and, more fundamentally, 

the development of democratic institutions. In addition to governmental aid, the 

United Nations and its specialized agencies must accept the principle that invest

-

ment flows coming from the private sector will be the key to sustaining economic 

growth and lifting populations out of poverty.

The United States is the largest contributor to the United Nations and in abso

-

lute terms the world’s largest donor of development assistance. U.S. development 

assistance has doubled over the past four years. Measured on a per capita basis, the 

United States is either the largest or second largest donor behind Japan, depending 

on how one does the bookkeeping. The United Nations has correctly perceived that 

over the years, development assistance has often failed to achieve its primary objec

-

tive of reducing poverty and spurring economic growth and development. 

In that spirit, the UN secretary-general has suggested that donor nations meet a 

benchmark of 0.7 percent of GDP for development assistance. The Task Force did 

not reach agreement on whether and under what conditions to endorse the 0.7 

percent GDP goal. All agreed, however, that all developed nations must raise the 

priority given to education, health, and economic opportunity in global affairs. In 

this regard, the Task Force calls on the United Nations to develop better measures for 

evaluating the effectiveness of assistance in recipient nations, and encourages countries 

to adopt the policies necessary to achieve genuine economic growth and development.

The Task Force looks forward to the day when all developed nations in addition 

to vital institutional reform, raise the priority given to education, health, and 

economic opportunity.
10 A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M

INTEGRITY, TRANSPARENCY, ACCOUNTABILITY, EFFECTIVENESS

The need for internal reform at the United Nations has never been more evident 

or urgent. Management systems that are common throughout the world in both 

public and private institutions are practically nonexistent at the United Nations. 

As the Oil-for-Food Program scandal has made clear, this UN-sanctioned program 

has been flawed by a combination of incompetence, gross mismanagement, and 

alleged corruption and criminality. Lack of effective oversight has besmirched the 

UN Secretariat, the UN secretary-general, and members of the Security Council. 

The scope and magnitude of the program overtaxed the United Nations’ flawed 

and fragile accountability mechanisms. Clearly, the United Nations is at present 

ill-equipped to manage such a program, and before any such project is again undertaken, significant reforms must be in place.

The Task Force concludes that substantial reforms of the UN’s oversight, management, budget, and personnel systems are feasible. This report addresses those 

reforms that are within the authority of the secretary-general to undertake and those 

requiring action by member-states. In both cases, a successful reform program will 

require serious and sustained diplomatic efforts in light of a long history of unimplemented and inadequate changes. 

The Task Force recommends a reform program that includes the following five 

elements:

• Establishment of an authoritative Independent Oversight Board that will have 

all the authority no less than that of an independent audit committee operating 

under U.S. standards.

• Empowerment of the secretary-general to replace his or her top officials and the 

creation of an effective Chief Operating Officer, and the creation of a modern 

personnel system managed by a reformed human resources department that can 

evaluate performance, provide promotional opportunities for deserving employees, retire unneeded and underperforming employees, and recruit only highly 

qualified employees.

• Establishment of effective policies on whistleblower protection, ethical and disclosure standards for top officials, and transparency.

• Effective sunset provisions for all programs and activities mandated by the 

General Assembly.

• Identification of operational programs that can be made more effective through 

providing their funding entirely by voluntary contributions.

PREVENTING AND ENDING CONFLICTS

United Nations peacekeeping is the most resource-intensive, visible, and, arguably, most important UN activity. Over the course of the past two decades, the 

United Nations has experienced major growth and transformation in peacekeeping 

activities. Between 1948 and 1990, the United Nations initiated some eighteen 
A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D T H E U N I T E D N A T I O N S 11

peacekeeping operations. Between 1990 and today, the Security Council, with the 

support of the United States, has initiated more than forty peacekeeping operations. 

As of late March 2005, there were nearly 70,000 international military and police 

forces serving in seventeen UN peacekeeping missions, and the approved budget for 

the period ending June 30, 2005 stood at nearly $4 billion (and was likely to rise 

significantly for 2005–2006).

Although there have been many successful peacekeeping missions over the years, 

current efforts are bedeviled by limited capacity, operational challenges, and inade

-

quate mandates. In recent years, UN peacekeepers have been asked to assume broad 

responsibilities relating to peace stabilization and reconstruction in societies emerg

-

ing from conflict. UN peacekeepers and their civilian counterparts have been asked, 

in essence, to help remake societies coming out of internal conflict—to help negoti

-

ate peace agreements, reform security sectors, promote political reconciliation and 

effective and democratic governance, and rebuild systems of justice. These missions 

differ substantially from “traditional” UN peacekeeping missions and have created 

new problems and challenges. 

In addition, the credibility of UN peacekeeping has been badly damaged by 

revelations of sexual exploitation and abuse in UN operations in the Congo and 

elsewhere. Task Force members are deeply concerned about these revelations and 

believe that any overall reform effort must include an effective plan and system-wide 

commitment to end abuses and ensure accountability. 

The Task Force finds that the United Nations cannot hope to plan for or carry out 

successful long-term peacekeeping operations while hobbled by the member state 

micromanagement endemic to the larger institution. To address these concerns, the 

Task Force recommends that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) 

become a more independent program with distinct rules and regulations appropri

-

ate for its operational responsibility for comprehensive peacekeeping missions. The 

United Nations must also credibly demonstrate its commitment to ending sexual 

exploitation and abuse by peacekeeping forces, including implementation of reform 

measures designed to ensure uniform standards of conduct for all civilian and mili

-

tary participants in peace operations. States that prove unwilling or unable to ensure 

discipline among their troops should be barred from providing troops to peacekeep

-

ing missions.

In addition to promoting the professionalization of peacekeeping, the United 

Nations must develop doctrine and strategy for multidimensional peace operations 

that thoroughly integrate the security dimension with associated economic and 

political development requirements.

The Task Force opposes establishment of a standing UN military force, but 

member-states must increase substantially the availability of capable, designated 

forces, properly trained and equipped, for rapid deployment to peace operations 

on a voluntary basis. In addition, the U.S. Department of Defense should prepare 

options for additional means to support UN peace operations with logistics, capac

-
12 A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M

ity-building assistance, and other means. Finally, the Bush administration should 

continue and step up training efforts for African troops through the Global Peace 

Operations Initiative announced at last year’s Group of Eight (G-8) Summit. PREVENTING CATASTROPHIC TERRORISM

Terrorism and the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons are 

deadly threats that have come together in the twenty-first century to create the 

world’s worst nightmare. They have become the most acute security challenge 

facing the United States and the international community. A fundamental judg

-

ment of the Task Force is that countering proliferation and terrorism effectively is 

significantly enhanced by broad international cooperation. Although such coopera

-

tion will at times be pursued most efficiently and appropriately outside the UN 

system—through unilateral actions or ad hoc, or more formal, interstate coali

-

tions—the United Nations and related organizations will often be very useful, given 

the wide scope of their membership and the special authorities and capabilities at 

their disposal.

To that end, the Task Force recommends that the Security Council play a more 

assertive role in ensuring effective verification and enforcement of nonprolifera

-

tion obligations. The United States should press within the council for improving 

the effectiveness of the Security Council’s Counterterrorism Committee under UN 

Security Council Resolution 1373. Of greatest political consequence, it should 

publicly list state sponsors of terror and list those countries failing to make adequate 

efforts to stanch terrorism emanating from their soil or to share information they 

may possess about terrorist organizations and individuals.

The Task Force has concluded that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 

must take a more dogged, probing approach to safeguards and increase its focus on 

threats from nonstate actors. IAEA board members should urge that the agency’s 

relatively new function of investigating nuclear trafficking networks be expanded, 

both as a means of monitoring members’ compliance with their safeguards agree

-

ments and as a contribution to stopping such networks from providing sensitive 

equipment or technology to terrorist groups. The United States and other board 

members must strongly encourage the agency to assign higher priority to nuclear 

security. Finally, the agency and its board should help develop a plan designed 

to discourage the spread of enrichment and reprocessing facilities under national 

control.

On the critical subject of the nuclear fuel cycle and the Nuclear Nonproliferation 

Treaty (NPT), the United States should continue to promote President Bush’s 

proposal that nuclear suppliers not assist in the development of new uranium 

enrichment or plutonium reprocessing facilities in any country that does not already 

have them. The United States should also consider what, if any, additional steps 

might enhance the prospects of this U.S. plan, including a multiple-year global 

moratorium on the construction of new facilities in all countries, in order to create 

greater short-term leverage against potential proliferators.
A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D T H E U N I T E D N A T I O N S 13

Definition of Terrorism. The UN General Assembly should move expeditiously 

to adopt a definition of terrorism along the lines recommended by the HighLevel Panel and endorsed by the secretary-general. On the basis of that definition, 

the General Assembly should proceed immediately to conclude a comprehensive 

convention on terrorism. The definition of terrorism should cover the actions of 

individuals or irregular organizations, rather than armies, because the latter are 

bound by the rules of war and need not be covered by additional language prohibiting terrorism.

Maximizing the Chances of Success. To advance a comprehensive reform strategy, 

the Task Force recommends working within the United Nations to strengthen the 

Democracy Caucus as an operational entity capable of organizing concerted political 

action to counter gross violations of human rights and to save lives. In addition, the 

Task Force recommends creating or strengthening alternative channels of influence 

outside the institution, such as the Community of Democracies.

CONCLUSION

During the Cold War, faced with the very real threat of nuclear war and an aggressive Soviet Union, Congress and the Executive Branch sustained collective security 

measures for forty-four years with remarkable stability despite many domestic and 

international challenges.

Now, faced with a very complex world in which people are starving to death, 

murdered, tortured, and brutalized, in which weapons of mass destruction are 

proliferating dangerously and possibly to terrorists, there is an urgent need for 

sustained, consistent American leadership. Confronting these threats is a matter of 

national security.

Without a renewed and effective United Nations, the challenges will be all that 

much greater. The United Nations was established sixty years ago to meet the challenges of a very different world. New, adapted, and reformed institutions, authorities, and mechanisms are needed if the United Nations is to meet today’s challenges. 

Such reform is necessary and desirable. With a U.S. president and a Congress united 

in their desire to advance our national interests, the United Nations can be reformed 

to meet these new challenges and the lofty—but significant—goals of its Charter.

TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS

The subsequent chapters of the Task Force report contain specific recommendations for reform regarding the substantive and organizational issues they address. 

Following is a summary listing of those recommendations, keyed to the areas and 

issues addressed in the subsequent sections of the report.

Saving Lives, Safeguarding Human Rights, and Ending Genocide

Darfur, Sudan

❚ The United States should take and/or support immediate initiatives as outlined 

in this report to halt the genocide in Darfur, Sudan, including the assembly of
14 A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M

a U.S. coordinated package of assistance for the African Union deployment in 

Darfur that will serve as a force multiplier.

❚ The U.S. government should make clear that responsibility for the genocide in 

Darfur rests with the government in Khartoum.

❚ The United States should welcome the role of the African Union (AU) in 

Darfur and assist in its development as an effective regional organization that 

can play a growing role in dealing with crises on the African continent.

❚ The United States should make every effort to enhance AU capabilities in two 

main areas: (a) ensuring that it is adequate to the task of providing security in 

Darfur and protecting civilians; and (b) building on AU capabilities going forward.

❚ At the UN Security Council, the United States should pursue a mandate for 

the AU-led force that provides for the protection of civilians and authorizes the 

deployment of a sufficiently large military force to achieve that end.

❚ The United States should assist in establishment of a “no-fly” zone over Darfur.

❚ The United States should assist in increasing the number of troops in the AU 

mission.

❚ The U.S. government should embrace the short-term strategic goal in Darfur 

of ending the ability of the militias to control the countryside so that security 

is adequate for civilians to return from refugee and IDP camps to their villages 

and resume everyday life.

❚ Perpetrators must be held accountable for war crimes and crimes against 

humanity.

❚ Press neighboring governments to cooperate with efforts to stop the killing in 

Darfur and not to interfere with international efforts under threat of sanction.

❚ Encourage the pursuit of a general peace agreement in Western Sudan/Darfur.

❚ Support and encourage democratic reform in Sudan.

Human Rights

❚ The United Nations and member-states should agree that the most pressing 

human rights task today is the monitoring, promotion and enforcement of 

human rights and, in particular, the stopping of genocide and mass killing.

❚ The UN Human Rights Commission should be abolished.

❚ A Human Rights Council ideally composed of democracies and dedicated to 

monitoring, promoting, and enforcing human rights should be created. The 

council should coordinate it’s work with the Democracy Caucus and the UN 

UN Democracy Fund.
A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D T H E U N I T E D N A T I O N S 15

❚ The U.S. Permanent Mission to the United Nations should include an official 

of ambassador rank whose responsibility will be to promote the efficacy of the 

Caucus of Democracies within the United Nations and to promote the extension of democratic rights more broadly among member-states.

❚ The U.S. Government should support authority for the High Commissioner for 

Human Rights to appoint an advisory council to exchange information, develop 

best practices, promote human rights, and publicize offenses.

❚ The U.S. Government should support the work of national and regional courts, 

as well as tribunals authorized by the Security Council, as well as truth and 

reconciliation commissions, in identifying those responsible for mass atrocities 

and prosecuting, and punishing them as appropriate.

Responsibility to Protect Your Own Citizens

❚ The U.S. government should affirm that every sovereign government has a 

“responsibility to protect” its citizens and those within its jurisdiction from 

genocide, mass killing, and massive and sustained human rights violations.

❚ The United States should endorse and call on the UN Security Council and 

General Assembly to affirm a responsibility of every sovereign government to 

protect its own citizens and those within its borders from genocide, mass killing, and massive and sustained human rights violations.

❚ Future presidents should affirm the “Not on my watch” pledge, articulated 

by President Bush in a notation on a document describing the horror of the 

Rwanda genocide.

❚ The urgent task required of all United Nation member-states right now, which 

the United States should lead, is to determine available capabilities and coordinate them so they can be brought rapidly to the fore in a crisis.

❚ The United States should be prepared to lead the Security Council in finding 

the most effective action across the full range of legal, economic, political, and 

military tools.

❚ The United States should take the lead in assisting the United Nations and 

other institutions in identifying potential assets and creating or improving 

mechanisms for coordination.

❚ The United States must insist that in cases in which the Security Council is 

unable to take effective action in response to massive human rights abuses 

and/or genocide, regional organizations and member-states may act where their 

action is demonstrably for humanitarian purposes.

❚ Support inclusion of language in all Chapter VII Security Council Resolutions 

calling on member-states, regional organizations, and any other parties to 

voluntarily assess the capabilities they can contribute to enforcement of the 

Resolution.
16 A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M

❚ Undertake a review of assistance programs to assess what bilateral action the 

United States can take that will enhance the capabilities of regional and other 

international organizations to prevent or halt genocide, mass killings, and 

massive and sustained human rights violations.

❚ The U.S. Government should reiterate that punishing offenders is no substitute for timely intervention to prevent their crimes and protect their potential 

victims.

Rapid Reaction Capability

❚ The United Nations must create a rapid reaction capability among UN memberstates that can identify and act on threats before they fully develop. The Task 

Force, however, opposes the establishment of a standing UN military force.

❚ The United States should support the principle that those nations closest to a 

crisis have a special regional responsibility to do what they can to ameliorate the 

crisis.

❚ The United States should also provide assistance aimed at the development of 

regional capacity in advance of a crisis.

❚ Support discretionary authority of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 

(HCHR) and the Special Advisor for the Prevention of Genocide (SAPG) to 

report directly to the Security Council.

❚ Ensure that the office of the HCHR and SAPG have adequate resources to 

rapidly investigate at the first indication of trouble.

❚ Support linkage of early information on potential genocide, mass killing, and 

massive and sustained human rights violations situations to early action to 

prevent.

In Need of Repair: Reforming the United Nations

General Recommendations

❚ The United Nations, most importantly, needs to create an Independent 

Oversight Board (IOB) that would function in a manner similar to a corporate independent audit committee. The IOB would receive Office of Internal 

Oversight (OIOS) reports and, in consultation with the Board of Auditors and 

Secretariat management, would have the authority to fix the budget and approve 

and direct the assignments of the OIOS and of the Board of External Auditors 

just as an independent audit committee in the United States has such authority 

with respect to both the internal and external auditor. The OIOS budget must be 

set by an Independent Oversight Board and submitted to the General Assembly 

budget committee in a separate track outside the regular budget.

❚ The United Nations must provide both the resources and the authority to 

OIOS to provide appropriate oversight to every activity that is managed by 
A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D T H E U N I T E D N A T I O N S 17

UN personnel whether or not that activity is funded by the assessments of the 

General Assembly or by voluntary contributions.

❚ Oversight reports must be accessible to member-states under guidelines that 

facilitate transparency and meet, at a minimum, the freedom of information 

flow between U.S. investigative agencies and the Congress

❚ The UN Secretariat needs to have a single very senior official in charge of daily 

operations and filling the role of Chief Operating Officer (COO).

❚ The United States should insist on management capability as a fundamental 

criterion for the selection of the next UN secretary-general.

❚ The United Nations must establish effective policies for whistleblower protection and information disclosure.

Budget and Programming

❚ The 5.6 rule, which requires the Secretariat to identify low-priority activities in the budget proposal, should be enforced and bolstered by an additional 

requirement that managers identify the lowest priority activities equivalent to 

15 percent of their budget request or face an across the board reduction of that 

amount. The identification of 15 percent of the budget as low priority should 

not necessarily be interpreted as a list for elimination, but as information on what 

programs could be reduced in favor of higher priority mandates.

❚ The Secretariat’s leadership must demand that managers define and attempt to 

achieve specific outcomes. Future budgets should be tied to whether those results 

are achieved. The OIOS should be tasked with a larger monitoring/evaluation 

role to evaluate the degree to which programs are achieving their targeted results.

❚ The United States should support the secretary-general’s plan, described in his 

March 21 report, to establish a Management Performance Board “to ensure that 

senior officials are held accountable for their actions and the results their units 

achieve.”

❚ The United States should insist upon both of the secretary-general’s sunsetting proposals: the 1997 proposal to include sunset clauses for all major new 

mandates, and the proposal in the March 21 report this year to review all 

mandates dating back five years or more. Every mandate and program should 

have a sunset clause to ensure that it is regularly evaluated and continues to 

perform a necessary function. The sunset clauses should assume that programs 

will be shut down unless the General Assembly’s budget committee confirms by 

consensus that they should continue based on a publicly available analysis identifying the program’s purpose, budget, and ongoing relevance.

❚ The United States should insist that the United Nations publish annually a list 

of all subsidiary bodies and their functions, budgets, and staff. Their budgets
18 A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M

should be subject to the same sunset provisions that apply to other UN programs 

and activities. The United Nations should also publish budget information in 

a manner that lays out multi-year expenditures by program and identifies the 

source of funds as assessed or voluntary (including the source country) and 

includes in-kind contributions.

❚ The U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) should annually report to 

Congress on all U.S. contributions, both assessed and voluntary, to the United 

Nations. Moreover, given the problem of duplication within the UN system, 

the new COO should be charged with analyzing programs and mandates to 

verify that they do not overlap with other mandates, programs, or entities in the 

UN system.

❚ The United States should work with a representative group of member-states 

to explore ways of giving larger contributors a greater say in votes on budgetary matters without disenfranchising smaller contributors. The consensus-based 

budget process has proved effective at reining in increases in the UN budget but 

not at setting priorities or cutting many obsolete items.

Personnel

❚ The United States should insist on the secretary-general’s call in his March 21 

report for a one-time severance program to remove unwanted, or unneeded, staff, 

and should monitor that program closely to ensure it is designed to remove the 

staff who ought to be removed.

❚ The United Nations should not offer permanent contracts to any new employees. The identification of redundant staff, along with other relevant recommendations in this report, should apply fully to the UN’s nearly 5,000 contractors and 

consultants.

❚ The UN’s hiring practice must reflect the emphasis on competence laid out in 

the Charter, with geographical considerations taken into account only after the 

competence test is met.

❚ The United States should insist that the United Nations install a more empowered and disciplined Human Resources Department that employs all the techniques of modern personnel policies.

❚ The United States should support granting UN managers the authority to 

assign employees where they can be best used and amending job placement 

policies to permit promotional opportunities.

❚ The United Nations should more systematically take advantage of secondments 

of personnel from member-states on a pro bono basis for specified periods or 

tasks.
A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D T H E U N I T E D N A T I O N S 19

❚ The General Assembly must fully implement its new requirement that candidates for positions on the UN Administrative Tribunal must possess appropriate qualifications before being approved.

❚ In criminal cases involving UN personnel, immunity should be waived unless 

the Legal Advisor to the secretary-general determines that justice is unlikely 

to be served in the country at issue. The Legal Advisor’s report should be made 

available to the proposed Independent Oversight Board to ensure accountability 

to an independent body. Efforts must be made to find an appropriate jurisdiction 

elsewhere.

❚ Legal fees for accused staff should only be reimbursed if the accused staff is 

cleared by appropriate legal processes.

❚ A new standard of personnel ethics must be developed and advertised within 

the United Nations. Disclosure forms must be mandatory at the P-5 level and 

above. Failure to disclose must be sanctioned, and sanctions clearly laid out. 

An Office of Personnel Ethics should be established within the Secretariat but 

accountable to the IOB to serve as a repository for disclosure documents. These 

documents must be made available to member-states upon request.

❚ The United Nations must meet the highest standards of information disclosure. 

The United States should carefully monitor the Secretariat’s current efforts to 

develop a comprehensive information disclosure policy.

❚ If the United Nations is again called upon to administer a large scale sanctions 

regime it should set up an effective and separate management structure, with serious audit capacity, to do so.

❚ The United States should work with other member-states to identify which of 

the operational programs now receiving funds from the assessed budget should be 

funded entirely by voluntary contributions.

❚ The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) should become a more 

independent program with distinct rules and regulations appropriate for its 

operational responsibility for comprehensive peacekeeping missions. Its responsibilities must include coordination with broader reconstruction and development 

activities of the United Nations.

❚ The General Assembly’s committee structure should be revised to increase its 

effectiveness and to reflect the substantive priorities of the United Nations, as 

identified in other parts of the Task Force report. Bearing in mind the recommendations of this report, the United States should review the mandates and performance of the committees with a view to identifying areas of duplication between 

the committees and other bodies, programs and mandates in the UN system.
20 A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M

Deterring Death and Destruction: Catastrophic Terrorism and 

Proliferation of Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Weapons

UN Security Council

❚ P-5 members should consult regularly on proliferation and terrorism issues.

Frequent substantive contacts will not guarantee unanimity, but they will 

promote greater convergence in perceptions of the threat and facilitate more 

constructive engagement when difficult issues are brought before the Council.

❚ The Council as a whole should also meet regularly on proliferation and terrorism issues. It should receive closed-door briefings three or four times a year by 

the Directors General of the IAEA and OPCW, the Chairs of the CTC and 1540 

Committee, and other senior officials from relevant UN organizations.

❚ The United States and other Security Council members should urge the 1540 

Committee to move aggressively in encouraging UN members to put in place 

the laws and control measures required by UN Security Council Resolution 

1540.

❚ The United States should press within the Council for improving the effectiveness of the UNSCR 1373’s Counter-Terrorism Committee. 

❚ The United States should promote the “naming of names” that is, the 

United States should push the Security Council to have the 1373 Committee 

publicly list state sponsors of terror.

❚ The United States should take the lead in the Council to rationalize the work of 

the three Security Council committees responsible for terrorism and proliferation under three separate resolutions (1267, 1373, and 1540).

❚ The United States should also take the lead in the Council on steps to 

strengthen international verification such as it is in the nonproliferation fields. 

If the IAEA or OPCW Technical Secretariat, respectively, is unable with existing authorities to resolve whether a particular country is in compliance, the 

Council will meet immediately with a view to providing authorization, under 

Chapter VII, to utilize much more extensive, supplementary verification 

methods (e.g., comparable to those authorized for use in Iraq by UN Security 

Council Resolution 1441).

❚ The Council should also strengthen the UN secretary-general’s existing authority to initiate field investigations of alleged violations of the Geneva Protocol 

or BWC by making it mandatory for states to grant prompt access and provide 

full cooperation.

❚ To carry out the more robust supplementary verification activities in the 

nuclear and chemical fields that may be authorized by the Security Council, the 

IAEA and OPCW should be prepared to make available on short notice inspectors who are specially trained in more rigorous verification methods. In the 

biological weapons area, where no comparable verification organization exists, the 
A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D T H E U N I T E D N A T I O N S 21

Council should establish and train a roster of specialists who would be available 

immediately in the event that the Council or secretary-general (under his authority to initiate CW or BW investigations) activated them.

❚ The U.S. should support a Council instruction to UNMOVIC and the IAEA 

to document and archive information on the investigation of Iraqi WMD 

programs begun in 1991, with a mandate to complete the task within six 

months.

❚ On the critical subject of the nuclear fuel cycle and the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty, the United States should continue to promote the Bush 

Administration’s initiative to prevent the acquisition of uranium enrichment 

and plutonium reprocessing facilities by additional countries.

❚ The United States should encourage the Council to strengthen legal authorities to interdict illicit WMD-related shipments and disrupt illicit WMD-related 

networks.

❚ The United States should urge Council action to discourage and impede unjustified use of the NPT’s withdrawal provision, which allows a party to leave the 

Treaty after 90 days if it asserts that remaining in the Treaty would jeopardize 

its supreme interests.

❚ The Council should develop a menu of penalties that would be available for 

future Council consideration in individual cases of violations.

UN General Assembly

❚ The General Assembly should move expeditiously to adopt a definition of 

terrorism along the lines recommended by the High-Level Panel and endorsed 

by the secretary-general. On the basis of that definition, the Assembly should 

proceed as soon as possible to conclude a comprehensive convention on terrorism. The definition of terrorism should cover the actions of individuals or irregular organizations, rather than armies since the latter are bound by the rules 

of war and need not be covered by additional language prohibiting terrorism. 

Although international consensus on the basis of the formulation contained in 

the High-Level Panel would be a major step forward, the definition of terrorism 

should ideally also cover acts of violence against noncombatant military units—

for example, those deployed to a given country as part of a UN-authorized 

peacekeeping force or those present on foreign soil only to provide training or 

receive logistics support.

❚ The Terrorism Prevention Branch of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime 

(UNODC) should be encouraged to intensify its efforts to promote wide 

adherence to the international conventions on terrorism, especially the new 

Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, and to provide 

member-states legal advice on domestic implementing legislation necessary to 

make those conventions effective.
22 A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

❚ The United States should continue pressing for establishment of a committee 

of the IAEA Board to review the Agency’s role in monitoring and promoting 

compliance with nuclear nonproliferation obligations.

❚ The IAEA and its Board should strongly promote universal ratification and 

rigorous enforcement of the Additional Protocol. Nuclear Suppliers Group 

members can assist in this effort by adopting a guideline that makes adherence to 

the Additional Protocol by recipient states a condition for nuclear cooperation.

❚ IAEA Board members should urge that the Agency’s relatively new function of 

investigating nuclear trafficking networks be expanded.

❚ The United States and other Board members must strongly encourage the IAEA 

to assign higher priority to nuclear security.

❚ The IAEA and its Board should examine means of assuring countries that 

renounce the right to possess their own enrichment and reprocessing capabilities that they will have reliable access to nuclear reactor fuel supplies.

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)

❚ The missions of OPCW and its Technical Secretariat should be adjusted to deal 

more heavily with the nonstate actor chemical weapons threat.

❚ OPCW should become a partner of the 1540 Committee to help it implement 

UN Security Council Resolution 1540’s requirements in the chemical area as 

in the case of the IAEA for nuclear issues, including taking the lead in assisting 

in establishing international standards for legislation criminalizing CW-related 

activities by nonstate actors. It should assist the Committee in the area of physical protection, assessing the adequacy of security and accountancy measures at 

declared chemical weapons storage depots and developing international standards 

for protecting chemical industry plants against theft or sabotage. With respect to 

the reports countries are called upon to submit under 1540, the OPCW would 

assist in evaluating performance, suggesting improvements, and coordinating 

assistance efforts.

❚ The United States and other CWC parties should request OPCW’s Technical 

Secretariat to examine the potential for state and nonstate actors to use new 

technologies, such as micro-reactors and novel chemical agents, for CW 

purposes and make recommendations on whether and how the CWC regime 

can be modified to keep up with the evolving CW proliferation threat.

World Health Organization (WHO)

❚ While the WHO should strengthen its existing public health capabilities 

that are also relevant to reducing the biowarfare threat, consideration should 

urgently be given to establishing a new U.N. organization responsible for dealing with biological weapons issues.
A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D T H E U N I T E D N A T I O N S 23

❚ WHO should be encouraged to undertake a major upgrading of its global 

disease surveillance and response network. The United States should be 

prepared to take the lead in persuading other donor governments to commit the 

additional resources required. Informal arrangements should be worked out so 

that, in the event of a suspicious disease outbreak that seemed to be the result 

of intentional BW use, WHO could immediately notify the new UN biological 

warfare organization and the UN secretary-general, who would be in a position 

to dispatch biowarfare experts to assist WHO in its investigation.

❚ The new UN organization responsible for countering the bio-warfare threat 

would work with the 1540 Committee and relevant international health organizations, including WHO, to develop common international biosecurity standards, both with respect to ensuring that only bona fide scientists have access 

to dangerous pathogens and ensuring that facilities engaged in legitimate 

research with dangerous pathogens have adequate physical security measures in 

place.

❚ The new bio-warfare organization should also work with the WHO and other 

international scientific organizations to develop international guidelines or standards for reviewing, approving, and monitoring dual-use bioscientific research 

projects, particularly in the area of genetic engineering, that could produce 

results that could be applied by states or terrorist groups to offensive BW 

purposes.

Conference on Disarmament (CD)

❚ The CD has outlived its usefulness and should be disbanded. Instead of having 

a single multilateral negotiating body take its place, the Security Council should, 

as the need arises, set up ad hoc bodies of manageable size to take on discrete, 

narrowly defined tasks, such as negotiating a treaty banning further production of 

fissile materials or developing common international standards for biosecurity.

War and Peace: Preventing and Ending Conflicts

UN Peacekeeping: Doctrine, Planning and Strategic Guidance

❚ The Department of Peacekeeping Operations should develop doctrine that 

recognizes the need for capable forces in the new security environments in 

which peacekeepers are mandated by the Security Council to operate, and the 

United States should press for member state acceptance of these new realities 

and their resource implications.

❚ More broadly, the United Nations should develop doctrine and strategy for 

multidimensional peace operations that thoroughly integrate the security 

dimension with economic and political development requirements. Prior to 

deployments, a strategic assessment of the crisis situation should be made to 

determine the full range of measures necessary to effectively address the causes 

of the crisis. Strategic mission plans should precede deployments, and should be 

drafted by senior-level mission strategy groups brought together prior to missions.
24 A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M

Sexual Exploitation and Abuse

❚ The United Nations must quickly implement a policy of zero tolerance of 

sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers. The United States should 

strongly support implementation of reform measures designed to ensure 

uniform standards for all civilian and military participants in peace operations; 

training programs relating to sexual exploitation and abuse; increased deployment of women in peacekeeping operations; deployment of established (rather 

than “patched together”) units to peacekeeping operations; accountability of 

senior managers; effective data collection and management; victims assistance; 

staffing increases to enhance supervision; and organized recreational activities for 

peacekeepers.

❚ While these measures have recently been endorsed by member-states, the 

United States should urge generous budgetary support for these initiatives, and 

should also press for independent investigative capacity.

❚ The United States should seek to ensure effective programs of assistance for 

victims who make substantial claims, even when neither the victim nor the 

United Nations is able to obtain redress from the perpetrator of the abuse.

❚ States that prove unwilling or unable to ensure discipline among their troops 

should not be permitted to provide troops to peacekeeping missions.

Rapid Deployment

❚ While the Task Force does not endorse a standing UN military force, membersstates must increase substantially the availability of capable, designated forces, 

properly trained and equipped, for rapid deployment to peace operations on 

a voluntary basis. The Secretariat should enhance its capacity to coordinate 

increases in member state contributions to the Stand-by Arrangements system.

❚ The United States should sustain and strengthen its support for regional peacekeeping capacity building, such as the Global Peace Operations Initiative.

❚ The Department of Defense should prepare policy options for U.S. support of 

capacity enhancements and for U.S. engagement in peace operations consistent 

with U.S. national interests.

The UN Role and Capacity in Conflict Mediation and Peacebuilding

❚ To enhance support for UN efforts at conflict mediation and negotiation, the 

United States should support an increase in resources for the Department of 

Political Affairs (DPA), following an independent study providing a strategy for 

enhancing DPA capacity and improving coordination with DPKO.

❚ To enhance support for postconflict peacebuilding activities, the United States 

should support the creation of a Peacebuilding Commission, a Peacebuilding 

Support Office, and a voluntary peacebuilding support fund.
A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D T H E U N I T E D N A T I O N S 25

❚ The United States should also encourage member governments with expertise 

in peacebuilding activities, such as those related to rule of law, to play lead 

nation roles on these issues in particular peace operations.

❚ The Task Force supports an increase in funding for the peace operation-related 

activities of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the 

UN’s Electoral Assistance Division.

U.S. Capacity in Civilian Postconflict Stabilization Activities

❚ To enhance U.S. ability to support postconflict reconstruction and to coordinate its efforts with the United Nations and other governments, the United 

States should strengthen the new State Department Office of Reconstruction 

and Stabilization, and Congress should provide it with resources necessary (and 

requested by the Administration) to play its coordination role.

Sanctions

❚ Sanctions must be part of an overall strategy that integrates diplomacy and 

coercion in an informed and effective manner, and must be carefully targeted to 

avoid unintentional impacts, punish perpetrators of abuses and illegality, and 

create incentives for change. Member-states and the Secretariat must develop 

dedicated capacities for sanctions analysis, implementation and enforcement.

Helping People and Nations: Development and Humanitarian Assistance

General Recommendations

❚ The U.S. Department of State should be the policy leader for development 

and humanitarian assistance issues, especially with respect to coordinating U.S. 

Government support to multilateral organizations.

❚ Enhance the predictability and coherence of U.S. support.

❚ Place greater emphasis on external evaluation.

Reducing Poverty

❚ Push the United Nations to balance the interest in poverty reduction with an 

interest in governance and economic growth.

❚ The U.S. Department of State’s new office for the Office of the Coordinator for 

Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) should establish a collaborative relationship with the UN Peacebuilding Commission, if such a new body is created 

as part of UN reform.

❚ Reorient the mission and activities of the Economic and Social Council 

(ECOSOC), giving it a clearly focused mission.

❚ ECOSOC should eliminate the practice of secret voting by members, and the 

Department for Economic and Social Affairs should be streamlined.
26 A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M

❚ Strengthen the UN relationship with the World Bank should be strengthened.

❚ Connect the UN Development Group (UNDG) with the equivalent executive 

bodies dealing with humanitarian and peacekeeping operations.

❚ Empower resident coordinators with regard to sector-wide strategies and 

budgets.

❚ Apply new business models for delivering assistance, including greater partnership between UN agencies and the private sector.

❚ Rationalize and simplify the funding of UN Programs.

❚ The Consolidated Appeals Process (CAPS) model—which greatly improves 

transparency and improves the ability of member governments to donate to 

priority programs—should be replicated beyond its current application in 

humanitarian relief to other domains of UN assistance, such as child survival, 

peace-building, rule of law, postcrisis recovery (including demobilization and 

reintegration of soldiers), and disaster risk mitigation.

❚ Allow leading UN officials and resident coordinators to appoint the personnel 

they wish, but hold them accountable for the mission and results.

❚ UN field offices should be encouraged to continue moving toward common 

services.

❚ Establish third-party and independent mechanisms for auditing as well as for 

monitoring and evaluation.

