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UNITED STates institute of peace

© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

“Electoral violence, 

especially recurrent, seems 

indicative of more widespread 

systemic grievances and 

tensions. Tensions over land 

rights, employment and ethnic 

marginalization are three 

dominant characteristics of 

recurring electoral violence.”

March 10, 2010 

Trends in Electoral Violence in 

Sub-Saharan Africa

Summary

•	 Studies indicate that violence in Africa’s elections affects between 19 and 25 percent of elections. In many countries where electoral violence is a risk, it tends to recur and may consequently lead to an unfavorable view of democratization. 

•	 The regularity with which electoral violence occurs suggests that underlying grievances or 

structural characteristics may be tied to the elections and fuel the violence.

•	 Electoral violence, especially recurrent, seems indicative of more widespread systemic grievances and tensions. Tensions over land rights, employment and ethnic marginalization are 

three dominant characteristics of recurring electoral violence. These areas intersect and are 

frequently manipulated by politicians. 

•	 Some recent actions taken by the government and civil society may offer insights into reversing the trends of recurring violence. These actions warrant further analysis in order to improve 

strategies to reduce violence.

Conflict and tension during elections have been common in Africa’s new democracies—coming 

into existence in the 1990s during the third wave of democracy.1 In fact, many new democracies, 

especially those with strong authoritarian legacies or deep ethnic cleavages common in many 

African countries, find it difficult to manage political opposition. 2 The manner in which these tensions are managed can make the difference between an election that proceeds peacefully versus 

one that degenerates into violence. 

Luckily, most elections are not intensely violent. Although the media may focus on the horrific violence that followed the elections in Kenya and Zimbabwe, studies indicate that violence 

in Africa’s elections affects between 19 and 25 percent of elections.3 In many countries where 

electoral violence is a risk, it tends to recur and may consequently lead to an unfavorable view 

of democratization. In at least one case—Republic of Congo (or, Congo-Brazzaville)—one may 

argue that the electoral violence laid the foundation for a civil war. Unfortunately, attempts to 

prevent, understand and address electoral violence are not well developed. In many instances, the 

perpetrators are not charged, the victims receive little or no redress, and the causes of the violence 

remain unexamined. This Peace Brief will provide an overview of some characteristics of electoral 

violence and identify some responses taken by national governments and the international community to address electoral violence.

Dorina Bekoe

E-mail: dbekoe@usip.org

Phone: 202.429.4708

peaceBrieF13
© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

Recurrent Electoral Violence

Port Gentil and Libreville, Gabon; Northern Ghana; Niger Delta, Nigeria; Lome, Togo; and Kenya 

have all been scenes of repeated electoral violence. Indeed, the regularity with which electoral 

violence occurs in many areas suggests that underlying grievances or structural characteristics 

may be tied to the elections and fuel the violence. Academic research remains underdeveloped in 

this area, but a few scholars are beginning to focus on grievances over land rights, jobs and ethnic 

marginalization as contributing to electoral violence. In reality, these tensions intersect and are 

frequently manipulated by politicians. 

Land

The politicization of ill-designed or unfair land tenure laws has served to motivate violence in 

a number of cases. As Catherine Boone argues, tensions in Côte d’Ivoire over economic crises, 

nationalism and the unclear rights between indigenous and non-indigenous inhabitants in the 

country’s south and southwest regions were exploited by politicians who fanned the fears of the 

indigenous. Consequently, the non-indigenous—comprising true foreigners, Muslims, and those 

with northern sounding names—were often violently expelled from their lands and homes and 

subjected to harassment. The transformation of this conflict into one of citizenship and identity 

lies at the root of the violence following the 2000 elections and the attempted coup in 2002 by 

northern military personnel.4 

Economic marginalization

In other instances, politicians exploit sentiments of economic discrimination or dominance of one 

ethnic group by another. In Kenya’s Coast province, the 1997 parliamentary elections threatened 

to unseat the two representatives of the ruling Kenya African National Union party as they faced 

opposition from non-indigenous voters in the constituency. Concurrently, the Coast’s Digo people 

accused the non-indigenous of taking their jobs, educational opportunities and land. Exploiting 

these sentiments, politicians armed local groups to threaten the migrants, effectively driving them 

out. Approximately 130 migrants were killed and 100,000 were displaced. With the resulting 

displacement, the politicians retained their seats.5

Ethnic marginalization

Identity politics represent a third dominant characteristic of recurrent electoral violence. The chieftaincy dispute between the Kusasis and Mamprusis in Ghana’s northern region, which predates 

Ghana’s independence, serves as an example. In the past, the National Democratic Congress and 

its political tradition were seen to side with the Kusasi’s claims to chieftaincy and the traditional 

area, while the Mamprusis were validated by the New Patriotic Party and its political tradition. 

