R i c h a rd Joseph

Smart Pa r t n e rships fo r

African Deve l o p m e n t

A New Strategic Fra m ewo r k

B r i e f l y . . .

• Po l i t ical and econo m ic libera l i z a t ion in Africa have yie l ded mixed re s u l t s, complic a t e d

by persistent armed conflic t s.

• The New Pa r t nership for African Developme nt (NEPAD) is at the fo re f ro nt of efforts to

p ro mote enhanced investme nts in poorer count r ies that unde r t a ke political, legal,

a nd econo m ic re fo r ms.

• Al t hough good go v e r na nce has been high on the age nda of African count r ies sinc e

t he 1980s, state ero s ion, corruption, and ins t i t u t io nal weakness characterize the publ ic sector in ma ny count r ie s.

• The de c l i n i ng security of African peoples as a cons e q u e nce of warfa re, pre datory of f ic ia l s, and weak econo m ies should not be eclipsed in the int e r na t io nal commu n i t y ’ s

pursuit of ant i - t e r rorism campaig ns.

• Two dec a des of econo m ic re fo r ms with high inflows of de v e l o p me nt assistance have

failed to ge ne rate sustainable growth in Africa in large part because of profo u nd ins t it u t io nal de f ic ie nc ie s.

• The “A f r ican pre d ic a me nt” is a global issue re q u i r i ng the mo b i l i z a t ion of ins t i t u t io na l

c a p a c i t ies in ma ny sectors: corpora t e, civic, re l ig io u s, philant h ro p ic, go v e r n me ntal, and

e duc a t io na l .

• “S mart partnerships” between peoples and ins t i t u t io ns should be tailored to the wide

d i v e rge nces amo ng African count r ies and even amo ng zones within particular count r ie s.

• A sig n i f ic a nt inc rease in the fund i ng of polic y - re l e v a nt re s e a rch involving African and

non - A f r ican ins t i t u t io ns is ne e ded to distill lessons learned re g a rd i ng go v e r na nc e,

s t a t e - b u i l d i ng, hu man security, and impedime nts to econo m ic gro w t h .

• A new stra t e g ic fra mework for African de v e l o p me nt would take into account tra nsna t io nal de mo g ra p h ic, commu n ic a t ion, and go v e r na nce tre nds that facilitate the pursuit of alternatives to state-cent r ic mo de l s.

w w w. u s i p . o rg

S P E C I A L R E P O R T

1200 17th Street NW • Washington, DC 20036 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

May 15, 2002

AB O U T T H E RE P O R T

O v e r l a p p i ng and mut ually re i n fo rc i ng crises in Afric a

have attracted inc reased attent ion from polic y -

ma kers and re s e a rc he r s. A major outcome of the s e

ref l e c t io ns is the cre a t ion of the New Pa r t ne r s h i p

for African Developme nt (NEPAD), a compre he ns i v e

re form pro g ram spons o red by African go v e r n me nt

l e a de r s. Ric h a rd Joseph, a senior fellow in the 

Je n n i ngs Randolph Pro g ram for Int e r na t io nal Pe a c e

at the United States Institute of Pe a c e, has stud ie d

a nd actively participated in efforts to pro mo t e

p e a c e, de mo c ra c y, and de v e l o p me nt in Africa. In

this report, he proposes a stra t e g ic fra mework of

dev e l o p me ntal partnerships based on the re a l i t ie s

of cont e m p o rary Africa. During a period when int e rna t io nal fina nc i ng of de v e l o p me nt is being actively

re- exa m i ne d, the aim of this report is to pro mote a

w ider debate of available policy 

The views ex p ressed in this report do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Institute of

Pea c e, which does not advocate specific policies.

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEAC E

CO N T E N T S

I nt ro duc t io n 2

A id for Refo r ms 2

G o v e r na nce and State-Building 3

A nt i - Te r rorism and Africa’s 

Security Ne e d s 5

Pol i t ical Impedime nts to 

E c o no m ic Gro w t h 7

To w a rd a New Stra t e g ic Fra me w o r k 9

C o nc l u s io n1 1
I n t ro d u c t i o n

In February 1990, a new political era began in Africa with the convening of a na t io na l

c o n f e re nce in the West African na t ion of Benin that led to the peaceful de p o s i t ion of

l o ng t i me ruler Ma t h ieu Ke re kou and a tra ns i t ion to a cons t i t u t io nal de mo c ra c y. Altho u g h

Kere kou re t u r ned to power via competitive electio ns in 1996, Benin has persisted as a

p l u ralist de mo c ra c y. The same is true of several other count r ies in Africa, such as Ghana ,

Mali, and Senegal. Less than five years after this dra ma t ic start of what was optimistically hailed as Africa’s “second inde p e nde nc e,” analysts began calling attent ion to its

many sho r t c o m i ngs. The conc l u s io ns that eme rged from these exe rcises have been re gularly confirmed: ma ny of the new de mo c ra c ies are really liberalized autocra c ies; public

i ns t i t u t io ns cont i nue to be fragile and ine f f ic ie nt; and de l i b e rately ins t igated vio l e nc e

i nc re a s i ngly de t e r m i nes political outcome s.

T he “Af r ican pre d ic a me nt” is one of the terms now used to refer to the overlapping

a nd mu t ually re i n fo rc i ng crises in ma ny parts of cont e m p o rary Africa. These pro b l e ms

i nc l ude state ero s ion, armed conflict, autho r i t a r ian go v e r na nc e, political corruption, low

e c o no m ic growth and stagna t ion, ethnic and re l ig ious clashe s, the misuse of mine ral and

e c o l o g ical re s o u rc e s, the pande m ic of HIV/AIDS, and the wide impact of other de b i l it a t i ng afflic t io ns such as ma l a r ia and tuberc u l o s i s. Despite two de c a des of int e ns i v e

reform efforts backed by substant ial fo re ign fina nc ial assistanc e, the basic security and

q uality of life of ma ny of Africa’s peoples re main highly de f ic ie nt. An era that began with

g reat hopes in Benin and several other African count r ies stagge red to a close with the

p o l i t ically motivated turmoil in Zimbabwe and that country’s disastrous pre s ide nt ial elect io ns of March 2002. 

Aid for Reforms: A New Era ?

In July 2001, a bold do c u me nt was endorsed in Lusaka, Za m b ia, in a summit of Afric a n

heads of state that advances a compre he nsive age nda for the pro mo t ion of peace, de v e lo p me nt, human rig ht s, and sound econo m ic ma na ge me nt in the cont i ne nt. After me rgi ng prior proposals from Senegal and South Africa, the pro g ram is now called the Ne w

Par t nership for Africa’s Developme nt or NEPAD. The re is near complete cong r u e nc e

between NEPAD and the Mo nt e r rey Cons e nsus that issued from the Int e r na t io nal Confere nce on Fina nc i ng for Developme nt under the sponsorship of the United Na t io ns in Mexico on Ma rch 18–22, 2002. The essence of NEPAD and the Mo nt e r rey Cons e nsus was

c o ge ntly ex p ressed in a New York Times op ed by UN secretary ge ne ral Kofi Annan on the

eve of the Mex ico me e t i ng: “The re is a new deal on the table: when de v e l o p i ng count r ies fig ht corruption, stre ng t hen their ins t i t u t io ns, adopt ma r ke t - o r ie nted polic ie s,

respect hu man rig hts and the rule of law, and spend mo re on the needs of the poor, ric h

c o u nt r ies can support them with tra de, aid, investme nt, and debt re l ief” (Ma rch 17,

2 0 0 2 ) .