Containing Disease

❚ Strengthen the lead coordinating role of WHO in combating infectious 

diseases.

❚ WHO should operate in all areas of the world. Taiwan, for instance, is excluded 

from WHO membership due to the opposition of China. This deprives the 

organization of valuable resources and signficantly impedes the fight against the 

SARS epidemic and other infectious diseases. Taiwan should have the closest 

possible association with WHO.

❚ Strengthen and mandate UNICEF to regain the lead it once had, ten years ago, 

in the global efforts for child survival and against hunger and nutritional deficiency diseases.

Alleviating Disaster

❚ Re-engineer the relief architecture of the current UN. 

❚ Require that 15–20 percent of disaster funding be spent toward risk reduction 

and mitigation.
2 

Saving Lives, 

Safeguarding 

Human Rights, 

and Ending 

Genocide
28 A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M

. The Task Force notes that the United Nations is a body of member-states and 

regrets that, too often, member-states have found it convenient to lay blame 

solely on the United Nations in cases when member-states themselves have 

blocked intervention or opposed action by the United Nations. On stopping 

genocide, all too often “the United Nations failed” should actually read “members 

of the United Nations blocked or undermined action by the United Nations.” 

Nevertheless, the Task Force believes that the American people expect effective 

action from the United Nations in terms of enhancing the international community’s ability to act to save lives and make people safer. Nowhere is this more true 

than in crafting effective strategies for preventing and halting genocide, mass killing, and major human rights abuses. The Task Force believes that the American 

people will strongly support a United Nations that is effective in these areas—and 

will be unfavorably disposed to a United Nations that fails to deliver. The following is a summary of key recommendations made concerning these areas:

❚ The United States should endorse and call on the UN Security Council and 

General Assembly to affirm a responsibility of every sovereign government 

to protect its own citizenry and those within its borders from genocide, 

mass killing, and massive and sustained human rights violations.

❚ The United Nations and member-states should agree that the most pressing 

human rights task today is the monitoring, promotion, and enforcement of 

human rights and, in particular, the stopping of genocide and mass killing.

❚ The UN Human Rights Commission should be abolished.

❚ A Human Rights Council ideally composed of democracies and dedicated 

to monitoring, promoting, and enforcing human rights should be created. 

The council should coordinate its work with the Democracy Caucus and 

the UN Democracy Fund.

❚ The United States should take and/or support immediate initiatives as 

outlined in this report to halt the genocide in Darfur, Sudan, including the 

assembly of a U.S.-coordinated package of assistance for the African Union 

deployment in Darfur that will serve as a force multiplier. 

❚ The United Nations must create a rapid reaction capability among UN 

member-states that can identify and act on threats before they fully 

develop. The Task Force, however, opposes the establishment of a standing 

UN military force.

The problem of responding effectively to genocide comes down to three key 

elements:

Authority. The United States has been an effective voice for the protection and 

promotion of freedom and democracy throughout the world. Americans have 

paid for their freedom and the freedom of others in blood and treasure through a 
S A V I N G L I V E S , S A F E G U A R D I N G H U M A N R I G H T S , A N D E N D I N G G E N O C I D E 29

long series of wars. Our Declaration of Independence says the first right that all 

people are endowed with by their Creator is the right to life.

❚ The United States government should affirm that every sovereign government 

has a “responsibility to protect” its citizens and those within its jurisdiction 

from genocide, mass killing, and massive and sustained human rights violations.

Sovereignty belongs to the people of a country, and governments have a responsibility to protect their people. If a government fails to protect the lives of those 

living within its jurisdiction from genocide, mass killing, and massive and 

sustained human rights violations, it forfeits claims to immunity from intervention 

(based on the principle of nonintervention in a state’s internal affairs) if such intervention is designed to protect the at-risk population. This principle is consistent 

with existing UN Charter authority.

In certain instances, a government’s abnegation of its responsibilities to its own 

people is so severe that the collective responsibility of nations to take action cannot 

be denied. The United Nations Security Council can and should act in such cases. 

In the event the Security Council fails to act, its failure must not be used as an 

excuse by concerned members to avoid protective measures. The United States 

should insist that states asserting an absolutist doctrine of nonintervention explain 

why they are prevent action against the world’s genocidaires. Those engaged in mass 

murder must understand that they will be identified and held accountable. 

❚ The United States government should call on the UN Security Council and 

General Assembly to affirm a responsibility of every sovereign government to 

protect its own citizenry and those within its borders from genocide, mass killing, and massive and sustained human rights violations. The secretary-general’s High-Level Panel and his own reform recommendations in the In Larger 

Freedom report address these issues as well.1

President Bush articulated a pledge in a written notation on a document describing 

the horror of the Rwanda genocide: “Not on my watch.” 

❚ Future presidents should affirm the “Not on my watch” pledge.

Ability. The United Nations, through its member-states and other international or 

transnational organizations or institutions, has substantial resources that they can 

bring to bear to the urgent task of preventing or halting genocide, mass killing, 

and massive and sustained human rights violations.

❚ The urgent task required of all United Nations member-states right now, 

which the United States should lead, is to determine available capabilities and 

coordinate them so they can be brought rapidly to the fore in a crisis.

It is important to remember that effective action in a pregenocidal situation may 

take many forms.
30 A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M

❚ The United States should be prepared to lead the Security Council in finding 

the most effective action across the full range of legal, economic, political, 

and military tools.

In addition to military action—which should never be ruled out, lest it encourage perpetrators to wait out the international community—potential tools 

include publicity, the Security Council’s taking action, sending a UN special 

envoy, applying “smart” sanctions against ringleaders (travel bans, asset freezes), 

threat of prosecution against the leaders and their agents, suspension of UN 

privileges, suspension of military sales, and economic sanctions.

Regional and other organizations often have substantial capacity at their 

disposal. NATO, the European Union, the African Union, and other institutions can bring effective pressure and, when necessary, forces to bear against 

genocide and mass killing. In addition, individual states have capabilities they 

may be willing to offer in response to particular situations.

❚ The United States should take the lead in assisting the United Nations and 

other institutions in identifying potential assets and creating or improving 

mechanisms for coordination.

For example, UN Security Council resolutions under Chapter VII should call 

on all member-states and other international and regional organizations to 

assess the relevant and appropriate capacity they possess to address the situation at hand and report back to the Security Council. In addition, the United 

Nations and other international and regional organizations should establish 

robust liaison offices in order to facilitate coordination.

Action. The first key component of mobilizing effective action is determining 

the potential development of genocide, mass killing, or massive and sustained 

human rights violations. There are cases in which action is needed no matter 

whether there has been a finding of genocide.

❚ The United States should strongly support the creation of an enhanced and 

effective capability within the UN system to identify these threats before 

they fully develop. This capability should be assigned to the Office of the 

Special Adviser for the Prevention of Genocide in association with the Office 

of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. They can organize early detection and warning procedures and link them to effective early action. Both 

the Special Adviser and the High Commissioner should have the authority to report such matters directly to the Security Council. The Task Force, 

however, opposes the establishment of a standing military force.

❚ The United States should support the principle that those nations closest to 

a crisis have a special regional responsibility to do what they can to ameliorate the crisis.
S A V I N G L I V E S , S A F E G U A R D I N G H U M A N R I G H T S , A N D E N D I N G G E N O C I D E 31

Appropriate assistance can come from nations or organizations outside the region 

when the nations closest to the crisis lack capacity.

❚ The United States should also provide assistance aimed at the development of 

regional capacity in advance of a crisis.

Some regional and international organizations seek to become more active in dealing with human rights crises but lack well-developed infrastructure and sufficient 

assets to be effective. The United States should consider the importance of developing such capability in the context of assistance programs. When a matter comes 

before the Security Council, the council should appoint a contact group of involved 

nations to monitor action toward its resolution. The contact group can provide 

additional liaison with regional organizations.

❚ The United States must insist that in cases in which the Security Council is 

unable to take effective action in response to massive human rights abuses and/

or genocide, regional organizations and member-states may act.

STRATEGIES AND SYSTEMS FOR EFFECTIVELY STOPPING GENOCIDE

AND MASS MURDER

One of the major problems in stopping genocide is the challenge of acting effectively while the genocide and mass killing are being perpetrated. The process of 

identifying the problem, getting agreement that action by the Security Council or 

individual nations is necessary, and then fashioning effective intervention is long 

and complicated.

The tragedies of Cambodia, Bosnia, Rwanda—and now Darfur—are grim and 

heartrending warnings that the limited tools for intervention have proven unusable 

and/or ineffective at deterring or stopping those who would engage in genocide, 

mass killing, and massive and sustained human rights violations. The following 

system would augment and clarify the process for protecting the innocent from these 

abuses.

Under the “responsibility to protect your own citizens,” the United States should 

propose a new set of strategies to be explicitly promulgated as a promise to the 

innocent and a guarantee of punishment to regimes engaged in genocide, mass killing, and massive and sustained human rights violations.

1. If genocide, mass killing, or massive and sustained human rights violations are 

under way, the government should be warned that it has a responsibility to protect its own citizens. 

2. Governments engaged in genocide, mass killing, and massive and sustained 

human rights violations should face sanctions, including seizure of financial assets 

of national leaders and those of their families and associates. A UN Security 

Council resolution should declare the regime to be criminal and impose on all 

member-states the absolute obligation to cut off all financial aid, diplomatic ties, 

etc. As such nations would have demonstrably “persistently violated the principles
32 A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M

contained in the present [United Nations] Charter,” they should be expelled 

in accordance with Article VI of the Charter. No representative of the criminal 

regime should be granted entry by other nations. In effect, any regime commit

-

ting genocide, mass killing, and massive and sustained human rights violations 

would be ostracized by the world.

3. If the above measures fail to lead to an expeditious change in behavior, the 

Security Council should consider authorizing military intervention. Any mili

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tary assets that can easily be destroyed or impounded should be immediately 

at risk. The Security Council should ensure that the intervention possesses the 

authority and capability to achieve its objective of preventing or halting geno

-

cide, mass killing, and massive and sustained human rights violations in the 

face of opposition by the criminal regime or its proxies. In the event that the 

Security Council is derelict or untimely in its response states—individually or 

collectively—would retain the ability to act.

4. Those perpetrating mass murder will be identified and held accountable. 

Accountability can come in many forms, including through tribunals autho

-

rized by the Security Council, national courts, hybrid tribunals, regional 

courts, or truth and reconciliation commissions.

Success has to be defined as stopping the killing and holding the guilty 

accountable. Talking while people die is not success. To the contrary, an impo

-

tent and ineffective response simply encourages others inclined to commit 

genocide, mass killing, and massive and sustained human rights violations. 

The measurement has to be in the reality on the ground for the innocent, not 

dialogue among diplomats and bureaucrats in New York and elsewhere. PREVENTING GENOCIDE

Specific measures the Task Force recommends the United States take to prevent 

future occurrences of genocide, mass killing, and massive and sustained human 

rights violations include the following: ❚ Support inclusion of language in all Chapter VII Security Council reso

-

lutions calling on member-states, regional organizations, and any other 

parties to voluntarily assess the relevant capabilities they can contribute 

to enforcement of the resolutions. Security Council resolutions have the 

potential to be more effective if they generate a menu of potential capabili

-

ties for enforcement. For example, as a crisis emerges, member-states should 

ask themselves whether and what they can contribute, either on their own 

or in conjunction with other states or relevant organizations such as NATO 

and the EU. This will not only generate a positive list of capabilities but 

will also reveal areas in which capabilities are missing, potentially allowing 

swifter action to generate them. Security Council resolutions should trigger 

expanded “prudent planning” in all such organizations. A key element in the 

prudent planning will be improved mechanisms for rapidly raising forces for 

quick deployment in crisis situations.
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❚ Undertake a review of assistance programs to assess what bilateral action the 

United States can take that will enhance the capabilities of regional and other 

international organizations to prevent or halt genocide, mass killing, and 

massive and sustained human rights violations. The U.S. assistant secretary of 

state for international organizations or other appropriate official should lead an 

interagency working group to conduct this review.

❚ Encourage the AU and other regional bodies to develop their own capabilities 

to prevent and halt genocide, mass killing, and massive and sustained human 

rights violations. Where appropriate, the United States should support these 

efforts through training, logistics, intelligence, and equipment.

❚ Support discretionary authority of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 

(HCHR) and the Special Adviser for the Prevention of Genocide (SAPG) to 

report directly to the Security Council. The HCHR and SAPG need to establish 

processes that ensure warnings are received efficiently and then speedily reviewed 

and investigated. Direct reporting authority helps ensure timely reporting in a 

crisis. This independent reporting capability, in turn, is likely to encourage other 

components of the UN structure to act quickly and weigh in on the crisis.

❚ Ensure that the offices of the HCHR and SAPG have adequate resources to 

rapidly investigate at the first indication of trouble. Nongovernmental organizations and neighboring national governments are often the “eyes and ears” 

of the international community in terms of early detection. The SAPG office 

needs significantly greater resources but must retain an ability to move quickly. 

The special adviser position should be full-time. Additional resources should be 

provided for the HCHR office to consolidate rapporteur functions in that office.

❚ Support linkage of early information on potential genocide, mass killing, and 

massive and sustained human rights violation situations to early preventive 

action. All reporting should include options for early action. These need not be 

exhaustive, but they should begin with the presumption that effective action is 

necessary and will be taken.

HUMAN RIGHTS

When world leaders met in 1945 at Dumbarton Oaks to hammer out a charter for 

the United Nations, Franklin Roosevelt argued for including in it a reference to 

individual human rights. Roosevelt was probably the only Allied leader at the table 

with an abiding interest in the subject, a characteristically American concern. In any 

event, he was persuasive enough to see to it that the UN Charter, unlike the Treaty 

of Versailles and the League of Nations Covenant that had preceded it, spoke of 

human rights. Many of these ideals were then incorporated in the 1948 Universal 

Declaration on Human Rights, which was championed by the United States.

In the intervening decades, however, the United Nations has not proven to be the 

advocate of human rights that President Roosevelt had hoped. Indeed, so distorted 

has the UN Human Rights Commission become that countries with appalling, even 

monstrous, human rights records—Syria, Zimbabwe, Libya, and Cuba, to name a 
34 A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M

few—could all be seated there. Iraq, too—at the very moment between 1987 and 

1988, when “Chemical Ali,” at the behest of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, was 

deploying mustard gas and Sarin nerve agents against his Kurdish countrymen, 

massacring one hundred thousand of them; arresting and detaining for months, 

in unspeakable conditions, thousands of Kurdish women, children, and elderly 

people; supervising the disappearance of tens of thousands of villagers, sometimes 

entire populations of villages; and so forth—was a member in good standing of 

the commission. Today the government of Sudan, even as it oversees the perpetra

-

tion of a genocide on its own soil, is serving its second term there. As a result of 

its politicization and eroded credibility, the Human Rights Commission is fail

-

ing in the most imperative human rights task now: monitoring, promoting, and 

enforcing human rights.

“We have reached a point at which the commission’s declining credibility has 

cast a shadow on the reputation of the United Nations system as a whole and 

where piecemeal reforms will not be enough,” Secretary-General Kofi Annan told 

delegates in Geneva on April 7, 2005. “The commission’s ability to perform its 

tasks has been overtaken by new needs and undermined by the politicization of 

its sessions and the selectivity of its work.” ❚ The Task Force recommends that the UN Human Rights Commission be 

abolished. All activities currently under way under mandate of the commis

-

sion should be terminated (without prejudice to the possibility of reauthoriza

-

tion under other auspices, as appropriate). This recommendation is in agree

-

ment with the UN secretary-general’s own assessment.

❚ The U.S. government should support the creation of a Human Rights 

Council, ideally composed of democracies, to monitor and enforce human 

rights. The United Nations’ credibility on human rights is undermined by its 

failure to hold its member-states to the human rights standards codified in 

the UN Charter. The United Nations counts the world’s worst human rights 

offenders as members in full standing. To the extent that the United Nations 

can contribute to the promotion, extension, and protection of human rights 

in the context of a world body whose de facto sole criterion of membership 

is territorial sovereignty, that contribution is most welcome. However, until 

the United Nations holds its members accountable for their failure to observe 

well-established human rights norms, the United Nations is not the best forum 

for the proposed Human Rights Council. Human rights are best promoted 

by states that themselves respect the human and political rights of their own 

citizens. Democratic governments that recognize the equal freedom of all citi

-

zens offer the best protection of human rights and the best examples in “state 

practice” in terms of customary international law on the protection of human 

rights. Historically, they have also been the most forceful and effective propo

-

nents of the extension of human and political rights and the end of their abuse. 

The council should be smaller than the Human Rights Commission and sit in 

permanent session. States under UN sanction and states unwilling to accept 
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monitoring missions authorized by the council must be ineligible for membership. The council should ideally consist of democracies committed to upholding 

and promoting the highest standards in human rights and coordinate its effort 

with the Democracy Caucus and the UN Democracy Fund. The United States 

should oppose efforts by regional groupings within the General Assembly to 

nominate members of the council solely on the basis of rotation.

❚ The U.S. Permanent Mission to the United Nations should include an official 

of ambassador rank whose responsibility will be to promote the efficacy of the 

Democracy Caucus within the United Nations and to promote the extension of 

democratic rights more broadly among member-states.

❚ The U.S. government should support authority for the HCHR to appoint 

an advisory council to exchange information, develop best practices, promote 

human rights, and publicize offenses. The High Commissioner should be mindful to appoint only those individuals with a strong record in support of human 

rights. Strict standards of professionalism, as well as uniform procedures for 

reporting, are essential. The HCHR should also have the authority to periodically 

review the mandates of the Special Rapporteurs to ensure they remain relevant 

and focus on the highest priorities.

❚ The U.S. government should support the work of national and regional courts, 

and tribunals authorized by the Security Council, as well as truth and reconciliation commissions, in identifying those responsible for mass atrocities and in 

prosecuting and punishing them as appropriate.

❚ The U.S. government should reiterate that punishing offenders is no substitute for timely intervention to prevent their crimes and protect their potential 

victims.

DARFUR: HALTING A GENOCIDE

Since the Rwandan genocide of 1994, there has been no clearer case of a calculated, 

government-sanctioned campaign of extermination than the one taking place in 

Darfur today. And there is no more persuasive argument for effective humanitarian/

military intervention than the catastrophic situation in which millions of Darfuris 

now find themselves.

A twenty-year Khartoum-backed crusade of violent harassment by the janjaweed, 

militias of Arab extraction against darker-skinned, “disloyal” Darfuris turned to 

outright warfare two years ago as badly outmatched rebel groups, emboldened by 

the apparent success of similar groups in southern Sudan, rose up to try to protect 

their communities. The calamitous result has now been widely, though not unanimously, recognized as a genocide by the international community. There is no 

dispute in the international community that human rights abuses and violations of 

international humanitarian law have occurred on a massive scale there. Slaughter, 

rape, starvation, displacement—the tools historically employed by mass murderers—are on display there for the whole world to see.
36 A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M

The government of Sudan, which has actively engaged in supporting the bomb-

ing of hospitals, the strafing of the unarmed, and the killing of the innocent, 

has continued to act with impunity. Meanwhile, “[c]aught in a maelstrom of 

violence, deprivation, and brutal destruction are more than three million Darfuri 

civilians,” warns Sudan expert Eric Reeves: “Almost four hundred thousand have 

already perished from violence, disease, and malnutrition in more than two years 

of conflict and displacement. Hundreds of thousands more will die cruel deaths 

in the coming months and years unless there is urgent humanitarian intervention, 

with necessary military support.”

2

The government of Sudan denied a member of the Task Force and expert staff of 

the Task Group access to Darfur by withholding visas. The Task Group has accord-

ingly relied on first-hand accounts of persons representing UN agencies, nongovern-

mental organizations, and the U.S. government in developing an understanding 

of the situation on the ground.

In relation to Darfur, the Task Force focused closely on how to coordinate and 

sequence a more effective international response aimed at halting killings in the 

region, ensuring sufficient security to enable refugees and internally displaced 

persons (IDPs) to return to and rebuild their villages, and bringing to justice 

perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity.

The case of Darfur resembles a game of “hot potato.” Individuals and institu

-

tions grab hold of the issue only long enough to pass it along to the next player. 

Too often, Task Force fact-finders were met with expressions of sympathy for 

the plight of the people of Darfur, general expressions of a willingness to help, 

and lengthy explanations about how such help could not be forthcoming until 

some other individual or institution acts first. In addition, some parties, acting 

in accordance with other interests, have chosen to give priority to policy issues 

that are subsidiary from the point of view of survival in Darfur. In these respects, 

consciously or not, the parties create a culture of delay and inaction or inadequate 

action for which no single party can be held accountable. It is alarming to think 

that the creation of this culture of delay may be the tacit wish of some of the 

parties. Yet the absence of outrage and the frequent expression of resignation at 

the difficulty of addressing the situation do little to dispel such an impression. ❚ The U.S. government should make clear that responsibility for the genocide 

in Darfur rests with the government in Khartoum. Palliative measures to halt 

the immediate loss of life are necessary but in themselves will not constitute a 

solution. A solution can come only in the form of a regime in Khartoum that 

respects the human rights of all Sudanese.

❚ The United States should welcome the role of the African Union (AU) in 

Darfur and assist in its development as an effective regional organization that 

can play a growing role in dealing with crises on the African continent.
S A V I N G L I V E S , S A F E G U A R D I N G H U M A N R I G H T S , A N D E N D I N G G E N O C I D E 37 ❚ The United States should make every effort to enhance AU capabilities in two 

main areas: (a) ensuring that it is adequate to the task of providing security 

in Darfur and protecting civilians, and (b) building on AU capabilities going 

forward.

❚ At the UN Security Council, the United States should pursue a mandate for 

the AU-led force that provides for the protection of civilians and authorizes the 

deployment of a sufficiently large military force to achieve that end.

Some have speculated that a more robust mandate may be difficult to achieve because 

of resistance from one or some of the P-5 members of the UN Security Council. 

Maximum diplomatic pressure must be brought to bear. The Security Council can 

assure all members that legitimate national interests of members can be protected in 

the context of a mandate adequate to protect civilians in Darfur. Surely no Security 

Council member can plausibly argue that its national interest requires the perpetu

-

ation of conditions in which massive killing and internal displacement of civilians 

continue, with potential famine conditions resulting from the inability to plant 

crops because of inadequate security. Estimates vary on the number of “boots on 

the ground” required to ensure security in Darfur, ranging in some cases as high as 

fifty thousand. There is no reason in principle that the Security Council should not 

pursue a very substantial authorization. In any event, the problem is not merely the 

authorized size of a force but the number of troops available, which has been smaller 

even than the currently authorized level of 3,400 troops for the monitoring force. ❚ The United States should assemble a package of assistance for the AU deployment in Darfur that will serve as a “force multiplier.”

The AU mission is short on critical assets that would greatly enhance its capabili

-

ties—and the United States is capable of generating a package of assistance to 

improve its effectiveness. Such a package would include military liaison personnel; 

helicopters to ensure increased mobility for troops in the region; and command, 

control, communication, intelligence, and reconnaissance assets to tie the entire 

force together. The AU force will also require additional on-the-ground training 

to fulfill its mission. Properly equipped, trained, and supported, the AU force will 

be able to fulfill an expanded mandate, including a robust mission statement and 

rules of engagement that permit the use of lethal force in the protection of civil

-

ians. It is important to emphasize that this assistance package does not contemplate 

deploying American troops in a combat role in Sudan. The personnel requirement 

will be limited to liaisons, helicopter pilots, and trainers. Any broader U.S. deploy

-

ment would be regarded as significantly disadvantageous by many of those currently 

engaged in Darfur. Some have expressed concerns that U.S. forces could come 

under terror and other attacks by Islamic radical elements known to be operating 

and training in the region, and others have noted that U.S. “boots on the ground” 

would likely have the effect of superseding the AU’s lead role, which in turn would 

be destructive of “downstream” AU capability, rather than helping in building that 

capacity.
38 A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M

A logical place to plan an assistance package would be NATO. If NATO is unable 

to achieve consensus, and given the European Union (EU) role to date in support 

of the AU mission (including financing of the force itself), it may be possible to 

agree to an EU lead role on assistance with NATO support in accordance with 

the “Berlin Plus” formula. EU leaders may prefer a bilateral EU-U.S. dialogue 

and agreement on an assistance package. In the event that no agreement within 

existing institutions is possible, the United States should be prepared to form and 

lead a “coalition of the willing” in support of the AU mission. ❚ The United States should assist in establishment of a “no-fly” zone over 

Darfur. The government of Sudan has repeatedly used helicopter gunships 

against civilian targets. This must stop. The government of Sudan must be 

informed that any additional use of helicopters or other aircraft against civil

-

ians will result in the disabling or destruction of all government air assets in the 

region. It is important to understand that enforcing a “no-fly” zone over Darfur 

is very different from, and militarily much simpler than, enforcing the “no-fly” 

zone over Iraq. The base from which Sudanese government helicopters operate 

is well-known and accessible. A “no-fly” zone in this case is a matter of sternly 

warning the government of Sudan, having good reconnaissance to detect viola

-

tions, and then following up if necessary.

❚ The United States should assist in increasing the number of troops in the 

AU mission. Beyond authorization of a larger force by the Security Council, 

the AU will likely require additional assistance in filling its ranks, and this may 

entail commitment of financial resources. At present, the AU deployment is 

funded largely through contributions by the European Union. The size of the 

commitment should be dictated by the requirements on the ground. 

❚ The United States government should embrace the short-term strategic goal 

in Darfur of ending the ability of the militias to control the countryside so 

that security is adequate for civilians to return from refugee and IDP camps 

to their villages and resume everyday life. The Office of the United Nations 

High Commissioner for Refugees has a credible plan for the return of refugees 

and IDPs to their homes (or what is left of them) in order to begin rebuilding, 

but the plan is contingent on an adequate security environment. A minimal 

intervention that only secures refugees and IDPs in camps is inadequate. The 

humanitarian aspect of relief work in Darfur must not become an excuse for 

avoidance of the political and, if need be, military task of ensuring security.

❚ Perpetrators must be held accountable for war crimes and crimes against 

humanity.

❚ Press neighboring governments to cooperate with efforts to stop the killing 

in Darfur and not to interfere with international efforts under threat of sanc

-

tion. States that insist on supporting the government of Sudan in proscribed 

activities should understand that they will pay a price for doing so.
S A V I N G L I V E S , S A F E G U A R D I N G H U M A N R I G H T S , A N D E N D I N G G E N O C I D E 39

❚ Encourage the pursuit of a general peace agreement in western Sudan/Darfur. A 

negotiated end to the political conflict in a fashion that protects civilians would 

be highly desirable.

❚ Support and encourage democratic reform in Sudan. In the long run, the only 

secure protection for the Sudanese people is a democratic Sudan whose government respects the rights of all its people. The United States should be forthright 

in its 

support for a democratic Sudan and should assist in whatever fashion is practical 

those persons and elements within Sudan dedicated to the creation of a democratic government that recognizes the freedom and dignity of all Sudanese.

ENDNOTES

1. United Nations, In Larger Freedom Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All. Report of 

the Secretary Genreal/A/59/2005 (March 21, 2005).

2 Eric Reeves, “Darfur Mortality Update: March 11, 2005.” Online. Available: http://www.

sudanreeves.org/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=44&mode=

thread&order=0&thold=0sudanreeves.org. (Accessed April 9, 2005.) See also UN High 

Commissioner for Refugees, “Operational Briefing on the Sudan Situation,” February 11, 2005; 

Norwegian Refugee Council/Global IDP Project, “Sudan: Darfur Crisis Adds To Challenge of 

Mass Return to the South Following Historic Peace Deal” (March 24, 2005); “U.S. Calls Killings 

in Sudan Genocide,” Washington Post, September 10, 2004, A1; House Concurrent Resolution 467 

(July 22, 2004), approved 422-0, and Senate Concurrent Resolution 133 (July 22, 2004), approved 

by voice vote.

3 

In Need of Repair: 

Reforming the 

United Nations
42 A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M THE NEED AND PROSPECTS FOR REFORM

When Task Force members and experts went to UN headquarters in late March, 

they met with every official they asked to see, from the deputy secretary-general 

to the chief of staff to a score of under secretaries-general, assistant secretar

-

ies-general, and various working-level staff, along with representatives of several 

member-states. The stories heard were frequently grim accounts of poor manage

-

ment, excessive politicization, and missed opportunities for reform. Despite the 

efforts of a few member-states, the United Nations remains lacking in oversight 

and accountability.

The need for internal reform has never been more pressing. During the Cold 

War, the United Nations and its staff reflected the same rifts that then divided the 

world, along with the upheavals caused by the rapid increase in the number of 

countries and thus the number of UN member-states. The restricted role of the 

UN Secretariat during this time consisted primarily of providing support services 

for intergovernmental conferences and diplomacy, along with some peacekeeping, 

development, and humanitarian operations. Now, the United Nations is being 

called upon to carry out far more demanding tasks that have tested the organi

-

zation’s administrative structures beyond their limits. Even if the United Nations 

is never again called on to manage so vast an undertaking as the Oil-for-Food 

Program (OFF), the member-states, including the United States, are insisting on 

a substantial operational agenda, from peacekeeping to humanitarian assistance to 

the “special political missions” intended to prevent or end conflicts.

Since the late 1980s, U.S. pressures, including financial restrictions, have helped 

to bring about several reforms: adherence to an informal rule on passing the 

budget by consensus, creation of the Office of Internal Oversight Services 

(OIOS), and adoption of results-based budgeting. But by and large, the United 

Nations has proved resistant to change. The internal management reforms carried 

out to date have failed to create an institution that meets basic standards of good 

management, much less one that reflects the profoundly changed nature of what 

the United Nations is doing. If the United Nations is to carry out those tasks, its 

ossified managerial structures need more than tinkering.

In the wake of recent scandals, the UN Secretariat’s top leadership appears to 

understand the need for substantial improvements in how the organization is run. 

The Secretariat’s paper, “UN Management Reforms 2005,” lays out a significant 

reform agenda and claims that many such changes are already under way.

1

 Some 

parts of the United Nations, such as the United Nations Development Program 

(UNDP), have already significantly reformed, demonstrating what may be possi

-

ble for the rest of the organization. WHAT IS WRONG?

It is a demanding task to make the United Nations work effectively, efficiently, 

and transparently. The United Nations faces structural problems of oversight and 

accountability, management, agenda setting and resource allocation, and human 

resources management. Efforts to address these problems are frustrated by basic 
I N N E E D O F R E P A I R : R E F O R M I N G T H E U N I T E D N A T I O N S 43

disagreements among the member-states as to what priorities the organization 

should serve, by enormous politicization over every detail of budget allocation and 

personnel, and by a legacy of poor management practices that has left the organiza

-

tion vulnerable to inefficiency and abuse. From the beginning, the United States 

and other member governments have wrestled with the challenge of devising an 

effective international bureaucracy that must answer to scores of bosses—the UN 

member-states (191 at present). In the late 1940s, the U.S. Senate released the first 

in what has become a long string of reports calling for reforms in UN management. 

Since then, decades of reform efforts have frequently stumbled on political shoals or 

bogged down under the weight of the institution’s enormous inertia.

The current wave of internal reforms began in 1997, when the newly elected secre

-

tary-general, Kofi Annan, launched a series of initiatives intended to make the 

United Nations a more efficient and effective organization.

2

 He eliminated one 

thousand staff positions that were not filled at the time, consolidated UN offices in 

other countries, merged various UN departments to create a more rational struc-

ture, and asked the General Assembly to authorize a number of reforms he could 

not undertake under his own authority. A series of U.S. Government Accountability 

Office (GAO) reports on implementation of these reforms found that the reforms 

have often been implemented slowly, when implemented at all. Most of the reforms 

that the secretary-general could undertake under his own authority have been imple

-

mented to some degree, but many are incomplete.

3

 Those reforms requiring General 

Assembly approval remain further behind. In his March 21, 2005 report In Larger 

Freedom: Towards Development, Security, and Human Rights for All, the secretarygeneral repeated some of his earlier calls for reform and added a few new ones.4

On May 17, 2005, Deputy Secretary-General Louise Frechette released a report of 

management reform measures the Secretariat is now undertaking.

5

Limited Oversight

The Oil-for-Food Program overtaxed the UN’s fragile oversight and accountabil-

ity mechanisms, revealing significant flaws that urgently need to be addressed if 

confidence in the United Nations is to be restored.

6 Even if the Office of the Iraq 

Program had not been flawed by some combination of incompetence and alleged 

criminality, the job of overseeing OFF would still have overstretched the available 

resources. But the OFF scandal may have also created an opportunity for reform by 

demonstrating conclusively the need for a significant strengthening of the oversight 

system.

There are three existing oversight mechanisms: • The OIOS, created in 1994 at U.S. instigation, is responsible for internal 

audits, investigations, inspections, monitoring, and evaluation.

7 The United 

States intended that the OIOS would serve functions similar to those of an 

inspector general in a U.S. government agency, but the actual role of the OIOS 

has been more limited and its resources seriously constrained. To audit or inves

-

tigate any UN body or activity whose funding is not part of the regular budget, 

the OIOS must ask that body for the necessary resources, one reason that the 
44 A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M

OIOS did not adequately oversee the OFF program. Until December 2004, 

OIOS reports were usually available only to the United Nations’ management 

team and seen as an internal management tool. OIOS audits are now avail

-

able to all member-states upon request, which promotes accountability but 

also raises concerns about whether those reports will be as frank and hardhitting as they need to be if they are to be a useful tool for the UN’s senior 

managers. There is no equivalent of a corporate independent audit committee 

to oversee the OIOS and provide true independence. Nor can OIOS manage 

its budget in an efficient manner. Employees lacking the skills of an auditor 

cannot be replaced by those who have such skills. The UN secretary-general 

has repeatedly called for a comprehensive review of OIOS, but, to date, the 

General Assembly has not acted on this recommendation.

• The Joint Inspection Unit, which was intended to serve as a UN systemwide 

equivalent of the U.S. GAO. It has not been much used.

• The Board of Auditors, created at the first session of the General Assembly 

in 1946. It consists of the auditors general or equivalent officials of three UN 

member-states, serving for a six-year, nonrenewable term upon appointment by 

the General Assembly, with one member’s term expiring every two years. The 

auditors general themselves spend a few weeks each year at the United Nations 

and detail staff to be there full-time for the duration of the term, with addi

-

tional staff coming in as needed. The board’s external audit reports are publicly 

available. The current members are from the Philippines, the Republic of South 

Africa, and France. This is the one part of the oversight system that seems to 

work well as is.

Inadequate Management Systems

No single official is tasked with the daily running of the United Nations. The 

UN Charter describes the secretary-general as the chief administrative officer, 

but the member-states have never looked for managerial expertise when selecting 

secretaries-general. The deputy secretary-general, whose position was created in 

the 1997 series of reforms, says that she is not the organization’s chief operating 

officer. Nor is anyone else. Secretary-General Kofi Annan has proposed useful 

reforms since taking office in 1997, but implementation of those proposals has 

been seriously inadequate. Moreover, his proposals fall far short of what is needed. 

Neither the secretary-general nor any other responsible part of the UN structure 

has been willing to push hard against resistance from some member-states or from 

Secretariat staff, and the formal process for monitoring and following through on 

reforms has left much to be desired.

The Secretariat has announced two reforms intended to redress some of these 

management weaknesses. First, it is creating an oversight committee charged 

with ensuring that appropriate management action is taken to implement the 

recommendations of the various oversight bodies. That committee will have three 

internal and two external members and should meet for the first time in summer 

2005. Second, it has established two senior committees, one on policy and the 
I N N E E D O F R E P A I R : R E F O R M I N G T H E U N I T E D N A T I O N S 45

other on management, both to be chaired by the secretary-general, to improve the 

quality and speed of high-level decision making.

