RUSSIA

RUSSIA

U n i t e d S t a t e s C o m m i ss i o n o n I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l i g i o us F r e e d o m

F ALL 2 0 0 6

THE U.S. COMMISSION 

ON INTERNATIONAL 

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

was created by the International Religious Freedom 

Act of 1998 to monitor 

the status of freedom 

of thought, conscience, 

and religion or belief 

abroad, as defined in the 

Universal Declaration of 

Human Rights and related 

international instruments, 

and to give independent 

policy recommendations to 

the President, Secretary of 

State, and Congress.

visit our web site at 

www.uscirf.gov

POLICYFOCUS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

Since Vladimir Putin became president of 

Russia in 2000, the Russian government has 

steadily retreated from democratic reform, 

endangering significant gains in human rights 

made since the end of the Soviet era, including in the areas of freedom of religion or belief.

Developments indicating that progress toward 

democracy is being halted, if not reversed, 

include: curtailments of media freedom and 

of the independence of political parties; the 

placement of tighter restrictions on non-governmental organizations (NGOs), religious 

communities, and other civil society groups; 

the harassment of human rights organizations; 

legal restrictions on freedom of assembly; 

constraints on the use of popular referenda; 

and President Putin’s decision to end the direct 

popular election of regional governors. The 

deterioration in conditions for human rights 

over the past few years appears to be a direct 

consequence of the increasingly authoritarian 

stance of the Russian government, as well as 

the growing influence of chauvinistic groups in 

Russian society which seem to be tolerated by 

the government.

Red Square, Moscow
2

The past year has signaled a further 

retreat from democracy in Russia. In 

January 2006, a restrictive new law was 

approved on NGOs that also affects the 

rights of religious communities. The 

new law enables the Ministry of Justice’s 

Federal Registration Service (FRS) to 

interfere with the activities of NGOs and 

deny the registration of groups that do 

not meet certain requirements, including minor or trivial ones. Members of 

minority religious communities may 

face new difficulties under military 

reform legislation that ends military 

deferments for students in religious 

institutions. And, despite considerable 

domestic and international opposition, 

in July 2006 President Putin signed an 

amended version of the 2002 law on 

counter-extremism. Citizens can now 

be charged with extremism if they are 

alleged, within the context of extremism, to have committed public slander of government officials, although 

these charges must be proven in court.

Moreover, those who are alleged to have 

defended, or even expressed sympathy 

with, individuals charged with extremism are themselves liable to charges of 

extremism. As this report went to press, 

the Russian State Duma was considering two draft laws of potential relevance 

to the country’s various religious communities: new regulations on religious 

outreach and a further expansion of 

charges under the extremism law as it 

relates to the media.1 

Since its inception in 1999, the 

U.S. Commission on International 

Religious Freedom has reported on the 

situation in Russia. A delegation of the 

Commission traveled to Russia in June 

2006, visiting Moscow, St. Petersburg, 

and Kazan, the capital of the Republic 

of Tatarstan. The Commission met with 

Russian government officials from the 

National Security Council, the Presidential Administration, the Ministry of 

Foreign Affairs, the FRS, and the Presidential Council on Religious Affairs, as 

well as with the President of the Republic of Tatarstan and other regional and 

local officials and legislators. The delegation also met with representatives 

from a wide range of Russia’s religious 

communities, as well as academics, 

legal advocates, and representatives of 

human rights organizations.

The Commission finds that political authoritarianism—combined with 

rising nationalism and a sometimes 

arbitrary official response to domestic 

security concerns—is jeopardizing 

the human rights of Russia’s citizens, 

including members of the country’s 

religious and ethnic minorities. 

Russian citizens have considerable 

personal freedom and some, though 

increasingly limited, opportunities for 

public political debate. In many areas 

of civil life, however, including freedom 

for religious worship and practice, 

it is increasingly a particular group’s 

or community’s relationship to the 

state—rather than the rule of law—that 

defines the parameters on freedom to 

engage in public activities.

Felice D. Gaer

Chair

Director, Jacob Blaustein 

Institute for the 

Advancement of Human 

Rights, The American 

Jewish Committee

Michael Cromartie

Vice Chair

Vice President, 

Ethics And Public 

Policy Center

Elizabeth H. Prodromou

Vice Chair

Associate Director of 

the Institute on Culture, 

Religion, and World Affairs 

and Assistant Professor of 

International Relations, 

Boston University

Nina Shea

Vice Chair

Director of the Center 

for Religious Freedom, 

Freedom House

Preeta D. Bansal

Commissioner

Partner, Skadden, Arps, 

Slate, Meagher & Flom

Archbishop Charles J. 

Chaput 

Commissioner

Archbishop of Denver 

Khaled Abou El Fadl

Commissioner

Professor of Law At UCLA

Richard D. Land

Commissioner

President and CEO of 

the Ethics and Religious 

Liberty Commission of 

the Southern Baptist 

Convention 

Bishop Ricardo Ramirez

Commissioner

Bishop of the Diocese of 

Las Cruces, New Mexico

John V. Hanford Iii 

Ex-Officio

Non-voting Commissioner 

Ambassador-at-large for 

International Religious 

Freedom, U.S. Department 

of State

Joseph R. Crapa 

Executive Director

C OMMI S S IONER

S

POLICYFOCUS

Political authoritarianism—combined with rising 

nationalism and a sometimes arbitrary official response 

to domestic security concerns—is jeopardizing the human 

rights of Russia’s citizens, including members of the 

country’s religious and ethnic minorities. 
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Key Concerns

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As a result of its visit to Russia and its ongoing monitoring of 

religious freedom and other human rights conditions in that country, 

the Commission has identified five major areas of concern: 

• The rise in xenophobia and ethnic and religious intolerance, resulting in an 

 increased number of violent attacks and other hate crimes, and the government’s

 failure to address this serious problem adequately.

• The Russian government’s challenge to international human rights institutions and its persistent claims that foreign funding 

of Russian human rights organizations constitutes illegitimate interference in Russia’s internal affairs.

• Official actions related to countering terrorism that result in harassment of individual Muslims and Muslim communities.

• New amendments to the law on non-commercial organizations (i.e. NGOs, which include religious organizations) which may be 

used to restrict severely their ability to function. 

• Continuing restrictions by Russian authorities on the exercise of freedom of religion or belief, particularly at the regional and 

local levels. 

The Commission concludes that the U.S. government can and should do more to urge the Russian government to take steps to 

deal effectively with each of these growing problems. 

The Inadequate Response 

to Increasing Xenophobia, 

Intolerance, and Hate Crimes

Virtually all of the Commission delegation’s interlocutors in Russia expressed 

concern about rising xenophobia, 

intolerance, and hate crimes in Russian 

society. Current Russian law has several 

provisions that address crimes motivated 

by ethnic or religious hatred.2 Unfortunately, Russia’s law enforcement agencies 

and judicial system have a history of infrequent, inconsistent, and even arbitrary 

and inappropriate application of these 

provisions. 

Many groups in Russia monitoring hate crimes have concluded that 

xenophobic attacks have become more 

violent, as in the early 2006 killings of 

African students and Tajik migrants in 

St. Petersburg and the knife attack that 

injured nine Jewish worshippers 

in a Moscow synagogue. While there 

are no official statistics available, the 

SOVA Center, a leading Russian monitor 

of hate crimes, documented 31 racist murders and hate-based attacks on 

413 individuals in 2005, although the 

Center estimated that the real number 

of violent attacks is far higher. In the first 

half of 2006, the SOVA Center documented a three-fold increase in racist 

murders compared to the same time 

period the previous year, with 19 killed 

and 166 injured by groups or individuals, 

commonly referred to as “skinheads,” 

espousing intolerant ideologies. Among 

the incidents in 2006 was the attempted 

killing of a 9-year-old Russian girl of 

African heritage, as well as the murders 

in St. Petersburg of a Senegalese student 

and a young Armenian boy. 

