alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
### §11131. Requiring reports on medical malpractice payments

#### (a) In general

Each entity (including an insurance company) which makes payment under a policy of insurance, self-insurance, or otherwise in settlement (or partial settlement) of, or in satisfaction of a judgment in, a medical malpractice action or claim shall report, in accordance with section 11134 of this title, information respecting the payment and circumstances thereof.

#### (b) Information to be reported

The information to be reported under subsection (a) includes—

(1) the name of any physician or licensed health care practitioner for whose benefit the payment is made,

(2) the amount of the payment,

(3) the name (if known) of any hospital with which the physician or practitioner is affiliated or associated,

(4) a description of the acts or omissions and injuries or illnesses upon which the action or claim was based, and

(5) such other information as the Secretary determines is required for appropriate interpretation of information reported under this section.

#### (c) Sanctions for failure to report

Any entity that fails to report information on a payment required to be reported under this section shall be subject to a civil money penalty of not more than $10,000 for each such payment involved. Such penalty shall be imposed and collected in the same manner as civil money penalties under subsection (a) of section 1320a–7a of this title are imposed and collected under that section.

#### (d) Report on treatment of small payments

The Secretary shall study and report to Congress, not later than two years after November 14, 1986, on whether information respecting small payments should continue to be required to be reported under subsection (a) and whether information respecting all claims made concerning a medical malpractice action should be required to be reported under such subsection.

(Pub. L. 99–660, title IV, §421, Nov. 14, 1986, 100 Stat. 3788.)
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Charles Fairley, Appellant.

[820 NYS2d 922]

Judgment unanimously affirmed. Counsel’s motion to be relieved of assignment granted *(see People v Crawford,*71 AD2d 38 [1979]). (Appeal from Judgment of Monroe County Court, Frank E Geraci, Jr., J. — Violation of Probation). Present — Pigott, Jr., P.J., Kehoe, Martoche, Smith and Pine, JJ.
#### § 449.2 Form G-FINW, notification by financial institutions of cessation of status as government securities broker or dealer pursuant to section 15C(a)(1)(B)(i) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and § 400.6 of this chapter.

This form is to be used by financial institutions that are government securities brokers or dealers to notify their appropriate regulatory agency that they have ceased to function as a government securities broker or dealer. The form is promulgated by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and is available from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the SEC.

[52 FR 27956, July 24, 1987, as amended at 79 FR 38456, July 8, 2014]
#### In the Matter of the Claim of Hany Kattaya, Appellant. Commissioner of Labor, Respondent.

[822 NYS2d 319]

Appeal from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, filed September 2, 2005, which ruled that claimant was disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits because he voluntarily left his employment without good cause.

During claimant’s tenure as a security officer at a museum, he worked both the day shift and the night shift, preferring the latter because he received a pay differential and free parking. Due to disciplinary problems, the employer decided to transfer him to the day shift. Claimant refused to accept the transfer and tendered his resignation. Thereafter, he applied for unemployment insurance benefits and the Unemployment In*1125surance Appeal Board disqualified him from receiving them on the ground that he voluntarily left his employment without good cause. Claimant now appeals.

We affirm. It is well settled that dissatisfaction with one’s work schedule does not constitute good cause for leaving one’s employment (see *Matter of Shifreen [Commissioner of Labor],*23 AD3d 823, 823-824 [2005]; *Matter of Adorisio [Commissioner of Labor],*18 AD3d 942, 942 [2005]). Here, claimant admitted that the reason he left his job was because of his transfer to the day shift. Loss of the pay differential and his parking space, and the additional cost of commuting and childcare expenses associated with working during the day, are not compelling reasons for resigning under the circumstances presented *(see e.g. Matter of Seftel [Commissioner of Labor],*31 AD3d 1011, 1012 [2006]). Therefore, we decline to disturb the Board’s decision.

Cardona, P.J., Crew III, Carpinello, Mugglin and Kane, JJ., concur. Ordered that the decision is affirmed, without costs.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Martha Hjalte, Appellant.

The evidence adduced was insufficient to establish appellant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Nolan, P. J., Carswell, Adel, Wenzel and MaeCrate, JJ., concur.
### §1395w–1. Repealed. Pub. L. 105–33, title IV, §4022(b)(2)(A), Aug. 5, 1997, 111 Stat. 354

Section, act Aug. 14, 1935, ch. 531, title XVIII, §1845, as added and amended Apr. 7, 1986, Pub. L. 99–272, title IX, §9305, 100 Stat. 190; Oct. 21, 1986, Pub. L. 99–509, title IX, §§9331(e), 9344(a)(1), 100 Stat. 2021, 2042; Dec. 22, 1987, Pub. L. 100–203, title IV, §§4045(b), 4083(a)(1), (c)(1), 4085(a), (i)(8), 101 Stat. 1330–87, 1330–129, 1330–130, 1330–132; July 1, 1988, Pub. L. 100–360, title IV, §411(i)(4)(A), 102 Stat. 788; Nov. 10, 1988, Pub. L. 100–647, title VIII, §8425(a), 102 Stat. 3803; Nov. 5, 1990, Pub. L. 101–508, title IV, §§4002(g)(3), 4118(j)(1), 104 Stat. 1388–37, 1388–70; Oct. 31, 1994, Pub. L. 103–432, title I, §126(g)(8), 108 Stat. 4416, related to Physician Payment Review Commission.