Politicized Budgeting and Programming

The budget/program process suffers from microcontrol by member-states. 

Member-states that pay only a tiny share of the UN regular budget have often 

shown little concern with whether funds are well spent. Programs and activi

-

ties, once mandated by the General Assembly, face little scrutiny and can live on 

forever without having to justify their existence as efforts to institute “sunset” 

provisions have failed. Under pressure from the United States, the Secretariat has 

adopted a system of “results-based” budgeting. However, not enough attention 

has been given to defining the sought-after “results” in a manner that makes them 

subject to measurement. And there does not appear to be an effective system to 

monitor the results nor to link those results back to budgetary decisions. Staff at 

the Secretariat argue that the General Assembly will not allow them to discon

-

tinue programs. However, the Task Group discerned no sustained, large-scale 

effort by the Secretariat to identify which activities should be discontinued.

Determining what programs the United Nations will carry out and how much 

money will go to those programs is determined by the General Assembly in a 

legislative process whose essentials would seem familiar to members of Congress. 

The UN Charter is vague about what that process should be, saying only, “1. The 

General Assembly shall consider and approve the budget of the Organization. 2. 

The expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by 

the General Assembly.”

The United Nations operates on a two-year budget cycle. The regular biennial 

budget is submitted by the secretary-general to the General Assembly for approval. 

That budget covers the Secretariat in New York, Geneva, Vienna, and Nairobi; the 

regional economic commissions; the special political missions (twenty-five at last 

count, including Afghanistan and Iraq); and smaller U.N. offices around the world.

The regular budget covers only part of core, or “first-ring” (see Appendix C), 

UN activities. Except for a small number of staff positions in the Department of 

Peacekeeping Operations that are covered by the regular budget, peacekeeping 

expenses are handled through a separate budget assessed annually, a budget that is 

now more than twice the regular budget. Several UN entities, such as UNDP and 

UNICEF, have separate budgets funded by voluntary contributions. The Oil-forFood Program, including administration of the program at UN headquarters, was 

funded from Iraqi oil revenues.

The secretary-general’s submission is reviewed by the Advisory Committee on 

Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), which consists of sixteen indi

-

viduals (ostensibly but not always experts on budgetary and administrative matters) 

who are nominated by their governments and elected by the General Assembly, but 

who serve in their personal capacity. The ACABQ, which scrutinizes every detail of 
46 A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M

the UN budget, has evolved into a powerful body. No country automatically has 

its candidate on the committee, but an American is usually a member.

The budget and the recommendations of the ACABQ are then reviewed by the 

General Assembly’s Administrative and Budgetary (Fifth) Committee, which is 

a committee of the whole. The Fifth Committee is clearly a significant source of 

the UN’s administrative difficulties. The quality of representatives on the Fifth 

Committee is questionable, with few countries making an effort to send people 

with expertise in budgetary or administrative matters. The extraordinary size of 

the committee (191 representatives, one for each member state) militates against 

efficient operation, but smaller states in particular seem determined to prevent 

any erosion of their voice.

Final approval of the budget is up to the General Assembly as a whole, with each 

member state entitled to one vote, regardless of how large a share of the budget 

it pays. Countries pay different shares according to a scale that takes into account 

such factors as their share of the global economy. The only formal rule on budget 

approval is Article 18 of the UN Charter, which states that a two-thirds major

-

ity of General Assembly members present and voting is necessary on “important 

questions,” including budgetary ones.

Since the late 1980s, at the behest of the United States, the budget has been 

adopted by consensus to ensure that the countries that pick up most of the tab 

cannot be forced to accept substantial increases in the size of the budget without 

their consent.

8

 However, there is no formal rule requiring consensus, and the 

United States cannot block a budget it opposes. If budgets were to come to a 

vote, the 128 member-states that pay the lowest assessments (totaling less than 1 

percent of the budget) collectively constitute a two-thirds majority and could thus 

pass the budget.

The practice of consensus on the budget (along with demands from Congress 

and the strengthening U.S. dollar that compensated for inflation and lessened 

pressure to increase the budget) has helped to constrain budget growth, leading 

to zero-growth budgets over the past three biennial budgets, covering six years. 

The United States has abandoned the zero-growth principle as the dollar has 

declined in value and as the United States has pressed for new special political 

missions and other new UN activities.

Significant flaws in the budget process remain. The General Assembly and 

especially its oversized Fifth (Budget) Committee have a culture of microman

-

agement. Too many countries with too little on the table have too much say in 

decision making. There is no tradition of delegating substantial authority to the 

Secretariat to act. Countries trade favors to protect programs that benefit their 

interests and jobs held by their nationals.

The 1997 reforms included a call for “results-based budgeting,” intended to 

shift the focus of planning, budgeting, reporting, and oversight from inputs and 

outputs to outcomes—i.e., whether programs actually achieve their intended 
I N N E E D O F R E P A I R : R E F O R M I N G T H E U N I T E D N A T I O N S 47

results. Results-based budgeting was ostensibly implemented beginning in the 

2004–05 biennium budget. But the evaluation of results that is a critical part of 

the process is sorely lacking. There is no comprehensive UN-wide effort to evaluate whether intended results are in fact being achieved. In part, the problem is 

that the desired improvements can be hard to define (e.g., should interpreters 

be required to speak more rapidly). But it also appears that many managers and 

member-states have little interest in making results-based budgeting work.

The 1997 reform proposals also included a recommendation that new UN initiatives involving new organizational structures and/or major commitments of funds 

be subject to “sunset provisions”—that is, time limits that would lead to termination of programs unless renewed by the General Assembly. There was no suggestion that such provisions would apply retroactively to eliminate existing programs. 

The General Assembly did not act on this minimal sunset recommendation. The 

March 21, 2005, report In Larger Freedom, backs off from the call for sunset 

provisions, calling only for a “review” of all programs whose mandates are more 

than five years old.

Another mechanism for dealing with obsolete programs is the “5.6 Rule,” the 

requirement that every Secretariat department identify the programs and activities within its realm that it considers to be the lowest priorities. Last year, the 

Secretariat identified 916 “outputs” (conferences, publications, etc.) that should 

be eliminated, not a large number compared to the many thousand outputs 

and programs mandated by the General Assembly. After much struggle with the 

member-states, all were eliminated, leading to savings of perhaps several million 

dollars.

Personnel

The United Nations (not including the specialized agencies) had 37,598 employees as of June 2004. Of those, 40 percent worked for the Secretariat, 21 percent 

for UNICEF, 16 percent for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 14 

percent for UNDP, and the remaining 9 percent for various other UN programs. 

As of 2003, the United Nations also employed 4,944 contractors and consultants.

The personnel system has accumulated a heavy load of staff who lack the skills or 

the motivation to perform their duties, or whose duties are no longer necessary. 

For too many of the member-states, the United Nations is seen as a job placement 

bureau. Staff may remain in the same job for years or decades and often resist 

efforts to transfer them, particularly if a transfer would mean leaving New York 

or other desirable locations. Morale is dismal. A recent survey of UN Secretariat 

staff, carried out by Deloitte on behalf of the OIOS, described a high level of 

discontent, distrust, and pessimism among staff concerning the integrity of the 

organization. Staff complained that supervisors do not follow the rules, particularly those related to budgetary and perquisite issues. They also complained about 

the use of political power in hiring and promotion. In response to an open-ended 
48 A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M

but positively phrased question, “What suggestions or comments would you 

like to offer to improve integrity within the United Nations?” some 75 percent 

of the answers were negative, with a heavy focus on behavior and accountabil

-

ity.

9

One significant reform has been made. Most UN staff members are now hired 

on fixed-term, rather than permanent, contracts, which should make it easier 

for a determined manager to phase out poor performers. (The exception, which 

we question, is some thirty-five to forty entry-level professional staff each year, 

who must first pass the National Competitive Exams and are given permanent 

appointments after a six-month probationary period.)

But more broadly, efforts to reform the system are not helped by the absurd level 

of member state micromanagement. A Secretariat request to reduce the length 

of time staff openings must be advertised from sixty to forty-five days was not 

only refused, but led to a General Assembly demand for yet another study of the 

causes of delay in recruiting UN staff.

The Human Resources Department does not utilize basic standard management 

practices. The existing performance appraisal system is ineffective. Supervisors 

appraise their own staff, but there is no 360-degree appraisal to enable staff to 

provide feedback about their supervisors; and the Human Resources Department 

has no system in place to rate the performance of managers or to provide an 

independent assessment of employees’ performance. In any case, the Human 

Resources Department is headed by an assistant secretary-general who is outranked 

by the under secretaries-general, whose performance her department ought to be 

evaluating. Among the reforms announced by the United Nations in May 2005 

is the establishment of a management performance board intended to systemati

-

cally assess the performance of senior managers. The board is to be chaired by the 

deputy secretary-general and include two under secretaries-general and one former 

senior official, with the heads of the Department of Management and the Office 

of Internal Oversight Services serving as ex officio members. There is no system for 

developing staff careers within the United Nations as all positions are filled through 

open competition.

The internal justice system available to staff who are threatened with termination 

for poor performance is, as one senior official candidly told us, “royally screwed 

up,” contributing mightily to the personnel problems by making it difficult to fire 

staff for cause. The key problem lies in the appeals process following the initial 

complaint and investigation. There are two staff-management boards that serve as 

the first round of appeal for staff. The Joint Appeals Board handles issues related 

to performance, benefits, and appraisals. The Joint Disciplinary Committee 

handles misconduct cases. These bodies typically take a year or more to review 

cases. Staff dissatisfied with the outcome at this level can appeal to the UN 

Administrative Tribunal, which has been a significant part of the problem. No 

qualifications have been required to serve as a judge on the administrative tribu

-

nal, and often the member-states that make those appointments seem more inter

-
I N N E E D O F R E P A I R : R E F O R M I N G T H E U N I T E D N A T I O N S 49

ested in providing a sinecure than in ensuring that the tribunal is truly competent 

and dedicated to the cause of justice. Descriptions of the quality of tribunal deci-

sions range from “uneven” to “appalling.” The tribunal cannot force the secretarygeneral to rehire staff, but if he refuses to do so, it can award substantial financial 

damages. Thus, what should be a fundamental deterrent to bad staff performance 

and a key support to a system of good personnel management is not available.

The secretary-general has repeatedly tried to reform the statute of the tribunal to 

require a minimal level of qualification. In April 2005, the General Assembly (GA) 

adopted a resolution amending the statute of the UN Administrative Tribunal to 

provide that its new members shall possess judicial or other relevant legal experience 

as of January 1, 2006, and specifically saying more members should be professional 

judges.10 The resolution does not specify how the GA will ensure that the tribunal’s 

members truly meet professional standards. The resolution also calls on the secre

-

tary-general to form a panel of external and independent experts to consider rede

-

signing the judicial administration system. THE REFORM EXPERIENCE OF UNDP

A potentially useful model for reform is the UNDP, one of the “funds and 

programs” in the United Nations’ second ring. UNDP receives most of its fund

-

ing from voluntary contributions that member-states make over and above their 

assessed dues to the regular UN budget. UNDP answers not to the General 

Assembly’s Fifth Committee but, rather, to a thirty-two-member executive board 

that is much less involved in management decisions. That board almost always 

includes UNDP’s top ten to twelve donor countries, which provide the vast bulk 

of its funding, along with a rotating membership of developing countries.

In the 1990s, the donor countries were dissatisfied with UNDP, expressing 

concerns that they did not understand what UNDP did or how it measured 

results. Funding was falling off. In response, in 1996 UNDP instigated a changemanagement process aimed at clarifying UNDP’s roles and procedures.

UNDP put together a business plan for itself, setting out its own goals to focus on 

strategic priorities not well covered by other development institutions, such as demo

-

cratic governance. After reviewing its headquarters structure and staffing, it reduced 

the headquarters budget and staff by 25 percent, terminating some staff and moving 

others to UNDP’s field operations. It reprofiled its 135 country offices to move 

them from working on assorted projects to the high-level policy advice that became 

UNDP’s main mission. It cut the budget of field offices by 15 percent and used the 

funds saved to buy out staff, mostly people who did not qualify under the new job 

criteria. Separation packages were funded through a combination of the separation 

budget allocation and the reprioritization of resources within the regular budget, 

not additional resources. In all, one thousand staff were given separation packages. 

About half were replaced with new hires whose skills better matched UNDP’s needs, 

including many from the private sector. The budget for coordinating this worldwide 

overhaul was a mere $500,000. In 1999, UNDP created a multiyear funding frame

-

work as a strategic management tool, designed to monitor key results achieved and 

resources used over three-year increments

.
50 A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M

Although the reform was designed at the top, UNDP made serious efforts to 

engage its worldwide workforce. High-level UNDP officials trained some 400 staff 

in country offices on the reform process and then picked 130 of those to facili

-

tate the reform process. UNDP headquarters provided toolkits, templates, model 

structures for country offices, and model job descriptions. UNDP admits that 

not every country office head leapt at the opportunity to make the hard decisions 

necessary to terminate staff and change programmatic direction, but argues that 

most country offices significantly reformed.

We take no position on whether the UNDP reform effort has translated into 

better results.11 What is clear, however, is that UNDP succeeded in many of 

the kinds of basic administrative reforms that have so long been stymied in the 

Secretariat.

UNDP’s reform process benefited from some significant advantages over other 

parts of the United Nations. By the nature of its work, it is easier (though still not 

easy) to specify what results are being sought and measure the degree to which 

they are being achieved. It does not have to deal with the General Assembly’s 

Fifth Committee. Its executive board is much smaller, and the member-states on 

the board are more willing to permit the UNDP administrator to make budget 

and personnel decisions without political interference. Because most of its budget 

comes from voluntary funding that dries up if member-states are not happy with 

UNDP’s performance, UNDP has a substantial incentive to focus on that perfor

-

mance.

Despite these differences, the UNDP experience does hold out promise as a 

model for other parts of the United Nations. One crucial lesson is the importance 

of leadership. Successful reform requires diligent, persistent effort, clear vision, 

and the capability to “sell” both member-states and staff on the need for specific 

changes. Another lesson is the role of member-states. Member-states are in 

control of UNDP’s budget and administration through the executive board, just 

as member-states control the Secretariat via the Fifth Committee. The difference 

is that the UNDP executive board allows the UNDP administrator to manage 

UNDP and to lay out the vision for the organization. The Fifth Committee does 

not usually give the secretary-general such leeway. RECOMMENDATIONS

Oversight

Effective oversight is crucial both to deter corruption and to ensure efficient 

use of resources. Effective auditing always saves more money than it costs. The 

Secretariat is now creating a new management structure with two committees that 

include several under secretaries-general, one committee for management and one 

for policy, so that there is a formal senior management structure charged with 

responding to OIOS findings. This is a useful step but falls far short of what is 

needed. ❚ Most important, the United Nations needs to create an Independent 

Oversight Board (IOB) that would function in a manner similar to a corporate 
I N N E E D O F R E P A I R : R E F O R M I N G T H E U N I T E D N A T I O N S 51

independent audit committee. Such bodies are crucial to ensure that audits and 

investigations are truly independent.12

❚ The IOB would receive OIOS reports and, 

in consultation with the Board of Auditors and Secretariat management, would 

have the authority to fix the budget and approve and direct the assignments of 

the OIOS and of the Board of External Auditors, just as an independent audit 

committee in the United States has such authority with respect to both the internal 

and the external auditor. The IOB would appoint the head of the OIOS (subject to 

the approval of the secretary-general) and set his or her salary and tenure. 

❚ In short, 

the OIOS budget must be set by an independent oversight board and submitted 

to the General Assembly budget committee in a separate track outside the regular 

budget process.

An effective IOB should consist of no more than seven fully qualified individuals. 

At least three of them should be the auditors general of three member countries 

other than those manning the Board of Auditors. Auditors general are typically 

independent of their own governments, have the proper skill sets for the job, and 

have the standing needed to establish the proper relationship with the Board of 

Auditors. Other members might include highly respected former finance ministers 

or heads of central banks. An effective IOB could also be responsible for appointing 

a separate investigating body in the case of any future large-scale scandals.

Two further steps are needed. 

❚ First, the United Nations must provide both the 

resources and the authority to OIOS to provide appropriate oversight to every 

activity that is managed by UN personnel, whether or not that activity is funded 

by the assessments of the General Assembly or by voluntary contributions. ❚ Second, transparency is key to the workings of a reformed United Nations 

system, and accountability to member-states is vital. Oversight reports must be 

accessible to member-states under guidelines that facilitate transparency and meet, 

at a minimum, the freedom of information flow between U.S. investigative agen

-

cies and the Congress.

Management

Many of the proposals for reform on management put forward by the secretarygeneral in his March report and in the subsequent May 17 list of reforms under 

way seem appropriate and desirable, but the secretary-general has often put forward 

good-sounding reform proposals then failed to push hard against predictable resis

-

tance from staff and member-states. The secretary-general needs a far more effective 

process for following through on reform proposals to ensure they are fully imple

-

mented.

The United Nations needs top leadership that knows how to manage a complex 

organization and is charged with doing so. 

❚ The UN Secretariat needs to have 

a single, very senior official in charge of daily operations and, filling the role of 

chief operating officer (COO). That official should not be the secretary-general, 

who has too many other responsibilities. But the secretary-general must understand 

and provide leadership on good management practices. 

❚ The United States should 

insist on management capability as a fundamental criterion for the selection of the 
52 A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M

next secretary-general. The United States should seek agreement in the General 

Assembly for a more effective management structure, one that would make the 

next deputy secretary-general the organization’s COO.

The secretary-general must have the authority to remove top management with

-

out cause. According to UN officials, new contracts for under secretaries-general 

and assistant secretaries-general will specify that all such officials serve at the plea

-

sure of the secretary-general.

Budget and Programming

Two existing pieces of the reform effort could, if properly implemented, help 

significantly to ensure that UN programs are worth doing and doing well. The 

first of these is the “5.6 Rule,” which requires the Secretariat to identify low-prior

-

ity activities in the budget proposal. 

❚ The 5.6 Rule should be enforced and 

bolstered by an additional requirement that managers identify the lowest-prior

-

ity activities equivalent to 15 percent of their budget request or face an acrossthe-board reduction of that amount. The identification of 15 percent of the 

budget as low priority should not necessarily be interpreted as a list for elimina

-

tion, but as information on what programs could be reduced in favor of higherpriority mandates.

Second, the United Nations needs to get serious about results-based budgeting, 

and that will require a thoroughgoing commitment throughout the Secretariat 

and by the member-states. 

❚ The Secretariat’s leadership must demand that 

managers define and attempt to achieve specific outcomes. Future budgets 

should be tied to whether those results are achieved. The OIOS should be 

tasked with a larger monitoring/evaluation role to evaluate the degree to 

which programs are achieving their targeted results. Funding for such evalua

-

tion should be a required part of every program’s budget submission, includ

-

ing the “funds and programs” such as UNDP that are not funded from the 

regular budget. The United Nations’ budget office should oversee the defining 

of the “results” to be achieved by programs, and the member-states must avoid 

micromanaging this process. ❚ The United States should support the secretarygeneral’s plan, described in his March 21 report, to establish a management 

performance board “to ensure that senior officials are held accountable for their 

actions and the results their units achieve.”

❚ In addition, the United States should insist upon both of the secretarygeneral’s sunsetting proposals: the 1997 proposal to include sunset clauses for all 

major new mandates, and the proposal in the March 21 report this year to review 

all mandates dating back five years or more. Every mandate and program should 

have a sunset clause to ensure that it is regularly evaluated and continues to 

perform a necessary function. ❚ The sunset clauses should assume that programs 

will be shut down unless the General Assembly’s budget committee confirms by 

consensus that they should continue, based on a publicly available analysis iden

-

tifying the programs’ purpose, budget, and ongoing relevance.
I N N E E D O F R E P A I R : R E F O R M I N G T H E U N I T E D N A T I O N S 53

Although the United Nations’ general budget is now on its website, far too much 

information remains obscure. The General Assembly, the Economic and Social 

Council (ECOSOC), and the Security Council all have numerous subsidiary bodies 

whose work commands resources but whose functions are often obscure and whose 

very existence may be known only to a handful of insiders. ❚ The United States 

should insist that the United Nations publish annually a list of all subsidiary 

bodies and their functions, budgets, and staff. Their budgets should be subject to 

the same sunset provisions that apply to other UN programs and activities. The 

United Nations should also publish budget information in a manner that lays 

out multiyear expenditures by program, identifies the source of funds as assessed 

or voluntary (including the source country), and includes in-kind contributions.

Moreover, given the problem of duplication within the UN system, the new COO 

should be charged with analyzing programs and mandates to verify that they do not 

overlap with other mandates, programs, or entities in the UN system.

The United States is the largest donor to the United Nations system, contributing 

22 percent of the regular budget and nearly 27 percent of the peacekeeping budget. 

As significant as these contributions are, however, these assessed contributions are 

exceeded by U.S. voluntary contributions to the UN system. According to the U.S. 

Department of State, the U.S. paid an estimated $3.845 billion in contributions to 

the UN system in 2004, of which $2.278 billion—nearly 60 percent—was 

voluntary.13 The State Department can only estimate these numbers because indi

-

vidual departments and agencies in the U.S. government provide funding directly, 

and no single part of the U.S. government is responsible for tracking all U.S. contri

-

butions to the United Nations system. ❚ The Office of Management and Budget 

(OMB) should annually report to Congress on all U.S. contributions, both 

assessed and voluntary, to the United Nations.

The consensus-based budget process has proved effective at reining in increases 

in the UN budget but not at setting priorities or cutting many obsolete items. 

❚ The United States should work with a representative group of member-states 

to explore ways of giving larger contributors a greater say in votes on budgetary 

matters without disenfranchising smaller contributors.

Personnel

The priorities on personnel reform are to remove staff who do not or cannot 

perform or whose skills are not in keeping with the current needs of the organiza

-

tion, and to modernize the human resources function. ❚ The United States should 

insist on the secretary-general’s call in his March 21 report for a one-time severance 

program to remove unwanted or unneeded staff and should monitor that program 

closely to ensure it is designed to remove the staff who ought to be removed. The 

sunsetting provisions described above, which will help to end programs, mandates, 

and publications that serve no meaningful purpose for the UN membership, will 

help to identify which staff are redundant and should be offered severance packages. 

The severance program should be paid for by the separated staff’s forgone salaries 

and benefits. Because the money saved over the years would not yet be available to 

pay severance costs at the time of separation, it will be necessary to provide one-
54 A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M

time severance funds. ❚ To prevent a resurrection of this problem, the United 

Nations should not offer permanent contracts to any new employees. The identification of redundant staff, along with other relevant recommendations in this 

report, should apply fully to the United Nations’ nearly five thousand contractors and consultants.

Article 101 of the UN Charter states, “The paramount consideration in the 

employment of the staff and in the determination of the conditions of service 

shall be the necessity of securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence, 

and integrity. Due regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on 

as wide a geographical basis as possible.” Unfortunately, this reasonable prioritization has been reversed and the emphasis on geographical balance for hiring decisions has become far too pronounced. ❚ The UN’s hiring practice must reflect 

the emphasis on competence laid out in the Charter, with geographical considerations taken into account only after the competence test is met.

It would be futile to undertake a severance program if the operation of the 

human resources function is not reformed. In a few years, the same deadwood of 

useless programs and ill-equipped employees would be repeated. ❚ Therefore, the 

United States should insist that the United Nations install a more empowered 

and disciplined Human Resources Department that employs all the techniques 

of modern personnel policies.

Another flaw in the system is the rigid restrictions that prevent managers from 

having the flexibility to move staff and positions to meet changing priorities. 

❚ The United States should support granting UN managers the authority to 

assign employees where they can be best used and amending job placement 

policies to permit promotional opportunities.

❚ The United Nations should more systematically take advantage of secondments of personnel from member-states on a pro bono basis for specified periods or tasks. There are many tasks and skills required by UN operations that 

could be better addressed by professionals seconded from national governments 

rather than new employees. Rotating these professionals into the United Nations 

on a periodic basis provides a means for introducing new ideas, techniques, and 

experience without having to deal with terminating contracts or moving people or 

positions. It also allows the system to deal with unexpected demands, particularly 

in cases of humanitarian or peacekeeping operations. Although some memberstates have previously opposed secondments, fearing that personnel from a handful of member-states would come to dominate, the UN’s new operational responsibilities demand a more flexible approach.

❚ The internal justice system must be rendered more effective. To ensure that 

the United Nations is able to terminate staff appropriately in the future, the 

General Assembly must fully implement its new requirement that candidates 

for positions on the UN Administrative Tribunal possess appropriate quali-
I N N E E D O F R E P A I R : R E F O R M I N G T H E U N I T E D N A T I O N S 55

fications before being approved. UN personnel charged with criminal offenses 

should not be able to take cover behind diplomatic or functional immunity. 

Given the existence of deeply flawed criminal justice systems in some areas of UN 

operations, however, there needs to be reasonable protections for UN staff who 

may be falsely charged. ❚ In criminal cases, immunity should be waived unless 

the legal advisor to the secretary-general determines that justice is unlikely to be 

served in the country at issue. The legal advisor’s report should be made available 

to the proposed independent oversight board to ensure accountability to an inde

-

pendent body. Efforts must be made to find an appropriate jurisdiction elsewhere. 

❚ Legal fees for accused staff should be reimbursed only if the accused staff is 

cleared by appropriate legal processes.

❚ A new standard of personnel ethics must be developed and advertised within the 

United Nations. Disclosure forms must be mandatory at the P-5 level and above. 

Failure to disclose must be sanctioned and sanctions clearly laid out. An Office of 

Personnel Ethics should be established within the Secretariat but should be account

-

able to the IOB to serve as a repository for disclosure documents. These documents 

must be made available to member-states upon request.

❚ The United Nations needs a far more robust policy for protecting whistleblow-

ers. A revised policy is currently under discussion within the United Nations, in 

what the Secretariat says is an effort to carry out the extensive staff consultation 

needed in formulating policies of this nature in order to build the kind of trust and 

confidence needed for the policy to have any real meaning.

The United Nations must meet the highest standards of information disclosure. The 

United States should carefully monitor the Secretariat’s current efforts to develop a 

comprehensive information disclosure policy.

If the United Nations is again called upon to administer a large-scale sanctions 

regime, it should set up an effective and separate management structure, with seri

-

ous audit capacity, to do so.

Rethinking the Management of UN Operational Activities

Some of the UN’s more operational programs, such as UNDP, seem to have found 

ways around the serious management deficiencies that plague the Secretariat. Their 

success suggests a model. Many UN programs, such as the UN Conference on 

Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the regional economic commissions, 

might function better if funded entirely by voluntary contributions. These programs 

already receive substantial voluntary contributions. Moving them out of the regular 

budget would have two advantages. First, they would be freed from the involvement 

of the General Assembly’s Fifth (Budget) Committee, a freedom that contributed 

significantly to UNDP’s success in pushing through rapid reform. Second, having 

them rely entirely on voluntary contributions imposes a kind of market discipline, 

forcing them to produce results in order to receive continued funding. ❚ The 

United States should work with other member-states to identify which of the 
56 A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M

operational programs now receiving funds from the assessed budget should be 

funded entirely by voluntary contributions.

The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) should become a more 

independent program, with separate staff support and distinct rules and regula-

tions appropriate for its operational responsibility for comprehensive peacekeeping 

missions. Its responsibilities must include coordination with broader reconstruc

-

tion and development activities of the United Nations.

With more than six hundred headquarters personnel responsible for a field pres-

ence that now approaches eighty thousand (uniformed and civilian), DPKO’s 

management is already overstretched. The scope of the department’s current 

responsibilities and operational requirements extend far beyond traditional peace

-

keeping deployments and now involve political engagement, human rights moni-

toring, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of fighters, protection of 

civilians under specified circumstances, and other, often high-risk, operations. 

In addition, DPKO missions must now coordinate integrated, multidimensional 

activities involving political development, small-scale “civic action”–type construc

-

tion, judicial and penal system development, governance and anticorruption 

measures, and development assistance.

The DPKO will continue to be funded by the assessed peacekeeping budget, and 

its head will continue to report to the secretary-general. But DPKO cannot hope 

to plan for long-term successful interventions while hobbled by the member state 

micromanagement endemic within the current budgetary and oversight process. 

This reform requires a separate and streamlined management, organizational, and 

budget process that includes a role for major financial and troop contributors and 

other “lead nations.”

General Assembly Reform

The General Assembly committees of the whole are entirely too large and consti-

tute a serious impediment to the organization’s effective operation. In addition 

to the problems with the Fifth Committee described throughout this report, 

it appears that the Second Committee (economic and financial) and the Third 

Committee (social, humanitarian, and cultural) largely replicate the purposes of 

ECOSOC. The secretary-general’s March 21 report calls for review of the General 

Assembly’s roles and structures, a call the United States should strongly endorse.

The General Assembly’s committee structure should be revised to increase its 

effectiveness and to reflect the substantive priorities of the United Nations, as 

identified in other parts of the Task Force report. ❚ Bearing in mind the recom

-

mendations of this report, the United States should review the mandates and 

performance of the committees with a view to identifying areas of duplication 

between the committees and other bodies, programs, and mandates in the UN 

system.
I N N E E D O F R E P A I R : R E F O R M I N G T H E U N I T E D N A T I O N S 57

BRINGING ABOUT REFORM: THE U.S. ROLE

A significant effort by the United States more than a decade ago demonstrates 

that diplomacy has the potential to be effective in certain circumstances. In 1991, 

American diplomacy was instrumental in developing support for reforms among a 

wide swath of member-states. In a process that started quietly with a small group 

of member-states and eventually expanded to include some fifty permanent representatives, a significant investment of U.S. diplomatic resources (along with strong 

support from the U.S. administration from the top down) led to strong consensus 

on a series of management and accountability reforms.

A rare opportunity for reform through diplomacy exists in the wake of the recent 

scandals at the United Nations. The United States should bring its considerable 

diplomatic leverage to bear to take advantage of this opportunity. To be successful, 

American diplomacy must build a strong coalition including key member-states 

from various regions and groups and among the UN’s staff, many of whom share 

America’s strong desire to reform the United Nations into an organization that 

works. In the course of these efforts, the United States needs to know what essential points it wishes to achieve and on which other issues it is prepared to negotiate 

formulas to induce others to accept U.S. positions.

Table 1. United Nations Scale of Assessments

Top 10 Contributors Percent Assessed

United States 22.0

Japan 19.5

Germany 8.7

United Kingdom 6.1

France 6.0

Italy 4.9

Canada 2.8

Spain 2.5

China 2.1

Mexico 1.9

Total Top 10 76.4

Contribution of Lowest 128 0.966

Source: United Nations, “Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly: Scale of Assessments for the 

Apportionment of the Expenses of the United Nations,” A/RES/58/1 (2004).
58 A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M

The scale of assessments is based in part on each country’s capacity to pay as 

determined by its share of the global economy. The U.S. share of global gross 

domestic product (GDP) is 30 percent. By special arrangement, the United States 

pays 22 percent of the regular budget. Japan’s share of GDP is 11.9 percent; it 

pays 19.5 percent of the regular budget.

However, the assessed contribution tells only part of the story. Total U.S. contributions to the United Nations system were $3.845 billion—not including 

indirect support for peacekeeping operations, which can cost billions of dollars per 

year. Only $1.567 billion of this contribution was to meet assessed budgets. By 

comparison, $2.278 billion, or nearly 60 percent of the total U.S. contribution, 

was voluntary.

Sources: United Nations, “Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly: Scale of Assessments for the 

Apportionment of the Expenses of the United Nations,” A/RES/58/1B, World Bank, “Total GDP 

2003,” World Development Indicators database. Online. Available: www.worldbank.org/data/

quickreference/quickref.html.

Figure 1. Comparison of Scale of Assessments to Percentage of Total GDP 2003
I N N E E D O F R E P A I R : R E F O R M I N G T H E U N I T E D N A T I O N S 59

Table 2. U.S. Contributions to UN System (Millions US Dollars), CY2004

Organizations by Category Total 

Contributions

Assessed 

Contributions

Voluntary 

Contributions

Total 3845 1567 2278

Weapons of Mass Destruction 132 79 53

IAEA

UN Regular Budget* 362 362 0

Peacekeeping/WCT** 739 739 0

Peacekeeping 

WCT

Open Markets 136 82 54

ILO

ICAO

UPU

ITU

WIPO

Health 226 96 130

UNAIDS

WHO

Humanitarian/Human Rights 1750 0 1750

UNRWA

UNHCR

UNHCHR

UNOHCHR

WFP

UNOCHA

UNICEF

UN Voluntary 

Fund for HR

UN Voluntary 

Fund Torture

ISDR

Environment 161 97 64

UNEP

CITES

UNFCCC/IPCC

Montreal 

Protocol

UNESCO/

ICSECA

IMO
60 A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M

Organizations by Category Total 

Contributions

Assessed 

Contributions

Voluntary 

Contributions

WMO

Development 317 112 205

HABITAT

FAO

UNDP

UNCDF

UNIFEM

IFAD

ITC

UN DESA

Other 22 0 22

UNFPA

UNODC

All contributions noted are from U.S. fiscal year 2004 except for those in red text. Red text indicates organizations whose assessments are paid at the end of the calendar year and are paid for in 

the subsequent U.S. fiscal year (i.e., the calendar year 2004 assessments are paid in U.S. fiscal year 

2005). The Peacekeeping budget matches neither fiscal year because the calendar year straddles two 

peacekeeping budgets. 

* The United States makes irregular voluntary contributions to UN Trust Funds. 

** The U.S. Department of Defense makes substantial voluntary and indirect contributions to 

UN peacekeeping that are not included in this table. For instance, the Government Accountability 

Office reported in 2002 that U.S. assessed and voluntary contributions to UN peacekeeping operations from 1996 to 2001 were an estimated $3.45 billion. However, GAO estimated that indirect 

U.S. contributions from 1996 through 2001 that benefited UN peacekeeping were an estimated 

$24.2 billion, primarily through DOD. Source: U.S. Government Accountability Office, "UN 

Peacekeeping: Estimated U.S. Contributions, Fiscal Years 1996-2001," (GAO-02-294), February 

2002. 

Source: U.S. Department of State. There is no comprehensive source of data on U.S. contributions 

the United Nations. Data in this table are approximations and restricted to funding controlled by 

the Department of State. Funding from other sources in the U.S. government, such as USAID or 

the Department of Agriculture, has been incorporated where possible, but the contributions in the 

table may not reflect the total contributions from these sources. Contributions from the Department 

of Defense are not included in this table.

Table 2. (continued)
I N N E E D O F R E P A I R : R E F O R M I N G T H E U N I T E D N A T I O N S 61

NOTES

1. United Nations, “UN Management Reforms 2005: Management Reform Measures to Strengthen 

Accountability, Ethical Conduct, and Management Performance,” May 17, 2005.

2. United Nations, “Renewing the United Nations: A Program for Reform,” Report of the SecretaryGeneral, A/51/950 (July 14, 1997). 

3. U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Observations on the Management and Oversight of the 

Oil for Food Program“ 

(Washington, D.C.: GAO, April 28, 2004).

4. United Nations, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security, and Human 

Rights for All. Report of the Secretary-General, A/59/2005 (March 21, 2005). 

5. United Nations, “UN Management Reforms 2005.”

6. Second Interim Report of the Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Oil-forFood Program, March 29, 2005; Interim Report of the Independent Inquiry Committee (IIC) 

into the United Nations Oil-for-Food Program, February 3, 2005.

7. United Nations Secretary-General’s Bulletin, “Establishment of the Office of Internal Oversight,” 

ST/SGB/273 (September 7, 1994). 

8. There is no formal requirement for consensus. The change in procedure is based on a 1986 state

-

ment from the president of the General Assembly that the GA “should continue to make all 

possible efforts with a view to establishing the broadest possible agreement” on the budget.