A n no u nc e me nts by Pre s ide nt George W. Bush befo re and after the Mo nt e r rey Confere nce sig naled that the United States had adopted these principles and the main elements of this “new deal.” While pledg i ng a sig n i f ic a nt inc rease in U.S. fo re ign aid, the

U.S. pre s ide nt emphasized that these commitme nts will be based on a “c o m p a c t ”

between rich and poor na t io ns in which the latter, to qualify for new aid allocatio ns,

must pursue “a broad ra nge of political, legal, and econo m ic re fo r ms.” Ado p t i ng the term i nology pro m i ne nt in African and UN do c u me nt s, these suppleme ntary allocatio ns will

c o nstitute a Millennial Challenge Fund with its own criteria for disburseme nt. 

Under the aegis of NEPAD, ma ny African leaders have agreed to meet key pre c o nd it io ns for recovery: good go v e r na nc e, conflict re s o l u t ion, the rule of law, ma c ro e c o no mic stability, and the curbing of corruption. NEPAD de l i b e ra t io ns, in which the South

A f r ican go v e r n me nt played the main mo b i l i z i ng ro l e, have ge ne rated a positive echo

2

AB O U T T H E IN S T I T U T E

T he United States Institute of Peace is an 

i nde p e nde nt, nonpartisan fede ral ins t i t u t ion 

c reated by Cong ress to pro mote the pre v e nt io n ,

mana ge me nt, and peaceful re s o l u t ion of int e r nat io nal conflic t s. Established in 1984, the Ins t i t u t e

meets its cong re s s io nal ma ndate through an 

a r ray of pro g ra ms, inc l ud i ng re s e a rch gra nt s, 

f e l l o w s h i p s, prof e s s io nal tra i n i ng, educ a t ion 

p ro g ra ms from high school through gra dua t e

s c hool, confere nces and worksho p s, libra r y

s e r v ic e s, and public a t io ns. The Institute’s Board of

D i rectors is appointed by the Pre s ide nt of the

United States and confirmed by the Sena t e.

BOA R D O F DI R E C TO R S

Chester A. Cro c ker ( C h a i r man), Ja mes R. Schlesinge r

P rofessor of Stra t e g ic Stud ie s, School of Fore ign Servic e,

G e o rgetown University • S eymour Martin Lipset ( V ic e

C h a i r man), Hazel Professor of Public Po l ic y, George

Mason University • Betty F. Bumpers, F o u nder and 

fo r mer Pre s ide nt, Peace Links, Wa s h i ngton, D.C. 

• Holly J. Burkhalter, Advocacy Dire c t o r, Phy s ic ia ns fo r

Hu man Rig ht s, Wa s h i ngton, D.C. • M a rc E. Leland, E s q . ,

P re s ide nt, Ma rc E. Leland & As s o c ia t e s, Arlington, Va. 

• M o ra L. McLean, Esq., Pre s ide nt, Afric a - A me r ica Ins t it u t e, New York, N.Y. • María Otero , P re s ide nt, AC C IO N

I nt e r na t io nal, Boston, Ma s s. • B a r b a ra W. Snelling, fo rmer State Senator and fo r mer Lie u t e na nt Governo r, She lb u r ne, Vt. • Harriet Zimmerman, V ice Pre s ide nt, Ame r ic a n

Is rael Public Affairs C o m m i t t e e, Wa s h i ngton, D.C.

ME M B E R S E XO F F I C I O

Lorne W. Cra n e r, As s i s t a nt Secretary of State for Demo cra c y, Hu man Rig ht s, and Labor • Douglas J. Fe i t h , Unde r

S e c retary of Defense for Po l icy • Paul G. Gaffney II, V ic e

Adm i ral, U.S. Navy; Pre s ide nt, Na t io nal Defense Un i v e r -

s i t y • R i c h a rd H. Solomon, P re s ide nt, United States

I nstitute of Peace (no n v o t i ng)
3

a mo ng Africa’s major de v e l o p me nt partne r s, who have pledged to fulfil their side of the

compact by pro v id i ng enhanced fina nc ial assistance and greater fa c i l i t a t ion of tra de and

i n v e s t me nt s. The most innovative dime ns ion of NEPAD will be the cre a t ion of a “peer

rev iew mechanism.” In place of the intrusive role that Western na t io ns inc re a s i ng l y

played in pro mo t i ng econo m ic and political re fo r ms, African go v e r n me nts now pro m i s e

to establish their own mo n i t o r i ng mechanism to devise mo re acceptable ways of ens u ri ng complia nce with int e r na t io nal no r ms. At a NEPAD me e t i ng in Abuja, Nige r ia, on

March 26, 2002, eig ht codes of behavior were pro p o s e d, and it was further agreed that

a “c redible African institute” would administer these codes “separate from the politic a l

p rocess and struc t u re s. ”

T he ma ny me e t i ngs convened in Africa and int e r na t io nally under the auspices of

N E PAD have attracted attent ion to African commitme nts to major re fo r ms and accelerated de v e l o p me nt. Mo re o v e r, NEPAD is at the fo re f ro nt of activities to build a new re l at io nship between poor count r ies and the world community with the aim of ex p a nd i ng

private ma r kets and inc re a s i ng direct fo re ign investme nt s. The Mo nt e r rey Cons e ns u s

a c k no w l e dges NEPAD as embody i ng the kind of “de v e l o p me nt fra meworks at the re g io nal level” that should be enc o u ra ge d. Mo re o v e r, the pro v i s io ns of the cons e nsus synt hesize re c o m me nda t io ns that can be fo u nd in ma ny re c e nt reports of the United Na t io ns

a nd its specialized age nc ies: “Good go v e r na nce is essent ial for sustainable de v e l o p me nt .

S o u nd econo m ic polic ie s, solid de mo c ra t ic ins t i t u t io ns re s p o nsive to the needs of the

people and improved infra s t r uc t u re are the basis for sustained econo m ic growth, poverty era d ic a t ion and employme nt cre a t ion. Fre e dom, peace and security, do me s t ic stabili t y, respect for hu man rig ht s, inc l ud i ng the rig ht to de v e l o p me nt, and the rule of law,

gender equa l i t y, ma r ke t - o r ie nted polic ie s, and an overall commitme nt to just and de moc ra t ic socie t ies are also essent ial and mu t ually re i n fo rc i ng . ”

With everyone lining up smartly behind these principles and go a l s, we should be witne s s i ng a new wave of ent hu s iasm about the prospects for African recovery and re ne w a l .

N E PAD is of f ic ially sanc t io ned by the Org a n i z a t ion of African Un i t y, soon to be the Afric a n

Un ion; it is spearhe a ded by two of the most powerful count r ies in Africa, South Africa and

N ige r ia, with further leadership pro v ided by Alge r ia and Senegal; it has bro u g ht within its

f ra mework several African age nc ies such as the UN Econo m ic Commission for Africa and

t he African Developme nt Bank; it has become the basis for ne go t ia t io ns between Afric a n

c o u ntr ies and bilateral and mu l t i l a t e ral do nors; and it has ex p a nded its list of conc e r ns to

e m b race almost the totality of political, econo m ic, and social issues in the cont i ne nt. 