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date of Repeal

Repeal effective Nov. 1, 1997, the date of termination of the Prospective Payment Assessment Commission and the Physician Payment Review Commission, see section 4022(c)(2) of Pub. L. 105–33 set out as an Effective Date; Transition; Transfer of Functions note under section 1395b–6 of this title.
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 412 Introduced in House (IH)]

112th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 412

To amend the lead prohibition provisions of the Consumer Product Safety 
Improvement Act of 2008 to provide an exemption for certain off-highway 
                   vehicles, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 25, 2011

  Mr. Rehberg (for himself, Mr. Bartlett, Mr. Burgess, Mr. Duncan of 
 Tennessee, Mr. Graves of Missouri, Mr. Herger, Mr. Hunter, Mr. Jones, 
Mrs. Lummis, Mr. McClintock, Mr. McCotter, Mr. McKinley, Mr. Paul, Mr. 
 Ross of Arkansas, Mr. Schock, Mr. Shimkus, Mr. Simpson, Mr. Smith of 
     Nebraska, Mr. Terry, Mr. Walberg, Mr. Walz of Minnesota, Mr. 
 Westmoreland, and Mr. Young of Alaska) introduced the following bill; 
       which was referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend the lead prohibition provisions of the Consumer Product Safety 
Improvement Act of 2008 to provide an exemption for certain off-highway 
                   vehicles, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Kids Just Want to Ride Act''.

SEC. 2. EXEMPTION FOR OFF-HIGHWAY VEHICLES.