9. Deloitte Consulting, LLP, “United Nations Organizational Integrity Survey 2004: Final Report,” 

2004.

10. United Nations “Administration of Justice at the United Nations,” A/C.5/59/L.46 (April 6, 

2005).

11. A recent study by the Department for International Development (DFID), the British govern-

ment’s equivalent to USAID, ranked UNDP first out of 23 multilateral organizations (World 

Bank, UNICEF, etc.) in terms of organizational effectiveness; see DFID’s “Assessment of 

Multilateral Effectiveness,” from the International Division Advisory Department, Government 

of the United Kingdom, February 28, 2005. In a recent OMB-led Performance Appraisal Rating 

Tool (PART) process assessing UNDP’s mission and performance, the organization was given 

the highest possible rating of “effective” and an overall score of 91 percent: purpose, 100 percent; 

planning, 88 percent; management, 100 percent; results/accountability, 84 percent. The PART 

summary also stated that UNDP supports U.S. strategic interests that “include economic devel

-

opment, democracy and human rights, and growth and stability worldwide.” The Task Group did 

not evaluate either study’s methodology and takes no position on their findings.

12. The need for such a body is highlighted by the fact that representatives of the Board of Auditors 

have expressed concern that the failure to have a completely independent OIOS with the author

-

ity and the resources to provide truly effective oversight of all UN operations may well constitute 

a material weakness in the internal controls of the United Nations and thus make it difficult if 

not impossible in the future for the Board of Auditors to render a clean opinion of the UN’s 

operations. 

13. This does not include indirect contributions to UN peacekeeping from the U.S. Department 

of Defense, which can be considerable. For instance, the Government Accountability Office 

reported in 2002 that U.S. assessed and voluntary contributions to UN peacekeeping operations 

from 1996 to 2001 were an estimated $3.45 billion. However, GAO estimated that indirect 

U.S. contributions from 1996 through 2001 that benefited UN peacekeeping were approxi

-

mately $24.2 billion, primarily through the Department of Defense; see U.S. Government 

Accountability Office, “UN Peacekeeping: Estimated U.S. Contributions, Fiscal Years 1996–

2001,” GAO-02-294 (February 2002).

4 

Deterring Death 

and Destruction:

Catastrophic 

Terrorism and the 

Proliferation of 

Nuclear, Chemical, 

and Biological 

Weapons
64 A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M THE THREAT

Concern about weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is nothing new. U.S. admin-

istrations have been preoccupied with the spread of such weapons for decades, and 

they have had notable successes in curbing it. Argentina and Brazil terminated their 

nuclear weapons programs when military-led governments fell from power. After 

independence, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan transferred their inherited nuclear 

weapons to Russia. South Africa gave up its small nuclear arsenal in the transition 

to black majority rule. In the early 1990s, Saddam’s Iraq was forced to abandon 

its WMD programs if not its hopes for regenerating them some day. And after the 

second Gulf War, Muammar Qaddafi agreed to give up Libya’s WMD efforts.

Despite these successes, current trends are alarming. North Korea continues defiantly 

to enhance its nuclear capabilities. Iran is building a uranium enrichment facility 

that it claims will produce enriched uranium for civil nuclear reactors but could also 

be used to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. U.S. and other investiga

-

tors are trying to understand the full scope of Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan’s black 

market network, which provided critical equipment and technologies to support the 

nuclear weapons programs of Iran, North Korea, Libya, and perhaps other countries. 

The Pakistani government itself faces a substantial threat from Islamic militants 

who, if they ever succeed in their goal of assuming power in Pakistan, would find 

themselves in possession of a substantial nuclear arsenal. Pessimism about the future 

of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime is growing. Left unchecked, it could 

lead countries around the world to conclude that unless they jump on the nuclear 

bandwagon—or at least hedge their bets by acquiring the infrastructure for a future 

nuclear option—they will be putting themselves in jeopardy.

The threat of nuclear proliferation is paralleled by the threat of the proliferation of 

biological weapons (BW), perhaps more aptly called weapons of mass murder than 

weapons of mass destruction. The BW threat is especially acute because of rapid 

advances in the area of genetic engineering and because BW programs are smaller, 

less expensive, and easier to conceal than nuclear weapons programs.

The threat of additional countries acquiring WMD is bad enough. But in a post9/11 world, the dangers are magnified several-fold by the very real prospect that 

terrorist groups will obtain the wherewithal to carry out mass-casualty attacks. In 

its review of U.S. intelligence regarding WMD, the Silberman-Robb Commission 

states that, in the wake of the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan, al-Qaeda’s BW 

program was found to be further along than previously believed and had prob

-

ably acquired several BW agents as early as 1999.

1

 In the nuclear area, al-Qaeda 

reportedly tried to buy highly enriched uranium from South Africa in 1992.

2 Bin 

Laden himself met with two retired Pakistani nuclear scientists to discuss nuclear 

weapons.

3 And documents found in Afghanistan suggested that al-Qaeda had been 

examining nuclear weapon designs.

4 In a report to Congress in December 2004, 

the Central Intelligence Agency’s National Intelligence Council (NIC) stated that 

terrorists had targeted Russian nuclear weapon storage sites. It cited reported thefts 

of weapons-grade nuclear materials from Russian institutes and came to a very 

troubling conclusion: “We assess that undetected smuggling has occurred, and we 
D E T E R R I N G D E A T H A N D D E S T R U C T I O N 65

are concerned about the total amount of material that could have been diverted or 

stolen in the last thirteen years.”5

This dual threat—terrorist groups and potentially hostile regimes both seeking 

WMD—has become the number one security challenge facing the United States 

today.

ASSESSMENT OF UN EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THE THREAT

To assess how effective the United Nations has been in combating the twin dangers 

of WMD proliferation and catastrophic terrorism, it is necessary to examine the 

various components of the UN system that have had responsibility for dealing with 

those threats.

Security Council

The first place to look in assessing the United Nations’ role in the areas of proliferation and terrorism is the Security Council, the UN organ assigned by the Charter to 

bear “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.”

Role in proliferation. The Security Council’s experience with Iraq since the first 

Gulf War illustrates both the strengths and weaknesses of the Council in dealing 

with WMD proliferation. On the one hand, council-imposed sanctions, while 

prone to leakage and corruption, nonetheless crippled Iraq’s war-making capacity 

and, together with council-mandated verification arrangements of unprecedented 

intrusiveness, apparently convinced Saddam to suspend his WMD programs. On 

the other hand, unique circumstances made possible the disarming of Iraq. The 

council was able to unite behind a tough regime of sanctions and inspections in 

the early 1990s because Iraq had been decisively defeated in war after committing a 

clear-cut act of aggression. Moreover, Saddam was willing to readmit inspectors only 

in late 2002 under a credible and imminent threat of U.S.-led military intervention.

In the area of verification of WMD-related obligations, the Security Council 

broke new ground in 1991 by setting up the United Nations Special Commission 

(UNSCOM) as part of its cease-fire resolution for the first Gulf War (UN Security 

Council Resolution, or UNSCR, 687). This resolution required Iraq to eliminate all of its programs for nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and longrange missiles, and directed UNSCOM, as a subsidiary body of the council, and 

the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to monitor implementation. 

UNSCOM was given responsibility for the biological, chemical, and missile parts of 

UNSCR 687’s mandate, while the IAEA was to handle its nuclear parts.

With inspection authorities much broader than those contained in any arms control 

or nonproliferation agreement, UNSCOM and the IAEA carried out certain key 

tasks effectively, despite frequent Iraqi obstructionist behavior. They destroyed large 

quantities of chemical weapons, BW production facilities, and nuclear infrastructure. But as the Security Council Permanent Five (P-5) consensus broke down in 

the mid-to-late 1990s, Saddam gained confidence that he could defy the international community with impunity, and Iraqi obstructionism increased significantly.
66 A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M

In December 1998, after being pulled out of Iraq on the eve of U.S. air strikes, 

UNSCOM and IAEA inspectors were not allowed by Iraqi authorities to 

return. One year later, the Security Council adopted UNSCR 1284, which set 

up the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission 

(UNMOVIC) as a successor to UNSCOM. But Saddam did not permit UN 

inspectors to return to Iraq until fall 2002, when the prospect of U.S.-led military 

intervention had become a credible threat. By then, the council had unanimously 

adopted UNSCR 1441, which gave UNMOVIC and the IAEA much stronger veri

-

fication authorities. They used those authorities to conduct an intensive campaign 

of inspections that ended when UN personnel were pulled out of Iraq shortly before 

the second Gulf War. The inspections produced assessments that, especially in retro

-

spect, appear accurate and consistent with the results of the exhaustive, postwar 

investigation carried out by the U.S.-led Iraq Survey Group.

6 UNMOVIC contin

-

ues to function in New York, engaged primarily in analytical activities.

The chief lesson from Iraq is that the Security Council can be an effective tool in 

the fight against proliferation when it is united and confronts a proliferator with 

the serious consequences of flouting its obligations. Thus, in the early 1990s and 

briefly in late 2002 (e.g., UNSCR 1441), it was united and effective. But when P-5 

consensus broke down in the late 1990s, the sanctions began to unravel. And when 

sharp divisions emerged in early 2003, a military solution was pursued outside the 

United Nations.

The Security Council has a mixed record in dealing with other proliferation chal

-

lenges. Counterterrorism sanctions imposed on Libya, together with the second 

Gulf War and Saddam’s capture, helped pressure Qaddafi to come clean on both 

terrorism and WMD. Following Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests in May 1998, 

the council passed a strong resolution of condemnation and called on the newly 

declared nuclear powers to adopt constraints. However, because many nations 

wanted to improve relations with New Delhi and Islamabad, and because the two 

had not joined and therefore not violated the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 

(NPT), the council did not pursue the matter further.

On North Korea, the IAEA board of governors referred Pyongyang’s noncompliance 

to the Security Council in 1993 and 2003. But China and others opposed council 

action, and so the venue shifted to bilateral U.S.–North Korea talks in 1993–94 

and to the current Six-Party Talks. The council was unable to prevent North Korea’s 

withdrawal from the NPT in January 2003. On Iran, while IAEA investigators have 

discovered numerous past violations of Tehran’s safeguards obligations, the IAEA 

board has not agreed with repeated U.S. efforts to send the issue to the council, 

arguing that European-Iranian negotiations should first be pursued and that the 

council would only bog down in P-5 disagreements. Thus, on the two major proliferation threats currently posed by countries—North Korea and Iran—the Council is 

playing essentially no role.

On the WMD proliferation threat posed by nonstate actors, the Security Council 

took a very encouraging step in April 2004 by adopting UNSCR 1540. Based on 
D E T E R R I N G D E A T H A N D D E S T R U C T I O N 67

a Bush administration initiative, UNSCR1540 directs that “all states shall refrain 

from providing any form of support to nonstate actors that attempt to develop, 

acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer, or use nuclear, chemical, or 

biological weapons and their means of delivery.” To ensure that states will have 

the capacity to fulfill that obligation, UNSCR 1540 requires them to put in place 

effective domestic laws, regulations, and enforcement mechanisms that can help 

prevent the proliferation of WMD and WMD-related materials and technologies 

to terrorist groups or other countries. Member governments are required to crimi

-

nalize proliferation-related activities by nonstate actors (e.g., illicit trafficking and 

brokering, manufacture of proscribed weapons and materials); establish effective 

national export, transshipment, and border control systems; and implement physical 

protection measures to secure sensitive materials from theft or seizure. Finally, the 

resolution calls on all states to submit reports on what they are doing to meet these 

requirements and establishes the “1540 Committee” with a two-year mandate to 

monitor progress.

What is envisioned is that the 1540 Committee and its staff will evaluate country 

reports, identify deficiencies, suggest improvements, and help the countries find 

the assistance they need to strengthen their capacities. But with less than a year 

left in the committee’s mandate, key questions remain: Against what standards will 

the committee measure performance? With authorization for only seven experts, 

how can it make its evaluations and recommendations? How energetically will it 

press member-states to comply with their obligations? Who will fund the assistance 

required to bring national controls up to acceptable standards? By adopting 1540 

under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (mandatory implementation), the Security 

Council has created a potentially powerful tool for countering the nonstate proliferation threat. Whether that tool is used effectively will depend on how these ques

-

tions are answered.

Role in terrorism. The Security Council, like the rest of the United Nations 

and the international community, was slow to address the threat of terror before 

September 11, 2001. Its attitude reflected the prevailing international attitude that 

terrorism was, with few exceptions, a national problem. It issued condemnatory 

resolutions and promoted the twelve antiterrorism conventions, but it took few 

practical steps to prioritize the threat. During the 1990s there were only two cases 

in which the council took strong actions against terrorism by applying mandatory 

sanctions, both in response to strong U.S. pressure. In 1992–93, it sanctioned Libya 

for the terrorist bombings in 1988 and 1989 of PanAm and UTA airliners. Later, 

in 1999, it also imposed sanctions (UNSCR 1267) on al-Qaeda and the Taliban 

regime in Afghanistan in the aftermath of the U.S. embassy bombings in East Africa 

and created a sanctions committee to monitor and report on implementation.

The 1992 Libyan sanctions were the first for terrorist acts under Chapter VII of the 

UN Charter (mandatory for UN members), and the first “targeted” sanctions—that 

is, sanctions mainly focused on the causative acts (in this case, arms, civil avia

-

tion, and diplomatic sanctions), and only secondarily on economic measures. Their 

contribution to getting Libya to cease its support of terrorism has caused them to be 
68 A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M

a model for all subsequent UN sanctions, including those on the Taliban, al-Qaeda, 

and Liberia.

Following 9/11, the Security Council became more active in countering terrorism. 

On September 28, 2001, acting under Chapter VII, it adopted UNSCR 1373, 

which reaffirmed its condemnation of the September 11 attacks and expressed its 

determination to prevent all such terrorist acts. UNSCR 1373 aims to combat 

terrorism by requiring member-states to control terrorist financing, deny terrorists 

support and safe haven, modernize law enforcement and judicial measures, share 

information with other governments, improve border and document security, assist 

in international terrorist investigations, and ratify the twelve antiterrorism conven

-

tions. The resolution also established the Counterterrorism Committee (CTC), 

which monitors the implementation of 1373 and seeks to increase national counter

-

terrorism capabilities.

The CTC had a relatively productive initial eighteen months, boosting the number 

of states ratifying all twelve antiterrorism conventions from two in 2001 to more 

than sixty and getting many states to strengthen controls on terrorist financing by 

instituting or improving regulation of financial institutions and transfers. Stimulated 

by the United Nations, many global, regional, and functional organizations, for the 

first time, placed counterterrorism on their agendas through terrorism action plans. 

In March 2003, the CTC convened a meeting of sixty international organizations 

(e.g., the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Organization of 

American States, the International Monetary Fund, the International Civil Aviation 

Organization, Interpol, the European Union, and the Association of Southeast 

Asian Nations), some regionally based and others technically specialized, in an effort 

to gain partners in the implementation effort. All sixty agreed to assist the CTC in 

implementing 1373.

This new workload and other obligations of its work program, such as review

-

ing country reports, placed strains on the CTC’s inadequate staff (six experts). 

While Security Council members quickly agreed there was a structural prob

-

lem, it took one year, until March 2004, to pass UNSCR 1535, establishing the 

Counterterrorism Executive Directorate (CTED). Now another year has gone by 

and the CTED exists mainly on paper, with only a new executive director and 

three staffers to support the work of the CTC. The momentum of the first eighteen 

months is gone. The role of the CTC as an international “hub” for coordination 

and cooperation, envisaged in the March 2003 meeting, was never realized. Instead 

of the sense of urgency that existed in 2001–02, there is a lack of attention by the 

council and bureaucratic inertia and opposition by the Secretariat.

In January 2004, following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, the Taliban collapse, 

and al-Qaeda’s dispersal, the Council revised UNSCR 1267. UNSCR 1526 focused 

on asset freezes, gave the sanctions a stronger and more global scope, and tried to 

address the complex disputes surrounding the “listing” of individuals and organiza

-

tions subject to sanctions. The resolution also restructured the 1267 Committee’s 

staff to enable it to better carry out its new mission of tracking al-Qaeda worldwide
D E T E R R I N G D E A T H A N D D E S T R U C T I O N 69

 and applying sanctions wherever necessary. Although finding al-Qaeda assets 

is increasingly difficult and internal disputes over “listing” continue, the 1267 

Committee is doing useful work in asset blockage and freezing, but it has not yet 

been effective on the travel and armaments controls mandated by UNSCR 1526.

General Assembly

As the UN organ most representative of the world body’s membership, the General 

Assembly (GA), has the potential to reinforce nonproliferation and counterter

-

rorism norms, build wide support for significant initiatives (e.g., UN General 

Assembly Resolution 59/90 on “man-portable” air defense systems), and strengthen 

the legitimacy of measures adopted in less representative bodies (e.g., UN General 

Assembly Resolution 59/80, endorsing UN Security Council Resolution 1540). But 

GA resolutions are nonbinding recommendations (unlike Security Council resolu

-

tions passed under Chapter VII), and the assembly long ago fell into the habit of 

adopting so many arms control and nonproliferation resolutions each year—many 

of them without a vote or serious debate—that the currency has become devalued 

almost beyond recovery. Its annual First Committee sessions have become a vehicle 

for scoring points and voicing pent-up frustrations rather than finding common 

ground or having a real-world impact. Therefore, while the United States sometimes 

regards the GA as an opportunity to promote its particular nonproliferation objec

-

tives, it is likely, in the absence of major reform, to view the GA most often as play

-

ing at best a marginal role, compared for example to the Security Council.

The significant work on terrorism being done in the GA has been done in its Sixth 

Committee, which has negotiated conventions related to international terrorism. 

Together with those negotiated in other venues, they collectively constitute the 

“twelve conventions,” critical elements in the still incomplete legal and political 

corpus of international law and “international norms” against terrorism.

A thirteenth antiterrorism convention—the Convention for the Suppression of 

Acts of Nuclear Terrorism—was recently completed by the Sixth Committee and 

approved unanimously by the GA on April 13, 2005. The convention will be 

opened for signature in September. It criminalizes the possession or use of a nuclear 

device or radioactive material to cause death or injury. It calls on parties to exchange 

information, ease extradition procedures, and pursue criminal prosecutions of 

individuals engaged in acts of nuclear terrorism. It has not, however, fully solved 

the dilemma of the definition of terrorism, which, after more than a decade, still 

bedevils the negotiation of a comprehensive treaty against terrorism. Many Group 

of Seventy-Seven (G-77) states, led by their Muslim members, insist that wars of 

national liberation and the ejection of “occupying forces” should be exempted from 

the terrorism constraints that apply to all other conflicts. Such a definition could 

legitimize the use of terror not just against Israel but also against coalition forces in 

Iraq. If this definitional issue can be resolved, agreement would soon be possible on 

a comprehensive treaty on terrorism.

The GA created the Terrorism Prevention Branch (TPB) in the United Nations’ 

Office of Drugs and Crime to strengthen international cooperation through tech

-
70 A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M

nical assistance. Based in Vienna, the TPB has assisted in the implementation of 

UNSCR 1373 in dozens of member-states. Besides promoting ratification and entry 

into force of the twelve conventions, TPB focuses on providing legal assistance to 

member-states, including advice on and drafts of implementing legislation needed 

in many countries to make the conventions effective.

Secretary-General and Secretariat

Public pronouncements by the UN secretary-general (SG) on questions of WMD 

proliferation and terrorism are not binding on member-states or other UN organs 

but can carry significant weight with the international community. The SG can call 

attention to particular issues and place them on the international agenda by conven

-

ing expert groups, commissioning studies, or issuing reports of his own. Since 9/11, 

the SG has used the “bully pulpit” to press member-states to give higher priority 

to terrorism, especially catastrophic terrorism. His speech on March 11, 2005, in 

Madrid was an ambitious call for action, for international cooperation, and for 

practical measures to defeat the scourge of terrorism globally.

7

 His recent report, In 

Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security, and Human Rights for All, addresses 

both the proliferation and terrorist threats.

8

The Secretariat, in accordance with the UN Charter, has played primarily a support 

and staff function. The Department for Disarmament Affairs and the Department 

of Political Affairs provide advice to the SG, support for international meet

-

ings (e.g., UNGA First Committee, Conference on Disarmament, NPT Review 

Conference), and objective information on arms control, nonproliferation, and 

terrorism to the public and member-states, which can be especially valuable to 

smaller countries.

The Secretariat has been less actively involved in terrorism issues than in prolifera

-

tion matters, reflecting the deeper international consensus on stopping prolifera

-

tion than on opposing terrorism. In general, the United States and other major 

powers have not encouraged the Secretariat to play an activist, policy-initiating role 

on proliferation or terrorism—or on most other UN issues, for that matter. The 

Secretariat is required by the Charter to staff all UN organs. While it does a cred

-

ible job of supporting the secretary-general, it has had an uneven record with the 

Security Council, which is why the major powers have not turned to it to support 

important council initiatives and have instead favored special council committees 

with staffs that are instructed by and are responsive directly to the council commit

-

tees—notably the CTC and 1540 Committee.

A little-known authority vested in the secretary-general by GA and Security Council 

resolutions is the ability to launch field investigations of alleged violations of the 

1925 Geneva Protocol (banning the use of biological and chemical weapons) or of 

the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). The SG has authorized four inves

-

tigations of the alleged use of chemical and toxin weapons: in the early 1980s in 

Southeast Asia and Afghanistan, during the 1980s Iran-Iraq war, and in 1992 in 

Mozambique and Azerbaijan.While the SG’s ability to initiate such investigations 

can help fill a void left by the absence of a verification mechanism in the BWC, 
D E T E R R I N G D E A T H A N D D E S T R U C T I O N 71

the authority as it currently stands has serious weaknesses. In particular, an accused 

country is under no obligation to accept a visit by UN investigators or to cooperate 

in other ways, and this undermined the effectiveness of the investigations launched 

in the 1980s and early 1990s. The United States supports strengthening the SG’s 

existing investigation authority by calling on BWC parties to accept investigations 

on their territory without the right of refusal.

International Atomic Energy Agency

A UN-related organization that has played, and will continue to play, a central role 

in efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism is the IAEA, the 

Vienna-based body charged with verifying nuclear nonproliferation obligations. 

Over the years, the IAEA has had major successes (e.g., discovering North Korea’s 

false declaration on plutonium holdings; eliminating and accurately evaluating the 

status of Iraq’s post-1991 nuclear program; digging out information about Iran’s 

eighteen-year, clandestine uranium enrichment effort). But it failed to detect Iraq’s 

pre-1991 nuclear program, Libya’s and Iran’s covert programs, and A. Q. Khan’s 

nuclear black market operations—failures that it shared in varying degrees with the 

world’s leading intelligence services.

The IAEA and its major members have learned from these mistakes. Handicapped 

severely in pre-1991 Iraq by its authority to inspect only declared nuclear sites, the 

agency successfully pushed for an Additional Protocol to existing safeguards agree

-

ments that requires its parties to give the agency much greater information and 

access. Just as important, instead of the overly trusting and cooperative safeguards 

culture that had previously characterized the IAEA’s approach toward the countries 

it was monitoring, the agency has in recent years adopted a more skeptical and 

aggressive attitude toward its verification tasks.

The IAEA has also adapted to the changing threat environment, especially to the 

threats posed by terrorist groups and illicit nuclear trafficking networks. Since 9/11, 

it has substantially beefed up its efforts in the area of nuclear security, including 

programs to help member-states improve their capability to protect nuclear materi

-

als and installations against theft or sabotage and to detect nuclear smuggling at 

their borders. It has been at the center of efforts to strengthen international guide

-

lines and legal instruments in the field of physical protection. It has helped develop 

and implement a code of conduct on securing radioactive sources that could be 

used in “dirty bombs.” It has worked with the United States and Russia to secure 

and repatriate U.S.- and Russian-origin highly enriched uranium from potentially 

vulnerable research reactor sites around the world. And as an outgrowth of its inves

-

tigations into the Libyan and Iranian nuclear programs, it has set up a small unit 

whose mission is to trace and help eradicate nuclear black market operations.

IAEA director general Mohamed ElBaradei has also taken the lead in calling inter

-

national attention to the loophole in the NPT that allows parties to acquire enrich

-

ment and reprocessing facilities—which are capable of producing both fuel for 

civil nuclear reactors and fissile cores for nuclear bombs—as long as such facilities 

are under IAEA safeguards. He commissioned a study that looks at alternatives to 
72 A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M

allowing additional countries to acquire sensitive nuclear facilities under national 

control, including multinational approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle.12 Recognizing 

that gaining international support for fewer proliferation-prone fuel cycle arrange

-

ments will be difficult and time-consuming and wishing to forestall the further 

spread of sensitive facilities while consideration of new arrangements is under way, 

he has proposed a five-year, worldwide moratorium on the construction of new 

enrichment and reprocessing plants.

While the IAEA has strengthened and expanded its capabilities to meet a rapidly 

evolving threat, it still faces serious impediments. To do its job effectively, it needs 

more information from member-states—information about nuclear transactions 

and procurement efforts, as well as intelligence about suspicious programs and 

activities. Its on-the-ground presence is a huge advantage, but it needs help from 

member-states on where to look. It also needs more robust verification authorities. 

The Additional Protocol is a big improvement over previous arrangements, but it 

provides far less than “anywhere, anytime” access and does not allow the agency to 

investigate weaponization activities where no nuclear material is present. Another 

handicap is resources. Breaking out of the zero-real-growth budget straightjacket 

that large donor governments had applied to all international organizations for 

many years has enabled the IAEA to devote greater resources to pressing verification 

needs. But the growth in agency missions, especially post-9/11 missions related to 

the terrorist threat, has outrun the growth in the budget. Finally, the agency and its 

board of governors need a more effective approach for dealing with hard compli

-

ance cases. Their handling of safeguards violations involving Romania, Libya, Iran, 

North Korea, and South Korea—with some violations being referred to the Security 

Council and others not—showed no consistent pattern, and this has adversely 

affected the IAEA’s credibility.

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) is a rela-

tively small UN organization based in The Hague and charged with monitoring 

compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which bans the 

development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons. The OPCW’s 

Technical Secretariat, with its director general and 180 inspectors, is responsible 

for overseeing the destruction of declared chemical weapons stocks and production 

facilities, and for monitoring industrial and military facilities to ensure that they are 

not being used for chemical weapons (CW) production or other proscribed activi

-

ties. Although budgetary shortfalls and public concerns about the safety of destruc

-

tion technologies have slowed implementation of the CWC, especially the time

-

frame for destroying U.S. and Russian CW stocks, most observers agree that the 

OPCW has done a good job on its relatively routine verification tasks—monitoring 

declared facilities and activities.

There is substantial doubt, however, about whether the OPCW is capable of detect

-

ing cheating by a determined CWC violator. Chemical weapons are relatively easy 

to manufacture and conceal. In recognition of the verification difficulties posed 

by CW, the CWC contains unprecedented inspection provisions, obligating its 
D E T E R R I N G D E A T H A N D D E S T R U C T I O N 73

parties to accept short-notice challenge inspections at any place on their territory 

where another party alleges that noncompliance is occurring. Despite suspicions 

by the United States and others that a number of CWC parties have clandestine 

CW programs, this challenge inspection procedure has never been exercised. Thus, 

unlike in the case of the IAEA, where initial NPT verification authorities were 

found wanting and strengthened, the OPCW’s most crucial verification tool has 

never been put to the test.

In assessing OPCW’s role in addressing the nonstate actor CW threat, it is impor

-

tant to keep in mind that the CWC, which was negotiated in the early 1990s and 

entered into force in 1997, focused almost exclusively on state-level activities. The 

missions assigned to OPCW at the time reflected that focus. Now that a consen

-

sus seems to be emerging that the CW threat comes primarily from terrorists 

rather than from states, urgent consideration should be given to how the OPCW’s 

missions could be adapted to address such nonstate actor threats.

World Health Organization

The World Health Organization (WHO), dedicated to improving public health 

globally, does not get involved in biological weapons issues per se. Indeed, WHO 

scientists are reluctant to get into the security side of the life sciences for fear that 

it could compromise their hard-won ability to work with and gain access to coun

-

tries where health needs are acute. Still, much of what WHO does in dealing with 

naturally occurring diseases is directly relevant to preventing and coping with biowarfare. Because there is no international body that deals specifically with the secu

-

rity dimensions of biotechnology, WHO has increasingly been called upon to play a 

significant role, consistent with its core public health mission, in addressing the BW 

threat.

WHO’s Global Outbreak Alert Response Network, established to provide an 

early detection and response capability for outbreaks of naturally occurring infec

-

tious diseases around the world, also provides a valuable mechanism for detecting, 

characterizing, responding to, and containing BW attacks. But if this network is 

to be effective in dealing with natural or man-made disease outbreaks, it must be 

strengthened considerably. Many developing countries lack adequate laboratory 

capabilities to test for diseases, and the overall global surveillance system is inad

-

equately funded.

To prevent terrorists from acquiring or making BW, it is essential to tighten restric

-

tions on who can have access to dangerous pathogens for legitimate research 

purposes and to strengthen physical security measures at facilities authorized to 

conduct such research. While the United States and others have taken such steps, 

there are currently no universally recognized biosecurity standards. Given its robust 

biosafety program, as well as the more preliminary work it has done in the areas of 

biosecurity, WHO could play a key role in crafting agreed-upon standards.

In view of rapid advances in the life sciences, especially in the area of genetic engi

-

neering, a serious concern today is that unbridled research could result in deliberate 
74 A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M

or even accidental creation of new or more lethal biowarfare agents. To minimize 

these risks, there should be international oversight mechanisms or procedures to 

review, approve, and monitor dual-use bioscientific research projects—especially in 

the area of genetic engineering—that have the potential to be misapplied by states 

and terrorists to offensive BW purposes. The only such mechanism currently in 

place is the WHO advisory panel that closely oversees research on smallpox at the 

two facilities in the United States and Russia authorized to retain the live small-

pox virus. WHO’s experience in this area, as well as the peer oversight procedures 

already in place in the United States and elsewhere, could be the basis for develop

-

ing international oversight standards.

Conference on Disarmament

As the multilateral negotiating body responsible for the NPT, the BWC, the CWC, 

the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and other agreements, the Conference on 

Disarmament (CD) has in the past made major contributions to arms control and 

nonproliferation. But for nearly a decade, it has produced no new agreements and 

has spent most of its time wrangling over priorities and procedural matters. Having 

grown to 65 members and 37 observers, it has become much too unwieldy to do 

serious work, especially for an institution that operates by consensus. It has become 

a debating society, not a negotiating body. Moreover, the CD remains focused 

mainly on the traditional state-to-state arms control and nonproliferation agenda 

and has been slow to take up measures addressing the nonstate actor threat. As it 

has become gridlocked, governments have begun to downgrade their participation 

in the forum. The CD, according to Kofi Annan, “faces a crisis of relevance.”

The UN’s Role to Date

The United Nations’ record in addressing the challenges of WMD proliferation 

and catastrophic terrorism is mixed. When there is consensus among the P-5, the 

Security Council can be an effective tool for stopping and frustrating proliferation 

and terrorism; witness its actions against Iraq, Libya, and Taliban-ruled Afghanistan. 

Lacking P-5 consensus, the council is immobilized, as it has been on North Korea 

and Iran, the two countries of greatest proliferation concern today.

UN negotiating organs—the CD on arms control and nonproliferation and the 

working group of the GA’s Sixth Committee on terrorism—have helped create and 

boost support for international nonproliferation agreements and counterterrorism 

conventions but have so far gridlocked on producing new multilateral nonprolifera

-

tion agreements and a definition of terrorism.

The IAEA failed to detect clandestine nuclear activities in Iraq, Iran, and Libya, but 

then strengthened its verification authorities and safeguards culture and effectively 

unraveled Iran’s eighteen-year covert enrichment effort. OPCW has performed its 

routine monitoring tasks competently but has not yet come to grips with wide

-

spread suspicions about CWC noncompliance.
D E T E R R I N G D E A T H A N D D E S T R U C T I O N 75

Although its record on both proliferation and terrorism is mixed, the United 

Nations’ role in fighting proliferation is somewhat more mature than in the case of 

counterterrorism. In part, this is because the international consensus against WMD 

proliferation formed decades ago, whereas widespread support for countering terror

-

ism emerged only after 9/11, and even now is uneven within the world community. 

As a result, the institutions for countering proliferation are for the most part already 

well established, while the institutions and methodologies in the area of counterterrorism have a long way to go.

Perhaps the most encouraging aspect of the UN record on proliferation and terror

-

ism is that key UN institutions established to deal with state-to-state issues have 

recognized that many of today’s most acute security threats come from nonstate 

actors and have begun to adapt their missions accordingly. This is most evident in 

the Security Council’s adoption of UNSCRs 1267, 1373, and 1540 and the IAEA’s 

enhanced efforts in the areas of nuclear security and illicit trafficking.

It remains to be seen, however, whether these initial steps to cope with nonstate 

actor threats will be effectively pursued. The three bodies implementing 1267, 

1373, and 1540 lack means of enforcing compliance with the resolutions’ require

-

ments. They rely on the power of persuasion and the incentive provided by offers 

to assist states in building their counterproliferation and counterterrorism capaci

-

ties. So far, even mild measures, such as “naming and shaming,” are widely seen as 

inconsistent with what most members believe should be the committees’ coopera

-

tive, consensual mode of operating.

Another critical question, in light of the growing number of countries found in 

recent years to have violated their commitments, is whether UN organizations 

and their member-states can muster the political will to enforce compliance with 

nonproliferation and counterterrorism norms and agreements. The failure so far to 

deal satisfactorily with either the North Korean or Iranian nuclear programs poses 

a fundamental challenge to the United Nations’ ability to fulfill its central goal of 

maintaining international peace and security.

Of course, it would be unfair to hold UN institutions wholly or even largely 

responsible for the threats currently posed to the international system by prolifera

-

tion and terrorism. After all, the United Nations is not much more than the sum of 

its member-states. Unless its members, especially the major powers, are prepared to 

recognize the gravity of these threats and to act together decisively to counter them, 

the dangers will only grow, regardless of what is done to strengthen UN institu

-

tions and practices. Still, the UN system at the present time clearly has significant 

shortcomings as a tool for fighting catastrophic terrorism and the proliferation of 

WMD—and reducing those shortcomings could pay real dividends for U.S. and 

international security. TASK FORCE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The U.S. strategy for preventing catastrophic terrorism and the proliferation of 

WMD involves a wide range of policies.
76 A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M

• Tightening national and multilateral controls over transfers of nuclear and other 

sensitive materials and technologies.

• Eradicating black market networks, especially the A. Q. Khan network.

• Controlling terrorist financing and denying terrorists safe havens or other suppor.

• Enhancing cooperation in interdicting illicit shipments of WMD-related materials.

• Bolstering international legal agreements, including the antiterrorism conventions, and strengthening compliance arrangements.

• Securing stocks of nuclear materials, biological pathogens, and chemical agents 

against theft or seizure by state or nonstate actors.

• Discouraging additional countries from acquiring enrichment or reprocessing 

capabilities.

• Heading off or rolling back rogue nation nuclear capabilities through diplomacy 

backed by strong pressures, including sanctions and the threat of military force.

• Strengthening U.S. intelligence capabilities and improving exchanges of information, both internally and with cooperating governments. 

• Protecting the American homeland, including by deploying missile defenses, 

upgrading air defenses, securing borders and ports, strengthening document security, and preparing to mitigate the effects of any WMD attack.

While the United States will look to the United Nations to play a significant role 

in pursuing a number of these policies, UN institutions will not be at the center 

of U.S. strategy. Some efforts will be pursued multilaterally outside the UN system, 

either through formal multilateral mechanisms (e.g., Nuclear Suppliers Group) 

or through less formal, ad hoc groups or coalitions (e.g., Proliferation Security 

Initiative, or PSI). Much will be done unilaterally, including strengthening U.S. 

intelligence, protecting the homeland, and preparing our military for counterterrorist operations. And much will be done bilaterally with our partners in Europe, Asia, 

and the Middle East.