In effect, NEPAD has eme rged as the “only game in town” on matters involving

A f r ica’s rel a t io nship with the indu s t r ialized world. Chaired by Pre s ide nt Olusegun

Obasanjo of Nige r ia, NEPAD’s Impleme nt a t ion Committee de c l a red in October 2001: “a l l

o t her initiatives pro moted by ind i v idual African count r ies should be subsumed under the

N E PAD pro c e s s, [which will] re p re s e nt a basis on which Africa can collectively and effectively cooperate with its de v e l o p me nt partne r s.” Following a NEPAD me e t i ng in Dakar in

F e b r uary 2002, led by To ny Blair and Abdoulaye Wa de, leaders respectively of the British

a nd Senegalese go v e r n me nt s, a joint communiqué affirmed NEPAD’s role as “the ma i n

v e h icle for Africa’s de v e l o p me nt . ”

N E PAD has the re fo re been ex t ra o rd i narily successful in de v e l o p i ng a cont i ne nt a l

f ra mework in which to pro mote the “A f r ican Rena i s s a nce” long advocated by Pre s ide nt

Thabo Mbeki of South Africa. At the G-8 me e t i ng in Alberta, Cana da, on June 26-28

2002, it is expected that a fo r mal re s p o nse will be ma de by the indu s t r ialized count r ie s

to NEPAD’s requests for various me a s u res to accelerate African de v e l o p me nt. One of

N E PAD’s key targets is ge ne ra t i ng over $60 billion in annual investme nts for Africa to

b r i ng avera ge econo m ic growth to seven perc e nt. While the stirring principles enu nc iated in NEPAD do c u me nt s, especially African ownership, leadership, and re s p o ns i b i l i t y,

have been widely applaude d, outside the circle of political leaders and go v e r n me nt of f ic ials the re s p o nse has been muted ske p t icism. In view of the high stakes involved, no t

only for Africa but the global commu n i t y, it is important that all conc e r ns be fully aire d,

Despite two decades of

i n t e n s i ve reform efforts backed

by substantial fo reign financial

a s s i s ta n c e, the basic security

and quality of life of many of

Africa’s peoples remain highly

deficient. 

Under the aegis of NEPA D ,

m a ny African leaders have

a g reed to meet key

p reconditions for re c overy: 

good gove r n a n c e, conflict 

resolution, the rule of law,

m a c roeconomic sta b i l i t y, and

the curbing of corruption.

While the stirring principles

enunciated in NEPA D

d o c u m e n t s, especially African

ownership, leadership, and

re s p o n s i b i l i t y, have been widely

applauded, outside the circle of

political leaders and gove r nment officials the response has

been muted skepticism.
4

a nd that a wider debate ensue re g a rd i ng possible alternatives and compleme nt a r y

a p p ro a c he s. 

G overnance and State-Building in Africa

Good go v e r na nce has been at the top of the age nda of int e r na t io nal de v e l o p me nt age nc ie s, along s ide ma r ket re fo r ms, since the 1980s. It featured pro m i ne ntly in me e t i ngs of

t he Global Coalition for Africa, spons o red initially by the Dutch Governme nt and the

World Bank, thro u g hout the 1990s. Hopes for African sustainable de v e l o p me nt have

c o me to rest on several “pre c o nd i t io ns”: the eme rge nce of mo re effective go v e r n i ng ins t it u t io ns, respect for the rule of law, the curbing of corruption, the tra ns p a re nt ma na gement of public fina nc e s, and executive age nc ies being held accountable ho r i z o ntally (by

p a r l ia me nts and jud ic ia r ies) and vertically (by civil society and perio d ic na t io nal elect io ns). In its compre he nsive draft of July 2001, NEPAD advocates “stre ng t he n i ng the

p o l i t ical and adm i n i s t rative fra mework of partic i p a t i ng count r ie s, in line with the princ iples of de mo c ra c y, tra ns p a re nc y, account a b i l i t y, int e g r i t y, respect for hu man rig hts and

p ro mo t ion of the rule of law.” What re ma i ns to be de mo ns t rated is how these longs t a nd i ng aspira t io ns will finally be reflected in actual pra c t ic e. Ma ny wonderful cons t i t ut io ns and codes of conduct have been devised in Africa that bear little re l a t io nship to

how power is exe rc i s e d. 

Despite the abunda nce of scholarly analyses of state fa i l u re, ero s ion, cont ra c t io n ,

a nd de c l i n i ng legitimacy in Africa, these stud ies have had little discernible impact on

t he polic ies of major do no r s. NEPAD ackno w l e dges the importance of building state

c a p a c i t y, and it ide nt i f ies ma ny of the re l e v a nt ne e d s, such as stre ng t he n i ng parliamentary oversig ht, inc re a s i ng participatory de c i s io n - ma k i ng, combating corruption, and

i m p l e me nt i ng jud ic ial re fo r ms. The gap between these laudatory objectives and the re a li t ies of ins t i t u t io nal ine f f e c t i v e ness in Africa, ho w e v e r, is cons ide ra b l e. Some of the pert i ne nt stud ies of these phe no me na inc l ude J. F. Bayart, R. Ellis, and B. Hibou, T h e

Criminalization of the State in Africa (1999), R. Joseph, ed., S t a t e, Conflict, and Democracy in Africa (1999), J. Herbst, States and Power in Africa (2000), and P. Eng l e b e r t ,

State Legitimacy and Development in Africa (2000). Ac c o rd i ng to Englebert, “the re is

now a broad cons e nsus that what has most disting u i s hed Africa from the rest of the

world over the last thre e - a nd-a-half de c a des is the weak capacity of its states to

re s p o nd to enviro n me ntal, ex t e r nal, and other supply shocks and to de s ign appro p r ia t e

p o l ic ies and ins t i t u t io ns for gro w t h . ”

A l most a de c a de ago, I ma de the fo l l o w i ng re l e v a nt observation in a seminar pres e nt a t ion that has been echoed in ma ny other stud ies: “Za i re is not the only country in

w h ich the ‘state’ disappears a short drive outside its capital or the area of re s ide nce of

its pre s ide nt. Whe re civil servants are irregularly paid and funds for no r mal func t io ns are

a b s e nt, go v e r n me nt of f ices may exist in various localities but no t h i ng of cons e q u e nc e

t a kes place within them. The go v e r n i ng struc t u res have thus joined the hospitals and

i n f i r ma r ies that lack me d ic i nes and equipme nt and schools that lack books and chairs.

In add i t ion to the ‘failed or collapsed states,’ the re are ma ny cases in Africa of the

a d v a nced ero s ion or atro p hy of the state. ”

Toda y, for most stude nts of African go v e r n me nt and politic s, the African “state” has

b e c o me a pro b l e ma t ic entity (Will Reno, Warlord Politics and African States, 1998). The

e v ide nce is ex t e nsive: citizens no longer looking to the state for basic pro t e c t ion of life

a nd property but ra t her seeking escape from pre datory state of f ic ials; the state becomi ng an ins t r u me nt of do m i na t ion by one or other ethnic group or clan; warlords bulldoz i ng their way to cont rol of the state; and ent re nc hed leaders turning na t io nal armie s

i nto private militia s. These and other do c u me nted tre nds cannot be overlooked as do no r

c o u nt r ies are asked to inc rease re s o u rce flows substant ia l l y, and private investors are

e nc o u ra ged to take up the ma ny lagging econo m ic opportunities in Afric a .