    (a) Exclusion of Certain Materials or Products and Inaccessible 
Component Parts.--Section 101(b) of the Consumer Product Safety 
Improvement Act of 2008 is amended by redesignating paragraph (5) as 
paragraph (6) and inserting after paragraph (4) the following:
            ``(5) Exception for off-highway vehicles.--
                    ``(A) Determination by commission.--Subsection (a) 
                shall not apply to off-highway vehicles.
                    ``(B) Off-highway vehicles defined.--For purposes 
                of this section, the term `off-highway vehicle' means 
                any motorized vehicle designed to travel on 2, 3, or 4 
                wheels, having a seat designed to be straddled by the 
                operator and handlebars for steering control, and such 
                term also includes snowmobiles.''.
    (b) Additional Amendment.--Such section is further amended in 
paragraph (1)(A) by striking ``any''.
                                 <all>
```
#### John W. Scheid, as President of the Village of Catskill, et al., Respondents, v Eight Sixteen Main Street Corporation, Appellant, and Sherman Fruits, Inc., et al., Respondents.

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court at Special Term, entered March 12, 1976 in Greene County. The Village of Catskill brought a proceeding to declare a fire damaged building a nuisance and to order its proper repair or demolition and removal. Special Term, *inter alia,*rejected the appellant’s contention that the Village Ordinance, Local Law No. 2 of 1969, was not validly enacted. Appellant upon this appeal again argues that it is invalid; however, the argument has no merit. The mere fact that the local law does not specify that the proceedings are to be brought in the Supreme Court or the fact that it did not provide for the same time limits as section 89 (subd 7-a, par d) of the former Village Law are not fatal. Since section 89 of the former Village Law was self-executing, the theory of the court in *Yax v Town of Evans*(41 AD2d 232) is inapplicable. As held in *Matter of Jewett v Luau-Nyack Corp.*(31 NY2d 298), the provision of subdivision 7-a of section 89 of the former Village Law was self-executing and, thus, the ordinance would have been invalid only as to the time limits if they varied and not as to its provisions in general. Subdivision 7-a of section 89 of the former Village Law has been repealed and section 4-412 of the present Village Law grants to the board of trustees the general power to protect "the safety, health, comfort and general welfare of its inhabitants”. Since Local Law No. 2 of 1969 had not been shown to be invalid, and it is self-executing, the commencement of this special proceeding in Supreme Court by resolution is appropriate (see *Matter of Jewett v Luau-Nyack Corp., supra;*cf. *Yax v Town of Evans, supra).*The appellant contends on this appeal that it was not served with a proper notice pursuant to a local law. However, Special Term determined that pursuant to the provision of the Village Law the petitioners afforded appellant its constitutional due process rights. Considering the fact that the building in question could not be razed until declared a nuisance by order of a Justice of the Supreme Court, which order provided for appellant to submit plans to make the building safe and upon the failure thereof, the building should be demolished, the defenses raised by appellant in its answer are without merit. Judgment affirmed, without costs. Greenblott, J. P., Kane, Mahoney, Main and Herlihy, JJ., concur.
NO. 07-08 -032 9-CR IN THE CO UR T OF APPEA LS FO R THE S EVEN TH D ISTRI CT O F TEXAS

AT AM AR ILLO PAN EL A AU GU ST 20, 2008

_________

_________

_________

___ ALL EN LEE BE LL, APPE LLA NT

V. THE S TATE OF TEXAS, APPEL LEE

_________

_________

_________

______ FRO M T HE 10 6 T H DI ST RI CT COU RT OF G AR ZACOU NT Y; NO . 04- 2216; HO NO RA BLE C AR TER T. SC HI LDK NE CH T, JU DG E

_________

_________

_________

____ Before CAMPBE LL a nd HANCOCK an d PIRT LE, JJ. ON A BA TEMENT A ND R EMA ND Appel lan t, Al len Lee Bel l, appeal s his conv icti on for sex ual ass aul t and s entenc e of 10 y ears i ncarcerati on i n the Ins ti tuti onal D iv is ion of the Tex as Dep artment of Cr imi nal Jus ti ce. Be caus e of confli cti ng i nformati on c ontai ned i n the cl er k’ s re cord for thi s c ause, w e abat e and re mand to the t ri al cour t for cl ar ific ati on. After a c areful ex aminatio n of the c ler k’ s record i n thi s c ause, w e are unabl e to deter mine the d ate s ente n ce w as impos ed i n open cour t. The J udg ment i ndi cat es that appel lan t was sent enced on J une 8, 2008. Appel lan t’ s noti ce of appeal is d ated Jul y 29,2

2008. Bas ed on the d ate o f sentenc ing i denti fied i n the Ju dg m e nt, appel lan t’ s n oti ce of appeal w as unti mely

fil ed. Howev er , t he c ler k’ s record al so cont ain s a co py of the t ri al court’s do cket, which states th at th e case w as called and hea rd on Ju ly 8, 200 8. Furthe r, there are tw o inter li neati ons cont ain ed in the Judg ment t hat c hang e a p re -p ri nted June 8 dat e to July 8. Because the da te sen ten ce is impo sed in o p e n c o u rtis esse ntial in deter mini ng the ti me in w hic h an appeal maybe p er fected, see T EX . R. A PP . P
. 2 6
. 2 (a ), we abate and remand th e caus e to the 1 06 D is tr ict C our t of Gar z a C ounty

for a dete rmi nati on th of t he appropr iat e sent enci ng date. See Fl ores v . Stat e, No. 07- 06- 0 3 4 9 -CR, 2006 Tex .App. LEX IS 9 081, at * 1- *2 ( Tex .App. –Amar il lo 2006, no pet .)
. Upo n remand, t he tr ial co urt s hal l deter mine the date that sent ence w as impos ed in open c our

t i n thi s c ause. The tr ial co urt s hal l als o c ause to be dev elo ped a supp lem ent al clerk’s record conta ining a fin ding of fact ide ntif

y in g t he d ate upo n w hich appel lan t’ s s entenc e w as impos ed i n open cour t. The tr ial co urt s hal l caus e the suppl emental cl er k’ s record to be filed w it h the cl er k of t his co urt on or before September 12, 2 008. Shoul d a d d it io n a l ti me be ne eded t o per form thes e tas ks , t he tr ial co urt may re q uestsa me on or

before September

12, 2008. It is so ordered. Per C ur iam

Do not p ubl is h.