But the United Nations’ role, even if limited, can be important. UN organizations 

have comparative advantages unavailable to the United States acting alone or even 

with coalition partners. They bring an added dimension of perceived legitimacy and 

objectivity that can help place effective pressure on reluctant countries to cooperate 

and meet their obligations. Their international authority can complement and reinforce what the United States and its partners are doing outside the UN system (e.g., 

the boost that UNSCR 1540 gives to the PSI). And the resources that UN institutions offer—funds to assist less-capable countries in building their nonproliferation 

or counterterrorism capacities, components of a global disease surveillance network, 

or weapons inspectors with on-the-ground presence—can add significantly to what 

the United States is able to provide on its own. Moreover, as we saw in Iraq and are 
D E T E R R I N G D E A T H A N D D E S T R U C T I O N 77

now seeing in Iran, issues will inevitably arise in the UN context that affect vital 

U.S. interests. The United States therefore has an important stake in the ability of 

UN organizations to function effectively in the fight against terrorism and proliferation.

On the basis of its own research, and after reviewing the reports of the High-Level 

Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change and the secretary-general, the Task Force 

offers the following recommendations.

Security Council

The council should play a more assertive role in ensuring effective verification and 

enforcement of nonproliferation obligations. The prospect of strong council action 

may serve as a deterrent to noncompliance. If the council appears paralyzed and 

unable to assume responsibility, the nonproliferation regime will unravel and threatened states will look to solutions outside the United Nations. Moreover, having 

taken important initial steps in UNSCRs 1373 and 1540 to address threats from 

nonstate actors, the council must now follow through to give those directives teeth 

and ensure that their potential is fully realized. If the Security Council fails to live 

up to its responsibilities, UN members will have to expect individual states to act 

on their own or in ad hoc coalitions or other multilateral structures to contain the 

threat.

❚ P-5 members should consult regularly on proliferation and terrorism issues. 

Frequent substantive contacts will not guarantee unanimity, but they could 

promote greater convergence in perceptions of the threat and facilitate more 

constructive engagement when difficult issues are brought before the Security 

Council.

❚ The Council as a whole should also meet regularly on proliferation and terrorism issues. It should receive closed-door briefings three or four times a year by 

the directors general of the IAEA and OPCW, the chairs of the CTC and 1540 

Committee, and other senior officials from relevant UN organizations.

❚ The United States should urge the 1540 Committee to move aggressively 

in encouraging UN members to put in place the laws and control measures 

required by UNSCR 1540. The committee should develop standards for 

evaluating states’ performance in key substantive areas (e.g., criminalization of 

proscribed activities, physical protection, export controls), establish procedures 

for identifying deficiencies and recommending improvements, and coordinate 

assistance programs to help states bring their laws and control systems up to 

acceptable standards. If countries resist recommendations for improving their 

capacities for proliferation control, the committee must have the means to 

press them to meet their obligations. Clearly, the committee cannot fulfill its 

ambitious mandate with seven experts. The IAEA and OPCW should be given 

responsibility (and adequate funding) for helping implement 1540 in their areas 

of expertise. In other areas (e.g., BW), the committee should be authorized 

additional staff. To eliminate uncertainty about the committee’s future, the 
78 A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M

Security Council should immediately authorize an indefinite extension of the 

committee’s mandate beyond April 2006.

The United States should press within the Security Council for improving the effec

-

tiveness of the UNSCR 1373’s Counterterrorism Committee. The United States 

should promote the “naming of names”—that is, the United States should push the 

Security Council to have the 1373 Committee publicly list state sponsors of terror. 

It should also list those countries failing to make adequate efforts to stanch terror

-

ism emanating from their soil and/or to share information they may possess about 

terrorist organizations and individuals.

In the realm of institutional improvements, key objectives of the Security Council 

should be fully staffing the Counterterrorism Executive Directorate as soon as 

possible, revising CTC practices so it becomes a policy oversight (not an execu

-

tive) committee, and giving the executive director full executive authority under 

the guidance of the CTC for carrying out the CTC’s approved work program. The 

provision of technical assistance to member-states should be facilitated, including by 

cooperating with other council committees charged with similar tasks. To remedy 

the current lack of common standards to measure states’ performance, the CTC and 

CTED should adopt broadly accepted standards, codes, and best practices, espe

-

cially those of intergovernmental organizations with expertise in areas relevant to 

1373 implementation. The council should also encourage CTC coordination and 

cooperation with international and regional organizations along the lines envisioned 

at the March 2003 conference of more than sixty intergovernmental organizations. ❚ The United States should take the lead in the Council to rationalize the work of 

the three Security Council committees responsible for terrorism and prolifera

-

tion under three separate resolutions (1267, 1373, and 1540). Although each 

committee has a distinct mandate, the functions of the three overlap signifi

-

cantly. With three separate committees, it is more difficult and time-consuming 

for the council to manage them effectively and harder to staff them properly. 

Among the solutions that should be explored are mandating closer coordination 

among the committees (including reducing unnecessary duplication in memberstates’ reports), combining their staffs, and combining the committees themselves. The council should also mandate a study on the advisability of setting 

up within the UN system an agency devoted to leading the work of the United 

Nations against terrorism, with a special emphasis on WMD terrorism.

❚ The United States should also take the lead in the council on steps to 

strengthen international verification authorities in the nonproliferation field. 

The Security Council should adopt the following resolution: If the IAEA board 

of governors or the OPCW executive council decides that the IAEA or OPCW 

Technical Secretariat, respectively, is unable with existing authorities to resolve 

whether a particular country is in compliance, the council will meet imme

-

diately with a view to providing authorization, under Chapter VII, to utilize 

much more extensive, supplementary verification methods (e.g., comparable 

to those authorized for use in Iraq by UNSCR 1441). The council should also 
D E T E R R I N G D E A T H A N D D E S T R U C T I O N 79

strengthen the UN secretary-general’s existing authority to initiate field inves-

tigations of alleged violations of the Geneva Protocol or BWC by making it 

mandatory for states to grant prompt access and provide full cooperation.

❚ To carry out the more robust supplementary verification activities in the 

nuclear and chemical fields that may be authorized by the Security Council, the 

IAEA and OPCW should be prepared to make available on short notice inspec

-

tors who are specially trained in more rigorous verification methods. In the 

biological weapons area, where no comparable verification organization exists, 

the council should establish and train a roster of specialists who would be avail

-

able immediately in the event that the council or secretary-general (under his 

authority to initiate CW or BW investigations) activated them. The roster 

would consist of experts who would be activated by the UN only if and when 

needed.

❚ The United States should support a council instruction to UNMOVIC and 

the IAEA to document and archive information on the investigation of Iraqi 

WMD programs begun in 1991, with a mandate to complete the task within 

six months. A final report should not be written; the issue has received enough 

broad-level scrutiny. But it would be useful nonetheless to catalogue, in the form 

of a manual or compendium of technical information, methodologies developed 

in the course of the Iraq experience for future reference by any other missions 

that may undertake intrusive inspections at the direction of the Security Council. 

In carrying out this task, UNMOVIC and the IAEA should draw on the work 

of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) and consult closely with ISG officials. After this 

task is completed, the Council should disband UNMOVIC.

❚ On the critical subject of the nuclear fuel cycle and the Nuclear 

Nonproliferation Treaty, the United States should continue to promote the 

Bush administration’s initiative to prevent the acquisition of uranium enrich

-

ment and plutonium reprocessing facilities by additional countries. It should 

also consider what steps by the Security Council might enhance the prospects of 

this initiative, including a resolution calling for a continuation of the one-year 

moratorium on transfers of enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technol

-

ogy adopted at the June 2004 G-8 Sea Island Summit meeting and possibly also 

for a fixed-duration moratorium on the construction of new facilities in all coun

-

tries. Depending on the length of any such measures, they could create shortterm leverage against potential proliferators without leading to a shortage in reac

-

tor fuel supplies, given the adequacy of existing enrichment capacity and enriched 

uranium stocks worldwide. (See also the IAEA section below regarding assurances 

of fuel supply; such assurances might help persuade states forgoing indigenous 

fuel-cycle capabilities that they would have reliable access to reactor fuel.)

❚ The United States should encourage the Security Council to strengthen legal 

authorities to interdict illicit WMD-related shipments and disrupt illicit 

WMD-related networks. In October 2005, members of the UN’s International 

Maritime Organization are expected to adopt a protocol to the 1988 agreement 
80 A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M

on Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 

that would give flag states a clear legal basis to board ships if they are suspected 

of carrying WMD or related materials. Building on that anticipated outcome, 

the council should consider what additional steps to take, including authoriza

-

tion for controls on finances for illicit proliferation networks (analogous to 

steps already taken to disrupt terrorist-related financial operations) and expan

-

sion of international law to permit interdiction of illicit WMD shipments on 

the high seas.

❚ The United States should urge Security Council action to discourage and 

impede unjustified use of the NPT’s withdrawal provision, which allows a party 

to leave the treaty after 90 days if it asserts that remaining in the treaty would 

jeopardize its supreme interests. Various approaches should be considered, 

including a council decision that (a) withdrawing states will be held account

-

able for any violations committed while in the treaty, (b) withdrawal will trigger 

immediate council consideration of the implications for international peace and 

security and imposition of enhanced verification measures in the withdrawing 

state, or (c) withdrawing states must forfeit the right to retain nuclear facilities 

or materials imported while party to the treaty and perhaps also the right to 

import additional nuclear equipment and technology.

❚ The Security Council should develop a menu of penalties that would be avail-

able for future council consideration in individual cases of violations. This 

could expedite adoption of sanctions when they may be warranted and thus 

enhance deterrence against violations of nonproliferation obligations. Based 

on the Council’s experience with “targeted” sanctions in the case of Libya (as 

well as the desirability from a humanitarian standpoint of limiting collateral 

effects), the menu would seek to focus tightly the impact of the penalties and 

relate them where possible to the nature of the causative acts. A wide range of 

measures should be considered, including “naming and shaming” and restrict

-

ing the rights and privileges of members states in UN organizations (e.g., 

participating and voting in UN committees and commissions or in the IAEA 

board). In addition to developing a menu of possible penalties, the council 

should prescribe some sanctions that would be imposed automatically in speci

-

fied circumstances—for example, suspension of nuclear cooperation with coun

-

tries found to be in noncompliance with their safeguards agreements (or coun

-

tries under investigation for safeguards violations). While the credible threat of 

council-imposed sanctions can help deter violations of nonproliferation obliga

-

tions, it is also important for the United States and other P-5 members to make 

clear that punitive steps by member-states outside the UN context may at times 

be justified if lack of P-5 consensus precludes collective action in the name of 

the council.

General Assembly

❚ The GA should move expeditiously to adopt a definition of terrorism along 

the lines recommended by the High-Level Panel and endorsed by the secre

-

tary-general. On the basis of that definition, the GA should proceed as soon 

as possible to conclude a comprehensive convention on terrorism. The defi

-
D E T E R R I N G D E A T H A N D D E S T R U C T I O N 81

nition of terrorism should cover the actions of individuals or irregular organiza-

tions, rather than armies, because the latter are bound by the rules of war and 

need not be covered by additional language prohibiting terrorism. Although 

international consensus on the basis of the formulation contained in the HighLevel Panel recommendation would be a major step forward, the definition of 

terrorism should ideally also cover acts of violence against noncombatant military 

units—for example, those deployed to a given country as part of a UN-autho-

rized peacekeeping force or those present on foreign soil only to provide training 

or offer logistics support.

❚ The Terrorism Prevention Branch of the UN Office of Drugs and Crime 

should be encouraged to intensify its efforts to promote wide adherence to the 

international conventions on terrorism, especially the new Convention for the 

Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, and to provide member-states legal 

advice on domestic implementing legislation necessary to make those conven-

tions effective.

International Atomic Energy Agency

If the IAEA is to be an effective instrument for preventing nuclear proliferation and 

nuclear terrorism, it must continue to take a more dogged, probing approach to 

safeguards and increase its focus on threats from nonstate actors. The agency’s effec

-

tiveness will also depend on its reputation for professionalism and objectivity, and 

that will require the director general and staff to adhere closely to their essentially 

technical mandate. But success will not depend only on the actions of the agency. 

The IAEA can be only as effective as the support it gets from its members—in 

terms of the authorities, information, and resources they are prepared to entrust to 

the agency—and the support it gets from the Security Council—in terms of prompt

attention to cases of noncompliance the IAEA refers to it. ❚ The United States should continue pressing for establishment of a committee 

of the IAEA board to review the agency’s role in monitoring and promoting 

compliance with nuclear nonproliferation obligations. The committee should 

examine how existing verification authorities, under comprehensive safeguards 

agreements and the Additional Protocol, can be fully exploited. The committee 

should recommend ways of strengthening those authorities, including giving 

agency inspectors a mandate to investigate weaponization activities and requir

-

ing states to provide the agency more complete information on nuclear exports 

and imports. The committee should also develop guidelines for dealing with 

questions of compliance with safeguards agreements—guidelines that distin

-

guish between the director general’s largely technical function of reporting all 

safeguards infractions to the board of governors and the board’s political func

-

tion of deciding when to refer noncompliance to the UN Security Council. The 

committee should report its findings and recommendations to the board of 

governors within a year.
82 A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M

❚ The IAEA and its board should strongly promote ratification and rigorous 

enforcement of the Additional Protocol. Nuclear Suppliers Group members 

can assist in this effort by adopting a guideline that makes adherence to the 

Additional Protocol by recipient states a condition for nuclear cooperation.

IAEA board members should urge that the agency’s relatively new function of 

investigating nuclear trafficking networks be expanded, both as a means of moni

-

toring members’ compliance with their safeguards agreements and as a contribu

-

tion to stopping such networks from providing sensitive equipment or technology 

to terrorist groups.

❚ The United States and other board members must strongly encourage 

the IAEA to assign higher priority to nuclear security. The agency should 

promote wide adherence to and effective implementation of relevant interna

-

tional legal instruments, including the Code of Conduct on the Safety and 

Security of Radioactive Sources and the Convention on the Physical Protection 

of Nuclear Materials, which will be amended and strengthened at a July 2005 

conference convened by the agency. It should also greatly expand its advisory 

and training efforts, especially its International Physical Protection Advisory 

Service (IPPAS) missions and its training programs for customs, border security, 

and other nuclear security officials. In an important new role for the agency, it 

should become a partner with the Security Council’s 1540 Committee in the 

area of nuclear security, assuming responsibility for establishing the physical 

protection guidelines to be used by the committee, evaluating states’ physi

-

cal protection programs, recommending improvements, and coordinating 

assistance. Funding for the agency’s nuclear security efforts has increased since 

9/11, but is mainly based on voluntary contributions and is far short of what is 

needed. The United States should support putting nuclear security in the regu

-

lar IAEA budget and substantially increasing funding levels.

❚ To support international efforts to discourage the spread of enrichment and 

reprocessing facilities under national control, the IAEA and its board should 

examine means of assuring countries that renounce the right to possess 

their own enrichment and reprocessing capabilities that they will have reli

-

able access to nuclear reactor fuel supplies. Given its reputation as an honest 

broker and provisions in its charter that anticipate a possible role in fuel 

supply, the IAEA could help identify and obtain an alternative source of 

supply in the event that a country’s existing fuel supplies were cut off for 

reasons unrelated to its compliance with its nonproliferation obligations.

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

The missions of OPCW and its Technical Secretariat should be adjusted to deal 

more heavily with the nonstate actor chemical weapons threat. Since manpower 

is already stretched thin trying to cope with OPCW’s existing mandate, this will 

require a substantial increase in resources for the organization.
D E T E R R I N G D E A T H A N D D E S T R U C T I O N 83

❚ OPCW should become a partner of the 1540 Committee to help it implement 

UNSCR 1540’s requirements in the chemical area, as in the case of the IAEA 

for nuclear issues. Drawing on its experience helping CWC parties prepare the 

domestic implementing legislation required by the CWC, OPCW should take 

the lead in assisting the 1540 Committee to establish international standards 

for legislation criminalizing CW-related activities by nonstate actors. It should 

assist the committee in the areas of physical protection, assessing the adequacy 

of security and accountancy measures at declared chemical weapons storage 

depots, and developing international standards for protecting chemical industry 

plants against theft or sabotage. With respect to the reports, countries are called 

upon to submit under UNSCR 1540, the OPCW would assist in evaluating 

performance, suggesting improvements, and coordinating assistance efforts.

❚ The United States and other CWC parties should request OPCW’s Technical 

Secretariat to examine the potential for state and nonstate actors to use 

new technologies, such as microreactors and novel chemical agents, for CW 

purposes and make recommendations on whether and how the CWC regime 

can be modified to keep up with the evolving CW proliferation threat.

World Health Organization and a Possible New Agency

WHO’s expertise and global reach are critical to the fight against bioterrorism. 

However, there is a serious risk that involving WHO too heavily in security matters 

could compromise its vital civilian public health mission. Accordingly, while WHO 

should be asked to strengthen its existing public health capabilities that are also 

relevant to reducing the biowarfare threat, consideration should urgently be given to 

establishing a new UN organization responsible for dealing with BW issues.

❚ WHO should undertake a major upgrading of its existing global disease surveillance and response network. The United States should be prepared to take the 

lead in persuading other donor governments to commit the additional resources 

required. Informal arrangements should be worked out so that in the event of a 

suspicious disease outbreak that seemed to be the result of intentional BW use, 

WHO could immediately notify the new UN biological warfare organization 

and the UN secretary-general, who would be in a position to dispatch 

biowarfare experts from the standby BW verification mechanism to assist WHO 

in its investigation.

❚ The new UN organization responsible for countering the biowarfare threat 

would work with the 1540 Committee and relevant international health organizations, including WHO, to develop common international biosecurity standards for ensuring that only bona fide scientists have access to dangerous pathogens and ensuring that facilities engaged in legitimate research with dangerous 

pathogens have adequate physical security measures in place. This will build on 

the work that WHO has already done in the area of biosafety and biosecurity.
84 A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M ❚ The new biowarfare organization should also work with WHO and other international scientific organizations to develop international guidelines or standards 

for reviewing, approving, and monitoring dual-use bioscientific research proj

-

ects, particularly in the area of genetic engineering, that could produce results 

that could be applied by states or terrorist groups to offensive BW purposes. In 

developing such standards, the new organization could draw initially on WHO’s 

experience with its smallpox advisory committee and could collaborate with 

such organizations as the International Union of Microbiological Societies and 

the InterAcademy Forum.

❚ In addition to its other responsibilities, the new UN organization could be 

responsible for training and administering a roster of BW specialists (see recom

-

mendation above) who would be available immediately to carry out field inves

-

tigations or other activities in the event that the Security Council or the secre

-

tary-general activated them.

Conference on Disarmament

The CD has outlived its usefulness and should be disbanded. Instead of having 

a single multilateral negotiating body take its place, the Security Council should, 

as the need arises, set up ad hoc bodies of manageable size to take on discrete, 

narrowly defined tasks, such as negotiating a treaty banning further production 

of fissile materials or developing common international standards for biosecurity. 

Participation in these ad hoc groups (both in terms of countries and international 

organizations) would vary from group to group, depending on the subject matter 

under consideration. Given the greater focus today on threats from nonstate actors, 

the tasks mandated by the Security Council are likely to range more widely than the 

items traditionally handled by the CD. CONCLUSIONS

Terrorism and the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons are 

twentieth century threats that have come together in the twenty-first century to 

create the world’s worst nightmare. They have become the most acute security chal

-

lenge facing the United States and the international community. Sometimes the 

measures needed to counter these twin dangers are the same or similar, and some

-

times they are distinct. But one thing these threats certainly have in common is 

that no single country can overcome them by itself. Countering proliferation and 

terrorism effectively is simply impossible without broad international cooperation. 

Although such cooperation will at times be pursued most efficiently and appropri

-

ately outside the UN system—through unilateral actions or ad hoc or more formal 

coalitions—the United Nations and related organizations will often be very useful, 

given the wide scope of their membership and the special authorities and capabili

-

ties at their disposal.

But if the United States is to look to the United Nations to play a major role 

in what has become the number one U.S. national security priority, the United 

Nations must prove that it can deliver—and that will require substantial improve

-

ments in UN institutions and practices. Fortunately, in recent years, we have seen a 
D E T E R R I N G D E A T H A N D D E S T R U C T I O N 85

growing recognition in UN organs that the international security environment has 

changed and that we must now focus as much attention on nonstate actors as on 

states. Moreover, there now seems to be much greater appreciation that terrorism is 

neither just a domestic concern nor a legitimate instrument of policy, but a fundamental challenge to the entire international system with no valid justification. Just 

as important, we have also seen a willingness to adapt UN institutions, at least some 

of them, to address today’s evolving threats.

There is a long way to go, however, between recognizing changing realities and 

putting in place effective organizations and practices to cope with them. Compared 

to counterproliferation, counterterrorism has a longer way to go, largely because the 

world woke up to the threat of catastrophic terrorism only after 9/11. Some states 

have dragged their feet on an acceptable definition of terrorism, and the institutional mechanisms needed to deal with the threat essentially had to be built from 

scratch, and indeed are still being built.

But in the area of proliferation as well, some UN-related mechanisms have yet to 

prove themselves, and others must be substantially strengthened, especially mechanisms for monitoring and enforcing compliance with international nonproliferation 

obligations. The cases of North Korea and Iran are critical tests for the UN system. 

President Bush and other world leaders have said that a North Korea or Iran with 

nuclear weapons would be intolerable. But if the international community is to have 

options other than tolerating the intolerable or using military force, the Security 

Council and particularly its permanent members must demonstrate that they truly 

regard the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction as a grave 

threat to international peace and security and they are prepared to act accordingly.

In the end, of course, it is not just a question of whether the United Nations and 

related organizations will adopt the necessary institutional and procedural reforms 

to make them more reliable tools for preventing catastrophic terrorism and the 

proliferation of WMD—although such reform is certainly critical. The more fundamental question is whether the United States and other member-states are prepared 

to summon the political will to work together and use those tools effectively. If the 

members fail to work together effectively, the pressures on the United States and 

other responsible governments to protect themselves by acting independently of the 

United Nations will become enormous.

NOTES

1. Jeffrey Kluger, “Osama’s Nuclear Quest,” Time, November 12, 2001, 38.

2. Kamran Khan and Molly Moore, “Two Nuclear Experts Briefed Bin Laden, Pakistanis Say,” 

Washington Post, December 12, 2001, A1.

3. Anthony Loyd, “Bin Laden’s Nuclear Secrets Found,” The Times of London, November 15, 2001.

4. National Intelligence Council, “Annual Report to Congress on the Safety and Security of Russian 

Nuclear Facilities and Military Forces,” December 2004. Online. Available: www.nti.org/e_

research/official_docs/cia/cia123104.pdf. (Accessed April 6, 2005).

5. “Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD” (Duelfer Report), 

September 30, 2004. Online. Available: www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd_2004/. (Accessed 

April 28, 2005).
86 A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M

6. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, “A Global Strategy for Fighting Terrorism,” March 10, 2005. 

Online. Available: www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp. (Accessed March 10, 2005).

7. United Nations, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security, and Human Rights for All. 

Report of the Secretary-General, A/59/2005 (March 21, 2005).

8. International Atomic Energy Agency, “Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle.” Expert 

Group Report for the Director-General, INFCIRC/640 (February 22, 2005). Online. Available: 

www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2005/infcirc640.pdf. (Accessed April 14, 2005). 
5 

War and Peace:

Preventing and

Ending Conflicts
88 A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M INTRODUCTION

There is a broad range of policy and operational issues that impact the role of the 

United Nations in “preventing and ending conflict and building stable societies.” 

In this chapter, the Task Force addresses three key issues that relate to capacity 

and effectiveness in this critical area: (1) United Nations peace operations, (2) the 

United Nations’ role in conflict mediation and postconflict peacebuilding, and (3) 

the role of international sanctions in addressing issues of conflict. There are also 

crucially important legal, policy, and operational issues relating to the use of force 

to prevent or end conflicts and quell large-scale abuses of human rights, but those 

issues are addressed in other parts of this Task Force report.

This chapter examines each of the three sets of issues described above, identifying 

and assessing obstacles to progress, assessing proposals for reform, and providing 

recommendations for action.

To examine an ongoing UN operation that illustrates many of the most compel

-

ling challenges relating to preventing conflict and building stable societies, the Task 

Force traveled to Haiti during March 13–17, 2005. What follows are the findings 

from that trip that are relevant to the broad themes of this assessment. UNITED NATIONS PEACE OPERATIONS

United Nations peacekeeping is the most resource-intensive, visible, and, arguably, 

most important UN activity designed to prevent and end conflict and build stable 

societies. While there have been many successful peacekeeping missions over the 

years, current efforts are bedeviled by both limited capacity and operational chal

-

lenges. In addition, the credibility of UN peacekeeping has been badly damaged 

by revelations of sexual exploitation and abuse in the UN operations in the Congo 

and elsewhere. Task Force members are deeply concerned by these revelations and 

believe that any overall reform effort must include an effective plan and systemwide 

commitment to end abuses and ensure accountability.

The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping

Over the course of the past two decades, the United Nations has experienced major 

growth and transformation in peacekeeping activities, particularly with the trans

-

formation of “traditional” UN peacekeeping and the assumption by the United 

Nations of broad responsibilities relating to peace stabilization and reconstruction 

in societies emerging from conflict. Between 1948 and 1990, the United Nations 

initiated some eighteen peacekeeping operations. Most were authorized by the 

Security Council implicitly under Article VI (Pacific Settlement of Disputes) and 

were assigned the relatively narrow tasks of monitoring ceasefires and border disen

-

gagement agreements between states that had grown weary of armed conflict, were 

prepared to agree to an armistice or even a peace agreement, but were deeply suspi

-

cious of the intentions of their opponents.

1

 The simple presence of an impartial, 

lightly armed, internationally recognized force to ensure observance of agreements 

and investigate and report on violations—but prepared to use force solely in selfdefense—could help to build the confidence necessary among the parties to sustain 

a fragile peace.

2
WA R A N D P E A C E : P R E V E N T I N G A N D E N D I N G C O N F L I C T S 89

Beginning nearly two decades ago, both the magnitude and scope of peacekeeping 

began to expand dramatically,

3 and while the pace of activity slowed considerably 

in the mid-1990s, that appears to have represented only a temporary lull. Between 

1990 and today, the Security Council, with the support of the United States, has 

initiated more than forty peacekeeping operations. As of late March 2005, there 

were nearly 70,000 international military and police forces serving in seventeen UN 

peacekeeping missions, and the approved budget for the period ending June 30, 

2005, stood at nearly $4 billion (and was likely to rise significantly for 2005–06).

More significant than the magnitude of these missions has been their breadth of 

focus and complexity, and the expectations that have accompanied the UN pres

-

ence. UN peacekeepers and their civilian counterparts have been asked, in essence, 

to help remake societies coming out of internal conflict—to help negotiate peace 

agreements, reform security sectors, promote political reconciliation and effective 

and democratic governance, and rebuild systems of justice. This more intrusive, 

multidimensional involvement was characteristic of UN missions in Namibia, 

Cambodia, Central America, Haiti, West Africa, and the Balkans, where the chal

-

lenges of rebuilding failed or failing state institutions have been formidable. These 

missions, generally termed “peace operations” to reflect their breadth and complex

-

ity, have also come with far more challenging and complicated security environ

-

ments than traditional peacekeeping deployments. In the absence of indigenous 

capacity, UN military and police have been asked to ensure public security in post

-

conflict environments, deter and respond to threats of violence, and mentor and 

train local security forces.

The Contemporary Record

The recent report of the secretary-general’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, 

and Change

4

 identifies a correlation between the increased involvement of the United 

Nations in addressing civil conflict and an overall decline in civil wars since the early 

1990s. And indeed, many UN peace operations, or UN civilian missions supported 

by “coalitions of the willing” under national or regional command—from Namibia 

to Sierra Leone, Cambodia to East Timor, and Macedonia to Kosovo—have helped 

to provide stability and to promote political and economic development.

Nonetheless, there have also been tragic failures. In some cases, such as Sierra Leone 

and East Timor, progress in strengthening missions came only after rebels effectively 

challenged peace agreements and peacekeepers, and local inhabitants were subjected 

to vicious attacks resulting in large-scale loss of life. Moreover, mass killings in 

Rwanda and Srebenica took place notwithstanding the presence of UN peacekeep

-

ers. The causes of these two disastrous chapters in the history of UN peacekeeping 

have been described in detail elsewhere.

5

 But in both cases, local populations had 

legitimate expectations of protection, while key UN member states were unprepared 

to assist or equip peacekeepers to address threats to civilians.

Recognizing the New Realities

Today, UN member governments appreciate that UN peacekeepers often need 

very robust capabilities to defend themselves, the mandate of their missions, and 

civilians in their areas of operations. This requirement was recognized in the 2000 
90 A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M

report of the secretary-general’s Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (here-

after, the Brahimi Report). At the same time, the panel emphasized “that consent 

of the local parties, impartiality and the use of force only in self-defense should 

remain the bedrock principles of peacekeeping.”

6

 And even when it went beyond 

these “bedrock principles,” the panel suggested that more robust capabilities would 

be needed to “defend” the mandate in response to would-be spoilers, rather than to 

pursue affirmatively broad-based security objectives through the use of force.

However compelling the theory and logic of this position of use of force as the 

exception to the rule, it bears less and less resemblance to what member states are 

actually asking of peacekeeping forces on a regular basis. In the case of the current 

UN deployment in Haiti, where the mission is expected “to ensure a secure and 

stable environment within which the constitutional and political process in Haiti 

can take place,”

7 the Haitian National Police (HNP) is the only formal indigenous 

institution with an internal security mandate. The HNP is widely regarded by 

Haitians as corrupt and brutal in its methods, ineffective as a law enforcement 

entity, and unable to operate with success against armed elements of the exmilitary or gangs associated with the former president. As a result, for peacekeepers 

and international civilian police, ensuring a secure and stable environment requires 

authority and willingness to launch attacks on police outposts being occupied by 

armed opposition elements, conduct security sweeps throughout Port-au-Prince 

neighborhoods engulfed in violence and criminality, and take on responsibilities for 

security sector reform.

The Bush administration has endorsed this robust security role for peacekeepers 

in Haiti, as it has also supported robust mandates elsewhere in recent years, from 

Liberia to Burundi to the Congo.

8

Peace Operations and U.S. National Interests

This approach has coincided with administration statements and policies in recent 

years indicating its general view that “failed states matter”—that poverty, 

political instability, and the absence of effective and accountable government abroad 

can create serious threats to U.S. interests at home. This perspective was clearly 

informed by the terrorist attack on the United States on September 11, 2001, and 

reflects recognition that the political chaos into which Afghanistan descended after 

1989 created a fertile environment for the emergence of the Taliban and a base of 

operations for al-Qaeda.

9

In the case of Haiti, administration officials identified important U.S. interests, 

noting that increased instability could create substantial pressures for outmigration and large-scale refugee flows. They also expressed concern about Haiti’s 

role as a transit point for narcotics traffickers in the Western Hemisphere and about 

risks of criminal domination of the Haitian economy. These factors almost certainly 

informed the decision to deploy U.S. troops to the country in 2004.

The key question for the Task Force in the area of UN peacekeeping is whether we 

are prepared to endorse the current practice of the United States and other members 
WA R A N D P E A C E : P R E V E N T I N G A N D E N D I N G C O N F L I C T S 91

of the Security Council in demanding that peacekeepers regularly engage in a broad 

range of robust security activities. If so, then the United States and other govern

-

ments must do much more to enhance capacities if we wish to ensure substantial 

success. The Task Force believes that the practical alternatives—to consign the 

United Nations to future failures, or to dramatically reduce the United Nations’ role 

in efforts to manage conflict and build stable societies—are unacceptable.

Areas for Enhancement

Since the early 1990s, the United Nations in general, and the Department of 

Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in particular, has implemented a series of 

improvements that has put the organization in a better position to meet contem

-

porary challenges. But despite important progress in recent years, we are concerned 

about several impediments to effective implementation of operations in the new and 

more challenging environments. These impediments involve both operational and 

structural issues, as well as issues of professionalism among peacekeepers.10

Doctrine, planning, and strategic guidance for mission deployment. In Haiti, the 

delegation was told that some nine months after the formal start of the mission, 

there was still no mission implementation plan. This created considerable uncer

-

tainty, especially with respect to the various roles and responsibilities among the 

more than 6,000 peacekeeping troops, as well as the more than 1,400 international 

civilian police. This absence of strategic guidance reflects not only a problem within 

the mission, but also deficiencies in the general development of common doctrine, 

which would identify roles, missions, and force employment principles to address 

the contemporary challenges faced by peacekeepers. These problems in Haiti also 

appear to reflect deficiencies in strategic and tactical planning within the UN 

Secretariat.

Pursuant to an earlier reform effort, the United Nations instituted integrated 

mission Task Forces, essentially interdepartmental working groups pulled together 

to coordinate activities relating to a particular field operation. Unfortunately, while 

useful as clearinghouses for information, these entities have not proven to be highly 

successful as interdepartmental planning and decision-making processes, and a 

number of experts have encouraged sharpened efforts in this area. For example, 

the Stimson Center has urged that the Integrated Mission Task Force structure be 

augmented by a senior-level mission strategy group that would bring together field 

and headquarters leadership prior to missions to plan strategy and implementation.

In the area of peacekeeping doctrine, member states have been reluctant even to 

support formally the Brahimi Panel’s endorsement of “robust” peacekeeping forces 

to meet new security challenges in peace operations, let alone consider broad 

doctrine recognizing the need for enhanced capabilities in this area.11

Rapid deployment. The Brahimi Report identified rapid deployment of troops 

as a key objective12 and also called for enhancements in capacity to deploy inter

-

national civilian police and rule of law specialists as well as other civilian special

-

ists for multidimensional operations. In recent years, there has been progress in 
92 A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M

many of these areas, such as use of new procedures to make UN monies avail-

able for planning missions before they are mandated; some enhancement of the 

UN Stand-By Arrangements system, by which member states make known to the 

organization the capabilities they may be willing to contribute in support of UN 

operations; and enhancement of strategic deployment stocks at the UN Logistics 

Base in Brindisi. But as demonstrated by very slow deployment of the mission to 

Haiti, the requirements in each of these areas continue to outstrip the resources and 

capacity to respond. A number of these issues were addressed in the report of the 

secretary-general’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, as well 

as in the subsequent report of the secretary-general, “In Larger Freedom: Toward 

Development, Security and Human Rights for All.” Both reports urged further 

improvements and suggested that, in some cases, regional peacekeeping operations 

be supported through assessed contributions to the United Nations.

There have also been regional efforts, by the African Union and others, to increase 

the supply of available peacekeepers worldwide. In June 2004, the United States 

announced the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) at the G-8 Summit in 

Sea Island, Georgia. This initiative, focused primarily (though not exclusively) on 

African countries, is designed to assist governments in Africa and other regions to 

substantially increase worldwide capability for peace stabilization. As announced 

at the summit, the goal was to train and equip 75,000 troops by 2010, as well as 

enhance related national capabilities and international coordination. The adminis

-

tration told the Task Force that it is providing $100 million toward this initiative in 

2005.