Despite the abundance of scholarly analyses of state fa i l u re,

e rosion, contraction, and 

declining legitimacy in Africa,

these studies have had little

discernible impact on the

policies of major donors.
5

R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s

• A major re s e a rch initiative is ne e ded that focuses on the re a l i t ies of weak go v e r na nc e

a nd de c l i n i ng stateness in Africa and seeks to ide ntify what can be do ne, in conc re t e

w a y s, to bring about positive change s. In this effort, Africa must be disaggre g a t e d.

T he re are different A f r ic a s, rang i ng from highly func t io nal and de mo c ra t ic states to

t he dys f u nc t io nal and conflic t - p l a g u e d. The re is an urge nt need for polic y - re l e v a nt

re s e a rch projects that would ide ntify inc re me ntal advances that can be ma de within

c o u nt r ies de p e nd i ng on the pre s e nce or absence of critical feature s. In brief, plausible and differe nt iated road maps of re form and recovery should be de s ig ne d.

• The re are valuable lessons to be distilled from the mu l t i p l icity of go v e r na nce re fo r ms

attempted in Africa du r i ng the past two de c a des by the World Bank and the overseas

dev e l o p me nt age nc ies of several count r ie s. What are the examples of mo de rate success and what factors explain them? The re should be greater sponsorship of the work

of African institutes in such efforts and support for collaborative work between the s e

c e nters and their counterparts in other count r ie s. And do nors should take gre a t e r

a c c o u nt of their find i ngs in the de s ign of assistance pro g ra ms. 

• De mo c racy pro mo t ion, cons ide red int r i ns ic to impro v i ng go v e r na nce in Africa, has

b e c o me inc re a s i ngly pro b l e ma t ic. It is now the exc e p t io nal case, such as Ghana

between 1992 and 2000, that na t io nal electio ns contribute to the cons o l ida t ion of

c o ns t i t u t io nal go v e r n me nt, permit the popular will to be ma n i f e s t e d, and fa c i l i t a t e

peaceful tra nsfers of power. In partic u l a r, new stra t e g ies should be devised to count e r

t he systema t ic unde r m i n i ng of multiparty electio ns as vehicles for de mo c ra t ic change.

A l t hough these issues have been debated ex t e nsively by Africa scholars and civil society activists, their de l i b e ra t io ns have had little appare nt impact on the ritua l i s t ic

c o nduct of election mo n i t o r i ng. The cont i nued ent re nc h me nt of “de mo c racy as pres e ntability” fosters cynicism amo ng all partic i p a nts: re g i me s, opposition gro u p s, and

ex t e r nal age nc ie s.

• One of the most vital issues in Africa toda y, for which the re has been even less of a

p o l icy re s p o nse than for election re form, conc e r ns the no n - v iability of ma ny states as

na t io n - s t a t e s. The story of how African states derived their particular territorial conf ig u ra t io ns is well known, and so also is the commitme nt to ma i nt a i n i ng the bounda r ies bequeathed by colonialism. Misgivings about the de s ign of African states, in

t heir int e r na t io nal bounda r ies as well as their struc t u res of go v e r n me nt, can no longe r

be sides t e p p e d, especially in view of the pro l i f e ra t ion of armed conflic t s. The initiat ion of a new era of int e r na t io nally supported re fo r ms is an ideal mo me nt to gra p p l e

with this issue. Even elected go v e r n me nt s, such as Nige r ia’s since 1999, have pref e r red to evade ra t her than address de ma nds for the re s t r uc t u r i ng of the fede ra t io n .

T he 120th anniversary of the Berlin Confere nce of 1884–85, which comme nced the

“ S c ramble for Africa” amo ng aspira nt colonial powers, would be an appro p r iate time

to initiate a tho rough exa m i na t ion of the cohe re nc e, legitima c y, via b i l i t y, and conf ig u ra t ion of Africa’s states. Of re l e v a nce to this effort, in add i t ion to stud ies alre a dy

c i t e d, are Christopher Clapham, Africa and the International System (1996), and Cra wfo rd Yo u ng and Mark Beissinge r, Beyond State Crisis? Postcolonial Africa and Po s t - S o v i e t

Eurasia in Comparative Pe r s p e c t i v e ( 2 0 0 2 ) .

A n t i - Te r rorism and Africa’s Security Needs

Slow or stagna nt econo m ic growth in much of Africa, state ero s ion, and the ins t r u me ntal use of vio l e nce by autocra t ic and militia leaders have steadily ero ded the security of

A f r ica’s peoples. Catastro p h ic inc ide nts such as the eruption of a volcano in Goma ,

C o ngo, the ex p l o s ion of an armory in Lago s, Nige r ia, the ge ne rally poor state of he a l t h

A major re s e a rch initiative 

is needed that focuses on the 

realities of weak gove r n a n c e

and declining stateness in

Africa and seeks to identify

what can be done, in concre t e

wa y s, to bring about positive

c h a n g e s.

The continued entrenchment of

“ d e m o c ra cy as pre s e n ta b i l i t y ”

fosters cynicism among all participants: re g i m e s, opposition

g ro u p s, and external agencies.
6

a nd educ a t ion fa c i l i t ie s, and sluggish go v e r n me nt re s p o nses to the HIV/AIDS pande m ic

a re just some of the ind ic a t io ns of diminished popular security. While attent ion is occas io nally drawn to the security needs of civilia ns trapped between armed gro u p s, or conf i ned to re f u gee camps, the mo re common whittling away of the securities of life and

p roperty is seldom cons ide red in its bre a dth and depth. A notable exc e p t ion was a joint

mee t i ng of the Int e r na t io nal Peace Ac a de my and the Econo m ic Commission of We s t

A f r ican States in Abuja, Nige r ia, in September 2001, which conc l uded that “the link

between security, de mo c ra t i z a t ion and go v e r na nce is ma de mo re ex p l icit by the inc re a si ng dema nd by ord i nary people for a mo re people-cent e red approach to security than

t he tra d i t io nal focus on re g i me survival. In West Africa, security fo rces (polic e, military,

p a ramilitary and int e l l ige nce) still re main a source of great ins e c u r i t y. These fo rces of t e n

mete out ind i s c r i m i nate vio l e nce against civilia ns. ”

A global ant i - t e r rorism campaign, under the leadership of the United States go v e r nment, was launc hed fo l l o w i ng the tra g ic events of September 11, 2001. Some Afric a n

c o u nt r ie s, such as Soma l ia and Sudan, cons e q u e ntly became targets of int e nse scrutiny.

Of wider concern is the da nger of African go v e r n me nts shie l d i ng do me s t ic misrule—as

o c c u r red fre q u e ntly du r i ng the Cold War—by ma n i p u l a t i ng the security anxie t ies of

Western powers. It would be tra g ic if Africa’s cons ide rable security needs were eclipsed

by the hu nt for Is l a m ic ex t re m i s t s. He re are some of the factors that should be take n

i nto cons ide ra t io n :

• The combined effects of Cold War ge o p o l i t ics and pre datory go v e r na nce have re ndered many Afric a ns wards of the int e r na t io nal commu n i t y.