Persons who have investigated or 

been publicly critical of hate crimes in 

Russia have themselves been subject 

to violent attacks. Nikolai Girenko, a St. 

Petersburg expert on xenophobia who 

often testified in trials concerning hate 

crimes, was gunned down in June 2004. 

Local police claimed in May—two years 

after the murder and shortly before the 

meeting of the G-8 countries in July 

2006—to have found the five men guilty 

of the killing, but some who are familiar 

with the case have questioned whether 

these are the real perpetrators. In addition, several judges who have ruled 

against skinheads have received death 

threats. As this report went to print in 

October, prominent Russian journalist 

Anna Politkovskaya, who reported extensively on the situation in Chechnya, was 

MOSCOW

REPUBLIC

OF TATARSTAN

FINLAND

UKRAINE

KAZAKSTAN

POLAND

BELARUS

SWEDEN

C a s p i a n 

S e a

A r t i c O c e a n

B a r e n t s

S e a

N o r t h

 S e a

Kazan

Male

Colombo

St. Petersburg
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murdered in Moscow in a crime that 

prosecutors have reportedly linked to 

her work. 

Indeed, during 2006, the incidents 

of violent hate crimes have increased 

not only in number, but also in scope. 

Frequently, migrants are the victims of 

xenophobic attacks in Russia. According to a May 18, 2006 report to the UN 

Secretary General, Russia today has a 

population of 12 million migrants, of 

which only 10 percent are thought to 

have legal status in that country. The 

majority of these migrants are Muslims from Central Asia and Azerbaijan. 

Nikolay Spasskiy, Deputy Secretary of 

the Russian Security Council, told the 

Commission that there are some 10 million illegal migrants in Russia. 

Noting the growing ethnic tensions 

in Russia resulting from the influx of migrants into the country, Itar-Tass news 

agency reported in September 2006 

that a recent national poll showed that 

although 45 percent of Russians favor 

teaching ethnic tolerance at schools 

and through the mass media, “[a]lmost 

all” of those polled expressed a “negative assessment” of the social impact of 

migrants. In August 2006, four young 

skinheads were arrested after they 

bombed a Moscow market, resulting in 

11 fatalities and 45 injuries. They told 

the police that they had bombed the 

market because “too many people from 

Asia” worked there.3 According to the 

Moscow police chief, the four are also 

responsible for eight additional bombings in Moscow and the Moscow region. 

Most officials, NGO representatives, and other individuals with whom 

the delegation met agreed that these 

attacks were motivated largely by 

ethnic intolerance, although religious 

and ethnic identities often overlap. 

Nevertheless, attacks have occurred 

against members of Muslim, Jewish, 

Protestant, and other religious communities that are explicitly motivated 

by religious factors. Leaders from these 

three communities expressed concern 

to the Commission about the growth of 

chauvinism in Russia. They also were 

apprehensive that Russian government 

officials provided tacit or active support 

to a view held by many ethnic Russians 

that their country should be reserved 

for them and that Russian Orthodoxy is 

the country’s so-called “true religion.” 

Many official and other interlocutors 

linked this view to a perception that 

Russian identity is currently threatened 

due to a demographic crisis stemming 

from a declining birthrate and high 

mortality rate among the ethnic Russian 

portion of the country’s population. 

Unlike in the Soviet period, the 

state no longer acts as the official sponsor of anti-Semitism. Yet, anti-Semitic 

literature that includes accusations 

that Jews engage in the ritual murder 

of Christian children is sold in the Russian State Duma building. The Russian Procuracy has not responded to 

complaints that such literature violates 

Russian laws against incitement of 

ethnic and religious hostility. In January 2005, 20 members of the Russian 

State Duma called on the Procurator 

General to ban all Jewish organizations 

in Russia, alleging that ancient Jewish 

texts teach incitement of religious and 

ethnic hatred. Though the letter was 

later officially withdrawn, none of the 

signatories has expressed regret for the 

views expressed in the letter. In April 

2005, a similar letter was signed by 5,000 

people, including many public figures 

and Russian Orthodox Church officials. 

Although the Russian Foreign Ministry 

condemned both letters, the Moscow 

Procuracy did not follow through on its 

investigation of the instigators of these 

letters and no charges were brought 

against any of the signatories. 

Russian officials have an inconNikolay Spasskiy, Deputy Secretary of the Russian National Security Council (right, in center), 

in a meeting with the Commission delegation 
sistent—and often inadequate—record 

in responding to anti-Semitic incidents. 

Nevertheless, there are some reported 

cases when hate crimes legislation has 

been used. In 2006, a group of extremists 

who tried to kill Jews in the Siberian city 

of Tomsk were convicted of attempted 

murder and terrorism (they had injured a policeman by booby-trapping 

an anti-Semitic sign with an explosive). 

Prosecutors in the central Russian city of 

Vologda are investigating the distribution 

of anti-Semitic leaflets and plan to charge 

any suspect they discover with inciting 

ethnic hatred, the SOVA Center reported. 

In June 2006, the Russian Supreme Court 

ordered a review of the 13-year sentence 

handed down against a young man who 

wounded nine worshippers during a 

January 2006 knife attack in a Moscow 

synagogue. Investigators found anti-Semitic literature and ammunition in the 

attacker’s apartment, but the lower court 

had not found the defendant guilty of 

incitement of ethnic or religious hatred 

(under Article 282 of the Russian Criminal Code). In the March 2006 trial, doctors diagnosed the defendant as suffering 

from schizophrenia; the attacker pled not 

guilty and cited anti-Semitic theories in 

his defense. Finally, in September, a Moscow court sentenced the young man to 16 

years in prison for attempted murder and 

inciting racial hatred under Article 282. 

Russian laws are applied inconsistently and all too frequently fail to 

address that the problem stems from 

intolerance or hate. The Commission 

delegation met with Russian government 

officials who gave varying responses 

to the growing problem of hate crimes. 

Officials from the Leningrad Oblast, or 

region, declined even to meet with the 

Commission because, in their words, 

there was no government official responsible for monitoring or prosecuting 

xenophobia and hate crimes since “their 

region did not have these problems.” 

Like many other Russian officials, local 

officials in Tatarstan and St. Petersburg labeled crimes targeting ethnic or 

religious communities simply as “hooliganism,” claiming that such crimes are 

motivated solely by economic hardships. 

In a similar vein, Nikolai Spasskiy told 

the Commission that hate crimes were 

“rooted in socio-economic misery that 

is shared by the attackers and victims.” 

Officials often noted that ethnic and 

migrant communities themselves were 

linked to criminal activities, or stated that 

they were “outsiders,” by which officials 

meant migrants from Central Asia or the 

Caucasus. 

Despite assurances from Spasskiy 

and Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr 

Yakovenko that the national government 

had sent strong messages to local prosecutors and law enforcement agencies to 

investigate and punish hate crimes, St. 

Petersburg officials told the Commission 

that no specific unit had been set up in 

that city to handle such crimes, nor were 

there any special guidelines or training for 

police or prosecutors. In Kazan, the tomb 

of the former head of the Jewish community and the city’s only synagogue had 

been defaced by swastikas. Yet, Tatarstan 

law enforcement officials insisted to the 

Commission that these acts constituted 

“hooliganism” and that the republic had 

no problems relating to xenophobia or nationalism. Tatarstan’s Human Rights Ombudsman, Rinat Vagizov, initially reiterated 

this claim, but after his assertion was 

repeatedly challenged by the Commission 

delegation, he acknowledged that “in his 

personal opinion,” the cemetery attack did 

bear the hallmarks of a hate crime.

Tatarstan President Mintimer 

Shaimiev repeatedly has spoken out 

against expressions of ethnic intolerance, 

including among leaders of political 

parties. The Commission delegation met 

other Russian officials, particularly local 

legislators in St. Petersburg and Moscow, who acknowledged a more explicit 

connection between ethnic and religious 

hatred and a rise in Russian nationalism. 