**UNITED      STATES**

**SECURITIES      AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION**

**Washington,      D.C. 20549**

**FORM      8-K**

**CURRENT      REPORT**

**Pursuant      to Section 13 or 15(d) of**

**the      Securities Exchange Act of 1934**

**November 15,      2007**

| **Delaware**(State                or other jurisdictionof                incorporation)                                                |         | **001-02217**(Commission                File Number) |   | **58-0628465**(IRS                EmployerIdentification                No.) |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------|------------------------------------------------------|--------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|  **One                Coca-Cola Plaza****Atlanta,                Georgia**(Address                of principal executive Offices) |    |  **30313**(Zip                Code)             |

**(404) 676-2121**

----

**Item      8.01                      Other      Events**

**Item      9.01(d)                                Financial      Statements and Exhibits**

----

**SIGNATURE**

|   Date:  November                15, 2007  | **THE                COCA-COLA COMPANY**               (REGISTRANT) By:           /s/                David M. Taggart      David                M. Taggart      Vice                President and Treasurer  |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                                                                |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |

----

**Exhibit      Index**

| **Exhibit**  |   | **Description**                                                                           |
|-------------------|--------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 99.1              |   | Press                Release of The Coca-Cola Company, dated November 15,                2007. |
|              |   |                                                                                           |
#### Ambalal Patel et al., Appellants, v 25 Gunhill Associates, Respondent and Third-Party Plaintiff. Advantage Elevator Co., Inc., Third-Party Defendant-Respondent.

[717 NYS2d 28]

—Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Janice Bowman, J.), entered August 13, 1999, which, in an action to recover for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff building resident allegedly as a result of inadequate building security, granted motions by defendant building owner and third-party defendant elevator maintenance company to dismiss the complaint and third-party complaint, respectively, and denied plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment on the issue of defendant’s liability, unanimously modified, on the law, to deny defendant’s and third-party defendant’s motions, and otherwise affirmed, without costs.

Plaintiff asserts that he was grabbed by an unidentified person in the lobby of the building, but managed to break free and run into the elevator. However, he was pursued by the assailant, who, due to a malfunctioning elevator door, was able to get into the car, where plaintiff was beaten and robbed. Plaintiff also adduces evidence that the problem with the elevator was a recurring one of which defendant had notice; that an ' entrance door lock had been broken for about a month before the incident, permitting unfettered access to the building’s lobby, about which defendant had received numerous complaints from tenants; and of a history of violent crime in the immediate neighborhood. Such evidence, absent countervailing evidence from defendant, suffices to raise an issue of fact as to the intruder status of the assailant *(see, Burgos v Aqueduct Realty Corp.,*92 NY2d 544, 551; *Brewster v Prince Apts.,*264 AD2d 611, 613-614, *lv dismissed*94 NY2d 875, *lv denied*94 NY2d 762). Accordingly, we modify to reinstate the complaint. The third-party complaint should also be reinstated as it appears to have been dismissed merely because the complaint was dismissed. We have considered and rejected plaintiff’s argument that he is entitled to summary judgment on the is*85sue of defendant’s liability. Concur — Sullivan, P. J., Rosenberger, Tom, Wallach and Andrias, JJ.
### §13005. Transferred

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

Section 13005 was editorially reclassified as section 20307 of Title 34, Crime Control and Law Enforcement.
# United States Court **of Appeals**  **f or the Fifth Circuit** 

**____________** No. 23

- 30615 Summary Calendar

**____________ Minh Vo,**  Plaintiff

— Appellant **,**
versus **Entergy Company; City Sewer,** Defendants

— Appellees
**.**

**______________________________** Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana USDC No. 3:22

- CV

- 255

**______________________________** Before **Clement ,**  **Elrod ,**  and **Ho ,**  Circuit Judges
**. Per Curiam**  **:** ***** Minh Vo appeals the district court’s order dismissing his a mended c omplaint for lack of subject

- matter jurisdiction. For the following reasons, we **AFFIRM**
. Vo and his family live in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Vo’s pro se amended complaint alleges that Entergy Company and City Sewer damaged the sewer

**_____________________**
* This opinion is not designated for publication. See **5th Cir**
**. R** 
**.** 47.5. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED November 2, 2023 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 23-30615 Document: 00516954349 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/02/2023No. 23

- 30615

2 system in the backyard of his home which caused his toilets to overflow and flooded areas of his home. Vo alleges that the flooding led to mold, which , in turn, caused heath issues for him and his family. On the district court’s fillable form for pro se complaints, the first item reads: “State the grounds for filing this case in Federal Court (include federal statutes and/or U.S. Constitutional provisions, if you know them).” Vo left the answer box underneath this item blank. On the line for listing defendants , Vo stated that Entergy Company is a business located in Alabama and City Sewer is a business located in Louis iana. The district court dismissed the amended complaint for lack of subject

- matter jurisdiction. First, the court held that Vo had failed to establish federal

- question jurisdiction because the amended complaint did not identify any federal law that had al legedly been violated nor did the factual allegations therein establish a colorable issue of federal law. Second, the court held that it lacked diversity jurisdiction because, as pled, the parties were not completely diverse

— Vo and City Sewer were both cit izens of Louisiana
. 1 We agree with the district court’s reasoning in its entirety. Vo remains free to pursue his claims in state court, subject, of course, to any applicable statutes of limitation. **AFFIRMED**
.

**_____________________** 1 The court also noted that, based on the public records of the Louisiana Secretary of State, it appeared that Entergy was a Louisiana citizen as well. Case: 23-30615 Document: 00516954349 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/02/2023