• Excess de a t hs (civilian de a t hs that exceed no r mal mortality rates) from warfa re are

e s t i mated in the millio ns, and would be multiples of that fig u re if the social cons eq u e nces of misrule were inc l ude d.

• Ou t w a rd mig ra t ion cont i nues to drain Africa of ma ny of its skilled and educated citi z e ns, but also of ind i v iduals with mo dest cre de nt ials who brave imme nse hard s h i p

to reach the sho res of southern Euro p e.

• Even count r ies with large re s o u rce flows from mine ral exports (Angola, Came ro o n ,

N ige r ia) have not de mo ns t rated the capacity to channel these into pro ductive econo m ic and social investme nt s.

• St a t e s, and proto-state ent i t ies led by warlord s, are the principal pro genitors of terror in Africa. In much of the cont i ne nt, warfa re and civil politics have become flip

s ides of the same coin as rulers ne u t ralize re s u rge nt civil society and political gro u p s

t h rough the ins t r u me ntal use of state vio l e nce (R. Joseph, “A f r ica 1990–1997: Fro m

A b e r t u r a to Closure,” Journal of Democracy, 1998). In the case of Liberia, ma s s i v e

i nse c u r i t ies have induced political and civic leaders to appeal to the world community for the cre a t ion of “an Int e r na t io nal Security Stabilization Force to take charge

of nat io nal security. ”

R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s

• A compre he nsive evalua t ion of Africa’s ho me l a nd security needs should be unde r t a ke n .

To render such a task ma na ge a b l e, it should be bro ken down accord i ng to the “differe nt Africas” me nt io ned above. The views of civil and community groups should be

given as much cons ide ra t ion as those of ex i s t i ng go v e r n me nt s. The initial aim of suc h

an exe rcise would be to establish the de g rees of security and insecurity actually ex p er ie nced by the people of Africa. This exe rcise would pro v ide a ma p p i ng of differe nt

z o nes of insecurity (which would not necessarily coinc ide with na t io nal bounda r ie s ) ,

ide ntify their main causes, and advance pra c t ical re me d ie s. 

• Ma ny Africa observers would concur with the re c o m me nda t ion ma de by Robert Rotb e rg: “an absolute refusal to lend and do nate in the absence of the rule of law, go o d

Of wider concern is the danger

of African gove r n m e n t s

shielding domestic misrule—

as occurred frequently during

the Cold Wa r — by manipulating

the security anxieties of

Western powe r s.
gov e r na nc e, and sensible econo m ic policy” (“A f r ica’s Me s s, Mugabe’s Ma y hem,” F o reign Affa i r s, 2000). At a time when enhanced fina nc ial tra nsfers are being advocated

by African leade r s, and when the U.S. go v e r n me nt is pre p a r i ng strict criteria for the i r

d i s b u r s e me nt, an authoritative re v iew should be conducted of the achie v e me nts and

fa i l u res of political and econo m ic cond i t io na l i t ies since the 1980s. In view of the

g ro w i ng distress of ma ny of Africa’s peoples, and the re s p o nsibility of ma ny ex i s t i ng

reg i mes for it, a promise by such re g i mes that things will be differe nt this time aro u nd

is obviously ins u f f ic ie nt. Since ex t e r nal cond i t io na l i t ies have often fa i l e d, and the

peer re v iew mechanism proposed by NEPAD re ma i ns to be seen, alternative appro a c hes should be developed with the aim of enhanc i ng the security of the African poor,

w ho constitute an overwhe l m i ng majority of their count r ies’ populatio n .

• The use of vio l e nce and terro r, especially against no n - c o m b a t a nt s, is today a ma j o r

i nt e r na t io nal concern, especially after the World Tra de Center attack and the int e ns if ic a t ion of Is ra e l i - Pa l e s t i n ian warfa re. In the case of Africa, politically motivated viol e nce and terro r, complicated by vig i l a ntism, are becoming commo n p l a c e. Few inro a d s

have been ma de against the “c u l t u re of impunity” that gravely unde r m i nes state

l e g i t i ma c y. The time has come for the ma ny hu man rig hts org a n i z a t io ns involved in

A f r ica to mo u nt an int e r na t io nal campaign aimed at calling attent ion to this scourge.

T he re should be vigo rous conde m na t ion and pro s e c u t ion of its perpetra t o r s. The syst e ma t ic compiling of the evide nce that resulted in the pro s e c u t ion of the fo r me r

Yugoslav ruler, Slobodan Milosevic, can be re p l icated with re g a rd to the most egreg ious purveyors of war crimes in Africa. The establishme nt of the Int e r na t io nal Crimi nal Court should facilitate such exe rc i s e s.

Political Impediments to Economic Grow t h

N E PAD and the Mo nt e r rey Cons e nsus both emphasize the importance of sound econo m ic

p o l ic ie s, especially those that facilitate the ex p a ns ion of the private sector. Africa’s ma rg i na l i z a t ion from the global econo my has been reflected in its de c l i n i ng share of world

t ra de and direct fo re ign investme nt. The re l e v a nt data has been systema t ically collected

a nd pre s e nted by a consortium of African and int e r na t io nal age nc ies in Can Africa

Reclaim the 21st Century? ( World Bank, 2000). Most African count r ies have now unde rgone between one and two de c a des of ex t e r nally supported pro g ra ms aimed at ge ne ra ti ng mo re effic ie nt and pro ductive ma r ket econo m ie s. The African Growth and Opportunity

Act, enacted du r i ng the Clinton adm i n i s t ra t ion and curre ntly being bro a de ned by its succ e s s o r, places the ex p a ns ion of tra de and investme nt at the center of U.S.-Africa polic y.

U rge nt attent ion should be devoted to the ma ny stud ies that hig h l ig ht the politic a l

i m p e d i me nts to econo m ic growth in Africa. A leading stude nt of these effo r t s, Nic o l a s

van de Wa l l e, has investigated “the fa i l u re of African econo m ies to re new with sustaine d

e c o no m ic growth over the last twenty years.” He re are the main causes he ide nt i f ies in

his study, African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979–99 (2001): “The

c e nt ral arg u me nt of this book is that . . . the real cons t ra i nts on policy are to be fo u nd

within the state itself. Three kinds of factors are emphasized in particular: clie nt e l i s m ,

low state capacity, and the ide o l o g ical pre f e re nces of de c i s ion ma ke r s. . . . Second, I

a rgue that the aid re l a t io nship between Western do nors and most African re g i mes has

exacerbated these do me s t ic obstacles to re form. Ne o - p a t r i mo n ial rulers could not have

resisted the pre s s u re of int e r na t io nal ma r kets for two de c a des had they not had the assist a nce of the int e r na t io nal community; large amo u nts of aid to the state coupled with

imperfect cond i t io nality of re form pro g ram lend i ng have allowed African go v e r n me nts to

get away with partial re fo r m . ”

Van de Walle’s study is not only a sweeping portrayal of the fa i l u re to tra ns fo r m

A f r ica’s low-perfo r m i ng econo m ie s, it also ma kes a stro ng case that the factors mo s t