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Many groups 

in Russia monitoring 

hate crimes have 

concluded that

xenophobic attacks have 

become more violent.

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr 

Yakovenko with Commissioner Michael 

Cromartie

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6

In addition to programs to improve the 

living standard of Russians and to bring 

social services to migrants to integrate 

them into the larger community, these 

officials proposed enhanced law enforcement methods as well as special training 

and other programs to address ethnic and 

religious hatred and promote tolerance. 

Rather than institute any new legislation 

dealing specifically with hate crimes, 

these officials believe that one important 

step would be for law enforcement officials and courts to prosecute and convict 

perpetrators of hate crimes under current 

Russian Criminal Code provisions for 

such acts. In July 2006, the St. Petersburg 

City Duma called on federal authorities to introduce enhanced penalties for 

murder and other crimes under current 

articles in the Russian Criminal Code in 

cases of proven motivations of ethnic, 

racial, or religious hatred, the newspaper 

Nezavisimaya gazeta reported. The Russian newspaper Trud reported that the 

Moscow city Duma would consider a bill 

in the autumn of 2006 that envisions the 

creation of a local commission to address 

ethnic discrimination. 

Several of the Commission’s nongovernmental interlocutors noted that 

President Putin and senior members 

of his administration had not spoken 

out strongly enough in support of the 

multi-ethnic and multi-confessional 

nature of the Russian state and society.4 

Some Western and other observers have 

suggested that Russian authorities have 

manipulated xenophobia for political 

purposes. The Kremlin is believed, for 

example, to have supported the formation of the ultra-nationalist “Rodina” 

political party—and then to have been 

unprepared for its popularity—as well 

as the politically active nationalist youth 

movement “Nashi.” President Putin has 

on occasion affirmed the value of pluralism, for instance at the meeting of the 

G-8 countries in July 2006, and has also 

decried anti-Semitism and hate crimes. 

Nevertheless, in the Commission’s view, 

more can and should be done to ensure 

that Russian law enforcement agencies recognize hate crimes for what they 

are—human rights abuses—and to 

prevent and punish such crimes, including those involving ethnicity and religion. 

While vigorously promoting freedom of 

expression, Russian public officials and 

leaders of religious communities should 

take steps to discourage rhetoric that 

promotes xenophobia or intolerance, 

including religious intolerance. 

Attempts to Challenge 

International Human Rights 

Institutions and Undermine 

Domestic Human Rights Advocacy

Growing suspicion of foreign influence 

in Russia has been exacerbated by the 

repeated assertions by President Putin and 

other Russian government officials that 

foreign funding of NGOs constitutes 

“meddling” in Russia’s internal affairs. The 

official branding of Russian human rights 

organizations as “foreign” has increased 

the vulnerability of Russia’s human rights 

advocates and those they defend. Moreover, although Russia has ratified international human rights treaties and agreements including the Helsinki Accords, 

government officials and other influential 

Russian figures have challenged international human rights institutions, as well as 

the validity of human rights advocacy in 

Russia, charging that both are being 

used for political purposes. Furthermore, 

they have complained of “double standards,” “selectivity,” and “politicization” 

when there is an inquiry into Russia’s human rights practices. In the Organization 

for Security and Cooperation in Europe 

(OSCE), for example, the Russian government has led efforts critical of the 

Chief Rabbi of Russia Adolf Shayevich (center), with Commissioners Felice D. Gaer, Michael 

Cromartie, Richard Land, and Elizabeth H. Prodromou, at Moscow Choral Synagogue

POLICYFOCUS
organization’s human rights and election 

monitoring efforts in Russia and neighboring countries. 

The Commission heard these and 

similar views about human rights and 

the foreign funding of Russian NGOs 

expressed not only by Russian government officials, but also by Metropolitan 

Kirill, the Metropolitan of Smolensk 

and Kaliningrad, and External Affairs 

spokesman of the Moscow Patriarchate 

of the Russian Orthodox Church. This is 

a particular cause for concern, given the 

increasingly prominent role provided to 

the Russian Orthodox Church in Russian 

state and public affairs. 

In April 2006, Metropolitan Kirill 

delivered a statement on “Human Rights 

and Moral Responsibility” to the World 

Council of the Russian People. In that 

document, he stated that Russia reserves 

the right to deviate from UN human 

rights norms to correct the “harmful 

emphasis” on “heightened individualism” which has infiltrated Russian society 

via “opposition groups” working through 

Russian civil society organizations. According to Kirill, such groups advance the 

political agendas of those foreigners

who fund their activities, while the average Russian views the rights that these 

groups advocate as intrusive and alien. 

To address this situation, the Moscow 

Patriarchate has proposed a “unifying 

strategy” for Russian civil society to 

define a “pure,” non-politicized human 

rights struggle. 

In June, during his meeting with the 

Commission delegation, Metropolitan 

Kirill affirmed the norms in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. At the 

same time, however, Kirill expressed 

three main concerns about international human rights norms and their 

application in Russia: human rights 

may be used “to offend or desecrate holy 

things;” human rights may “defame people” or be used as “an excuse for certain 

unacceptable acts;” and laws created 

under the guise of promoting human 

rights may be used “to destroy morality” 

and related values. In Kirill’s view, human rights must be connected to ethical 

and moral “values” rather than what he 

claims are simply “political agendas.” 

7

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The Commission has 

received increasing 

reports of unwarranted 

official government 

detention and prosecution 

of Muslims in Russia.

Metropolitan Kirill, Metropolitan of Smolensk and Kaliningrad and External Affairs spokesman of the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church, meeting with the 

Commission delegation

Increasing Official Harassment 

of Muslims 

As is the case in many other countries, 

the Russian government faces major 

challenges as it addresses the problems 

of religious extremism and acts of terrorism that claim a religious linkage, while 

also protecting freedom of religion or 

belief and other human rights. The rapid 

post-Soviet revival of Islamic worship and 

religious education, along with the ongoing war in Chechnya and growing instability in the North Caucasus, compound 

difficulties for the Russian government in 

dealing with its 20 million-strong Muslim 

population, the country’s second largest 

religious community. 

Security threats from domestic 

terrorism, particularly those related to 

the conflict in Chechnya, are genuine. 

According to Deputy Secretary Spasskiy, 

the security threat emanating from the 

North Caucasus is driven by a religion 

hijacked by political extremism. The 

region faces chronic instability due to a 

variety of factors: severe economic dislocation, especially among young men; the 

continuing conflict in Chechnya; some 

radical foreign influences on indigenous 

Muslims; and other local grievances. All 

these factors have combined to fuel volatile, and increasingly violent, expressions 

among Muslims of popular dissatisfac-
8

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tion with the Russian government. 

In response to these security concerns, many Russian officials, including 

Deputy Foreign Minister Yakovenko, identified to the Commission the need for calibrated government policies that enhance 

security without human rights abuses or 

unwarranted government control of Islamic religious practice. Deputy Secretary 

Spasskiy told the Commission that he 

deplored discrimination against members 

of Muslim communities by police in their 

“daily routine.” Human rights groups and 

others, however, expressed concern to 

the Commission that the methods used 

by the Russian government to address 

security threats could increase instability 

and exacerbate radicalism among Russia’s 

Muslim community. 

The Commission has received 

increasing reports of unwarranted official 

government detention and prosecution 

of Muslims in Russia. During its visit 

to Russia, the Commission met with a 

number of NGOs and human rights activists who are monitoring human rights 

abuses against Muslim individuals and 

communities. They provided evidence 

of numerous cases of Muslims being 

prosecuted for extremism or terrorism 

despite no apparent relation to such 

activities. These included dozens of cases 

of individuals detained for possessing religious literature, such as the Koran, or on 

the basis of evidence—including banned 

literature, drugs, or explosives—allegedly 

planted by the police. The Commission 

was informed of at least 200 cases of 

Muslims imprisoned on what reportedly 

are fabricated criminal charges of possession of weapons and drugs. The Russian 

human rights group Memorial reports 

that men with long beards, women wearing head scarves, and those Muslims 

perceived as “overly devout” are viewed 

with suspicion. Such individuals may be 

arrested on vague official accusations of 

alleged Islamic extremism or for displaying Islamist 

sympathies. 