Thus, violence between the two groups occurs with each political cycle as each tries to undermine 

the others’ political aims by using violence to put their preferred political parties on top. In 2008, 

the violence and tensions reverberated beyond the northern regions, with conflicts erupting 

between the Kusasi and Mamprusi migrant communities in Accra.6

Undermining Democratization

There are indications that elections with high degrees of conflict or continuous violence may slow 

the consolidation of democracy. An analysis by Afrobarometer of Africans’ view of democracy 

suggests that poor elections are to blame for dissatisfaction with elections as means to attain 

Trends in Electoral Violence in sub-Saharan Africa

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© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

political representation. Indeed, among the eighteen countries surveyed by Afrobarometer, the 

three countries where elections have been relatively free of violence—Ghana, Botswana, and 

Namibia—are the most satisfied with elections as a means to engage the government. On the other 

hand, Zimbabwe, Nigeria and Zambia, where elections have been more violent and controversial, 

are the least satisfied.7

Violence can also undermine the entire election itself. With the presence or threat of violence, 

voters may opt not to register or decide to stay away from the polls altogether, candidates may 

withdraw, or politicians may use it as a reason to cancel or postpone the election.8 When domestic 

and international observers judge that an election has been marred by violence, the legitimacy of 

the result is jeopardized, as is the legitimacy of the elected official. For example, at the start of Nigerian President Umaru Yar’Adua’s term, he had to acknowledge the problems in Nigeria’s electoral 

process, and he was forced to submit to a review of his own electoral victory. Many other elected 

officials also saw their victories reviewed and, in a number of cases, reversed. This hardly serves as 

an auspicious beginning for an administration.

A Precursor to Civil War

One may argue that the postelection violence in 1993–1994 in the Republic of Congo laid the 

groundwork for its civil war in 1997. After the result of the May 1993 legislative election, which gave 

President Pascal Lissouba’s party a majority, was disputed by the other two contenders, Denis 

Sassou-Nguesso and Bernard Kolelas, violence erupted between their militias. The election was 

re-run in October 1993, and although the opposition picked up a few more seats, Lissouba’s party retained its majority. Even though the opposition agreed to participate in the assembly, violent clashes 

had resumed by November. Between November 1993 and January 1994 as many as 2,000 people 

were killed.9 In 1997, clashes between militia loyal to Sassou-Nguesso and Lissouba broke out as a result of disputes over electoral rules, attempts by Lissouba’s supporters to stop the electoral process, 

and claims of assassination attempts by Sassou-Nguesso, among other issues. From May 1997 until 

October when Sassou-Nguesso captured the presidential palace, as many as 15,000 people lost their 

lives.10 Clashes continued over the next two years, claiming the lives of 20,000 more.11

Management of Electoral Conflict and Violence

Despite Ghana’s recurrent electoral violence, actions taken in 2008 by the government and civil 

society may offer some insights to reversing this history. Three months before the December 

2008 general elections, the Ghana Center for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana) trained and 

deployed electoral violence observers to 26 constituencies that were considered likely to experience 

violence. The observers collected data on incidents of violence, perpetrators and victims, and the 

consequences of the violence. In partnership with the government’s National Commission on Civic 

Education and religious leaders, CDD-Ghana and the Coalition of Domestic Election Observers used 

this information to develop workshops promoting peace, broadcast radio programs encouraging 

peaceful elections, and organize educational events to promote peace and non-violence. Preliminary 

reports suggest that the number of violent incidents decreased after these interventions: 42 incidents 

of violence were recorded in the first month and 20 incidents in the second month of the project.12 

It is difficult to assess whether the activities of civil society and the government, in response to the 

observers’ reports, were solely responsible for the decrease in violence, but the effect and impact of 

their interventions still warrant careful analysis in order to improve strategies for reducing violence. 

Notwithstanding these efforts, during the tense days between the first and second rounds of the 

presidential election, a crowd—armed with machetes—gathered at the electoral commission’s 

Trends in Electoral Violence in sub-Saharan Africa

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© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

office to protest the first round’s results and the airwaves were littered with derogatory ethnic slurs. 