7

Few inroads have been made

against the “c u l t u re of impunity”

that gra vely undermines sta t e

l e g i t i m a cy. The time has come 

for the many human rights

o rganizations invo l ved in Africa

to mount an international campaign aimed at calling attention

to this scourg e.
re s p o nsible for the disappoint i ng outcomes are largely unc h a nge d. The wave of de mo c ra t ic

t ra ns i t io ns since 1990, he arg u e s, has not altered the exe rcise of power nor the “toothless cond i t io nality” of ex t e r nal do no r s. It is difficult to re c o ncile van de Walle’s critique

with the promises curre ntly being ma de by African go v e r n me nts and major int e r na t io na l

dono r s. The criteria for gra nt i ng aid and loans have been re f i ne d, over and again, and

a p p l ied by the U.S. Age ncy for Int e r na t io nal Developme nt and other age nc ie s. Van de

Walle’s conc l u s io ns confirm earlier stud ies of the ine f f e c t i v e ness of the cond i t io na l i t ie s

reg i me by such scholars as Tho mas Callaghy and Béatrice Hibou. Other factors and cons ide ra t io ns usually int e r v e ned to influence the allocation of gra nt funds and distort the i r

u t i l i z a t ion (T. M. Callaghy and J. Ravenhill, eds., Hemmed In: Responses to Africa’s Economic Decline, 1993; and B. Hibou, L’Afrique est-elle protectionniste? 1 9 9 6 ) .

R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s

• The ma r r ia ge of ex t e r nal do nors and re fo r m - p ro m i s i ng go v e r n me nts has not pro duc e d

t he de s i red of f s p r i ng of sustainable growth in Africa. Ins t e a d, accord i ng to van de

Wal l e, the re has been a re c e nt ra l i z a t ion of executive power, de c l i ne in the capacity

of public ins t i t u t io ns, re duced social servic e s, he ig ht e ned corruption, and the int e ns i f ic a t ion of fa c t io nal struggles over state of f ic e s. Simu l t a ne o u s l y, the greater int r us i v e ness of do nors in de t e r m i n i ng econo m ic stra t e g ie s, and the pro v i s ion of a “large

a nd historically unpre c e de nted flow of re s o u rc e s,” have resulted in the ent re nc h me nt

of re g i mes irrespective of their econo m ic fa i l i ng s. Can these cycles be bro ken? This

vital question should not be left to the efforts of a few de t e r m i ned scho l a r s. Te ns of

b i l l io ns of dollars in new aid funds are curre ntly being requested in the na me of

A f r ica’s distressed peoples and socie t ie s. The Office of the UN Secretary Gene ra l ,

w h ich has been successful in ge ne ra t i ng inc reased commitme nts to de v e l o p me nt

a s s i s t a nc e, can perhaps take the lead in de mo ns t ra t i ng that now mo re is on the table

than elaborate promises that the old pra c t ices will some how work again.

• Al o ng s ide the omnibus fra mework created by NEPAD, a variety of leaner or “sma r t ”

p a r t nerships should be cons ide re d. Several African count r ies—or particular states or

p ro v i nces of large count r ies such as Nige r ia—that have achieved even the partia l

refo r ms described by van de Walle in go v e r na nc e, the rule of law, and econo m ic policy should be invited to take part in multi-year eng a ge me nts in which key ins t i t ut io ns in each field would be ma t c hed with their counterparts overseas. Instead of

e n v i s io n i ng partnerships at the level of go v e r n me nt s, what should be cons ide red are

p a r t nerships between peoples and ins t i t u t io ns. In the case of the United States, an

i m p o r t a nt compone nt of the Millennial Aid Fund proposed by Pre s ide nt Bush could

p ro v ide support for stra t e g ic partnerships between Ame r ican and African ins t i t u t io ns

that would be rigo rously based on perfo r ma nce ra t her than pro m i s e. Ma ny of the

t ra i ned Afric a ns who now mig rate to the United States can be enc o u ra ged to work at

ho me if affo rded ins t i t u t io nal cont exts in which they can effectively use their talent s.

T he great potent ial for Ame r ican corpora t io ns, universitie s, health care ins t i t u t io ns,

p o l icy and tra i n i ng ins t i t u t e s, and re l ig ious and charitable bodies to contribute to

A f r ican de v e l o p me nt through the cre a t ion of smart partnerships has been bare l y

t a p p e d. The re c o rd is clear: commitme nts ma de only between go v e r n me nts are subject to dilution because of na t io nal security conc e r ns and patrimo n ial politic s. 

• Su s t a i nable de v e l o p me nt is not possible in Africa without, at a minimum, better-run

p u b l ic ins t i t u t io ns, law-based go v e r na nc e, and a sharp re duc t ion in corruption. Develo p me nt org a n i z a t io ns such as the World Bank, bilateral age nc ies of ma ny We s t e r n

c o u nt r ie s, and scholarly and policy centers have acquired cons ide rable kno w l e dge

about go v e r na nc e, statene s s, and ma r ket re fo r ms in Africa. The re is a need to tra nslate this kno w l e dge into action. Us i ng the mo del of smart partne r s h i p s, it should be

possible to establish, conc re t e l y, what must be achieved for partic i p a t i ng count r ie s,

8

The marriage of external 

donors and re fo r m - p ro m i s i n g

g overnments has not pro d u c e d

the desired offspring of sustainable growth in Africa.

The great potential fo r

American corpora t i o n s, unive r si t i e s, health care institutions,

p o l i cy and training institutes,

and religious and charita b l e

bodies to contribute to African

d evelopment through the

c reation of smart partnerships

has been barely ta p p e d .
or sub-sectio ns of them, to meet the UN Millennial goals for 2015, such as the halvi ng of the poverty ra t e. The tra ns na t io na l i z i ng of Africa, best typified by pro l i f e ra t i ng

networks of tra ders opera t i ng in ma ny Western citie s, inex p e nsive commu n ic a t io n

t e c h no l o g ie s, and the de c l i n i ng sig n i f ic a nce of sovere ig nty in this global era, ma y

p ro v ide unique opportunities and pathways.

Toward a New Strategic Po l i cy Fra m ewo r k

T he dep t hs and pervasiveness of the African pre d ic a me nt re nder it imperative that mo re

f u nda me ntal re fo r ms be devised and impleme nt e d. Instead of simply echo i ng, applaudi ng, or critic i z i ng the NEPAD initia t i v e, we need to cons ider alternative appro a c he s. In

a dd i t ion to the points ma de above, a coord i nated int e r na t io nal re s p o nse could take

a c c o u nt of the fo l l o w i ng observatio ns :

• T he African pre d ic a me nt has re a c hed such a scale and has such wide implic a t io ns that

it should be re g a rded as a global i s s u e. A new stra t e g ic policy fra mework would emphas i z e, in this globalizing age, the need to mo b i l i z e, in Africa and int e r na t io na l l y, a wide

a r ray of capacities in ma ny sectors—corpora t e, civic, re l ig io u s, philant h ro p ic, go v e r nmental, educ a t io nal—to tackle the ma ny pro b l e ms. What is re c o m me nded he re would

go well beyond the ad hoc and unc o o rd i nated na t u re of such prior linka ge s. The ide a l s

of African ownership, leadership, and re s p o nsibility are lauda b l e. They are not cont rad ic t e d, ho w e v e r, by the equally pertine nt ones of shared global re s p o nsibility and leade r s h i p .