In one case, a prominent Islamic 

activist who worked for religious reconciliation in the North Caucasus city of 

Nalchik “disappeared” in November 2005, 

shortly after being interrogated by Russian security services. Persons suspected 

by local police of involvement in alleged 

Islamic extremism have reportedly been 

subjected to torture and ill-treatment 

in pre-trial detention, prisons, and 

labor camps. 

Muslim leaders have also been targeted by Russian officials. For example, a 

leading Muslim activist in the southern 

region of Astrakhan has been charged 

with incitement to religious hatred by the 

regional authorities, although his lawyer 

from the Slavic Legal Center insisted that 

the charges are “very crudely falsified.”5 

Well-known Russian human rights activists have signed an open letter supporting 

the Astrakhan Muslim leader. In another 

incident, after a court in the North Caucasus republic of Adygei rejected a case 

brought against a local imam for “incitement of hatred or hostility by insulting 

human dignity” under Article 282.1 of the 

Russian Criminal Code in March 2006, officials brought administrative suit against 

the imam the following September—for 

the “illegal sale of spoiled butter.” 

There are also concerns that certain 

government actions to counter extremism will have a chilling effect on freedom 

of expression in Russia. For example, 

Sheikh Nafigulla Ashirov, the Chairman 

of the Spiritual Directorate for the Muslims of the Asian part of Russia, told the 

Commission that Russian officials had 

warned him that he could be charged 

with extremism for publishing a courtrequested expert analysis of texts from 

the radical Muslim group Hizb ut-Tahrir. 

As a result of Ashirov’s conclusion that 

the documents of the organization’s Russian branch did not advocate violence, 

he claims that several defendants received lighter sentences from the courts. 

Mufti Gusman Khazrat Iskhakov, head of the Council of Spiritual Affairs for Muslims of the 

Republic of Tatarstan (front row, second from left),with Commission delegation
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The Memorial human rights organization, which requested and then posted 

Ashirov’s analysis on its Web site, was 

also informed that it could be charged 

with extremism. 

According to human rights groups, 

a 2003 Russian Supreme Court decision 

to ban 15 Muslim groups for their alleged 

ties to international terrorism has made 

it much easier for officials to detain arbitrarily individuals on extremism charges 

for alleged connections to these groups. 

The evidence on which the Court reached 

this decision was not made public for 

over three years, yet police, prosecutors, 

and courts reportedly have used the 

decision to arrest and imprison hundreds 

of individuals from Russia’s Muslim 

community. Indeed, it was not until July 

2006 that the official Russian newspaper 

Rossiiskaya gazeta published a list of terrorist-designated organizations drawn up 

by the Federal Security Service (FSB).6 

The Commission delegation also 

received reports that Russian government officials have closed a number of 

mosques. While some mosque closures 

may have been necessitated by security 

concerns, in other cases officials seem 

to have acted in an arbitrary fashion. 

For example, the previous president of 

the Kabardino-Balkaria republic in the 

North Caucasus ordered the closure of 

six of the city’s seven mosques in Nalchik, the regional capital. This decision, 

along with allegations by Russian analysts that local police had tortured young 

men suspected of Islamist sympathies, 

are seen as having been major contributing factors to the October 2005 violence 

in Nalchik, which resulted in the deaths 

of over 100 persons.7 The new president 

of the Kabardino-Balkaria republic said 

in September 2006 that he plans to reopen two of the mosques in Nalchik. In 

August 2006, the Russian Supreme Court 

upheld a lower court decision ordering 

that the local Muslim community pay 

for the demolition of its new mosque in 

the city of Astrakhan on the Caspian Sea. 

Allegedly, the city’s Muslim community 

had not received all the required building permits, although the construction 

of this mosque had been partly funded 

by the previous regional and city governments. Officials of the European Court 

for Human Rights arrived in Russia in 

September 2006 as the first step in that 

body’s consideration of an appeal by 

Astrakhan’s Islamic community in the 

mosque demolition case. 

The Commission delegation’s visit to 

Kazan, the capital of Tatarstan, provided 

further perspectives on Russian government policies and practices concerning the country’s Muslim population. 

Tatarstan is a Muslim-majority republic with a sizeable Russian Orthodox 

Christian minority. The republic reportedly enjoys relatively good relations 

between the Muslim and Christian 

communities—a balance that Tatarstan 

government officials appear anxious 

to maintain. Officials also noted local 

government support for preserving 

Tatarstan’s traditionally moderate form 

of Islam. A potential complication, however, arises from the fact that nearly onethird of the imams in the republic’s 1,100 

mosques reportedly were trained in 

Saudi Arabia and other countries in the 

Middle East. The promotion of moderate Islam may also prove difficult due to 

the Tatarstan government’s own actions. 

According to the human rights group 

Memorial, Tatarstan officials sometimes 

threaten or imprison those Muslims who 

refuse to testify in court against their 

co-religionists or who provide humanitarian assistance to Muslim prisoners or 

their families. 

Tatarstan President Shaimiev and 

other regional officials supported the 

training of imams through the government-funded Russian Islamic University in Kazan. However, according to 

President of the Republic of Tatarstan 

Mintimer Shaimiev with Commissioner 

Michael Cromartie
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Aleksandr Kudryavtsev, Director of the 

Presidential Administration Liaison with 

Religious Organizations, meeting with the 

Commission delegation (second from right)

Arseny Roginsky, chairman of the human 

rights organization Memorial (standing), with 

Memorial staff and Commission delegation

Rafik Mukhametshin, deputy head of 

the Islamic Studies Department at the 

Tatarstan Academy of Sciences, the University’s approach to religious education 

was so secular that local Muslim leaders 

viewed it as insufficient to train imams. 

Although local officials report no danger 

from extremism, they did confirm that 

there had been several investigations 

into extremist activity. Furthermore, Tatarstan officials did admit that in at least 

one case, individuals had been arrested 

when police erroneously identified the 

Koran as extremist material. In another 

case, charges were brought against an 

individual for distributing allegedly extremist material in Tatarstan: a textbook 

on the Arabic language printed in Moscow. In September 2006, a Moscow court 

took up a case on whether the writings 

of Said Nursi, a Turkish pacifist Islamic 

theologian with 6 million adherents in 

Turkey, should be declared extremist. 

The Tatarstan procurator had initiated a 

case against the private Tatarstan-based 

Nuri-Badi Foundation that has published 

Nursi’s works. The Russian Council of 

Muftis, asked by the court to conduct 

an expert analysis of Nursi’s writings, 

concluded that Nursi’s writings were not 

extremist. Indeed, the extensive analysis, 

published by the Web site “portal-credo.

ru” and signed by Mufti Ravil Gainutdin, 

concluded that in this case the analytical 

methods of the Tatarstan procuracy had 

been “anti-religious” as well as prejudicial toward Islam. 

A Restrictive New NGO Law 

That Also Applies to Religious 

Organizations

The Commission is concerned that a law 

passed earlier this year that restricts the 

activities of non-commercial organizations (i.e. NGOs) will have a negative 

effect on religious groups. Although 

Aleksandr Kudryavtsev, Director of the 

Presidential Administration Liaison 

with Religious Organizations, told the 

Commission delegation that the new 

law would have little impact on religious organizations, Sergei Movchan, 

the director of the Federal Registration 

Service (FRS), confirmed that some of 

the law’s most intrusive provisions apply 

to religious organizations, to charitable 

and educational entities set up by religious organizations, as well as to groups 

defending human rights. 

The FRS, established as a department 

in the Ministry of Justice in late 2004, is 

charged with enforcement of the NGO 

law, as well as the registration of all political parties and real property in Russia. 