For countries less successful in preventing electoral violence, commissions have at times been 

established to inquire into the cause or extent of the violence; it may be treated as a passing 

phenomenon; or it may be addressed as a criminal matter. Following Kenya’s 1992 and 2007 elections, where more than 1,000 people died and several hundred thousand were displaced on each 

occasion, commissions were established to investigate the violence. These commissions have not 

resulted in punishing the perpetrators, though many were named. Ethiopia treated the electoral 

violence following the 2005 parliamentary elections as a criminal matter. Approximately 30,000 

suspected opposition supporters were arrested and charged with an assortment of crimes, including subverting the constitution.13 Yet other countries have treated incidents of violence as episodic 

phenomena, leaving them largely unaddressed by the national government. This occurred following the 2000 postelection violence in Côte d’Ivoire. 

Employing a more robust response, some countries develop a political agreement between 

opposition groups and the government in a bid to resolve the underlying causes of violence and 

maladministration of the election. Kenya, Zimbabwe, Togo, and Zanzibar have each adopted such 

agreements. While Kenya and Zimbabwe’s postelection political agreements (PPAs) have received 

a great deal of attention and are more robust than those of Togo and Zanzibar, it is still too early 

to evaluate their effectiveness. However, in light of the attention they have received, important 

considerations for policymakers are the implications for democratization efforts and the message it 

sends about the use of violence, when losing political parties are incorporated in a government of 

national unity in order to keep the peace. 

The agreements in Togo and Zanzibar portray two different paths for creating PPAs. Following 

the killing of approximately 500 to 800 people after the 2005 presidential elections, Togo created a 

government of national unity and agreed to a comprehensive political accord (CPA).14 In the CPA, 

Togo addressed some of the critical impediments to free and fair elections, such as the composition of the electoral commission, the creation and review of the voters’ registry, and the role of the 

security forces. The parties also agreed to the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. These reforms were meant to cover principally the 2007 legislative elections, which by all 

accounts proceeded smoothly and without violence. The CPA has been unevenly implemented and 

some of the reforms have been reversed. Indeed, the March 4, 2010 presidential elections have been 

followed by opposition protests over the transparency of the vote count; they claim to have won the 

election, but refuse to appeal to the constitutional court, as they do not believe it will adequately 

resolve the electoral dispute. 

Zanzibar began negotiations for the Muafaka Agreements after the 1995 elections produced 

protests from the opposition Civic United Front (CUF) about the fairness and legitimacy of the polls. 

The Muafaka Agreementsfocused on remedying the problems with registration, bias of the electoral 

commission, and other logistical issues. Muafaka I of 1999 was never implemented, plunging the 

2000 elections into a tense atmosphere. The victory of Chama Cha Mampinduzi (CCM) in Zanzibar’s 

legislative elections produced protests by CUF, who also charged CCM with harassment of their supporters. Thirty people were killed in clashes with police.15 After the violence, CCM and CUF negotiated Muafaka II of 2001. CUF and CCM did not create a GNU, forming instead the Joint Presidential 

Supervisory Commission. By the time of the 2005 elections, the Muafaka Agreement was largely 

unimplemented. Although the elections were not violent, the CUF refused to recognize the CCM 

government until 2009. At present, CCM and CUF are debating when and whether to form a GNU. 

With the 2010 elections scheduled for October, it remains to be seen if there is sufficient electoral 

reform and political good will to forestall violence. 

page 4 • PB 13 • March 10, 2010

Trends in Electoral Violence in sub-Saharan Africa
© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

United States 

Institute of Peace

1200 17th Street NW

Washington, DC 20036

202.457.1700

www.usip.org

Conclusion 

Electoral violence, especially the incidents that occur with some regularity, seems indicative of more 

widespread systematic grievances. Treating electoral violence as a criminal matter or a cyclical 

phenomenon is not likely to end future elections from being violent. The more robust approach 

of adopting postelection political agreements in Togo and Zanzibar showed early promise, but the 

protests following the recently held elections in Togo show a continuing institutional weakness for 

managing electoral conflict. 

Moreover, further research is needed to improve measurement of electoral violence and, correspondingly, the factors that trigger it; the effects of electoral violence on democratization; and 

effective methods for managing the threat or eruption of electoral violence.

Endnotes

1. Samuel P. Huntington defines the third wave of democracy in “The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth 

Century.” It captures democratizing countries after 1974 into the early 1990s.

2. Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder. Turbulent Transitions: Why Emerging Democracies go to War, in eds. Chester Crocker, 

Fen Olser Hampson, and Pamela Aall, “Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World”; Larry Diamond, 

Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset. Introduction: What Makes for Democracy? in eds. Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and 

Seymour Martin Lipset, “Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy.” 