• Viable partnerships for de v e l o p me nt would be premised on a re newal of the socia l

compact and “social citizenship” within Africa. (See Adebayo Olukoshi’s conc l ud i ng

chapter in S t a t e, Conflict and Democracy in Africa). Pa r t nerships amo ng Afric a ’ s

diverse peoples, and between go v e r n me nts and their socie t ie s, would create firme r

bases for partnerships pro moted ex t e r na l l y. One of the NEPAD leade r s, Pre s ide nt

A b doulaye Wa de, re c e ntly re f e r red to the “tra de union of pre s ide nts” that refused to

c o ndemn gross go v e r n me ntal misconduct in Zimbabwe (New York Times, April 10,

2002). It is critical that the voices of other “tra de unio ns” in Afric a — of civic, commun i t y, educ a t io nal, busine s s, and re l ig ious groups—be he a rd and that they become

active partic i p a nts in the de s ign and opera t ion of smart partne r s h i p s.

• The re should be a sig n i f ic a nt inc rease in fund i ng for polic y - re l e v a nt re s e a rch and coll a b o rative investig a t io ns by re s e a rc hers and pra c t i t io ners conc e r ned with Africa. In

J u ne 1994, a White House Confere nce on Africa was convene d, and acade m ic

res e a rc hers on Africa worked along s ide pra c t i t io ners in specialized working gro u p s.

T he re was, ho w e v e r, no follow-up to this important and pro m i s i ng initia t i v e. An

a p p ro p r iate and cont i nu i ng forum should be established and given the ma ndate to

distill polic y - re l e v a nt find i ngs on the key issues discussed above: go v e r na nc e, stateb u i l d i ng, hu man security, and political impedime nts to econo m ic growth. Simu l t a neo u s l y, enhanced re s e a rch, tra i n i ng, and policy dialogues should be spons o re d

i n v o l v i ng Afric a ns and no n - A f r ic a ns.

• The ero s ion of public ins t i t u t io ns in Africa has resulted in the steady ex p a ns ion of

t he activities of no n - go v e r n me ntal ent i t ie s, both do me s t ic and int e r na t io nal. Tho us a nds of hu ma n i t a r ian and re l ief org a n i z a t io ns have assumed re s p o nsibility for prov id i ng fo o d, clothing, and health services for the populatio ns of ma ny count r ie s. In

res p o nd i ng to the unmet needs of Africa’s peoples, the role of these org a n i z a t io ns

has exp a nded inexo rably and they now pro v ide ma ny basic public go o d s. The terrain occupied by these org a n i z a t io ns will not be re o c c u p ied by most states for the

fo reseeable future. They are alre a dy involved in partnerships for pro g ress and the i r

a c t i v i t ies constitute a sig n i f ic a nt part of the web of Africa’s conne c t ion with the

global commu n i t y. A new stra t e g ic policy fra mework would take into cons ide ra t io n

9
t he struc t u res and dy na m ics of this shared go v e r na nce that has evolved de facto in

much of the cont i ne nt .

• What constitutes Africa? The member count r ies of NEPAD, mirro r i ng the African Un io n ,

i ncl ude de mo c ra t ic, no m i nally de mo c ra t ic, and autho r i t a r ian go v e r n me nt s. In add i t io n

to the tens of millio ns of Afric a ns on the cont i ne nt who are still de n ied an effective say

in ho w, by whom, and for what ends they are go v e r ne d, the re are now ex t e nsive Afric a n

d ia s p o ras that consist of ind i v iduals whose talents and ene rg ies are fruitfully invested

in the de v e l o p me nt of other land s. In essenc e, Africa is no longer only in Africa. Vibra nt

o rg a n i z a t io ns have sprung up amo ng these dia s p o ra s. They should be cons ide red essent ial compone nts of the ins t i t u t io nal infra s t r uc t u re of a Greater Africa with much to contribute to the de s ign and opera t ion of the new partne r s h i p s.

• Co ns ide rable attent ion has been directed to ma k i ng the case for inc re a s i ng fina nc ia l

flows to Africa though various me c h a n i s ms, inc l ud i ng debt re l ief, de v e l o p me nt gra nt s,

a nd private investme nt s. At t e nt ion should also be paid to the abunda nt re s o u rc e s

that have been, and cont i nue to be, dissipated. The hu ndreds of billio ns of do l l a r s

that Nige r ia, for exa m p l e, has earned from petroleum export since the end of the

B ia f ran war in 1970 should have alre a dy ma de that count r y, as The Economist o nc e

w ro t e, an “ec o no m ic colossus.” To da y, Nige r ia’s poverty rate is estimated at 70 perc e nt. The discovery of new oil fields in the Gulf of Guinea, is—based on past ex p e r ie nc e — a l a r m i ng ra t her than re a s s u r i ng ne w s. How can it be assured that the s e

res o u rces will contribute to elimina t i ng the de f ic ie nc ies discussed above ra t her than

merely fo s t e r i ng mo re corruption, vio l e nt conflict, political disarra y, and econo m ic

dec l i ne in the petro-states borde r i ng the gulf? With the exc e p t ion of Botswana, no

m i ne ra l - r ich African country has avoided this syndro me after gaining inde p e nde nc e

f rom colonial or settler rule. The re are unde n iably major ex t e r nal barriers to Afric a n

dev e l o p me nt, especially access to the ma r kets of indu s t r ialized count r ie s. Ho w e v e r,

A f r ican competitiveness in the curre nt global econo my will event ually de p e nd on the

e me rge nce of do me s t ic politic o - e c o no m ic systems that can match the perfo r ma nce of

A f r ica’s competitors. The smart partnerships proposed he re could involve corporat io ns, re s e a rch cent e r s, and go v e r n me nt age nc ies in de mo ns t ra t ion projects of ho w

A f r ica’s great unde rg ro u nd wealth could contribute to social wealth and welfa re above

g ro u nd.

• At the heart of the African pre d ic a me nt is Africa’s fa i l u re to establish viable ins t i t ut io ns of public life. From Aristide Zo l b e rg’s Creating Political Order (1966), Peter Eke h ’ s

“ C o l o n ialism and the Two Publics” (1975), Goran Hy den’s No Shortcuts to Pro g re s s

(1983), my own “A f f l u e nce and Unde rde v e l o p me nt” (1978) and Democracy and

Prebendal Politics (1987), and Michael Bratton and van de Walle’s Democratic Experiments in Africa (1997), Africa scholars have re t u r ne d, time and again, to this critic a l

o b s e r v a t ion. Africa’s future will not differ from the grim pre s e nt if a We b e r ian culture

of effective and legitimate bure a uc ra t ic org a n i z a t ion does not take root in Afric a n

soil. This precept applies to ins t i t u t io ns in the private as well as public realm and, of

c o u r s e, to the state itself, which is a complex of ins t i t u t io ns. At the center of sma r t

p a r t nerships for African de v e l o p me nt will be one overrid i ng commitme nt: building

s u s t a i nable ins t i t u t io ns that actually work as int e nde d. Millio ns of African econo m ic

exiles thro u g hout the world work successfully in such ins t i t u t io ns. How this very fundame ntal but re v o l u t io nary step can be ma de at ho me is a question for which ans w e r s

have not been fo u nd since Ghana led the way to inde p e nde nce in 1957. From this

p e r s p e c t i v e, Africa’s re na i s s a nce will be enacted in my r iad sites, via partne r s h i p s

within and without Africa, and will be reflected in the flourishing of legitimate ins t it u t io ns of all types that perform their assig ned tasks. Such a process will ne c e s s a r i l y

involve the ada p t a t ion and re newal of ins t i t u t io nal fo r ms alre a dy pre s e nt in Afric a .