FRS officials told the Commission delegation that among its staff of 30,000, the FRS 

currently has 2,000 employees nationwide 

who are tasked with the oversight of 

NGOs, including religious organizations. 

FRS officials also said that over the next 

two years, it plans to hire an additional 

12,000 employees. FRS officials claimed 

there are some 100,000 active NGOs in 

Russia, rather than the figure of 500,000 

often cited by other Russian government 

officials and in the media. Since the new 

NGO law took effect in April 2006, the FRS 

reports that it has received 6,000 requests 

for registration, of which 600 applications 

were refused, mainly, the agency claims, 

on technical grounds.

Under the new law, FRS officials can order an examination of an 

organization’s documents, including 

financial information, as well as attend 

its events, without the group’s consent 

or a court order. If violations are found, 

the FRS can call for court proceedings 

against the group, possibly resulting in 

the group’s eventual liquidation. FRS 

officials told the Commission that the 

FRS regulations on the use of these 

powers had not yet been finalized, but 

that officials would be able to use this 

new authority if they believed that an 

organization was acting contrary to its 

charter—something that has apparently 

already occurred. According to a June 

2006 Interfax report, the FRS branch in 

Novosibirsk recently found that a registered local Pentecostal church violated 
r uss i a

11

its charter when it conducted religious 

activities in military units. If the church 

does not change its charter accordingly, 

it will face court proceedings that could 

lead to its liquidation.

Moreover, the FRS has almost 

complete discretion to cancel programs 

and ban financial transactions by Russian branches of foreign organizations. 

Although the law provides only the 

vaguest guidance regarding the circumstances under which officials could take 

these actions, FRS officials confirmed to 

the delegation that no further regulations were being considered. Instead, 

they plan to wait until FRS actions are 

challenged in court to undertake any 

refinements in guidelines regarding the 

scope of these powers. 

The new law also establishes extensive and onerous reporting requirements. NGOs are required to submit 

detailed annual reports regarding all of 

their activities, the composition of their 

governing bodies, as well as documentation of spending and the use of other 

property, including assets acquired from 

foreign sources. Some representatives 

with whom the Commission delegation met expressed concern about the 

administrative and financial burdens of 

these requirements, especially for small 

religious organizations. FRS officials 

said that they are aware of this concern 

and claimed that some steps were being 

taken to inform organizations about the 

reporting and other requirements of the 

law. FRS Director Movchan claimed that 

this aspect of the new law will not be 

strictly applied, at least initially. He also 

offered to work with the U.S. Embassy 

in Moscow to hold public seminars on 

compliance with the law. 

Given the unfettered discretion 

granted to FRS officials under the new 

law, its actual impact will be measured 

by its practical implementation. Security 

Council Deputy Secretary Spasskiy 

told the Commission delegation that 

although he viewed the law as a “fine 

piece of art,” he also acknowledged that 

the law’s implementation could be problematic, stating that “a delicate balancing act” was needed to regulate NGOs 

properly while respecting concerns 

about unwarranted government intrusion and restriction. Spasskiy also said 

that implementation of the law would be 

monitored by the Public Chamber, a new 

body consisting of civil society figures 

appointed by the Russian government 

with no formal oversight authority or accountability to the courts or the Duma. 

The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 

along with several government officials, 

such as Spasskiy, Yakovenko, and Kudryavtsev, insisted that the new law was in 

line with those found in European and 

other Western countries. This assertion, 

however, is questioned by legal experts 

in the United States and at the Council of Europe and by the Commission. 

Spasskiy and Yakovenko informed the 

Commission delegation that Russia remained open to U.S. concerns regarding 

implementation of the law. 

FRS officials told the Commission 

that one of the problems the law was 

designed to address was that foreign 

funding had reached Russian political 

parties via NGOs or had otherwise influenced the political process. In Kazan, the 

Tatarstan Human Rights Ombudsman 

Members of the Inter-Religious Council of Russia meeting with the Commission delegation

Commissioners Richard Land (left) and 

Michael Cromartie (right) with Sergei 

Movchan, Director of Russia’s Federal 

Registration Service (center) 
POLICYFOCUS

12

Many of the problems faced by minority religious 

communities in Russia stem from the notion set forth in 

the preface to the 1997 law that only four religions—

Russian Orthodoxy, Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism—

have “traditional” status in that country. 

told the Commission delegation that one 

of the key purposes of the new legislation was to prevent NGOs and other 

non-commercial organizations from 

engaging in political activities, especially those entities that receive funding 

from foreign sources. Yet, this purpose 

is not directly stated in the NGO law. 

Russia’s human rights organizations are 

particularly vulnerable to this implicit 

prohibition, which is subject to arbitrary 

interpretation. These provisions of the 

NGO law on foreign funding are part of 

the broader effort by Russian officials, 

described above, to link human rights 

groups to “foreign interference,” and 

thus to discredit—and perhaps ultimately 

halt—their activities. 

Continuing Restrictions on 

Religious Freedom at the 

Regional and Local Levels

Unlike under the Soviet regime, people in 

Russia today are generally able to profess 

and practice the religion of their choice. 

Nevertheless, minority religious groups 

continue to face some restrictions on religious activities, especially at the regional 

and local levels, stemming from a variety 

of factors, including Russia’s weak judicial 

system, inconsistent adherence to the 

rule of law, and local officials’ sometimes arbitrary interpretations regarding 

the status of the so-called “traditional” 

religions. These problems include denials 

of registration (status of legal person) 

requests; refusals to allot land to build 

places of worship; restrictions on rental 

space for religious activities and lengthy 

delays in the return of religious property; and attacks in the state-controlled 

media that incite intolerance. Aleksandr 

Kudryavtsev, Director of the Presidential 

Administration Liaison with Religious Organizations, confirmed to the Commission delegation that Russian government 

officials continue to violate the rights of 

persons belonging to religious communities at the regional and local levels. 

In 2005, the Russian Federation’s 

Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman (RFHRO) issued an annual report 

detailing human rights violations and 

complaints among Russia’s citizens. A 

representative of that agency told the 

Commission that his office receives 

between 200 and 250 religious freedom 

complaints every year, representing thousands of alleged individual violations, 

and that its investigations reveal that 

about 75 percent of these cases represent 

genuine violations of religious freedom 

guarantees under Russian law. According 

to the RFHRO report, the restrictions and 

limitations that produce these problems 

are due to subjective factors, including 

the notion that Russian officials should 

accord different treatment to the four socalled “traditional” religions, compared 

to that accorded the many alleged “nontraditional” religious communities in 

Russia. Another factor is the alleged preferential treatment given to the Russian 

Orthodox Church, and the documented 

influence of Russian Orthodox priests on 

local and regional government officials. 

Official Barriers to Legal Status and 

Practice; Societal Intolerance

Since the passage of a law in 1997 “On 

Freedom of Conscience and on Religious 

Communities,” the Russian government 

has registered thousands of religious 

congregations. Yet registration remains 

a complex issue for many of Russia’s 

religious groups. Some groups, including 

some Russian Orthodox communities, 

believe they can satisfy the requirements 

of their religious life without undergoing 

the increasingly complex and time-consuming registration procedure. Others, 

such as the “initiative” Baptists, refuse to 

register because they view this process 

as a violation of their right to freedom of 

conscience. As many as half of Russia’s 

Muslim communities reportedly are not 

registered for various reasons. 

Although the number of registered 

religious communities has increased, 

there has been a steady rise in groups 

experiencing chronic difficulties in obtaining legal status through registration. 

According to the RFHRO report, religious 

groups experiencing such difficulties include various Orthodox churches which 

do not recognize the Moscow Patriarchate, Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Hare Krishna 

Society, Pentecostal churches, and the 
Church of the Latter-day Saints. Representatives of a number of these groups 

confirmed their registration difficulties to 

the Commission delegation. The March 

2004 Moscow court decision banning the 

Jehovah’s Witnesses in the city of Moscow, 

upheld on appeal, marked the first time 

that a national religious organization in 

Russia had a local branch banned under 

the 1997 law. 