Absence of developed country involvement in blue-helmeted operations. In Haiti, 

only 3.5 percent of the military staff and contingents are from the developed world, 

and these numbers are similar to figures worldwide. One senior DPKO official told 

the delegation that of the nearly 70,000 peacekeepers worldwide, the twenty-five 

countries of the European Union make up only 6.7 percent of the total. They make 

up only 2.3 percent of some 55,000 peacekeepers in Africa.13 Since the mid-1990s, 

the United States has essentially adopted a policy of noninvolvement of its mili

-

tary units in UN peace operations,14 though a very small number of U.S. military 

observers and staff officers have joined them on occasion.15

UN officials maintain that the involvement of more developed-country troops, with 

their enhanced capabilities, is important to send a strong message of resolve to spoil

-

ers and to fill important implementation gaps, especially in areas such as transport, 

logistics, communications, and intelligence. The High-Level Panel called upon 

developed states to transform their capabilities in the post–Cold War environment 

to permit greater participation in peacekeeping activities. A very senior Haitian 

government official put it in much simpler terms for the delegation when he said 

that, in lieu of the thousands of UN soldiers in Haiti, the country would need 

only fifty U.S. troops, along with some vehicles, to maintain security. While he was 

certainly overstating the case, the delegation heard sentiments from other experts 

about both the symbolic and deterrent value of some U.S. military presence in the 

country.
WA R A N D P E A C E : P R E V E N T I N G A N D E N D I N G C O N F L I C T S 93

Despite the very limited involvement of the U.S. military in peace operations, the 

U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has recognized the increasing importance of 

peace stabilization activities. For example, DOD is deeply involved in the admin

-

istration’s GPOI, and DOD officials have focused considerable attention in recent 

months on enhancing capabilities to coordinate on stabilization issues with civilian 

counterparts, as well as with nongovernmental, regional, and international organiza

-

tions.

Information analysis and early warning. In recent years, the UN Secretariat 

has implemented a range of measures to enhance access to information, including 

development of the DPKO’s Situation Center and Best Practices Unit; the United 

Nations’ “ReliefWeb” website, which provides a clearinghouse for information on 

humanitarian issues; and a range of other informal networks. Nonetheless, “the 

United Nations still has no single, co-located team dedicated to managing informa

-

tion, tracking multiple crisis and conflict trends, recommending preventive action 

based on those trends, or anticipating global UN requirements for either peacekeep-

ing or peacebuilding.”16

Enhancing capacity at headquarters is only part of the challenge. UN peacekeep-

ing missions must have access to detailed and real-time information. In Haiti, the 

delegation heard repeated complaints about the limited or nonexistent resources to 

obtain information on local conditions essential to meeting the mission’s objectives. 

This limited considerably the ability of mission personnel to identify law enforce

-

ment and security threats and respond appropriately. U.S. interests are directly 

affected in this case; for example, information on gang violence, narcotics traffick

-

ing, and related issues could be critical to ensuring that the UN-supported political 

process is not hijacked by criminal enterprises masquerading as legitimate political 

organizations.

Headquarters staffing and funding for peacekeeping operations. Despite signifi-

cant enhancements, capacity to support field missions from headquarters is still 

far too limited. The United Nations deploys more “out-of-area” forces than any 

government in the world, with the exception of the United States. Yet the headquar

-

ters staff of the DPKO numbers only about 600. DPKO’s civilian police division, 

which includes about twenty professional staff, is inadequate to support the more 

than 4,000 international civilian police deployed around the world. The High-Level 

Panel recognized this deficiency and endorsed the creation of a corps of fifty to one 

hundred senior police officials to conduct assessments and assist in the start-up of 

operations.

As of early March, the annual peacekeeping budget was about $4 billion for the 

period ending June 30, 2005, and is likely to rise considerably given new require

-

ments. DPKO headquarters staff are funded from the UN peacekeeping support 

account (which can fluctuate from one year to the next) and not from the regular 

budget, creating uncertainty within the institution about DPKO’s capacity to main

-

tain basic institutional competence over time. Moreover, member states have exer

-

cised exceptional scrutiny over peacekeeping budgets; for example, with some recent 
94 A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M

exceptions, assessed contributions have not been authorized for start-up reconcili-

ation and development activities, even though voluntary funding (the traditional 

source of support for these activities) is often in short supply at the outset of new 

missions.17

Professionalism: addressing the crimes of sexual exploitation and abuse. The 

United Nations defines sexual exploitation as “any actual or attempted abuse of 

a position of vulnerability, differential power, or trust for sexual purposes, includ

-

ing, but not limited to, profiting monetarily, socially, or politically from the 

sexual exploitation of another.” Sexual abuse is defined as “actual or threatened 

physical intrusion of a sexual nature, whether by force or under unequal or 

coercive conditions.”18

Members of the Task Force are deeply concerned about reports of sexual exploitation and abuse by deployed UN peacekeepers. Although most experts believe 

this problem is evident in many peace operations, this issue became the subject 

of considerable public attention in the context of recent abuses in the Congo, 

described in an excerpt from the summary of a UN investigative report:

Media reports in early 2004 indicated the recurrence of acts of sexual exploitation and abuse 

of Congolese women and girls by United Nations peacekeepers serving with the United 

Nations Organization Mission in the Congo (MONUC) in Bunia. ... Interviews with 

Congolese women and girls confirmed that sexual contact with peacekeepers occurred with 

regularity, usually in exchange for food or small sums of money. Many of these contacts ... 

involved girls under the age of 18, with some as young as 13.19

The delegation interviewed Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein, the Jordanian 

ambassador to the United Nations, who was asked by the secretary-general to 

advise him on this issue and prepare a public report. Ambassador Zeid emphasized 

that the key to addressing this issue effectively was ending a climate of impunity. 

His recently issued report, “A Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual 

Exploitation and Abuse in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations” (hereafter, 

“Comprehensive Strategy”), indicates that there is “an extensive mosaic of provisions 

drafted at varying points in time and with varying degrees of legal force dealing 

with sexual exploitation and abuse that apply to the various categories of peacekeep

-

ing personnel.”20

The report’s description of the applicability of the secretary-general’s 2003 bulletin 

on measures to address sexual exploitation and abuse appears to reflect this sense of 

ambiguity. The report indicates that the bulletin applies only to UN staff members, 

but that civilian police and military observers agree to be bound by directives that 

summarize the provisions of the bulletin. The rules regarding military members 

of national contingents have been less clear. The model status of forces agreement 

indicates that troop-contributing countries have jurisdiction over military members 

of contingents,21 and the report states that “troop-contributing countries have over 

the years universally accepted the general standards of conduct set out in the publi

-

cations entitled Ten Rules: Code of Personal Conduct for Blue Helmets and We Are 

United Nations Peacekeepers.”22 But as a practical matter, there has been no system

-
WA R A N D P E A C E : P R E V E N T I N G A N D E N D I N G C O N F L I C T S 95

atic effort to ensure that such requirements are deemed binding by members of 

military contingents or to ensure that troops know they will be held accountable.

In summary, principal shortcomings appear to include a lack of clearly identifiable 

rules applicable to all; the absence of a systemwide commitment (including among 

member states) to investigation and, as appropriate, punishment of members of 

military contingents; the absence of local enforcement capability for investigation 

and prosecution of civilian members of UN missions;23 limitations on resources 

for effective investigations; absence of dedicated procedures and personnel at head

-

quarters and within peacekeeping missions to address issues such as mission educa

-

tion and training and interaction with local populations; and absence of redress 

or compensation for victims. Finally, without seeking in any way to excuse sexual 

exploitation and abuse, the “Comprehensive Strategy” report notes that absence of 

organized recreational activities for troops can also contribute to aberrant and unac

-

ceptable behavior.

The report’s major recommendations are that the standards and requirements of 

the secretary-general’s bulletin be made applicable to all participants in UN peace 

operations, and that troop-contributing nations formally agree that their troops will 

be bound by those standards and be subject to national disciplinary action if they 

violate those standards; that the United Nations establish a permanent criminal 

investigative capacity; that experts from troop-contributing countries be involved in 

investigations of members of military contingents, to ensure that evidence is gath

-

ered in conformity with methods that might permit host country prosecution; that 

troop-contributing countries agree to on-site courts-martial for members of military 

contingents who are believed to have committed serious offenses; that headquar

-

ters and field staff be hired to ensure intensive training of contingents, outreach 

programs, and data collection and management; that troop-contributing countries 

attempt to send regular units to peacekeeping operations, as such units seem to have 

greater discipline than units patched together for a particular operation; that UN 

missions be empowered to develop additional (and, as appropriate, more stringent) 

rules, depending on their particular situations; that increased efforts be made to 

provide organized recreational opportunities to peacekeepers; that better efforts be 

made to provide redress and compensation for victims, such as through the creation 

of a voluntary fund; that systems of managerial accountability be established; and 

that efforts be made to consider how to assist local authorities to enforce criminal 

accountability against civilian members of missions who engage in sexual exploita

-

tion and abuse. Finally, the report urges that DPKO and member states seek to 

increase the number of women peacekeepers. This final recommendation is consis

-

tent with UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000), a landmark measure that 

endorsed the urgent need to increase the involvement of women in UN activities 

relating to conflict prevention and mediation.

In late April 2005, the General Assembly Special Committee on Peacekeeping 

Operations expressed its support for the bulk of the recommendations described 

above,24 and the General Assembly’s Special Political and Decolonization 

Committee (Fourth Committee) subsequently endorsed the decisions of the Special 
96 A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M

Committee on Peacekeeping Operations.25 The challenge, however, will be in imple-

mentation, especially given significant funding requirements. Moreover, some of the 

key recommendations, such as creation of an independent capacity for investigation, 

do not seem to have been fully embraced. In the case of investigations, the Task 

Force was told that member states appear to support use of the Office of Internal 

Oversight Services (OIOS). It is, however, unclear whether OIOS is best equipped 

to collect information that might be relevant to criminal prosecutions, or to work 

jointly with member state investigators, as recommended in the “Comprehensive 

Strategy” report.

Recommendations for United Nations Peacekeeping

The United States should encourage the following reforms and enhancements. ❚ Doctrine, planning, and strategic guidance. The DPKO should develop doctrine 

that recognizes the need for capable forces in the new security environments in 

which peacekeepers are mandated by the Security Council to operate, and the 

United States should press for member state acceptance of these new realities 

and their resource implications.

More broadly, the United Nations should develop doctrine and strategy for multi

-

dimensional peace operations that thoroughly integrate the security dimension with 

economic and political development requirements. Prior to deployments, a strategic 

assessment of the crisis situation should be made to determine the full range of 

measures necessary to address effectively the causes of the crisis. Strategic mission 

plans should precede deployments and should be drafted by senior-level mission 

strategy groups brought together prior to missions. In general, the lead-nation prin

-

ciple should be used for rule-of-law measures, including police, judiciary, and penal 

systems, as well as for military training, equipping, deployment, and support. ❚ Sexual exploitation and abuse. The United Nations must quickly implement a 

policy of zero tolerance of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers. The 

United States should strongly support implementation of reform measures 

designed to ensure uniform standards for all civilian and military participants in 

peace operations; improve training programs relating to sexual exploitation and 

abuse; increase deployment of women in peacekeeping operations; encourage 

deployment of established (rather than “patched together”) units to peacekeep

-

ing operations; impose accountability of senior managers; support effective data 

collection and management; provide victims assistance; increase staff to enhance 

supervision; and organize recreational activities for peacekeepers. While these 

measures have recently been endorsed by member states, the United States 

should urge generous budgetary support for these initiatives and should also 

press for independent investigative capacity. The United States should seek to 

ensure effective programs of assistance for victims who make substantial claims, 

even when neither the victim nor the United Nations is able to obtain redress 

from the perpetrator of the abuse. Finally, states that prove unwilling or unable 

to ensure discipline among their troops should not be permitted to provide 

troops to peacekeeping missions.
WA R A N D P E A C E : P R E V E N T I N G A N D E N D I N G C O N F L I C T S 97

❚ Rapid deployment. While the Task Force does not endorse a standing UN 

military force, member states must substantially increase the availability of 

capable, designated forces, properly trained and equipped, for rapid deployment 

to peace operations on a voluntary basis. The Secretariat should enhance its 

capacity to coordinate increases in member state contributions to the Stand-By 

Arrangements system.

Currently, more than eighty governments participate in the UN Stand-By 

Arrangements system, a voluntary arrangement whereby governments express their 

willingness to make troops and other capabilities available to peace operations. But 

most governments are not in a position to deploy quickly. DPKO should prepare 

and present to member states a plan to assist governments to substantially augment 

their capabilities in this area. Such a plan will have significant implications for 

DPKO resources.

❚ U.S. support for peace operations. (1) The United States should sustain and 

strengthen its support for regional peacekeeping capacity-building, such as 

the Global Peace Operations Initiative. (2) The U.S. Department of Defense 

(DOD) should prepare policy options for U.S. support of capacity enhancements and for U.S. engagement in peace operations consistent with U.S. 

national interests.

DOD’s recent efforts to enhance coordination and capabilities relating to stability 

operations set the right tone for a plan and a program of greater U.S. support in 

this general area. For example, while the United States formally participates in the 

United Nations’ Stand-By Arrangements system, its participation is of only limited 

operational value to the United Nations—as it provides only a very general list 

of U.S. capabilities with little indication of what precisely might be forthcoming. 

More than fifty governments, including the United Kingdom, Australia, and many 

other U.S. allies, provide more detailed information about the support they might 

consider, and the United States should consider upgrading its participation in this 

voluntary program.

❚ Information analysis and early warning. Member states should create a single, 

co-located team committed to tracking and identifying conflict trends and 

anticipating requirements for peacekeeping or peacebuilding.26 DPKO should 

identify, and member states should generate, resources required to ensure that 

all peacekeeping missions have information-gathering capacity to ensure operational success.

❚ Headquarters staffing and funding for peacekeeping operations. The United 

States should support (1) the creation of a senior police force management unit 

to conduct assessments and assist in the establishment of new peace operations; 

(2) assessed funding for first-year, quick-impact projects in peace operations, as 

well as the full range of early disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration 

assistance when those have been identified in premission assessments as critical 

for success; and (3) the adoption of two-year budgets for support of peacekeep-
98 A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M

ing to ensure greater stability, permit more careful planning, and reduce admin-

istrative burdens.

❚ Organization of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. As noted in the 

chapter on UN integrity, accountability, transparency, and effectiveness, the 

Task Force believes that DPKO effectiveness would be greatly enhanced if the 

department operated as a more independent program.

UN ROLE AND CAPACITY IN CONFLICT MEDIATION AND PEACEBUILDING

Contemporary peacekeeping deployments are designed to sustain security neces-

sary to permit political reconciliation and economic development. The likelihood of 

such reconciliation and development is often affected by two critical elements: first, 

the quality and character of conflict mediation and resolution efforts of parties to 

the conflict acting with the cooperation of regional and international organizations; 

and second, the coherence and timeliness of postconflict peacebuilding activities 

relating to rule of law, political reconciliation and constitutional development, and 

to economic recovery and reconstruction.

In the case of Haiti, the last of a series of UN missions, the International Civilian 

Support Mission in Haiti (MICAH) departed the country in 2001, largely in 

frustration about the level of Haitian government cooperation.27 In the period 

leading to the crisis of 2004 resulting in the departure of President Aristide, the 

Organization of American States and the Caribbean Community were involved in 

efforts to end the various impasses in Haiti; but the impact was modest, at best,28

and neither the Security Council nor the Secretariat was deeply engaged. While 

the international community has a strong interest in developing regional mediation 

capacity in the Americas and elsewhere, earlier re-engagement in Haiti by the UN 

mediators might have made a difference. Even if such re-engagement did not result 

in a negotiated solution, it may have helped to set the stage for a more rapid and 

coherent planning process for the peace operation that was ultimately deployed.

The issue, of course, is broader than the Haiti case. For example, in Africa in partic

-

ular, there have been several examples of peace processes that yielded unsustainable 

or flawed agreements in circumstances where more intensive, more coherent, and 

more broadly based UN involvement may have made a difference.

Many have argued that the UN “diplomatic service,” represented by officials in the 

Secretariat’s Department of Political Affairs (DPA), is underresourced and under

-

staffed. The total number of professionals in the department is about 150, with only 

about 50 officers in regional bureaus. As a result, its ability to provide early warning 

to other parts of the UN system, to be systemically engaged in peace negotiations, 

and to keep its counterparts in the UN system well-informed about impending 

requirements for the institution is seriously limited.

In the area of postconflict peacebuilding, the UN system has made progress in 

recent years. For example, the United Nations Development Program’s (UNDP) 

Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery has developed critical expertise and 
WA R A N D P E A C E : P R E V E N T I N G A N D E N D I N G C O N F L I C T S 99

provided valuable resources to reconstruction efforts in postconflict settings. 

Moreover, DPKO field missions have better integrated the work of agencies deal-

ing with peacebuilding activities, and the head of the local UNDP office now 

generally serves as the deputy special representative of the secretary-general in 

countries with multidimensional UN peace operations. At the same time, impor

-

tant elements of the Secretariat that should actively support the peacebuilding 

components of peace operations have been under-resourced. For example, the 

Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, which has very capable 

leadership and many dedicated field staff, has been without the capacity to deploy

human rights monitors with the speed and numbers required for new opera

-

tions in Africa. In addition, the Secretariat is without the operational capacity 

to quickly deploy judges, lawyers, and other rule-of-law specialists to assist field 

operations. With respect to electoral assistance, one UN electoral adviser in 

Haiti perhaps put it best when he complained to the delegation about the lack of 

resources for UN field operations in this area. Using an automobile-related simile 

while reflecting on his own professional transition from the private voluntary 

organization (PVO) sector to the United Nations, he said it was like going from 

a “Mustang” to a “tractor with a flat tire and no gas.” When he worked for the 

PVO, he supervised personnel working in nine countries, and his staff was larger 

than the entire staff of the UN electoral division in New York. As demonstrated 

in the case of the recent Iraqi elections, this UN division can play an important 

role in advancing the democratic process.

A number of reports have urged enhancements in the UN capacity for conflict 

mediation. For example, the secretary-general’s High-Level Panel urged that the 

United Nations’ DPA be provided with additional resources and be restructured 

to ensure a “field-oriented, dedicated mediation support capacity,” as well as 

expertise in negotiation.29 The Stimson Center has made similar recommenda

-

tions.30

There have also been calls for substantial enhancements in the United Nations’ 

abilities in the area of postconflict reconstruction. The High-Level Panel endorsed 

the creation of an intergovernmental peacebuilding commission, as well as a 

peacebuilding support office, focused on efforts to avert state collapse and to assist 

in the full range of postconflict activities. And the panel supported a standing 

peacebuilding fund of at least $250 million. In his subsequent report, the secre

-

tary-general endorsed the call for the peacebuilding commission and fund, focus

-

ing primarily on the postconflict challenge.

The Bush administration last year established a new State Department Office of 

Reconstruction and Stabilization. According to the State Department, this office 

“will lead and coordinate U.S. government planning and institutionalize U.S. 

capacity to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition.” Unfortunately, 

initial requests for modest support of this office have not been fully funded by 

the Congress, but the office has nonetheless begun to play an important role in 

formulation of U.S. policy in this area.
100 A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M

Recommendations

❚ The UN role and capacity in conflict mediation and peacebuilding. To enhance 

support for UN efforts at conflict mediation and negotiation, the United States 

should support an increase in resources for the Department of Political Affairs, 

following an independent study providing a strategy for enhancing DPA capacity and improving coordination with DPKO.

To enhance support for postconflict peacebuilding activities, the United States 

should support the creation of a peacebuilding commission, a peacebuilding 

support office, and a voluntary peacebuilding support fund. The United States 

should also encourage member governments with expertise in peacebuilding activities, such as those related to rule of law, to play lead-nation roles on 

these issues in particular peace operations. Finally, the Task Force supports an 

increase in funding for the peace operation–related activities of the Office of 

the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the United Nations’ Electoral 

Assistance Division.

❚ U.S. capacity in civilian postconflict stabilization activities. To enhance U.S. 

ability to support postconflict reconstruction and to coordinate its efforts with 

the United Nations and other governments, the United States should strengthen 

the new State Department Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization, and 

Congress should provide it with resources necessary (and requested by the 

administration) to play its coordination role.

THE ROLE OF SANCTIONS IN ADDRESSING ISSUES OF CONFLICT

The United Nations Security Council has imposed sanctions under Chapter VII in 

sixteen cases: Afghanistan, Angola, Cote d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the 

Congo, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Haiti, Iraq, Liberia, Libya, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, 

Somalia, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Sudan, and the former Yugoslavia.31

The vast majority have been imposed since 1990, and most have been designed to 

prevent or end conflicts, in one manner or another.

At the time of the Task Force visit, Haiti had been free of international sanctions for 

many years. But an examination of UN sanctions imposed upon Haiti in the early 

and mid-1990s reveals several of the key issues that have surrounded the sanctions 

debate. After the 1991 coup, the administration of George H. W. Bush imposed 

limited sanctions against Haiti. In June 1993, UN Security Council Resolution 841 

imposed an oil and arms embargo, froze foreign assets, and established a Security 

Council monitoring committee. Though the embargo was suspended on August 27, 

1993, with the expected implementation of the Governor’s Island Accord,32 it was 

reimposed in October by UN Security Council Resolution 873, and then substantially strengthened in May 1994 by UN Security Council Resolution 917.

The Haiti case yields several conclusions of general applicability and relevant to UN 

action in this area.

Sanctions are less likely to be successful when targets perceive mixed signals from the 

international community. Certainly before 1993, there was little likelihood that the 
WA R A N D P E A C E : P R E V E N T I N G A N D E N D I N G C O N F L I C T S 101

coup sponsors in Haiti felt overwhelming pressure for change as a result of sanctions 

that were in effect. The Bush administration’s ambivalence about President Aristide 

was well known, and multilateral sanctions were not imposed until June 1993.

Sanctions, by themselves, are less likely to be effective when targets perceive the conflict 

in “winner-take-all” terms. By some accounts, the sanctions regime played a role in 

convincing Haiti’s de facto leaders to agree to the Governor’s Island Accord, but 

only insofar as the sanctions demonstrated resolve by the international community 

to persevere—even if that meant use of force. Thus, when armed thugs succeeded 

in preventing the USS Harlan County from deploying personnel in support of the 

agreement, a subsequent renewal of sanctions did little to move the regime.33

Broad sanctions will be less successful if they cannot effectively target constituencies with 

influence over the political process. In Haiti, where there were yawning income gaps, 

the members of the regime and the very rich could mitigate the negative impacts of 

sanctions, while the very poor—who were seriously affected by sanctions—had little 

influence over the political process.

Labor- and resource-intensive monitoring and enforcement efforts can be critical to 

success. To ensure against widespread violations of sanctions, the Clinton administration stepped up monitoring and enforcement efforts on both the high seas and at 

the border between Haiti and the Dominican Republic.34 These kinds of measures 

reflected the priority accorded to the Haitian case by U.S. policymakers, but often 

such measures have not accompanied other UN sanctions regimes.

Broad-based sanctions regimes are a blunt instrument that can impose dire impacts on 

the poor. By one account, sanctions against Haiti led to the elimination of 300,000 

jobs in the formal economy by the time they were lifted in 1994, and increased fuel 

and transportation costs meant dramatic price increases for staple goods.35

Most of the other sanctions regimes imposed over the past fifteen years have tended 

to reaffirm these lessons and have also offered some others. For example, sanctions 

on Serbia demonstrated the importance of measures to mitigate impacts to third 

parties. According to one estimate, Security Council sanctions cost Macedonia $1.2 

billion in 1992 and $1.8 billion in 1993.36 In the case of Iraq sanctions, the failure 

to seriously consider compensation for Jordan meant turning a blind eye to Iraqi 

smuggling, and even condoning it,37 which greatly enhanced Iraq’s coffers. In addition, beyond the internal management failures and reports of malfeasance, the oilfor-food arrangements pursuant to Iraq sanctions demonstrated broader limitations 

in the current capacity of the UN Secretariat to administer sanctions regimes that 

involve highly complex operational issues. Moreover, lack of consensus among key 

member states regarding implementation issues, inadequate oversight, and member 

state complicity in violations only compounded the problems.

Most debates about sanctions within the Security Council do not pay adequate 

attention to how the proposed regime would impact the actions of the targeted 

parties, nor do they consider sanctions in the context of a broader strategy toward 

promoting change. Moreover, while UN sanctions resolutions have established sanc-
102 A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M

tions committees to monitor implementation, member states bear significant indi-

vidual responsibility in this area, and there is often little effective coordination.

The most detailed recent recommendations relating to sanctions come from the 

secretary-general’s High-Level Panel. Suggested enhancements include the routine 

establishment of more effective monitoring mechanisms to ensure enforcement, 

guidelines, and reporting procedures for member states, greater donor support to 

states to enhance their sanctions enforcement capabilities, effective auditing proce

-

dures to ensure adequate administration, and improved procedures within sanctions 

committees for consideration of the humanitarian impact of sanctions. The report 

calls for appointment of a senior official with resources necessary to consider the 

most effective means of targeting sanctions and coordinating responsibilities. The 

official would also be involved in compliance efforts and could make recommenda

-

tions for adjustments, as appropriate.

Recommendation ❚ Sanctions must be part of an overall strategy that integrates diplomacy and 

coercion in an informed and effective manner, and must be carefully targeted to 

avoid unintentional impacts, punish perpetrators of abuses and illegality, and 

create incentives for change. Member states and the Secretariat must develop 

dedicated capacities for sanctions analysis, implementation, and enforcement.

❚ Among the enhancements suggested by the High-Level Panel on Threats, 

Challenges and Change, we support establishment by the Security Council and/

or sanctions committees of more effective monitoring mechanisms, guidelines, 

and reporting procedures for member states; more effective auditing procedures 

to oversee sanctions administration; and improved procedures within sanctions 

committees for consideration of humanitarian impacts. We believe that the 

panel’s recommendation for the appointment of a senior Secretariat official to 

address these issues will only be effective if that official is supported by a strong 

team of technical experts and diplomats.

NOTES

1. This is not to suggest that early UN peace operations never became involved in the internal affairs 

of member states. For example, the UN operation in the Congo (1960–1964) was authorized to 

provide to the government military assistance, to help the government to establish law and order, 

and to maintain the territorial integrity and political independence of the Congo.

2. Peacekeepers could not quell conflict when states were determined to resume warfare; nor could 

they ensure that the truces they sought to establish would be followed by sustainable peace 

agreements between states. Nonetheless, whether it was the United Nations Military Observer 

Group in India and Pakistan that monitored the disengagement in Kashmir; the United Nations 

Emergency Forces that were deployed to monitor and supervise the cessation of hostilities and 

withdrawal and redeployment of forces after conflict between Egypt and Israel; or the United 

Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, designed to supervise a ceasefire and maintain a buffer 

zone between parties to the conflict, traditional UN peacekeeping operations could help to 

provide stability, early warning, and/or an environment in which political negotiations could take 

place.

3. There are many studies that describe this evolution. See Michael Doyle, “War-Making and PeaceMaking: The UN in the 1990s,” in Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International 

Conflict, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington, D.C.: 

United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001).
WA R A N D P E A C E : P R E V E N T I N G A N D E N D I N G C O N F L I C T S 103

4. United Nations, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility. Report of the Secretary-General’s 

High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change (New York: United Nations, 2004), 33. 

Some of the information in this paragraph is drawn from the report, at 33–34.

5. See, for example, “Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations 

During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda,” S/1999/1257 (December 15, 1999); and “Report of 

the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35, the Fall of Srebrenica,” 

A/54/549 (November 15, 1999).

6. “Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations,” A/55/305-S/2000/809 (2000), 9. 

(Hereafter, “Brahimi Report”).

7. UN Security Council Resolution 1542 (April 30, 2004).

8. See UN Security Council Resolutions 1509 (September 19, 2003), 1545 (May 21, 2004), and 

1565 (October 1, 2004).

9. In a March 14, 2002, speech before the Inter-American Development Bank, in which he revealed 

plans for a major increase in development assistance, President Bush reflected on the connection 

between state failure, poverty, and political instability, on the one hand, and U.S. national interests on the other:

Poverty doesn’t cause terrorism. Being poor doesn’t make you a murderer. Most of the plotters of 11 September were 

raised in comfort. Yet persistent poverty and oppression can lead to hopelessness and despair. And when governments 

fail to meet the most basic needs of their people, these failed states can become havens for terror.

 In Afghanistan, persistent poverty and war and chaos created conditions that allowed a terrorist regime to seize power. 

And in many other states around the world, poverty prevents governments from controlling their borders, policing 

their territory, and enforcing their laws. Development provides the resources to build hope and prosperity, and security.

10. Some of the discussion in the paragraphs that follow in this section, especially on progress that has 

already been achieved in areas of concern, is drawn from or informed by William J. Durch et al., 

The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace Operations (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson 

Center, 2003).

11. Ibid., 22, citing A/C.4/55/6 (December 4, 2000), para. 45.

12. Brahimi Report, xi, 14–16.

13. Although the DPKO official appeared to recite these figures from memory and numbers are 

continually changing, the percentages cited were substantially accurate as of April 2005.

14. In defending their general reluctance about U.S. military deployments in support of peace stabilization, military, Department of Defense, and other U.S. officials have, over the years, expressed 

a range of concerns. First, they have noted the potential impact on overall readiness, especially 

given the intractable nature of many political conflicts and deployments of long duration. Second, 

they have argued that the U.S. military would inevitably be pressed into public security and law 

enforcement missions for which they are ill-suited. Third, officials have noted that, with many 

hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops deployed in critical regions around the world, the U.S. 

military is already making unique contributions to international peace and security, and that the 

demands of burden sharing suggest that others should take the lead on peace operations. Finally, 

they have contended that U.S. troops on the ground can become especially attractive targets for 

“spoilers,” who well understand that undermining the resolve of the United States can go a long 

way toward compromising the will of the international community.

15. As of February 28, 2005, the United States had a total of seven such officers deployed—four in 

Haiti and another three in Liberia. Henry L. Stimson Center, “U.S. Personnel Contributions to 

UN Peacekeeping Operations.” Online. Available: www.stimson.org/fopo/?SN=FO20050317799.

16. Durch et al., The Brahimi Report, 39.

17. The UN’s budget committees have expanded the scope of activities that might be supported 

through assessed contributions, largely on a case-by-case basis, but this has not been systematic. 

For example, assessed funding traditionally supported disarmament and initial demobilization 

activities, such as the establishment of reception centers and identification of combatants. In the 
104 A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M

case of the mission in Liberia, established in 2003, funding was also provided for reintegration 

activities. Similarly, missions have recently included some support for so-called “Quick Impact 

Projects.” See discussion of these issues in Durch et al., The Brahimi Report.

18. Secretary-General’s Bulletin, “Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and 

Sexual Abuse,” ST/SGB/2003/13 (October 15, 2003).

19. United Nations, “Investigation by the Office of Internal Oversight Services into Allegations of 

Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic 

Republic of the Congo,” A/59/661 (January 5, 2005), 1.

20. United Nations, “A Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation and Abuse 

in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations” (hereafter, “Comprehensive Strategy”), A/59/710 

(March 24, 2005), 12.

21. A/45/594, annex, para. 47(b) as cited in “Comprehensive Strategy,” 11.

22. “Comprehensive Strategy,” 11.

23. Although such civilians have immunity from prosecution for official acts, the secretary-general 

may waive immunity. The real challenge is developing effective local law enforcement capability. 

The alternative, accountability in the country of nationality, is very challenging, given legal and 

logistical impediments to effective prosecution.

24. United Nations, “Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and its Working 

Group on the 2005 Resumed Session,” A/59/19/Add.1 (April 11, 2005).

25. United Nations, “Comprehensive Review on A Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation 

and Abuse in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations,” A/C.4/59/L.20 (April 13, 2005).

26. This recommendation is drawn from Durch et al., The Brahimi Report, 39.

27. International Crisis Group, A New Chance for Haiti? ICG Latin America/Carribean Report, no. 

10 (Port-au-Prince/Brussels: International Crisis Group, November 18, 2004), 8.

28. For example, the Organization of American States was unable to fund and implement even a 

relatively modest 2003 proposal for the deployment of six hundred international civilian police; 

see ibid., 9.

29. For all of the recommendations from the panel, see United Nations, A More Secure World: Our 

Shared Responsibility. Report of the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, 

and Change (New York: United Nations, December 2004), Annex I.

30. Durch et al., The Brahimi Report, 103.

31. A description of UN sanctions regimes can be found at the UN website, at www.un.org/News/

ossg/sanction.htm.

32. UN Security Council Resolution 861 (1993).

33. George Lopez and David Cortright, The Sanctions Decade: Assessing UN Strategies in the 1990s

(Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2000), 102.

34. “President Clinton’s Remarks to the Press,” (June 10, 1994). Online. Available: http://www.

ibiblio.org/pub/archives/whitehouse-papers/1994/Jun/1994-06-10-Statement-by-the-President—

Haiti.

35. Lopez and Cortright, The Sanctions Decade, 96.

36. These figures were drawn from website of the Life and Peace Institute, Uppsala, Sweden. When it 

was accessed in early 2005, the URL (www.life-peace.org/newroutes/newroutes1998/nr199802/

against.htm) suggested that the figures appeared in a 1998 edition of New Routes, a journal of the 

Institute. However, the author was unable to access or examine the 1998 edition of the journal 

prior to publication of this chapter.

37. See “U.S. Condoned Iraq Oil Smuggling, Trade Was An Open Secret in Administration, UN,” 

CNN, February 2, 2005. Online. Available: http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/02/02/

iraq.oil.smuggle.
6 

Helping People

and Nations:

Development and

Humanitarian

Assistance
106 A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M

INTRODUCTION

Extreme poverty, disease, natural disaster, and weak and failing states threaten 

millions of lives worldwide. What can be done about these challenges, and by 

whom? The magnitude of the task necessarily involves different responses by a 

number of different entities. There are roles for governments and the private sector 

in rich and poor countries alike. 

In addressing these global threats, there is also a clear ongoing role for the United 

Nations. The UN development and assistance programs enjoy a number of advantages over individual countries in achieving development goals, including universality, on the ground presence, expertise, and experience. The World Bank, in particular, has a sizeable advantage with respect to development, which is likely to grow in 

the coming years. 

The contribution of the United Nations is, however, sometimes hindered by 

entrenched politics. There is also a need to place more emphasis on free markets, 

the rule of law, civil society, and democratic governance. In addition, there is a 

proliferation and redundancy of normsetting and implementing entities and a lack 

of transparency and accountability. 

This Task Force thinks that the time is ripe for reform. Poor countries have been 

receiving development assistance for forty years or more—a total of more than a 

trillion dollars—but, tragically, that assistance has often failed to reduce poverty. 

The priority should be to make assistance effective by promoting the legal, political, 

and economic infrastructure that will allow aid and private investment to flourish. 

This will also require changes and reform at relevant UN programs and institutions. 

This is a big challenge in part because the United Nations is a complex constellation 

of entities and programs, which comprise a multilevel network that operates with 

different (and sometimes overlapping) missions, management and reporting structures, and funding programs.

With respect to development and humanitarian assistance, the United Nations 

operates on three levels. First, the United Nations operates on a policy level. This 

involves the Security Council, which passes resolutions, some of which are mandatory; the administrative role of the secretary-general and the Secretariat; the 191-

member General Assembly, which debates, votes on rules, and passes nonbinding 

resolutions; and the 54-member Economic and Social Council.

Second, the United Nations operates on a conceptual level, such as establishing the 

development goals enshrined in the 2000 Millennium Declaration and developing technical standards as provided by various independent specialized agencies. An 

example of a technical standard would be strategies for reducing infant mortality or 

increasing agricultural production.

Third, the United Nations works on programs and field projects, coordinating 

development and disaster relief functions in recipient countries and regions. Fixing 

problems on one level does not necessarily change the reality at another.
H E L P I N G P E O P L E A N D N A T I O N S : D E V E L O P M E N T A N D H U M A N I T A R I A N A S S I S T A N C E 107

With respect to the approximately twenty assistance-related UN agencies working 

in these areas, it is useful to distinguish between (1) the funds and programs that 

report directly to the secretary-general; and (2) the independent specialized agen

-

cies, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which 

report to their own executive boards.