Mo re o v e r, the dy na m ic age nts of this re v o l u t ion will be the tens of millio ns of Afric a ns

f reed at ho me from re p re s s i v e, ine f f e c t i v e, and venal go v e r na nc e.

1 0

C o n s i d e rable attention has been

d i rected to making the case fo r

i n c reasing financial flows to

Africa though various mecha n i s m s, including debt re l i e f ,

d evelopment gra n t s, and priva t e

i n ve s t m e n t s. Attention should

also be paid to the abundant

re s o u rces that have been, and

continue to be, dissipated.

African competitiveness in 

the current global economy 

will eventually depend on the

e m e rgence of domestic politicoeconomic systems that can

m a tch the performance of

Africa’s competito r s.

At the center of smart partnerships for African deve l o p m e n t

will be one overriding commitment: building susta i n a b l e

institutions that actually 

work as intended. 
1 1

C o n c l u s i o n

“Life Mo re Abunda nt” was one of the slogans used by African na t io nalist leaders to mo b ilize their people in the struggle to rid the cont i ne nt of colonial rule. Four de c a des later,

A f r ica is mired in a complex of crises. Ac c o rd i ng to Pie r re Englebert, “since 1960, Afric a ns

have seen their inc o me rise by less than one-half of a perc e nt per year, leaving the cont i ne nt with the worst de v e l o p me nt re c o rd and the hig hest conc e nt ra t ion of count r ies with

negative growth of all the re g io ns of the world.” To da y, one of every five Afric a ns lives in

a country “severely disrupted by conflict,” while the cont i ne nt's share of the world's

absolute poor cont i nues to “grow re nt l e s s l y,” inc re a s i ng from 25 to 30 perc e nt in the

1990s (Can Africa Reclaim the 21st Century?). A f r ica has pro p o r t io nately mo re armed conf l icts and re f u gees than any other re g ion; and ma ny African count r ies cluster at the top

of the “c o r r u p t ion scale” of Tra ns p a re ncy Int e r na t io nal and at the bottom of the Hu ma n

D e v e l o p me nt index of the United Na t io ns Developme nt Pro g ram. To these woes is adde d

t he catastro p h ic impact of HIV/AIDS, ma l a r ia, and tuberculosis on African socie t ie s.

N E PAD cont e nds that yearly investme nts in Africa of $64 billion, toge t her with the

p romise of corre c t i ng ma ny opera t io nal fa i l i ng s, will ge ne rate the level of annual econom ic growth ne e ded to lift the cont i ne nt’s people from poverty. This Special Report,

while ackno w l e dg i ng the adm i rable principles and aims of NEPAD, advocates a differe nt

a p p roach that emphasizes perfo r ma nce over pro m i s e s. Genu i ne exc i t e me nt would be

gene rated worldw ide by an Africa in which go v e r n me nts de mo ns t rated respect for the i r

c o ns t i t u t io ns and laws, state of f ic ials at all levels re s p o nsibly executed the du t ies of the i r

off ic e s, public ins t i t u t io ns ma de effic ie nt use of funds pro v ide d, political vio l e nce and

c o r r u p t ion were sharply re duc e d, the people’s needs were dutifully addressed by public

a nd private servic e s, electio ns were fairly conduc t e d, and the state, once again, became

t he collective property of its citizens. While no ne of these virtues are ne w, in the cont e m p o rary African cont ext they would be re v o l u t io na r y.

It was believed du r i ng the 1990s that such an Africa was being nu r t u red and that

power embedded in ins t i t u t io ns would the nc e fo r w a rd characterize go v e r na nce in mo s t

s t a t e s. These hopes have not been re a l i z e d. While mo re liberties of speech, associa t io n ,

a nd mo v e me nt have been accorde d, these are often abruptly circ u mscribed when invoke d

to hold go v e r n me nts account a b l e, or to replace them de mo c ra t ic a l l y. Inc re me ntal de mo cra t i z a t ion will cont i nue to occur in disparate sites, a few eme rge nt de mo c ra c ies will succeed in becoming cons o l ida t e d, and such advances will be accompanied at times by

i m p roved go v e r na nc e. Ho w e v e r, the re is little to suggest that these advances will take

t he form of a wave of irresistible change in the near future. 

T he likely persistence in Africa du r i ng this de c a de of int e r ne c i ne warfa re, ins t i t u t io nal fra g i l i t y, mass poverty, and state weakness compel a mo re sober, re a l i s t ic, and differe nt iated approach to re newal and de v e l o p me nt. The watchword of such an appro a c h

s hould indeed be "partnership," as I advocated at the start of the cont i ne nt’s last

“ re na i s s a nce” (“Par t nership not Pa t ro nship,” Africa Report, September 1990). Ho w e v e r,

t he last thing Africa needs is ano t her gra nd iose opera t ion that soaks up massive fund s

with little to show after my r iad me e t i ngs have been held and leng t hy do c u me nts diss e m i na t e d. Hav i ng stumbled in the closing de c a des of the last cent u r y, Africa can re g a i n

lost gro u nd by taking advant a ge of tra ns na t io nal tre nd s. Legitimate and re s p o ns i b l e

l e a ders of African ins t i t u t io ns at local, pro v i nc ial, state, and interstate levels should be

p ro v ided enhanced fa c i l i t ies to fo rge partnerships with their counterparts thro u g hout the

w o r l d. The ex t e nsive commitme nts curre ntly being ma de in re s p o nse to the AIDS crisis

p ro v ide ample opportunities to impleme nt such an approach. 

“ L i v i ng an ord i nary life is a luxury that we can only enjoy in times of peace” (Junji

Ito, As ia Society). This stateme nt can serve as the motto of the approach being advocated he re. Instead of ex p e r ie nc i ng "the luxury of an ord i nary life," ma ny Afric a ns have

had to adapt to the re l e ntless rise in insecurity and unc e r t a i nt y. As To ny Blair ackno w le dged at the confere nce of the British Labour Party in October 2001, ende m ic poverty

Legitimate and re s p o n s i b l e

leaders of African institutions

at local, provincial, sta t e, and

i n t e r s tate levels should be 

p rovided enhanced facilities 

to forge partnerships with their

counterparts throughout the

wo r l d .
a nd political turmoil in Africa had become “a scar on the cons c ie nce of the world.” Ide a lism should be wedded to realism. At the core of the new stra t e g ic fra mework would be

s mart partnerships in de v e l o p me nt based on lessons learned du r i ng a half-century of ex p e ri me nt a t ion and scholarly re s e a rch. Multi-year partnerships would be jointly de s ig ned and

a dm i n i s t e red by ins t i t u t io ns in Africa and overseas with the support of go v e r n me nts and

p h i l a nt h ro p ic org a n i z a t io ns. It is not me a nt to be a da z z l i ng plan but ra t her a re a l i s t ic one

that can work.

For mo re info r ma t ion on this topic,

see our web site (www. u s i p . o rg), whic h

has an online edition of this re p o r t

c o nt a i n i ng links to related web sites, 

as well as add i t io nal info r ma t ion 

on the subject.

SP E C I A L RE P O R T 8 8

1 2

United States 

Institute of Pe a c e

1200 17th Street NW

Was h i ngton, DC 20036