Religious groups that have taken 

their cases to court to overturn registration denials have often been successful, 

but some administrative authorities 

have been unwilling to implement court 

decisions. For example, the Salvation 

Army has not been re-registered in the 

city of Moscow, despite a Russian Constitutional Court ruling in their favor. 

Russian authorities have also denied 

registration to certain religious communities because they allegedly have not 

been in existence for a sufficiently long 

period, despite a 2002 Russian Constitutional Court decision that an active 

religious organization registered before 

the 1997 law could not be deprived of 

legal status for failure to re-register. The 

problem is particularly acute at the local 

level, since local officials sometimes 

either refuse outright to register groups 

or create prohibitive obstacles to registration. The European Court of Human 

Rights is currently considering appeals 

from religious communities refused 

registration by the cities of Moscow, 

Nizhnekamsk in Tatarstan, and others.

The 1997 religion law gives a 

minimum of 10 citizens the right to 

form a religious association, which, in 

turn, provides them the legal right for a 

house of worship. Yet, despite this legal 

guarantee, building or renting worship 

space remains a problem for a number 

of religious groups. For example, local 

authorities in Kaliningrad, Sochi, and 

St. Petersburg have not responded to 

longstanding requests from Muslim communities to be given permission to build 

mosques. Roman Catholics, Protestants, 

Old Believers, Molokans, and other 

alternative Orthodox communities have 

also reported difficulties in obtaining 

permission to build houses of worship. 

In November 2005, Moscow authorities 

overturned their decision to allot land 

for the building of a Hare Krishna temple 

and the case was lost on appeal. After the 

case received publicity in India, Moscow 

authorities indicated in 2006 that they 

would reconsider the case. The RFHRO 

report also cites several cases where local 

officials have used opinion surveys—

which, according to the RFHRO, are 

sometimes falsified—of neighborhood 

residents to deny requests from minority religious communities for permission 

to build places of worship. For example, 

in July 2006, after local veterans’ groups 

protested, Orenburg city officials ordered 

that a mosque be built in another location in the city, the SOVA Center reported. 

Muslim and Protestant leaders and 

non-governmental sources, including the 

SOVA Center, describe articles in the Russian media that frequently were hostile 

to Muslims or that spread falsehoods 

about Protestants. The SOVA Center has 

noted several specific examples. Despite 

complaints from the Muslim community in the Siberian city of Tyumen, the 

local TV station showed footage of their 

mosque during a story about the radical 

Muslim group Hizb-ut-Tahrir. In April 

2006, in the Buddhist-majority republic 

of Kalmykia, a local parliamentarian 

branded Protestants as “Satanists” in a 

statement broadcast on TV. A Pentecostal church service in the Siberian city of 

Perm was disrupted by a gas attack in 

August 2006; the church’s pastor believes 

the attack may be connected to negative 

articles in the local media. Media attacks 

on religious communities contribute to 

an atmosphere of intolerance and even 

hatred of these religious groups. Furthermore, concerned communities are 

usually denied opportunities to counter 

such claims publicly. 

Fr. Gleb Yakunin of the All-Russian Movement for 

Human Rights (center) with Commissioners Felice D. 

Gaer, Michael Cromartie, and Richard Land

r uss i a

13

Archbishop Tadeusz Kondrusiewicz of the 

Roman Catholic Church with Commissioner 

Richard Land
Evangelical Protestants and 

members of other minority Christian 

communities have been targeted in violent attacks, to which local authorities 

reportedly do not adequately respond. 

For example, the Forum 18 News Service 

reported that Russian police failed to 

respond after drunken youths attacked 

a Pentecostal service in the Siberian 

city of Spassk in April 2006 or when a 

Catholic service in St. Petersburg was 

disrupted by intruders in late May. In 

both incidents, only after church leaders 

complained did the authorities take action. Security police have also reportedly restricted the religious activities 

of certain religious minorities. In May 

2006, in Ivanovo near Moscow, the FSB 

raided a Baptist event at a rented cinema 

and detained two Baptists who were 

distributing religious literature, according to Forum 18. The Slavic Legal Center 

reports it is defending an Evangelical 

Christian pastor in Syktyvkar, capital of 

the republic of Komi, who is appealing 

the fine ordered by a court in August 2006 

for singing hymns allegedly outside the 

legally designated area for his church. 

The Ministry of Justice has sent to the 

Russian State Duma a series of amendments to control so-called “missionary 

outreach” activity. The draft amendments 

contain detailed regulations concerning 

missionary outreach, defined as “popularization” of religious teaching or practice 

outside of places designated for religious 

observance; those who engage in such activities would be required to be registered 

with state authorities. The proposed new 

law would also extend criminal liability for imparting “immoral” influences 

related to religion. 

“Traditional” vs. “Non-Traditional” 

Religions

Many of the problems faced by minority religious communities in Russia stem 

from the notion set forth in the preface 

to the 1997 law that only four religions—

Russian Orthodoxy, Islam, Judaism, and 

Buddhism—have “traditional” status in 

that country. Other religious groups are 

held to be “non-traditional,” and their activities and leaders are subject to official 

oversight and possible restrictions. 

In recent years, there have been 

various (as yet unsuccessful) attempts in 

the Russian state Duma to adopt a law 

that grants privileges to the “traditional” 

religions. According to the RFHRO report, 

this “extra-legal” concept is based on 

historic and cultural considerations, and 

should not be included in legislation. 

Aleksandr Kudryavtsev told the Commission that President Putin does not support 

legislation that would formalize privileges 

for the so-called “traditional religions.” 

Metropolitan Kirill told the Commission that although all religious communities should be equal under the law, 

it was unrealistic to expect that all such 

groups would be accorded equal respect 

by government officials and society, in 

light of the role that the so-called “traditional” religions have played in Russian 

history and culture. He also observed 

that while all religious groups have equal 

rights, “getting attention and respect 

does not depend on equal rights but on 

the contribution each [group] makes to 

the life of the country.” Unfortunately, 

sometimes this perceived cultural and 

14

POLICYFOCUS

Russian Orthodox church in Moscow 

Kul Sharif Mosque, Kazan, Tatarstan
social significance assumes greater 

importance to government officials at 

various levels than the constitutional 

and legal concept of equal rights. Such 

officials are frequently responsible for 

the violations of the rights of members 

of religious minorities. 

The Russian Orthodox Church 

(ROC), which has played a special role in 

Russian history and culture, receives the 

bulk of state support, including subsidies for the construction of churches, 

although other so-called “traditional” 

religious communities also sometimes 

benefit from such subsidies. The ROC 

also has agreements with a number of 

government ministries on guidelines for 

public education, religious training for 

military personnel, and law enforcement 

decisions. Early in 2006, a bill was introduced that would allow only ROC clergy 

to serve as official military chaplains. 

Metropolitan Kirill stated during his 

meeting with the Commission delegation that religious organizations will be 

empowered to operate based on “their 

weight in society,” with proselytism 

“totally [prohibited]...to avoid conflict 

between faiths.” ROC officials also sometimes use their influence with regional 

authorities to restrict the activities of 

other religious groups. There are frequent reports, particularly on the local 

level, that minority religious communities must secure permission from the 

ROC before being allowed to build, buy, 

or rent a house of worship and that local 

authorities sometimes deny registration 

to minority groups at the behest of local 

ROC officials. 