3. Dorina Bekoe counts an election as violent if one person is killed; 25 percent meet this criterion (“Managing Electoral 

Conflict in Africa,” unpublished manuscript, March 2009); Scott Straus and Charles Taylor assigned gradations of violence, with 

19 percent representing those elections which feature repression, a violent campaign, and incidents leading to 20 or more 

deaths in a paper entitled, “Redistricting by Other Means: Democratization and Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1990-2007,” 

for a USIP Workshop on electoral violence in Africa, June 16-17, 2009. In a more general paper on electoral violence, Fischer 

finds that 24.5 percent of elections resulted in violence (Jeff Fischer. “Electoral Conflict and Violence: A Strategy for Study and 

Prevention.” IFES White Paper, 2002-01, February 5, 2002 (electronic version), pp. 17–18.

4. Catherine Boone. “Electoral Populism where Property Rights are Weak: Land Politics in Contemporary Sub-Saharan Africa.” 

Contemporary Politics. January 2009, pp. 183–201.

5. Human Rights Watch. “Playing with Fire: Weapons Proliferation, Political Violence, and Human Rights in Kenya.” May 2002, 

pp 2–3; 24.

6. CDD-Ghana and CODEO. “Preventing and Managing Conflict in Election 2008.” Final Draft Report, January 2009; Christian 

Lund. “ ‘Bawku is still volatile’: Ethno-political Conflict and State Recognition in Northern Ghana.” Journal of Modern African 

Studies, vol. 41 no. 4 (2003).

7. Afrobarometer. “Citizens and the State in Africa: New Results from Afrobarometer, Round 3.”Working Paper no. 61, May 2006, 

p 12.

8. Kristine Höglund. “Electoral Violence in Conflict-Ridden Societies: Concepts, Causes, and Consequences.” Terrorism and 

Political Violence, vol. 21 (2009), pp. 417–418.

9. U.S. Department of State, Congo Human Rights Practices, 1994; United Nations. “Congo-Brazzaville: Background Brief on 

Congo-Brazzaville.” October 22, 1997. Integrated Regional Information Network for the Great Lakes (http://www.africaaction.

org/docs97/braz9710.htm).

10. Remy Bazenguissa-Ganga. “The Spread of Political Violence in Congo-Brazzaville.” African Affairs (1999), vol. 98, pp. 39–42; 

Hanlie de Beer and Richard Cornwell. “Congo-Brazzaville: The deep end of the pool.” Occasional Paper No. 41, September 1999.

11. Polity IV Country Report 2003: Congo (Brazzaville); University of Maryland Center for International Development and 

Conflict Management.

12. Ghana Center for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana) “Conflict Prevention, Management and Peace Promotion 

in Election 2008: Observers’ Report, pp. 26-27;” Ghana Center for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana) and Coalition of 

Domestic Election Observers (CODEO), 2nd Stakeholder Confidential Briefing, November 21, 2008, p. 2. See also Franklin 

Oduro. “Preventing Electoral Violence.” USIP Workshop on Electoral Violence in Africa, June 16–17, 2009, Washington, D.C.

13. Lahra Smith. “Political Violence and Democratic Uncertainty in Ethiopia.” USIP Special Report, no. 192. August 2007, p. 7.

14. United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). La Mission d’établissement des faits chargée 

de faire la lumière sur les violences et les allégations de violations des droits de l’homme survenues au Togo avant, pendant 

et après l’élection présidentielle du 24 avril 2005, 29 August 2005 (http://www2.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/EVOD6H3JDK?OpenDocument).

15. “Constitutionalism and Political Stability in Zanzibar: The Search for a New Vision,” A Report of the Fact Finding Mission 

Organized Under the Auspices of Kituo Cha Katiba, October 2003 (http://www.kituochakatiba.co.ug/zanzibap.htm).

About This Brief

This Peace Brief seeks to provide 

an overview of some characteristics 

of electoral violence in sub-Saharan 

Africa and identify responses taken 

by national governments and the 

international community to address 

electoral violence.

USIP provides the analysis, training and 

tools that prevent and end conflicts, 

promotes stability and professionalizes 

the field of peacebuilding.

For media inquiries, contact the office 

of Public Affairs and Communications, 

202.429.4725

Trends in Electoral Violence in sub-Saharan Africa

page 5 • PB 13 • March 10, 2010