At the country level, the UN system is even more complex, with ten to twenty UN 

agencies or programs often present in even the poorest country. A country team is 

coordinated (often loosely) by a resident coordinator. In the event of a peacekeep

-

ing mission, the country team is led by a special representative of the secretarygeneral (SRSG). The appointment of an SRSG is a highly personal and politically 

sensitive selection by the secretary-general. While a number of these appointees 

have served with distinction, recent merit testing has improved the quality of resi

-

dent coordinators.

It is in U.S. interests to raise the priority given to health, development, and humani

-

tarian assistance. The United States should focus its UN reform efforts on enhanc

-

ing efficiency, eliminating overlaps, and responding in a more timely manner. These 

reforms include the following: • Creating a new consensus focusing on increasing economic growth and devel

-

opment. The preponderance of economic analysis reveals that liberal economic 

policies and the rule of law are key drivers in promoting economic growth and 

reducing poverty.

1

 The United Nations’ focus on increasing official develop-

ment assistance (ODA) to the target of 0.7 percent of donor nations’ gross 

domestic product (GDP) reflects a laudable effort. Emphasizing the precondi

-

tions necessary for development, however, is the key to bringing these countries 

out of poverty. While government-to-government assistance is important and 

in certain cases indispensable, private investment and the legal, political, and 

economic infrastructure that allow such aid and investment to flourish are the 

key to development. While aid may help the poor cope temporarily with some of 

the consequences of poverty, it should be targeted to help create the conditions 

under which aid and private investment can flourish. Countries beset by corrup

-

tion, heavy state intervention, and other counterproductive policies will not see 

long-term sustained economic growth and development even with the support of 

economic assistance. Development assistance should be disbursed based on results 

and designed to encourage recipients to adopt sound economic policies and 

bolster the rule of law. 

• Incorporate total resource flows, including government assistance and private 

flows, to the developing world into a new metric analyzing development assis

-

tance. The role of development assistance is exaggerated. Most resources for 

economic development and sustainable poverty reduction come through trade, 

private financial flows, international charitable organizations and expatriate remit

-

tances. The 0.7 percent of GDP target would be more meaningful if other contri

-

butions relevant to development were incorporated into this calculation, includ

-

ing private charitable donations. The United States should work to promote this 
108 A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M

metric internationally. Additionally, the most important benchmark, of course, is 

the effectiveness of assistance in achieving genuine economic growth and development to alleviate poverty. The reality is that effective poverty reduction is often 

delivered by private, nongovernmental groups and that sustainable poverty reduction also requires investment, trade, and economic growth.

• Restating that the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are laudable objectives, but are focused largely on the symptoms of poverty and are not, in themselves, a solution to poverty which requires increased economic growth. Honest 

governance, the rule of law, and respect for private property are essential prerequisites for achieving the MDG goals of halving extreme poverty and hunger; 

achieving universal basic education, promoting gender equality, reducing child 

and maternity mortality, combating AIDS and other major diseases, and expanding access to clean water and sanitation and ensuring environmental sustainability.

• Requiring independent external monitoring and evaluation, requiring more 

results-based budgeting, and making operational agencies more subject to 

voluntary contributions over which contributing member states will have more 

supervision.

• Reducing the bloated staffing of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs 

and ensuring that the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) focuses on 

useful endeavors rather than, as now, engaging in endless, redundant discourse or 

pretending that it is the World Trade Organization.

• Reassessing the many programs, funds, and subsidiary bodies in the UN system 

studying or advising countries on development issues for purpose, coordination, 

and capabilities, with many existing bodies phased out or merged to eliminate 

duplication and increase efficiency.

• Strengthening the coordination of the development agencies by strengthening the 

role of the resident coordinator and the UN Development Program (UNDP).

• Increasing the effectiveness of the World Heath Organization (WHO), ensuring 

it can perform a strong coordinating role to contain the spread of diseases across 

borders.

• The U.S. Congress should propose an interdonor effort to reorganize the organizational architecture of UN relief agencies, revising their mandates, where necessary, to eliminate duplication and bureaucracy.

ENDING POVERTY

Major issues related to the reform of UN development programs include questions 

about their stated goals, the adequacy of the management systems, the cost-effectiveness of implementation, the unpredictability of resources, and the independent 

validation of their results.
H E L P I N G P E O P L E A N D N A T I O N S : D E V E L O P M E N T A N D H U M A N I T A R I A N A S S I S T A N C E 109

Governance and management. The present UN system tends to proliferate agen-

cies and programs, with inadequate and dispersed accountability. As a result, the 

UN country teams have great difficulty with serious coordination and strategy 

development from the independent clusters of agencies and the disparity of influ

-

ence of the World Bank and the IMF. Much depends on the quality of the resident 

coordinators. Poorly qualified resident coordinators more bent on central control 

than quality can overlook the technical expertise of the specialized agencies. There 

is no sure way to balance between centralization and decentralization, but better 

country management is essential if the UN system is to reduce rather than magnify 

transaction costs to recipient countries.

Delivery and implementation. The basic question about the content of what the 

United Nations is delivering concerns the extent to which basic best practices of 

development are being incorporated, for example, ensuring local ownership when 

there is demonstrated political will within the country, allowing competition among 

proposals when practical, building the indigenous human capacity, and providing 

transparency and clear accountability. The United Nations can start by working to 

reduce unnecessary redundancies, such as the duplication of support services—from 

motor pools to informational technology services and office space. Moving toward 

common services has been much discussed but not vigorously pursued.

Resources. In humanitarian assistance, it is understandable that saving lives will 

be more critical than saving dollars. However, sustainable development assistance 

is different; member states deserve to have more control over which operational 

agencies they wish to fund. Reliance on voluntary funding for operational agen

-

cies would introduce greater market pressures for these agencies to be responsive 

to donors. At the same time, pushing UN agencies to work more from voluntary 

contributions will accentuate the problem of an endless competition for raising 

money for specific projects undertaken by specific agencies. To counteract this drag 

on aid effectiveness and to avoid a complete focus on raising piecemeal funds, it will 

be imperative to strengthen the strategic planning function of the United Nations 

and ensure that funds are raised for country-level programs rather than narrow, 

sector-by-sector projects. At the same time, member states can make their voluntary 

contributions more predictable or multiyear. Whatever money is spent, however, 

it is critical that the UN system be more transparent and accountable for how 

money—including U.S. tax dollars—is spent and accounted for.

Results. Can a new focus on measuring the MDGs help bring better information to 

the public sphere to determine which interventions are working and which are not? 

Because of the lack of temporal congruity between two- and four-year political time 

frames and five- and ten-year development cycles, there is ample scope for a wider 

appreciation by U.S. officials and the public of the historical context and long-term 

trends at stake in development. Regular qualitative assessments of progress toward 

achieving agreed outcomes can be one element of demonstrating results.
110 A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M

Is It Possible to Manage the United Nations System?

Two of the four major organs of the United Nations—the General Assembly and 

ECOSOC—are deeply involved in debating or shaping humanitarian and develop

-

ment assistance policies. Several programs and funds, notably the United Nations 

Children’s Fund (UNICEF), UNDP, and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 

(UNHCR), were created by the United Nations and have separate boards. But 

most of the normative and operational capacities of the UN system reside in fifteen 

specialized agencies that have developed largely independently of these principal 

organs.

2

 In addition, actions taken by a third organ, the Security Council, can have 

a profound impact on humanitarian and development assistance by dint of the 

mandates or resolutions emanating from this decision-making body.

3

 To dwell on 

the elements most important to ending poverty, however, it is imperative that deci

-

sion makers understand (1) the severe limitations of ECOSOC, (2) the continued 

potential of the UNDP and UN Development Group, and, finally, (3) some of the 

elements of the specialized agencies.

ECOSOC. The Economic and Social Council was created by the UN Charter to 

serve as the principal organ for coordinating humanitarian and development issues 

for both the United Nations proper and its family of specialized agencies. The delib

-

erations of ECOSOC have been greatly weakened by the tripling of its membership 

since it was founded. As a result, it is no longer capable of carrying out its assigned 

functions of promoting “fundamental freedoms” by serving as a “central forum” for 

discussion and coordination of the activities of all UN agencies. Indeed, ECOSOC 

generates scant impact on its mandated issues and has been frustrated by its limited 

ability to influence decisions and programs of such organizations as the World 

Trade Organization, the World Bank, and the IMF. Moreover, composed of demo

-

cratic and autocratic governments alike, ECOSOC has limited ability to address 

the Charter’s call for addressing fundamental human rights and “social progress 

and better standards of life in larger freedom.” ECOSOC is supported by some one 

thousand employees in a Secretariat body, the Department of Economic and Social 

Affairs, and ostensibly coordinates the specialized agencies; in reality that function is 

more effectively achieved through the UN Development Group (UNDG), headed 

by UNDP. Many of ECOSOC’s deliberations are redundant, with the result that 

ECOSOC hashes and rehashes pronouncements and resolutions, including those 

espousing ideas antithetical to U.S. interests.

ECOSOC must be reoriented toward a useful function.

This analysis is largely consistent with the three major recommendations of the 

report of the secretary-general’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and 

Change. That report underscores the institutional problems that arise from the fact 

that issues of trade and finance reside outside the United Nations, making it futile 

for ECOSOC to attempt to manage them, and that the rise of specialized agencies 

independent of the principal UN organs makes it equally fanciful for ECOSOC 

to assume that it is the ultimate coordinating body.

4

 The UN secretary-general has 

called for ECOSOC to play the “leading role” in making policies and helping to 

implement the MDGs.

5

 The three ways ECOSOC could play that role were spelled 
H E L P I N G P E O P L E A N D N A T I O N S : D E V E L O P M E N T A N D H U M A N I T A R I A N A S S I S T A N C E 111

out in the High-Level Panel report as follows: (1) giving it “normative and analyti-

cal leadership” over issues linking development and security by creating a new 

Committee on the Social and Economic Aspects of Security Threats; (2) making 

ECOSOC “an arena in which states measure their commitments to achieving key 

development objectives in an open and transparent manner”; and (3) providing 

“a regular venue for engaging the development community at the highest level, in 

effect transforming itself into a ‘development cooperation forum.’”

6

United Nations Development Program and Development Group. Although the 

UNDP is sometimes portrayed as “the UN’s global development network,”

7 the 

reality is far more complex. In 1970, inspired by a major reform study known as the 

Jackson Report, the General Assembly established UNDP as the central element of 

the UN system’s technical cooperation. Although the General Assembly sets out the 

overall policy of UNDP, and ECOSOC is responsible for the general rules of gover

-

nance of UNDP, the body is largely self-governed by its own executive board and 

run by an administrator and his or her staff. UNDP’s chief tasks are threefold and 

involve all operational development cooperation activities and all sectors of develop

-

ment: (1) to help provide a single financing instrument, (2) to provide country-level 

coordination, and (3) to help coordinate financing and technical implementation 

issues between headquarters and the UN family of agencies.

8 The limitations of 

UNDP are obvious: UNDP is not a single funding source. Indeed, the budgets of 

the agencies coordinated by UNDP far exceed the resources of UNDP. Also, the 

UNDP resident coordinator is a primus inter pares whose success is dependent on 

the skill of the coordinator and the cooperation of others.

The recent reform of UNDP has given added weight to its role as a key coordinat

-

ing body. But its main function continues to be its special relationship with host 

governments, promoting transparency and good governance, and improving the 

planning of development. In the past decade, UNDP has become more prominent 

as a conceptual leader, with its UN Human Development Reports, first published in 

the early 1990s, and more recently with publications such as the UN Arab Human 

Development Report, which has given some voice to regional calls for political and 

economic freedom in the Middle East. Bolstering the resident coordinator system, 

creating a common program framework known as the United Nations Development 

Assistance Framework, introducing a multiyear funding framework, initiating 

results-based management, and shoring up the authorities and quality of resident 

coordinators have added some business discipline to an overly decentralized system.

The questions reformers now face are the perennial one of the balance between 

more or less centralization within the United Nations and whether UNDP could 

play yet a stronger role if it were granted greater authority over personnel and 

perhaps budgets. But the key question for U.S. policymakers should be what 

goals they want UNDP to focus on and how UNDP fits with U.S. development 

programs, which have in the past few years been refocused more on economicgrowth approaches to development.9

Current problems discussed with respect to inefficiency and ineffectiveness of UN 

development programs include the following:
112 A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M

• The lack of a chief executive officer and unity of command, including in recipient 

countries. Member states pursue their parochial interests, while separate agencies 

focus on their own projects, while resident coordinators have limited authorities 

over personnel and budget.

• The tussle between greater centralization and decentralization within the UN 

system. While creating a more effective chain of command within the United 

Nations would seem to be common sense, there is also a concomitant danger of 

overly centralizing the complex technical responsibilities of development. This 

tension can also reduce the quality of joint planning.

• The blurred division of responsibilities between norm-setting and implementing 

agencies. Not every agency needs to be in the field, especially those whose 

comparative advantage lies in their ability to establish international norms and 

national-level policies, whether on education, agriculture, health care, trade, or 

the environment.

• A highly unstable and unpredictable resource base. There is no simple cure to this 

problem. Increasing predictable core funding can lead to a lack of competition 

among agencies with duplicative abilities; decreasing core funding forces them to 

spend far more time touting their project successes and seeking to raise money. 

One recent innovation has been the use of a multiyear budget framework, but 

this is only a planning tool.

Specialized agencies. Another way to look at the long quest for UN reform on 

development is the shoring up of the United Nations’ conceptual leadership in the 

field of development, reforms undertaken to improve the structure and policymaking capacity of the United Nations, and measures taken to streamline and improve 

the effectiveness of UN administration. Conceptually, the World Bank dominates 

development, a fact that is difficult for the United Nations and even the U.S. 

Agency for International Development (USAID) to fully digest. Structurally, the 

strengthening of the resident coordinator system, which helps coordinate all UN 

activity on the ground in recipient countries, is improving “jointness” among UN 

agencies. But not all parts of the UN system are equal; the World Bank and IMF 

tend to have a great deal of sway with host governments. Administrative problems 

include not only unnecessary duplication of common services, but the serious lack 

of independent monitoring, evaluation, and accountability.

The United Nations should also be diligent in incorporating the best practices of 

development. While the history of development suggests a need to keep expectations modest—and remain fully aware that we may be seeing good plans that will 

never be fully enacted—this preliminary survey is identifying an unexpected but 

clear pattern:

• Greater ownership and participation at the local, regional, and national level.

• A much sharper focus on economic growth and private sector development and 

trade as a means of reducing poverty.
H E L P I N G P E O P L E A N D N A T I O N S : D E V E L O P M E N T A N D H U M A N I T A R I A N A S S I S T A N C E 113 • Much more attention to the rule of law and property rights. • A concentration on larger, focused programs rather than myriad small projects 

that are delinked rather than interconnected.

• A desire to achieve specific, measurable results in a finite period of time.

Resources

Nearly all studies on development assistance focus solely on government-to-govern-

ment transfers, which captures only part of the picture. Most resources for economic 

development and sustainable poverty reduction will come not through ODA, but 

through trade, private financial flows, international charitable organizations, and 

expatriate remittances (see figure 2). ODA is only a tiny percentage of total resource 

flows to the developing world. Over the past decade, the United States and Japan 

have accounted for 40 percent of total development assistance worldwide, with the 

United Kingdom, Germany, France, and the Netherlands contributing 35 percent, 

and all other donors about 25 percent.10 While the United States provided 24 

percent of the world’s development assistance in 2004 ($19 billion of a total $79 

billion), that ODA was less than private charitable giving, investment, remittances, 

and trade by a wide margin. There is no accurate measure of many private resource 

flows, nor is there broad consensus whether to distinguish between private chari

-

table flows and those flows that are economically driven. Nonetheless, it makes little 

sense to magnify the importance of official governmental aid over private resources. CONTROLLING DISEASE

The U.S. government should encourage the United Nations to play a larger and 

increasingly indispensable role in managing dangerous diseases that have the 

potential to cross international borders. It is impossible to predict when and how 

mutations may lead to new diseases that will rapidly spread across continents; but 

we know from history that unimagined, lethal epidemics, such as the influenza 

pandemic of 1918, spread across continents roughly twice a century, killing millions 

of people. The central UN entity responsible for tracking and addressing health 

problems is the WHO, which has a critical mass of expertise, essential for the craft

-

ing of public health norms and medical best-practice guidance. WHO maintains 

databases of global disease patterns required to help ministries establish priorities.

Health activities also make up a substantial part of the aid portfolio of other UN 

agencies. UNICEF has the most extensive field programs in immunization, child 

health, and hygiene.11 UNDP mounts integrated programs, the Joint United 

Nations Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) provides technical expertise on fighting 

AIDS, and the World Food Program targets food assistance as support to families 

affected by chronic disease. The UNHCR manages surveillance and health care 

outreach programs for some ten million refugees and internally displaced persons 

per year. Each of these UN agencies covers overlapping territory, much of the time 

complementary. For example, the World Bank may provide funding to UNICEF, 

to work under the aegis of UNHCR in a refugee crisis, to provide immuniza

-

tion according to guidelines developed by WHO. Multilateral funding for disease 

control has proven more and more popular over the years.
114 A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M

Some of the most cost-effective investments known in any area are simple immu-

nizations, vitamin A, and oral rehydration salts that, for mere pennies per person 

reached, have in combination saved tens of millions of children from death. The 

United Nations’ primary health care efforts against diarrhea, respiratory infection, 

measles, malnutrition, and parasitic diseases have saved billions of life years, despite 

some recent reversals due to AIDS and the reemergence of tuberculosis (the return 

of which is largely related to immune-compromise due to AIDS).

The United States Supports the UN’s Control of Infectious 

Disease in Many Ways

The United States also has a special role in global health issues. Much of the world’s 

leading research on disease science and disease control is conducted through funding 

by the U.S. National Institutes of Health (NIH) and through efforts by laboratories 

under the aegis of the U.S. armed forces.12 Much of the world’s development of 

life-saving drugs and vaccines is conducted by and reliant upon U.S.-based phar

-

maceutical companies as well as non-U.S. firms with significant research labs in the 

United States, supported by constellations of U.S. universities and innovative, risktaking biotech firms.

Historically, many of the WHO’s most important programs were guided in either 

partnership with the U.S. Centers for Disease Control (CDC) or with staff lent 

from CDC. The relationship with CDC had historically been ad hoc, however, 

depending to a great degree on the independent initiatives of individuals in CDC or 

their offices. In recent years, the relationship between CDC and WHO has waned 

further, as the U.S. administration, particularly at the Department of Health and 

Human Services, has asserted itself more as the decision maker in U.S. govern

-

ment–WHO relations, inhibiting and reducing many CDC-WHO initiatives that 

had worked well in the past.

Hunger and Nutrient Deficiency Diseases

In recent years, USAID’s successful Famine Early Warning System (FEWS)13 has 

allowed U.S. and UN food aid to reach potential famine zones in a timely enough 

manner to avert famine. Famine-related starvation has declined year-by-year for 

the past forty years and rarely occurs today, except in small pockets, mostly in war 

zones or failed states. For the first time in human history, famine has been largely 

conquered. Yet while famine-related starvation has been largely reduced, chronic 

malnutrition persists in roughly the same numbers each year, in large measure 

because of a failure to reduce malnutrition rates in much of sub-Saharan Africa and 

the sheer numbers of at-risk children in Asia. Vitamin and mineral (micronutrient) 

deficiency diseases are much more widespread, often unseen and neglected, yet as 

lethal, despite the fact that they can be prevented inexpensively. The UN system has 

many nutrition offices scattered among specialized agencies, funds, and programs. 

However, no one UN agency houses a critical mass of nutrition experts or champi

-

ons the fight against malnutrition in its various forms, which greatly impedes the 

nutrition work of the organization as a whole.
H E L P I N G P E O P L E A N D N A T I O N S : D E V E L O P M E N T A N D H U M A N I T A R I A N A S S I S T A N C E 115

Similarly, the UN system needs a champion for the larger category of childhood 

survival, which encompasses many strategies and tactics incubated at UNICEF, 

though lost in UNICEF’s recent turn from operationality.

Obstacles to Better UN Coordination in Disease Control

The principal impediment to WHO’s effectiveness and credibility is the multi-

layered system of authorities through which it is required to work. Not only does 

WHO have to abide by its own governing body, the World Health Council, but 

WHO decisions and programs are also mediated by regional health bodies, which 

collectively comprise the WHO, each of which has its own governing structure, 

and each of which can block or delay the implementation of actions initiated at 

WHO headquarters.14 In the field, country offices of WHO are staffed by and 

report primarily to their regional bodies, not to WHO headquarters. Its structure 

represents a business model that would not be deemed functional in any commer

-

cial or government enterprise. The future of international public health hinges on 

reform in the organizational structure of WHO. However, while each country may 

acknowledge the need, on a global scale, to free WHO of its regional tiers, many 

countries will resist losing control over their own regional body.15 ALLEVIATING DISASTER

As the world’s population continues to grow and concentrate in cities, the trend for 

disasters will continue to increase as well, as more people are exposed to floods and 

other inevitable natural phenomena.

One lesson of the December 2004 tsunami disaster ought to be that there are a 

wide range of infrequent but high-impact natural events, including earthquakes, 

volcanic eruption, and meteor impact, for which we need to prepare. Even though 

the lessons of the 2004 tsunami and other emergencies repeatedly point out that 

the best way to save lives is through prevention and preparedness, funding remains 

disproportionately low for disaster risk reduction and preparedness, including early 

warning systems, national standards for disaster-resistant housing, emergency plans 

and stockpiles, public education, and the like.

United Nations and Related International Organization 

Agency Capabilities

Member governments have at times sought to consolidate responsibility for overall 

humanitarian action by the United Nations.16 Further frustrations with field-level 

coordination have led the United Kingdom minister of development to propose 

that the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) manage a 

$1 billion budget—in essence making this office of the UN Secretariat operational.17

OCHA has grown in its scope of activities and does a good job of providing infor-

mation about the work of non-UN agencies as well, including nongovernmental 

organizations (NGOs) and the Red Cross movement. UNHCR and the World 

Food Program (WFP) provide the bulk of aid in emergencies.
116 A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M

Persistent Gaps in UN Response to Emergencies

In one disaster after another, key gaps are repeatedly observed. One much-debated 

gap is for a category of emergency-affected persons, internally displaced persons 

(IDPs), who have not benefited from the same level of protection or assistance as 

refugees, due to the absence of any one UN agency that accepts responsibility.

Persistent water shortages in refugee camps and famines invariably account for a 

large share of total deaths in emergencies.18 No UN agency takes responsibility for 

water supply in a dependable manner, because no UN agency has been mandated 

to. Similarly, there are failures of attention to community health, vector control, 

micronutrient delivery, risk reduction, community education, and field-level protection. Protection of civilians from intentional harm, including massacres, has also 

been given short shrift in many aid programs. Most UN efforts and NGO field 

projects have focused on the delivery of commodities and health care, rather than 

the equally vital needs of rescue, documentation, accompaniment, and advocacy.

Of equal importance are gaps in the geographic apportionment of humanitarian aid. 

Each year one or two big-headline emergencies capture the majority of earmarked 

donations, binding UN agencies to applying them only in the one or two most 

visible emergencies. Millions of civilians deaths in Angola, Mozambique, Burundi, 

Congo, India, Burma, and, until recently, Afghanistan were directly related to lack 

of proportionality in donations and the fact that funds that UN agencies do receive 

are not sufficiently fungible in how they can be used.

Finally, there are critical gaps in timing. Typically, the lion’s share of funding arrives 

after the acute period of an emergency, when international intervention was most 

needed. In short-onset natural disasters, this problem is intractable: there is almost 

no way that large amounts of funding can be usefully programmed to save lives 

given that almost all of the deaths associated with the hazard occur within the first 

hours. Meanwhile, for longer-term, protracted emergencies, including famines, 

wars, and complex emergencies, it is feasible for aid to be better-timed. Frequently, 

pledges are never honored or are not best suited for the situation. The case of 

Darfur is instructive. Aid agencies performed well after arrival in response to the 

massive displacement, keeping excess mortality low during the period from July 

2004 to present. Actual mortalities were less than predicted because of effective 

programs by aid agencies. However, the whole international community was late in 

arriving. Tens of thousands of deaths probably did occur during early 2004, before 

the UN humanitarian apparatus was sufficiently established in Khartoum and 

Darfur.

Restructuring of UN Assistance Programs

There are three feasible approaches for restructuring UN humanitarian assistance 

programs.

One way is to extend the current trend in common services to its logical limits. 

Organizing the United Nations around functions would tend to resolve the current 

awkward situation whereby UNHCR oversees refugees, UNICEF oversees children, 
H E L P I N G P E O P L E A N D N A T I O N S : D E V E L O P M E N T A N D H U M A N I T A R I A N A S S I S T A N C E 117

and WFP oversees the food needs of refugee children, all at the same time. A logical 

extension of this trend in the near term would be to carve out common services for 

other sectors as well, including security, base camps, personnel, telecommunications, 

training, procurement, final distribution, health services, and evaluation.

A second course is to convert UNHCR into the UN Agency for Forced Migrants, 

which would handle all displaced persons, not only refugees. At present, confu

-

sion in the field derives from a cross-hatch of agencies claiming some but not all 

responsibility for displaced persons. Converting UNHCR into this wider agency 

could give it global responsibility for all forced migrants and persons in refugee-like 

jeopardy, including internally displaced persons (IDPs), environmentally displaced 

persons, forcibly trafficked persons, and other displaced people. In order to reduce 

time lags, debates, and funding shortfalls, UNHCR would be given a global 

mandate, but commensurately, UNHCR would not be responsible for all related 

fundraising.

A third approach is to create one unified UN humanitarian aid agency. Whereas 

a new UN Agency for Forced Migrants would be the lead agency responsible for 

all refugees and IDPs, a larger agency would also manage each of the sectors, such 

as food and water, and also work in the relief and mitigation of natural disasters, 

including famines, reflecting the range of issues addressed by OCHA. The over

-

all evaluation, streamlining, and consolidation of humanitarian bodies should 

include those devoted to the Palestinian situation. The advantages of a single UN 

relief agency are reduced expense and delays, greater coherence, greater economies 

of scale, easier planning, and enhanced accountability and transparency.19 Risks, 

however, include loss of creative tensions, less agency access into some countries, 

and potential for vulnerability to bad senior management. Also, seeking the creation 

of a unified humanitarian aid entity would meet considerable resistance from 

entrenched bureaucracies, within both the United Nations itself and various funding 

offices that define their importance according to their relationship to whichever of 

the myriad UN agencies would be collapsed. This is the reason why it will only get 

due consideration if pushed strongly by an influential outside body, such as the U.S. 

Congress. RECOMMENDATIONS

General Recommendations ❚ The U.S. Department of State should be the policy leader for development 

and humanitarian assistance issues, especially with respect to coordinating U.S. 

government support to multilateral organizations. To achieve better burdensharing with the United Nations (and to avoid having every donor discussion 

focus on why the United States needs to contribute more money), the United 

States needs to speak with a more coherent voice, at the very minimum with 

respect to multilateral organizations such as the United Nations. USAID has the 

greatest knowledge and capacity for the many technical components comprising 

both development and humanitarian aid, and thus the Department of StateUSAID relationship must be well integrated. Treasury’s leading role in managing 

the multilateral development banks should continue, but it, too, should be done 
118 A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M

in a manner tightly integrated with the Department of State. Meanwhile, over-

all decision making on U.S.-wide UN issues should be given greater coherence, 

planning, and coordination by Department of State principals. The Bureau for 

Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) could be renamed the Humanitarian 

Policy and Planning Bureau, which elevates and acknowledges its current exper

-

tise and practice. It should be encouraged to take a greater role in working with 

the UN system in planning a more integrated and preventive approach to disas

-

ters, forced migration, and the humanitarian impact of wars. In this it needs 

to work in consultation and coordination with the International Organization 

Affairs and Democracy Human Rights, and Labor bureaus of the Department 

of State, as well as the new Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and 

Stabilization. Overseeing all of this could be a deputy national security advisor for 

stabilization, reconstruction, and development.

❚ Enhance the predictability and coherence of U.S. support. The U.S. govern-

ment needs to fix three problems with its support of UN assistance. First, there 

currently exists no mechanism to measure the total sum of support to any of the 

UN development or relief agencies—including funding and technical support, 

as well as personnel secondments. Second, branches of the U.S. government that 

manage some funding of their corresponding UN agencies are largely unaware 

of and therefore not coordinated with other branches in the U.S. government 

also funding that same UN agency. At a minimum, transparency and coordina

-

tion within the U.S. government should be increased among all these funding 

mechanisms. Third, U.S. government and other donor contributions to many of 

the operational, assistance-delivering UN agencies, from UNICEF and UNHCR 

to UNDP and WFP and other emergency entities, are largely “voluntary,” irregu

-

lar, and difficult to predict. The U.S. Congress could work with legislatures 

of other donor countries to help make funding more predictable and ensure, 

among other things, funding for refugees and victims of protracted develop

-

ment problems and neglected crises. The incoherence in U.S. government fund

-

ing is nowhere more problematic than in the health sector, which would greatly 

benefit from regularized, aggregated, and predictable support. Within the Good 

Humanitarian Donorship Initiative (begun in 2004), the United States should 

seek ways in which hundreds of different donor offices can bring about a more 

unified approach to funding time-sensitive UN programs. The U.S. Office 

of Management and Budget needs to be able to report to Congress and the 

Department of State what total levels of UN support are.

❚ Place greater emphasis on external evaluation. The United States should demand 

more independent evaluation of UN development and humanitarian programs. 

Monitoring programs must not simply be restricted to assessing progress in the 

MDGs, but include assessment of improved political and economic governance. 

With respect to humanitarian programs, the long-held perspective that field 

research and documentation in times of crisis is a nuisance or a lesser priority has 

led to enormous waste, as inappropriate and wasteful aid supplies continue to 

be donated in the wrong places. Independent cross-check and evaluation mecha

-
H E L P I N G P E O P L E A N D N A T I O N S : D E V E L O P M E N T A N D H U M A N I T A R I A N A S S I S T A N C E 119

nisms should be instituted, potentially though expansion of the Joint Inspection 

Unit (JIU) of the United Nations, which up to now has been little used.

Recommendations for Reducing Poverty ❚ Push the United Nations to balance the interest in poverty reduction with 

an interest in governance and economic growth. Economic analysis reveals 

that liberal economic policy and the rule of law are key drivers in promot

-

ing economic growth and reducing poverty. While aid may help the poor cope 

temporarily with some of the consequences of poverty, countries beset by corrup

-

tion, heavy state intervention, and other counterproductive policies will not see 

long-term sustained economic growth and development, even with the support 

of economic assistance. A key element in development assistance must be to 

encourage recipients to improve governance, adopt sound economic policies, 

and bolster the rule of law, which are essential to increasing growth and reduc

-

ing poverty. Like the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), the United 

Nations should create systems that don’t just reward for reward’s sake, but bolster 

and reinforce good governance practice where it is put into effect. At the same, 

the U.S. should recommend other metrics, beyond the aspirational goal of 0.7 

percent of GDP contribution to government assistance in favor of a new metric 

that incorporates all relevant flows to the developing world, including private and 

charitable contributions.

❚ Support for reforming failing or weak states. The U.S. Department of State’s 

new Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) 

should establish a collaborative relationship with the UN Peacebuilding 

Commission, if such a new body is created as part of UN reform. Both S/CRS 

and the Peacebuilding Commission will need to work with UNDP and counter

-

part offices in other aid agencies that have the expertise for assisting governance, 

rule of law, property rights, and reconstructing governments and infrastructure in 

transitional states (like Liberia), in emerging states (like East Timor or Kosovo), 

and in failed states (like Somalia). As mentioned above, giving a single deputy 

national security advisor responsibility for stabilization, reconstruction, and 

development could help improve interagency coordination, which in turn would 

better leverage the United Nations.

❚ Reorient the mission and activities of the Economic and Social Council 

(ECOSOC). The mission of a scaled back and focused ECOSOC should be 

directed toward crosscutting issues, achievement of the MDGs, and issues of 

good governance, the rule of law, and anticorruption. ECOSOC should elimi

-

nate the practice of secret voting by members, and the Department for Economic 

and Social Affairs should be streamlined.

❚ Clarify the UN role in development. There are more than twenty programs, 

funds, and subsidiary bodies in the UN system studying or advising countries 

on development issues. These bodies seldom meet or coordinate their activities. 

The United Nations needs to reassess these bodies for purpose, coordination, and 

capabilities, with many existing bodies phased out or merged to eliminate dupli

-
120 A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M

cation and increase efficiency. Moreover, there needs to be a recognition of the 

United Nations’ limitations. The amount of ODA given directly to the United 

Nations is relatively small, perhaps amounting to little more than $1 billion of a 

total global ODA of around $65 billion. The World Bank and other international 

financial institutions and the bilateral aid agencies have a commanding advantage 

over the United Nations in development knowledge and resources. Global anti

-

poverty efforts should recognize the comparative advantage in resources, knowl

-

edge, and influence of the World Bank and bilateral aid agencies. To the extent 

that the United Nations should remain involved in development, its role should 

be limited to discussion of crosscutting issues, achievement of the MDGs, the rule 

of law, and anticorruption.

❚ Strengthen the UN relationship with the World Bank. Global antipoverty efforts 

should better blend the World Bank’s intellectual leadership with the UN ground 

presence around the world. For example, UNDP should manage trust funds in 

countries where those trust funds involve crisis recovery, failed states, and use by 

other UN agencies (mostly because of the speed with which UNDP can move 

money relative to the World Bank). The World Bank, in turn, should manage 

trust funds that are primarily for budgetary support to weak governments and 

large infrastructure projects.

❚ Connect the UN Development Group (UNDG) with the equivalent executive 

bodies dealing with humanitarian and peacekeeping operations, knitting together 

the lead agencies and offices into a supra-coordinating entity. Particularly in the 

emerging areas of peacebuilding and reconstructing failed states, the UNDG needs 

a more formal and coherent action plan for how it will tap state-building capaci

-

ties from around the system. The United States should encourage the trend toward 

merging the governing boards of independent agencies, as currently piloted by the 

joint meetings of UNDP, UNICEF, and WFP governing boards.

❚ Empower resident coordinators with regard to sectorwide strategies and 

budgets. The United Nations country resident coordinator should be supported 

to better coordinate sectorwide approaches among United Nations agencies as 

well as Bretton Woods institutions (such as the World Bank). There should be 

a single budgeting process and budget presentation that is consolidated all year 

round, not only for an occasional publication, and where possible, a common 

location for UN country offices. To improve the overall quality of UN resident 

coordinators, the United Nations should make it easier to draw them from all 

UN agencies, not just UNDP. It should also lower the barrier to the timely 

recruitment of qualified resident coordinators from outside the UN system.

❚ Apply new business models for delivering assistance, including greater partner-

ship between UN agencies and the private sector. Among the models that UN 

agencies should seek to adopt and adapt are some pioneered by the Millennium 

Challenge Corporation—setting clear, independently measurable standards. New 

business models should not be confined merely to how UN agencies themselves 

behave; they should include new business models for understanding how poverty 
H E L P I N G P E O P L E A N D N A T I O N S : D E V E L O P M E N T A N D H U M A N I T A R I A N A S S I S T A N C E 121

reduction is actually achieved—through policy changes to increase economic 

freedom and the rule of law, which lead to improved economic growth. UN and 

other public aid should be viewed as complementary public investment in such 

public goods as health, education, and infrastructure to support private invest

-

ment. Aid should focus on improvements in governance, including anticorrup

-

tion and the rule of law, that support private investment and entrepreneurship. 