The ROC proposal to add a voluntary 

course on Russian Orthodox culture as 

part of the national education curriculum 

can also be viewed as an example of the 

ROC’s assertion of preferential status. As 

of September 2006, four regions of the 

Russian Federation—Kaluga, Belgorod, 

Bryansk, and Smolensk—had introduced 

compulsory classes focusing on Russian 

Orthodoxy. The course will be offered as 

an elective subject in another 11 regions, according to press reports. Several 

Muslim, Jewish, and Protestant leaders 

informed the Commission delegation 

that they objected to the proposal to 

introduce even voluntary courses on the 

“Russian Orthodox Culture,” because it 

asserted one religious tradition to be the 

foundation of Russian culture. Representatives of the four “traditional” religions 

told the Commission that they favored 

religious instruction as part of the state 

curriculum, but only on a voluntary basis 

and available to members of all religious 

communities based on the number of 

participating students. 

Because of the threat to the constitutionally mandated secular status of 

the state and the separation of the state 

from religion set forth in Russian law, 

a representative of the Human Rights 

Ombudsman’s office told the Commission 

delegation that teaching about religion 

in state schools must be conducted by 

academics and other experts on world 

religions rather than by clerics. Moreover, 

in May 2006, Interfax reported that the 

Ombudsman had declared that the mandatory teaching of religious subjects in 

public schools would be unconstitutional. 

Andrei Fursenko, the Russian Federation 

Education Minister, told Itar-Tass in September 2006 that he disapproves of the 

introduction of the courses on Russian 

Orthodoxy in “14 Russian regions,” that 

he favors teaching children “the history of 

all religions,” and that he intends to ask 

the Public Chamber to resolve the issue. 

U.S. Ambassador to Russia William Burns (center) hosting a roundtable meeting with 

the Commission delegation and civil society activists at Spasso House, the ambassador’s residence

r uss i a

Bishop Sergey Ryakhovskiy, head of the 

Russian Union of Christians of Evangelical 

Faith, with Commissioner Richard Land

15
POLICYFOCUS RUSSIA

1

 Amendments to the federal media law and ad-

ministrative code relating to anti-terrorist measures 

were sent to the Russian State Duma on September 

6, 2006, the Moscow Times reported. Under the 

proposed amendments, any media outlet could be 

closed down for acting as the “cause of damage to 

the person or health of citizens, the environment, 

public order, public safety, property or the legal 

economic interests of individuals or legal entities, 

society or the state.” 2

 For example, Article 282 of the Russian Criminal 

Code forbids the incitement of ethnic and religious 

hatred. Article 63 contains a provision for enhanced 

penalties in violent crimes with evidence of bias 

motivation. The Russian Criminal Code also contains 

five articles (105, 111, 112, 117, 244) with explicit 

provisions for the punishment of violent hate crimes. 3

 The three men have been charged with multiple 

counts of racially motivated murders and investiga-

tors reportedly will order psychiatric examination.As 

of this writing, they are being held in jail awaiting trial. 4

 For example, President Putin has not responded 

publicly to the August 2006 incident of communal 

violence in the northern republic of Karelia. 5

 Geraldine Fagan, “Russia: Muslim rivalry behind 

criminal charges?” Forum 18 News Service, Febru-

ary 8, 2006. 6

 According to the head of the FSB Department for 

Combating International Terrorism, there are three 

criteria for inclusion on this list: violent activities 

aimed at changing Russia’s constitutional system; 

links to illegal armed groups and other extremist 

organizations operating in the North Caucasus; and 

connections to groups regarded as terrorist by the 

international community. 7

 In October 2005 in Nalchik, violence erupted in 

which some 300 persons attacked military garrisons 

and police stations, leaving 34 police and armed 

forces members dead.

END NOTES

Russian Islamic University, Kazan, Tatarstan

16

For additional information 

on this issue contact:

Catherine Cosman, 

Senior Policy Analyst

202-523-3240, ext. 125

ccosman@uscirf.gov

Cathedral Square, the Kremlin, Moscow
r uss i a

Recommendations

As the Commission has persistently stated, Russia’s importance in the community of nations requires continuing examination of the Russian government’s 

policies affecting democratic reform and 

the protection of religious freedom and 

other human rights. What is more, Russia continues to be a highly influential 

model for many countries, particularly 

other former Soviet states. Russia also 

remains an increasingly vital partner 

for the United States, which continues 

to have many important and ongoing 

opportunities to promote strong human 

rights protections in Russia.

The U.S. government should neither abandon nor neglect its efforts to 

strengthen human rights protection and 

promote democracy in Russia. Rather, 

the President and Secretary of State 

should encourage the governments of the 

other G-8 countries to speak out on these 

matters. President Bush and other U.S. 

officials should be prepared to counter 

the persistent claims by Russian leaders that U.S. and UN efforts to advance 

human rights concerns constitute foreign 

“meddling” or are aimed at harming the 

Russian Federation.

The Commission presents the following recommendations which focus 

on six areas: Combating Xenophobia, 

Intolerance, and Hate Crimes; Reforming 

or Withdrawing the 2006 Russian Law on 

Non-Commercial Organizations; Ensuring 

the Equal Legal Status and Treatment of 

the Members of Russia’s Religious Communities; Strengthening Attention to the 

Issue of Freedom of Religion or Belief in 

U.S. Diplomacy; Strengthening U.S. Programs on Promoting Religious Freedom 

and Combating Religious Intolerance; and 

Addressing the Crisis in Chechnya and the 

North Caucasus.

 Combating Xenophobia, 

Intolerance, and Hate Crimes 

The U.S. government should urge the 

Russian government to: 

• condemn in a timely fashion specific 

acts of xenophobia, anti-Semitism, and 

intolerance, as well as incidents of hate 

crimes and make clear that hate crimes 

are to be treated by officials as human 

rights abuses, not as “hooliganism,” 

and that they will be fully and promptly 

investigated and prosecuted;

• establish a special nationwide anti-discrimination body, as recommended by 

the Council of Europe’s European Commission against Racism and Intolerance; 

• implement the numerous specific 

recommendations made by Russia’s 

Presidential Council on Human Rights, 

the official Human Rights Ombudsman, and the Council of Europe’s Commission against Racism and Intolerance 

to address anti-Semitism and xenophobia and prevent and punish hate 

crimes, including full implementation 

by regional and local law enforcement 

personnel of criminal code provisions 

prohibiting incitement and violence 

motivated by ethnic or religious hatred, 

in accordance with standards established by the European Court for Human Rights; and

• report, as required, to the OSCE on the 

specific measures that have been undertaken on a national level to address 

hate crimes, including maintaining 

statistics on these crimes, and strengthening legislative initiatives to combat 

them, and to take advantage of relevant 

OSCE training programs for Russian 

law enforcement and judicial officials.

 Reforming or Withdrawing the 

2006 Russian Law on Non-Commercial Organizations

The U.S. government should encourage 

the Russian government to:

• develop regulations that clarify and 

sharply limit the state’s discretion to 

interfere with the activities of NGOs, 

including religious groups, recognizing 

that the new law on NGOs is troublesome enough to warrant its full repeal.

These regulations should be developed in accordance with international 

standards and in conformance with 

1 

2 

17
18

international best practices.

• ensure that all data related to the NGO 

law, including information available on 

the government’s official web sites, is 

accurate and up to date. For example, 

the comparative study of NGO laws 

prepared by the Russian Ministry of 

Foreign Affairs’ Department of Information and Press should be amended 

or removed. 