Development tools such as microfinance should likewise be supported as a means 

for both direct enterprise creation and education in markets for people other

-

wise unfamiliar with them. In general, more UN agencies need to learn to work 

through the private organizations, both nonprofit and commercial, in their field 

implementation. UN agencies and Bretton Woods institutions can build more on 

the United Nations Office of Procurement Services (UNOPS) business model, 

which is less bureaucratic, more flexible, more results-oriented, and makes better 

use of delivery capacities in the private sector. Rather than competing with one 

another, UN assistance agencies should become less operational and subcontract 

more, and in the process frame a competitive bidding environment among fieldbased partners.

❚ Rationalize and simplify the funding of UN programs. There should be a 

detailed study that assesses field assistance operations and the issues of moving 

them off the assessed budget. More broadly, the entire budgets of UNHCR, WFP, 

WHO, UNICEF, the UN Population Fund (UNFPA), the UN Development 

Fund for Women (UNIFEM), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 

the International Labor Organization (ILO), the International Fund for 

Agricultural Development (IFAD), the UN Industrial Development Organization 

(UNIDO), UNDP, and other assistance-oriented agencies outside the Secretariat 

could be fully funded through voluntary funding. This would allow clearer corre

-

spondence in foreign aid programs managed by the United Nations between 

donors such as the U.S. government and the programs they are supporting. As a 

next step, UN operational agencies, both in the UNDG and on the humanitarian 

side, should build on the recent donor principles negotiated at the Organization 

for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and in the Good 

Humanitarian Donorship Initiative, to simplify the way that the whole set of UN 

programs is presented for funding to donors and, in turn, how donors can more 

coherently respond.

❚ The Consolidated Appeals Process (CAPS) model—which greatly improves 

transparency and improves the ability of member governments to donate to 

priority programs—should be replicated beyond its current application in 

humanitarian relief to other domains of UN assistance, such as child survival, 

peacebuilding, rule of law, postcrisis recovery (including demobilization and rein

-

tegration of soldiers), and disaster risk mitigation.20

❚ Allow leading UN officials and resident coordinators to appoint the personnel 

they wish, but hold them accountable for the mission and results. In turn, UN 

officials also should exercise the right to terminate employment of staff for poor 

or nonperformance, and the United Nations should move toward performance-
122 A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M

based compensation. Particularly in field operations, project work should not 

inherit from the Secretariat a presumption of lifetime entitlement akin to the 

foreign or civil service. The UN quota system of employment should be limited 

to hiring people with demonstrated skill sets.

❚ UN field offices should be encouraged to continue moving toward common 

services. More common services should be shared between UN assistance agen

-

cies, including collocation, base stations, information and telecommunications, 

procurement, logistics, security, personnel, assessment missions, mapping, public 

communication, and NGO liaison.

❚ Establish third-party and independent mechanisms for auditing, monitoring, 

and evaluation. Independent evaluation is required in order for the U.S. govern

-

ment, other governments, and the UN development agencies to learn from past 

experience and respond with institutional change. UN development and relief 

agencies should adopt proven corporate practices in measuring outcomes. As 

it is, they continue to monitor and report only their throughput (how much 

they spent) and how many target populations were visited (although UNDP 

has recently launched results-based management based on outcomes or impact, 

related to the MDGs). Both the UN Office of Internal Oversight (OIOS) and 

a revitalized JIU can play an important role in auditing and evaluation, with a 

mandate to make the workings and accomplishments of the United Nations open 

to the public. In the development field, the World Bank can usefully contribute 

expertise in establishing performance measures.

Recommendations for Containing Disease ❚ Strengthen the lead, coordinating role of WHO in combating infectious 

diseases. Subject to the consent of sovereign nations, WHO’s emergency author-

ity needs to be augmented21 to better achieve its goal of rapidly containing new 

types of pandemic diseases. This is particularly important with regard to inter

-

national disease surveillance and early warning, including issues pertaining to 

international travel and quarantine of individuals, which require coordination 

with municipal, state, and national governments.22 The WHO’s natural strength 

is in establishing global norms and regulations, managing scientific knowledge, 

collecting field data (disease surveillance), and intervening to stop the spread of 

communicable diseases.23 WHO should focus on infectious diseases that harm 

poor countries, not tertiary issues like the use of tobacco or obesity. In order for 

WHO to better meet expectations by the U.S. government and other donors 

to understand, model, detect, and address diseases arising from animal vectors, 

the animal and veterinary epidemiology divisions and capabilities of the FAO24

should be transferred from FAO to WHO.25 To achieve greater operational qual

-

ity, WHO needs to have a clearer line of authority from its headquarters to its 

field offices.26 Therefore, WHO’s charter should be amended to revise its current 

governance structure, eliminating the veto authority and governance authority of 

the regional structures. (One way of doing this is for WHO’s governing council 

to seek this potentially controversial change of its charter via a request from the 

United Nations General Assembly.)27
H E L P I N G P E O P L E A N D N A T I O N S : D E V E L O P M E N T A N D H U M A N I T A R I A N A S S I S T A N C E 123 ❚ WHO should operate in all areas of the world. Taiwan, for instance, has been 

excluded from WHO membership due to the opposition of China. This deprives 

the organization of valuable resources and significantly impedes the fight against 

the SARS epidemic and other infectious diseases. Taiwan should have the closest 

possible association with WHO.

❚ Strengthen and mandate UNICEF to regain the lead it once had, ten years ago, 

in the global efforts for child survival and against hunger and nutritional defi

-

ciency diseases. One UN agency should assume responsibility for the lead role 

in the stalled efforts to reduce malnutrition in developing countries, a role which 

UNICEF previously played and needs to reacquire through consolidation of 

the various small nutrition oversight cells within WFP, FAO, UNAIDS, UNDP, 

IFAD, and the Administrative Committee on Coordination/Standing Committee 

on Nutrition (ACC/SCN).

❚ Every five years, revisit the fragmentation of multilateral action in health. In 

recent years, there has been a proliferation of entities with redundant objectives, 

creating unnecessary competition and inefficiency—for example, UNAIDS and 

the Global Fund for HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, which duplicate work 

already done by WHO and the World Bank. Governments should periodically 

review these newer entities to determine the most efficient manner of achieving 

overall objectives. UNAIDS, which nominally blends the work of nine other UN 

agencies, but in fact is a stand-alone agency based in Geneva, brings added value 

in concentrating attention and mobilizing resources in a common spirit, which is 

called for at times in history.28 Along with that, WHO remains the larger normsetting, guidelines-publishing body.29

Recommendations for Alleviating Disaster ❚ Re-engineer the current UN relief architecture. The United States should lead a 

serious, high-level effort to address the problem of too many independent agen

-

cies, with overlapping responsibilities, inefficient competition, and persistent 

failures to respond in certain sectors. Instead of more ad hoc, short-term arrange

-

ments, deeper, more long-term changes should be considered, such as redefining 

the mandate of UNHCR, or building the capacity of one UN operational agency 

to ensure the delivery of whatever assistance is required by refugees, IDPs, and 

other persons affected by natural disaster.30 One agency responsible for relief, plus 

mitigation and recovery, can combine the capabilities, missions, budget streams, 

and field presence of any set of existing agencies

❚ Require that 15–20 percent of disaster funding be spent toward risk reduction 

and mitigation. Crises have always captured the attention and money of donors, 

after the fact and therefore too late to avert the impact of the crisis. The United 

States should promote the benefits of disaster mitigation to other donors and 

collectively aim for increasing current levels.31 UN agencies also underspend on 

mitigation and should be required, via U.S. earmarks, to devote more of their 

field program expenditures to risk prevention, mitigation, and preparedness.
124 A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M

NOTES

1. The substantial economic analysis in this area is summarized and expanded upon in chapter 2, 

“Spurring and Sustaining Economic Growth” of the Global Monitoring Report 2005, published by 

the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Also see Marc A. Miles, Edwin J. Feulner, 

and Mary Anastasia O’Grady, 2005 Index of Economic Freedom (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage 

Foundation and Dow Jones & Company, Inc., 2005).

2. The fifteen agencies are International Labor Organization; Food and Agriculture Organization 

of the United Nations; UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; World Health 

Organization; World Bank Group; International Monetary Fund; The International Civil 

Aviation Organization; International Maritime Organization; International Telecommunication 

Union; Universal Postal Union; World Meteorological Organization; World Intellectual Property 

Organization; International Fund for Agricultural Development; United Nations Industrial 

Development Organization; and the World Tourism Organization.

3. A fifth organ, the Trusteeship Council, could theoretically be pivotal should the United Nations 

establish a trusteeship over a country as was done, for instance, in East Timor. The secretarygeneral called for its revitalization in the late 1990s, and yet little has come of it, presumably 

because lead member states such as the United States found it too weak for the dangerous peacemaking and enforcement missions in Afghanistan and Iraq. In his latest report, he favors its abolition. But the institution itself deserves additional review, even if it would be more applicable to a 

state such as Liberia rather than Iraq. Where the United States does not intend a viceroy model 

such as that employed after World War II in Germany and Japan, the notion of an international 

trusteeship following a protective war could be a valuable multilateral mechanism for burdensharing. Only the sixth organ, the International Court of Justice, is more removed from humanitarian and development assistance, although there is a potential for more systematic linkages 

between the UN presence on the ground and deliberations over human rights abuses and crimes 

against humanity.

4. A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility. Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, 

Challenges, and Change, (New York: United Nations, 2004), 86.

5. See United Nations, In Larger Freedom Towards Development, Security, and Human Rights for All.

Report of the Secretary-General. (New York: United Nations, 2005).

6. United Nations, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility. (New York: United Nations, 

2004).

7. Basic Facts About the United Nations, 39.

Remittances

3.2%

Scholarships

0.1%

USA AID

1.4%

Other US ODA

0.2%

Multilat Dev. Banks

0.3%

US Imports from poor

countries

52.2%

to the UN

0.5%

UN peacekeeping

0.1%

Private giving

2.4%

FDI

39.6%

Figure 2. Resource flows from the United States to developing countries

Note: Numbers are based on U.S. federal appropriations for 2003 and other estimates by U.S. think tanks.
H E L P I N G P E O P L E A N D N A T I O N S : D E V E L O P M E N T A N D H U M A N I T A R I A N A S S I S T A N C E 125

8. Stephen Klingebiel, Effectiveness and Reform of the United Nations Development Programme 

(UNDP) (London: Frank Cass, 1999), 69–72.

9. One area in which UNDP has played a critical role is bringing together a core quartet of opera-

tional UN agencies: the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the UN Population Fund (UNFPA), 

and the World Food Program (WFP). The UN Development Group comprises Secretariat 

bodies as well as the other development funds and programs and the following UN institutions: 

Conference on Trade and Development, Drug Control Program, Environment Program, Office 

of the High Commissioner for Refugees, Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the 

Near East, and Human Settlements Programm (UN-Habitat).

10. John Cassidy, “Always with Us: Jeffrey Sachs’s Plan to Eradicate World Poverty,” The New Yorker,

April 11, 2005.

11. Established in 1946 as the UN International Children’s Emergency Fund for Postwar Europe, 

UNICEF has evolved its mission over the decades, under its governing council—on which the 

United States serves—to now play a leading role in advocacy for the rights of children, and 

for helping countries with field-level delivery of primary health care, maternal education, and 

hygiene. One of UNICEF’s competitive strengths vis-á-vis other UN agencies is that is relied 

upon by all actors to provide 40 percent of all childhood vaccines in the world, or all the vaccines 

from the UN system, alongside the special work of the Pan American Health Organization 

(PAHO) in the Americas.

12. For example, the U.S. armed forces maintain a state-of-the-art laboratory network around 

the world, a pivotal (and at this point in time indispensable) element of the Global Emerging 

Infections Surveillance and Response System (GEIS). U.S. support to global infectious disease 

surveillance also extends to the participation of U.S. veterinarians and the Association for 

Assessment and Accreditation of Laboratory Animal Care International.

13. The FEWS project, designed in 1986, has been, per dollar invested, one of the most efficient, and 

high-impact efforts that Congress has ever funded, saving millions of lives by catalyzing timely 

aid.

14. As an example, in the Western Hemisphere, the PAHO supports health programs throughout 

Latin America, the Caribbean, and North America. Among other things, the PAHO procures and 

ships childhood vaccines for its many member states. The PAHO has also been a leader among 

all UN agencies in designing systemwide approaches to natural disaster response, including relief 

logistics.

15. Because the U.S. government has a special relationship with the PAHO, commensurate with 

its special role in the hemisphere, and is proud that the PAHO is based in Washington, D.C., 

the U.S. government may be conflicted about diminishing PAHO’s role vis-à-vis Geneva. 

Nevertheless, Congress should recognize that there are courses of reform that can maintain 

PAHO’s level of importance and activities in day-to-day programming, while at the same time 

providing the necessary authority, oversight, and global coherence roles that WHO requires at a 

central level.

16. In 1992, at the behest of a U.S. government initiative, the United Nations created the 

Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA), which later was renamed the Office for the 

Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Because of donor frustrations with field coor

-

dination in relief, this office has grown dramatically in the last ten years, even as UNHCR and 

other emergency entities have remained flat-lined in their budgets and activities.

17. The current, 2005, minister in charge of the Department for International Development (DFID), 

Hilary Benn, has proposed a number of enhancements to UN humanitarian aid, including the 

proposition that OCHA should have its own $1 billion fund for executing relief operations and no 

longer be tied to the goodwill of other UN agencies to see results. OCHA officials interviewed by 

the USIP Task Force on the UN were wary of OCHA becoming operational and losing its neutral

-

ity vis-à-vis other UN agencies. In any case, it would completely change OCHA’s style and role.

18. Water supply—when it is lacking in absolute volume—is more important than water quality.

19. In fact, these were the reasons for the original creation of UNDRO, DHA, and OCHA; they 

were simply unable to be realized given the architecture of the larger UN system that these groups 

confronted.

20. For example, new “Mitigation Appeals Process (MAPs) and a Recovery Appeals Process (RAPs).”
126 A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M

21. Discussion of these authorities is currently under review within WHO’s executive board with 

participation of the U.S. government.

22. Among its lead roles, WHO, for any category of humanitarian emergency, should lead the inter-

national system in defining which diseases or conditions are notifiable (reportable), which “essen-

tial drugs” should be imported (in concert with the national Ministry of Health), and in fashion-

ing the surveillance system and surveys.

23. An interesting recent example occurred when WHO was asked by governments to convene 

experts to render an opinion, highly visible and controversial, about whether genetically modified 

foods were dangerous to persons consuming them. This occurred during the height of the food 

aid response in southern Africa in fall 2002, when several food-deficit countries put off allowing 

U.S. food aid (corn primarily) to be given for urgent humanitarian purposes on account of appre-

hensions about this genetically modified food’s safety. WHO did render and publish an opinion 

stating that there were no known or proven adverse health outcomes from genetically modified 

food, though the wording left open the possibility that harmful health effects might be discovered 

in the future.

24. FAO’s Emergency Prevention System for Trans-Boundary Animal and Plant Pests and Diseases 

(EMPRES), established in 1994, should be moved to WHO. Similarly, the normative functions 

of the FAO in tracking the health aspects of edible foods and drugs, in the form of the Codex 

Alimentarius, should be transferred to WHO.

25. The Codex Alimentarius is at present jointly managed by the FAO and WHO to develop food 

standards and codes of practice that govern food trade. The FAO was established ahead of most 

other UN agencies: in 1943 in Hot Springs, Virginia, an interim commission was created and 

FAO was signed into being in 1945. It took a lead role in many areas because in the first part 

of the 1900s, most of the world’s population was still engaged in agriculture for a living. As the 

world economy diversifies, agriculture will play less and less a central organizing role in framing 

transboundary issues, such as product safety or disease alerts.

26. The regional structures currently prevent headquarters control. They should exist as regional 

offices but without the degree of control they have had to override WHO’s central authority. 

Currently, WHO as a whole reports to its governing council and not to ECOSOC or the Security 

Council. The General Assembly plays a somewhat neutral, and therefore feasible role, in achiev

-

ing WHO rechartering.

27. Even in its dealings with member states, the General Assembly’s resolutions are not like those of a 

legislature; they do not establish binding obligations on members.

28. At present, the fact that it is nonoperational, but norm-setting, is valuable because it is widely 

respected as neutral and lacking conflicts of interest. It is also of value because its neutrality is 

useful for shedding light on the emerging AIDS spread in regions, such as central, south, and 

east Asia, that are reluctant both politically and socially to acknowledge their indigenous AIDS 

epidemic.

29. A key reason why UNAIDS was not simply left as a part of WHO was the counterweight of 

UNDP, which also had active AIDS programs. The compromise between WHO and UNDP was 

to create a stand-alone entity, UNAIDS.

30. It could also become the UN system’s lead agency in two related areas: disaster risk reduction and 

postcrisis recovery. The reason that it might be the lead UN agency for implementing disaster risk 

reduction and postcrisis recovery (currently a task UNDP champions) is because the best way to 

achieve both objectives is during relief activities, using bursts of relief funds to design interven

-

tions according to principles of “developmental relief.” No UN agency currently has the demon

-

strated ability to be a lead in disaster mitigation or preparedness, as it involves a different way of 

thinking, which it would be mandated to mainstream.

31. The current proportion of disaster funding spent on mitigation is somewhere between 2 percent 

and 8 percent, but difficult to measure for two reasons. First, as a bad practice, aid agencies hide 

programs that are aimed at mitigation by labeling them something else (relief or development), 

because of a disinterest in mitigation by donors. Second, as a good practice, much of the mitiga

-

tion/prevention aspects of relief and development programs are blended in as “developmental 

relief,” and it is therefore difficult to label as fitting either in a relief cost accounting category 

or a mitigation category. The development minister of the UK, Hilary Benn, has proposed that 

a minimum of 10 percent of disaster funds be spent on mitigation. As a proportion of overall 

foreign aid, the proportion spent on risk mitigation is closer now to 1 percent

.
Appendixes

A P P E N D I X E S 129

APPENDIX A: TASK FORCE ON THE UNITED NATIONS

CONSULTATIONS, DECEMBER—MAY 2005

Austria

Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency 

IAEA Senior Officials

Belgium

Deputy U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO and senior staff

U.S. Representative to NATO Military Committee

Headquarters, U.S. European Command 

Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe 

UK Permanent Representative to NATO

Norwegian Permanent Representative to NATO

 NATO Secretary-General and senior staff

EU officials

Canada

Prime Minister 

Minister of Foreign Affairs

Assistant Deputy Minister Global Affairs, Foreign Affairs

Vice President, Canadian International Development Agency

Assistant Deputy Minister North America, Foreign Affairs

Director-General, Policy Planning, Department of Defense

Director-General, International Security Bureau, Foreign Affairs

Director-General, Global Issues, Foreign Affairs

Cote d’Ivoire

Economic Affairs Section Chief, U.S. Embassy

Representative, UNDP

Representative, UNHCR

France

Director for United Nations and International Organizations 

French Foreign Ministry

General Meetings

UN Association of Canada

Department of State/Office for the Coordinator for Reconstruction and

 Stabilization

U.S. Government Accountability Office

National Security Council

John R. Mathiason

Stephen Stedman, Research Director, United Nations High-Level Panel on 

Threats, Challenges, and Change

Daniel Fata, Senate Republican Policy Committee

Edward Luck, Columbia University

Ambassador (ret.) James Dobbins, RAND Corporation
130 A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M

Joshua Muravchik, American Enterprise Institute

Anne Bayefsky, Hudson Institute

Ambassador (ret.) David Birenbaum, Woodrow Wilson Center

Vidar Helgesen, State Secretary, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Rolf Ekéus, OSCE Commissioner on National Minorities

Mark Malloch Brown, Chief of Staff to the UN Secretary-General

Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations

William H. Luers, Chairman and President of the United Nations Association

Timothy Wirth, President of the United Nations Foundation

Ambassador Jan Eliasson, Sweden (incoming President of the General 

Assembly)

Ambassador (ret.) Max Kampelman, Georgetown University

Dick Thornburgh, former Attorney General and UN Under Secretary-General 

for Administration

Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Secretary of State

Japanese Embassy Officials in Washington, D.C

German Embassy Officials in Washington, D.C..

South Korean Embassy Officials in Washington, D.C.

Ghana

Representative and Acting UN Resident Coordinator, WHO

Representative, UNICEF

Representative, WFP

Representative, UNFPA

Resident Representative, UNDP

Officer, Poverty Reduction Unit, UNDP

Peace and Governance Adviser, UNDP

Representative, IMF

Partnership Officer, World Bank

Executive Director, Integrated Social Development Center

Director, West Africa Network for Peacebuilding

Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy

Director-General, Private Enterprise Foundation

George Gyan-Baffour, Deputy Minister, Ministry of Finance

Alex Newton, Deputy Director, USAID

Haiti

UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)

Special Representative of the Secretary-General and principal staff

Commander of UN Military Forces

Commanding officer of Jordanian Formed Police Unit

Commanding officer of Pakistani Formed Police Unit

Commanding officer of Chinese Formed Police Unit

Commanding officer of Jordanian Army Battalion

Acting UN Civilian Police Commander and staff

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reinsertion Program

U.S. Civilian Police Contingent officers
A P P E N D I X E S 131

UN Election Division officials

Organization of American States (OAS)

Ambassador and Head of Mission

Inter-American Development Bank

Head of Office

Haitian Government Officials

Prime Minister

Minister of Interior

Minister of Justice

Haitian National Police Director-General

U.S. Government Officials

American Ambassador

Political Officer

Police Advisor

USAID Country Director

Defense Attaché

Others

National Coalition on Human Rights

International Crisis Group

Representatives of political parties and local NGOs

Indonesia

Deputy U.S. Ambassador and senior officials

USAID/Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance/Disaster Assistance Response

 Team senior officials

World Health Organization

UN Development Program

Australian Aid

UN Children’s Fund

World Food Program 

Joint Logistics Center

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

Save the Children UK

International Organization of Migration

Office of the High Commission for Human Rights

U.S. Health and Human Services

Catholic Relief Services 

Liberia

Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Coordinator of United

 Nations Operations in Liberia

Ambassador, U.S. Embassy
132 A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M

Representative, OTI

Representative, OFDA

Representative, Food for Peace

Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy

Political Counselor, U.S. Embassy

Economic Officer, U.S. Embassy

Senior Program Officer and Senior Repatriation and Reintegration Officer, 

UNHCR

Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Coordinator of UN 

Operations

Director, LRRRC

Representatives, U.S. CIVPOL

Head, U.S. CIVPOL Contingent

Deputy Contingent Commander, U.S. CIVPOL

Acting Operations Coordinator, U.S. CIVPOL

Political Counselor, U.S. Embassy

Representative, USAID

Regional Security Officer, U.S. Embassy

Representative, USAID

Head of Mission, Norwegian Refugee Council

Acting Program Manager, Norwegian Refugee Council

Representative, WHO

Country Director, UNDP

Representative, UNICEF

Representative, FAO

Representative, WFP

Acting Head of Mission, IOM

Country Director, International Republican Institute

Country Director, National Democratic Institute

Director, USAID

Head of Delegation, International Committee of the Red Cross

Administrator, Catholic Archdiocese

Program Officer, Save the Children UK

Executive Director, Center for Democratic Empowerment

Executive Director, National Human Rights Center

Head of UN Elections Division and staff

Head of UN Civil Affairs Division and staff

Representative, UN Political Plans and Policy Division

Libya

Prime Minister

Mali

Representatives, U.S. Embassy

Officials, UNDP

Mali Government Officials, Millennium Challenge Account

Representative, West African Enterprise Network
A P P E N D I X E S 133

Representative, Eltham Green Christian Center

Representative, Primature

Director, Direction de la Cooperation International, Ministry of Foreign 

Affairs

Secretary-General, Ministry of Planning

UN Agencies

Director, USAID

Netherlands

President of the International Criminal Court (ICC)

Chief Prosecutor, ICC

President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 

(ICTY)

Chief Prosecutor, ICTY

Singapore

Officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Sweden

Hans Blix, former head of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and 

Inspection Commission

Switzerland

UN Development Program

World Health Organization

Acting High Commissioner for UNHCR

International Organization for Migration

Swedish Mission to the UN Geneva

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

UN Children’s Fund

Director, UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction

Officials from the U.S. Mission to UN Geneva

Officials from the European Commission

International Committee of the Red Cross

UN High Commissioner for Human Rights

Human Rights Officer, Sudan (via telephone from Khartoum)

U.S. Permanent Representative to the Human Rights Commission

United Kingdom Permanent Representative to the Human Rights Commission

Australia Permanent Representative to the Human Rights Commission

United Kingdom

Stephen Pattison

Emyr Jones Parry

Minister, DFID

Foreign Office Permanent Under Secretary

United Nations Headquarters, New York

UN Office of the Deputy Secretary-General
134 A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

UN Office of Legal Affairs

UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights

UN Office of the Special Adviser for the Prevention of Genocide

UN Department of Political Affairs, Africa Division

Mission of China to the UN

Mission of France to the UN

Mission of the United Kingdom to the UN

Mission of Nigeria to the UK

Mission of the United States to the UN

Under Secretary-General for Communications

United Nations Information Center

U.S. Representative to the United Nations for UN Management and Reform

Under Secretary-General and Legal Counsel,

Assistant Secretary-General, Office of Legal Affairs

Assistant Secretary-General for Human Resources

Under Secretary-General, Internal Oversight Services

Deputy Permanent Representative, Permanent Mission of Jamaica

Deputy to the President of the G-77 on GA Reform

Delegates to Fifth Committee

Department of Management, Procurement

Director of the Investigations Division, OIOS

Director, Legal Division, Office of Legal Affairs

Senior Adviser, UNDP Initiatives on UN Reform

Department of Political Affairs

Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations

Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations

Under Secretary-General for Management

United States Congress

House International Relations Committee Staff

Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff
A P P E N D I X E S 135

APPENDIX B: LEGISLATION ESTABLISHING THE TASK FORCE
136 A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M
A P P E N D I X E S 137
138 A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M
A P P E N D I X E S 139

APPENDIX C: THE UNITED NATIONS AS A SERIES OF CONCENTRIC RINGS

World Bank 

Group

IMF

World Bank 

Group

UPU

WMO

WTO

ILO UNIDO

FAO

UNESCO

ICAO

IMO

ITU

WIPO

IFAD

Fully Independent 

Speciaiized 

Agencies

Semi-Independent 

Programs and 

Funds**

UNDCP

UNICEF

UNHCR

WFP

UNHabitat

CharterEstablished 

Bodies*

Security

Council

Secretariat: 

(Headed by SG)

General 

Assembly

Economic & Social Council

supports

UNDP

UNRWA UNFPA

UNEP

 * Most funded by regular budget through assessed contributions

** Funded primarily by voluntary contributions but generally bound by rules of Secretariat

WHO

“The UN” can refer to several different entities: the collection of national governments that are its members and decision makers, the staff whose function it is to 

carry out the decisions of the member states, or the large number of intergovernmental organizations that are loosely, collectively labeled “the UN system.” To ensure 

clarity, it is helpful to think of the United Nations as a series of concentric rings.

At its core, the United Nations is an intergovernmental entity established by the 

UN Charter, with four intergovernmental bodies: the General Assembly, which 

includes every member state; the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), which 
140 A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M

includes a rotating membership of fifty-four member states; the Security Council, 

comprising fifteen member states, five of whom (the United States, the United 

Kingdom, Russia, France, and China), known collectively as the Permanent Five, 

or P-5, are permanent and have veto power; and the defunct Trusteeship Council. 

These bodies are supported by a staff of international civil servants in the UN 

Secretariat, which is headed by the secretary-general. Most of these entities and their 

activities are funded under the regular budget, for which member states are assessed 

dues by the General Assembly. Peacekeeping is funded by a separate assessed 

budget and is carried out under the auspices of the Secretariat’s Department of 

Peacekeeping Operations.

In the next ring out, the United Nations includes a series of what are called “Funds 

and Programs,” semi-independent entities established by the General Assembly, such 

as the UN Development Program and the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF). The 

“Funds and Programs” (not to be confused with activities in the “core,” or first ring, 

which misleadingly are also referred to as “Programs”) report to independent boards 

of member states and are funded primarily by voluntary contributions, but are gen

-

erally bound by the rules and procedures of the Secretariat.

The last ring out is the UN system, which includes all of the specialized agencies 

(the UN Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization, or UNESCO; the World 

Health Organization; the Food and Agriculture Organization; etc.) that are loosely 

affiliated with the United Nations but are fully independent entities, based on 

their own separate treaties, and that are not subject to the authority of the secretarygeneral or the General Assembly. The chapter in this report on assessment of UN 

internal reform covers only the first two rings, as the specialized agencies operate 

independently. A major issue not covered in this report is the need for coordination 

across the agencies.
141

LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACABQ Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions 

ACC/SCN Administrative Committee on Coordination/Standing Committee on 

AIDS Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome 

AU African Union 

BW Biological Weapons

BWC Biological Weapons Convention

CAPS Consolidated Appeals Process

CD Conference on Disarmament

CDC United States Centers for Disease Control

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

COO Chief Operating Officer

CTC Counterterrorism Committee

CTED Counterterrorism Executive Directorate

CW Chemical Weapons

CWC Chemical Weapons Convention

DCI Director of Central Intelligence

DOD U.S. Department of Defense 

DPA Department of Political Affairs

DPKO Department of Peacekeeping Operations

ECOSOC Economic and Social Council

EU European Union

FAO Food and Agriculture Organization

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FEWS Famine Early Warning System

GA General Assembly

GAO U.S. Government Accountability Office

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GPOI Global Peace Operations Initiative

HCHR High Commissioner for Human Rights

HNP Haitian National Police

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

IDP Internally Displaced Persons

IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development

ILO International Labor Organization

IMF International Monetary Fund

IOB Independent Oversight Committee

ISG Iraq Survey Group

JIU Joint Inspection Unit

MCA Millennium Challenge Account

MCC Millennium Challenge Corporation

MDG Millennium Development Goals

MICAH International Civilian Support Mission in Haiti

MINUSTAH United Nations Mission in Haiti 
142

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGO Nongovernmental Organization

NIH National Institutes of Health

NPT Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

OAS Organization of American States

OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

ODA Official Development Assistance

OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

OFF Oil-for-Food Program

OIOS Office of Internal Oversight Services

OMB U.S. Office of Management and Budget 

OPCW Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

P-5 UN Security Council Permanent Five (United States, Russia, 

England, France, and China)

PRM Bureau of Population Refugees and Migration (U.S. Department 

 of State)

PSI Proliferation Security Initiative

PVO Private Voluntary Organization

S/CRS Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization 

 (U.S. Department of State)

SAPG Special Adviser for the Prevention of Genocide

SARS Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome

SC Security Council

SG Secretary-General

SRSG Special Representative of the Secretary General

TPB Terrorism Prevention Branch

UN United Nations

UNAIDS Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS

UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

UNDG United Nations Development Group 

UNDP United Nations Development Program

UNESCO United Nations Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organization

UNFPA United Nations Population Fund

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund

UNIDO United Nations Industrial Development Organization

UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

UNIFEM United Nations Development Fund for Women

UNMOVIC United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection 

 Commission

UNOPS United Nations Office of Procurement Services

UNSCOM United Nations Special Commission 

UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development

WFP World Food Program

A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M
143

WHO World Health Organization

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction

L I S T O F A C R O N Y M S
144

MEMBERS OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE

UNITED NATIONS

The members of the Task Force are a diverse and bipartisan group of distinguished Americans from a variety of 

professions and backgrounds. They include former diplomats, policymakers, business executives, and military leaders. The Task Force is co-chaired by Newt Gingrich, former Speaker of the House of Representatives, and George 

Mitchell, former Majority Leader of the Senate.

Newt Gingrich, Former Speaker of the House of 

Representatives (Co-Chair)

CEO, Gingrich Group

George J. Mitchell, Former Majority Leader of the Senate 

(Co-Chair)

Chairman, DLA Piper Rudnick Gray Cary, LLP

Wesley K. Clark, General U.S. Army (Ret.)

Chairman and CEO, Wesley K. Clark & Associates

Edwin J. Feulner

President, The Heritage Foundation

Roderick M. Hills

Partner, Hills & Stern, LLP

Donald McHenry, Ambassador (Ret.)

Distinguished Professor, School of Foreign Service, 

Georgetown University

Thomas R. Pickering, Ambassador (Ret.)

Senior Vice President, International Relations, 

The Boeing Company

Danielle Pletka

Vice President, Foreign and Defense Policy, 

American Enterprise Institute

Anne-Marie Slaughter

Dean, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and 

International Affairs, Princeton University

A. Michael Spence

Partner, Oak Hills Capital Partners

Malcolm Wallop, Former U.S. Senator 

Chairman and Founder, Frontiers of Freedom

R. James Woolsey

Former Director of Central Intelligence

Vice President, Booz Allen Hamilton

Senior Advisers

Charles G. Boyd, General U.S. Air Force (Ret.)

President and CEO, Business Executives for National 

Security

J. Robinson West

Chairman, PFC Energy

Chairman of the Board of Directors, U.S. Institute of 

Peace

A M E R I C A N I N T E R E S T S A N D U N R E F O R M
TA S K F O R C E O N T H E U N I T E D N A T I O N S 145

TASK GROUP MEMBERS AND EXPERTS

As directed by the Congress, the U.S. Institute of Peace 

has organized the Task Force with the support and participation of leading public policy organizations, including the American Enterprise Institute, the Brookings 

Institution, the Center for Strategic and International 

Studies (CSIS), the Council on Foreign Relations, the 

Heritage Foundation, and the Hoover Institution. Each of 

these institutions provided a number of experts to support 

the members of the Task Force. Below is a list of experts 

listed by Task Force working groups.

Group One: Preventing and Ending Conflicts and 

Building Stable Societies

Members 

• Wesley K. Clark (Wesley K. Clark & Associates)

• Malcolm Wallop (Frontiers of Freedom)

Experts

• Eric Schwartz, Coordinator (Council on Foreign 

Relations)

• Frederick Barton (CSIS)

• Bathsheba Crocker (CSIS)

• Michael McFaul (Hoover Institution)

• William Nash (Council on Foreign Relations)

Group Two: Preventing and Responding to 

Genocide and Gross Human Rights Violations

Member

• Anne-Marie Slaughter (Princeton University)

Senior Adviser 

• J. Robinson West (PFC Energy)

Experts 

• Tod Lindberg, Coordinator (Hoover Institution)

• Ivo Daalder (Brookings Institution)

• Lee Feinstein (Council on Foreign Relations)

• Joseph Loconte (Heritage Foundation)

Group Three: Preventing Catastrophic Terrorism 

and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass 

Destruction

Member 

• Thomas R. Pickering (The Boeing Company)

Senior Adviser 

• Charles G. Boyd (Business Executives for National 

Security)

Experts 

• Robert Einhorn, Coordinator (CSIS)

• Michael O’Hanlon (Brookings Institution)

• James Phillips (Heritage Foundation)

Group Four: Ensuring the Effectiveness, Integrity, 

Transparency, and Accountability of the UN System

Members 

• Edwin J. Feulner (Heritage Foundation)

• Roderick M. Hills (Hills & Stern)

Experts 

• Ann Florini, Coordinator (Brookings Institution)

• Nile Gardiner (Heritage Foundation)

• Branka Jikich (CSIS)

• James Lindsay (Council on Foreign Relations)

• Brett Schaefer (Heritage Foundation)

Group Five: Fostering Economic Development and 

Reducing Poverty

Members 

• Donald McHenry (Georgetown University)

• A. Michael Spence (Oak Hills Capital Partners)

Experts 

• Patrick Cronin, Coordinator (CSIS)

• Kenneth Anderson (Hoover Institution)

• Steve Hansch (Georgetown University)