 Ensuring the Equal Legal 

Status and Treatment of the 

Members of Russia’s Religious 

Communities

The U.S. government should encourage 

the Russian government to: 

• to affirm the multi-ethnic and multiconfessional nature of Russian society;

• affirm publicly that all religious communities in Russia are equal under the 

law and entitled to equal treatment, 

whether registered or unregistered; 

publicly express opposition to any 

legislation that would grant preferences 

to the purported “traditional” religions 

over other groups; and direct national 

government agencies to address and resolve continuing violations of religious 

freedom at the regional and local levels, 

including by:

• issuing instructions to local law 

enforcement, prosecutors, and 

registration officials as well as 

publicly affirming that members of 

all religious communities are to be 

treated equally under the law; 

• enforcing non-discriminatory, 

generally applicable zoning and 

building codes, and ordering an 

end to the practice of using local 

public opinion surveys that serve 

as a basis to deny land and building 

permits to minority religious communities; and 

• deleting from the preface to the 

1997 Law on “Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations” the reference to the four 

“traditional” religions (Russian 

Orthodoxy, Islam, Judaism, and 

Buddhism), as that reference contradicts the Russian constitutional 

provision that “religious associations are separate from the state 

and are equal before the law” and 

has led Russian officials to establish 

inappropriate limits or demands 

against members of Russia’s other 

religions communities;

• denounce media attacks on any religious community and adopt administrative measures against government 

officials who encourage them;

• cease all forms of interference in the 

internal affairs of religious communities; 

• avoid taking steps that could exacerbate religious extremism by (1) developing policies and strategies to protect 

the religious freedom and other human 

rights of the members of Russia’s Muslim community, and (2) reviewing past 

cases of alleged arbitrary detention or 

arrest of members of this community;

• ensure that law enforcement officials 

vigorously investigate and prosecute 

acts of violence, arson, and desecration 

perpetrated against members of any 

religious community, their property, 

or houses of worship; set up a review 

mechanism outside the procuracy to 

ensure that government authorities and 

law enforcement personnel are investigated and sanctioned, as appropriate, 

if they are found to have encouraged or 

condoned such incidents;

• distribute on a regular basis updated 

information on freedom of religion or 

belief, as well as on Russian constitutional provisions and jurisprudence on 

separation of church and state and the 

equal status of religious denominations, 

to the Russian judiciary, religious affairs 

officials at all levels of government, the 

Federal Registration Service, the procuracy, and all law enforcement bodies;

• extend the current annual training 

program for regional and local religious 

affairs officials to include their counterparts in the judiciary, procuracy, law enforcement agencies, and to the Federal 

Registration Service; and 

• direct the Russian Federation Human Rights Ombudsman to set up a 

nationwide monitoring system on the 

status of freedom of religion or belief 

in the 89 regions of Russia. 

 Strengthening Attention to the 

Issue of Freedom of Religion or 

Belief in U.S. Diplomacy

The U.S. government should: 

• ensure that the U.S. Congress main3 

POLICYFOCUS

4 
r uss i a

19

tain a mechanism to monitor publicly 

the status of human rights in Russia, 

including freedom of religion or belief, 

particularly in the case of any repeal of 

the Jackson-Vanik amendment with respect to Russia, and maintain the Smith 

Amendment as U.S. law; 

• urge the government of the Russian 

Federation to invite the three OSCE 

Personal Representatives on combating 

intolerance as well as the UN Special 

Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or 

Belief to visit the Russian Federation 

during 2007-2008;

• ensure that U.S. Embassy officials and 

programs (a) engage with regional and 

local officials throughout the Russian 

Federation, especially when violations 

of freedom of religion occur, and (b) 

disseminate information to local officials concerning international legal 

norms on freedom of religion or belief, 

including the rights of unregistered 

religious communities; 

• ensure that the issue of human rights, 

including freedom of religion or belief, 

be raised within the context of negotiations on Russian accession to the World 

Trade Organization; 

• work with the Council of Europe, its 

member countries, and the other members of the G-8 to raise issues relating to 

freedom of religion or belief with Russian officials in the context of the Russian Federation’s responsibilities both 

as President of the Council of Europe in 

2006 and as a member of the G-8; and

• work with the other members of the 

G-8 to ensure that the issue of human 

rights, including the human rights 

aspects of migration and protecting 

human rights in the context of counterterrorism are raised at all bilateral and 

multilateral meetings.

 Strengthening U.S. Programs on 

Promoting Religious Freedom and 

Combating Religious Intolerance 

The U.S. government should:

• ensure that U.S. government-funded 

grants to NGOs and other sectors in 

Russian society include the promotion 

of legal protections and cultural respect 

for religious freedom as well as methods to combat xenophobia, including 

intolerance based on religion; solicitations and requests for proposals should 

include these objectives;

• support programs developed by Russian institutions, including universities, 

libraries, NGOs, and associations of 

journalists, particularly those who have 

engaged in the activities described in 

the above recommendation, to organize 

conferences and training programs on 

issues relating to freedom of religion or 

belief, as well as on promoting interreligious cooperation, encouraging 

pluralism, and combating hate crimes 

and xenophobia;

• support programs to train lawyers to 

contest violations of the rights to freedom of religion or belief as guaranteed in 

Russian law and under its international 

5 
POLICYFOCUS

20

obligations, both in Russian courts and 

before the European Court of Human 

Rights; 

• translate, where necessary, into Russian 

and print or otherwise make available 

to Russian citizens relevant documents 

and materials, including: 

• hate crimes guidelines developed 

by the U.S. Federal Bureau of 

Investigation, as well as U.S. Justice 

Department expertise on combating hate crimes and religiously-motivated attacks; and

• international documents and 

materials generated by Russian 

institutions relating to freedom of 

religion or belief, xenophobia, and 

hate crimes, as well as relevant 

U.S. Department of State and 

Commission reports, including by 

posting such documents on the 

U.S. Embassy Web site; 

• ensure that Russia’s citizens continue 

to have access to alternative sources of 

information through U.S.-governmentfunded radio and TV broadcasts, as well 

as Internet communications, and that 

these broadcasts include information 

about freedom of religion or belief and 

the need to combat xenophobia and 

hate crimes; in particular by:

• restoring the funding of Russianlanguage radio broadcasts of Voice 

of America and Radio Free Europe/

Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) to the levels 

of fiscal year 2006; and

• increasing funding for radio broadcast programs in minority languages spoken in Russia, including the 

RFE/RL Tatar and North Caucasus 

services, which are often the primary source of independent broadcast media in regions of Russia with 

majority Muslim populations;

• include in U.S.-funded exchange programs a wider ethnic and religious cross 

section of the Russian population, with 

particular focus on educational and 

leadership development programs for 

students from the North Caucasus, Tatarstan, and other regions of Russia with 

sizeable Muslim and other religious and 

ethnic minority populations; and 

• initiate International Visitor’s Programs 

relating to the prevention and prosecution of hate crimes for Russian officials 

and other relevant figures.

 Addressing the Crisis in 

Chechnya and the North Caucasus

The U.S. government should:

• ensure that the continued humanitarian crisis in Chechnya and allegations 

of human rights abuses perpetrated by 

the Russian military there and in other 

North Caucasian republics remain a 

key issue in U.S. bilateral relations 

with Russia;

• urge the Russian government to end and 

vigorously prosecute all alleged acts of 

involuntary detention, torture, rape, and 

other human rights abuses perpetrated 

by members of the Russian security 

services in Chechnya, including those by 

pro-Kremlin Chechen militia;

• urge the Russian government to abide 

by all resolutions passed by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 

Europe relating to the human rights and 

humanitarian situation in the North 

Caucasus, and reinstate regular on-site 

visits by the Council of Europe’s Special 

Rapporteur for Chechnya; 

• urge the Russian government to accept 

a site visit to Chechnya from the UN 

Special Rapporteurs on Extrajudicial 

Executions and Violence against Women 

and to reconsider their October 2006 

decision to deny access to the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture;

• work with other OSCE Member States 

to ensure that issues related to human 

rights abuses in the North Caucasus 

play a more prominent role in OSCE 

deliberations, and encourage the OSCE 

to raise humanitarian and other forms 

of assistance to the civilian populations 

affected by the decade-long conflict in 

Chechnya; and

• ensure that U.S.-funded conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction 

programs for the North Caucasus also 

fund credible local partners in Chechnya, Ingushetia, and Dagestan.

6 

DELEGATION TO RUSSIA

• Commission Chair Felice D. Gaer

• Commission Vice Chair Michael Cromartie

• Commission Vice Chair Elizabeth H. 

 Prodromou

• Commissioner Preeta D. Bansal

• Commissioner Richard D. Land